A little suggestion for a "historical gameplay experiment" for the Kuban campaign. In 1943-44 larger bombs (250-500-1000 kg) were extremely rarely used by the Red Army\Navy airforce on the southern wing of the front (around the Black Sea and Sea of Azov). In this area, Il-2s carried cluster bombs, 8-10-25-35-50 kg bombs and rarely 100 kg, bombers used almost exclusively 50 and 100 kg bombs (Pe-2s sometimes also used 2,5kg cluster bombs). It wasn't about production issues - for unknown reasons, the local command requested smaller caliber bombs and was averse to "big booms." At the same time, other commands complained about the deficit of smaller caliber bombs and had to use heavier ones when they were suboptimal. Except for the northern wing (Murmansk area) - 250-500-1000 kg bombs were used extensively there, but the conditions of this theater were truly unique - Il-2 even performed the role of strategic bomber there, with notable successes.
@Temeluchas interesting. I have tried clusters in the IL-2 and I think they got patched recently so might try a mission with them fir this campaign. I wonder if command was trying to avoid making big craters that would hamper ground forces retaking the territory
@@DunkzGam1ng, To be honest, I have a strong suspicion that the whole "craters made by our aircraft hampered our forces" thing was just an easy way for ground forces commanders to cover up their own screw-ups =) For example, during the third assault on Sevastopol in June 1942, the Germans concentrated a quarter of their bombers on the Eastern front against a target area of roughly 30x30 km, making about 15,000 bomber sorties in a month. There were no complaints about craters or rubble despite the terrain combining mountains and built-up areas with mostly stone buildings. A couple months later, the very same aircraft (VIII Fliegerkorps) bombed Stalingrad. They dropped less bomb tonnage on a wider area and easier terrain with mostly wooden buildings. The ground forces complained about craters and rubble. The difference - Sevastopol was successfully taken, Stalingrad wasn't. And I can't remember any instances of soviet ground commanders complaining about craters hampering them. They also regularly used the Air Force as a convenient scapegoat, just in other ways =) The issue is in hyperfixation on a certain group of targets. Against troops, truck columns, artillery batteries and other relatively soft but dispersed targets, it is better to drop 12x35kg than 2x250kg - a large number of smaller bombs produces a bigger area of effect. If you bomb large hardened targets like buildings - it's the other way around. Why the local command focused so hard on "soft dispersed targets" is unknown. At least the documents explaining this decision have not been found yet. Moreover, since the Black Sea Fleet aviation's logistics was also routed through ground forces, they had to fly anti-shipping strikes in 1943 with essentially anti-personnel munitions (mostly 25-35kg fragmentation bombs, sometimes even with AJ-2 incendiary cluster bombs). By November 1943, they switched to PTABs (anti-tank clusters) as an anti-ship weapon. PTABs weren't good at sinking ships but very good at damaging them and forcing prolonged repairs, so the number of ships available for the Germans rapidly declined. Only by spring 1944 did FAB-100s start being used regularly for anti-shipping strikes. Still not optimal (in the Baltics and in the North, naval aviation switched from 100 kg to 250-500-1000 kg bombs by late 1943) but effective enough to make the evacuation of Crimea painful for the Germans and Romanians.
@@DunkzGam1ng@DunkzGam1ng Partially, it is for historical reasons - if we exclude the bombing of ports, only 1 regiment of Il-2s and 1 regiment of fighters from the Black Sea Fleet flew anti-ship missions. The "Sea Dragons" campaign is dedicated to this Il-2 regiment. But then again, only a small portion of missions in this campaign are against shipping. Partly for historical reasons - even though the regiment was singled out for anti-shipping duties, only about 1/3 of their sorties were against naval targets. But the campaign's author also complained that creating a historically accurate convoy was virtually impossible due to issues with the ships AI.
the game engine throws in too many limitations i think, i hope for Korea they develop a game engine, environment and mission generation system that can bring the single player experience to life alot more
@СергейГалс I use the track recording of the mission, when watching the recording press F11 for free Camera then you can move the camera over target and thats how I take the recon footage. You can also use F11 when you are flying the mission
Grea skill Enjoyed it a bunch
Fantastic drop!
Great Mission!
A little suggestion for a "historical gameplay experiment" for the Kuban campaign.
In 1943-44 larger bombs (250-500-1000 kg) were extremely rarely used by the Red Army\Navy airforce on the southern wing of the front (around the Black Sea and Sea of Azov). In this area, Il-2s carried cluster bombs, 8-10-25-35-50 kg bombs and rarely 100 kg, bombers used almost exclusively 50 and 100 kg bombs (Pe-2s sometimes also used 2,5kg cluster bombs).
It wasn't about production issues - for unknown reasons, the local command requested smaller caliber bombs and was averse to "big booms." At the same time, other commands complained about the deficit of smaller caliber bombs and had to use heavier ones when they were suboptimal. Except for the northern wing (Murmansk area) - 250-500-1000 kg bombs were used extensively there, but the conditions of this theater were truly unique - Il-2 even performed the role of strategic bomber there, with notable successes.
@Temeluchas interesting. I have tried clusters in the IL-2 and I think they got patched recently so might try a mission with them fir this campaign. I wonder if command was trying to avoid making big craters that would hamper ground forces retaking the territory
@@DunkzGam1ng, To be honest, I have a strong suspicion that the whole "craters made by our aircraft hampered our forces" thing was just an easy way for ground forces commanders to cover up their own screw-ups =)
For example, during the third assault on Sevastopol in June 1942, the Germans concentrated a quarter of their bombers on the Eastern front against a target area of roughly 30x30 km, making about 15,000 bomber sorties in a month. There were no complaints about craters or rubble despite the terrain combining mountains and built-up areas with mostly stone buildings. A couple months later, the very same aircraft (VIII Fliegerkorps) bombed Stalingrad. They dropped less bomb tonnage on a wider area and easier terrain with mostly wooden buildings. The ground forces complained about craters and rubble. The difference - Sevastopol was successfully taken, Stalingrad wasn't.
And I can't remember any instances of soviet ground commanders complaining about craters hampering them. They also regularly used the Air Force as a convenient scapegoat, just in other ways =)
The issue is in hyperfixation on a certain group of targets. Against troops, truck columns, artillery batteries and other relatively soft but dispersed targets, it is better to drop 12x35kg than 2x250kg - a large number of smaller bombs produces a bigger area of effect. If you bomb large hardened targets like buildings - it's the other way around. Why the local command focused so hard on "soft dispersed targets" is unknown. At least the documents explaining this decision have not been found yet.
Moreover, since the Black Sea Fleet aviation's logistics was also routed through ground forces, they had to fly anti-shipping strikes in 1943 with essentially anti-personnel munitions (mostly 25-35kg fragmentation bombs, sometimes even with AJ-2 incendiary cluster bombs). By November 1943, they switched to PTABs (anti-tank clusters) as an anti-ship weapon. PTABs weren't good at sinking ships but very good at damaging them and forcing prolonged repairs, so the number of ships available for the Germans rapidly declined. Only by spring 1944 did FAB-100s start being used regularly for anti-shipping strikes. Still not optimal (in the Baltics and in the North, naval aviation switched from 100 kg to 250-500-1000 kg bombs by late 1943) but effective enough to make the evacuation of Crimea painful for the Germans and Romanians.
@Temeluchas Its a shame there are no anti-ship missions in the game for the kuban campaign. I think the devs missed a trick there
@@DunkzGam1ng@DunkzGam1ng Partially, it is for historical reasons - if we exclude the bombing of ports, only 1 regiment of Il-2s and 1 regiment of fighters from the Black Sea Fleet flew anti-ship missions. The "Sea Dragons" campaign is dedicated to this Il-2 regiment. But then again, only a small portion of missions in this campaign are against shipping. Partly for historical reasons - even though the regiment was singled out for anti-shipping duties, only about 1/3 of their sorties were against naval targets. But the campaign's author also complained that creating a historically accurate convoy was virtually impossible due to issues with the ships AI.
the game engine throws in too many limitations i think, i hope for Korea they develop a game engine, environment and mission generation system that can bring the single player experience to life alot more
Hi, where do you get your reconnaissance photos?
@СергейГалс I use the track recording of the mission, when watching the recording press F11 for free Camera then you can move the camera over target and thats how I take the recon footage. You can also use F11 when you are flying the mission
I see. I thought you had this data before the mission.
@СергейГалс I start the mission to get the recon then I restart and do the mission in full