Good discussion. Some perspective on 42 tons (short tons, mind you, combat loaded) that will neither satisfy viewers nor dampen debate but will explain the outcome: this is the result of the requirements written and what the Army prioritized in the acquisition, which was speed to fielding above all else. Early in the development of the requirement there was a desire to return to the airdroppable (more than once) requirement from the M551 and M8 AGS. However, three things got in the way: (1) the user desired greater protection, especially underbelly protection, that meant that the original M8 design would not meet the requirement (and it needed redesign anyway, as many components had gone obsolete since the cancelation of the program, (2) for whatever reason, the requirements community did not support, nor would the Army fund, a growth in the heavy drop parachute program to allow dropping higher weights, and (3) the desire to deliver the capability quickly ("in the hands of soldiers in 2021") meant that there was not time to design a new vehicle from scratch to meet that requirement. Given the schedule pressure and technical limitations, the requirements community reconsidered their operating concept and decided that airdrop would be so little used that it was not worth retaining. The air transportability requirement became "2 per C-17" which sets an upper bound of roughly 40 tons in transport configuration. The desire was for something smaller and lighter, of course, but given all of the other priorities (mobility, firepower, protection) lighter weight was not weighted above the other key attributes. Enter the second schedule impact. Remember, to meet the 2021 "In Soldiers hands" expectation (which became the year-long Soldier Vehicle Assessment at Fort Bragg), there wasn't time to do a clean sheet design, so the decision was made to pass risk to industry by requiring them to show up with a bid sample vehicle at the start of the competition (a bid sample is a prototype that may lack some production features, but demonstrates the proposed capability); the selection of who would go forward into the prototype evaluation phase would be based on the bid sample, and no redesign would occur after the contract award. The winners would immediately start building prototypes in order to have the necessary performance and safety testing done in time to allow Soldiers to use a platoon set of vehicles in 2021. Requirements were finalized in 2017 and the competition conducted in 2018, with contract award and start of prototype build in December 2018 (which with 18-24 months production lead time for the first prototype, means prototypes would begin to show up just in time). The compressed schedule and bid sample requirement meant any competitor needed to hustle to assemble a vehicle with available components; no time for new or novel designs. So they did the best they could in the time available -- knowing that they would have time to adjust some things during prototype build if they won the contract. (As a footnote: the contracts were Firm Fixed Price contracts for the 12 prototypes plus associated test support; so the contractors had to propose and live within their budgets, and to keep from getting charged extra from constructive changes, the government had to refrain from giving either contractor design direction. So what was bid would be what was built.) BAE of course refreshed the old M8 design addressing the increased protection requirements and obsolescence issues; GDLS took a basic Abrams turret structure, changed the material, and used a hull derived from the ASCOD (though functionally it changed so much that about all that is left in common with the original ASCOD & Ajax forebears is the shape). There was a third competitor initially, but since they failed to get their bid sample turned in in time they were eliminated from the competition. BAE and GDLS of course got contracts, built their prototypes, conducted the SVA and other testing, and then (after a brief period to provide final proposal updates) the final phase of the competition occurred. Key here -- this was one competition all along, with the rules, and the value the government would place on various design features and performance, set at the very beginning of the bid sample phase. The contractors knew the rules of the competition and what would win on a best value (performance weighed against cost) basis. Ultimately, of course, the 42-ton GDLS design won over the 28-ton BAE design. Both were capable of meeting the defined Key Performance Parameters, and as stated above weight was not valued in such as way as to advantage light weight over other Key Performance requirements. In the end, the winner met or exceeded requirements, fits the operating concept as defined in the user requirement, and was at a price point the government considered affordable. You can not like the design; you can argue that the user got the requirement wrong -- people are certainly entitled to their opinions. In the end though the Army did get exactly what it asked for.
There's just one issue that sticks out: the mysterious "compliance" issue that killed the BAE design. Generally speaking, I've only seen that brought out when a entry doesn't meet KPPs or blows contractual deadlines - and BAE was according to army statements, not guilty of either of those. It remains one heck of a mystery.
Agreed, the machine fits the requirements perfectly. I fear it will go the way as the MGS however. No CROWS and APS (admittedly, early production), means it can't survive on a modern battlefield vs peer. No parts commonality with current armored vehicles (atleast that they aren't saying, unlike AMPV).
The Water Grunts have already said they will request armored support from the Army. For the island hoping campaigns they envision these would probably serve the intended purposes that they need. The Chinese islands have bunkers but no real armor that’s known of. Mostly APC’s and such. But here’s the real question: *NAME!* What are we gonna name this thing?!?!
I don't belong in this thread but I want to ask. Would it be worth just folding the infantry BCTs into armored divisions in the same way that the stryker BCTs were? This way the infantry brigades could perform their infantry tasks and if they need rescuing they can call on elements from the division. You give these new divisions a few extra armored vehicles and they could efficiently cover the infantry brigades. There would be using common platforms. If the army still wanted a large number of quick to deploy light divisions some of the infantry brigades could be given to the airborne divisions. They could be specifically trained and equipped to deploy fast and hold ground. Since many of the infantry brigades would be within armored divisions the airborne infantry could get a bigger slice of the AT and air transportable artillery systems.
@@iivin4233 the whole point of the BCT structure is to allow for independent operations at the brigade scale. If you start folding units into divisions again, you can dispense with the independent service and support elements and go back to things like DIVARTY and MBT companies in infantry brigades.
@@LOLHAMMER45678 which was correct during COIN (counter insurgency) doctrine, now we’re shifting toward LSAC (large scale combat) preparing for a war in Europe and the South Pacific. Independent, small scale counterterrorism operations are being replaced with full scale assault and attrition operations.
As a former light infantryman, I'd sure as hell rather have a light/medium tank that has a 105mm M68 that carries 25% more rounds than a 120mm M256, especially given the twin facts of 105mm APFSDS being pretty damned good already, and the Javelin is a thing, well integrated into infantry units at fairly low levels. Chances are, that 105mm is going to be shooting at a lot more sangars, sandbags MG positions in buildings, and BMPs than it is T-90s, and it'll do just dandy on those targets. Meanwhile, we have objective, empirical proof that the Javelins we have in the TO&E down to the rifle company level will do just fine on T-72s, T-80s, and T-90s. Especially since we won't be using uo our supply of quarter million dollar Javelins on friggin' MG positions if we have 50 or so of these clanky-clanks per division ready to spew $500 main gun rounds instead... and *each* tank is probably carrying more main gun HEAT rounds aboard as the rifle company - particularly a *dismounted* rifle company - is carrying Javelins all told. And as for 120mm light and medium tanks, well, the AGS and even the Textron Stingray were both offered with 120mm uogrades as well... and neither managed to find any buyers for a 120mm version. I can't understand how this vehicle is supposed to be *worse* than using up all your ATGMs on non-tank targets, and relying on a HMMWV with a Mk19 for other direct fire support roles...
It would not shock me at all if the 105 was still enough to frontally penetrate Russian T90m’s. They’ve been shown to be exceedingly vulnerable in Ukraine.
Really good comment. The facts are that the MPF can carry much more 105 than 120, that 105 can deal with literally every threat that isn't a modern MBT, and that an attached assault gun allows the infantry to save their TOWs and Javelins for enemy armor. I've become convinced that 105 is a totally reasonable choice.
@@JelqSmith M900 cannot penetrate a T-72B (1990) @ point blank. Even the oldest K-5 compositions such as the earliest T-80U it would not be able to defeat beyond 200m.
@@lIllIlllIlIllIlllIlIllIlllIl That's false. Even if supposing a particular 105 round can't go straight through the front of a particular tank at its thickest part there's always side shots and mobility kills, and that's all completely not factoring in the infantry the MPF will be attached to will have Javelins to shoot at anything the MPF can't shoot through the front of.
@@T51B1 What did I say that was false? You didn't bring a counter to what I addressed. Also the engagements in Ukraine show otherwise pretty consistently. Almost every tank on tank kill during this war has been on a tank shooting another across the frontal arc. Just this week there were photos on telegram of a T-72 with distinct APFSDS penetration marks across the front plate.
It's like arguing a Stug should be used as a Jagdpanther. Just because it has tracks doesn't make it a tank killer. Doctrine should not be dictated by the need to adjust track tension. Thanks for the videos on the MPF they shine a small bit of light on the future of battle tech.
@@MrChickennugget360 i dont think thats tru , but i will say it will have anti tank rounds or sabot rounds and can kill an older tank such as a t72 but newer tanks head on prob not , that would be the m1a2s job, this is ment for air drop into combat zones for door to door fighting or breaching a city or a strong hold position , so like the m1a3 it will have anti tank wepons just in case
It’s almost as people who do this for a living have thought of everything that a redditor comment section might come up with, and much much more, and more to the point these people actually understand how warfare works.
@@nfsfanAndrew Some do, some don't. Some are making assertions of "fact" and telling everyone how wrong the design is, while others are essentially asking questions or asking for insight into the decisions. Either way, I find it funny to imagine an alternative universe where the U.S. Army defers all specification and requirements gathering for a tank to the UA-cam comments section of a Chieftain video. 😁
I think some people just imagine taking two pieces of equipment, plus crew, and making them 1v1 as what makes something "good" or fit a role. Can't treat a vehicle like this as something operating on its own, when it is supposed to be backed up by infantry who are nominally backed up with tanks, air, arty, and their organic AT weapons like Javelin and TOW.
The MPF looks to basically be the Stryker with an 105mm, but on tracks and with a good fire control system, so it’s missing all the bad things that recoil caused that light vehicle. Same mission, but fixing wheeled problems with a track.
It also will have better visibility and likely better overall awareness capabilities That and making it much more reliable As I’ve heard the Stryker was quite troublesome
The concept of the Stryker made sense when it was made but the end result was not what was hoped. So It's back from heavily armed armored car to light tank (the more things change the more they stay the same). Although honestly the US could've done a lot worse than what we got.
You hear a lot of people say the same things about Ajax. Its vibration issues aside, people still think "40 tonnes is too heavy to be a light recce". Despite Bradley being a huge recce vehicle for years and very good at it...
I'll wait until I see the training, but we did have all of these discussions when we transitioned to M2s. The "new" capabilities it gave the infantry company provided many amusing "I got killed at NTC" moments while everyone came to grips with the proper way to fight such a system. The way this is trained in units will reveal the thinking and perhaps make the choice much clearer. I'm sure that this system will require some lessons learned the hard way as well.
On next Q & A, The Chieftain will present his favorite personal anti-rabbit weapon ; The Holy Handgrenade.. and the reasoning why every tank should have a stockpile of those. It's not open for discussion, because we don't want to go down that rabbithole.
Isn't it interesting that you presented most of this in your original presentation, but people have their bias even before watching. Thanks for the content.
1:45 Went to the American Heritage Museum/Collins Foundation today while on Vacation after deployment, got into the whole rabbit hole with my family (Mother and Uncle) about the differences between a Tank, Tank Destroyer, Self Propelled Gun, Infantry Support Vehicle, and more. Using the StuG III ausf G was a good example as it was right next to and infront of the T-34 (F-34) and how it comes down to which country is using it for what purpose, and how even though the StuG and the near by JgPz38(t) look similar in construction one is a Assault Gun while the other is a Tank Destroyer, and how right next to the JgPz38, the M18 GMC and A34 Comet, they look similar but one is a Tank Destroyer/Gun Motor Carriage, while the other is a Tank.
I was reading an article by Christopher Gabel on tanks in the ETO during WWII recently in a history of American tanks. He wrote that 70% of rounds fired were HE. While tank vs tank action gets disproportionate attention most tanks fought in the same conditions that are informing the MPF requirements.
That was a unique circumstance. The WW2 era tanks actually had an HE round and were used as artillery especially later as German armor became non-entity. Also, American tankers liked to use HE at long range against armor because it was easier to spot the fall of shot and a hit would cause at least some damage. A 75mm AP round isn't going to do anything against a Panther at 2000yds. An HE or Willy Pete has a chance of disabling something important
Read chapter 5 of Camp Colt to Desert Storm p 179. "Day in, day out, armor's chief contribution were in functions that armor doctrine should avoid: fighting in cities, reducing pillboxes, and generally operating at the pace of the infantry." Consequently the idea that HE was only being fired at German tanks is nonsensical.
@@patrickreilly2026 I didn't say that. I said that armor engagements in WW2 did not follow the same pattern as armor engagements in the 21st century and that the engagements used a disproportionate amount of HE.
@@stupidburp IMO uparmored CV90 with AMOS turret (but with one mortar replaced by an autocannon) with good APS gonna be better (basically BMP3 but without dismounts). Cause the elevation angles, good HA and all the nice things.
the Sheridan never used the missile in combat. The Sheridan used a 152mm cannon. It's plus was that the HE round was real hard on bunker complexes, and in the open it's bee hive round would clear out a foot ball field.
@@garytotty3971 The 152 cannon was also hard on the Sheridan. My first platoon sergeant's first deployment to Viet Nam was as a buck private loader on an M551 Sheridan. Upon getting into the Sheridan for his first time to get an orientation from his tank commander, he was handed an ammo can. "What's this for, sarge?" "If we shoot the main gun, it's your job to look on and under the turret floor for any parts that fall off---you put them in the ammo can and give it to the mechanics when we get back to basecamp."
@@SomeRandomHuman717 down in Quang Nghai there was a huge fire fight going on where the old bus turn around was. The VC had the building with at least three machine guns in there. They had this infantry C.O trapped under the water fountain. We happened up on this just as a Sheridan rolls up next to the fountain. The C.O. told him to put three HE rounds in there about 30 degrees apart. Then follow that up with can rounds (3!) . I hear the engine rev up, and he looks down at the two guys and tells the to get their heads down. He fires off the first round, and I'd swear the tank jumped three or four inches off the ground! Scared me to death. Puts a hole in the building (concrete) about six foot in diameter. Then another, another. Then he shoots the first can round and it looked something shook the whole building. As he was getting ready for the third round he radio's two squads to come in on the back side. I told Top we needed one of these at our base camp.
@@garytotty3971 I do know about Sheridan. My point is that the MPF reminds me of the same kind of requirement for a lightweight heavily armed vehicle for light troops.
It's not hard to see how various pieces of equipment can be useful. What is had is seeing what piece of equipment is useful enough to be worth the budget.
7:48 "For starters, I couldn't come up with a way of elegantly getting in or out of the thing" Are we about to see the invention of the "Oh bugger, the weather is cold" test?
To increase the interoperability, I feel they should include a fold-down touch-screen next to the infantry phone, showing the view from a turret camera, so that an infantryman can indicate 'points of interest' to the crew.
@@madcynic perhaps if there are lots of poi in the area, or they are well concealed or hid behind cover. Especially in urban areas, with buildings being half blown apart. I could see the merit on being able to put a bullseye on a screen that everyone can see.
@@madcynic A spring-loaded armoured case would help keep it safe. As to why not just call out the coordinates, just because an infantryman can see something, it doesn't mean anyone in the tank can.
@@GoranXII I believe they already have solutions for this in other systems (such as ATAK). They would probably be better off investing in that capability and extending it to more units/improving the integration of it than forcing the solution to be a fixed, mounted screen on the tank. In other words, leverage the existing systems they have for battlefield communication/coordination, and the only thing missing is the turret cam you refer to (which could be presented via ATAK or through these existing systems if they really wanted it and thought it made sense). Provide better mechanisms for infantry to coordinate POI to armor, yes. Relegate this to a mounted touchscreen on the back of the tank, not so sure.
Going onto the subject of using a CROWS instead of a flex 50, i personally think that for use on a vehicle meant to be up close and supporting the infantry most importantly as a organic element of an IBCT the flex is better, we have been told many many many times in my unit (an IBCT) that the CROWS requires a very special class run by civilians for us to really even be allowed to get close to the thing, and even then they love to throw fits, throw codes, and overall make a annoyance of themselves VERY quickly, and with the Op Tempo and supply lines of an IBCT getting those special parts, or hopefully having SOMEONE in your unit that knows how to fix it is in my opinion a weak link. Where as if you just have a flex mount 50, its just a standard 50, i know im going to sound like a reformer here but theres no computer to get fired, theres no cabling to break, theres no "Error 404" that you experience with a CROWS. Now yes i understand the immense advantage that the CROWS can bring, enhanced zoom, thermal, larger area that it can traverse and cover, allowing it to be used safe and buttoned up, allowing the crew basically an extra set of REALLY GOOD eyes, but for a front line light infantry brigade, i just dont think that those are worth the supply and maintenance hassle that comes with a CROWS. Other people i have spoke to in my brigade that use CROWS on JLTVs and MAT-Vs all basically agree, that yes in theory if you can keep it working, if you can keep it maintained, if you have the know how and the spare parts, its a great force multiplier for the boots on the ground, but *ONLY IF* you can do all that, again, the amount of people who are given permission to work on them need to do a civilian run class which from what i have seen is not the easiest thing to go to, now maybe thats just my Commander and 1SG being assholes and not approving the paperwork for me to go. But TL:DR CROWS is too finicky imo for an IBCT and going with the flex was the right move
I think it's less about reliability and more about why the MPF will show up to a fight in the first place. The infantry has plenty of 50s. They don't need the assault gun to show up and start blasting 50 as well. If that would have done anything, they wouldn't need the tank. I'm guessing they are keeping the flex mount as a very backup emergency weapon and focusing their efforts on getting the commander to help the main gun engagement go faster rather than giving him the possibility to be distracted by blasting away with his CROWS. It's like... if it goes into an engagement with anything other than the main gun, does it even need to be there in the first place? Infantry certainly have plenty of 50s and 240s.
I have to disagree. Training issue is training issue, it can be train out of someone. Process can be simplified. Whatever backend logistical issue can be solved without putting someone in actual danger. But for a vehicle that is meant for up close and personal, an exposed crew, especially when they are sticking haflway out of a tall obnoxious metal box, makes them a very obvious target to go for. If we are dealing with couple guys armed with AKs in bushes, that probably is fine. But what if we are dealing with peer that has a bunch of decently trained sniper corp for example... In the end, the army accepted it. Imo, this makes perfect sense as a short term project but there are just a little bit too much compromised for a long term vehicle.
@jintsuubest9331 the problem with the "training issue" is that the Army physically does not allow you to train on the equipment with out the class and certification so you aren't allowed to train on the equipment so the problems can be ironed out
@@jintsuubest9331 Interesting discussion here. I suppose all training issues are not created equal- you have some which truly ought to be viewed through this perspective (i.e. "Just train away the training issue, simplify process, etc.") whereas you have some which are not solved so easily. For example, if one imagines a shortage of fighter pilots- or a decision to not move forward with a new aircraft design because AF determines they won't have enough qualified pilots for it- one could argue that a shortage of fighter pilots or the investment in the new aircraft ought not be decided by number of qualified pilots because it "is just a training issue"- just train more pilots, right? But if you lack enough qualified candidates to even be trained as a pilots in the first place, it isn't solely a training issue at that point. In this case with the CROWS vs. flex 50, I could see it both ways. Maybe this is just big Army being stubborn and not sending more troops for training on CROWS, and it could easily be remedied by sheer will to do so. Then again, if the Army truly believes that CROWS can only be trained to a limited subset of troops because of, for example, limitations/bugs in the technology, or the reliance on civilian contractors, etc. then it becomes both a training issue and a logistical issue in a sense (similar to how training more pilots is both a training issue and a logistical issue).
Hey Chieftain, You mentioned that you could make a video about defining tanks (i. e. what makes a tank/what is a tank). I would enjoy such video enormously. Me and my friends had a bit of a conversation one day about the subject, abd they didn't seem to understand the difference between assault guns and tanks, for example. (they haven't watched your sophisticating videos like me so I had to forgive them.) And of course, loads of examples to convince the average Joe. (Like su-152, StuG, m10, and strv103 etc.)
A misunderstanding of the MPF likely comes from a misunderstanding of the purpose and role of the IBCT in general. IBCTs operate in terrain which leave tanks vulnerable. It’s unlikely a brigade of heavy armor will roll into a heavily wooded and swampy area, that’s where the IBCT is. Based on your previous video I think the MPF will increase the survivability and firepower of the IBCT. The biggest challenge I see is the potential for misuse the MPF or worse, leave them underused. Would of been nice to have had them at JRTC.
Go ask Gamelin's ghost about how wise it is to assume where heavy armor can't go... An IBCT dragging a bunch of armored vehicles into a heavily wooded swamp with them is pretty much the definition of misuse.
Not necessarily. Roads still exist in those areas which is why it’s dangerous for armored vehicles that are constricted to those roads. MPFs working in conjunction with the infantry would not be the lead element because they would be limited to roads very often. Infantrymen would set the conditions for implementation of MPF in the mission. MPF is not going to go out alone and unafraid looking for a fight.
“Unlikely “ in this context has gotten a lot of allies killed. Perhaps foolish would be a better word. Assuming the other side has a wise commander is not a good idea. Nobody is going to send heavy tanks into the Ardennes.
by the way the stug turned out to be one of the best all around vehicles, so if this new "fighting" vehicle is as successful. than they have hit the mark!
The Griffin II design that won is bigger than the updated M8 that BAe submitted, and carries more ammunition. I'm pretty sure they also dispensed with the autoloader and went with a human loader. Its also some 19 tons heavier than the M8 was with its level3 add-on armor. BAe really should have offered the 105mm turret armed version of the CV90 (which in the latest IFV version was already up to 37 tons and protected better than some cold war medium tanks). They'd have likely have won with that as it got hull commonality with a LOT of NATO partners and easier logistics for spare parts that way when deployed overseas on NATO missions. The 105mm gun caliber was likely chosen because of the still LARGE stockpiles of 105mm ammo in US inventory and the fact that HEP/HESH rounds make great bunker punchers and concrete wall openers and are best fired out of a rifled gun. NOT to mention the fact the current CV90s have among the best anti-tank mine protection (defeating stacked 10kg mines) going of all IFVs in service. And they keep developing the thing. In 2015 they developed an active damped suspension system that let the 37 ton CV9035 exceed MBT speeds cross country while reducing wear & tear on the vehicle components and improving crew comfort. They also got two big contracts last year for Slovenia (152 CV9035 Mk IVs of which about 120 witll be with 35mm gun and SPIKE-ER missiles) and the Czech republic for around 210 total MkIVs also. The czech contract losers included the ASCOD and the Lynx 41.
it seems to me like alot of the arguments using the MPF's hard factors (weight, dimensions, and equipment) is a confusion of weight classes from other simplified definitions (Light, Medium, and Heavy) and their intended mission/role, and some hypothetical scenario. my take is that the vehicle and it's hard factors is nothing more but a platform to materialize and realize the concept it was designed for, a concept which has been derived from decades worth of knowledge from previous conflicts. 42 tons is just the weight, even if it does drop in the category of medium tanks in terms of weight class in simplified terms, it doesn't mean that it's mission and role is the same as those. and even if it's looks like a tank, shaped metal box in tracks, doesn't mean it's a tank, a tank can have different kinds of designs, it can even use wheels to move itself around, but that has been found to be more vulnerable and even more automotively hectic to deal with than a track (imagine all the hell around the driveshafts and differentials going around like those in the panhard EBR).
Thank you very much for your thoughts on this. It is interesting to see a bit of a resurgance of "lighter" Tanks and the 105 in a fire support role. It also gives me hope that the Ukrainians will get some good use out of the AMX-10RC
Just keep in mind the amx-10 rc has a weaker 105mm and even the most modernised version still has no stabiliser. Ie it's not a direct comparison and it might fair alot worse.
I like the MPF. When you look at the war in Ukraine, where units get into situations they didn't want to be in such as "Reaction Regiments" having to play heavy infantry, this is a great idea. Light and mobile infantry bounce around the battlefield and just when the enemy thinks they can hold them off with a dug-in defense line the MPF comes along a rips apart their defenses. Basically what the Army is doing here is that they knew an enemy will try to counter their Light Infantry with other infantry, well that would be a bad plan thanks to MPF, it gives our infantry a very big stick to send in to enemy strong points or DFPs.
That is not how tanks are being used in Ukraine. One of the main reasons why the battles have bogged down into attritional trench warfare is that ATGMs and drones have made classic armored assaults untenable. They are mostly being used for defensive direct fires and mostly providing indirect fires. In that, the MPF won't do any better or worse than the old T-62s Russia dragged in.
Ukraine has been focused on indirect fire and explosive weapons. There are however many close engagements within a few kilometers of the adversaries. A 120mm automatic gun mortar such as NEMO / AMOS seems like a better option for fire support in that environment.
PLS (10x10 version) had a curb weight of about 50,000lbs lbs, unarmored. And we used those in the 101st in support of our Infantry battalion. We had our own HEMMET wrecker, while the brigade support had some HETTS.
I was reading a few of those comments about the gun, and that it's going to fight T-72s whether the tank wants to or not. I was thinking that while the 105 might not be as much of a tank killer as a 120, the 105 with modern ammunition should be nothing to sneeze at. The centurion had a 105 and it did just fine for a long time. The key word to me though was ammunition. I think our shells are a bit different now than they were in 1940s.
07:50 - I was not at all ready for the imagery of Chieftain getting eaten by a wild, prowling armored vehicle. Then again, they _are_ especially dangerous in this season of the year, when they come out of hibernation.
2:15 number 4- absolutely, the MGS was top heavy, had overloaded suspension and was generally awkward as a vehicle. It was quite restricted in where it was able to go.
@@egoalter1276 MGS at worst took up a massive amount of time from armorers. Don't have it in front of me, so the number is wrong. But I remember reading something along the lines of 70% of time for maintenance of all vehicles was devoted to MGS.
My main point of concern with the 105mm being chosen is for logistical reasons. It’s another type of ammunition to haul around, instead of further standardizing on the 120mm. It does help that the 105mm is still a standard NATO caliber, and the Stryker MGS carries that caliber as well though.
“A lot of the complaints seem to be unwarranted.” Bold of you to assume these people are actually making criticisms based on reality and not their fever dreams
It does sound like, at some point, the Army changed their mind on what *exactly* they wanted considering there was a time they were thinking about making a requirement for air-drop capability which would've resulted in a significantly lighter vehicle by necessity. That would've been a true 'light tank' as I see one. What they have now is still *sort of* a light tank, but it's not so light and it's not so tank. The StuG III comparisons are apt. I do still feel that at least role wise MPF will find itself doing 'light tank things' alongside 'assault gun' things, which I suppose does put it in a class of it's own, though for myself that probably just means I will expand my definition of what a "light" tank can be
Agreed, but without air capabilities (being only rail, ship, C5/C17) the MPF will get to the fight at the same time as a Abrams could. So why spend tens of billions on a new platform and not just give M1s which we have plenty of in reserve in limited numbers to IBCTs? Heck the original 105 M1s were only 54t, reduce the armor/engine to the level of MPF and even with updated electronics you'd be right at the weight of a MPF.
@@requen You've never moved heavy equipment have you ? There aren't THAT many C-5s and C-17s in USAF inventory to begin with and using a C-17 to haul a single M1 is a universally stupid waste of transport resources. I could break down everything wrong with your statement but I just don't have that sort of time. FORTUNATELY there's already a government briefing document detailing the IBCT modernization efforts. sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R44968.pdf
@@Michael-wo6ldyeah I think people are missing that the IBCT are getting completely reworked and will look dramatically different and fight differently. The MPF and ISV will give a lot more firepower and mobility to the brigade.
I think it's real purpose is to be a large direct fire cannon which can keep up with the infantry. It can be used to engage machine gun nests and other fortifications at long range allowing the infantry to save their javelins and tows for tanks if they show up.
Chieftain nailed it with his "Stug" comment..personally, having served alongside Leopard 1s, looking at all this armor in the 40 tons range, wondering how much better they would be vs a new build Leopard 1 with all the latest bling...?
Ukraine has shown that tank on tank combat is very rare. More then likely these would come up against IVF's and I imagine the 105 is more then capable of knocking them out.
While tank on tank combat appears to be rare in Ukraine (although any information coming out of there needs to be taken with a healthy dose of skepticism), I'm not sure we can claim that is a generally applicable lesson. Ukraine started the war with a relatively weak tank force and seems to have kept it back as a reserve, leaving few chances for large scale tank battles.
@@ARCNA442 That isn't true. Ukraine started the war with hundreds of tanks including 4 Armored brigades. and there were tank-on-tank engagements. A lot the footage fighting in cities like Chernihiv, where the 1st Tank Brigade fought was never released, likely for OPSEC reasons.
Yeah, the 105 is "inadequate" for dealing with MBT armor, but it's not intended for that, and modern 105 SABOT rounds (like M900) will still easily go through the side hull and turret armor of modern MBT's.
They'll easily go thru the front of most russian MBTs also. Remember for all the fancy naming, a T-90 is still only 53 short tons in its most updated version and the T-72 family is lighter than that. Prior to the war in ukraine fewer than 2400 T-90s had been built and 1000 of those are in India and 100 in Egypt. Russia themselves only built about 1,000 for domestic usage. Meanwhile there were 25,000+ T-72s built,
Without ever having seen your channel, I saw your face and immediately knew what your voice would sound like. I was not disappointed. That's not an insult. I love reading all the armchair warriors in your comment section. They clearly know more about the machine than the people who designed it, lmao. I can't imagine being so full of myself that I think I know more than actual experts.
America should just import rabbits from Caerbannog and just air drop them upon our enemies. Surely, they can not have that many Holy Hand Grenades in Russia. I mean, LOOK AT THE BONES!
I have a suggestion for a new rule. Don't ask about the capabilities of a gun vs. a given tank unless you've already pondered volunteering to let that gun take one shot at the tank with you sitting in it with the round of their choice. Then after that, you can tell everybody how that gun didn't do a very good job.
This reminds me of what GI History Handbook said about small arms: There are graveyards full of people killed by supposedly anemic rounds. (might be paraphrasing) Personally, I try to avoid getting shot by .22LR let alone anything heavier.
The MPF will most likely not have the armour package to take MBT anti tank munitions, but how about 25, 30 or 40mm autocannon rounds? I'm guessing that a support vehicle for an infantry unit that might go up against BMPs, will be very happy if it can shrug of those autocannon rounds from the front, unlike many IFVs (I know, it is not an IFV, but they overlap in the support infantry role).
I believe the confusion is caused by the Army and its tangled aspects of a Stryker Brigades, the light infantry units aka 10th Mountain and 82/101 and an Infantry Brigade e (or Division) and what makes it Infantry vs Armored Bridges or Divisions. Maybe one day we will see the MPF bouncing alongside the highway by Ft Richardson like we once had the M48 or M-60 tanks! (which they had to cut down a forest North of Anchorage because the sight distances over 100 yards were impossible in the Alaska Forests!
Thanks for the effort and patience on these videos 😀 However......lol When I heard the vehicle weight I was even less convinced about MPF. Maintenance and logistics requirements and just plain common sense dictates that if your supporting a Stryker brigade you build something on a Stryker platform. The same applies to Bradley and future OMFV units. When the Army developed the Stryker Dragoon they chose a cost effective off-the-shelf drop-in solution with the Konigsberg MCT-30 turret. The Infantry fire support requirement does not need the re-invention of the wheel or an entirely new vehicle with its additional logistics and maintenance requirements. It requires an effective off-the-shelf drop-in turret that will fit Stryker, Bradley and the OMFV. These solutions already exist. If the Army really wants a 105mm to use up existing ammo stockpiles then something like the Cockerill 3105 optional manned turret with its 105mm HP gun seems like a solution. It's certainly more proven and low risk than the Stryker MGS was. Its already been fitted to many different platforms. Other manufacturers exist with similar products. Another, and arguable more flexible option is a 120mm gun/mortar turret. I am some what confused. The U.S Army is already seeking to acquire a Stryker based 120mm gun-mortar system to replace its M1129 Stryker 120mm mortar carrier. The Army requirement states a minimum range of 220 yards. That means they want a direct fire capability. A 120mm mortar round will make a nice big hole in you average house. Does this not overlap with the MFP requirement? It's "not a light tank" afterall. It's just meant to deliver firepower to support the Infantry. The 120mm gun-mortar is a more flexible solution. This kind of system can deliver a large high explosive projectile against fortifications and structures both indirectly and directly with the option of firing a variety of 120mm guided mortar rounds like Strix or the future XM395 PGMM. An example would be the Patria NEMO unmanned 120mm gun-mortar turret. If the MPF must be tracked, then put a NEMO-style turret on a Bradley or OMFV chassis.
I agree witj you whole heartedly about the vehicle's intended use and role as well as how it will likely be used. I am more convinced the name of the vehicle program is more to do with fooling congress to let the Army buy more tank/tanklike vehicles without congress flipping out about tanks being expensive. Even though this probably costs a pretty penny.
considering BAE's MPF only weighed 27 tons - minus all the possible add-on armor packages - and came equipped with a proven autoloader design, which was also tested with the 120mm smoothbore, it really is surprising as to why GDLS MPF was chosen
Im glad you said something abot the cv 120 im tired of people thinking its so much better its a good vehicle i assume but like you said no one has bought it
I wonder how much of the decision to avoid going to 120 was a forward looking decision-after all, most nations considering new tank development are going to 130 or 140mm cannons. Be kind of silly to develop and deploy a 120mm gun MPF only to have that AT capability fade into obsolescence inside a decade or two as a new bigger gun becomes the mainstay. Meanwhile, keeping the 105, if the Army goes to 130 or 140 for the future MBT, becomes even more of a strong point as the MPF becomes notably more important as a relatively light and high-ammo count alternative.
Given the range and accuracy of Javelin and TOW, in most cases, a missile will be more useful than a cannon when fighting enemy MBTs. There might be some conditions when the missile's guidance system is less capable than the thermal sight a gunner uses, but not very often. If you can't see it from where you are with a thermal sight, neither system is going to work.
Within the context of the last comment regarding Bradley and Marder, I belive adding the cv90 to that discussion would be interesting given Sweden promising 50 cv9040 for Ukraine.
From my short time in the U.S. Army and discussion of tactics when there the machine in question seems to be well thought out for the role it is intended to play. That being working in a mostly urban environment where mobility and agility is needed.
My issue with 105mm is less so of anti-armour performance alone, but rather of growth potential and ammunition aspect. 120mm caliber already has incredibly capable APFSDS and AMP rounds available, meanwhile 105mm AMP has yet to be developed and has to be pursued purely because of using 105mm on the MPF. While APFSDS performance isn't the priority (due to MPF's role, as you pointed out), it would still be beneficial to make use of powerfull already in-service rounds instead of using a slightly dated M900 or having to develop a new round. Picking 120mm would also simplify the logistics to a degree, although ig its not as big of an advantage given MPFs will serve in different units than M1s.
And, as others have noted, this vehicle is meant to kill hardpoints, sniper nests, apc/ifv and softer vehicles, and only (if things go Very Wrong) shoot at actual tanks until their camouflage-wearing speedbump friends lob ATGMs at it. Anti-tank being at best a tertiary mission, more rounds for the primary mission is a better design choice. (IMO) Needless to say, if I crewed one, I would want the Navy Railgun thing or an equivalent mounted on my ride. With a Wings worth of CAS at my personal disposal 24/7. So would anyone. But the question is, what is the best for the mission? If a smaller gun is better for the main job- it is the right choice. If that same gun makes crews decide not to hunt tanks for "The Glory!!!" of it, all the better.
Legacy rounds for the 105mm M68/A1 gun are the M392 series APDS-T , M728 APDS-T, M735 APFSDS-T, M774 APFSDS-T, M833 APFSDS-T, M456 series HEAT-T, M393A2 HEP-T, M494 series APERS-T (aka Beehive) and M416 WP-T. Granted much of the listed cartridge models are long out of production, one should not have to spend a lot of time reinventing the wheel, so to speak. The range of ammo types would be sufficient to cover almost all of the expected threat target arrays for an air transportable battalion task force my face in the foreseeable future. Keep in mind, what must be resisted at all cost is that insidious mission/task creep that will explode the cost of any future weapon system. Remember, 'Perfection is the enemy of good enough.
When Sweden adopted the strv103 TANK people classified it a "tank destroyer" or spg. When Sweden adopted the IKV91 which literary means "infantry cannon wagon" people classified it as a "light tank"...
Question regarding the CoAx MG. The British Challenger 2 has had several friendly fire incidents when using the CoAx in close support of infantry due to the offset between the main sight and the CoAx. Since the MPF is intended as a close support vehicle, has this problem been addressed on the MPF?
Is the boiling vessel world class? Keurig? How many rounds of coffee does it carry? Can they be loaded quickly and efficiently? How about pastries? Will it support expresso upgrades?
My main question to ask is as such: I remember reading that the M10 Booker (MPF) due to its weight would require the very same heavy trucks and trailers (forgot the exact units, the US army is not my forté) used to move the M1 Abrams to be moved over long distances. Rather than the medium trucks and trailers that were already an organic part of these infantry units. Thus you are adding a lot of extra tail in new vehicles and spares to these units to allow them to operate the MPF properly. With that in mind, why not save the money on procurement of the MPF and field the M1 Abrams in that role? As far as I can tell the major downsides there would be that you only get one per C-17 compared to 2 MPFs, and likely far greater fuel consumption. Unless those two requirements do indeed make a world of difference in allowing light infantry battalions to operate with organic armour or not.
There is still the fundamental problem of weight and particularly bridging. Right now, the heaviest vehicle in a light division is a couple of tons heavier than MPF (a loaded HEMTT variant) so there is no different operational restriction. M1 is heavier than that and would require a more limited movement map. In other words, a light division is entirely self mobile in an area where no bridges are above class 50, that would not apply with M1s attached.
Great comments here all i have to add is #lucky good timing as who knows what is new as this is ground up clean sheet design. Be interesting to know who provides the engine all known is an Allison Drivetrain apparently.
Hi i have watched a lot of tank videos on armour... but havnt seen one about tank armour working irl. I watched fury and saw how the tiger shrugged off the shermans... but modern, do we have examples of tanks surviving hits?
I think it's precisely because the AGS lost that the Chieftain was allowed to film inside. Since it isn't going to be an active duty vehicle, it remains a curiosity. A prototype for testing that never went anywhere.
@@nobleman-swerve I had assumed being made for the same spec sheet would be enough for us to not see it for a few decades. Then again, they do expect to stuff it full of grunts for the next few decades.
As a member of an M60 battalion in the late 70s, that 105 was a damn good gun. Certainly not the 120, but good enough. As an infantry support vehicle, it should do well. It can handle the older tanks, from T72 back and remember, there are still a lot of those out there. In fact the bulk of Saddam's tanks could have been handled by the M60s. The M1 just made the win less bloody for us (always a good thing). Beats the crap out of the Sheridan.
I am curious about your opinion of post-WWII light tanks Chieftain. I've heard it said light tanks became effectively obsolete during WWII, but then France made AMX-13 light tanks after the war and they sold like hot cakes, but then again I've been told the AMX-13 was not a very good tank. It's been very difficult for me to find any instance of combat that has vindicated or condemned the AMX-13 so I'm curious what you think of them.
Im not sure where the AMX13 was exported to, but keep in mind that in many countries, having anything cheap and armored is the goal. And most of the countries just so happen to be in Africa and the Levant where i imagine french sales were common. Could be wrong though.
AMX-13 was very good for the French, who wanted to be able to do colonial things, and most of the other nations who bought it also don't seem to be expecting to fight massive armor battles. You probably wouldn't want to fight a bunch of t-64s charging across Europe in one, though.
I think I could make a lot of money selling a system of fold-down seats that would attach to the side skirts, say five or six per side. Seats would be able to lock into forward, side, and rear facing positions. An MPF platoon could then provide rapid transportation for a platoon+/- of infantry in a much safer manner than if they crowded onto the turret roof and front deck, WW2 GI-style. Ammo supply did not seem to be mentioned, but my guess is that the MPF will have more main gun ammo than M1A2 (40 rds). I'd say anywhere from 48-52. For reference, the M1 slick held 55 and the M60A1/A3 held 63.
The increased ammo capacity of a 105-equipped vehicle was actually one of the main reasons the original M1s up until M1A1's introduction had 105mm guns. They wanted to have a lot more ammo.
When the Striker came out I b*tched and moaned that it wasn't any good too large la-dee-da. I was proven wrong. I don't know anything near enough about modern armor (M1) or the MPF (in particular) to take a side. I hope it works out better than plannned...that'd be nice.
Whenever I see naysayers about the MPF, i go back to this video. Its such a good response. When palced in the context of the US army doctrine, it makes complete sense. perhaps one can always argue the weight could have been used for more capability... but at the end of the day, the MPF meets the requirement, and is a low-risk platform being based off an existing vehicle. We can always try to do better but this is what we get and its not a bad one
IIRC the issue with the Abrams in USMC was the decrease of the number of supply ships per task force/battlegroup from 4 to 3 hence making the transport space a premium.
Also, the USMC took a good long look at their expected taks list, and determined that an opposed beach landing requiring armour support was not very likely to occur any time soon. Reverting to a mostly light infantry force with only moderate armour support saves them a lot of money (a perpetual problem for the USMC), thus allowing them to address a lot of other issues that have been accumulating, without really impacting their effectiveness. If they ever did REALLY need tanks, they can always ask the Army, but in the mean time fixed and rotary wing air support and naval shore bombardment are probably more than adequate support for any task they are likely to actually receive
I think part of the question about tonnage is that it could be considered a rough proxy to cost and maintenance, and that a 40 ton MPF might not cost that much less than an actual tank.
I have a question about weight @The Chieftain With many of our vehicles are getting heavier, are we actually sacrificing mobility, or is there a new technology (Like suspension or something.) that overcomes these high ground pressures? For example the HMMWV replacement the JLTV. I keep reading that the JLTV is so much better off road but given that it weighs about x5 the standard HMMWV how is that possible? Specifically regarding snow and mud I would think the JLTV would be worse becasue it must have a significantly higher ground pressure.
It also has much larger wheels as I recall and can deflate them accordingly. Plus it can raise itself to increase ground clearance. There may be special tricks or can do with gearing, diffs and sending power to the correct wheels at the right time
Excellent discussion. Both BAE and GDLS are customers of our company so we were not going to lose on this competition either way, but I believe we are getting the best vehicle as a result.
I served in a stryker brigade. their mobility is basically useless if there are mines or FASCAM scattered about. The stryker mgs can only fire in forward or rear because shooting at an angle it can tip the stryker over (the troops working with the MGS hated it, too). I like that the MPF will fill that role. It should be more reliable than a stryker, too. Our infantry companies spent half their week in the motorpool trying to keep them running.
Regarding the bonus question about the lack of tanks for the Marines. I know that it is technically a separate service, but in time of war couldn't you just "cross attach" an army tank battalion to a USMC division/brigade if and when the operation required it? I'd just assume that the overall theatre commander would simply tell the two "generals with fewer stars" than him i.e. the commanders if said USMC and Army division/brigade to figure out the details and get it done. Hard to imagine that an opportunity for a meaningful amphibious operation would be passed up just because the Marines no longer have tanks "organicaly". It's not as if the concept of a "battlegroup" is unknown territory. And any large scale naval invasion already will by definition involve at least two of the services (Marines and Navy) and very likely also support from the air force.
As always great stuff. Today enhanced by the shirt. RUN AWAY! Huge fan of MP and The Chieftain. PS: Marder and Bradley vid with a view to combat in Ukraine would be great.
In regards to the CV90 with either the 105mm or 120mm, people forget that one of the CV90's biggest strengths is that it is a whole family of outstanding armoured vehicles based on the same chassis. This allows a nation fielding it to have a lot of commonality of parts for maintenance and manufacturing. This advantage is lost on the US due to not using the CV90 for it's base IFV and variants.
Like my Uncle’s who served in the infantry in WW2 ETO. They said a tank was easy to defeat but on two conditions. One remained hidden, two remove the enemy infantry support. Then destroy the tank
I think this is a great step forward for the military I like the MPS it won't scream out in pain every time it fires and if you didn't have the best cross-country Mobility not just good cross-country Mobility
It's infantry support role/intention to me just says "So it's just a big M3 Scott?" - albeit with all the the modern gizmos and doodads. They may be saying it's a new designation, but the underlying concept is not at all novel so I'd say its almost certainly just a marketing thing.
I glad that some one point it out that it is not a light tank. I am tired of those people who try to tell you it is a new generation "light" tank because MBT are now mostly in the 60t range.
I am amused by the number of commenters who assume that the military is stupid, and that they are so much smarter as to what the military needs to carry out its function of waging war. I think it's pretty much agreed that the U.S. is the number one military force in the world. It hasn't got that way by being led by a bunch of idiots. They live and breathe on how our armed forces can continue being number one. Suddenly, these Monday Morning Quarterbacks become experts, and know more about weapons systems, strategies, etc than the people who are the real experts. Sure, the military will make mistakes, but that usually because the politicians get involved, and begin telling the military how to do its job. We are lucky to have people like you to set the record straight.
Definitely looking forward to the M8 video! As to your last response, part of the reason the Marines got rid of the Abrams is that _the SEPv3 is _*_20%_*_ over the weight capacity_ of the LCAC hovercraft. The M1A1s that the Marines had were "only" 10% over capacity, which was tolerable at a higher rate of overhaul. But I'm not sure an LCAC can even float with a 72 ton load, let alone get up on the skirt.
I’d rather handle logistics of transporting 105 rounds for knocking holes in houses and bunkers then Javelins. The transport containers are smaller and you only have to distribute them to said number of vehicles, not to every other infantry man whose first thought will be to fire and forget as soon as humanly possible to not having a Javelin on his back for the foreseeable future
dont get why folks are mad about 40 tons. a loaded semi-truck weighs between 40 and 41 tons (in-state local can run 45 tons). i know bridging weight is slightly different because a truck is 65 feet long and this Vehicle is considerably shorter, but the Vehicle isnt hitting the bridge deck at 65 miles per hour either.
One critical factor I haven’t seen discussed is that with the M1’s adoption of the Trophy APS system it became much more dangerous for infantry to hang out near the tank. MPF lacking an APS may be very intentional. It’s actually a qualitative gap in capability. The M1 now can be free to hunt other tanks and act aggressively with other motorized troops while the MPF can go block by block clearing houses with the grunts.
The concerns of APS with infantry have been studied and the risks are generally overstated. Especially when one considers that friendly infantry shouldn't be between the vehicle and the enemy due to the blast danger zone from the 105mm
Good discussion. Some perspective on 42 tons (short tons, mind you, combat loaded) that will neither satisfy viewers nor dampen debate but will explain the outcome: this is the result of the requirements written and what the Army prioritized in the acquisition, which was speed to fielding above all else.
Early in the development of the requirement there was a desire to return to the airdroppable (more than once) requirement from the M551 and M8 AGS. However, three things got in the way: (1) the user desired greater protection, especially underbelly protection, that meant that the original M8 design would not meet the requirement (and it needed redesign anyway, as many components had gone obsolete since the cancelation of the program, (2) for whatever reason, the requirements community did not support, nor would the Army fund, a growth in the heavy drop parachute program to allow dropping higher weights, and (3) the desire to deliver the capability quickly ("in the hands of soldiers in 2021") meant that there was not time to design a new vehicle from scratch to meet that requirement.
Given the schedule pressure and technical limitations, the requirements community reconsidered their operating concept and decided that airdrop would be so little used that it was not worth retaining. The air transportability requirement became "2 per C-17" which sets an upper bound of roughly 40 tons in transport configuration. The desire was for something smaller and lighter, of course, but given all of the other priorities (mobility, firepower, protection) lighter weight was not weighted above the other key attributes.
Enter the second schedule impact. Remember, to meet the 2021 "In Soldiers hands" expectation (which became the year-long Soldier Vehicle Assessment at Fort Bragg), there wasn't time to do a clean sheet design, so the decision was made to pass risk to industry by requiring them to show up with a bid sample vehicle at the start of the competition (a bid sample is a prototype that may lack some production features, but demonstrates the proposed capability); the selection of who would go forward into the prototype evaluation phase would be based on the bid sample, and no redesign would occur after the contract award. The winners would immediately start building prototypes in order to have the necessary performance and safety testing done in time to allow Soldiers to use a platoon set of vehicles in 2021. Requirements were finalized in 2017 and the competition conducted in 2018, with contract award and start of prototype build in December 2018 (which with 18-24 months production lead time for the first prototype, means prototypes would begin to show up just in time).
The compressed schedule and bid sample requirement meant any competitor needed to hustle to assemble a vehicle with available components; no time for new or novel designs. So they did the best they could in the time available -- knowing that they would have time to adjust some things during prototype build if they won the contract. (As a footnote: the contracts were Firm Fixed Price contracts for the 12 prototypes plus associated test support; so the contractors had to propose and live within their budgets, and to keep from getting charged extra from constructive changes, the government had to refrain from giving either contractor design direction. So what was bid would be what was built.)
BAE of course refreshed the old M8 design addressing the increased protection requirements and obsolescence issues; GDLS took a basic Abrams turret structure, changed the material, and used a hull derived from the ASCOD (though functionally it changed so much that about all that is left in common with the original ASCOD & Ajax forebears is the shape). There was a third competitor initially, but since they failed to get their bid sample turned in in time they were eliminated from the competition.
BAE and GDLS of course got contracts, built their prototypes, conducted the SVA and other testing, and then (after a brief period to provide final proposal updates) the final phase of the competition occurred. Key here -- this was one competition all along, with the rules, and the value the government would place on various design features and performance, set at the very beginning of the bid sample phase. The contractors knew the rules of the competition and what would win on a best value (performance weighed against cost) basis.
Ultimately, of course, the 42-ton GDLS design won over the 28-ton BAE design. Both were capable of meeting the defined Key Performance Parameters, and as stated above weight was not valued in such as way as to advantage light weight over other Key Performance requirements. In the end, the winner met or exceeded requirements, fits the operating concept as defined in the user requirement, and was at a price point the government considered affordable.
You can not like the design; you can argue that the user got the requirement wrong -- people are certainly entitled to their opinions. In the end though the Army did get exactly what it asked for.
There's just one issue that sticks out: the mysterious "compliance" issue that killed the BAE design. Generally speaking, I've only seen that brought out when a entry doesn't meet KPPs or blows contractual deadlines - and BAE was according to army statements, not guilty of either of those. It remains one heck of a mystery.
Agreed, the machine fits the requirements perfectly. I fear it will go the way as the MGS however. No CROWS and APS (admittedly, early production), means it can't survive on a modern battlefield vs peer. No parts commonality with current armored vehicles (atleast that they aren't saying, unlike AMPV).
I love the airdroppable (more than once) bit, haha. Thanks for clarifying the weight part as well.
The Water Grunts have already said they will request armored support from the Army. For the island hoping campaigns they envision these would probably serve the intended purposes that they need. The Chinese islands have bunkers but no real armor that’s known of. Mostly APC’s and such.
But here’s the real question: *NAME!* What are we gonna name this thing?!?!
@@soonerfrac4611 M1 as always
As the creator of the joint concept for expeditionary operations, I would enjoy talking to you about this.
Reach out to me on my FB page, can you? Or DM me on Twitter or some such
@@TheChieftainsHatch WILCO Ps - love this channel, cavalryman, used your insights for the DAGOR
I don't belong in this thread but I want to ask. Would it be worth just folding the infantry BCTs into armored divisions in the same way that the stryker BCTs were?
This way the infantry brigades could perform their infantry tasks and if they need rescuing they can call on elements from the division.
You give these new divisions a few extra armored vehicles and they could efficiently cover the infantry brigades. There would be using common platforms.
If the army still wanted a large number of quick to deploy light divisions some of the infantry brigades could be given to the airborne divisions. They could be specifically trained and equipped to deploy fast and hold ground.
Since many of the infantry brigades would be within armored divisions the airborne infantry could get a bigger slice of the AT and air transportable artillery systems.
@@iivin4233 the whole point of the BCT structure is to allow for independent operations at the brigade scale. If you start folding units into divisions again, you can dispense with the independent service and support elements and go back to things like DIVARTY and MBT companies in infantry brigades.
@@LOLHAMMER45678 which was correct during COIN (counter insurgency) doctrine, now we’re shifting toward LSAC (large scale combat) preparing for a war in Europe and the South Pacific. Independent, small scale counterterrorism operations are being replaced with full scale assault and attrition operations.
As a former light infantryman, I'd sure as hell rather have a light/medium tank that has a 105mm M68 that carries 25% more rounds than a 120mm M256, especially given the twin facts of 105mm APFSDS being pretty damned good already, and the Javelin is a thing, well integrated into infantry units at fairly low levels.
Chances are, that 105mm is going to be shooting at a lot more sangars, sandbags MG positions in buildings, and BMPs than it is T-90s, and it'll do just dandy on those targets.
Meanwhile, we have objective, empirical proof that the Javelins we have in the TO&E down to the rifle company level will do just fine on T-72s, T-80s, and T-90s. Especially since we won't be using uo our supply of quarter million dollar Javelins on friggin' MG positions if we have 50 or so of these clanky-clanks per division ready to spew $500 main gun rounds instead... and *each* tank is probably carrying more main gun HEAT rounds aboard as the rifle company - particularly a *dismounted* rifle company - is carrying Javelins all told.
And as for 120mm light and medium tanks, well, the AGS and even the Textron Stingray were both offered with 120mm uogrades as well... and neither managed to find any buyers for a 120mm version.
I can't understand how this vehicle is supposed to be *worse* than using up all your ATGMs on non-tank targets, and relying on a HMMWV with a Mk19 for other direct fire support roles...
It would not shock me at all if the 105 was still enough to frontally penetrate Russian T90m’s. They’ve been shown to be exceedingly vulnerable in Ukraine.
Really good comment. The facts are that the MPF can carry much more 105 than 120, that 105 can deal with literally every threat that isn't a modern MBT, and that an attached assault gun allows the infantry to save their TOWs and Javelins for enemy armor. I've become convinced that 105 is a totally reasonable choice.
@@JelqSmith M900 cannot penetrate a T-72B (1990) @ point blank. Even the oldest K-5 compositions such as the earliest T-80U it would not be able to defeat beyond 200m.
@@lIllIlllIlIllIlllIlIllIlllIl That's false. Even if supposing a particular 105 round can't go straight through the front of a particular tank at its thickest part there's always side shots and mobility kills, and that's all completely not factoring in the infantry the MPF will be attached to will have Javelins to shoot at anything the MPF can't shoot through the front of.
@@T51B1 What did I say that was false? You didn't bring a counter to what I addressed.
Also the engagements in Ukraine show otherwise pretty consistently. Almost every tank on tank kill during this war has been on a tank shooting another across the frontal arc. Just this week there were photos on telegram of a T-72 with distinct APFSDS penetration marks across the front plate.
It's like arguing a Stug should be used as a Jagdpanther. Just because it has tracks doesn't make it a tank killer. Doctrine should not be dictated by the need to adjust track tension. Thanks for the videos on the MPF they shine a small bit of light on the future of battle tech.
its clearly not a tank killer since a tank killer would at a minimum require a 120mm.
@@MrChickennugget360 i dont think thats tru , but i will say it will have anti tank rounds or sabot rounds and can kill an older tank such as a t72 but newer tanks head on prob not , that would be the m1a2s job, this is ment for air drop into combat zones for door to door fighting or breaching a city or a strong hold position , so like the m1a3 it will have anti tank wepons just in case
It’s almost as people who do this for a living have thought of everything that a redditor comment section might come up with, and much much more, and more to the point these people actually understand how warfare works.
Its almost as if people who make these comments want to hear said informed person's take on their comments...
@@nfsfanAndrew Some do, some don't. Some are making assertions of "fact" and telling everyone how wrong the design is, while others are essentially asking questions or asking for insight into the decisions. Either way, I find it funny to imagine an alternative universe where the U.S. Army defers all specification and requirements gathering for a tank to the UA-cam comments section of a Chieftain video. 😁
Great Scott, I think he's nailed that salient!
I think some people just imagine taking two pieces of equipment, plus crew, and making them 1v1 as what makes something "good" or fit a role. Can't treat a vehicle like this as something operating on its own, when it is supposed to be backed up by infantry who are nominally backed up with tanks, air, arty, and their organic AT weapons like Javelin and TOW.
In reality the people designing this stuff, at one point were interested college kids asking these questions on reddit.
The MPF looks to basically be the Stryker with an 105mm, but on tracks and with a good fire control system, so it’s missing all the bad things that recoil caused that light vehicle. Same mission, but fixing wheeled problems with a track.
It also will have better visibility and likely better overall awareness capabilities
That and making it much more reliable
As I’ve heard the Stryker was quite troublesome
@@bornonthebattlefront4883 Agreed. The stryker was more of a "look what we can do" machine, and not a "this does X mission" machine.
I think the gun is supposed to be better on the mpf.
Yep. If the Stryker 105's a-rockin', they fired the gun.
The concept of the Stryker made sense when it was made but the end result was not what was hoped. So It's back from heavily armed armored car to light tank (the more things change the more they stay the same).
Although honestly the US could've done a lot worse than what we got.
You hear a lot of people say the same things about Ajax. Its vibration issues aside, people still think "40 tonnes is too heavy to be a light recce". Despite Bradley being a huge recce vehicle for years and very good at it...
One should select something along the lines of Weisel for recon.
At 40 short tons, too ...
@@PropensityVisualized drones
Its more like Cavalry worked around its hugeiness with tactics, dismount scouts, and supplementing them with uparmored humvees.
I'd say the Bradley is more a heavy than a light, which frankly it should be since it's supposed to sometimes hang around with M-1s.
I'll wait until I see the training, but we did have all of these discussions when we transitioned to M2s. The "new" capabilities it gave the infantry company provided many amusing "I got killed at NTC" moments while everyone came to grips with the proper way to fight such a system. The way this is trained in units will reveal the thinking and perhaps make the choice much clearer. I'm sure that this system will require some lessons learned the hard way as well.
On next Q & A, The Chieftain will present his favorite personal anti-rabbit weapon ; The Holy Handgrenade.. and the reasoning why every tank should have a stockpile of those. It's not open for discussion, because we don't want to go down that rabbithole.
Well if whatever the Russians can scrape together performs like the 1st guards, I think the American infantry division will do just fine.
@@killdizzle Right, this vehicle brings the firepower of a older M1 abrams in a package the size of a Bradly. That's a lot of punch.
Isn't it interesting that you presented most of this in your original presentation, but people have their bias even before watching. Thanks for the content.
1:45 Went to the American Heritage Museum/Collins Foundation today while on Vacation after deployment, got into the whole rabbit hole with my family (Mother and Uncle) about the differences between a Tank, Tank Destroyer, Self Propelled Gun, Infantry Support Vehicle, and more. Using the StuG III ausf G was a good example as it was right next to and infront of the T-34 (F-34) and how it comes down to which country is using it for what purpose, and how even though the StuG and the near by JgPz38(t) look similar in construction one is a Assault Gun while the other is a Tank Destroyer, and how right next to the JgPz38, the M18 GMC and A34 Comet, they look similar but one is a Tank Destroyer/Gun Motor Carriage, while the other is a Tank.
I was reading an article by Christopher Gabel on tanks in the ETO during WWII recently in a history of American tanks. He wrote that 70% of rounds fired were HE. While tank vs tank action gets disproportionate attention most tanks fought in the same conditions that are informing the MPF requirements.
That was a unique circumstance. The WW2 era tanks actually had an HE round and were used as artillery especially later as German armor became non-entity. Also, American tankers liked to use HE at long range against armor because it was easier to spot the fall of shot and a hit would cause at least some damage. A 75mm AP round isn't going to do anything against a Panther at 2000yds. An HE or Willy Pete has a chance of disabling something important
Read chapter 5 of Camp Colt to Desert Storm p 179. "Day in, day out, armor's chief contribution were in functions that armor doctrine should avoid: fighting in cities, reducing pillboxes, and generally operating at the pace of the infantry." Consequently the idea that HE was only being fired at German tanks is nonsensical.
@@patrickreilly2026 I didn't say that. I said that armor engagements in WW2 did not follow the same pattern as armor engagements in the 21st century and that the engagements used a disproportionate amount of HE.
Excellent.
I stand corrected, had not taken tight corner cqb and neutral turns in account.
Thank you for clearing this up.
In tight urban terrain I would rather have a few JLTV with M61 vulcan on remote turrets.
@@stupidburp IMO uparmored CV90 with AMOS turret (but with one mortar replaced by an autocannon) with good APS gonna be better (basically BMP3 but without dismounts). Cause the elevation angles, good HA and all the nice things.
It reminds me of the M-551 Sheridan, except without the Guided Missile / Gun system, The Sheridan also came in at 33,600 lbs.
the Sheridan never used the missile in combat. The Sheridan used a 152mm cannon. It's plus was that the HE round was real hard on bunker complexes, and in the open it's bee hive round would clear out a foot ball field.
@@garytotty3971 The 152 cannon was also hard on the Sheridan. My first platoon sergeant's first deployment to Viet Nam was as a buck private loader on an M551 Sheridan. Upon getting into the Sheridan for his first time to get an orientation from his tank commander, he was handed an ammo can. "What's this for, sarge?" "If we shoot the main gun, it's your job to look on and under the turret floor for any parts that fall off---you put them in the ammo can and give it to the mechanics when we get back to basecamp."
@@SomeRandomHuman717 down in Quang Nghai there was a huge fire fight going on where the old bus turn around was. The VC had the building with at least three machine guns in there. They had this infantry C.O trapped under the water fountain. We happened up on this just as a Sheridan rolls up next to the fountain. The C.O. told him to put three HE rounds in there about 30 degrees apart. Then follow that up with can rounds (3!) . I hear the engine rev up, and he looks down at the two guys and tells the to get their heads down. He fires off the first round, and I'd swear the tank jumped three or four inches off the ground! Scared me to death. Puts a hole in the building (concrete) about six foot in diameter. Then another, another. Then he shoots the first can round and it looked something shook the whole building. As he was getting ready for the third round he radio's two squads to come in on the back side. I told Top we needed one of these at our base camp.
@@garytotty3971 I do know about Sheridan. My point is that the MPF reminds me of the same kind of requirement for a lightweight heavily armed vehicle for light troops.
It's not hard to see how various pieces of equipment can be useful. What is had is seeing what piece of equipment is useful enough to be worth the budget.
7:48
"For starters, I couldn't come up with a way of elegantly getting in or out of the thing"
Are we about to see the invention of the "Oh bugger, the weather is cold" test?
To increase the interoperability, I feel they should include a fold-down touch-screen next to the infantry phone, showing the view from a turret camera, so that an infantryman can indicate 'points of interest' to the crew.
#FirstThingToBreak ;-)
Plus, what's wrong with "poi at 7 o'clock 500 yards"?
@@madcynic perhaps if there are lots of poi in the area, or they are well concealed or hid behind cover. Especially in urban areas, with buildings being half blown apart.
I could see the merit on being able to put a bullseye on a screen that everyone can see.
@@madcynic A spring-loaded armoured case would help keep it safe. As to why not just call out the coordinates, just because an infantryman can see something, it doesn't mean anyone in the tank can.
While this makes sense, I suspect such a thing would break after about three days in a combat zone.
@@GoranXII I believe they already have solutions for this in other systems (such as ATAK). They would probably be better off investing in that capability and extending it to more units/improving the integration of it than forcing the solution to be a fixed, mounted screen on the tank. In other words, leverage the existing systems they have for battlefield communication/coordination, and the only thing missing is the turret cam you refer to (which could be presented via ATAK or through these existing systems if they really wanted it and thought it made sense).
Provide better mechanisms for infantry to coordinate POI to armor, yes. Relegate this to a mounted touchscreen on the back of the tank, not so sure.
Going onto the subject of using a CROWS instead of a flex 50, i personally think that for use on a vehicle meant to be up close and supporting the infantry most importantly as a organic element of an IBCT the flex is better, we have been told many many many times in my unit (an IBCT) that the CROWS requires a very special class run by civilians for us to really even be allowed to get close to the thing, and even then they love to throw fits, throw codes, and overall make a annoyance of themselves VERY quickly, and with the Op Tempo and supply lines of an IBCT getting those special parts, or hopefully having SOMEONE in your unit that knows how to fix it is in my opinion a weak link. Where as if you just have a flex mount 50, its just a standard 50, i know im going to sound like a reformer here but theres no computer to get fired, theres no cabling to break, theres no "Error 404" that you experience with a CROWS. Now yes i understand the immense advantage that the CROWS can bring, enhanced zoom, thermal, larger area that it can traverse and cover, allowing it to be used safe and buttoned up, allowing the crew basically an extra set of REALLY GOOD eyes, but for a front line light infantry brigade, i just dont think that those are worth the supply and maintenance hassle that comes with a CROWS. Other people i have spoke to in my brigade that use CROWS on JLTVs and MAT-Vs all basically agree, that yes in theory if you can keep it working, if you can keep it maintained, if you have the know how and the spare parts, its a great force multiplier for the boots on the ground, but *ONLY IF* you can do all that, again, the amount of people who are given permission to work on them need to do a civilian run class which from what i have seen is not the easiest thing to go to, now maybe thats just my Commander and 1SG being assholes and not approving the paperwork for me to go.
But TL:DR CROWS is too finicky imo for an IBCT and going with the flex was the right move
I think it's less about reliability and more about why the MPF will show up to a fight in the first place. The infantry has plenty of 50s. They don't need the assault gun to show up and start blasting 50 as well. If that would have done anything, they wouldn't need the tank. I'm guessing they are keeping the flex mount as a very backup emergency weapon and focusing their efforts on getting the commander to help the main gun engagement go faster rather than giving him the possibility to be distracted by blasting away with his CROWS.
It's like... if it goes into an engagement with anything other than the main gun, does it even need to be there in the first place? Infantry certainly have plenty of 50s and 240s.
@alexanderwalls8978 possible for sure
I have to disagree. Training issue is training issue, it can be train out of someone. Process can be simplified. Whatever backend logistical issue can be solved without putting someone in actual danger.
But for a vehicle that is meant for up close and personal, an exposed crew, especially when they are sticking haflway out of a tall obnoxious metal box, makes them a very obvious target to go for.
If we are dealing with couple guys armed with AKs in bushes, that probably is fine. But what if we are dealing with peer that has a bunch of decently trained sniper corp for example...
In the end, the army accepted it. Imo, this makes perfect sense as a short term project but there are just a little bit too much compromised for a long term vehicle.
@jintsuubest9331 the problem with the "training issue" is that the Army physically does not allow you to train on the equipment with out the class and certification so you aren't allowed to train on the equipment so the problems can be ironed out
@@jintsuubest9331 Interesting discussion here. I suppose all training issues are not created equal- you have some which truly ought to be viewed through this perspective (i.e. "Just train away the training issue, simplify process, etc.") whereas you have some which are not solved so easily. For example, if one imagines a shortage of fighter pilots- or a decision to not move forward with a new aircraft design because AF determines they won't have enough qualified pilots for it- one could argue that a shortage of fighter pilots or the investment in the new aircraft ought not be decided by number of qualified pilots because it "is just a training issue"- just train more pilots, right? But if you lack enough qualified candidates to even be trained as a pilots in the first place, it isn't solely a training issue at that point.
In this case with the CROWS vs. flex 50, I could see it both ways. Maybe this is just big Army being stubborn and not sending more troops for training on CROWS, and it could easily be remedied by sheer will to do so. Then again, if the Army truly believes that CROWS can only be trained to a limited subset of troops because of, for example, limitations/bugs in the technology, or the reliance on civilian contractors, etc. then it becomes both a training issue and a logistical issue in a sense (similar to how training more pilots is both a training issue and a logistical issue).
Hey Chieftain,
You mentioned that you could make a video about defining tanks (i. e. what makes a tank/what is a tank). I would enjoy such video enormously. Me and my friends had a bit of a conversation one day about the subject, abd they didn't seem to understand the difference between assault guns and tanks, for example. (they haven't watched your sophisticating videos like me so I had to forgive them.) And of course, loads of examples to convince the average Joe. (Like su-152, StuG, m10, and strv103 etc.)
A misunderstanding of the MPF likely comes from a misunderstanding of the purpose and role of the IBCT in general. IBCTs operate in terrain which leave tanks vulnerable. It’s unlikely a brigade of heavy armor will roll into a heavily wooded and swampy area, that’s where the IBCT is. Based on your previous video I think the MPF will increase the survivability and firepower of the IBCT. The biggest challenge I see is the potential for misuse the MPF or worse, leave them underused. Would of been nice to have had them at JRTC.
Go ask Gamelin's ghost about how wise it is to assume where heavy armor can't go...
An IBCT dragging a bunch of armored vehicles into a heavily wooded swamp with them is pretty much the definition of misuse.
Not necessarily. Roads still exist in those areas which is why it’s dangerous for armored vehicles that are constricted to those roads. MPFs working in conjunction with the infantry would not be the lead element because they would be limited to roads very often. Infantrymen would set the conditions for implementation of MPF in the mission. MPF is not going to go out alone and unafraid looking for a fight.
“Unlikely “ in this context has gotten a lot of allies killed. Perhaps foolish would be a better word. Assuming the other side has a wise commander is not a good idea. Nobody is going to send heavy tanks into the Ardennes.
@@phildf2447 all tanks need infantry support
That’s my point
by the way the stug turned out to be one of the best all around vehicles, so if this new "fighting" vehicle is as successful. than they have hit the mark!
The Griffin II design that won is bigger than the updated M8 that BAe submitted, and carries more ammunition. I'm pretty sure they also dispensed with the autoloader and went with a human loader. Its also some 19 tons heavier than the M8 was with its level3 add-on armor. BAe really should have offered the 105mm turret armed version of the CV90 (which in the latest IFV version was already up to 37 tons and protected better than some cold war medium tanks). They'd have likely have won with that as it got hull commonality with a LOT of NATO partners and easier logistics for spare parts that way when deployed overseas on NATO missions. The 105mm gun caliber was likely chosen because of the still LARGE stockpiles of 105mm ammo in US inventory and the fact that HEP/HESH rounds make great bunker punchers and concrete wall openers and are best fired out of a rifled gun. NOT to mention the fact the current CV90s have among the best anti-tank mine protection (defeating stacked 10kg mines) going of all IFVs in service. And they keep developing the thing. In 2015 they developed an active damped suspension system that let the 37 ton CV9035 exceed MBT speeds cross country while reducing wear & tear on the vehicle components and improving crew comfort. They also got two big contracts last year for Slovenia (152 CV9035 Mk IVs of which about 120 witll be with 35mm gun and SPIKE-ER missiles) and the Czech republic for around 210 total MkIVs also. The czech contract losers included the ASCOD and the Lynx 41.
Yep, CV90 is also in the IFV replacement program.
Parts commonality wouldve been beneficial.
@@dwwolf4636 I believe, BAE will be pitching upgraded Bradley instead of CV90 in the next contest
@@solarissv777 BAE has published its all-new design vehicle for OMFV project.
it seems to me like alot of the arguments using the MPF's hard factors (weight, dimensions, and equipment) is a confusion of weight classes from other simplified definitions (Light, Medium, and Heavy) and their intended mission/role, and some hypothetical scenario.
my take is that the vehicle and it's hard factors is nothing more but a platform to materialize and realize the concept it was designed for, a concept which has been derived from decades worth of knowledge from previous conflicts.
42 tons is just the weight, even if it does drop in the category of medium tanks in terms of weight class in simplified terms, it doesn't mean that it's mission and role is the same as those.
and even if it's looks like a tank, shaped metal box in tracks, doesn't mean it's a tank, a tank can have different kinds of designs, it can even use wheels to move itself around, but that has been found to be more vulnerable and even more automotively hectic to deal with than a track (imagine all the hell around the driveshafts and differentials going around like those in the panhard EBR).
Great video. Nice to know the Chieftain reads the comments.
Love the T-shirt. "Run Away!"
Thank you very much for your thoughts on this.
It is interesting to see a bit of a resurgance of "lighter" Tanks and the 105 in a fire support role. It also gives me hope that the Ukrainians will get some good use out of the AMX-10RC
Just keep in mind the amx-10 rc has a weaker 105mm and even the most modernised version still has no stabiliser.
Ie it's not a direct comparison and it might fair alot worse.
I like the MPF. When you look at the war in Ukraine, where units get into situations they didn't want to be in such as "Reaction Regiments" having to play heavy infantry, this is a great idea. Light and mobile infantry bounce around the battlefield and just when the enemy thinks they can hold them off with a dug-in defense line the MPF comes along a rips apart their defenses. Basically what the Army is doing here is that they knew an enemy will try to counter their Light Infantry with other infantry, well that would be a bad plan thanks to MPF, it gives our infantry a very big stick to send in to enemy strong points or DFPs.
That is not how tanks are being used in Ukraine. One of the main reasons why the battles have bogged down into attritional trench warfare is that ATGMs and drones have made classic armored assaults untenable. They are mostly being used for defensive direct fires and mostly providing indirect fires. In that, the MPF won't do any better or worse than the old T-62s Russia dragged in.
Ukraine has been focused on indirect fire and explosive weapons. There are however many close engagements within a few kilometers of the adversaries. A 120mm automatic gun mortar such as NEMO / AMOS seems like a better option for fire support in that environment.
@@stupidburp The USA can afford both
Every modern infantry unit in the world will be carrying plenty of missiles that will kill one of these things very easily
@@questionmaker5666 tell me how you figure that when literally 100% of the US defense budget is deficit spending money
PLS (10x10 version) had a curb weight of about 50,000lbs lbs, unarmored. And we used those in the 101st in support of our Infantry battalion. We had our own HEMMET wrecker, while the brigade support had some HETTS.
I was reading a few of those comments about the gun, and that it's going to fight T-72s whether the tank wants to or not. I was thinking that while the 105 might not be as much of a tank killer as a 120, the 105 with modern ammunition should be nothing to sneeze at. The centurion had a 105 and it did just fine for a long time. The key word to me though was ammunition. I think our shells are a bit different now than they were in 1940s.
07:50 - I was not at all ready for the imagery of Chieftain getting eaten by a wild, prowling armored vehicle. Then again, they _are_ especially dangerous in this season of the year, when they come out of hibernation.
2:15 number 4- absolutely, the MGS was top heavy, had overloaded suspension and was generally awkward as a vehicle. It was quite restricted in where it was able to go.
As far as I know, it rarely went anywhere due to reliability issues. MGS just shook itself apart.
And the army bought it anyway
Yeah, if thes thing is a StuG, the MGS was a Marder.
@@egoalter1276 MGS at worst took up a massive amount of time from armorers. Don't have it in front of me, so the number is wrong. But I remember reading something along the lines of 70% of time for maintenance of all vehicles was devoted to MGS.
My main point of concern with the 105mm being chosen is for logistical reasons. It’s another type of ammunition to haul around, instead of further standardizing on the 120mm. It does help that the 105mm is still a standard NATO caliber, and the Stryker MGS carries that caliber as well though.
“A lot of the complaints seem to be unwarranted.”
Bold of you to assume these people are actually making criticisms based on reality and not their fever dreams
It does sound like, at some point, the Army changed their mind on what *exactly* they wanted considering there was a time they were thinking about making a requirement for air-drop capability which would've resulted in a significantly lighter vehicle by necessity. That would've been a true 'light tank' as I see one. What they have now is still *sort of* a light tank, but it's not so light and it's not so tank. The StuG III comparisons are apt. I do still feel that at least role wise MPF will find itself doing 'light tank things' alongside 'assault gun' things, which I suppose does put it in a class of it's own, though for myself that probably just means I will expand my definition of what a "light" tank can be
Agreed, but without air capabilities (being only rail, ship, C5/C17) the MPF will get to the fight at the same time as a Abrams could. So why spend tens of billions on a new platform and not just give M1s which we have plenty of in reserve in limited numbers to IBCTs? Heck the original 105 M1s were only 54t, reduce the armor/engine to the level of MPF and even with updated electronics you'd be right at the weight of a MPF.
@@requen A C-17 can either transport one Abrams or two mpf. In the infantry support role, two mpf will be significantly better.
@@requen You've never moved heavy equipment have you ? There aren't THAT many C-5s and C-17s in USAF inventory to begin with and using a C-17 to haul a single M1 is a universally stupid waste of transport resources. I could break down everything wrong with your statement but I just don't have that sort of time. FORTUNATELY there's already a government briefing document detailing the IBCT modernization efforts.
sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R44968.pdf
@@Michael-wo6ldyeah I think people are missing that the IBCT are getting completely reworked and will look dramatically different and fight differently. The MPF and ISV will give a lot more firepower and mobility to the brigade.
@@requen mpf is 38t and part airborne troop while m1 is 70t and part of armor division. C17 can carry 2 mpf while only 1 abram.
I think it's real purpose is to be a large direct fire cannon which can keep up with the infantry. It can be used to engage machine gun nests and other fortifications at long range allowing the infantry to save their javelins and tows for tanks if they show up.
I think it's pretty cool, I think it will be a lot cooler when the 105 AMP round is developed
Yes 👍
There's is already 105mm AMP being developed by US Army.
Yes! Marder and Bradley video, please! :-)
Chieftain nailed it with his "Stug" comment..personally, having served alongside Leopard 1s, looking at all this armor in the 40 tons range, wondering how much better they would be vs a new build Leopard 1 with all the latest bling...?
Leopard would be better
Ukraine has shown that tank on tank combat is very rare. More then likely these would come up against IVF's and I imagine the 105 is more then capable of knocking them out.
While tank on tank combat appears to be rare in Ukraine (although any information coming out of there needs to be taken with a healthy dose of skepticism), I'm not sure we can claim that is a generally applicable lesson. Ukraine started the war with a relatively weak tank force and seems to have kept it back as a reserve, leaving few chances for large scale tank battles.
That is untrue.
@@ARCNA442 That isn't true. Ukraine started the war with hundreds of tanks including 4 Armored brigades. and there were tank-on-tank engagements. A lot the footage fighting in cities like Chernihiv, where the 1st Tank Brigade fought was never released, likely for OPSEC reasons.
I would suggest that as the Chieftain intimated the 105 with DU rounds is a significant threat to most OPFOR vehicles its likely to face.
I'd say there's more tank on tank goin on in Ukraine then we see on UA-cam lol
Yeah, the 105 is "inadequate" for dealing with MBT armor, but it's not intended for that, and modern 105 SABOT rounds (like M900) will still easily go through the side hull and turret armor of modern MBT's.
They'll easily go thru the front of most russian MBTs also. Remember for all the fancy naming, a T-90 is still only 53 short tons in its most updated version and the T-72 family is lighter than that. Prior to the war in ukraine fewer than 2400 T-90s had been built and 1000 of those are in India and 100 in Egypt. Russia themselves only built about 1,000 for domestic usage. Meanwhile there were 25,000+ T-72s built,
the 120mm that would make sense to me would be a breech-loading mortar.
Yes
That pretty much answers the concerns I had about it.
Without ever having seen your channel, I saw your face and immediately knew what your voice would sound like. I was not disappointed. That's not an insult.
I love reading all the armchair warriors in your comment section. They clearly know more about the machine than the people who designed it, lmao. I can't imagine being so full of myself that I think I know more than actual experts.
America should just import rabbits from Caerbannog and just air drop them upon our enemies. Surely, they can not have that many Holy Hand Grenades in Russia. I mean, LOOK AT THE BONES!
I have a suggestion for a new rule. Don't ask about the capabilities of a gun vs. a given tank unless you've already pondered volunteering to let that gun take one shot at the tank with you sitting in it with the round of their choice.
Then after that, you can tell everybody how that gun didn't do a very good job.
This reminds me of what GI History Handbook said about small arms: There are graveyards full of people killed by supposedly anemic rounds. (might be paraphrasing)
Personally, I try to avoid getting shot by .22LR let alone anything heavier.
The MPF will most likely not have the armour package to take MBT anti tank munitions, but how about 25, 30 or 40mm autocannon rounds?
I'm guessing that a support vehicle for an infantry unit that might go up against BMPs, will be very happy if it can shrug of those autocannon rounds from the front, unlike many IFVs (I know, it is not an IFV, but they overlap in the support infantry role).
I believe the confusion is caused by the Army and its tangled aspects of a Stryker Brigades, the light infantry units aka 10th Mountain and 82/101 and an Infantry Brigade e (or Division) and what makes it Infantry vs Armored Bridges or Divisions. Maybe one day we will see the MPF bouncing alongside the highway by Ft Richardson like we once had the M48 or M-60 tanks! (which they had to cut down a forest North of Anchorage because the sight distances over 100 yards were impossible in the Alaska Forests!
Thanks for the effort and patience on these videos 😀
However......lol
When I heard the vehicle weight I was even less convinced about MPF.
Maintenance and logistics requirements and just plain common sense dictates that if your supporting a Stryker brigade you build something on a Stryker platform. The same applies to Bradley and future OMFV units.
When the Army developed the Stryker Dragoon they chose a cost effective off-the-shelf drop-in solution with the Konigsberg MCT-30 turret.
The Infantry fire support requirement does not need the re-invention of the wheel or an entirely new vehicle with its additional logistics and maintenance requirements.
It requires an effective off-the-shelf drop-in turret that will fit Stryker, Bradley and the OMFV. These solutions already exist.
If the Army really wants a 105mm to use up existing ammo stockpiles then something like the Cockerill 3105 optional manned turret with its 105mm HP gun seems like a solution. It's certainly more proven and low risk than the Stryker MGS was. Its already been fitted to many different platforms. Other manufacturers exist with similar products.
Another, and arguable more flexible option is a 120mm gun/mortar turret.
I am some what confused.
The U.S Army is already seeking to acquire a Stryker based 120mm gun-mortar system to replace its M1129 Stryker 120mm mortar carrier.
The Army requirement states a minimum range of 220 yards.
That means they want a direct fire capability.
A 120mm mortar round will make a nice big hole in you average house.
Does this not overlap with the MFP requirement?
It's "not a light tank" afterall. It's just meant to deliver firepower to support the Infantry.
The 120mm gun-mortar is a more flexible solution.
This kind of system can deliver a large high explosive projectile against fortifications and structures both indirectly and directly with the option of firing a variety
of 120mm guided mortar rounds like Strix or the future XM395 PGMM.
An example would be the Patria NEMO unmanned 120mm gun-mortar turret.
If the MPF must be tracked, then put a NEMO-style turret on a Bradley or OMFV chassis.
As far as im concerned its not an armoured vehicle till cheifton does "the tank is on fire" drill.
I agree witj you whole heartedly about the vehicle's intended use and role as well as how it will likely be used. I am more convinced the name of the vehicle program is more to do with fooling congress to let the Army buy more tank/tanklike vehicles without congress flipping out about tanks being expensive. Even though this probably costs a pretty penny.
considering BAE's MPF only weighed 27 tons - minus all the possible add-on armor packages - and came equipped with a proven autoloader design, which was also tested with the 120mm smoothbore, it really is surprising as to why GDLS MPF was chosen
I appreciate both videos.
Im glad you said something abot the cv 120 im tired of people thinking its so much better its a good vehicle i assume but like you said no one has bought it
Love the Terrava Skrama in the background. Very informative video as always. Cant wait for America to debut the next main battle tank. Cheers!
I wonder how much of the decision to avoid going to 120 was a forward looking decision-after all, most nations considering new tank development are going to 130 or 140mm cannons. Be kind of silly to develop and deploy a 120mm gun MPF only to have that AT capability fade into obsolescence inside a decade or two as a new bigger gun becomes the mainstay. Meanwhile, keeping the 105, if the Army goes to 130 or 140 for the future MBT, becomes even more of a strong point as the MPF becomes notably more important as a relatively light and high-ammo count alternative.
Given the range and accuracy of Javelin and TOW, in most cases, a missile will be more useful than a cannon when fighting enemy MBTs. There might be some conditions when the missile's guidance system is less capable than the thermal sight a gunner uses, but not very often. If you can't see it from where you are with a thermal sight, neither system is going to work.
Within the context of the last comment regarding Bradley and Marder, I belive adding the cv90 to that discussion would be interesting given Sweden promising 50 cv9040 for Ukraine.
From my short time in the U.S. Army and discussion of tactics when there the machine in question seems to be well thought out for the role it is intended to play. That being working in a mostly urban environment where mobility and agility is needed.
My issue with 105mm is less so of anti-armour performance alone, but rather of growth potential and ammunition aspect. 120mm caliber already has incredibly capable APFSDS and AMP rounds available, meanwhile 105mm AMP has yet to be developed and has to be pursued purely because of using 105mm on the MPF. While APFSDS performance isn't the priority (due to MPF's role, as you pointed out), it would still be beneficial to make use of powerfull already in-service rounds instead of using a slightly dated M900 or having to develop a new round. Picking 120mm would also simplify the logistics to a degree, although ig its not as big of an advantage given MPFs will serve in different units than M1s.
Maybe I'm REALLY wrong, but is there even a 105 penetrator more powerful than the M900?
And, as others have noted, this vehicle is meant to kill hardpoints, sniper nests, apc/ifv and softer vehicles, and only (if things go Very Wrong) shoot at actual tanks until their camouflage-wearing speedbump friends lob ATGMs at it.
Anti-tank being at best a tertiary mission, more rounds for the primary mission is a better design choice. (IMO)
Needless to say, if I crewed one, I would want the Navy Railgun thing or an equivalent mounted on my ride. With a Wings worth of CAS at my personal disposal 24/7.
So would anyone. But the question is, what is the best for the mission? If a smaller gun is better for the main job- it is the right choice. If that same gun makes crews decide not to hunt tanks for "The Glory!!!" of it, all the better.
Legacy rounds for the 105mm M68/A1 gun are the M392 series APDS-T , M728 APDS-T, M735 APFSDS-T, M774 APFSDS-T, M833 APFSDS-T, M456 series HEAT-T, M393A2 HEP-T, M494 series APERS-T (aka Beehive) and M416 WP-T. Granted much of the listed cartridge models are long out of production, one should not have to spend a lot of time reinventing the wheel, so to speak. The range of ammo types would be sufficient to cover almost all of the expected threat target arrays for an air transportable battalion task force my face in the foreseeable future. Keep in mind, what must be resisted at all cost is that insidious mission/task creep that will explode the cost of any future weapon system. Remember, 'Perfection is the enemy of good enough.
When Sweden adopted the strv103 TANK people classified it a "tank destroyer" or spg.
When Sweden adopted the IKV91 which literary means "infantry cannon wagon" people classified it as a "light tank"...
Question regarding the CoAx MG. The British Challenger 2 has had several friendly fire incidents when using the CoAx in close support of infantry due to the offset between the main sight and the CoAx. Since the MPF is intended as a close support vehicle, has this problem been addressed on the MPF?
Love the shirt!
Is the boiling vessel world class? Keurig? How many rounds of coffee does it carry? Can they be loaded quickly and efficiently? How about pastries? Will it support expresso upgrades?
My main question to ask is as such:
I remember reading that the M10 Booker (MPF) due to its weight would require the very same heavy trucks and trailers (forgot the exact units, the US army is not my forté) used to move the M1 Abrams to be moved over long distances. Rather than the medium trucks and trailers that were already an organic part of these infantry units. Thus you are adding a lot of extra tail in new vehicles and spares to these units to allow them to operate the MPF properly.
With that in mind, why not save the money on procurement of the MPF and field the M1 Abrams in that role? As far as I can tell the major downsides there would be that you only get one per C-17 compared to 2 MPFs, and likely far greater fuel consumption.
Unless those two requirements do indeed make a world of difference in allowing light infantry battalions to operate with organic armour or not.
There is still the fundamental problem of weight and particularly bridging. Right now, the heaviest vehicle in a light division is a couple of tons heavier than MPF (a loaded HEMTT variant) so there is no different operational restriction. M1 is heavier than that and would require a more limited movement map. In other words, a light division is entirely self mobile in an area where no bridges are above class 50, that would not apply with M1s attached.
Great comments here all i have to add is #lucky good timing as who knows what is new as this is ground up clean sheet design. Be interesting to know who provides the engine all known is an Allison Drivetrain apparently.
Hi i have watched a lot of tank videos on armour... but havnt seen one about tank armour working irl. I watched fury and saw how the tiger shrugged off the shermans... but modern, do we have examples of tanks surviving hits?
One version with a 12cm Mortar, the Finns has a version for shooting horizontal , and this ammo has no casing that takes space.
If you remove the armor on type 10 and shorten it, i think you can use it for airborne insertion.
If you don't do either of those things, and just use it for airborne operations anyway, at least one of them will likely happen for free on landing.
Which was the original concept of the BAE MGS, it get abandoned because you still need to transport the armor.
Or you could just place an order (finally) for M8s.
@@obsidianjane4413 sorry, that dream is too far gone. Also you would still need to transport the add on armore for that one too lol.
@@Tankliker you can just choose to not have the armor though?
M8 is already resistant to small arms fire without the armor.
Interesting that the powers that be keep one under wraps, but let slip the inside of its direct competitor.
Or maybe that just isn't the factor.
I think it's precisely because the AGS lost that the Chieftain was allowed to film inside. Since it isn't going to be an active duty vehicle, it remains a curiosity. A prototype for testing that never went anywhere.
@@nobleman-swerve I had assumed being made for the same spec sheet would be enough for us to not see it for a few decades.
Then again, they do expect to stuff it full of grunts for the next few decades.
As a member of an M60 battalion in the late 70s, that 105 was a damn good gun. Certainly not the 120, but good enough. As an infantry support vehicle, it should do well. It can handle the older tanks, from T72 back and remember, there are still a lot of those out there. In fact the bulk of Saddam's tanks could have been handled by the M60s. The M1 just made the win less bloody for us (always a good thing). Beats the crap out of the Sheridan.
Thanks for the information legend sir. Well done man.
I am curious about your opinion of post-WWII light tanks Chieftain. I've heard it said light tanks became effectively obsolete during WWII, but then France made AMX-13 light tanks after the war and they sold like hot cakes, but then again I've been told the AMX-13 was not a very good tank. It's been very difficult for me to find any instance of combat that has vindicated or condemned the AMX-13 so I'm curious what you think of them.
Im not sure where the AMX13 was exported to, but keep in mind that in many countries, having anything cheap and armored is the goal.
And most of the countries just so happen to be in Africa and the Levant where i imagine french sales were common.
Could be wrong though.
@@2639theboss amx13 was used by Israel but was found to be too lightly armored.
@@2639theboss
AMX-13 was in production from the 1950s-1980s and was exported to 26 countries. Five countries still use them.
AMX-13 was very good for the French, who wanted to be able to do colonial things, and most of the other nations who bought it also don't seem to be expecting to fight massive armor battles. You probably wouldn't want to fight a bunch of t-64s charging across Europe in one, though.
@@shaider1982 It seemed successful as a recon vehicle, but as a tank, not so much
I think I could make a lot of money selling a system of fold-down seats that would attach to the side skirts, say five or six per side. Seats would be able to lock into forward, side, and rear facing positions. An MPF platoon could then provide rapid transportation for a platoon+/- of infantry in a much safer manner than if they crowded onto the turret roof and front deck, WW2 GI-style.
Ammo supply did not seem to be mentioned, but my guess is that the MPF will have more main gun ammo than M1A2 (40 rds). I'd say anywhere from 48-52. For reference, the M1 slick held 55 and the M60A1/A3 held 63.
The increased ammo capacity of a 105-equipped vehicle was actually one of the main reasons the original M1s up until M1A1's introduction had 105mm guns. They wanted to have a lot more ammo.
Oh bugger, the what ever the hell it is is on fire.
When the Striker came out I b*tched and moaned that it wasn't any good too large la-dee-da. I was proven wrong. I don't know anything near enough about modern armor (M1) or the MPF (in particular) to take a side. I hope it works out better than plannned...that'd be nice.
Whenever I see naysayers about the MPF, i go back to this video. Its such a good response. When palced in the context of the US army doctrine, it makes complete sense.
perhaps one can always argue the weight could have been used for more capability... but at the end of the day, the MPF meets the requirement, and is a low-risk platform being based off an existing vehicle. We can always try to do better but this is what we get and its not a bad one
IIRC the issue with the Abrams in USMC was the decrease of the number of supply ships per task force/battlegroup from 4 to 3 hence making the transport space a premium.
Also, the USMC took a good long look at their expected taks list, and determined that an opposed beach landing requiring armour support was not very likely to occur any time soon. Reverting to a mostly light infantry force with only moderate armour support saves them a lot of money (a perpetual problem for the USMC), thus allowing them to address a lot of other issues that have been accumulating, without really impacting their effectiveness. If they ever did REALLY need tanks, they can always ask the Army, but in the mean time fixed and rotary wing air support and naval shore bombardment are probably more than adequate support for any task they are likely to actually receive
Neat T-shirt for the year of the rabbit.
I think part of the question about tonnage is that it could be considered a rough proxy to cost and maintenance, and that a 40 ton MPF might not cost that much less than an actual tank.
I have a question about weight @The Chieftain
With many of our vehicles are getting heavier, are we actually sacrificing mobility, or is there a new technology (Like suspension or something.) that overcomes these high ground pressures? For example the HMMWV replacement the JLTV. I keep reading that the JLTV is so much better off road but given that it weighs about x5 the standard HMMWV how is that possible? Specifically regarding snow and mud I would think the JLTV would be worse becasue it must have a significantly higher ground pressure.
It also has much larger wheels as I recall and can deflate them accordingly. Plus it can raise itself to increase ground clearance. There may be special tricks or can do with gearing, diffs and sending power to the correct wheels at the right time
Excellent discussion. Both BAE and GDLS are customers of our company so we were not going to lose on this competition either way, but I believe we are getting the best vehicle as a result.
I served in a stryker brigade. their mobility is basically useless if there are mines or FASCAM scattered about. The stryker mgs can only fire in forward or rear because shooting at an angle it can tip the stryker over (the troops working with the MGS hated it, too). I like that the MPF will fill that role. It should be more reliable than a stryker, too. Our infantry companies spent half their week in the motorpool trying to keep them running.
a stryker with tow missiles is really as heavily as you want to arm it for maintenance and operation.
You define how it's going to be transported and that's the game. As you've always said about the Sherman.
It is tragic we did not build another 200 or so C-17s for our use or to sell off on spec.
Regarding the bonus question about the lack of tanks for the Marines. I know that it is technically a separate service, but in time of war couldn't you just "cross attach" an army tank battalion to a USMC division/brigade if and when the operation required it?
I'd just assume that the overall theatre commander would simply tell the two "generals with fewer stars" than him i.e. the commanders if said USMC and Army division/brigade to figure out the details and get it done. Hard to imagine that an opportunity for a meaningful amphibious operation would be passed up just because the Marines no longer have tanks "organicaly".
It's not as if the concept of a "battlegroup" is unknown territory. And any large scale naval invasion already will by definition involve at least two of the services (Marines and Navy) and very likely also support from the air force.
Yes, and that's exactly what the USMC Commandant said in the paper which announced the divestiture of the tanks
As always great stuff. Today enhanced by the shirt. RUN AWAY! Huge fan of MP and The Chieftain. PS: Marder and Bradley vid with a view to combat in Ukraine would be great.
In regards to the CV90 with either the 105mm or 120mm, people forget that one of the CV90's biggest strengths is that it is a whole family of outstanding armoured vehicles based on the same chassis. This allows a nation fielding it to have a lot of commonality of parts for maintenance and manufacturing. This advantage is lost on the US due to not using the CV90 for it's base IFV and variants.
Like my Uncle’s who served in the infantry in WW2 ETO. They said a tank was easy to defeat but on two conditions. One remained hidden, two remove the enemy infantry support. Then destroy the tank
I think this is a great step forward for the military I like the MPS it won't scream out in pain every time it fires and if you didn't have the best cross-country Mobility not just good cross-country Mobility
Thanks for the responses, however I would like to hear about loader vs auto loader on this vehicle.
It's infantry support role/intention to me just says "So it's just a big M3 Scott?" - albeit with all the the modern gizmos and doodads.
They may be saying it's a new designation, but the underlying concept is not at all novel so I'd say its almost certainly just a marketing thing.
I glad that some one point it out that it is not a light tank. I am tired of those people who try to tell you it is a new generation "light" tank because MBT are now mostly in the 60t range.
Let's just call it a "light MBT" lol
I am amused by the number of commenters who assume that the military is stupid, and that they are so much smarter as to what the military needs to carry out its function of waging war. I think it's pretty much agreed that the U.S. is the number one military force in the world. It hasn't got that way by being led by a bunch of idiots. They live and breathe on how our armed forces can continue being number one.
Suddenly, these Monday Morning Quarterbacks become experts, and know more about weapons systems, strategies, etc than the people who are the real experts. Sure, the military will make mistakes, but that usually because the politicians get involved, and begin telling the military how to do its job. We are lucky to have people like you to set the record straight.
Looking forward to the BAE video!
Definitely looking forward to the M8 video!
As to your last response, part of the reason the Marines got rid of the Abrams is that _the SEPv3 is _*_20%_*_ over the weight capacity_ of the LCAC hovercraft. The M1A1s that the Marines had were "only" 10% over capacity, which was tolerable at a higher rate of overhaul. But I'm not sure an LCAC can even float with a 72 ton load, let alone get up on the skirt.
I agree it's in the medium tank tonnage range.
I’d rather handle logistics of transporting 105 rounds for knocking holes in houses and bunkers then Javelins. The transport containers are smaller and you only have to distribute them to said number of vehicles, not to every other infantry man whose first thought will be to fire and forget as soon as humanly possible to not having a Javelin on his back for the foreseeable future
dont get why folks are mad about 40 tons. a loaded semi-truck weighs between 40 and 41 tons (in-state local can run 45 tons). i know bridging weight is slightly different because a truck is 65 feet long and this Vehicle is considerably shorter, but the Vehicle isnt hitting the bridge deck at 65 miles per hour either.
Great comment on how quick you can replace the pack. It should be no more that 20 min.
One critical factor I haven’t seen discussed is that with the M1’s adoption of the Trophy APS system it became much more dangerous for infantry to hang out near the tank. MPF lacking an APS may be very intentional. It’s actually a qualitative gap in capability. The M1 now can be free to hunt other tanks and act aggressively with other motorized troops while the MPF can go block by block clearing houses with the grunts.
The concerns of APS with infantry have been studied and the risks are generally overstated. Especially when one considers that friendly infantry shouldn't be between the vehicle and the enemy due to the blast danger zone from the 105mm