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V1 Wildcat vs Zero 12012022
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- Опубліковано 3 січ 2023
- Conventional wisdom says that the performance of the Mitsubishi A6M Zero-Sen (Zero) was far superior to the Grumman F4F Wildcat. However, if that is truly the case, why is the exchange ratio - number of F4Fs vs. Zero’s shot down - significantly in favor of the Wildcat?
From the attack on Pearl Harbor until the first F4U Corsairs began to be deployed in February 1943 and the F6F Hellcats in September 1943, the Wildcat was the U.S. Navy’s frontline fighter. Naval and Marine Corps Aviators more than held their own.
In the early months of World War II, i.e. December 7th, 1941 to the Battle of Midway, the exchange ratio was essentially a draw. By, the end of the Battle for Guadalcanal on February 3rd, 1943, records show that Navy and Marine Corps aviators shot down 5.9 Zeros for every Wildcat lost. When the Japanese surrendered in September 1945, the Wildcat to Zero exchange ratio had increased to 6.9 to one.
So, the question is why? In this presentation, Marc compares the two airplane’s strengths and weaknesses. He uses his extensive flying experience to explain in easily understandable terms why U.S. Naval and Marine Corps Aviators ultimately prevailed against an airplane - the Mitsubishi A6M Type 0 - that could climb faster and turn tighter than the one they were flying, the F4F-4 Wildcat.
Great video, stumbled upon this while researching about the Wildcat.
One minor error is the Wildcat having servo tabs. While it is definitely true that the Wildcat had superior controllability at higher [dive] speeds, I don't believe any wildcats had servo/balance tabs, and that the Wildcat's controllability was more due to its control surface geometry over the Zero's . (Checked in various Wildcat Flight + Maintenance manuals, original drawings, etc)Later fighters however, like the F6, and the F4U do have servo-type tabs to decrease control pressure.
One interesting fact about the Zeros v. Wildcats topic is that one of the two currently airwothy Zeros ironically uses a wildcat engine (PW R-1830)!
From what I've heard, the Japanese did eventually develop and install self-sealing tanks, but they were not as effective as the US used. On another point, wing-mounted guns also had to have a set convergence point, side to side. So where F4Fs (and other US fighters) did have a convergence that had to be set, the IJN had two, the wing-to-wing convergence and the 7.7 mm to 20 mm convergence. My impression from reading about the Battle of Midway (especially "Shattered Sword") is that IJN pilots found the 20 mm cannon to be much more effective and at Midway may have landed to rearm often enough to keep the carriers' decks tied up with rearming and topping off fuel. Between the time spacing of USN torpedo attacks and decks being tied up with rearming, IJN attack aircraft had to be kept in the hangars (where being enclosed later had horrific consequences).
Great video, thank you!
One believed falsehood is that the Zero never had armor or self-sealing fuel tanks. They started adding more armor, fire suppression, self-sealing tanks, and more armament later in the war. The A6m5 variants were examples of this. But it also had an effect on performance, even after better powerplants. And it was a case of "too little too late".
Something that isn't stressed enough is the ability of multiple .50 cals to put much more "lead on target". Range, muzzle velocity, rate of fire....whatever...six .50 cals is going to bring a world of hurt, especially to an enemy craft that doesn't have much structural integrity and lights up like a torch.
Most of the A6M variants didn't have armor or self-sealing tanks. Even if they did, the light structure of the airplane would have been torn apart by the fifties in Navy and Army Air Force fighters. The extra weight also reduced their ability to maneuver. As I said in the video, once a U.S. pilot got a bead on an A6M, its pilot was going to have a bad day.
Thank you for an interesting and informative video. What you decided to say and how to word it were ideal for me. I had read most of the information before except for the stiffness of controls over 300mph. You explained the trajectory problem better than I have heard before. I think your conclusions about the kill ratios are rational. I read one Japanese book about the Zero that insisted that the Zero was the best fighter of the war, but most other authors seemed to say that the Wildcat was better if the pilot did not try to turn or climb with a Zero. Also, I, too, have read that the Wildcat came out better in the 1942 carrier battles from Midway and later. Thanks again.
I believe that the Wildcat is one of the most underrated airplanes of WWII. While it was quickly outclassed, it was still flown off CVEs until the end of the war.
One of the selling points of the SNJ/AT-6 was that it "could" be used as a fighter-bomber on merchant ships turned into miniature aircraft carriers. Congress wanted only warplanes produced--not "worthless" auxiliary and training aircraft. This can be noted in the shortage of long-range cargo aircraft, too--numbers of B-24 bombers became C-87 aircraft and Eddy Rickenbacker wound up floating in the Pacific in a rubber raft when the B-17 used as his transport airplane ran out of fuel. Due to the SNJ/AT-6 being an advanced trainer with a cowl mounted gun (later moved to one of the wings) and a rear seat gunnery position for gunnery practice, it was a "better than nothing" fighter substitute that could carry a light bomb load.
Wildcat production numbers proved sufficient so that the SNJ expedient wasn't necessary. For the USAAF, the P-40 series was another underrated airplane. I was a volunteer staffer at the Hill Aerospace Museum for a decade and one of the docents mentioned that Clair Chennault preferred the P-40 series over the P-51 series because the latter had higher fuel consumption but the P-40 had adequate performance in his theater of operations. The production lines for both Wildcat and P-40 were running full steam, there was a need for advanced gunnery and bombing trainers in high performance aircraft between the SNJ/AT-6 and the higher-performance combat aircraft such as the F4U and P-47 (cut down on dead student pilots if they had a few dozen hours in P-40 or F4F cockpits first so that they could get used to the greater power and weight of "real" combat planes), and at war's end, both Wildcats and P-40s were dumped in the ocean to get rid of surplus because they weren't worth scrapping--that required moving them from the combat zones.
The Wildcat was one reason that the Imperial Japanese naval air force broke its back during 1942. The P-40 did a number on the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force in the same place and same period. Unlike Imperial Japan's two air forces, the three air forces of the United States "played well with others" out of necessity. Yes, I have to agree--the F4F Wildcat is underrated. The Wildcat continued to fly until the end of the war as a second-line carrier-based fighter because it was good enough.
When you look at the training syllabus for the Navy before and during WWII before being designated and then in the squadrons and RAGs, two things stand out. One was the emphasis on gunnery, particularly deflection shooting. If one was sent to a fighter squadron, maneuvering in a 3-dimensional environment to get off a shot was the goal of training. In the SBD squadrons there was some, but less. In the torpedo squadrons, not so much. The second is that the training was "transferable" from community to community. What often astounds me is the number of pilots who started as torpedo or dive bombers on their first tour and then became aces in fighters.
I can tell you when I went through the training command, those core values were still there, albeit reduced because by then Naval Aviation was very siloed. Those were reduced and now Naval Aviators can change communities. Not so when I was a JO, much to my frustration!!!
I knew 90% of this old tale. The Zero operating w/out radio is new and shocking, the why of its fickle construction is insightful. That's WW1. Pleasing to hear your take.
Passing to a USAF vet and historian I know.
You would think that many aviation historians would have taken the time to look at the entire story instead of just looking at performing numbers. In the beginning, the Zero gave Wildcat pilots fits until they figured out how to fight it effectively. Young's book on Wildcat vs. A6M Zero-Sen mentions this. The radio weighted something in the order of 100 lbs including antenna, wiring, radio control head and the radio itself. To me, it was unbelievable given their experience early in the war in massed formations with aircraft from several carriers.
@@marcliebman3847 Ever watch History Channel DOGFIGHTS?
One known Zero pilot who was named would climb, the pursuing Wildcat stalls and easy prey.
The Zero pilot pulling the trick died at the hand of the better Hellcat.
US pilots found tactics. I saw them go head on and shread it by gunfire while armor protected.
Still I feel trained Japanese pilots would make the best of the plane.
I measure it as dogfighting technique.
A radio was worth its weight.
@@TheKeithvidz Ea
Early on, Wildcats would attempt either a loop or an Immelmann type maneuver and the Zero would be all over it. Also, in level turns at below 300 mph, the Zero had a better rate of turn. So, until Flatley and Thatch started pushing their fellow Wildcat pilots into getting above the Zero and conducting diving attacks and used what became the Thatch weave, the F4F pilots were at a disadvantage. Early in the war, a lot of what the Navy developed in terms of tactics came from the writings of Claire Chennault and what the AVG found successful against the Zero and its sister, the Ki-43 in China.
@@marcliebman3847 I have seen loop and Immelmann. Can position the Wildcat behind the Zero - then again a good Zero driver can match those.
By level turn you may be referring to circles and Flat Scissors - Mig 17 Fresco in Vietnam would best any US fighter decades later as the Zero.
The Thatch Weave first appeared in Midway? You're right I have seen US pilots in the war perform dives - the height and speed gained leveled the field, paired with radar and flimsy construction...the Japanese never adapted evidently.
The Chennault guy. His name is familiar.
Great video Mark! I expected to also hear about the, "Boom & Zoom" and Thatch "Weave" and am still interested to hear your thoughts about these hard-learned tactical innovations, (and any others you would like to include). Grace & Peace.
The Thatch Weave actually was created on Thatch's kitchen table with Jimmy Flatly. They were using matchbooks (remember them) to represent airplanes and colored them with crayons (blue = USN, red = IJN). At the time, the Navy had disseminated Claire Chennault's report and analysis from the AVG's experience. What is known as slash and dash (get above the target, dive, find a target, shoot, dive away) was Chennault's solution in the P-40B vs. the more maneuverable Japanese aircraft. At Midway, both their squadrons were familiar with the Thatch Weave and the slash and dash tactic. It wasn't perfect, but it worked. By Guadalcanal, all USN/USMC fighter pilots were trained in it and given the advantages of radar, coast watcher alerts and radios, the Marine Wildcat pilots were usually able to be vectored into positions above the Japanese formations before they attacked.
@@marcliebman3847 Thanks Marc, from a USMC lifer-brat.
This was so informative. Thank you! Also, I really liked your other video about tactics too.
Thank you for doing this. This is an exceptional video.
I am not a pilot. Just someone really interested in the WW2 air war. Especially in the Pacific Theater.
From everything I read and seen, the Wildcat was a great frontline carrier fighter. I also think that as the war waged on, our pilots got better and better. Earl on the Japanese pilots were more experienced. At least combat experienced.
Two Wildcats using the Thatch Weave, seemed to be able to hold their own against the Zero.
I think the Wildcat was a very important aircraft for the Royal Navy. The Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm had its specially designed fighters, but they were slow, underpowered, two-man, dual purpose aircraft like the Blackburn Skua and the Fairey Fulmar. They also got naval versions of the Spitfire and Hurricane, but they were difficult to land on carriers because of narrow, weak undercarriages and long noses. They did not have folding wings neither. The Wildcat was plenty good enough for what the Royal Navy needed.
The Wildcat has always been a wildly underrated aircraft.
It's funny how an initial impression perseveres. It fought for years and totally crushed the enemy yet the first few months of war sealed its reputation (unfairly). All it took was some changes to tactics by learning in battle. But the bad rep remains.
Yup. Now you know the reason behind the video.
It was VMF 214 Based on Espiritu Santo that first went against the still formidable Japanese pilots in WW2. They got involved first - fighting in the infamous 'slot' when the question was still very much in doubt. In 6 months, (by July of 1943), things had changed - but for me anyway - it was the Corsair and those incredibly brave Marine pilots who took the heart out of the Japanese.
You are correct. By the time the Battle for Guadalcanal was over, officially it is February 1943, but in reality it was over about three months earlier as the Japanese tried to evacuate its few remaining troops on the island, the IJN's capability to conduct offensive operations on any scale was whittled way back. However, Rabaul was still a significant base and that's when VMF-214 and other Marine squadrons, now flying from bases in Buka and Bougainville took it to the Japanese. Add in a couple of carrier strikes and Rabaul was untenable for the Japanese to use as a base as well as isolated.
During WWII, the quality of the Japanese Army and Navy pilots began to decline significantly after 1942. There are three basic reasons. One, the Japanese flight training system couldn't increase its throughput due to its methodology. Time and space doesn't allow for an explanation. Two, Japanese pilots were sent to the front where they stayed until they were either killed or disabled. Few were brought back to the home islands to share their experience and knowledge. Three, the U.S. submarine campaign was extremely effective and Japanese industry was short of every critical material, particularly fuel. This affected flight training as well as every aspect of Japanese war production.
Please pin this comment. Also, thank you for making this video. I have been arguing with people about the virtues of the Wildcat for a long time. In the critical early years of the Pacific campaign (42,43) the Wildcat was critical to winning battles. It is nice to see the Wildcat getting the recognition it deserves.
@@cvr527 Now you know why I did this video. The Wildcat did its job until better performing airplanes (Corsair in February 1943 then the Hellcat win September 1943) came along.
Excellent video Marc! Definite thumbs up for you on this one. Most historians tell the story of the F4F being inferior to the zero.
Performance wise, yes
I read Martin Caidin's book Samurai! This is the wartime story of Japanese ace Saburo Sakai. In this book, Sakai discussed removing radios from their Zeros, but it was my impression that not all units that flew the Zero did this. Sakai mentions that they did this to, as Mr. Liebman points out, further lighten the plane. In the absence of radios, they used hand signals.
At at least one point in this tale, Sakai confesses that there was at least one dogfight when he wished that he had had a radio.
Sakai as well as Young's book on the Wildcat vs. Zero also mentions the lack of radios. Given the research that I did for the podcast and an article in MilitaryHistoryNowonline.com, I found several sources that mentioned this. Also, the Zero that the USAAF and USN used for flight tests in 1943, did not have a radio.
@@marcliebman3847 Well, one thing that sticks in my memory, although I admittedly read this book fifteen years ago, is that Sakai stated emphatically that they actually physically removed the radios and also cut off the radio masts.
As for the Zero you mention that was used for flight tests, I assume you are referring to the one found crash landed and intact in the Aleutian Islands.
I'm skeptical that all Japanese planes went into combat sans radios. It seems unimaginable to me that properly coordinating bombing and fighter attacks would be possible, even though it clearly was done by Sakai's unit. But, I am not an historian.
As a pilot myself and longtime aviation and military history nut, I really enjoyed your presentation. And I thought I would mention, too, that for many years I hated the Wildcat. I thought it was a beer barrel with wings. But about eight years ago I watched a vid of Greg Shelton doing an acro routine in an FM-2, and I started to change my mind. As I considered the weightiness of the task that the rugged Wildcat had to shoulder, I came to regard it as a scrappy little plane that did its job very well--especially as the type improved and was subsequently employed on escort carriers in the Atlantic and Pacific.
I also discovered Kermit Weeks' vids, as he has one or two vids of himself flying the Wildcat, combined with a walkaround and preflight.
@@lonzo61 Yes to your question, the A6M used in the USAAF/USN flight tests in early '43 was the one captured in the Aleutians.
In his autobiography “Samurai!” Saburo Sakai got into a dogfight with an F4F-4 Wildcat piloted by Lt “Pug” Sutherland USN. Sakai admitted that was the most harrowing one-on-one dogfight he ever fought. Read Sakai’s account carefully and you’ll see that Sakai would have been shot down if Sutherland had had any ammunition left. Sakai actually let Sutherland bail out before he shot down the plane.
@@williampaz2092 Thank you for posting. I had read excerpts of Sakai's fight, and wondered about the American pilot's fate. Accounts such as this, before the cream of Japanese pilots were eliminated illustrated most clearly the parity of the Wildcat vs the Zero.
I met a humble guard at a gated factory parking lot in Wilmington, NC, who said he flew a Wildcat in WWII (This was around the turn of the century He must of been wearing a hat with a carrier's name or something). He mentioned that they put a small piece of tape on the altimeter, indicating 3,000 feet. If they had a zero on their tail, they could dive, and the zero would of course follow. The tape reminded the wildcat pilot exactly when to pull out of the dive. The zero couldn't pull out of the dive below 3,000 feet while the wildcat could, and so, splash one more zero!
I remember reading a book on the Flying Tigers as a teen. Claire Chennault knew of the zero's weaknesses well before the war with America broke out. I wonder if advice from the former carrier pilots in the flying tigers somehow got back to their pals back home.
This is a really cool story. And yes, above 300mph, the controls of the Zero stiffened noticeably affecting the pilot's ability to maneuver the airplane. As I noted in the video, the Wildcat had servo tabs on all the controls which meant that it didn't have the same restrictions above 300 mph.
As far as Chennault's advice. According to what I learned, Chennault wrote a detailed report to the U.S. Army Air Corps about the experience of his pilots flying the P-40B against the Zero. A copy was given to the Navy and Jimmy Thatch and John Flately in 1941 and they began developing tactics to counter the Zero's advantages over the Wildcat. It was not until Midway and later that they were implemented fleet wide. Ultimately, tactics, training and technology gave the Wildcats pilots the advantage over the Zero.
Re training, the US created massive training programs very early (or slightly before) entering the war (crew and technicians/mechanics as well as pilots) and used existing civilian resources very effectively. Coast watchers, radar, and radio ... there is a huge difference between just-in-case continuous patrolling and taking off knowing when/where an attack was coming. Some of the former was necessary, but as much for early warning as for being there to respond to an attack. Technology significantly shaped tactics.
Extremely interesting analysis. A few details I didn't know made the difference in favour of the US fighters. I'd very much love to watch Marc comparing the Spitfire Mk V against the Macchi C202 over the Mediterranean and North Africa.
It is funny that you mentioned the Macchi C202. My dad flew in 34th Bomb Squadron, 17th Bomb Group in North Africa. they arrived days after the invasion of North Africa (On November 10th) and his first WW2 ended in November 1943. He often talked about the Macchi C202 that attacked their formations. Look for a podcast called "The Thunderbirds Go to War" which will be posted in the next week or two. For me to do a comparison, I prefer to have pilot reports from men who flew both airplanes in a "controlled" environment so they can be properly analyzed. There's too much emotion, adrenalin, fear and excitement that often spills into actual mission reports, biographies and memoirs. H.
I just discovered this channel today. I know the answer to this one before I watch - the Wildcat was better. The Zero had some advantages, but the Wildcat could easily exploit the many weaknesses of the Zero. Then there all the reasons you're adding to the why of it.
Informative comparison, Marc. Quite a departure from stories about your experiences in the venerable SH-3. I seem to remember you mentioning flying a T-28 in one of our past communications.
After doing a little bit of research, I was sort of surprised to find that production of the Zero was almost two times production of any other Japanese fighter in WWII. Since such a large proportion of the air war in the Pacific was not near Japanese land-based aircraft it makes sense, I suppose. Number two was the Ki-43 Hayabusa (Oscar) built for the Japanese army. I expect that as our ships got nearer to Japan, our pilots likely encountered some other-than-Zero types.
yes, I have lots of time in the T-28 whose performance in some ways, similar to the Wildcat. In many ways, the KI-43 was the same airplane as the A6M and had the same issues - maneuverable, but susceptible to catching on fire. It had the same engine as the A6M and until the Ki-43iiia's came out, it was very lightly armed.
Good video.... HELLCAT and P40 comparatives with other rival fighters, !👍🏻
Thanx. I'd like to do more, however, what I based these on is actual flight tests that took place during WW2. All these tests were conducted to determine which was the better airplane in what part of the flight regime and if they were against enemy aircraft, what are the best tactics to use to defeat them.
Hi Marc,
I enjoyed this video and appreciate the digging that made it happen. I'm wondering if you could comment on where the number of victories came from and give your opinion on how accurate they are? I've read different accounts of how the post-war analysis found fewer shootdowns than the pilots claimed (not that a fighter pilot would ever purposely
exaggerate something).
Cheers!
You ask a great question. Most of the exaggerations come from the bombers' gunners each of whom claimed hits. As it turned out, they were wildly optimistic. Fighters, at least U.S. and RAF ones, is a different story since they all had gun camera footage. So, now the intel officer looking at the film can make a determination if the airplane was shot down or not. Unfortunately, the fighters are maneuvering and if the pilot isn't seen bailing out or the plane doesn't explode, what do you call it? How do you determine if the plane was so damaged it didn't fly again even if the pilot managed to land it safely. Or, the pilot bails out of the damaged plane after being hit on his way home. These are all variables that are "not knowable" right after the combat occurs. Obviously the desire to "show results" comes into play here. My conclusion is that for the fighters, there is some inaccuracy but I believe that for the most part, 85-90% of the kills are real.
Good info settles a lot about the differences those war birds.
Thanx. I had fun researching it!!!
The fact that well-trained (but not combat experienced) USN pilots could even maintain parity against combat veteran Japanese pilots in the early is the most convincing argument of the quality of the Wildcat's design.
True, but the way USN aviators were trained as well as how quickly they adapted to fighting the A6M played a major role. This is a story unto itself and highlights the different pre-war and during the war training philosophies.
@@marcliebman3847 The early war Navy pilots were professionals indeed! Didn't SBDs score kills on Zeros while using the Thach Weave, during one of the '42 carrier battles?
@@petesheppard1709 Thatch and Flatley created the Thatch weave and began to train their pilots its use just before the Battle of the Coral Sea. They based some of their tactical ideas on the lessons learned from Claire Chennault's report to the USAAC which was given to the Navy. The Thatch weave was one. Dive, shoot, dive away was another. But, during the pre-war years, the Navy stressed deflection shooting and that was an important factor in the success of the Wildcat pilots.
@@marcliebman3847 Being willing to consider outside thinking (Chennault) is one thing professionals do. Your videos were the first time I have heard of Navy pilots reading his reports.
The biggest drawback of the Zero was its slow firing 20 mm cannons: Saburo Sakai claimed kills were achieved mostly with the 7.7s... Even with 4 Type 99-II 20 mm cannons (480 rpm), the N1K had trouble quickly killing targets... I do not give much credence to the claimed kill ratios in air to air combat, because of overclaiming. In Osprey's F4U ""Corsair vs A6M", a detailed statistical analysis is made of the entire first year of F4U combat, with 671 airframes in 18 Squadrons, the Corsair was shot down, air to air, 129 times (78 killed/51 rescued) plus 8 times due to enemy ground fire. To this was added 175 operational losses (41 deaths), for a total of 312 airframe losses. P. 74: "The ratio of actual kills scored by either types is one to one." (During the F4U's first year)
Historian Justin Pyke did some intensive research into US Intelligence archives, and the results of what he found are quite revolutionary to our understanding of the Zero. US pilots noted that one of the biggest tactical problems of the Zero was that, in full compliance with Japanese Navy Navy doctrine, the Zero avoided turning and low speeds at all costs, and only attacked in dives using higher speed. In September 1942, one US Navy Wildcat pilot said: "Zero pilots have generally poor fighter tactics. If they would only chop their throttle and turn with us, they could just sit on our tail." So, in reality, one of the major tactical problems of the Zero was that its pilots adhered to high speed tactics that avoided turns...
I also believe the low speed turn rate difference between the F4F and the Zero was very small, especially when the FM-2 came up against the shorter span A6M5. It could not turn with the Ki-43 Oscar however, but that was really the only exception in the Japanese arsenal. Japanese Army doctrine was not as dead set against turn fighting as the Japanese Navy doctrine was, and new research shows this was increasingly a sounder approach on all fronts. The high speed hit and run model, despite 1930s assumptions, was increasingly used as a supporting tactic at the actual front lines, despite the training emphasis. The reason was that high deflection, or high rate overtaking attacks, required an unaware target, and thus forced firing at point blank range to avoid warning the target. Otherwise the high speed approach was easily disrupted by the target simply turning... The prop era was simply different to the later jet era.
Also a lack of ammo. the Model 21 only carried 60 rounds per cannon. Who wins in 1 v 1 air to air combat is dictated by how the fight starts, training, experience in the airplane and in ACM, tactics and how well one pilot can fly his airplane or helicopter. This was true in WWI, WWII, Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East and every war in which fighters of one country engaged the other and is still true. This is why the West created exercises such as Red Flag and schools like Top Gun and continues to invest in them.
Did the whole fleet learn the Thach Weave maneuver both by Naval and Marine aviators? How much contribution did this maneuver help in countering the Japanese zeroes?
There is a constant narrative that the US took inferior machines and learned to use them effectively, so anti-zero tactics in the USN and anti-Oscar tactics in the AVG.
Learning is not endemic to the US though, so what is the IJN/or IJA response tactically for the USAAF/USN change in tactics to BnZ tactics, or in this case improved fighter direction over Guadalcanal? Maybe it’s a cultural bias but surely squadrons and air groups tried new twists to counter the new tactics of refusing to get into turn/climb tactics instead of simply riding the old tactics down in flames?
The Wildcat is a midwing aircraft. This is pretty unusual. You missed that. A midwing splits the difference in natural stability between a high wing and a low wing aircraft.
If you read samurai by Saburo Sakai one of their top aces he said the 0 would do 350 mph also the
captured/found 0 that we tested test pilots were ordered not to damage the engine and so we never really discovered its true top speed
This is not exactly correct. For one thing the American aircraft fuels were superior. So knock was not an issue. If the a/c was designed for 80-90 octane and you are running 100-130 you can run it to its max power setting with no fear of engine damage due to detonation. So the captured Zero from the Aleutians could be run at full power within its limits without much fear. And speed in not relevant in many cases and the Zero was not the only aircraft with controls that got heavy at higher speeds. The Bf-109 had a reduction in its roll rate at high speed ranges due to to high forces needed to move the stick.
Thach weave only works well if zero and wildcat are co-energy. It's not a silver bullet as many suggest
Absolutely true. It was just one tactic in a bag of tricks that the Wildcat had to turn the tables on the Zero.
I wonder what the kill ratio would have looked like with better training, similar im sure but probably not as stark
Thanx for your comment. When you research how the pilots were trained both before and after 12/7/41, the differences become apparent very quickly. The Japanese focused on following orders even to the detriment of mission accomplishment. Their doctrine was based on "fighting spirit" and aggressively attacking will carry the day. Much of their training was on aerobatic maneuvers.
Contrast this with the U.S. Navy which prized then and still does, initiative and freedom to innovate. The Thatch Weave and other tactics used by Navy squadrons early in the war evolved partly from hard learned experience but also by reading Chennault's report on the AVG experience. U.S. Naval Aviators spent less time practicing aerobatics and more time maneuvering the airplane to get into a firing position and once there, gunnery. Deflection shooting was practiced and practiced until it was second nature.
Brewster kind of got screwed by the Navy. They built the Buffalo to the Navy Spec. Except for the landing gear, the Buffalo was a very good airplane until the Navy added a ton of equipment to it. If the Navy had given Brewster the specs for the Wildcat, they would have built a better F4 than Grumman came up with since Brewster had more complete development experience for the type. The Brewster Buffalo was equal to the Zero in maneuverability until it became overweight by the addition of extra equipment. If the Buffalo was built as large as the Navy Spec allowed for the Wildcat, the landing gear problem would have been corrected and it would have been superior to the Wildcat.
In a way they did, but they also screwed themselves. Brewster couldn't built anything with consistency and quality. The Buffalo and then a dive bomber and then the Corsair all had quality problems. Their designs were good, if not great, it was execution that got them in trouble.
@@marcliebman3847 Finnish Brewster actually had a kill ratio of 33:1. So better than Hellcat.
Interested to know what models used in these narratives and where to buy
You also missed that a zero pilot could clear his guns if they jammed because the receiver section is rigjtin the cockpit directly in front of them.😁
the moment i start hearing about crazy 100,000 : 1 kill ratios of any aircraft to that of another from Japan, USA, Mars, Jupiter, Alpha Centauri - I start to question.
I enjoyed your presentation.
One quibble--not all German tanks were Tiger tanks and not all Japanese airplanes were Zeroes. The kill ratio charts seemed to be number of Wildcats lost in action versus number of Japanese aircraft shot down. Add in the number of Wildcats lost to ground fire because those PTO Wildcats on jeep carriers were often used for CAS, and the number of lost Wildcats increases. Late in the war gun cameras confirmed air-to-air kills, but there was still the problem of tactics--gang up on an enemy aircraft and both pilot and wingman take turns shooting or shoot at the same time, and was it one or two Japanese aircraft shot down? Fog of war is hard to see through. Just for comedic effect, mix in the need to improve morale; when in doubt, give the pilot credit for a kill so that their baseball cards back home keep the home front cheering for victory.
I think you've used the best information available. Rumor has it that during the early battles of 1942 Allied losses in air-to-air combat exceeded Japanese losses. Ground fire and shipboard AAA took their tolls, too. Then there was simply the fact that flying is dangerous--today, aviators follow risk management principles that result in few accidents. In 1942 it was possible to fly one degree off-course, miss the carrier, and run out of fuel--plane lost, pilot probably lost as well. Navigation at the Battle of Midway almost resulted in the American dive bombers missing the entire Japanese carrier fleet instead of leaving three out of four carriers burning in less than five minutes.
Thanx for your your thoughtful note. I tried, as best I could to winnow out the Wildcat kills of Betty bombers, Val dive bombers, etc. as well as those lost in CAS missions. The exchange ratio at Coral Sea was 1.1 - 1 in favor of the Wildcat. And, yes not all Japanese fighters were Zeros. Some were the IJA's equivalent which was more lightly armed. I focused on the Zero because it represented the most common IJN fighter. You are absolutely right about navigation. Compounding the problem is that my experience as a Naval Aviator tells me the ship isn't where it says (or the navigator) thinks it is. In a helo, without a radar and at relatively low altitudes, i.e. ~1,000 feet finding the ship when it is in a emissions control situation is a challenge. We used the same Mk 1 plotting board as used in WW2 because it allows you to plot relative positions and tracks. Nonetheless, we often found the wake before the carrier. Add in night time and the pucker factor goes way up!!!
@@marcliebman3847 I was an avionics tech on LPH-10/USS Tripoli, part of HMM-262, and my take on the navigation problem was from the viewpoint of the AN/ACR-51 UHF radio system with its ARA-25 antenna. Much like rifle marksmanship, the helicopter had to aim where the Tripoli would be when the helicopter "got there." The pilots were exceeding the duty cycle of their UHF final power amplifier tube (I forgot the nomenclature, but they were $500 in 1978 per tube) and had five elements to boost power. Transmitting more than five minutes caused the silver solder to melt and vibration would short out the tube, blowing the fuse and possibly damaging circuit boards. I was directed to give a lecture to the helicopter pilots--I don't know if I only annoyed them, but they seldom burned out a radio after that. The pilots were homing in on each other and having the ship get fixes on the helicopters so that the ship didn't give away its own position by excessive transmissions in the UHF band.
@@alancranford3398 I had to stop laughing after I read this before I could type. Finding a ship the middle of a large ocean in a helo is one of the most difficult evolutions I know. When I was doing my "penance" in the ASW community (I'm a SAR/CSAR/Special ops guy), we would be sent 100 miles out to a point in the ocean to dip our sonar in the water to listen for a submarine. Since we often operated under conditions in which the ship was not radiating anything - radar, TACAN, ADF, etc. - we were DR'ing our way back generally low on fuel. I can't tell you the number of times I recovered aboard with less than 20 minutes of fuel. Part of the problem is that the captain of the carrier or destroyer would decide for whatever reason to change course. So instead of being where he said he would be, he was 20 - 30 miles away. At 500 or 1,000 feet, that's outside one's visual range!!! We'd arrive to about where the ship was supposed to be and would find nothing but open ocean. If we were lucky, we'd find the wake and follow it to a ship that was, hopefully, ours.
I have read that -4 pilots didn't like the six guns because the weight of the outer guns and ammo in the wings reduced roll rate in addition to reduced ammo load. Have you seen this?
Yes, you are correct. The two major differences between the F4F-3 and F4F-4 were folding wings and 6 .50 guns. When GM started production of the FM-2, they went back to 4 .50s of the original -3 version with more ammo/gun. The FM-2 had a lighter, more powerful R-1820 which also helped performance.
@@marcliebman3847 Thank you for answering! ALSO, would a discussion of FM-2s against late war Japanese fighters be worthwhile, since the Wildcats (AIUI) were still fighting them over Okinawa during the kamikaze campaign
@@petesheppard1709 I think that the FM-2 would have been outclassed by the Japanese Shiden and Raiden fighters. However, by the end of the war, the average Japanese pilot had far less experience than their U.S. counterparts. Also, the FM-2s flying off CVEs were taking on pilots who didn't know how to land and had only a few hours of flight instruction. Yes, their escorts were flown by more experienced pilots, but for the most part, the fighters escorting the kamikazes were variants of the A6M.
@@marcliebman3847 Thanks!
That is not conventional wisdom it is "History Channel" wisdom. Any study of the war in the Pacific shows the relative performance accurately.
Thanx for your comment. When you go back and read the actual pilot reports and start looking at the actual engagements, I think the Wildcat got a bad rap. It wasn't until the Battle of Midway and then the Battle of Guadalcanal that the Marines and Navy pilots began using tactics that countered the Zero.
All these kill ratios you are talking about are based on the number of kills reported by the US airforce, which were about three to four times higher than the actual losses of the Japanese. Also, you sort of touched on that, but if it was not for the huge operational disadvantage of the long distance the Zeros had to travel, the F4F's would have been rapidly obliterated, as they were in the typical carrier to carrier combat. If the Japanese had F4F's, they would not have been able to operate over Guadalcanal.
Capable Japanese pilots could easily cope with the F6F and F4U. There is a well known story, confirmed from both sides, that Saburo Sakai survived combat with 15 F6F's in his A6M5 without a single bullet hole. Sakai at that time was half blind.
One can make a presentation like this, not directly lie, but completely distort the picture. The F4F was completely outclassed by the Zero, and it only managed to do its job due to the other operational advantages that were completely unrelated to aviation. The major error that the Japanese did in the campaign is that they refused to risk their capital ships. Had they taken the risk on their precious carriers and battle ships, they had a good chance of winning the battle of Guadalcanal.
Demetri, thanx for your comment. However, you are mixing apples and oranges. You are absolutely correct when you say the the USAAF's claims by bomber crews in terms of the number of German fighters shot down was widely exaggerated. The causes are way beyond the scope of this note.
In the Pacific, during the Battle for Guadalcanal which officially lasted from August 8th, 1942 until the last Japanese evacuation in February, 1943, distance was not the only problem the Japanese faced. One was the fact that the Cactus Air Force had the advantage of advance warning by the coast watchers and radar. This gave the Wildcats time to climb above the Japanese formations. Two, the Japanese fighters did not have radios and therefore couldn't coordinate their defense of their own formations, much less of the bombers. Three, by this time in the war, the Navy/Marine Corps pilots had adopted tactics (Thatch Weave, dive, shoot, and dive away etc.) that took advantage of the Wildcat's flying qualities and negated those of the Zero.
As far as if they had been closer, the Wildcats would have been rapidly obliterated is simply not true. Before the Battle of Guadalcanal, the exchange ratio by the Wildcat at the Battle of Coral Sea was 1.1 Zeros shot down for every Wildcat lost and at the Battle of Midway, it was up to 1.5 to one. During the carrier battles during the Battle of Guadalcanal (the Battle of the Eastern Solomons and the Battle of Santa Cruz) the exchange ratio had improved to over 2 - 1 in favor of the Wildcat.
The Hellcat and the Corsair had kill ratios over the Zero of 19-1 (Hellcat) and 11-1 (Corsair) that your comment doesn't hold water. yes, there were Japanese aces who managed to survive in the Zero. But every flight test I have read show that the Zero was clearly outperformed by the Hellcat and the Corsair.
The Battle for Guadalcanal was a war of attrition that the Japanese would lose no matter how many ships they committed and lost. I suggest you read two books, Neptunes Inferno by James Hornfischer and Islands of Destiny by John Prados.
@@marcliebman3847 Thank you for your lengthy message. I will try to analyze your arguments one by one.
All airforces in WWII over claimed. No exception. It was usually not done on purpose, it is the confusion of combat, and the fact that the combatants cannot be impartial. There has been a lot of historical comparisons of claims and losses, and the typical rate is 3:1, often 4:1. One notable example is that the P-38's that attacked Yamamoto claimed 4 or 5 escorting zeros shot down. All 6 zeros landed safely. The zeros claimed a large number of P-38's too. Only one was shot down.
The USA air forces had additional reasons to overclaim. That was, they had to ask for funding from Congress for a war that had no benefit to the USA. In a more seemingly democratic environment such as the USA, high quality propaganda is far more important (especially compared to Asian cultures where generally authority is respected by default), and this over claim was brought to a new level. Perhaps the worse over claimers were the AVG's, who were getting paid money for every enemy plane claimed, in other words they had additional motivation to lie. Therefore, all your kill to loss ratios that you quote need to be divided by 4.
I agree about the additional operational advantages of the F4F during the G campaign. These are the reasons why the F4F's were not obliterated, as they were in the carrier to carrier engagements.
The main reasons that the Hellcat and Corsair kill ratio improved, was the very low quality of the late war Japanese pilots. Japan would often send A6M's by pilots that could barely fly as decoys, this is how for example McCampbell got his 7 (claimed) kills in one day. Any Japanese pilot that knew how to exploit the capabilities of his Zero could outfight F6F's or F4U. The phenomenon is not unique to the A6M F4U comparison. A similar comparison would be an F4U vs. Mig 15 7 years later. Even though the F4U was porky and overweight compared to the Zero, it was still light and nimble compared to the Mig 15, so it could win in a dogfight.
If the Japanese had brought their cruisers and carriers to the game, they would have obliterated the airfields in Guadalcanal. They were very close to doing that in their first attack, but the Japanese headquarters misjudged, and thought that protecting their capital ships was too important. In reality, even at a loss of a few extra capital ships, they could have won the battle in Gl. Had they done so, they would have likely destroyed the American will to fight. I agree that long term that USA could out produce Japan and win in an attrition war. However, war is also psychology, and the pacific war was a war that had no benefit to the average US citizen (except for those working in the war industries of course), the motivation was based on propaganda and racial hatred as far the average American was concerned. So, it is conceivable that a defeat and slaughter of the US force in Guadalcanal would change the short term American policy with respect to the Pacific war.
As for the books, you need to read books from the opposite side in order to avoid the propaganda. I did not see any citations with Japanese names on your suggestions. One of the major problems of the second world war is that in the USA, it is based on war propaganda which is now interpreted as "history". This is very problematic, because war propaganda is not meant to be accurate, it is meant to motivate people to enter the meat grinder called war....
So, in short, when it comes to the air war, the victory of the USA was more related to a quantitative advantage as opposed to qualitative advantage with respect to aircraft. But this conclusion is not very attractive to the propaganda machine, so it needs to be distorted in order to make history and war sound more ... inspiring. Without realizing it, you are also advancing this propaganda. Remember the big war is the basis for selling the newer wars, so it needs to be dressed up as much as possible....
Demitri, I don't know where you are getting your information. In the fighter world, there were gun cameras in every U.S. fighter. While not the perfect answer, they confirmed probably 90% of the U.S. fighter kills during the war. Those that weren't confirmed were classified as "probables" and "possibles." Second, the Japanese constantly underreported their won losses up the chain of command since if they reported the real numbers, the local commanders would have suffered a major loss of face. And, at the same time, it would have caused their superiors to lose face since they would have been seen giving directions that were "ineffective."
Your insistence that the Zero could hold its own against either the Corsair or the Hellcat again, doesn't hold water. It is incorrect from an aviation perspective and by 1943, the average Japanese pilot was going into combat with 150 hours of flight time or less in a plane that was slower, couldn't climb or dive as fast, climb as high, roll as well didn't turn as well, except between 200 - 250mph. That data is borne out by test after test of the A6M 21 and 51 which were the variants built the most. They faced U.S. Navy and Marine Corps pilots who had, on average about 350 hours, had been trained by combat experienced pilots (something the IJN and IJA didn't do except at the front).
Yes, the number of kills were inaccurate to some degree, but except for the bomber claims, most held up to scrutiny after WWII. I could go on and on. I know nothing of your background or sources so if you wish to continue this dialogue, suggest you reach out to me via my website www.marcliebman.com/contact/. We can then, if you wish, share more info.
@@marcliebman3847 Perhaps we can talk more via your website. Any true historical analyses shows the huge disparity between claims and true losses. A very good example is Air War for Burma: The Allied Air Forces Fight Back in South-East Asia 1942-1945 (The Bloody Shambles Series, Vol. 3) by Christopher Shores. Despite gun cameras etc. This is not only to the Pacific front, it also applies to the European theater. As I told you, it applies to more or less ALL airforces in WWII, but perhaps a bit more amplified in the US Airforce. I gave you a very good example of the Yamamoto shooting down. The careers of all the six zero pilots was very well recorded, yet according to the US airforce, with gun cameras and all, they all died.
Actually the Zero was competitive in climb to late war US fighters, which were all over weight. But the turn performance is very critical both in defensive and offensive combat. I gave you a very good example of Saburo Sakai surviving combat with 15 F6F's with one eye.
I agree, the training made the difference. Japan lacked the fuel to train pilots.
nice work, just sayin, if I had the option to chose either the the cat or the zero for a one v one I know what A/C I choose. however, if the the fight was a two v two or two v plus, I would lean heavy to the cat, especially if my wingman was a Thatch/O'Hare trained wingman! like you said . training is as, if not more, important than the weapon. A combat aircraft without a well trained Fighter pilot is just a target.
Mark, thanx for your kind words. A lot depends on how the fight starts, i.e. altitude and relative position of the two airplanes. If both are about 5 thousand feet, the Wildcat pilot can just shove the nose over and dive away. The one I would fear is the Zero bouncing the Wildcat from above and behind and getting in the first shot. So, my point is, tell me how the fight begins and then I can tell you who survives to fight another day.
A faster Boom & Zoom airplane with a pilot that understand it dictates the nature of the engagement against a slower Turn & Burn airplane.
This was learned post-WW1,a nd most Western nations understood this change, but Japan did not or simply refused to accept it and focused on maneuverability.
no they had high speed planes. ki-61 and ki-44
Training.
Mundane but vital. it is also important in how you train, which was a painful lesson we re-learned during Vietnam and out of it came what is colloquially known as Top Gun as well as a series of very realistic, free play exercises such as Red Flag.
The old guys knew what they were doing. But after the war it became fashionable to go light and remove survivability features. The result: We got our assess kicked in Viet Nam. Thousands of downed American airplanes. Congress got pissed and passed Public Law 92-156 which requires every program to define a vulnerability requirement and verify it in test. Armor and fire suppression ALWAYS buys its way on.
Yup....
The point is, the conventional wisdom is true, but only partly so. The Zero is far superior to the Wildcat but only in terms of manoeuvrability and range. The Zero fails in all other respects. It's those other respects that get you killed.
Well said.
Zero climbs better and better p/w ratio
Smol angery meow meow 🥰
Japan knew it could only fight a 2 year war. If anybody was sent back to train the next wave...the war was already lost.
that's a very interesting comment. ADM Yamamoto said that he thought that unless Japan won in six months, they would lose the war. What I find fascinating when I read about the planning done by the Japanese general staff is their lack of realistic assumptions on logistics. Then, when the U.S. submarine campaign began, one would think the IJN would have changed tactics and emphasis, but it didn't. Ultimately, the submarine campaign strangled Japan's ability to wage war. FYI, if they wanted, the Japanese could have rewickered their flight training programs, but cultural and institutional barriers prevented doing i.
A great read is " Japanese Destroyer Captain " by Hara. Against war from the start he quickly comes to realize they will not get kill ratio needed to win
@@toonsis I've read it. It is a very interesting book.
@@marcliebman3847 it would be a movie had he not killed so many americans !
@@toonsis Amen... One of the principal reasons the Japanese went to war with the West was that they were afraid that the Brits, Dutch and U.S. were going to cut them off from the raw materials coming out of SEA, but mostly crude oil from Borneo and Indonesia. When FDR embargoed shipments of oil to Japan in July 1941, they began to plan for war with the U.S., Dutch and British. The IJN were great fans of Mahan's concept of the "decisive battle" and believed that in one or two decisive battles, they could win control of the Pacific and hence the war. Unlike the Atlantic where the U.S./Canada/U.K. won the Battle of the Atlantic which was an ASW war, the Japanese lost the ASW battle. Coupled with the defeats at Coral Sea, Midway and the naval battles between August 42 and February 43, the IJN never could recover. Worse, it allowed Japan, a maritime nation, to be strangled by the U.S. submarine campaign. Having worked with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces during my career in the Navy, I can tell you it is a lesson the Japanese have not forgotten.