Produci species intelligibilis: D. Báñez in opposition to Cajetan and Ferrariensis | Marino Neri

This study is focused on the epistemological status of the intellectus agens, phantasma and species intelligibilis considered in the causative moment of the human being's noetic process. After a critical comparison between two interpretations of Cajetan and Ferrariensis, we will expose the Báñezian doctrine of the illumination of the intellectus agens on phantasms, placed ex professo in radical opposition, in fact, to both illuminatio obiectiva (Cajetan) and illuminatio radicalis (Ferrariensis), positing the efficient action of the intellectus agens as a true production of the intelligible species. By carefully comparing the principles and gnoseological consequences of the first two, starting with the analysis of the textual sources, we intend to show the reasonableness of the Salamanca theologian's counter-arguments; moreover, even the solution he proposes is on the one hand a certain systematization of Thomas' theory of knowledge, and on the other hand constitutes an organic reformulation of the latter, in a relationship of original fidelity to Aquinas' thought. Thus, starting from the description of the constituent aspects of Báñez's exegesis, the epistemological risks (e.g. extrinsic assistance or representionalism) associated with this illuminatio effectiva can be considered to have been dispelled. The productive function of the agent intellect can therefore be accepted, insofar as, by negative abstraction, it makes present the intelligible universal, through the synergistic efficient action of the agent intellect (principal cause) that moves the phantasma as an instrument (instrumental cause), thus causing the intelligible species, with that productive abstract operation capable of starting the apprehensive abstraction proper of the possible intellect.