It's pleasing to the ear to hear a native German speaker pronounce German names. I am a weird native English speaker who strives to pronounce foreign language names as close as possible to the original pronunciation.
I appreciate your efforts as much as Mark Felton's in this subject. I think foreign names and locations should be pronounced as close to the respective mother language as possible. You wouldn't want yours to be pronounced in a weird foreign accent or dialect either, would you ?
@@Capt.Turner I'm with you, and loathe my country's tendency to "Localize" foreign names and words. It's frustrating, and potentially disrespectful. For a long time I thought a lot of foreign artists and politicians were Hungarian as names like Jules Verne were turned into Verne Gyula and whatnot.
@@ohgosh5892 years ago I knew a very nice and very pretentious person who would effect(affect?) a comical Spanish accent upon saying almost any word that was even vaguely Spanish. And only Spanish. No other language got the accent treatment.
Im not professional but got a scholarship for my education from the government for my history dedication. I find all Chris,s videos extremely informative and accurate to all historians i follow. Richard Ovary and Bob Carruthers being two of my favorite's..Chris will definitely be a part of this fine tradition for the future.
If a person lives in Hove, they will say "Brighton" because Hove is less well known, then they will say, "Well, Hove actually" BBC Radio Brighton had a radio programme called "Hove, actually".
@@CEGBrevival From Wikipedia: A well-known reply by residents of Hove, usually humorous, when asked if they live in Brighton is "Hove, actually" thus maintaining a distinction with their less genteel neighbour.[72] One source has identified the locally resident actor Laurence Olivier (who lived in Brighton) as the origin of the phrase.[73] In the 1990s the Hove borough council used the slogan "Hove, actually" to promote the town for tourism.[74]
The British home defence network was more than just radar. The sector and group network, as well as filter stations, meant that a detected raid was identified and marked on the appropriate sector map within 10 minutes of the first detection. The plots were continually updated, and a system was n place that identified plots that were "lost" . It was the worlds first total air defence system
@@antigen4 Not in 1939 they didn't. They set up their initial radar/searchlight/nightfighter/ground controlled air defence system in response to the bombing raids later on in the war. The earliest version was set up in July 1940, but took another year's development to become really effective. Search for 'Kammhuber Line'. It was complicated, with a search radar, two tracking radars (the second tracking the night fighter) and a searchlight and could only concentrate on one target at a time. By 1942 it had become much more effective, but the RAF developed various tactics to overcome it - the 'bomber stream' which swamped it, 'window' (modern term - chaff), radio countermeasures, 'spoof raids' to distract from the real bomber force and low flying below the radar. For a good history of radar and countermeasures, try "Instruments of Darkness" by Alfred Price (just don't mix it up with a BBC book of the same name which is a Doctor Who adventure by Gary Russell)
@@ohgosh5892 Exactly! The German war effort was fueled by arrogance, and attacked a bunch of farmers and nations that weren't working on war machinery after "the war to end all wars" had just been fought and ravaged their country. However, it wasn't long before Germany was out-managed, out-smarted, out-engineered, out-produced, out-intelligenced, out-fought, and clobbered TECHNOLOGICALLY in every technology that matter to win a war. Little Britain was bleeding them everywhere around the world, supplying Germany's opponents, and organized resistance in their occupied countries, before the US was involved. Germany was already going backwards by December of 1941. Germany's idea of a fix was to declare war on the US, the most advanced and resourceful industrialized country in the world where the people had the government's hands tied from getting involved in another European war, and as a result, refused to accept another armistice, and insisted on unconditional surrender because they weren't going to do this every twenty years. To add to that, Germany then invested heavily in useless, resource-intensive, "Wonder/Desperation Weapons", that had all of the war-winning potential of saying boo! Oh duh!
@@jackt6112 I think you up play the Allies and downplay the Germans more than just a little. Really the biggest issue for Germany as a whole was Hitler's personal arrogance and the fact that he built a cadre of yes-man officers around himself. Germany had an actual plan of preparing for war but Hitler jumped the gun by almost 6 years and then decided to attack Russia, who were actually abiding by their joint treaty, simply on ideological grounds. He also had this personal belief that he was some amazing general himself and constantly overrode his actual generals. In reality he was a painter who served as a dispatch runner from regimental headquarters during WW1. He was brave and a charasmatic speaker, but he had no actual experience or training in leading men in combat much less grand strategy. "Little Britain" still had the world's largest navy and empire at the time and was not so little at all. In fact they were the pre-eminent world power at the time and were in an active ship building race with Germany at the time. The US also wasn't at all recognized as "the most advanced resourceful industrialized country in the world" prior to WW2. They were definitely on their way up as a power to be respected but no where near the best you portray them as. At their best, they were merely the largest neutral arms supplier in the early stages of the war. Germany declaring war on the US was also by no means their real intent. The additional man power from the US (not their technological ability) had swayed the first world war against them before. It was purely Japan's ambitions for US holdings that drew them into a surprise attack and then the whole network of alliances forced Germany's hand in that regard. Also saying that they were "clobbered TECHNOLOGICALLY in every technology that matter to win a war" is both incorrect and objectively a pointless statement to make. From that standpoint you could have a super computer and I could have a rock that I beat you over the head with. Hey look, i was technologically superior in every technology that mattered in our conflict. By saying that you're saying oh the person who lost had better tech but it wasn't relevant to the war effort which is completely incorrect. The fact of the matter is that Germany was deploying technologically superior tanks, planes, and often small arms (the US' universal semi-automatic rifle deployment being the one major exception to this) at most points in the war. They were on par at times but generally held the tech lead in military equipment. What lost them the war was the fact that they just got overwhelmed with numbers. The US built 8x more shermans than Germany produced of all variety of tanks.
Iirc, Chain Home used HF frequency while the Germans used VHF and UHF frequency. The Germans didn’t see CH as that much of a threat because their radar engineers had disproved of HF as a usable frequency due to how much more power it needed The sector of intelligence that really won the Battle of Britain were the filter rooms which were able to process information from around 200 miles away
According to a book of Watson -Watts early testing procedures. The Germans already had a Radar system set up in the 30's. It still begs the queston, WHY weren't their suspicions roused enough, to regard those Tower's as a threat? They did of course, bomb them much later--and too late.
@@Jagdtoq I think if the Luftwaffe had targeted the pubs, they would have had a way bigger problem... What better motivation for the English than defending their pubs?
Your operational analysis reminds me of Parshall and Tully’s work in Shattered Sword regarding the battle of Midway. It is amazing that there are still layers of understanding to be uncovered in even the best known events of WW2. At least sometimes, it is the work necessary to reverse decades of “conventional wisdom.”
I sat at Beachy Head in pub garden and saw a Spitfire flying low as well, perfect setting for a spot on a Summers Day. Totally agree with your thought good video. The Brits had very very good teamwork. With Germany military structures at top level Hitler/Nazi had them competing this affected team work on a huge large scale. Downing was the man with the Vision to get things in place. The logistics where huge. Radar, observers, filter rooms to plotting rooms. Then those observing the plot making decisions on how to fight the raid and how with what squadrons. All in real time. Took Vision planning and time. Disgusting how Dowding was treated later on, as people scrabbled to steal the glory. He was sidelined. The guy was a genius.
@@KuraIthys Very true. During WWI, the man who actually created the first combined arms battleplan and made it work (spectacularly so) was later almost completely ignored because he was both Australian and his parents were Jewish (he was not raised as a Jew himself as his father wanted the family to be fully accepted as Australians) but that didn't matter to the British Command. His name was John Monash and he should be recognized as the man who created modern warfare. Instead, most people have never even heard his name. Monash was also responsible for the almost miraculous withdrawal of British forces from Gallipoli with literally no loss of life. He was truly brilliant, and deserves better.
@@kostakisgeorgiou3637 Looking up the reasons for the failure of the attacks on the Western Front in 1916 would be a good start. Look up the German attack on Verdun that diverted French troops from the build-up for the envisaged joint attacks on the Somme in 1916. Look up Plan D in 1940. Look at the plans of the 1st French Army Group under whose command the BEF was placed. The BEF was very small compared to the French and German armies. Have a look at the Escaut Plan. Look up the paralysis of the French High Command in 1940. Have a look at Gamelin's plans and actions from late 1939 and 1940. Look at Weygand's two day cancellation of counter-attacks against the Germans. Read primary sources. They're all readily available. But luckily the British, with the Americans and Canadians, came back. And did rather well.
The Chain Home system was essential for the whole defence system. Not only did it give Fighter Command early warning of raids, but it allowed via measurement of how long a raid took to cross the Channel and how high it was as a guide to determine whether the force coming across were bombers or a fighter sweep. If it was the latter, Park and his controllers did their dammed hardest to avoid combat with that formation by getting everybody out of its way. The Germans eventually picked up on this and flew low speed fighter sweeps after 15th September 1940, but Park then delayed launch of the squadrons and vector to intercept until positive ID by the Observer Corps. The Chain Home system had one major limitation that is only covered in Bungey's book "Most Dagerous Enemy" and that was the AMES Type 1 (Chain Home) Radars needed a common timing source to avoid the radars transmissions from one Chain Home Station interfering with the rest of the network. This was due to the very long wavelength signal of the CH radar transmission being able to bounce off the ionosphere and the ground out to ranges of thousands of miles and be reflected back to the receivers of both its own station and everybody else. There were only four spot frequencies that the equipment could transmit on, so one station would fire out a pulse of energy, display the returns for the first 120 miles or so then switch the displayed signal from the receiver off and wait for its signal to dissipate. Then some other station would fire off a pulse and go through the same process. To synchronise all of this the British decided to use a timing system already in place and that was the 50hz frequency used by the UK National Grid mains electrical power network, which had to be in precise phase across the whole network or there would be major problems. Most modern radars with a 120NM range would work at a Pulse Repetition frequency of around 750 pluses per second. A modern Air Defence Search Radar runs as 250 PPS. Chain Home ran at 25PPS and if Ionospheric reflections were really strong as low as 12.5 PPS. This meant that mains power supply to the stations were essential for optimal operation and a switch over to standby local power supply due to it being cut could cause interference with other stations across the network due to the loss of the master timing source. Some of the most serious disruptions to the CH Radar network in the South East during the Eagle Attack in mid August were not caused by direct attack on the radar stations themselves, but by random bombs landing in Kent that took out the National Grid power lines that fed the power to the majority of the Radar Stations in the county. Fortunately the Chain Home Low Stations were a lot more resistance to interference from the ones next door to them due to the beam nature of their transmissions, so they could work on standby power. The RAF formed an organisation dedicated to support of all RDF activities in the service (as Radar was or course known at the time) called No. 60 Group in early 1940. Their role was firstly to support the training for, Operation, Maintenance and calibration of the Chain Home System, taking over from the original Air Ministry Experimental Station (Bawdsey), who became Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE). 60 Group were still in the process of taking over full responsibility of the RDF chain from TRE when the Battle of Britain kicked off. There doesn't seem to be any operational records for the Radar Stations by name done by the RAF during the period of the battle, but 60 Group does have a records book covering the period of the battle in the UK National Archives and seeing it was their personnel who had to fix the damage, it would most likely be a good source of what damaged was done. TRE did also maintain operational reports from the RDF chain stations in 1940/41 by station name. The later may cover what happened to the station during the battle as regards damage, but none of them are digitized, so a trip to Kew is required to look at them. Poling CH station was trashed in a major Stuka attack on 18th August 1940 along with three other targets in the area, but the Stuka Wing got the shit kicked out of it in the process. Poling' CHL station was however undamaged and still had a 60 NM range.
@Uncle Joe Your statement is in error!!! The Germans did attack the Radar stations with Bf-110 and Bf-109's in the very first attacks and most damage was done by bombs. The chances of doing major damage with cannon and MG fire on the Transmitter site was very low as the transmitter was in a hardened building with a blast wall around it. Cutting the cables on the aerial towers or hitting the towers with cannon fire was also very unlikely as was damaging anything underground (which the bombs did do). Damaging the Receiver site was much easier as the towers were made of wood and the receiver and display buildings were wooden huts. Had the Germans attempted low level attacks, I suspect a shed load of British Soldiers would have been deployed around the stations with a lot of MG's and the Royal Engineers would have put some form of blast protection around the buildings on the Receiver Site. The British also had more radars than the AMES Type 1 CH and Type 2 CHL. There was also the AMES Type 9 Mobile RDF unit. This was a transportable mini CH station that could be deployed anywhere and the RAF had at least 10 of them in 1940. It wasn't as good as CH or CHL, but was better than nothing. Also the CH system could work on Stand-by power, it just made the operator's life a lot harder as there was a lot more crap on the screen. The other problem would have been did the Germans have the fighters to do it? 20 percent of the German fighter force was stuck over France at all times doing standing patrols over their airfields as Herman got a bit pissed off by Bomber and Coastal Command doing random attacks on German Airfields in occupied Europe. The Germans didn't have a clue how the British Fighter Control system actually worked and I doubt they knew how the power grid was set up either.
@@richardvernon317 Fascinating insight, about the power grid especially. Many thanks. I wonder if you know about how the Wurzburg system was used for aircraft direction? Wiki is devoid of any reference, which is unusual. In a TV programme called "Enemy at the Door" made by LWT in 1978-80 there is a depiction of the use of two Wurzburgs to direct a night fighter. Using Freya(?) as the initial detector, the first Wurzburg finds the enemy aircraft. The second Wurzburg tracks the night fighter and directs it onto the intruder. Central to this was a glass table, with a local map on the surface. The two Wurzburgs were connected to light projectors which projected dots of light onto the underside of the map, a controller worked the night fighter until the two dots were together, and the night fighter had visual contact. Because of the sensitivities around the occupation of the Channel Isles the show was well supplied with military advisors to fact check the detail. Yet, I've seen no reference elsewhere.
@@nicktecky55 That is the Himmelbett system in its Mid life form and it operates exactly as you describe. The Airspace across Denmark, Germany, the low countries and France was divided into a line of 20 x 20 mile boxes. In that box was a Freya, Two Wurzburgs, A control center, a radio beacon and a Night-fighter. Freya provides early warning and target acquisition data for a Wurzburg which then tracks the target and range and bearing data is passed by phone to a light operator sitting at the base of a two level display system called a Seeburg Table. The (Red) light was steered by rotation and sliding device the controls of which were in bearing and range from the radar on the the base of a frosted glass tabletop and showed the position of the target. The Night fighter orbited the radio beacon until required when the second Wurzburg would acquire and track it and pass the fighter's position to a second light operator who would steer a blue light dot on the glass that showed the position of the fighter. The Fighter controller would then use these light plots to steer the fighter to an intercept point where the Radar operator in the fighter could pick the target on the fighter's radar and steer the pilot to visual acquisition and attack. This system became operational in early 1942 originally with the small Wurzburg originally built for Flak control that were replaced with the larger Giant Wurzburg built for Fighter Control as they came out from late 1941 onwards. Before that the Germans had a few methods of night interception. Dark Night Hunt (English translation) where a Freya and a Wurzburg was used in conjunction to try and get a non radar equipped night fighter to intercept a bomber. To do this the fighter had to ride the beam of the Freya so that the radar could see both it and the target. The primary purpose of the Wurzburg was to provide height information on the target, though I would have thought that the Wurzburg could be used initially to track the fighter and give it steering commands to get it into the beam of the Freya . It did work occasional if the moon light was good and I suspect against a receding target going away from the radars. Illuminated Night fighting. Most of the searchlights in Germany were put in a line 35 KM deep that covered the main approach route to the Ruhr in mid 1940 after the British bombing campain really got going. Early warning was provided by the Freyas, but target acquisition for the Searchlights was initially done by sound locators. The Night fighter orbited radio beacons and attacked bombers as the were lit up by the searchlights. When the production Wurzburgs cam on stream in late 1940, they started to take over from the sound locators. The system was effective if cloud cover wasn't too heavy, but the RAF came up with a easy countermeasure, fly around the belt. This lead to the belt being shortened in width but expanded in length in 1941. During this period the Himmelbett (Heavenly (four poster) Bed) system started to be rolled out, with the target tracking Wurzburg also aiming searchlights. When the Nightfighter (still not fitted with radar) got within close range, the searchlights would illuminate the target for the fighter to complete the intercept visually. By early 1942 the plotting board used in the system was replaced with the Seeburg table and the line ran from Denmark to Metz in France. As the Night fighters with radar came on stream in early 1942, the searchlights were removed for use by the Flak batteries defending the towns. The other system the Germans came up with before 1943 was "Combined Night fighting" which involved putting an air defence area around some city and used a Freya, a number of Wurzburgs and their Searchlights to employ both fighters and flak within the same zone. As you can guess this was somewhat of a bad idea as the flak boys had a nasty habit of engaging their own night fighters. Himmelbett's main weakness was lack of depth and the fact that one box could only intercept one target at a time. This was not a problem when Bomber Command's aircraft were flying individual routes to the target with raids lasting hours. However the advent of the GEE navigation aid and British Air Intelligence working out how the German system worked. Bomber Command introduced the Bomber Stream that put as many aircraft as possible as quickly as possible through the smallest number of boxes as possible. On top of this they fitted Mandrel Jammers to a number of Bombers in each squadron to jammer the Ferya's and a Comms jammer called Tinsel to jam the German Fighter Controller's comms in late 1942. One counter to the Bomber Stream was to extend the depth of the line, by setting up more boxes (3 x Radars, a beacon and an extra Seeburg table required per box) which has done in some locations, while another that was put into wide scale practice was use direction finding equipment to triangulate the position of the night fighters (X 2) from their radio transmissions and fit the Seeburg table with 4 light projectors. The two Giant Wurzburgs could then be used to each track a target and the positions of all four aircraft would be shown to a pair of controllers who would each steer a fighter to the intercept a bomber at the same time. The later system was employed to the end of the war even after Himmelbett had its cornflakes pissed on big time with the introduction of Window in July 1943 which resulted in much looser forms of night-fighter control being introduced that involved getting the fighters into the Bomber stream (mainly by fitting them with homing systems to track the radar systems fitted to the RAF aircraft) and allowing them to pick off anything they found or putting Day fighters over the target, so that they could engage the bombers using the fires below to illuminate them.
Chris, you said there were not many books that spoke about the use of radar during the Battle of Britain. You need to acquire this book. "Britain's Shield Radar And The Defeat Of The Luftwaffe", by David Zimmerman (with a Forward by Sir Bernard Lovell ). It was published by Amberley Publishing, ( in England ), in 2001. It excellently spells out the concepts of radar and the uses made of it by the British government at that time. I'm sorry to correct you because you usually have all the answers, and those you don't, can be found in your bibliographies. Thanks for another great history lesson. I am Seventy Years Old, and I'm still learning stuff every day. When I was a kid, my nickname was, "Professor", as I always had a book with me. I still do. Never stop learning, it keeps me young.
Chris, to answer you question, "Why not destroy radar during Battle of Britain." This was very difficult early in the war. One reason is, It was very difficult to hit - if you were interested in trying. What you see of the Chain Home system is very insubstantial. Early 1940's technology would have had a very difficult time detecting, targeting, or destroying a structure not much more. substantial than a couple of street lamps strung together with wires. You did not have radar guided bombs. You did not have bombs that would guide themselves to a radar signal. In the infantry there is an expression, 'a miss is as good as a mile - yeah. The counter example would be the destruction of Axis 'V' sites on the continent V1 and V2. Also not easily done, but later in the war with higher technology and greater will and resources were in place. It was done. So, could the Luftwaffe have done it? Possibly, but they would also also severely degraded all of their other operational aims. So, the sad fact of the matter for the Germans was that they encountered an upright and fully functional Chain Home system and did not have the resources to defeat it without compromising other objectives - like invading England.
Actually, the truth of the matter is that although radar was known, at this stage in the war, it was not very well understood, and underestimated. The Luftwaffe looked at bombing cities as being more productive. Hindsight is always 20/20. Sure, destroying the radar would have helped the Luftwaffe, but a mistake? Not at the time based on priority of targets further based on intent of flights.
@@DimBeam1 No what I said was correct! The reason the radar stations were not destroyed was because they were not deemed important enough. It was more important to the Luftwaffe and the German High Command to bomb the cities because they believed that putting fear into the civilian population would force the British to sue for peace. Remember who was in charge of the Luftwaffe - Hermann Goering. Goering didn't think that the radars were as effective as they proved to be, and his ego placed the Luftwaffe as unstoppable. As I said, hindsight is always 20/20. The best course of action for the Luftwaffe would have been to first take out the radar stations, then destroy the airfields, but Goering's ego wouldn't let him accept that the British were more than capable.
Great video. A little off topic, but people generally don't consider the role of the National Grid, created by Stanley Baldwin in the '30's and was the world's largest infrastructure project at that time, had on the Battle of Britain. Before that, knocking out the local power generation meant that area lost its supply. The National Grid meant that was no longer the case, which kept the lights on in London.
Interesting video! It all boils down to the idea that the Great Britain air defense had a well organized Command and Control System. The radar posts where one of the important links in a chain of information gathering, information processing, and command communication infrastructure.
Exactly what I thought with the addition that at the beginning of the war no one had clear strategies or doctrines for an air campaign with relatively evenly matched opponents (the Luftwaffe had experience but not really against well equipped and organised defences), which I think is born out by the high losses RAF bomber command endured after the Battle of Britain when launching raids against Germany and their air defence system.
Probably an important thing to remember is that the RAF also didn't directly attack German radar installation, instead they chose to counter them via electronic warfare such as chaff and I don't think it can be argued that the RAF didn't understand the significance of radar. Clearly what they did understand is how hard it is to attack radar with conventional weapons and it's better to seek to take it out either temporarily or more permanently via electronic warfare.
They where repaired in two days" welllll.... no. There was a big mis-direction there as well. Because the listning posts in France where hearing the radar transmittir again, didn't mean that the radar was operational again. The Brits made the transmitter operational as quick as possible to suggest that the radar was working again. That there was no receiver or that the radar had yet to be calibrated didn't matter. Remember that back in the days, a plane had to fly a surtain pattern to calibrate that thing to let the output mean anything. And try to find a pilot in the middle of the BoB. I recall reading about it in a book called "Augen durch die nacht" translated: Eyes trough the night. Can't remember the writer though. It also described an hilarious story about Hitler and Göring visiting a small radar van. Göring remarked something about a splendid machine when the radar operator looked up from his radar screen and back at him, notecing that his corpulant body was pressed against the protective mesh around the hight KiloVolt magnetron that was creating the radar waves. A few centimetres more and he would have been zapped out of existence....
One of my school teachers was a Chain Home operator. As he described it, one of the main defenses of the system was obscurity. At many of the sites, while there would be bunkers built & visible from the air, those bunkers weren't where the operators and equipment were placed. The equipment & operators were in a nearby farm building or house, or camouflaged under trees. Pretty much anywhere BUT the bunkers, as they well understood that to any Luftwaffe pilot who had been sent against the CH sites, a bunker translated as "Valuable Target, please insert bomb here", whereas a farm building or house was seen as a civilian structure & not worth wasting munitions on. Apparently, the operators would watch attacks & deliberately turn off the equipment before any real damage occurred, as the attacking pilots would see the radar going off as a successful mission & go back to base...
The Luftwaffe might be forgiven, for not understanding how much of a defensive advantage Chain Home gave the RAF. This was the first time that an air campaign of this type had been waged, between opposing countries that had a radar early warning system. Simply put, in 1940, the British had a better understanding of the advantage it provided, and a better system in place to make use of that advantage. The Germans did know of the Chain Home system before the start of the war. Years ago, delving into the history of airships, I read an account stating that prior to the war, the Germans had taken the Graf Zeppelin, loaded it up with electronic gear, and had made a flight off the English coastline, for the purpose of gathering intel on the British radar systems. And besides radar, the British had invested quite some effort in creating an air defense system. The Zeppelin and German Air Force bombing raids during WWI had put something of a scare into them, the prospect of air attack in a future war being seen afterwards as a real and present threat. They had already invested considerable effort along this line in the interwar years, well before radar became a thing.
I think it is a mistake to overemphasize the importance of radar in the Battle of Britain. The English also had a sophisticated visual system of marine and shore based observers feeding information on German aircraft formations. Radar was also subject to various subterfuges such a feint raids. Had the Germans not changed their focus from defeating the RAF by attacking the airfields to bombing civilians in retaliation of to the British attack on Berlin, the battle very well could have been lost. This experience is one reason why the British put such effort into developing the VTOL Harrier. Static airfields are simply too vulnerable to neutralization. The Harrier can be operated from any small open area and does not require a long airstrip. Another benefit is it is easily operated from most large ships. Characteristics shared with the F35.
Not Quite, the Germans knew the British had developed radar from capturing British Army Mobile RDF Unit equipment in France and it didn't impress them a lot. The Zeppelin flight didn't really pick up anything bar that the British National Grid seemed to be very nosily. They were not looking at low enough frequencies. The Luftwaffe's biggest issue was a Nazi style intelligence system where the various arms within the service were in-fighting because one officer in charge of one part hated one in another.
I think two factors have to be considered 1) British manufacturing philosophy is different to German/US. We tune the hell out of things, where as German/US is to work to a specification, so when the Graf Zeppelin flew along the south coast of England in 1938 it missed most of the installations be cause the frequencies of the few installations we had were all over the place. 2)The battle last 4 months at most. Starting form the point that we don't have a effective Radar, to realising we have and reacting to it requires changing the Battle Plan, and that usually takes some time.
There is also the aspect that radar played no part in the thinking of the Luftwaffe, because of course, they were fighting the offensive side of the battle. When you think offensively, you don't necessarily always think like a defender. Given that the technology was so new to both sides (less than 5 years old really), the Germans weren't looking for the "Edge" in battle, rather thinking of their Luftwaffe as a giant club with which to beat Great Britain into submission. The primary goals, as you detailed, were not inconsiderate of reducing their early warning systems, but rather at the beginning of the battle followed traditional doctrine: 1. Reduce the enemy's tactical responses by hitting logistical resources; and 2. Reducing their operational responses by whittling down their aircraft in the sky, and available to be put into the sky. The British, being on the defensive, were able to adapt and such by dispersing their fighters both to smaller fields, and by improving their responses to incoming raids, which was probably one of the single most important features in winning the battle. The other factor which helped them win the battle was the Luftwaffe's shift in strategy away from pounding airfields to destruction of other targets. The RAF was near the breaking point by the end of the first few weeks of the battle, and if the Germans had continued their policy of simply destroying aircraft and airfields, they may have won the battle. That is indeed more armchair quarterbacking, however, since they (the NAZI's) would not have really "Won" anything unless they followed up with an invasion of Great Britain itself, i.e., putting troops on the ground, via the beaches and landing fields. As close as they got, they never succeeded in gaining that all elusive "Air superiority" they desired, due to poor strategy. Knocking out the radar the British used as part of their overall defensive strategy wouldn't have helped (most likely) them actually win the battle. As quickly as the Germans assembled landing barges in the French and Dutch ports along the coast, the British bombed and strafed them to put those out of action as well. The British "Moat" (the English Channel) effectively did its job and helped win the battle as much as any other single factor, when thinking of the battle as one nation conquering another that is. In the end, as a result of the German's muddled strategy towards the overall conquest of Britain, it becomes relatively simple to see that the British could "Win" the air battle, both due to the quality of the aircraft, as well as pilots, but also their production and training capacity, and the marvelous command and coordination structure put together by Fighter Command's Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding.
It's also true that the Germans didn't fully understand how capable the British RADAR capabilities were, so it wasn't valued high enough as a target. The myth of carrots improving eyesight was spread as propaganda to explain how British pilots intercepted German aircraft so effectively.
@@Metaljacket420 Yes. But they shoud have. The Germans themselfs had radar too. In fact, the english did steal one of there radars from the France coast, including ab oparator who they did take along for the ride so they could interregate him. It was so succesfull that they found out that they could trick that radar by strips of aluminimum foil. They did use it on D-Day for the first time and its used ever since.
Very interesting analysis. A bit of ancidoctal info that came from my uncle Michael he was an engine mechanic on spitfires stationed at Tangmere during the Battle of Britain. Two things he told me and as I am now 67 and my uncle has passed away, well somebody needs to put these memories down somewhere. So when it comes to Luftwaffe attacks on this airfield. He said that the bombers got through so many times that they were being fed by mobile soup kitchens and tea waggons as the normal kitchens had been destroyed. They got so pissed off that the army had to surrounded them to prevent them from deserting. So this airfield was attacked relentlessly day after day at least for a prolonged period. He also told me something of Douglas Bader our famous fighter ace of the time. Now I don't know whether Douglas Bader was ever at Tangmere, but his reputation one way or another travelled. If you can tell me different I'd like to know. Many of Britain's fighter aces are immortalized, they were very courageous and I do not wish to degrade their bravery or dedication . All I can tell you is what my Uncle either knew first hand or heard on the grape vine. Anyway this is what my uncle said about Bader. He was disliked by ground crew and aircrew alike. No matter how hard the ground crew worked either with his guns and gun sights or the tuning of his engine, or flight controls he constantly complained. When it came to the squadron pilots and this would have filtered down via frustration to the ground crew when the squadron landed after a combat sortie, they complained that he was in it for himself and not a team player. I can add a little to this conversation in so far as when I was in the RAF myself as an aircraft technician, in the early 1980's on a very busy station Douglas Bader turned up and demanded a refuel of his litttle single engined plane. It was like the whole of transport command had to miss a beat whilst this man got a refuel. I was in the flightline control centre and thankfully our chief technician, politely told him that we were a busy air force transport base and we would get to him after we had met our current refuelling commitments.
Great social history there Alan... its sad to see this sort of thing lost in the "sands of time". I've got all my father's anecdotes regarding his time in the Royal Navy. Just sorry I never recorded them all for posterity.
Bader was at Tangmere in 1941 and the general view of him within the vast majority of the RAF was he was a cock!!! I have heard that from people who were at Coltishall in 1940 when he was there with 242 Squadron.
Nice work mate- can I suggest however that the influence of radar (and even Spitfires) may have been overstated because of the post war treatment of Dowding. Britain won the battle-yet the person responsible for this awesome victory was victimised and run out of the military. In the face of this embarrassing fact, a plausible saviour was needed (Bader and his cronies were obviously wrong, and couldn't be used). The overstated importance of radar was therefore a useful political tool.
As you point out, the RAF seems to have had by far the best institutional appreciation and setup to use Radar. There seems to have been an integrated system for interception with both radar and ground observation incorporated. So not only was the information fed up to the commander reliably, but it was also communicated back out in the relevant bits to the relevant fighters for interception. It seems that the British and US Navies were slower in picking up on radar use, in part perhaps because the radar requirements for sea use were more demanding, so they didn't have as much time to appreciate the newest stuff. You touch on the difficulty of knocking out the Chain Home station. One real important question that would be interesting to know is about the availability of spares, and the difficulty of putting in a replacement station. It would be interesting to know about the difficulties of putting in the replacement station that you mention. Apparently the Germans also knew about the ineffectiveness of the radar at low level, and did do some nuisance raids at low level. I guess they didn't do large raids at low level, as they would be easy to attack from above, as well as being vulnerable to barrage balloons and smaller caliber Flak. Perhaps another hypothetical question you can ask in a future video if you haven't already.
It should be noted, that the Observer Corps wasn't just a bunch of people with binoculars/field glasses, they also had giant listening horns & parabolic acoustic mirrors, where they could hear the engines of approaching aircraft from many miles away & determine the direction, which they were approaching from. These listening stations were also networked by telephone into the central clearing house, with those ladies pushing pieces around a map table, like we see in the movies, so if the Brits didn't detect the Germans by radar, the listening posts would detect them. If the listening posts failed to detect them, then the people with binoculars/field glasses would see them. It all overlapped in a built in redundancy.
@@deathsheadknight2137 Probably, but they likely weren't networked or at least not as efficiently networked as the British ones were. That was the Brits major innovation. Networking them to a central clearing house, where the information could be rapidly analyzed from various stations, radar, listening, & visual, and a response implemented, which usually meant deploying fighters from various aerodromes scattered around England.
As a member of Battle of Britain Historical Society and someone who tends the grave of one of The Few, I found your presentation absolutely fascinating. I have read many books on Bob and most point out that the RAF's strength was the way Dowding and his teams were able to disseminate the data incoming to them and out to the squadrons best placed to intercept, but not really seen much written about the German perspective.
@@davidinger961 They attempted that several times. The towers while thin but robustly built to withstand the frequent high winds off the channel, and consequently fairly resistant to bomb damage.
@@davidinger961 They did attempt it. The fixed equipment was severely damaged, but mobile equipment was brought in to fill the gap by the end of the day. They pretty much stopped wasting resources because of that.
There's a chain home station on the Yorkshire coast that I visited three years ago. The command bunker was made of steel-reinforced concrete between a foot and eight inches thick, about the size of a common bedroom. It resembled a pillbox that you would find on the south coast or along a canal. Good luck bombing that without guided ordinance.
As well as the two RAF Museums at Hendon and Cosford, and the old 11 Grp bunker at Uxbridge that have good info on radar, and more importantly the Dowding System, I really recommend a vist to the RAF Radar Museum at RRH (formerly RAF) Neatishead, the longest serving military radar establishment in the world. Having been in continual service since 1941. There in what started as the original WWII era control building you can follow the developments of British radar and control systems from 1939 right through to the 1990's. This includes the old standby cold war control room that was in operation during the 70/80's and is pretty much exactly a it was left when it closed in October 1992. I did 9 years in the RAF a a radar tech, serving at Neatishead apart from during training. I left the RAF at just about the same time the control room you can visit shut.
You have very successfully destroyed one of the standard myths from WWII (which I've often heard, and believed myself), that the German's should have knocked out British radar at the start of the battle of Britain, and the only reason they didn't was because they didn't see the importance of it, ie. they were a bit dumb, or some one high in command (Goering?) overruled those who knew better. A great topic to address!
The radar on the Graf Spee was superior to contemporary British sets. Thank you for the straight forward explanation as to why the German planners didn't fully exploit radar's potential. in a centralized aerial defense.
Extremely professional piece this. I say this with no surprise because Chris always produces good stuff. The way this one has been shot and edited etc is definitely worth a mention but I really enjoyed the looking at things in a different way or from a different aspect perspective. Keep up the good work Chris
Thanks a lot for this one! It's an interesting topic and I am surprised that there are so little published on the use of radars and Air command and control during ww2. If ignoring of the radars was a mistake or not by the commanders of Luftwaffe can be argued, but your little scenario shows that the whole campaign was much more complex then it seems at first glance. Do you know of any literature that covers the use of radars and air command and control in Germany or during the mobile battles in north Africa, on the eastern front or in Europe after 1944? Once again, thanks for this very intersting video.
There is a sizeable literature on radar in itself, especially during the later half of WW2 but, at least from my attempts to find something, this can not be said about 1940. Every book covers it but these tend to be general descriptions of radar and Chain Home. The only studies I found that considered the question only partially covered the topic and were more exploratory than analytical. Check out 'Electronic Combat over the Third Reich' for some introductory reading.
Military Aviation History I read a book, (sorry don’t remember which) was said that the Germans knew the importance and did try to hit them, but they proved difficult to hit, and when they did hit then, the British repaired them within only a few hours, German resources ended up in need in other targets, so they ended up just being left. I suppose bombing some of the frames was difficult, but some of the radar equipment was easier to hit. Hermann Goering always gets a bad press, but he was more capable than revisionists claim. He also wasn’t behind some of the mistakes, they where direct orders from Hitler, and many things he disagreed with. Like the switching of targets from airfields to cities. That was Hitler, and Goering vehemently disagreed with the tactic.
@@damedusa5107 The germans had the idea that the vulnerable and hard to replace electrics would be protected by being underground or in hardened buildings, so too hard for most bombers to attack. The vulnerable and hard to replace electrics being in wooden huts was not something that crossed there mind.
Really enjoyed this video. My understanding is that the aim of the German airforce was complete air superiority over South East England, and to do this they needed to destroy fighter command. The Germans were supremely confident of being able to achieve this, if fighter command would come up to fight. Maybe they considered chain home as a help with this aim.
Thank you for a tremendous video on a subject I have often wondered about. To boil down all of your arguments into two points: 1) destroying Chain Home would have been a bit like trying to turn off the internet 2) The germans understood point #1 I wonder if it would be possible for you to create a video on DECCA, the great grandchild of which is e-Loran? I once rescued a stray cat and took it to a rescue centre at a bungalow a few miles from my home. When dropping off the animal I noticed large baulks of timber cemented into the floor of the outbuilding which looked as though they might have had a large generator bolted to them. Also, the bungalow itself was very utilitarian in appearance. I asked and it transpired the house was converted from a WW2 Decca site and even had connections for 25 telephones when the current owners took it on.
Before having watched this fully, I think that part of the entire idea of "just target Chain Home" comes from a very modern and somewhat accurate perception of an air war. Today, the first thing anyone would do is send in a cloud of anti-radar missiles.
In modern war the first job is to take out the GPS jammers with HARM missiles. When they're gone, it's time to stick the cruise missiles on the static targets.
And the first thing the opposition would do is start the little 1kw generators plugged into the microwave ovens with open doors and triggered interlocks. See war in Yugoslavia for details!
Good analysis, as an addition to what you commented on in Chapter One. R. V. Jones in his 'Most Secret War' wrote that the major difference between British and German attitudes to radar was that the Germans saw it as a way to economize on ground observers (e.g. You don't use as many people to monitor raids as they occur.), while the British saw it as a way to economize on fighters (e.g. No need to send aircraft up on Standing Patrols.) and that the first sign that the Germans had realized that the latter course was correct was not until mid 1943.
I think people think the system was fragile, open frames are very resistant. This arent huge installations and they are redundant. You would need to wipe out several and then attack immediately after. The fog of war would make coordination of wiping out a section of radar, then communicating a success, then run bombers into the gap would be difficult.
Indeed. Compare the numerous unsuccessful operations of the Dambusters Squad when the targets were metal frame bridges etc. In the end they needed the 'earthquake' bombs to go for the foundations because otherwise even misses of a few feet often proved fruitless (but costly for the attackers).
Even when the Germans knocked out a radar station, the British set up a temporary transmitted, that mimicked the radar, so the Germans did not know that they had knocked out the radar, and the radar stations either side covered the gap. The biggest fault of the British was putting the huts above ground, were they were vulnerable to bomb damage.
@Charles McCarron You are correct. I am a structural engineer. These sorts of frames generally use simple pinned connections and simple straight sections. Any damaged sections can literally be cut from standard stock, replaced one for one, and require very little technical experience or tools.
@@someguy2741 Seems to me like exactly the sort of construction that lends itself to having stockpiles of prefabricated sections that could be used to significantly speed up larger repairs or even quickly erect a completely new tower if needed. I mean frames typically feature lots of repetition of the same basic geometry which lends itself to building modular segments for later assembly.
@@seraphina985 Precisely. The frame itself is only 5% solid so it is hard for bullets or shrapnel to hit and concussion blows right through it. And the repairs are simple like you say. Not to mention its not like a video game where a green light turns on or parts of the map go dark when you knock it out. The trouble of knocking it out and then knowing it is knocked out then getting enough stuff through the gap to exploit it when it might only be down for a half a day makes it a real pain. If it was a harder target it would be easier to destroy... ironic :p
Great video I served at RAF Digby and the aerial erector school there still uses the mast at Stenigot to train on. This is the only true WW2 mast still in existence, as it has the platforms on it. It was from these that the transmitting cables were strung and explains why after bomb damage the repairs could be done easily and quickly. (The cables were hung between the masts to form an array to direct the radio waves where they "needed to go". Apologies for very non-technical description. For those interested the BBC World Service masts on Ascension Island use the same technology, on a much larger scale, one array pointing to Africa and one to South America). Your map of a "typical station" misses out on a crucial detail. The receiving masts were made of wood and were a few hundred metres (yds) from the transmitting masts and were made of WOOD. I wonder if a large stick of incendiary bombs could have affected these? In the radar community it has been suggested that the separation between transmitter and receiver could make stealth aircraft visible to a WW2 mast! It is not widely known that RAF Digby still has its WW2 Sector Control station completely intact and is a small, but very good museum. Details in RAF Digby Web site, visiting once a month on Sundays I believe. (pre covid info). Your comments abut the radar warning are useful, but if you read Forgotten Voices RAF (sorry can't find book) it has a section on the operators at the foot of the masts. Here they state they could see into France as the Bombers formed up. Air Vice Marshal Keith Parks, who fought the Battle on the Dowding System, used this info to get his pilots up to try to defend the southern airfields, but interception often after bombs dropped. I suspect a detailed biography of Parks would sort the story of the use of radar out as he used the radar in Malta (1942) to intercept the INCOMING bombers. Regards Mark Kennard Padre RAF (ret)
It is good to remember that it was very difficult for the Germans, to bomb those very high radar arrays because of their inherent resistance to the blast of the bombs. It is very interesting to notice that there are photos taken by the Germans, with very powerful lens, from France depicting German fighters flying in front one of the radar arrays...
Born and raised on the Isle of Wight, in Godshill near Ventnor. The old Chain home station was one of my favourite places to go and explore when I was a wayward youth! Knew little about it's history then, amazing to think the role it played. Thanks for the fantastic video!
What I've learned from videos like this one is that wars are fought by humans and humans make mistakes but usually the bad guys in any conflict make 2 or 3 times as many mistakes. I know people's first response to my comment will be that the victor (which is normally the one who makes the fewest mistakes) determines who the good guy is, but I don't think that explains it. My observations are that the side with the most dictatorial political system actually creates a military structure which works less effectively, which contributes to more war losses. I think some historian should study that idea, whether bad political structures have a correlation with war losses.
War is the extension of politics by other means. This idea was studied contemporarily whenever in times of war. Fervor has to be instilled. Fighting without believing (in whatever object) means individually speaking that you see no reason to sacrifice yourself, there is no source of courage to draw from. That way it makes more sense to just give up and live.
The Chinese won the total war without firing a shot. The virus was invented and released and became the dominant world power. Now what? They have three times our population and have the biggest army in the world with modern equipment and a super Air Force they are firmly in the driver seat and. It is not a self driving car. QED we are screwed and there is nothing we can do about it.
Except boycott their goods for I am sure the rest of the world will eventually figure out what or who started the virus and why. All just too convenient. Now a Chines women scientist has stated that the Chinese did start the virus with a purpose? Now what do we get? China against the world? Maybe it was not the brightest idea after all.
I don't know if the bad guys in WW2 necessarily made 2 or 3 times as many mistakes. I mean, they definitely made mistakes, but they were sort of screwed due to who they were fighting. Russia, which had probably the worst command structure of any of the seven major powers at the start, was able to trade men and land to buy time to rectify enough of the issues, and then use that same manpower advantage to push back the other way (but now with good commanders). France, however, didn't have as much land to trade for time. The US fought Japan on about equal footing until sometime in 1943, making many a mistake in those early fights, mistakes that helped Iron Bottom Sound gain its nickname. However, the US was able to make good its naval losses and build many additional ships, while Japan couldn't even do the former. Japan was doomed to lose that from the start, barring a political solution, and at least some of their admirals knew it. And over in Europe, that same manufacturing ability allowed the US to just feed its bombers into the meat grinder that was daylight bombing, something that Germany couldn't even afford to do on the smaller stage that was the Battle of London. That campaign would have been a backbreaking mistake for anyone but the US. And on the Atlantic, well, the Second Happy Time is, once again, the US screwing up. But then they did listen to the British, and also built a crap ton of merchant ships to make good the losses and more. Basically, as far as WW2 went, the Axis couldn't afford to make mistakes, while two of the three Allies could. That said, yeah, any military with a bad command structure or a military that hasn't evolved to the current times, will be more likely to make mistakes and therefore lose.
The allies had a similar problem with German radar stations when flying bombing attacks into the country. German radar stations were set up along the likely routes are were used quite effectively to target the bomber streams for flak and fighter attacks. Even when the allies had air superiority, the radar stations were very difficult to knock out and the attacks were found to be ineffective. That is why Window chaff was used instead of shutting down the radar stations. Another target that was worth going after was radio homing signals that could be used for precise targeting. Jamming and spoofing were much more common than going after the actual transmitters.
A really good point you have made. The fact the allies, operating with much greater resources, were unable to effectively attack German radar speaks volumes about the difficulty of the task.
@@dcwhitworth The Reason that the deep radar stations were left alone was that they were surrounded by a shit load of light flak. The Stations on the French coast were pummelled in the run up to D-day as the Typhoons and P-47's had a chance of pulling it off with light losses. To go any deeper, you needed to use Mosquitoes or Mustangs, which were better used attacking the German fighters or their airfields. The radio links between the German Fighters and their Controllers were jammed, the Radar's themselves were jammed. The Heavy Flak could resort to Box Barrage if all targeting information was lost and a German Nightfighter, if flown by an expert could kill a lot of RAF bombers if he got into the Bomber Stream even as late as March 1945.
Precise vectoring wasn’t the point of Chain Home - early warning was. It takes time for fighters to get to bomber altitude so without Radar you need to have fighters in the air all the time (I.e. fighter cap). With Radar your planes can be parked on the ground with pilots resting until you get a warning. A half hour later the fighters can be at altitude waiting with full(ish) fuel tanks and rested crews. That maximises the number of fighters that can engage incoming bombers with the longest possible engagement time, limited by ammunition not fuel unlike the Germans escorts which were severely fuel limited.
I was a child during the war and lived in east London. In 1945 I was aged eight. In the 1950s I studied electronics and became an electronics engineer. The chain home towers were very distinctive. They were about 300 feet high and had horizontal gantries each side. I presume the antennas comprised vertical "arrays" constructed of wires strung between the gantries. They were not steerable. The radar was primative (of course). I believe it used VHF frequencies (around 50 MHz). The radar presentation to the operators was not like a "map" (as used today). Rather was it simply a horizontal green line on a cathode ray tube. Enemy aircraft would appear as "blips" on the green line, and their distance could be calculated from how far to the right the "blips" appeared. A few of the towers are still evident today. Most have had their horizontal gantries removed and are used for communications. In 1958 I worked on such a tower on the island of Orkney installing (405 line) television transmitting antennas. At the base of the tower were wartime concrete bunkers once used to house the radar equipment. I think it would not be easy to destroy these installations by bombs because of the need for high accuracy. Perhaps the Stukers could do it. But they were slow and very vulnerable to being shot down. I agree that the chain home system faced only outwards. But Hitler's airforce didn't seem to know this. During night air-raids they sometimes dumped lots of silver paper strips intended to "jam" radar systems. Perhaps local radar was used to obtain targets for anti-aircraft guns, but I really don't know. (I used to collect this stuff on the way to school). I have no doubt that German radar was superior to our own at the beginning of the war. Also they specialised in navigation beacon transmitters. This was necessary because, having lost the Battle of Britain, Hitler's airforce could only attack at night-time so navigation was difficult.
There's both Chain Home & Chain Light Radar systems accurately modelled in IL-2 Cliffs of Dover - Blitz plus the German Freya system. Also the ROC & fighter command directing is modelled. Pilots (players) receive a barrage of information of audio sighting reports and, if you call for a Radar report, strings of numerical information (which takes some time to learn to interpret) on where, in relation to your plane, is the enemy. After that it's down to trigonometry to plot an intercept and eyeball Mark 1. Fighters close to a bomber formation were masked to Radar by the larger bomber signal return, as in real life. Been caught a few times with this one, attacking the bombers only to discover that they have little friends with them. In the TWC 1940 BoB timeline Campaign (which lasted the duration of the BoB) the Axis (blue) side did target CH Radar stations, discovered that this only put them out of action for a 24 hour period, then switched back to bombing airfields and the strategic targets that they actually needed to bomb to score campaign points. As the blues didn't know exactly where all the CH Radar stations were exactly and forgetting that once inland the CL Radar took over and lit them up again, it was all to no avail. They also had no idea where the coverage was out and would occasionally stray into another CH radar coverage zone. It was more of an inconvenience to the RAF (red) side players, who would wait further inland for the CL Radar to light up a raid. For a RAF (red) player logging into the server, one would usually hear, "Dover (CH) & Dungeness (CH) Radar are out again". Also Margate (CL) and Sandwich (CL) would be occasional targets. For the RAF side (red) finding the mobile Freya dishes proved more hazardous and difficult, as these changed position by several kilometres every 12 hour campaign map cycle. Many players were shot down and many valuable aircraft lost (wasted) just trying to find the things. There were also dummy Freya sites. Both the British & German Radar systems were produced by Siemens, because the German side of Siemens had been seized & taken over by the Nazi's in 1938, whilst the British side of the company remained independent. It reunited after the end of the war.
Really, CH Radar was build by Marconi. CHL Radar was built by MetroVick. The 45 Mhz IF Amplifier in the receiver for most British Radars came out of a Pye TV set.
Very informative and well researched video, one point skimmed over was the technology itself. German radar was actually well ahead of the system used in chain home, they had carried out reconnaissance of the entire system following Dunkirk and much of the emissions from the chain home network were assumed to be arcing from poor insulators on the electrical grid. The system itself was quite primitive which also helped when it came to repairing damage. The JU 87 would have been the preferred attack craft for precision bombing but these were removed from service after taking heavy casualties from RAF Hurricanes. Still, learned much and plenty to think about from this excellent presentation.
Excelent video. As a former fighter pilot I would like to comment. Knowing where your enemy is before he knows where you are. Invaluable! Absent radar. Caps must be established which means that you may be very low on fuel when the enemy shows up. Additionally it is a waste of manpower and aircraft time. Being able to proceed directly to the enemy also saves fuel. It is important to understand the importance of fuel to the pilot and the ability to engage. Lastly from a battle management perspective it allows optimized allocation to the threat.
The Germans knew about radar and they thought we had it. Many years ago I read an article in one if the popular historic aviation magazines that the Germans suspected the towers along the coastline were radar transmitter/receivers and flew the zeppelin Graf Zeppelin along the coast looking for the transmissions from these towers, but looked at the same part of the radio spectrum they were using and completely missed our radar transmissions as we were using a different part of the radio spectrum.
Actually, the Navy spotted the zeppelin and passed the information to the Admiralty, who passed it to the Air Ministry, who told the CHL/CHH operators to switch off the system. The Germans got no sigs intel that day.
I also read (somewhere) that the Germans weren't looking in the correct part of the radio spectrum for the British radar signals but I have my doubts. I don't have specific knowledge on this but it's my assumption that every participant in the war had radio operators continually scanning the radio spectrum looking for anomalous signals.
An excellent video and well-presented! So, it seems to me, that Britain's main advantage over Germany (with regards to destroying one another's radar systems) is that Britain had "eyes on the ground" on the continent whereas Germany had little or no one on UK soil to guide them into their targets.
The impression I always got was that the Germans had a more advanced radar or thought they did and did target the radar stations to some existent but the gaps could be quickly filled ( bit like whack a mole )
I recall a documentary some time ago that Britain’s was slightly behind the Germans at the start of the war but the way it was put together made it easy to modify and improve it compared to the Germans theirs being sealed units that had to be rebuilt at the factory that slowed their their upgrades to the point we quickly overtook them
I might add that while the Luftwaffe didn't have much of an integral understanding of radar that could be that radar is generally at the time a defensive system and Nazi Germany was projecting its power. It's been noted* that both Britain and France had an almost obsessive concern over bombers due to some prewar studies erroneously indicating that terror bombing of civilian centres would rapidly lead to civilian morale collapse and calls for surrender. This fear of urban strikes is said* to have influenced the inexplicable orders for the cancelling of the Saar Offensive during the "Phoney War" phase and Britain holding back its best interceptors during The Battle of France and therefore allowing the Luftwaffe so many successes flying tactical support missions. *I'm afraid I don't have any sources to hand.
Another fantastic video and thanks! I remember reading that an additional British "weapon" was that they would monitor both the fighter and bomber radio frequencies. As it was standard practice for Luftwaffe pilots to conduct a "radio check" with their control tower during start-up, a British frequency monitor would count the checks as another method to get an idea of numbers in advance.
I recall reading there was a similar thing going the other way - a particular piece of equipment on a bomber gave off a detectable signal when it was started, and the Germans then knew a raid was coming. I don't remember more about it than that.
Very nicely put together, enjoyable and educational. One aspect I’m not sure was touched on . The attempts by the Luftwaffe to knock out the radar installations, while the effect was mostly an exercise in destroying cabling lines, as mentioned quickly remedied. The main issue I think was in the fact that the ju 87 dive bombers were rapidly shot down in high numbers due to sluggish speed and armament. And in the end the radar attacks were too costly pilot and aircraft wise.
Hello Chris! I have a video idea about Motor-canon's I can't find a reason why it's a good idea to slap a 37mm autocannon literally inside the prop and even more Next to the inline engine system's Esspecially in 109 series, Yakolev and Lagg Fighter series. Why risk a lot of problems about stuck shells,overheating of gun breach that might damage Power unit,recoil of big calibers again damaging electronics or oil/water cooling etc. While wing mountings with convergence sacrifing accuracy while not encountering this systems problems. Plus a empty space for to work on. (of course excluding P-63 cobras because I wouldn't miss that opportunity) Thanks! Edit: I failed to find any research or articles or even videos about this. Will be really glad If you make a video on it :))
No guns in the wings means less support is needed and a lighter airframe is achieved. The whole "stuck shells" thing can be argued about any configuration, if designed properly this shouldn't be an issue. As for the other issues mentioned I'd assume, if designed properly, shouldn't come up with a motor cannon. If an aircraft isn't designed for one and you force it you could have issues however if it's designed to accommodate such weapons then it'll likely be designed around those potential issues.
Part of why could be that a cannon mounted inside of the prop doesn't need synchronization with the propeller. If the cannon was nose-mounted but not in the propeller, then it's fire rate is limited by the propeller's spin rate. I don't know what the fire rate of the cannon was or how fast the propeller typically spins but this is just a guess.
An interesting thought, i do have a question though. I'm well aware of rhe Russian yak's and IL series using 37mm's as well as the US p-39's using them. But was not aware of any 109's using a cannon larger than the 30mm mk108 motor-cannon for an inline. I'm quite interested though if you have any models in particular you can pass along for me to look into.
Mounting cannon possibly close to mass center is good for flight performance. If you mount guns in wings, you need 2 guns instead of 1 for same fire time. You can't install heavy weapon off center, without other one to balance it out, unless plane itself is heavy enough to not care. Wing mounted weapons require sturdier wings. Which means not only more weight, but also shifting that weight away from center of plane, which makes it less responsive in flight.
Analysis of Battle of Britain tends to focus on southern England. Understandable as such was directly threatened with invasion/need for air superiority etc. *however* there were bombing raids on East Coast shipping and Northern England, many of which radar should have contributed more to early detection off.. Many of those attacks were on the coast... Long flights across sea usually result in some navigational error, but how much time for observer Corp to sight aircraft. Given the North South difference Was that reflected in what the luftwaffle experienced with northern attacks. Long flight across sea mean zero fighter escorts along with bombers. Would appear to be tempting targets. If there was time for interception... But that only happens if radar effective/there's defending fighters to put up/radar information fed to fed to fighter defence. Idk... Not responding per radar might have lead luffwaffle towards combination of radar less effective and RAF closer to breaking point than reality... Thus more likely to continue to throw forces towards southern England in attempt to gain air superiority. Enigma decripts might not be the only time information helpful to defending forces was held back to try help longer term goals.
Wow! What an educated, informed, and illuminating analysis! Always wondered about that myself. Never thought of THIS analysis! Excellent history! Thanks!
The Germans used Stukas early in the battle of Britain to take ouy some radar stations. But they were easy targets for Hurricanes and Spitfires, and pulled out of the battle. The Luftwaffe should have provided fighters for escorts and continued the Stuka bombings.
Stukas were withdrawn from the battle as they were getting the shit kicked out of them with a fighter escort!!! If Sealion had gone ahead, the Luftwaffe needed the Stukas to deal with the Royal Navy as they were the only effective anti ship weapon they had. that was the primary reason that they were removed from the battle. Only two Radar Stations were attacked by Stukas. the second attack on Ventnor and one on Pooling, both on 18th August 1940. Both CH stations were knocked out for a month!!! (Ventnor did get a Mobile RDF unit equipment installed on the Isle of Wright to cover it, but the kit couldn't be calibrated so it wasn't very good. While the CHL station at Pooling was undamaged and remained in operation). However the Stuka group doing it got the shit kicked out of it by Hurricanes, while the escort got a bit of a kicking from a Spitfire squadron. The first attacks on radar stations were by low level fighter bombers (a mix of Me-110 and Me-109's) while the first attack on Ventnor was done by Ju-88's in a dive attack.
Excellent video Chris. Too many people look for black and white answers (and therefore catchy headlines) in historical analysis, but as you say, it's nearly always more complex and nuanced - and therefore far more interesting!
Dowling was criticised for sending up individual squadrons, to attack the raiders ASAP., and Leigh-Mallory (no 10 group commander)wanted to send a big wing (50-60 aircraft )to attack. The trouble was it took so long to assemble the big wing, the Germans had bombed their target and were on the way home by the time the big wing could attack. In war game exercises after the Battle of Britain, they used the big wing tactics, and they lost the battle !!! Dowdings tactics were proved to be correct for this time. Later, the big wing tactics were used to success
One thing I have learned over the years is that there is always more to a history subject. I had been under the impression that The Luftwaffe was only a few days away from completely wrecking Chain Home. "If only they hadn't switched to bombing London they could have won." I guess that's more dramatic documentary making than "The Luftwaffe didn't have any hope of destroying the radar of the Brits and still get anything else done." Thanx for clearing this up for me. I see I have so much more to learn. Good!
they only ever attacked i think five main CH sites in the south east,the rest of the stations were never attacked and the ROC posts were of course never attacked either
I enjoyed this, but I think you might have missed the critical point, unless I didn't register it in the video. Radar gave time, even though it wasn't that much. But it gave just enough to enable the RAF to get into action, without the need for perpetual standing patrols. It was enough to know when an attack was due, rather than waiting for it to appear to be spotted by the ROC. Fighters of that era did not have that much endurance, and RAF resources were limited. (The Bf109 only had about 15 minutes or so of combat time over England, before it became fuel critical). So the radar gave that critical time to enable the RAF to concentrate its limited numbers at the right time and approximate place. The ROC then took over to spot direction, course changes etc., but the radar was the key.
@@gwtpictgwtpict4214 Sorry - not quite. I have watched the whole thing again. I cannot hear any of the words "perpetual standing patrols". If I have missed it I would be grateful if you could tell me the point at which he says it (although you can infer it if you know exactly how the system worked). This is a very good video, very well presented, but the point I was making was that radar did not stand on its own. It was an integrated system - radar, ROC, controllers and the fighters. But without radar, the other 3 wouldn't survive. I agree he talks well about the flying times, the part played by the ROC etc. The timings are important, but without the early warning, there would be much less time left to get the fighters into position if the ROC, as good as they were, had been the early warning. That's why they developed the sound mirrors in the late 20s and early 30s. Radar gave the ability to at least get fighters into the air - maybe not quite in the right place, but enough to enable the ROC and control to get them properly vectored. If the ROC could have seen as far as the radar, then obviously radar would be less critical - but I don't think they could, even with powerful binoculars. But I may be wrong.
Good video the buildings at ventnor were only slightly damaged but the main power cable was cut and the number of unexploded bombs made it hazardous to operate,so they used a mobile system which was set up nearby. The cables were in cable tunnels about 18 inches below the surface (on most of the east coast) or routed along hedges,on posts but the weak point was where they joined the masts and in some cases the blocks. the powerhouse was usually between the transmitter and receiver blocks,the buried reserves could be near their associated block on the surface or in a pair some distance from the main station One building (the receiver block)at Pevensey was damaged,with a bomb cracking the false roof filled with shingle,the shingle subsequently all fell into the toilet of the building and made it hazardous to use until it was made safe.They continued to use the transmitter in attempt to fool the germans the station was still operational and again moved in a mobile piece of equipment in nearby Most of the east coast stations also had two underground bunkers (as well as the surface bunkers) called buried reserves,with duplicate equipment but these weren't as capable as the main site having much smaller masts and older equipment
It should be noted, that the Observer Corps wasn't just a bunch of people with binoculars/field glasses, they also had giant listening horns & parabolic acoustic mirrors, where they could hear the engines of approaching aircraft from many miles away & determine the direction, which they were approaching from. These listening stations were also networked by telephone into the central clearing house, with those ladies pushing pieces around a map table, like we see in the movies, so if the Brits didn't detect the Germans by radar, the listening posts would detect them. If the listening posts failed to detect them, then the people with binoculars/field glasses would see them. It all overlapped in a built in redundancy.
I think there is growing scholarship indicating that while certainly a bright moment for the British people, the effect of the Battle of Britain one way or the other has been greatly overstated.
Chris - I was very interested to come across your video commentary on the Chain home system. My father was an RAF Flight Seargent and being very technical and knowledgeable in radio technology, was snapped up and underwent technical training both at Bawdsey and Orford Ness. He was initially posted to the northernmost radar site at Netherbutton on the Orkneys. It was only just completed when he arrived there. With no proper staff quarters yet constucted, he was billeted with the Firths, the farmer on whose land the radar towers were built. He actually ended up renting a nearby crofter's hut, where my mother, a nurse, joined him and in October 1941 I was born in the Hut. In 1991 I went up to Orkney with my son and not only found the site of the farm but also the concrete bases of the radar masts, together with the nearby power generator shelter and sundry other relics of the Netherbutton site. We also met Mary Firth, daughter of the original farmer on whose land it was all located. My father was subsequently posted to several of the other Chain Home site. After the war he joined BOAC as a flight engineer, but sadly died when I was only five years old. I do recall that the first house my parents bought in Ringwood, Hampshire, was named Netherbutton.
I think you sternly underestimate the value of radar and early warning. Command might have thousands of ground observers deployed; such observers only see a relative few miles. Radar would be a key asset by informing Command about which sector is MOST likely to be attacked, so they may alert aircrews to prepare quickly, plus alert the ground observers in the area. That way, ground observers may provide more specific intercept guidance to already-airborne combat crews, probably by way of Command. Without the radar, there's much greater chance that attacking forces may attack and depart without ever being hassled. As you admit, aircrews literally can't get in the air to fight quickly enough.
just my two cents but let's assume the Germans would have made the radar sites their primary target: Ironically, the radar would still have accomplished its goal! What do you need a radar for? To know WHEN and WHERE the enemy air force attacks. If the Germans had to CONSTANTLY attack the radar SITES to keep them out of order - all the Brits had to do was focusing their defense there. The enemy don't need early warning when you become predictable...
But they can't arrange for fighters to be waiting en masse at high altitude at the right place and time for when you arrive. Radar and the ROC enabled that for attacks on inland cities, factories, and airfields. Without radar, the British had no way to know WHICH knocked-out radar station site was going to be attacked or re-attacked that day. The advantage thus lay with the attacker. On top of that, with radar being knocked out, the Germans could also start hitting the ports and shipping. None of that involved being drawn inland where the ROC could let the RAF know where to assemble and where the Brits had an attritional advantage.
True. I would imagine the RAF would have much preferred radar station attacks rather than the attacks on airfields which caused a great amount of disruption. The odds that they could knock out all the radar stations and keep them knocked out whilst not suffering a large amount of attritional losses is not very likely
Brilliant presentation. The question of the radar installations on mainland Great Britain during the battle of Britain not being attacked by the Luftwaffe has been answered. The impression I was given was that the installations were totally ignored by the Germans.
I seem to recall seeing a documentary that the Germans were aware of Chain Home and sent a zeppelin to investigate its abilities. If memory serves their detection sets were of a lower frequency and therefore did not provide useful intelligence. Based upon their findings, the Germans concluded that Chain Home was some kind of weather radar or navigational aid. I was sorta surprised that this information wasn't included in your vid... which is otherwise informative and well researched. Further, my limited understanding of German radar is that its primary use was for navigation... but I could be wrong
One advantage the RAF had was the communications were mainly by landline which was dug deep and protected. Both sides learnt early the hard way that using your radio meant detection and fast interception. Squadrons could be launched and never chat on radio until they sighted an enemy or the leader had a report to send like low on fuel. Each radar station on its own only gave a piece of the picture to HQ, overlapping stations giving their data meant a far better detailed picture to help make decisions. Even when radars are jammed same as radios it does not mean it is useless btw. It reduces its effective range and quality but does not fully block. It actually takes huge amounts of power to transmit the amount of energy needed to jam long distances. Even if you jam operators have orders each day (which are changed daily) on what to do. In those days they were to change frequency which was de-conflicted so it didn’t affect neighbouring stations. If you hopped freq and jamming still present you took note of strength and effect on your system. Then kept hopping until you found the best freq on your list. Same as we did for radios.
"And it was here, in these skies that the Luftwaffe was defeated. Not just by brave airmen in fine aircraft, but by invisible beams of electromagnetic energy that could se further than the human eye; the great, British secret weapon: RADAR!" *Arm gesticulating wildly*
Yeah - that Secret Weapon that everybody had invented independently, and all sides knew about. (By the way, the first in-service radars were Air Search sets the 1937 installation on the USS Leary, and the first production set was the XAF radar on the USS New York. The Germans wnt in more for higher frequency, shorter ranged systems with better resolution intended for aiding AA Fire control. The RAF had a lower performing system with Chain Home, but it was part of the first Integrated Air Defense System, which made it more useful for the war that they had. Everybody thought that there stuff was better than the other guy's, and they were right - for differing reasons.
@@peterstickney7608 The first radar got patented in Germany in 1904 (Hülsmeyer). It's primary intent was to equip ships with it, so collisions could be avoided. It was not commercially successful and the navy completely uninterested (it worked but had a rather short range and was in hindsight a technological dead end). The later radar development was completely independent of it.
@@Segalmed it's a pity it never worked in its early years To think if it had been used in ww1, could or have been effective in stopping zeppelin raids on london?
@@Segalmed There were a number of patents for radio detection systems in the early 20th century - most, like Huelsmeyer (whose system was not built), were essentially "Automatic Door Opener" systems, where short range detection was either an interrupted or reflected continuous wave beam, with no directionality or ranging. The first actual radio detection hardware was built by the U.S. Navy Research Laboratory in 1922. the NRL built the first pulsed (and therefore ranging) radar in 1934, and British and Germoan efforts yielded pulse radars in 1935 and 1936, respectively. Everybody was keeping their radar development secret, due to its potential in warfare. There were still some elaks, rumors, and speculation - I happen to have inherited a popular illustrated book - "The War in the Air Fighting Planes and Pilots in Action". John B. Walker, Random House, 1941, makes mention of "Klystron Rays" used in Night Fighting. (The Klystron is a microwave source and amplifier invented in the late 1930s by the Varian Brothers in the U.S. While initially somewhat lower-powered than a Cavity Magnetron, it can, by being used as an amplifier, generate much higher power levels. It also has the advantage of generating coherent signals, which Magnetrons do not, thus allowing for doppler signal processing, reducing vulnerability to countermeasures like chaff.
@@peterstickney7608 Huelsmeyer sold a handful of his devices. But he was on the wrong track with his attempts at ranging (and it was indeed non-directional). As I said, it had no influence on the general development and is mainly of interest, that that early there already was the idea of radar and a proof of concept.
Just so you know for the future: Ventnor is proniunced Vent-nah or Vent-na. The ending-NOR is always shortened and we don't pronounce the 'R'. Americans do pronounce those endings like in butter (budderrrrr) but English pronunciation is buTT-a Hope this helps you with your, already, superb English. Great video
Anoter good ready son was that Goering didn't want to destroy the Radar because he wanted the radar to keep giving the RAF information because he wanted to knock out the RAF in the air. With the wrong information he was getting from the Luftwatte about how many Spits and Hurricanes they were shooting down, he thought we were running out of planes when in fact we were making more than we had at the begginning! PS, it is great to hear the perspective of a young German into what happened, thank you!
As long as you're doing Battle of Britain myths, maybe talk about the London bombings. The traditional narrative says that the Luftwaffe attacks on airfields brought the RAF to the breaking point, but then London was accidently bombed leading to Berlin being bombed, then Hitler was enraged and switched targets. I've heard a few times now that Hitler wasn't the only one who planned to bomb London and that was part of the plan to destroy RAF fighters as another way to draw them out, and that this narrative seems to be another "blame Hitler for the loss because he was emotional" tropes.
CreatorUser the Germans thought that the RAF was down to its last 200 fighters, and attacking London was intended to force the RAF to commit fighters to defending London, and the Germans would finish the fighters off. The British still had over 500 fighters.
I don't think there's much question that bombing London was designed to draw RAF fighters up to be destroyed rather than be held in reserve. This would include drawing up fighters from airfields the Luftwaffe couldn't bomb because they were beyond the range of the BF 109.
@@gort8203 There is though since there's still the story that London was only bombed because of Hitler's emotional decision making and the claim that stopping the attacks on airfields somehow was a blunder and what lost the battle for the Germans. That doesn't take in the factual reasons for the switch.
@@creatoruser736 I thought I was agreeing with you. Are you or are you not of the opinion that there was a design behind bombing London that went beyond simple retaliation by Hitler?
@@gort8203 Apologies, we are in agreement. I was just saying that narrative is still out there and prevalent and dispelling it in a comprehensive video would be a good idea.
Chris I just subscribed and of course a thumbs-up since it is with this video I realized that you have made the transition from a gamer making vids to a definitely more historical, detailed approach to all of your subject matter. Congratulations to you on your continuing growth and of course best wishes for the future. Thank you for your posts and I look forward to your future videos. Best regards from Ontario.
You have been taken in by Ventnors cover story. All the critical installations were underground inside the cliff including cables. Until the 1960's the tunnels were open then they blocked them off with concrete when the modern part of the station was built, which probably re-uses some of these. If you walk around you can still see the two original entrances and some of the ventilation covers, the emergency exit was bulldozed and buried. The huts bombed were all decoys. Due to its height above sea level the requirements for the aerials were easy to achieve with a far smaller antenna than other sites this was hidden and was placed along the cliff away from the surface structures so it was on the highest point (now a car park). Huge complex impressive wood and chicken wire dummy antenna were constructed specifically for the Germans to bomb. As was the temporary unit set up to conceal the fact that the station was not damaged. Ventnor was never off line but sent all its information during its 'offline' time via a dedicated line to another coastal station. All this was done because ventnors far superior range and line of sight to the bomber corridors due to its positioning and height was regarded as critical. When I lived there I knew a couple of old guys who worked there in the later years of the war. It was one of those wartime secrets that nobody knew except those who worked there and a few officers. It would probably never have been documented except in Nazi files because the Germans would probably have been suspicious that despite having knocked it out, the RAF response times to attacks stayed the same. They may have also noticed that it was odd that the station was not on the highest point of the cliff!
I liked this episode very much because it cuts through the jingoistic historical "propaganda" that one reads and sees on British TV. It is the most detached and neutral document that I have ever seen on this subject. Keep up the good work.
Enjoyed this. My personal take is that Chain Home took the place or the pressure off of standing patrols. This then reduces fuel use, engine hours and pilot hours. The limited resources of pilots and planes are then able to put their effort into interception. It may also enable a squadron to be in the air when their base is attacked, saving those most critical resources. Ten to twenty minutes of extra warning is worth something and maybe a lot on some days. So not decisive, but even if it has psychological effect on the 'home' team it has a poitive value.
aussie jim I think most people have the same problem. People tend to look at things in isolation instead of a part of a system. You kind of alluded to this anyway but in a sense, you sort of answered your own question.
@@torinjones3221 the exact opposite is true. In fact he pretty specifically described how the advantage was not in the radar itself, which the Germans also had, but in the sophisticated command and control system, which the Germans did not have and therefore did not understand how to dismantle.
Hitting small targets with unguided dumb bombs and rudimentary targeting sights was an incredibly difficult task as this excellent video demonstrates. In any case even had they managed to knock out the radar the RAF was very much still in existence, the ROC could still track enemy raids and the Dowding system ensured as speedy a response as possible. Then there was the real problem of how to actually invade a heavilly fortified island-for example the landing barges that were being amassed in European ports were unlikely to make a successful channel crossing even in the calmest waters. It has also been calculated that the Nazis would be unable to get hold of the large number of cargo ships required to transport the necessary heavy armament and supplies. And then of course the Brits were quite prepared to use poison gas and a whole array of flame projectors and other nasties should a landing be attempted. The Nazis came to realise this and quietly shelved Operation Seelowe and then embarked on the equally lunatic Operation Barbarossa which ultimately resulted in the total defeat of the Third Reich.
It's pleasing to the ear to hear a native German speaker pronounce German names. I am a weird native English speaker who strives to pronounce foreign language names as close as possible to the original pronunciation.
So am I.
Do you pronounce "San Antonio, Texas" as "Thannantoyotaythath"?
I appreciate your efforts as much as Mark Felton's in this subject.
I think foreign names and locations should be pronounced as close to the respective mother language as possible.
You wouldn't want yours to be pronounced in a weird foreign accent or dialect either, would you ?
@@Capt.Turner I'm with you, and loathe my country's tendency to "Localize" foreign names and words. It's frustrating, and potentially disrespectful. For a long time I thought a lot of foreign artists and politicians were Hungarian as names like Jules Verne were turned into Verne Gyula and whatnot.
@@ohgosh5892 years ago I knew a very nice and very pretentious person who would effect(affect?) a comical Spanish accent upon saying almost any word that was even vaguely Spanish. And only Spanish. No other language got the accent treatment.
I'm a professional historian. Congratulations to you: this is superb video history.
Im not professional but got a scholarship for my education from the government for my history dedication. I find all Chris,s videos extremely informative and accurate to all historians i follow. Richard Ovary and Bob Carruthers being two of my favorite's..Chris will definitely be a part of this fine tradition for the future.
This video is a phenomenal piece of work, a truly professional analysis of this aspect of the war. Thank you so much indeed, brilliant
"Hove actually". Great joke. Well done.
Phenomenal is exactly the right word.
@si james I'll explain the joke. If you ask someone if they live in Brighton, they will often answer "Hove actually" because it is posher.
If a person lives in Hove, they will say "Brighton" because Hove is less well known, then they will say, "Well, Hove actually" BBC Radio Brighton had a radio programme called "Hove, actually".
@@CEGBrevival From Wikipedia: A well-known reply by residents of Hove, usually humorous, when asked if they live in Brighton is "Hove, actually" thus maintaining a distinction with their less genteel neighbour.[72] One source has identified the locally resident actor Laurence Olivier (who lived in Brighton) as the origin of the phrase.[73] In the 1990s the Hove borough council used the slogan "Hove, actually" to promote the town for tourism.[74]
The British home defence network was more than just radar. The sector and group network, as well as filter stations, meant that a detected raid was identified and marked on the appropriate sector map within 10 minutes of the first detection. The plots were continually updated, and a system was n place that identified plots that were "lost" . It was the worlds first total air defence system
and the germans had an integrated electronic air defense network covering the entirety of western europe that could see across britain and then some
@@antigen4 Not in 1939 they didn't. They set up their initial radar/searchlight/nightfighter/ground controlled air defence system in response to the bombing raids later on in the war. The earliest version was set up in July 1940, but took another year's development to become really effective. Search for 'Kammhuber Line'. It was complicated, with a search radar, two tracking radars (the second tracking the night fighter) and a searchlight and could only concentrate on one target at a time. By 1942 it had become much more effective, but the RAF developed various tactics to overcome it - the 'bomber stream' which swamped it, 'window' (modern term - chaff), radio countermeasures, 'spoof raids' to distract from the real bomber force and low flying below the radar. For a good history of radar and countermeasures, try "Instruments of Darkness" by Alfred Price (just don't mix it up with a BBC book of the same name which is a Doctor Who adventure by Gary Russell)
Communication and control were key.
Sadly, speaking as a Brit, the only thing that Britain did better than Germany.
@@ohgosh5892 Exactly! The German war effort was fueled by arrogance, and attacked a bunch of farmers and nations that weren't working on war machinery after "the war to end all wars" had just been fought and ravaged their country. However, it wasn't long before Germany was out-managed, out-smarted, out-engineered, out-produced, out-intelligenced, out-fought, and clobbered TECHNOLOGICALLY in every technology that matter to win a war. Little Britain was bleeding them everywhere around the world, supplying Germany's opponents, and organized resistance in their occupied countries, before the US was involved. Germany was already going backwards by December of 1941. Germany's idea of a fix was to declare war on the US, the most advanced and resourceful industrialized country in the world where the people had the government's hands tied from getting involved in another European war, and as a result, refused to accept another armistice, and insisted on unconditional surrender because they weren't going to do this every twenty years. To add to that, Germany then invested heavily in useless, resource-intensive, "Wonder/Desperation Weapons", that had all of the war-winning potential of saying boo! Oh duh!
@@jackt6112 I think you up play the Allies and downplay the Germans more than just a little. Really the biggest issue for Germany as a whole was Hitler's personal arrogance and the fact that he built a cadre of yes-man officers around himself. Germany had an actual plan of preparing for war but Hitler jumped the gun by almost 6 years and then decided to attack Russia, who were actually abiding by their joint treaty, simply on ideological grounds. He also had this personal belief that he was some amazing general himself and constantly overrode his actual generals. In reality he was a painter who served as a dispatch runner from regimental headquarters during WW1. He was brave and a charasmatic speaker, but he had no actual experience or training in leading men in combat much less grand strategy.
"Little Britain" still had the world's largest navy and empire at the time and was not so little at all. In fact they were the pre-eminent world power at the time and were in an active ship building race with Germany at the time. The US also wasn't at all recognized as "the most advanced resourceful industrialized country in the world" prior to WW2. They were definitely on their way up as a power to be respected but no where near the best you portray them as. At their best, they were merely the largest neutral arms supplier in the early stages of the war. Germany declaring war on the US was also by no means their real intent. The additional man power from the US (not their technological ability) had swayed the first world war against them before. It was purely Japan's ambitions for US holdings that drew them into a surprise attack and then the whole network of alliances forced Germany's hand in that regard.
Also saying that they were "clobbered TECHNOLOGICALLY in every technology that matter to win a war" is both incorrect and objectively a pointless statement to make. From that standpoint you could have a super computer and I could have a rock that I beat you over the head with. Hey look, i was technologically superior in every technology that mattered in our conflict. By saying that you're saying oh the person who lost had better tech but it wasn't relevant to the war effort which is completely incorrect. The fact of the matter is that Germany was deploying technologically superior tanks, planes, and often small arms (the US' universal semi-automatic rifle deployment being the one major exception to this) at most points in the war. They were on par at times but generally held the tech lead in military equipment. What lost them the war was the fact that they just got overwhelmed with numbers. The US built 8x more shermans than Germany produced of all variety of tanks.
Iirc, Chain Home used HF frequency while the Germans used VHF and UHF frequency. The Germans didn’t see CH as that much of a threat because their radar engineers had disproved of HF as a usable frequency due to how much more power it needed
The sector of intelligence that really won the Battle of Britain were the filter rooms which were able to process information from around 200 miles away
Another wiki reading keyboard general thinking he is soooo pro....
According to a book of Watson -Watts early testing procedures. The Germans already had a Radar system set up in the 30's.
It still begs the queston, WHY weren't their suspicions roused enough, to regard those Tower's as a threat? They did of course, bomb them much later--and too late.
What's also interesting is a modern stealth aircraft would have absolutely no defence against it.
"There is a pub there now because of course there is." Brilliant....
The Luftwaffe didn't target the pubs so that was another advantage the Brits had.
A very german observation. But then, we are not quite so different.
@@Jagdtoq Love that.
@@Jagdtoq I think if the Luftwaffe had targeted the pubs, they would have had a way bigger problem...
What better motivation for the English than defending their pubs?
Your operational analysis reminds me of Parshall and Tully’s work in Shattered Sword regarding the battle of Midway. It is amazing that there are still layers of understanding to be uncovered in even the best known events of WW2. At least sometimes, it is the work necessary to reverse decades of “conventional wisdom.”
This played out in the battle of the Atlantic as Wildcat night Fighters sunk German U-boats
I sat at Beachy Head in pub garden and saw a Spitfire flying low as well, perfect setting for a spot on a Summers Day. Totally agree with your thought good video. The Brits had very very good teamwork. With Germany military structures at top level Hitler/Nazi had them competing this affected team work on a huge large scale. Downing was the man with the Vision to get things in place. The logistics where huge. Radar, observers, filter rooms to plotting rooms. Then those observing the plot making decisions on how to fight the raid and how with what squadrons. All in real time. Took Vision planning and time. Disgusting how Dowding was treated later on, as people scrabbled to steal the glory. He was sidelined. The guy was a genius.
Yes, true. Treatment to Downing is big black mark in british history of the second war.
What a shame.
The Brits had very very good teamwork. Why they lost to Germans in France in 1916 and 1940?
Seems to be a british habit to mistreat people that were important during the war.
Alan Turing comes to mind as well...
@@KuraIthys Very true. During WWI, the man who actually created the first combined arms battleplan and made it work (spectacularly so) was later almost completely ignored because he was both Australian and his parents were Jewish (he was not raised as a Jew himself as his father wanted the family to be fully accepted as Australians) but that didn't matter to the British Command. His name was John Monash and he should be recognized as the man who created modern warfare. Instead, most people have never even heard his name. Monash was also responsible for the almost miraculous withdrawal of British forces from Gallipoli with literally no loss of life. He was truly brilliant, and deserves better.
@@kostakisgeorgiou3637 Looking up the reasons for the failure of the attacks on the Western Front in 1916 would be a good start. Look up the German attack on Verdun that diverted French troops from the build-up for the envisaged joint attacks on the Somme in 1916. Look up Plan D in 1940. Look at the plans of the 1st French Army Group under whose command the BEF was placed. The BEF was very small compared to the French and German armies. Have a look at the Escaut Plan. Look up the paralysis of the French High Command in 1940. Have a look at Gamelin's plans and actions from late 1939 and 1940. Look at Weygand's two day cancellation of counter-attacks against the Germans. Read primary sources. They're all readily available. But luckily the British, with the Americans and Canadians, came back. And did rather well.
The Chain Home system was essential for the whole defence system. Not only did it give Fighter Command early warning of raids, but it allowed via measurement of how long a raid took to cross the Channel and how high it was as a guide to determine whether the force coming across were bombers or a fighter sweep. If it was the latter, Park and his controllers did their dammed hardest to avoid combat with that formation by getting everybody out of its way. The Germans eventually picked up on this and flew low speed fighter sweeps after 15th September 1940, but Park then delayed launch of the squadrons and vector to intercept until positive ID by the Observer Corps. The Chain Home system had one major limitation that is only covered in Bungey's book "Most Dagerous Enemy" and that was the AMES Type 1 (Chain Home) Radars needed a common timing source to avoid the radars transmissions from one Chain Home Station interfering with the rest of the network. This was due to the very long wavelength signal of the CH radar transmission being able to bounce off the ionosphere and the ground out to ranges of thousands of miles and be reflected back to the receivers of both its own station and everybody else. There were only four spot frequencies that the equipment could transmit on, so one station would fire out a pulse of energy, display the returns for the first 120 miles or so then switch the displayed signal from the receiver off and wait for its signal to dissipate. Then some other station would fire off a pulse and go through the same process. To synchronise all of this the British decided to use a timing system already in place and that was the 50hz frequency used by the UK National Grid mains electrical power network, which had to be in precise phase across the whole network or there would be major problems. Most modern radars with a 120NM range would work at a Pulse Repetition frequency of around 750 pluses per second. A modern Air Defence Search Radar runs as 250 PPS. Chain Home ran at 25PPS and if Ionospheric reflections were really strong as low as 12.5 PPS. This meant that mains power supply to the stations were essential for optimal operation and a switch over to standby local power supply due to it being cut could cause interference with other stations across the network due to the loss of the master timing source. Some of the most serious disruptions to the CH Radar network in the South East during the Eagle Attack in mid August were not caused by direct attack on the radar stations themselves, but by random bombs landing in Kent that took out the National Grid power lines that fed the power to the majority of the Radar Stations in the county. Fortunately the Chain Home Low Stations were a lot more resistance to interference from the ones next door to them due to the beam nature of their transmissions, so they could work on standby power.
The RAF formed an organisation dedicated to support of all RDF activities in the service (as Radar was or course known at the time) called No. 60 Group in early 1940. Their role was firstly to support the training for, Operation, Maintenance and calibration of the Chain Home System, taking over from the original Air Ministry Experimental Station (Bawdsey), who became Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE). 60 Group were still in the process of taking over full responsibility of the RDF chain from TRE when the Battle of Britain kicked off. There doesn't seem to be any operational records for the Radar Stations by name done by the RAF during the period of the battle, but 60 Group does have a records book covering the period of the battle in the UK National Archives and seeing it was their personnel who had to fix the damage, it would most likely be a good source of what damaged was done. TRE did also maintain operational reports from the RDF chain stations in 1940/41 by station name. The later may cover what happened to the station during the battle as regards damage, but none of them are digitized, so a trip to Kew is required to look at them.
Poling CH station was trashed in a major Stuka attack on 18th August 1940 along with three other targets in the area, but the Stuka Wing got the shit kicked out of it in the process. Poling' CHL station was however undamaged and still had a 60 NM range.
Richard Vernon Outstanding comment; very nice interesting. Thank you! 👍
@Uncle Joe Your statement is in error!!! The Germans did attack the Radar stations with Bf-110 and Bf-109's in the very first attacks and most damage was done by bombs.
The chances of doing major damage with cannon and MG fire on the Transmitter site was very low as the transmitter was in a hardened building with a blast wall around it. Cutting the cables on the aerial towers or hitting the towers with cannon fire was also very unlikely as was damaging anything underground (which the bombs did do).
Damaging the Receiver site was much easier as the towers were made of wood and the receiver and display buildings were wooden huts. Had the Germans attempted low level attacks, I suspect a shed load of British Soldiers would have been deployed around the stations with a lot of MG's and the Royal Engineers would have put some form of blast protection around the buildings on the Receiver Site.
The British also had more radars than the AMES Type 1 CH and Type 2 CHL. There was also the AMES Type 9 Mobile RDF unit. This was a transportable mini CH station that could be deployed anywhere and the RAF had at least 10 of them in 1940. It wasn't as good as CH or CHL, but was better than nothing. Also the CH system could work on Stand-by power, it just made the operator's life a lot harder as there was a lot more crap on the screen.
The other problem would have been did the Germans have the fighters to do it? 20 percent of the German fighter force was stuck over France at all times doing standing patrols over their airfields as Herman got a bit pissed off by Bomber and Coastal Command doing random attacks on German Airfields in occupied Europe.
The Germans didn't have a clue how the British Fighter Control system actually worked and I doubt they knew how the power grid was set up either.
@@richardvernon317 Fascinating insight, about the power grid especially. Many thanks. I wonder if you know about how the Wurzburg system was used for aircraft direction? Wiki is devoid of any reference, which is unusual. In a TV programme called "Enemy at the Door" made by LWT in 1978-80 there is a depiction of the use of two Wurzburgs to direct a night fighter. Using Freya(?) as the initial detector, the first Wurzburg finds the enemy aircraft. The second Wurzburg tracks the night fighter and directs it onto the intruder. Central to this was a glass table, with a local map on the surface. The two Wurzburgs were connected to light projectors which projected dots of light onto the underside of the map, a controller worked the night fighter until the two dots were together, and the night fighter had visual contact. Because of the sensitivities around the occupation of the Channel Isles the show was well supplied with military advisors to fact check the detail. Yet, I've seen no reference elsewhere.
@@nicktecky55 That is the Himmelbett system in its Mid life form and it operates exactly as you describe.
The Airspace across Denmark, Germany, the low countries and France was divided into a line of 20 x 20 mile boxes. In that box was a Freya, Two Wurzburgs, A control center, a radio beacon and a Night-fighter.
Freya provides early warning and target acquisition data for a Wurzburg which then tracks the target and range and bearing data is passed by phone to a light operator sitting at the base of a two level display system called a Seeburg Table. The (Red) light was steered by rotation and sliding device the controls of which were in bearing and range from the radar on the the base of a frosted glass tabletop and showed the position of the target. The Night fighter orbited the radio beacon until required when the second Wurzburg would acquire and track it and pass the fighter's position to a second light operator who would steer a blue light dot on the glass that showed the position of the fighter.
The Fighter controller would then use these light plots to steer the fighter to an intercept point where the Radar operator in the fighter could pick the target on the fighter's radar and steer the pilot to visual acquisition and attack.
This system became operational in early 1942 originally with the small Wurzburg originally built for Flak control that were replaced with the larger Giant Wurzburg built for Fighter Control as they came out from late 1941 onwards.
Before that the Germans had a few methods of night interception.
Dark Night Hunt (English translation) where a Freya and a Wurzburg was used in conjunction to try and get a non radar equipped night fighter to intercept a bomber. To do this the fighter had to ride the beam of the Freya so that the radar could see both it and the target. The primary purpose of the Wurzburg was to provide height information on the target, though I would have thought that the Wurzburg could be used initially to track the fighter and give it steering commands to get it into the beam of the Freya . It did work occasional if the moon light was good and I suspect against a receding target going away from the radars.
Illuminated Night fighting. Most of the searchlights in Germany were put in a line 35 KM deep that covered the main approach route to the Ruhr in mid 1940 after the British bombing campain really got going. Early warning was provided by the Freyas, but target acquisition for the Searchlights was initially done by sound locators. The Night fighter orbited radio beacons and attacked bombers as the were lit up by the searchlights. When the production Wurzburgs cam on stream in late 1940, they started to take over from the sound locators. The system was effective if cloud cover wasn't too heavy, but the RAF came up with a easy countermeasure, fly around the belt.
This lead to the belt being shortened in width but expanded in length in 1941. During this period the Himmelbett (Heavenly (four poster) Bed) system started to be rolled out, with the target tracking Wurzburg also aiming searchlights. When the Nightfighter (still not fitted with radar) got within close range, the searchlights would illuminate the target for the fighter to complete the intercept visually.
By early 1942 the plotting board used in the system was replaced with the Seeburg table and the line ran from Denmark to Metz in France. As the Night fighters with radar came on stream in early 1942, the searchlights were removed for use by the Flak batteries defending the towns.
The other system the Germans came up with before 1943 was "Combined Night fighting" which involved putting an air defence area around some city and used a Freya, a number of Wurzburgs and their Searchlights to employ both fighters and flak within the same zone. As you can guess this was somewhat of a bad idea as the flak boys had a nasty habit of engaging their own night fighters.
Himmelbett's main weakness was lack of depth and the fact that one box could only intercept one target at a time. This was not a problem when Bomber Command's aircraft were flying individual routes to the target with raids lasting hours. However the advent of the GEE navigation aid and British Air Intelligence working out how the German system worked. Bomber Command introduced the Bomber Stream that put as many aircraft as possible as quickly as possible through the smallest number of boxes as possible. On top of this they fitted Mandrel Jammers to a number of Bombers in each squadron to jammer the Ferya's and a Comms jammer called Tinsel to jam the German Fighter Controller's comms in late 1942.
One counter to the Bomber Stream was to extend the depth of the line, by setting up more boxes (3 x Radars, a beacon and an extra Seeburg table required per box) which has done in some locations, while another that was put into wide scale practice was use direction finding equipment to triangulate the position of the night fighters (X 2) from their radio transmissions and fit the Seeburg table with 4 light projectors. The two Giant Wurzburgs could then be used to each track a target and the positions of all four aircraft would be shown to a pair of controllers who would each steer a fighter to the intercept a bomber at the same time.
The later system was employed to the end of the war even after Himmelbett had its cornflakes pissed on big time with the introduction of Window in July 1943 which resulted in much looser forms of night-fighter control being introduced that involved getting the fighters into the Bomber stream (mainly by fitting them with homing systems to track the radar systems fitted to the RAF aircraft) and allowing them to pick off anything they found or putting Day fighters over the target, so that they could engage the bombers using the fires below to illuminate them.
@@richardvernon317 Again many thanks. For taking the time for such a comprehensive reply.
Chris, you said there were not many books that spoke about the use of radar during the Battle of Britain. You need to acquire this book. "Britain's Shield Radar And The Defeat Of The Luftwaffe", by David Zimmerman (with a Forward by Sir Bernard Lovell ). It was published by Amberley Publishing, ( in England ), in 2001. It excellently spells out the concepts of radar and the uses made of it by the British government at that time. I'm sorry to correct you because you usually have all the answers, and those you don't, can be found in your bibliographies. Thanks for another great history lesson. I am Seventy Years Old, and I'm still learning stuff every day. When I was a kid, my nickname was, "Professor", as I always had a book with me. I still do. Never stop learning, it keeps me young.
Chris, to answer you question, "Why not destroy radar during Battle of Britain." This was very difficult early in the war. One reason is, It was very difficult to hit - if you were interested in trying. What you see of the Chain Home system is very insubstantial. Early 1940's technology would have had a very difficult time detecting, targeting, or destroying a structure not much more. substantial than a couple of street lamps strung together with wires. You did not have radar guided bombs. You did not have bombs that would guide themselves to a radar signal. In the infantry there is an expression, 'a miss is as good as a mile - yeah.
The counter example would be the destruction of Axis 'V' sites on the continent V1 and V2. Also not easily done, but later in the war with higher technology and greater will and resources were in place. It was done.
So, could the Luftwaffe have done it? Possibly, but they would also also severely degraded all of their other operational aims. So, the sad fact of the matter for the Germans was that they encountered an upright and fully functional Chain Home system and did not have the resources to defeat it without compromising other objectives - like invading England.
Actually, the truth of the matter is that although radar was known, at this stage in the war, it was not very well understood, and underestimated. The Luftwaffe looked at bombing cities as being more productive. Hindsight is always 20/20. Sure, destroying the radar would have helped the Luftwaffe, but a mistake? Not at the time based on priority of targets further based on intent of flights.
@@jasonpenn5476 William you are correct. Jason, no. Not sure if you just made that up thinking it sounded smart or copy pasted from another comment.
Also they did try and in some cases succeed to put some sections out of operation. But only for a few hours at a time.
@@DimBeam1 No what I said was correct! The reason the radar stations were not destroyed was because they were not deemed important enough. It was more important to the Luftwaffe and the German High Command to bomb the cities because they believed that putting fear into the civilian population would force the British to sue for peace. Remember who was in charge of the Luftwaffe - Hermann Goering. Goering didn't think that the radars were as effective as they proved to be, and his ego placed the Luftwaffe as unstoppable. As I said, hindsight is always 20/20. The best course of action for the Luftwaffe would have been to first take out the radar stations, then destroy the airfields, but Goering's ego wouldn't let him accept that the British were more than capable.
@@DimBeam1 - Not sure if you just made that up thinking it sounded smart or copy pasted from another comment.
Great video. A little off topic, but people generally don't consider the role of the National Grid, created by Stanley Baldwin in the '30's and was the world's largest infrastructure project at that time, had on the Battle of Britain. Before that, knocking out the local power generation meant that area lost its supply. The National Grid meant that was no longer the case, which kept the lights on in London.
Interesting video! It all boils down to the idea that the Great Britain air defense had a well organized Command and Control System. The radar posts where one of the important links in a chain of information gathering, information processing, and command communication infrastructure.
Exactly what I thought with the addition that at the beginning of the war no one had clear strategies or doctrines for an air campaign with relatively evenly matched opponents (the Luftwaffe had experience but not really against well equipped and organised defences), which I think is born out by the high losses RAF bomber command endured after the Battle of Britain when launching raids against Germany and their air defence system.
Probably an important thing to remember is that the RAF also didn't directly attack German radar installation, instead they chose to counter them via electronic warfare such as chaff and I don't think it can be argued that the RAF didn't understand the significance of radar. Clearly what they did understand is how hard it is to attack radar with conventional weapons and it's better to seek to take it out either temporarily or more permanently via electronic warfare.
They where repaired in two days" welllll.... no. There was a big mis-direction there as well. Because the listning posts in France where hearing the radar transmittir again, didn't mean that the radar was operational again. The Brits made the transmitter operational as quick as possible to suggest that the radar was working again. That there was no receiver or that the radar had yet to be calibrated didn't matter. Remember that back in the days, a plane had to fly a surtain pattern to calibrate that thing to let the output mean anything. And try to find a pilot in the middle of the BoB.
I recall reading about it in a book called "Augen durch die nacht" translated: Eyes trough the night. Can't remember the writer though. It also described an hilarious story about Hitler and Göring visiting a small radar van. Göring remarked something about a splendid machine when the radar operator looked up from his radar screen and back at him, notecing that his corpulant body was pressed against the protective mesh around the hight KiloVolt magnetron that was creating the radar waves. A few centimetres more and he would have been zapped out of existence....
..I would have said nothing :)
I'm German and wouldn't have objected either. _Nicht im Göringsten_ .
@@achtsekundenfurz7876 A German pun. Wonderful!
@@mrt3870 They say that French puns are crêpe, but German puns are the Wurst.
@@achtsekundenfurz7876 Ein Gesang von Gustav Mahler heißt „Blick mich nicht in die Lieder“. Ist das vielleicht auch ein Wortspiel? (Augenlider)
The Chain Home system was called RDF (Range & Direction Finding) and not radar at that time.
I loved the reference to 'Hove Actually'! It made my day
One of my school teachers was a Chain Home operator. As he described it, one of the main defenses of the system was obscurity. At many of the sites, while there would be bunkers built & visible from the air, those bunkers weren't where the operators and equipment were placed. The equipment & operators were in a nearby farm building or house, or camouflaged under trees. Pretty much anywhere BUT the bunkers, as they well understood that to any Luftwaffe pilot who had been sent against the CH sites, a bunker translated as "Valuable Target, please insert bomb here", whereas a farm building or house was seen as a civilian structure & not worth wasting munitions on. Apparently, the operators would watch attacks & deliberately turn off the equipment before any real damage occurred, as the attacking pilots would see the radar going off as a successful mission & go back to base...
The Luftwaffe might be forgiven, for not understanding how much of a defensive advantage Chain Home gave the RAF.
This was the first time that an air campaign of this type had been waged, between opposing countries that had a radar early warning system.
Simply put, in 1940, the British had a better understanding of the advantage it provided, and a better system in place to make use of that advantage.
The Germans did know of the Chain Home system before the start of the war. Years ago, delving into the history of airships, I read an account stating that prior to the war, the Germans had taken the Graf Zeppelin, loaded it up with electronic gear, and had made a flight off the English coastline, for the purpose of gathering intel on the British radar systems.
And besides radar, the British had invested quite some effort in creating an air defense system. The Zeppelin and German Air Force bombing raids during WWI had put something of a scare into them, the prospect of air attack in a future war being seen afterwards as a real and present threat. They had already invested considerable effort along this line in the interwar years, well before radar became a thing.
I think it is a mistake to overemphasize the importance of radar in the Battle of Britain. The English also had a sophisticated visual system of marine and shore based observers feeding information on German aircraft formations. Radar was also subject to various subterfuges such a feint raids. Had the Germans not changed their focus from defeating the RAF by attacking the airfields to bombing civilians in retaliation of to the British attack on Berlin, the battle very well could have been lost.
This experience is one reason why the British put such effort into developing the VTOL Harrier. Static airfields are simply too vulnerable to neutralization. The Harrier can be operated from any small open area and does not require a long airstrip. Another benefit is it is easily operated from most large ships. Characteristics shared with the F35.
Not Quite, the Germans knew the British had developed radar from capturing British Army Mobile RDF Unit equipment in France and it didn't impress them a lot. The Zeppelin flight didn't really pick up anything bar that the British National Grid seemed to be very nosily. They were not looking at low enough frequencies. The Luftwaffe's biggest issue was a Nazi style intelligence system where the various arms within the service were in-fighting because one officer in charge of one part hated one in another.
I think two factors have to be considered
1) British manufacturing philosophy is different to German/US. We tune the hell out of things, where as German/US is to work to a specification, so when the Graf Zeppelin flew along the south coast of England in 1938 it missed most of the installations be cause the frequencies of the few installations we had were all over the place.
2)The battle last 4 months at most. Starting form the point that we don't have a effective Radar, to realising we have and reacting to it requires changing the Battle Plan, and that usually takes some time.
I felt this was an excellent lecture on the topic! Well thought out and, articulately presented. It was great lesson!
There is also the aspect that radar played no part in the thinking of the Luftwaffe, because of course, they were fighting the offensive side of the battle. When you think offensively, you don't necessarily always think like a defender. Given that the technology was so new to both sides (less than 5 years old really), the Germans weren't looking for the "Edge" in battle, rather thinking of their Luftwaffe as a giant club with which to beat Great Britain into submission. The primary goals, as you detailed, were not inconsiderate of reducing their early warning systems, but rather at the beginning of the battle followed traditional doctrine: 1. Reduce the enemy's tactical responses by hitting logistical resources; and 2. Reducing their operational responses by whittling down their aircraft in the sky, and available to be put into the sky. The British, being on the defensive, were able to adapt and such by dispersing their fighters both to smaller fields, and by improving their responses to incoming raids, which was probably one of the single most important features in winning the battle. The other factor which helped them win the battle was the Luftwaffe's shift in strategy away from pounding airfields to destruction of other targets. The RAF was near the breaking point by the end of the first few weeks of the battle, and if the Germans had continued their policy of simply destroying aircraft and airfields, they may have won the battle.
That is indeed more armchair quarterbacking, however, since they (the NAZI's) would not have really "Won" anything unless they followed up with an invasion of Great Britain itself, i.e., putting troops on the ground, via the beaches and landing fields. As close as they got, they never succeeded in gaining that all elusive "Air superiority" they desired, due to poor strategy. Knocking out the radar the British used as part of their overall defensive strategy wouldn't have helped (most likely) them actually win the battle. As quickly as the Germans assembled landing barges in the French and Dutch ports along the coast, the British bombed and strafed them to put those out of action as well. The British "Moat" (the English Channel) effectively did its job and helped win the battle as much as any other single factor, when thinking of the battle as one nation conquering another that is. In the end, as a result of the German's muddled strategy towards the overall conquest of Britain, it becomes relatively simple to see that the British could "Win" the air battle, both due to the quality of the aircraft, as well as pilots, but also their production and training capacity, and the marvelous command and coordination structure put together by Fighter Command's Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding.
The germans were trying to destroy it, the british were rebuilding it quicker than an amish barn raising team.
Not true, they did bomb it only ones.
It's also true that the Germans didn't fully understand how capable the British RADAR capabilities were, so it wasn't valued high enough as a target. The myth of carrots improving eyesight was spread as propaganda to explain how British pilots intercepted German aircraft so effectively.
@@Metaljacket420 Yes. But they shoud have. The Germans themselfs had radar too. In fact, the english did steal one of there radars from the France coast, including ab oparator who they did take along for the ride so they could interregate him. It was so succesfull that they found out that they could trick that radar by strips of aluminimum foil. They did use it on D-Day for the first time and its used ever since.
@@icourant - Actually, "Window" was 1st used by the British in Operation Gomorrah. That was the bombing of Hamburg in late July 1943.
@@BA-gn3qb 👍
Very interesting analysis. A bit of ancidoctal info that came from my uncle Michael he was an engine mechanic on spitfires stationed at Tangmere during the Battle of Britain. Two things he told me and as I am now 67 and my uncle has passed away, well somebody needs to put these memories down somewhere. So when it comes to Luftwaffe attacks on this airfield. He said that the bombers got through so many times that they were being fed by mobile soup kitchens and tea waggons as the normal kitchens had been destroyed. They got so pissed off that the army had to surrounded them to prevent them from deserting. So this airfield was attacked relentlessly day after day at least for a prolonged period. He also told me something of Douglas Bader our famous fighter ace of the time. Now I don't know whether Douglas Bader was ever at Tangmere, but his reputation one way or another travelled. If you can tell me different I'd like to know. Many of Britain's fighter aces are immortalized, they were very courageous and I do not wish to degrade their bravery or dedication .
All I can tell you is what my Uncle either knew first hand or heard on the grape vine. Anyway this is what my uncle said about Bader. He was disliked by ground crew and aircrew alike. No matter how hard the ground crew worked either with his guns and gun sights or the tuning of his engine, or flight controls he constantly complained. When it came to the squadron pilots and this would have filtered down via frustration to the ground crew when the squadron landed after a combat sortie, they complained that he was in it for himself and not a team player. I can add a little to this conversation in so far as when I was in the RAF myself as an aircraft technician, in the early 1980's on a very busy station Douglas Bader turned up and demanded a refuel of his litttle single engined plane. It was like the whole of transport command had to miss a beat whilst this man got a refuel. I was in the flightline control centre and thankfully our chief technician, politely told him that we were a busy air force transport base and we would get to him after we had met our current refuelling commitments.
Great social history there Alan... its sad to see this sort of thing lost in the "sands of time". I've got all my father's anecdotes regarding his time in the Royal Navy. Just sorry I never recorded them all for posterity.
Bader was at Tangmere in 1941 and the general view of him within the vast majority of the RAF was he was a cock!!! I have heard that from people who were at Coltishall in 1940 when he was there with 242 Squadron.
Nice work mate- can I suggest however that the influence of radar (and even Spitfires) may have been overstated because of the post war treatment of Dowding. Britain won the battle-yet the person responsible for this awesome victory was victimised and run out of the military. In the face of this embarrassing fact, a plausible saviour was needed (Bader and his cronies were obviously wrong, and couldn't be used). The overstated importance of radar was therefore a useful political tool.
As you point out, the RAF seems to have had by far the best institutional appreciation and setup to use Radar. There seems to have been an integrated system for interception with both radar and ground observation incorporated. So not only was the information fed up to the commander reliably, but it was also communicated back out in the relevant bits to the relevant fighters for interception. It seems that the British and US Navies were slower in picking up on radar use, in part perhaps because the radar requirements for sea use were more demanding, so they didn't have as much time to appreciate the newest stuff.
You touch on the difficulty of knocking out the Chain Home station. One real important question that would be interesting to know is about the availability of spares, and the difficulty of putting in a replacement station. It would be interesting to know about the difficulties of putting in the replacement station that you mention. Apparently the Germans also knew about the ineffectiveness of the radar at low level, and did do some nuisance raids at low level. I guess they didn't do large raids at low level, as they would be easy to attack from above, as well as being vulnerable to barrage balloons and smaller caliber Flak. Perhaps another hypothetical question you can ask in a future video if you haven't already.
It should be noted, that the Observer Corps wasn't just a bunch of people with binoculars/field glasses, they also had giant listening horns & parabolic acoustic mirrors, where they could hear the engines of approaching aircraft from many miles away & determine the direction, which they were approaching from. These listening stations were also networked by telephone into the central clearing house, with those ladies pushing pieces around a map table, like we see in the movies, so if the Brits didn't detect the Germans by radar, the listening posts would detect them. If the listening posts failed to detect them, then the people with binoculars/field glasses would see them. It all overlapped in a built in redundancy.
didn't the germans have listening stations too?
@@deathsheadknight2137 Probably, but they likely weren't networked or at least not as efficiently networked as the British ones were. That was the Brits major innovation. Networking them to a central clearing house, where the information could be rapidly analyzed from various stations, radar, listening, & visual, and a response implemented, which usually meant deploying fighters from various aerodromes scattered around England.
@@sparky6086 yes, quite intriguing.
As a member of Battle of Britain Historical Society and someone who tends the grave of one of The Few, I found your presentation absolutely fascinating. I have read many books on Bob and most point out that the RAF's strength was the way Dowding and his teams were able to disseminate the data incoming to them and out to the squadrons best placed to intercept, but not really seen much written about the German perspective.
Attacking chain home was like trying to bomb string.
Would have thought they would have attempted it ?
@@davidinger961 They attempted that several times. The towers while thin but robustly built to withstand the frequent high winds off the channel, and consequently fairly resistant to bomb damage.
@@davidinger961 They did attempt it. The fixed equipment was severely damaged, but mobile equipment was brought in to fill the gap by the end of the day. They pretty much stopped wasting resources because of that.
There's a chain home station on the Yorkshire coast that I visited three years ago. The command bunker was made of steel-reinforced concrete between a foot and eight inches thick, about the size of a common bedroom. It resembled a pillbox that you would find on the south coast or along a canal. Good luck bombing that without guided ordinance.
@@davidinger961 They did but it's like trying to bomb an electrical pylon.
As well as the two RAF Museums at Hendon and Cosford, and the old 11 Grp bunker at Uxbridge that have good info on radar, and more importantly the Dowding System, I really recommend a vist to the RAF Radar Museum at RRH (formerly RAF) Neatishead, the longest serving military radar establishment in the world. Having been in continual service since 1941. There in what started as the original WWII era control building you can follow the developments of British radar and control systems from 1939 right through to the 1990's. This includes the old standby cold war control room that was in operation during the 70/80's and is pretty much exactly a it was left when it closed in October 1992. I did 9 years in the RAF a a radar tech, serving at Neatishead apart from during training. I left the RAF at just about the same time the control room you can visit shut.
Just re-watched this today. Wonderful video, clear and concise facts as ever. Thank you Chris.
You have very successfully destroyed one of the standard myths from WWII (which I've often heard, and believed myself), that the German's should have knocked out British radar at the start of the battle of Britain, and the only reason they didn't was because they didn't see the importance of it, ie. they were a bit dumb, or some one high in command (Goering?) overruled those who knew better.
A great topic to address!
The radar on the Graf Spee was superior to contemporary British sets. Thank you for the straight forward explanation as to why the German planners didn't fully exploit radar's potential. in a centralized aerial defense.
When was that known or speculated upon about Graf Spee Radar please?
Are you comparing apples with pears really?
Extremely professional piece this. I say this with no surprise because Chris always produces good stuff. The way this one has been shot and edited etc is definitely worth a mention but I really enjoyed the looking at things in a different way or from a different aspect perspective. Keep up the good work Chris
Thanks a lot for this one! It's an interesting topic and I am surprised that there are so little published on the use of radars and Air command and control during ww2. If ignoring of the radars was a mistake or not by the commanders of Luftwaffe can be argued, but your little scenario shows that the whole campaign was much more complex then it seems at first glance.
Do you know of any literature that covers the use of radars and air command and control in Germany or during the mobile battles in north Africa, on the eastern front or in Europe after 1944?
Once again, thanks for this very intersting video.
There is a sizeable literature on radar in itself, especially during the later half of WW2 but, at least from my attempts to find something, this can not be said about 1940. Every book covers it but these tend to be general descriptions of radar and Chain Home. The only studies I found that considered the question only partially covered the topic and were more exploratory than analytical.
Check out 'Electronic Combat over the Third Reich' for some introductory reading.
Military Aviation History I read a book, (sorry don’t remember which) was said that the Germans knew the importance and did try to hit them, but they proved difficult to hit, and when they did hit then, the British repaired them within only a few hours, German resources ended up in need in other targets, so they ended up just being left. I suppose bombing some of the frames was difficult, but some of the radar equipment was easier to hit. Hermann Goering always gets a bad press, but he was more capable than revisionists claim. He also wasn’t behind some of the mistakes, they where direct orders from Hitler, and many things he disagreed with. Like the switching of targets from airfields to cities. That was Hitler, and Goering vehemently disagreed with the tactic.
@@MilitaryAviationHistory Get a copy Most Secret War by R.V. Jones.
@@damedusa5107 The germans had the idea that the vulnerable and hard to replace electrics would be protected by being underground or in hardened buildings, so too hard for most bombers to attack.
The vulnerable and hard to replace electrics being in wooden huts was not something that crossed there mind.
@@SuperFunkmachine That was a very useful vid start to finish. The simple conclusions we all heard were too simple.
Really enjoyed this video. My understanding is that the aim of the German airforce was complete air superiority over South East England, and to do this they needed to destroy fighter command. The Germans were supremely confident of being able to achieve this, if fighter command would come up to fight. Maybe they considered chain home as a help with this aim.
This Chris fella really knows a lot about aviation. He'd get along well with Greg and Bismark!
It's an absolutely perfect Bismarck impression
Bismarck, really?
Oh, you mean Chris get along with Bis18mark70?
LMAO! XD
Chris and Bismark can't stand each other, that's why you never see them in the same room.
@@renngretsch so damn true! LOL!!!
Thank you for a tremendous video on a subject I have often wondered about.
To boil down all of your arguments into two points:
1) destroying Chain Home would have been a bit like trying to turn off the internet
2) The germans understood point #1
I wonder if it would be possible for you to create a video on DECCA, the great grandchild of which is e-Loran?
I once rescued a stray cat and took it to a rescue centre at a bungalow a few miles from my home.
When dropping off the animal I noticed large baulks of timber cemented into the floor of the outbuilding which looked as though they might have had a large generator bolted to them.
Also, the bungalow itself was very utilitarian in appearance.
I asked and it transpired the house was converted from a WW2 Decca site and even had connections for 25 telephones when the current owners took it on.
Before having watched this fully, I think that part of the entire idea of "just target Chain Home" comes from a very modern and somewhat accurate perception of an air war. Today, the first thing anyone would do is send in a cloud of anti-radar missiles.
In modern war the first job is to take out the GPS jammers with HARM missiles. When they're gone, it's time to stick the cruise missiles on the static targets.
And the first thing the opposition would do is start the little 1kw generators plugged into the microwave ovens with open doors and triggered interlocks. See war in Yugoslavia for details!
Good analysis, as an addition to what you commented on in Chapter One. R. V. Jones in his 'Most Secret War' wrote that the major difference between British and German attitudes to radar was that the Germans saw it as a way to economize on ground observers (e.g. You don't use as many people to monitor raids as they occur.), while the British saw it as a way to economize on fighters (e.g. No need to send aircraft up on Standing Patrols.) and that the first sign that the Germans had realized that the latter course was correct was not until mid 1943.
I think people think the system was fragile, open frames are very resistant. This arent huge installations and they are redundant. You would need to wipe out several and then attack immediately after. The fog of war would make coordination of wiping out a section of radar, then communicating a success, then run bombers into the gap would be difficult.
Indeed. Compare the numerous unsuccessful operations of the Dambusters Squad when the targets were metal frame bridges etc. In the end they needed the 'earthquake' bombs to go for the foundations because otherwise even misses of a few feet often proved fruitless (but costly for the attackers).
Even when the Germans knocked out a radar station, the British set up a temporary transmitted, that mimicked the radar, so the Germans did not know that they had knocked out the radar, and the radar stations either side covered the gap. The biggest fault of the British was putting the huts above ground, were they were vulnerable to bomb damage.
@Charles McCarron You are correct. I am a structural engineer. These sorts of frames generally use simple pinned connections and simple straight sections. Any damaged sections can literally be cut from standard stock, replaced one for one, and require very little technical experience or tools.
@@someguy2741 Seems to me like exactly the sort of construction that lends itself to having stockpiles of prefabricated sections that could be used to significantly speed up larger repairs or even quickly erect a completely new tower if needed. I mean frames typically feature lots of repetition of the same basic geometry which lends itself to building modular segments for later assembly.
@@seraphina985 Precisely. The frame itself is only 5% solid so it is hard for bullets or shrapnel to hit and concussion blows right through it. And the repairs are simple like you say.
Not to mention its not like a video game where a green light turns on or parts of the map go dark when you knock it out. The trouble of knocking it out and then knowing it is knocked out then getting enough stuff through the gap to exploit it when it might only be down for a half a day makes it a real pain.
If it was a harder target it would be easier to destroy... ironic :p
Good analysis. It's good to hear somebody appreciate the importance of the 'system' part of the Dowding System, and not just the radar.
excellent upload - very informative (as usual!) - loved the "Hove actually" quip!!
Great video
I served at RAF Digby and the aerial erector school there still uses the mast at Stenigot to train on. This is the only true WW2 mast still in existence, as it has the platforms on it. It was from these that the transmitting cables were strung and explains why after bomb damage the repairs could be done easily and quickly. (The cables were hung between the masts to form an array to direct the radio waves where they "needed to go". Apologies for very non-technical description. For those interested the BBC World Service masts on Ascension Island use the same technology, on a much larger scale, one array pointing to Africa and one to South America).
Your map of a "typical station" misses out on a crucial detail. The receiving masts were made of wood and were a few hundred metres (yds) from the transmitting masts and were made of WOOD. I wonder if a large stick of incendiary bombs could have affected these? In the radar community it has been suggested that the separation between transmitter and receiver could make stealth aircraft visible to a WW2 mast!
It is not widely known that RAF Digby still has its WW2 Sector Control station completely intact and is a small, but very good museum. Details in RAF Digby Web site, visiting once a month on Sundays I believe. (pre covid info).
Your comments abut the radar warning are useful, but if you read Forgotten Voices RAF (sorry can't find book) it has a section on the operators at the foot of the masts. Here they state they could see into France as the Bombers formed up. Air Vice Marshal Keith Parks, who fought the Battle on the Dowding System, used this info to get his pilots up to try to defend the southern airfields, but interception often after bombs dropped. I suspect a detailed biography of Parks would sort the story of the use of radar out as he used the radar in Malta (1942) to intercept the INCOMING bombers.
Regards
Mark Kennard Padre RAF (ret)
It is good to remember that it was very difficult for the Germans, to bomb those very high radar arrays because of their inherent resistance to the blast of the bombs. It is very interesting to notice that there are photos taken by the Germans, with very powerful lens, from France depicting German fighters flying in front one of the radar arrays...
Born and raised on the Isle of Wight, in Godshill near Ventnor. The old Chain home station was one of my favourite places to go and explore when I was a wayward youth! Knew little about it's history then, amazing to think the role it played. Thanks for the fantastic video!
What I've learned from videos like this one is that wars are fought by humans and humans make mistakes but usually the bad guys in any conflict make 2 or 3 times as many mistakes. I know people's first response to my comment will be that the victor (which is normally the one who makes the fewest mistakes) determines who the good guy is, but I don't think that explains it. My observations are that the side with the most dictatorial political system actually creates a military structure which works less effectively, which contributes to more war losses. I think some historian should study that idea, whether bad political structures have a correlation with war losses.
You are not wrong it has been shown that a voluntary military is far more effective.
War is the extension of politics by other means. This idea was studied contemporarily whenever in times of war. Fervor has to be instilled. Fighting without believing (in whatever object) means individually speaking that you see no reason to sacrifice yourself, there is no source of courage to draw from. That way it makes more sense to just give up and live.
The Chinese won the total war without firing a shot. The virus was invented and released and became the dominant world power. Now what? They have three times our population and have the biggest army in the world with modern equipment and a super Air Force they are firmly in the driver seat and. It is not a self driving car. QED we are screwed and there is nothing we can do about it.
Except boycott their goods for I am sure the rest of the world will eventually figure out what or who started the virus and why. All just too convenient. Now a Chines women scientist has stated that the Chinese did start the virus with a purpose? Now what do we get? China against the world? Maybe it was not the brightest idea after all.
I don't know if the bad guys in WW2 necessarily made 2 or 3 times as many mistakes. I mean, they definitely made mistakes, but they were sort of screwed due to who they were fighting. Russia, which had probably the worst command structure of any of the seven major powers at the start, was able to trade men and land to buy time to rectify enough of the issues, and then use that same manpower advantage to push back the other way (but now with good commanders). France, however, didn't have as much land to trade for time. The US fought Japan on about equal footing until sometime in 1943, making many a mistake in those early fights, mistakes that helped Iron Bottom Sound gain its nickname. However, the US was able to make good its naval losses and build many additional ships, while Japan couldn't even do the former. Japan was doomed to lose that from the start, barring a political solution, and at least some of their admirals knew it. And over in Europe, that same manufacturing ability allowed the US to just feed its bombers into the meat grinder that was daylight bombing, something that Germany couldn't even afford to do on the smaller stage that was the Battle of London. That campaign would have been a backbreaking mistake for anyone but the US. And on the Atlantic, well, the Second Happy Time is, once again, the US screwing up. But then they did listen to the British, and also built a crap ton of merchant ships to make good the losses and more. Basically, as far as WW2 went, the Axis couldn't afford to make mistakes, while two of the three Allies could.
That said, yeah, any military with a bad command structure or a military that hasn't evolved to the current times, will be more likely to make mistakes and therefore lose.
The allies had a similar problem with German radar stations when flying bombing attacks into the country. German radar stations were set up along the likely routes are were used quite effectively to target the bomber streams for flak and fighter attacks. Even when the allies had air superiority, the radar stations were very difficult to knock out and the attacks were found to be ineffective. That is why Window chaff was used instead of shutting down the radar stations.
Another target that was worth going after was radio homing signals that could be used for precise targeting. Jamming and spoofing were much more common than going after the actual transmitters.
A really good point you have made. The fact the allies, operating with much greater resources, were unable to effectively attack German radar speaks volumes about the difficulty of the task.
@@dcwhitworth The Reason that the deep radar stations were left alone was that they were surrounded by a shit load of light flak. The Stations on the French coast were pummelled in the run up to D-day as the Typhoons and P-47's had a chance of pulling it off with light losses. To go any deeper, you needed to use Mosquitoes or Mustangs, which were better used attacking the German fighters or their airfields. The radio links between the German Fighters and their Controllers were jammed, the Radar's themselves were jammed. The Heavy Flak could resort to Box Barrage if all targeting information was lost and a German Nightfighter, if flown by an expert could kill a lot of RAF bombers if he got into the Bomber Stream even as late as March 1945.
The RAF's job was to survive. Early warning was crucial to that. Chain Home's limited usefulness at vectoring interceptors, really isn't the point.
Precise vectoring wasn’t the point of Chain Home - early warning was. It takes time for fighters to get to bomber altitude so without Radar you need to have fighters in the air all the time (I.e. fighter cap). With Radar your planes can be parked on the ground with pilots resting until you get a warning. A half hour later the fighters can be at altitude waiting with full(ish) fuel tanks and rested crews. That maximises the number of fighters that can engage incoming bombers with the longest possible engagement time, limited by ammunition not fuel unlike the Germans escorts which were severely fuel limited.
I was a child during the war and lived in east London. In 1945 I was aged eight. In the 1950s I studied electronics and became an electronics engineer.
The chain home towers were very distinctive. They were about 300 feet high and had horizontal gantries each side. I presume the antennas comprised vertical "arrays" constructed of wires strung between the gantries. They were not steerable. The radar was primative (of course). I believe it used VHF frequencies (around 50 MHz). The radar presentation to the operators was not like a "map" (as used today). Rather was it simply a horizontal green line on a cathode ray tube. Enemy aircraft would appear as "blips" on the green line, and their distance could be calculated from how far to the right the "blips" appeared.
A few of the towers are still evident today. Most have had their horizontal gantries removed and are used for communications. In 1958 I worked on such a tower on the island of Orkney installing (405 line) television transmitting antennas. At the base of the tower were wartime concrete bunkers once used to house the radar equipment.
I think it would not be easy to destroy these installations by bombs because of the need for high accuracy. Perhaps the Stukers could do it. But they were slow and very vulnerable to being shot down.
I agree that the chain home system faced only outwards. But Hitler's airforce didn't seem to know this. During night air-raids they sometimes dumped lots of silver paper strips intended to "jam" radar systems. Perhaps local radar was used to obtain targets for anti-aircraft guns, but I really don't know. (I used to collect this stuff on the way to school).
I have no doubt that German radar was superior to our own at the beginning of the war. Also they specialised in navigation beacon transmitters. This was necessary because, having lost the Battle of Britain, Hitler's airforce could only attack at night-time so navigation was difficult.
There's both Chain Home & Chain Light Radar systems accurately modelled in IL-2 Cliffs of Dover - Blitz plus the German Freya system. Also the ROC & fighter command directing is modelled. Pilots (players) receive a barrage of information of audio sighting reports and, if you call for a Radar report, strings of numerical information (which takes some time to learn to interpret) on where, in relation to your plane, is the enemy. After that it's down to trigonometry to plot an intercept and eyeball Mark 1. Fighters close to a bomber formation were masked to Radar by the larger bomber signal return, as in real life. Been caught a few times with this one, attacking the bombers only to discover that they have little friends with them.
In the TWC 1940 BoB timeline Campaign (which lasted the duration of the BoB) the Axis (blue) side did target CH Radar stations, discovered that this only put them out of action for a 24 hour period, then switched back to bombing airfields and the strategic targets that they actually needed to bomb to score campaign points. As the blues didn't know exactly where all the CH Radar stations were exactly and forgetting that once inland the CL Radar took over and lit them up again, it was all to no avail. They also had no idea where the coverage was out and would occasionally stray into another CH radar coverage zone. It was more of an inconvenience to the RAF (red) side players, who would wait further inland for the CL Radar to light up a raid. For a RAF (red) player logging into the server, one would usually hear, "Dover (CH) & Dungeness (CH) Radar are out again". Also Margate (CL) and Sandwich (CL) would be occasional targets.
For the RAF side (red) finding the mobile Freya dishes proved more hazardous and difficult, as these changed position by several kilometres every 12 hour campaign map cycle. Many players were shot down and many valuable aircraft lost (wasted) just trying to find the things. There were also dummy Freya sites.
Both the British & German Radar systems were produced by Siemens, because the German side of Siemens had been seized & taken over by the Nazi's in 1938, whilst the British side of the company remained independent. It reunited after the end of the war.
Really, CH Radar was build by Marconi. CHL Radar was built by MetroVick. The 45 Mhz IF Amplifier in the receiver for most British Radars came out of a Pye TV set.
Very informative and well researched video, one point skimmed over was the technology itself.
German radar was actually well ahead of the system used in chain home, they had carried out reconnaissance of the entire system following Dunkirk and much of the emissions from the chain home network were assumed to be arcing from poor insulators on the electrical grid. The system itself was quite primitive which also helped when it came to repairing damage.
The JU 87 would have been the preferred attack craft for precision bombing but these were removed from service after taking heavy casualties from RAF Hurricanes.
Still, learned much and plenty to think about from this excellent presentation.
“Wich is probably true in a few individual cases” shows video of hermann goring.
4:00
Given Goring's size, I'd count him as two separate cases.
Excelent video. As a former fighter pilot I would like to comment.
Knowing where your enemy is before he knows where you are. Invaluable!
Absent radar. Caps must be established which means that you may be very low on fuel when the enemy shows up. Additionally it is a waste of manpower and aircraft time.
Being able to proceed directly to the enemy also saves fuel. It is important to understand the importance of fuel to the pilot and the ability to engage.
Lastly from a battle management perspective it allows optimized allocation to the threat.
"There is a Pub here now, because of course there is" hahahaha that made me laugh...
A great, in depth analysis, thanks so much for this. By far the best I've seen.
The Germans knew about radar and they thought we had it. Many years ago I read an article in one if the popular historic aviation magazines that the Germans suspected the towers along the coastline were radar transmitter/receivers and flew the zeppelin Graf Zeppelin along the coast looking for the transmissions from these towers, but looked at the same part of the radio spectrum they were using and completely missed our radar transmissions as we were using a different part of the radio spectrum.
Actually, the Navy spotted the zeppelin and passed the information to the Admiralty, who passed it to the Air Ministry, who told the CHL/CHH operators to switch off the system. The Germans got no sigs intel that day.
@@PORRRIDGE_GUN do you have a source for that I recalling an article in Aeroplane.
@@neiloflongbeck5705 Thats where I read it too, but I also recall it in a book written many years ago that I read too.
@@PORRRIDGE_GUN thanks for getting back to me.
I also read (somewhere) that the Germans weren't looking in the correct part of the radio spectrum for the British radar signals but I have my doubts. I don't have specific knowledge on this but it's my assumption that every participant in the war had radio operators continually scanning the radio spectrum looking for anomalous signals.
An excellent video and well-presented! So, it seems to me, that Britain's main advantage over Germany (with regards to destroying one another's radar systems) is that Britain had "eyes on the ground" on the continent whereas Germany had little or no one on UK soil to guide them into their targets.
The impression I always got was that the Germans had a more advanced radar or thought they did and did target the radar stations to some existent but the gaps could be quickly filled ( bit like whack a mole )
I recall a documentary some time ago that Britain’s was slightly behind the Germans at the start of the war but the way it was put together made it easy to modify and improve it compared to the Germans theirs being sealed units that had to be rebuilt at the factory that slowed their their upgrades to the point we quickly overtook them
An outstanding piece of knowledge! One would think a few minutes of advanced notice is better than a true surprise! Thank you for this great info!
I might add that while the Luftwaffe didn't have much of an integral understanding of radar that could be that radar is generally at the time a defensive system and Nazi Germany was projecting its power. It's been noted* that both Britain and France had an almost obsessive concern over bombers due to some prewar studies erroneously indicating that terror bombing of civilian centres would rapidly lead to civilian morale collapse and calls for surrender. This fear of urban strikes is said* to have influenced the inexplicable orders for the cancelling of the Saar Offensive during the "Phoney War" phase and Britain holding back its best interceptors during The Battle of France and therefore allowing the Luftwaffe so many successes flying tactical support missions.
*I'm afraid I don't have any sources to hand.
Another fantastic video and thanks!
I remember reading that an additional British "weapon" was that they would monitor both the fighter and bomber radio frequencies. As it was standard practice for Luftwaffe pilots to conduct a "radio check" with their control tower during start-up, a British frequency monitor would count the checks as another method to get an idea of numbers in advance.
I recall reading there was a similar thing going the other way - a particular piece of equipment on a bomber gave off a detectable signal when it was started, and the Germans then knew a raid was coming. I don't remember more about it than that.
The British mindset was set on defence of an island for years before the war. You'd hope it was effective when needed in 1940.
Very nicely put together, enjoyable and educational. One aspect I’m not sure was touched on . The attempts by the Luftwaffe to knock out the radar installations, while the effect was mostly an exercise in destroying cabling lines, as mentioned quickly remedied. The main issue I think was in the fact that the ju 87 dive bombers were rapidly shot down in high numbers due to sluggish speed and armament. And in the end the radar attacks were too costly pilot and aircraft wise.
Hello Chris!
I have a video idea about Motor-canon's
I can't find a reason why it's a good idea to slap a 37mm autocannon literally inside the prop and even more Next to the inline engine system's Esspecially in 109 series, Yakolev and Lagg Fighter series.
Why risk a lot of problems about stuck shells,overheating of gun breach that might damage Power unit,recoil of big calibers again damaging electronics or oil/water cooling etc. While wing mountings with convergence sacrifing accuracy while not encountering this systems problems. Plus a empty space for to work on. (of course excluding P-63 cobras because I wouldn't miss that opportunity) Thanks!
Edit: I failed to find any research or articles or even videos about this. Will be really glad If you make a video on it :))
No guns in the wings means less support is needed and a lighter airframe is achieved. The whole "stuck shells" thing can be argued about any configuration, if designed properly this shouldn't be an issue. As for the other issues mentioned I'd assume, if designed properly, shouldn't come up with a motor cannon. If an aircraft isn't designed for one and you force it you could have issues however if it's designed to accommodate such weapons then it'll likely be designed around those potential issues.
Part of why could be that a cannon mounted inside of the prop doesn't need synchronization with the propeller. If the cannon was nose-mounted but not in the propeller, then it's fire rate is limited by the propeller's spin rate. I don't know what the fire rate of the cannon was or how fast the propeller typically spins but this is just a guess.
An interesting thought, i do have a question though. I'm well aware of rhe Russian yak's and IL series using 37mm's as well as the US p-39's using them. But was not aware of any 109's using a cannon larger than the 30mm mk108 motor-cannon for an inline. I'm quite interested though if you have any models in particular you can pass along for me to look into.
@@Bou_Diran None were, the MK 108 was the largest motor cannon in a 109.
Mounting cannon possibly close to mass center is good for flight performance. If you mount guns in wings, you need 2 guns instead of 1 for same fire time. You can't install heavy weapon off center, without other one to balance it out, unless plane itself is heavy enough to not care. Wing mounted weapons require sturdier wings. Which means not only more weight, but also shifting that weight away from center of plane, which makes it less responsive in flight.
Analysis of Battle of Britain tends to focus on southern England. Understandable as such was directly threatened with invasion/need for air superiority etc. *however* there were bombing raids on East Coast shipping and Northern England, many of which radar should have contributed more to early detection off.. Many of those attacks were on the coast... Long flights across sea usually result in some navigational error, but how much time for observer Corp to sight aircraft. Given the North South difference Was that reflected in what the luftwaffle experienced with northern attacks. Long flight across sea mean zero fighter escorts along with bombers. Would appear to be tempting targets. If there was time for interception... But that only happens if radar effective/there's defending fighters to put up/radar information fed to fed to fighter defence. Idk... Not responding per radar might have lead luffwaffle towards combination of radar less effective and RAF closer to breaking point than reality... Thus more likely to continue to throw forces towards southern England in attempt to gain air superiority.
Enigma decripts might not be the only time information helpful to defending forces was held back to try help longer term goals.
Thank you, such a great idea and such an awesome treatment!!!
Wow! What an educated, informed, and illuminating analysis! Always wondered about that myself. Never thought of THIS analysis! Excellent history! Thanks!
The Germans used Stukas early in the battle of Britain to take ouy some radar stations.
But they were easy targets for Hurricanes and Spitfires, and pulled out of the battle.
The Luftwaffe should have provided fighters for escorts and continued the Stuka bombings.
Stukas were withdrawn from the battle as they were getting the shit kicked out of them with a fighter escort!!! If Sealion had gone ahead, the Luftwaffe needed the Stukas to deal with the Royal Navy as they were the only effective anti ship weapon they had. that was the primary reason that they were removed from the battle. Only two Radar Stations were attacked by Stukas. the second attack on Ventnor and one on Pooling, both on 18th August 1940. Both CH stations were knocked out for a month!!! (Ventnor did get a Mobile RDF unit equipment installed on the Isle of Wright to cover it, but the kit couldn't be calibrated so it wasn't very good. While the CHL station at Pooling was undamaged and remained in operation). However the Stuka group doing it got the shit kicked out of it by Hurricanes, while the escort got a bit of a kicking from a Spitfire squadron. The first attacks on radar stations were by low level fighter bombers (a mix of Me-110 and Me-109's) while the first attack on Ventnor was done by Ju-88's in a dive attack.
Excellent video Chris. Too many people look for black and white answers (and therefore catchy headlines) in historical analysis, but as you say, it's nearly always more complex and nuanced - and therefore far more interesting!
"...and there is a pub here now, because of course there is..." an English man at heart ;)
Dowling was criticised for sending up individual squadrons, to attack the raiders ASAP., and Leigh-Mallory (no 10 group commander)wanted to send a big wing (50-60 aircraft )to attack. The trouble was it took so long to assemble the big wing, the Germans had bombed their target and were on the way home by the time the big wing could attack. In war game exercises after the Battle of Britain, they used the big wing tactics, and they lost the battle !!! Dowdings tactics were proved to be correct for this time. Later, the big wing tactics were used to success
"Hove, actually" Ha ha!! Bravo !!
Best line in the video for anyone who lives locally. Brilliant that he picked up on a local joke.
Haven't heard that one for ages!
One thing I have learned over the years is that there is always more to a history subject. I had been under the impression that The Luftwaffe was only a few days away from completely wrecking Chain Home. "If only they hadn't switched to bombing London they could have won." I guess that's more dramatic documentary making than "The Luftwaffe didn't have any hope of destroying the radar of the Brits and still get anything else done." Thanx for clearing this up for me. I see I have so much more to learn. Good!
they only ever attacked i think five main CH sites in the south east,the rest of the stations were never attacked and the ROC posts were of course never attacked either
I enjoyed this, but I think you might have missed the critical point, unless I didn't register it in the video. Radar gave time, even though it wasn't that much. But it gave just enough to enable the RAF to get into action, without the need for perpetual standing patrols. It was enough to know when an attack was due, rather than waiting for it to appear to be spotted by the ROC. Fighters of that era did not have that much endurance, and RAF resources were limited. (The Bf109 only had about 15 minutes or so of combat time over England, before it became fuel critical). So the radar gave that critical time to enable the RAF to concentrate its limited numbers at the right time and approximate place. The ROC then took over to spot direction, course changes etc., but the radar was the key.
He covers those exact points in the video.
@@gwtpictgwtpict4214 Sorry - not quite. I have watched the whole thing again. I cannot hear any of the words "perpetual standing patrols". If I have missed it I would be grateful if you could tell me the point at which he says it (although you can infer it if you know exactly how the system worked). This is a very good video, very well presented, but the point I was making was that radar did not stand on its own. It was an integrated system - radar, ROC, controllers and the fighters. But without radar, the other 3 wouldn't survive. I agree he talks well about the flying times, the part played by the ROC etc. The timings are important, but without the early warning, there would be much less time left to get the fighters into position if the ROC, as good as they were, had been the early warning. That's why they developed the sound mirrors in the late 20s and early 30s. Radar gave the ability to at least get fighters into the air - maybe not quite in the right place, but enough to enable the ROC and control to get them properly vectored. If the ROC could have seen as far as the radar, then obviously radar would be less critical - but I don't think they could, even with powerful binoculars. But I may be wrong.
Good video the buildings at ventnor were only slightly damaged but the main power cable was cut and the number of unexploded bombs made it hazardous to operate,so they used a mobile system which was set up nearby.
The cables were in cable tunnels about 18 inches below the surface (on most of the east coast) or routed along hedges,on posts but the weak point was where they joined the masts and in some cases the blocks.
the powerhouse was usually between the transmitter and receiver blocks,the buried reserves could be near their associated block on the surface or in a pair some distance from the main station
One building (the receiver block)at Pevensey was damaged,with a bomb cracking the false roof filled with shingle,the shingle subsequently all fell into the toilet of the building and made it hazardous to use until it was made safe.They continued to use the transmitter in attempt to fool the germans the station was still operational and again moved in a mobile piece of equipment in nearby
Most of the east coast stations also had two underground bunkers (as well as the surface bunkers) called buried reserves,with duplicate equipment but these weren't as capable as the main site having much smaller masts and older equipment
Either way , it was pretty impressive how Britain managed to defend itself like it did.
It should be noted, that the Observer Corps wasn't just a bunch of people with binoculars/field glasses, they also had giant listening horns & parabolic acoustic mirrors, where they could hear the engines of approaching aircraft from many miles away & determine the direction, which they were approaching from. These listening stations were also networked by telephone into the central clearing house, with those ladies pushing pieces around a map table, like we see in the movies, so if the Brits didn't detect the Germans by radar, the listening posts would detect them. If the listening posts failed to detect them, then the people with binoculars/field glasses would see them. It all overlapped in a built in redundancy.
I think there is growing scholarship indicating that while certainly a bright moment for the British people, the effect of the Battle of Britain one way or the other has been greatly overstated.
Britain has spent many years defending its moat. Our history still focuses a lot on the last time the defences failed :)
@@rogerthomas368 1066?
Chris - I was very interested to come across your video commentary on the Chain home system. My father was an RAF Flight Seargent and being very technical and knowledgeable in radio technology, was snapped up and underwent technical training both at Bawdsey and Orford Ness. He was initially posted to the northernmost radar site at Netherbutton on the Orkneys. It was only just completed when he arrived there. With no proper staff quarters yet constucted, he was billeted with the Firths, the farmer on whose land the radar towers were built. He actually ended up renting a nearby crofter's hut, where my mother, a nurse, joined him and in October 1941 I was born in the Hut.
In 1991 I went up to Orkney with my son and not only found the site of the farm but also the concrete bases of the radar masts, together with the nearby power generator shelter and sundry other relics of the Netherbutton site. We also met Mary Firth, daughter of the original farmer on whose land it was all located. My father was subsequently posted to several of the other Chain Home site. After the war he joined BOAC as a flight engineer, but sadly died when I was only five years old. I do recall that the first house my parents bought in Ringwood, Hampshire, was named Netherbutton.
When is the next airplane identification guide? Also, I hope it is about the hawker hurricane or spitfire
I think you sternly underestimate the value of radar and early warning.
Command might have thousands of ground observers deployed; such observers only see a relative few miles. Radar would be a key asset by informing Command about which sector is MOST likely to be attacked, so they may alert aircrews to prepare quickly, plus alert the ground observers in the area. That way, ground observers may provide more specific intercept guidance to already-airborne combat crews, probably by way of Command.
Without the radar, there's much greater chance that attacking forces may attack and depart without ever being hassled. As you admit, aircrews literally can't get in the air to fight quickly enough.
just my two cents but let's assume the Germans would have made the radar sites their primary target:
Ironically, the radar would still have accomplished its goal!
What do you need a radar for? To know WHEN and WHERE the enemy air force attacks.
If the Germans had to CONSTANTLY attack the radar SITES to keep them out of order - all the Brits had to do was focusing their defense there.
The enemy don't need early warning when you become predictable...
But they can't arrange for fighters to be waiting en masse at high altitude at the right place and time for when you arrive. Radar and the ROC enabled that for attacks on inland cities, factories, and airfields. Without radar, the British had no way to know WHICH knocked-out radar station site was going to be attacked or re-attacked that day. The advantage thus lay with the attacker. On top of that, with radar being knocked out, the Germans could also start hitting the ports and shipping. None of that involved being drawn inland where the ROC could let the RAF know where to assemble and where the Brits had an attritional advantage.
True. I would imagine the RAF would have much preferred radar station attacks rather than the attacks on airfields which caused a great amount of disruption. The odds that they could knock out all the radar stations and keep them knocked out whilst not suffering a large amount of attritional losses is not very likely
Brilliant presentation. The question of the radar installations on mainland Great Britain during the battle of Britain not being attacked by the Luftwaffe has been answered. The impression I was given was that the installations were totally ignored by the Germans.
I seem to recall seeing a documentary that the Germans were aware of Chain Home and sent a zeppelin to investigate its abilities. If memory serves their detection sets were of a lower frequency and therefore did not provide useful intelligence. Based upon their findings, the Germans concluded that Chain Home was some kind of weather radar or navigational aid.
I was sorta surprised that this information wasn't included in your vid... which is otherwise informative and well researched.
Further, my limited understanding of German radar is that its primary use was for navigation... but I could be wrong
Thank you Peter Stickney and Richard Vernon for the many detailed and informative comments under this video. It's most helpful and enjoyable to read.
26:15 “Brighton, well Hove actually” lols
One advantage the RAF had was the communications were mainly by landline which was dug deep and protected. Both sides learnt early the hard way that using your radio meant detection and fast interception. Squadrons could be launched and never chat on radio until they sighted an enemy or the leader had a report to send like low on fuel.
Each radar station on its own only gave a piece of the picture to HQ, overlapping stations giving their data meant a far better detailed picture to help make decisions.
Even when radars are jammed same as radios it does not mean it is useless btw. It reduces its effective range and quality but does not fully block. It actually takes huge amounts of power to transmit the amount of energy needed to jam long distances. Even if you jam operators have orders each day (which are changed daily) on what to do. In those days they were to change frequency which was de-conflicted so it didn’t affect neighbouring stations. If you hopped freq and jamming still present you took note of strength and effect on your system. Then kept hopping until you found the best freq on your list. Same as we did for radios.
"And it was here, in these skies that the Luftwaffe was defeated. Not just by brave airmen in fine aircraft, but by invisible beams of electromagnetic energy that could se further than the human eye; the great, British secret weapon: RADAR!"
*Arm gesticulating wildly*
Yeah - that Secret Weapon that everybody had invented independently, and all sides knew about. (By the way, the first in-service radars were Air Search sets the 1937 installation on the USS Leary, and the first production set was the XAF radar on the USS New York. The Germans wnt in more for higher frequency, shorter ranged systems with better resolution intended for aiding AA Fire control. The RAF had a lower performing system with Chain Home, but it was part of the first Integrated Air Defense System, which made it more useful for the war that they had. Everybody thought that there stuff was better than the other guy's, and they were right - for differing reasons.
@@peterstickney7608 The first radar got patented in Germany in 1904 (Hülsmeyer). It's primary intent was to equip ships with it, so collisions could be avoided. It was not commercially successful and the navy completely uninterested (it worked but had a rather short range and was in hindsight a technological dead end). The later radar development was completely independent of it.
@@Segalmed it's a pity it never worked in its early years
To think if it had been used in ww1, could or have been effective in stopping zeppelin raids on london?
@@Segalmed There were a number of patents for radio detection systems in the early 20th century - most, like Huelsmeyer (whose system was not built), were essentially "Automatic Door Opener" systems, where short range detection was either an interrupted or reflected continuous wave beam, with no directionality or ranging. The first actual radio detection hardware was built by the U.S. Navy Research Laboratory in 1922. the NRL built the first pulsed (and therefore ranging) radar in 1934, and British and Germoan efforts yielded pulse radars in 1935 and 1936, respectively. Everybody was keeping their radar development secret, due to its potential in warfare.
There were still some elaks, rumors, and speculation - I happen to have inherited a popular illustrated book - "The War in the Air Fighting Planes and Pilots in Action". John B. Walker, Random House, 1941, makes mention of "Klystron Rays" used in Night Fighting. (The Klystron is a microwave source and amplifier invented in the late 1930s by the Varian Brothers in the U.S. While initially somewhat lower-powered than a Cavity Magnetron, it can, by being used as an amplifier, generate much higher power levels. It also has the advantage of generating coherent signals, which Magnetrons do not, thus allowing for doppler signal processing, reducing vulnerability to countermeasures like chaff.
@@peterstickney7608 Huelsmeyer sold a handful of his devices. But he was on the wrong track with his attempts at ranging (and it was indeed non-directional). As I said, it had no influence on the general development and is mainly of interest, that that early there already was the idea of radar and a proof of concept.
You do such a nice job with these topics. I had often wondered about that same question and your answer is very convincing. Thank you.
Just so you know for the future:
Ventnor is proniunced Vent-nah or Vent-na.
The ending-NOR is always shortened and we don't pronounce the 'R'.
Americans do pronounce those endings like in butter (budderrrrr) but English pronunciation is buTT-a
Hope this helps you with your, already, superb English.
Great video
Anoter good ready son was that Goering didn't want to destroy the Radar because he wanted the radar to keep giving the RAF information because he wanted to knock out the RAF in the air. With the wrong information he was getting from the Luftwatte about how many Spits and Hurricanes they were shooting down, he thought we were running out of planes when in fact we were making more than we had at the begginning!
PS, it is great to hear the perspective of a young German into what happened, thank you!
As long as you're doing Battle of Britain myths, maybe talk about the London bombings. The traditional narrative says that the Luftwaffe attacks on airfields brought the RAF to the breaking point, but then London was accidently bombed leading to Berlin being bombed, then Hitler was enraged and switched targets. I've heard a few times now that Hitler wasn't the only one who planned to bomb London and that was part of the plan to destroy RAF fighters as another way to draw them out, and that this narrative seems to be another "blame Hitler for the loss because he was emotional" tropes.
CreatorUser the Germans thought that the RAF was down to its last 200 fighters, and attacking London was intended to force the RAF to commit fighters to defending London, and the Germans would finish the fighters off. The British still had over 500 fighters.
I don't think there's much question that bombing London was designed to draw RAF fighters up to be destroyed rather than be held in reserve. This would include drawing up fighters from airfields the Luftwaffe couldn't bomb because they were beyond the range of the BF 109.
@@gort8203 There is though since there's still the story that London was only bombed because of Hitler's emotional decision making and the claim that stopping the attacks on airfields somehow was a blunder and what lost the battle for the Germans. That doesn't take in the factual reasons for the switch.
@@creatoruser736 I thought I was agreeing with you. Are you or are you not of the opinion that there was a design behind bombing London that went beyond simple retaliation by Hitler?
@@gort8203 Apologies, we are in agreement. I was just saying that narrative is still out there and prevalent and dispelling it in a comprehensive video would be a good idea.
Chris I just subscribed and of course a thumbs-up since it is with this video I realized that you have made the transition from a gamer making vids to a definitely more historical, detailed approach to all of your subject matter. Congratulations to you on your continuing growth and of course best wishes for the future. Thank you for your posts and I look forward to your future videos.
Best regards from Ontario.
Young military historian Arnold Schwarzenegger before he discovered body building.
You took the words out of my mouth! (He's even got the tooth gap!)
You have been taken in by Ventnors cover story. All the critical installations were underground inside the cliff including cables. Until the 1960's the tunnels were open then they blocked them off with concrete when the modern part of the station was built, which probably re-uses some of these. If you walk around you can still see the two original entrances and some of the ventilation covers, the emergency exit was bulldozed and buried. The huts bombed were all decoys. Due to its height above sea level the requirements for the aerials were easy to achieve with a far smaller antenna than other sites this was hidden and was placed along the cliff away from the surface structures so it was on the highest point (now a car park). Huge complex impressive wood and chicken wire dummy antenna were constructed specifically for the Germans to bomb. As was the temporary unit set up to conceal the fact that the station was not damaged. Ventnor was never off line but sent all its information during its 'offline' time via a dedicated line to another coastal station. All this was done because ventnors far superior range and line of sight to the bomber corridors due to its positioning and height was regarded as critical. When I lived there I knew a couple of old guys who worked there in the later years of the war. It was one of those wartime secrets that nobody knew except those who worked there and a few officers. It would probably never have been documented except in Nazi files because the Germans would probably have been suspicious that despite having knocked it out, the RAF response times to attacks stayed the same. They may have also noticed that it was odd that the station was not on the highest point of the cliff!
I liked this episode very much because it cuts through the jingoistic historical "propaganda" that one reads and sees on British TV. It is the most detached and neutral document that I have ever seen on this subject. Keep up the good work.
Really enjoyed this. Thanks Bismarck a very informative overview of the issues. 👍😁👊
The country of Heinrich Hertz understood radar.
Yes, We All Use "Hertz" As A Measurement Of Frequency But Michael Farady's Hypothesis & James Clerk Maxwell's Math Is The Reason For It . . .
@@thewatcher5271 haha
Enjoyed this. My personal take is that Chain Home took the place or the pressure off of standing patrols. This then reduces fuel use, engine hours and pilot hours. The limited resources of pilots and planes are then able to put their effort into interception.
It may also enable a squadron to be in the air when their base is attacked, saving those most critical resources.
Ten to twenty minutes of extra warning is worth something and maybe a lot on some days. So not decisive, but even if it has psychological effect on the 'home' team it has a poitive value.
Perhaps the Germans didn't actually fully appreciate how effective the system was.
Yes but he is German so would never admit grandaddy was incompetent
They thought they outnumbered and out fought the RAF. Also they DID try and destroy radar sites. They failed and had heavy losses doing so.
aussie jim I think most people have the same problem. People tend to look at things in isolation instead of a part of a system. You kind of alluded to this anyway but in a sense, you sort of answered your own question.
@@torinjones3221 the exact opposite is true. In fact he pretty specifically described how the advantage was not in the radar itself, which the Germans also had, but in the sophisticated command and control system, which the Germans did not have and therefore did not understand how to dismantle.
Hitting small targets with unguided dumb bombs and rudimentary targeting sights was an incredibly difficult task as this excellent video demonstrates. In any case even had they managed to knock out the radar the RAF was very much still in existence, the ROC could still track enemy raids and the Dowding system ensured as speedy a response as possible. Then there was the real problem of how to actually invade a heavilly fortified island-for example the landing barges that were being amassed in European ports were unlikely to make a successful channel crossing even in the calmest waters. It has also been calculated that the Nazis would be unable to get hold of the large number of cargo ships required to transport the necessary heavy armament and supplies. And then of course the Brits were quite prepared to use poison gas and a whole array of flame projectors and other nasties should a landing be attempted. The Nazis came to realise this and quietly shelved Operation Seelowe and then embarked on the equally lunatic Operation Barbarossa which ultimately resulted in the total defeat of the Third Reich.