I thought the proximal final cause of a motion always had to be the same as the category the motion was in. So since the asteroid was moving with respect to place the final cause was a place. The formal cause would then be the form of the asteroid in that place, not the place itself. Maybe I’m wrong. Thanks for the talk
That's correct. You can distinguish however between the end as a thing and the end as possession of that thing. For example, in one way happiness is God, and in another way happiness is the possession of God. The Category "where" denominates a thing from its place. There is no inherent form of being in a place. There is only the thing in place, the place, the relations between the thing and its place, and the denomination of the thing from its place. If we say place is the final cause, that is like saying God is happiness. If we say "where" is the final cause, that is like saying the possession of God is the final cause. Both ways of speaking are correct.
Thank you for the feedback! I did a video combining c. 6 with some other related passages, such as In Nic. Ethics, lec. 7. It is called "Analogy in Aquinas"
Aristotle's understanding of ether should not be confused with the enlightenment atomistic notions in which ether was a continuum of atoms filling all space. Aristotle did not think ether was a continuum of atoms, but instead a homogeneous substance. In the early 20th century, the Michelson Morley experiment was thought to have disproven the enlightenment theory of ether, but many of the leading scientists of the 20th century have argued that newer theories, such as GTR and quantum field theory have, in effect, reintroduced something very much like an Aristotelian notion of ether. There is a good article on this by Chris Decaen if you are interested.
I thought the proximal final cause of a motion always had to be the same as the category the motion was in. So since the asteroid was moving with respect to place the final cause was a place. The formal cause would then be the form of the asteroid in that place, not the place itself. Maybe I’m wrong. Thanks for the talk
That's correct. You can distinguish however between the end as a thing and the end as possession of that thing. For example, in one way happiness is God, and in another way happiness is the possession of God. The Category "where" denominates a thing from its place. There is no inherent form of being in a place. There is only the thing in place, the place, the relations between the thing and its place, and the denomination of the thing from its place. If we say place is the final cause, that is like saying God is happiness. If we say "where" is the final cause, that is like saying the possession of God is the final cause. Both ways of speaking are correct.
This is really helpful. You should do c. 6!
Thank you for the feedback! I did a video combining c. 6 with some other related passages, such as In Nic. Ethics, lec. 7. It is called "Analogy in Aquinas"
@@ElliotPolskyPhilosophy oh great! I'll look for that one. Thanks.
22:41 shouldn't walking be a proximate final cause of health?
Comment for traction
is this from a book?
In science of physics is there ether?
Aristotle's understanding of ether should not be confused with the enlightenment atomistic notions in which ether was a continuum of atoms filling all space. Aristotle did not think ether was a continuum of atoms, but instead a homogeneous substance. In the early 20th century, the Michelson Morley experiment was thought to have disproven the enlightenment theory of ether, but many of the leading scientists of the 20th century have argued that newer theories, such as GTR and quantum field theory have, in effect, reintroduced something very much like an Aristotelian notion of ether. There is a good article on this by Chris Decaen if you are interested.