Alex Gregory (University of Southampton): ‘Structural Rationality in Desire’

#LSEChoiceGroup​​​ | 31 January 2024
Alex Gregory (University of Southampton): ‘Structural Rationality in Desire’
Abstract: Can desires be irrational? This paper focuses on the possibility that desires can be irrational in virtue of failing to cohere with other mental states of the person in question (including their other desires). Recent literature on structural irrationality has largely neglected structural requirements on desire, and this paper aims to remedy this neglect, not only to inform that literature, but more because of the broader interest in the topic - for example, in helping evaluate the debates between reasons internalists and reasons externalists, since the former might be interpreted as a truth about structural rationality (see e.g. Gregory 2021, 192-96; Worsnip 2022, 281-88). This paper predominantly focuses on the instrumental requirement to desire the means to our ends, and defends this requirement from numerous objections (e.g. Broome 2005; Wedgwood 2011). Towards the end the paper also expands on some other possible structural requirements on desire.
Alex Gregory is an Associate Professor at the University of Southampton.
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