Wilfrid Sellars and the Framework of Thoughts, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" and "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," The Analytic Tradition, Spring 2017.
Thanks for posting these excellent classes. It seems to me that by tagging scientific theories as "images," and using the metaphor of stereoscopic vision, he sidesteps the issue of the status of unobservable theoretical posits (e.g. quarks). To treat everyday intersubjective understandings as "appearances" relative to our current theories seems problematic.1) We do not "see" or experience lower-level objects of physics without tools that bring them into interaction with the macro-level world where our detectors/colliders etc. pick them up, and it's unclear *what* they are when not framed by Manifest Level properties like concepts, beliefs, interpretations of data-- all of which exist in the "space of reasons." Thus it's not clear that there is an "image" or intelligible worldview offered by particle physics. More likely there are experimental results which are predictive, not necessarily *descriptive* of the world. 2) Long after the latest QM paradigm is superceded, scientists will still have to talk about what the meters say, reasons for endorsing theories, etc. It would seem the activity of science presupposes PERSONS or, anyway, intelligent systems to carry it out. Is it not possible to reverse the ontological priorities of the 2 "images" so that whatever we call fundamental is knowable only through the "manifest image" (or something very much like it, in which perceptible and perceiving persons have beliefs for reasons)? 3) Finally, is it not misleading to speak of the "manifest image" as a "theory" (now called "folk psychology") as if it were cut off from the sciences? "Common understandings" are permeable, and what we take to be intuitive or counter-intuitive responds to changes in culture including scientific theories. It is no longer intuitive to attribute a bad cold as demon possession, but once it was. It is not intuitive to think some groups of people are "meant to be" slaves and others rulers, but once it was (see Aristotle). Relativity once seemed totally counter-intuitive, but not as much in the 21st century as it has entered into some parts of mass-culture through Nova, Star Trek, etc. Also, physics is nowhere near the point of explaining mind, and physicalism promises more than it can deliver.
All for this is crucially disabled by ignoring the discoveries of Chomsky. As long as this remains the case, the philosophers deploy an idea of language which is an artificial simplification which they have merely invented for their own theoretical convenience.
Could you please elaborate on missing points of this presentation and philosophy of language in general? It seems that it's true of every third video about philosophy I watch, that someone in the comment section disagrees, hinting to some Chomsky's insight, although not showing the argument directly, so I'm intrigued.
@@findbridge1790 Chomsky's account of syntax is absolutely irrelevant for Sellars's refutation of the Myth of the Given, because the argument doesn't rely on philosophy of language (almost) at all. And even Chomsky has admitted on several occasions that Quine and others have a point with insisting that language is holistic, even though he failed to understand the thesis of indeterminacy of radical translation. What's your issue? Or are you just another Chomsky fanboy who repeats whatever he said in one of thousands interviews with him?
Excellent job professor! Clear, concise. I was especially interested in the second section as it is an impotant theme in my dissertation.
Thanks for posting these excellent classes. It seems to me that by tagging scientific theories as "images," and using the metaphor of stereoscopic vision, he sidesteps the issue of the status of unobservable theoretical posits (e.g. quarks). To treat everyday intersubjective understandings as "appearances" relative to our current theories seems problematic.1) We do not "see" or experience lower-level objects of physics without tools that bring them into interaction with the macro-level world where our detectors/colliders etc. pick them up, and it's unclear *what* they are when not framed by Manifest Level properties like concepts, beliefs, interpretations of data-- all of which exist in the "space of reasons." Thus it's not clear that there is an "image" or intelligible worldview offered by particle physics. More likely there are experimental results which are predictive, not necessarily *descriptive* of the world. 2) Long after the latest QM paradigm is superceded, scientists will still have to talk about what the meters say, reasons for endorsing theories, etc. It would seem the activity of science presupposes PERSONS or, anyway, intelligent systems to carry it out. Is it not possible to reverse the ontological priorities of the 2 "images" so that whatever we call fundamental is knowable only through the "manifest image" (or something very much like it, in which perceptible and perceiving persons have beliefs for reasons)? 3) Finally, is it not misleading to speak of the "manifest image" as a "theory" (now called "folk psychology") as if it were cut off from the sciences? "Common understandings" are permeable, and what we take to be intuitive or counter-intuitive responds to changes in culture including scientific theories. It is no longer intuitive to attribute a bad cold as demon possession, but once it was. It is not intuitive to think some groups of people are "meant to be" slaves and others rulers, but once it was (see Aristotle). Relativity once seemed totally counter-intuitive, but not as much in the 21st century as it has entered into some parts of mass-culture through Nova, Star Trek, etc. Also, physics is nowhere near the point of explaining mind, and physicalism promises more than it can deliver.
The eternal cow which can be distinguished is not the eternal cow.
34:07
38:22 ... well that was weird
All for this is crucially disabled by ignoring the discoveries of Chomsky. As long as this remains the case, the philosophers deploy an idea of language which is an artificial simplification which they have merely invented for their own theoretical convenience.
Could you please elaborate on missing points of this presentation and philosophy of language in general? It seems that it's true of every third video about philosophy I watch, that someone in the comment section disagrees, hinting to some Chomsky's insight, although not showing the argument directly, so I'm intrigued.
Platonism is mistake. Chomsky's attempt to revive this notion will fail for the same reasons Frege and Russel failed.
This particular argument by Sellars has NOTHING to do with whatever Chomsky has to say, and whatever he has to say isn't the ultimate truth.
@@hss12661 you are wrong. and Chomsky has the best model of the actual nature of language.
@@findbridge1790 Chomsky's account of syntax is absolutely irrelevant for Sellars's refutation of the Myth of the Given, because the argument doesn't rely on philosophy of language (almost) at all. And even Chomsky has admitted on several occasions that Quine and others have a point with insisting that language is holistic, even though he failed to understand the thesis of indeterminacy of radical translation. What's your issue? Or are you just another Chomsky fanboy who repeats whatever he said in one of thousands interviews with him?