Would a King G battleship with 3 quadruple turrets be worth the extra cost ? Assuming it was build like this from te start and not modified from real life built ships ?
If Operation Ten-Go had succeeded - how useful would that actually have been, to have Yamato and the other ships beached as shore batteries? Similarly, how useful would an Allied shore battery on the north-west corner of Savo Island have been against the Tokyo Express?
The German ships of World war 2 seemed to have generally inferior anti aircraft weaponry compared to their allied contemporaries and be less than adequate in anti air defense. If you were in charge of German ship design what would you do make German naval anti aircraft defense up to par or superior to their allied contemporaries?
Thanks for answering my question Drach, earlier than anticipated haha! That's more or less what I had concluded as well; always had a feeling when reading about her sinking that all the crew's efforts to save her was for naught, that torpedo hit was absolutely brutal. Figured that would be a great thought experiment on just how much a ship can be damaged before it's beyond repair.
I also had a low view of the Italian Navy for a long time as I considered them cowards and lacked good aim. Your channel really puts things into perspective and changed my view.
That's the problem with history of pretty much any topic. There is a lot of context that's required to see the full picture. And sometimes there's not enough Source material for that to even be possible. Especially if it happened outside of living memory.
Fascinating and illuminating as always Drach! You're mention of the " electro-mechanical" fire control computers reminded me of an " electric calculator" my Father had saved from the trash, when he worked in the telephone industry. It was as big and heavy as an oversized typewriter that you plugged into a wall outlet. You could punch in calculations and hit the a button and the machine would jump, noisily and put up your solution in a window, with digits on dials I think...it was fun to mash away on as a kid! He'd also saved an old oscilloscope which was a ton of fun, imagining a sonar screen, hunting subs....or a radar scope revealing an incoming raid... These devices were in many cases, developed out of the wartime technology, and they deserve to be remembered. Thanks for reminding me ,anyway..... Thanks again!
I swear, Drach and Bloke on the Range must be long lost brothers. Both are engineers, both have a strong interest and knowledge of military history, both have beards, both are great at explaining mathematical concepts, and both run excellent UA-cam channels.
I'm pretty sure Bloke on the Range is also an engineer. I, as an engineer, too, know that we studied a lot of math. Not just in math class, but applied to our physics classes, as well as engineering classes. In communications theory, we use convolution integrals, while most laymen think all math is convoluted.
@@michaelmoorrees3585 I’m studying data science and economics so I’m taking a decent amount of math courses. I wish more of my math professors had the ability to explain concepts.
@@michaelmoorrees3585 when I was in school for engineering, my physics instructor was the head of the department teaching out of his own book (well, who else can he trust to cover the subject properly?).
34:20 AA is also more prominent in pop culture because there is a lot more stock footage of AA guns and crews shooting at and killing enemy planes. Thus right after the war movies could use this footage to beef up the action without having the cost of filming their own.
@@glenchapman3899 And CAP footage from the deck looks boring; they had to declassify gun camera footage or make up their own POV footage to make it interesting...
In your talk about the air cap, you left out another huge difference between the aircraft and A.A. Ammunition. Aircraft carry a very limited supply and have to use it sparingly. That's why I love the story of a pilot who ran out of ammo, lowered his landing gear and beat a Japanese bomber to death with them.
His guns might have jammed or frozen, that was an issue for the Cactus Air Force early on, especially with Betties coming in at 29,000 feet for bombing raids.
'Napalm in the morning' was written by John Milius. Who wrote and directed 'Red Dawn', 'Conan' and 'The Wind And The Lion'. Who wrote the Indianapolis scene in 'Jaws'.
Just discovered two great books Dreadnought Britain Germany & the coming of the great war & Castles of Steel Britain Germany & the winning of the great War both by Robert K Massie. I've got the audio versions and what I've listerned to so far is excellent.
I would LOVE to see the inner workings of an analogue fire control computer explained. Especially a more complex arrangement like a later AFCT. That'd be fucking sick.
I think one area the IJN totally ignored was to use their submarine force against merchant shipping - specifically the US/Pearl Harbor to Australia supply line. The supply chain was long enough as it was with really no submarine (or really any other) threat. Imagine if the US would have had to divert transports and supply ships several thousand miles out of their way, or divert escort assets to protect convoys to Australia. May not have affected the outcome of the war (other than maybe lengthening the Pacific War), but could it have affected the outcomes of both the Coral Sea and Midway battles? A more favorable outcome of these battles for the IJN could have had significant affects on events later in the war. Might be an interesting "what if" scenario similar to a discussion of "what if" the Type XXI U-Boat had started service in early 1944 instead of April/May of 1945.
Thank you answer #1. I always thought it was because the bow and stern were always the most uncomfortable part of the ship as they rose and fell the most. The midships portion would rise and fall the least!
In the age of sail the stern cabin under the quarterdeck was the captains, and the other officers cabins were clustered near or below (midshipmans on the bottom). The petty officers would have a place in the forecastle. The crew slept in rows of hammocks on the decks in between. Moving the officers away from the stern cabins to the middle of the ship was breaking centuries old traditions...
About the IJN not pressing on compared to the Army, Infantry is a lot easier to replace than a bunch of warships (at least without a ludicrous industry). If Japan is going to risk sacrificing a significant naval force, the damage inflicted needs to be worth it.
It’s very interesting to hear how your views of the Japanese navy have evolved over time. Growing up in the US and being a fan of the naval war in the Pacific from and early age my views of the Japanese Navy as a capable, advanced and skilled opponent especially at the outset of the war have been there from the beginning. Which makes me wonder what “popular” (for lack of a better term) British history is on the Pacific war vs that in the US. You mentioned Shattered Sword and I would argue that it has been the most transformative work of history in the field that has been published. I say this because when you compare the accepted narrative of the Japanese side of the battle (most of which came from Prange and Fuchidia who we now know was a liar on an epic scale) to what the truth was they are very different. Not to mention the fact that we now know thanks to Shattered Sword that the conventional narrative of the Torpedo planes dragging the fighter cover down and paving the way for the dive bombers was also false.
Comment pretty much describes my impressions growing up in the US. I developed an interest in WWII as a pre-teen due to being bombarded with all the various war movies and TV series ever made being rebroadcast on TV which had left me with the impression the Japanese Navy were first rate until attrition took over. Nothing I read after developing that interest really changed that initial impression.
The one thing I do know about being an American, is that only the British yak on about the Battle of Trafalgar. Even in a book called Victory vs Redoutable, there's almost no information about Redoutable in it. And in a documentary called HMS Victory, when they get to the duel between HMS Victory and Redoutable, they talk about anything but HMS Victory as they endlessly praise Nelson's great genius the formation of all ships before skipping the duel and announcing Nelson was gunned down and that it was probably inevitable. There's just no self-reflection in these propaganda pieces or any interest in the French perceptive because the Victory / Redoutable duel was one of the most interesting in history and it's been hushed up because it's inconvenient to the propaganda of the Royal Navy. The victors definitely wrote the history on Trafalgar, unlike say Waterloo with French and British historians having equal fascination with.
@@jetdriver Because the British would probably not have written much material in the Pacific War, having had embarrassing losses in it. You'd probably get distinctive American and Japanese history written about the Pacific War since both sides experienced major victories while the Royal Navy perspective about the Pacific War was probably quietly forgotten.
Jet Driver - I would tend to agree with you, though I would expand the reading list a bit. Zimm's book on Pearl Harbor opened my eyes to several unappreciated aspects of that battle and it's "perfect planning & perfect execution". Miller's War Plan Orange filled in a lot of the prewar US thinking, particularly the competition between the Thrusters and the Cautionary strategies in the 20s and 30s. Kaigun by Evens & Peattie filled in the prewar perspective of the IJN, and Sunburst by Peattie rounded that out with a focus on the naval air component, particularly the complementary aspects of the land- and sea-based forces. And Lundstrum's analysis of USN naval air campaigns straightened out a few misconceptions on how we stumbled our way to the top. These are all part of a "third wave" of historians taking another look at the Pacific War and it's calcified myths.
1:02:50 By 1944 the Japanese were on the strategic defense. Their airpower, both land and carrier based was not sufficient to support large amphibious offensives the likes of which they were conducting in 1941-42 (and back then it was against weak opposition - by 1944. US has filled the Pacific with combat units). Besides they got the resources they wanted in the Dutch East Indies and all they needed to do to win the war is to beat the Chinese while repelling Allied counterattacks. The Japanese were not SEEKING a decisive naval battle. Kantai Kessen assumed a war with US - which now was the case - and in such a war such a battle would be coming to Japan anyway and the doctrine was looking for ways to offset the US superiority. One thing that seems to slip off of minds of people is that WAR IS NOT A LONG-TERM SUSTAINABLE STATE OF AFFAIRS FOR ANY COUNTRY! It is a huge burden on economy, production is focused on war materiel which, unless it conquers something, results in 0 return for the investment immediately (and in case of a loss the return is less and less long term - depending on how bad the loss was - and even a victory can return a net loss on investment). Meanwhile population growth decreases, treasury gets drained, mortality and inflation rises, productivity in many if not most spheres falls (many of the farmers and workers are at the front not producing...), trade and exports decrease... And the neutral powers, potential rivals are often making a ton of cash selling necessities to war parties at inflated prices. Think of a country at war as a man running. Running a 100 m dash at 41 km/h would be akin total war, but it can only be done for a a few minutes (akin a few years of war). A man running a marathon is akin USA in Vietnam - limited war commitment. The man can run for a couple of hours just as the country can sustain a limited war for up to a few decades, but the marathon runner still needs to stop and rest after those few hours of running. In the end a man can go farther by walking (peacetime) than by running in one go. But certain situations necessitate running. So war is a kind of a race. The invader chooses when the race starts, so it is usually better prepared, but also usually runs on an uphill track since he needs to be stronger to succeed and his supply lines are by default longer. The attacker therefore needs to concentrate his forces on sea, air and land in such a way to achieve the necessary advantage. In addition US is stronger economically overall. Kantai Kessen doctrine has correctly recognized both and was looking for a way to turn the tables. In effect it says "If we fight US or UK, they'll come at us in consecutive big concentrated fleet efforts that outgun us. Let's see how we can defeat those the way we had to defeat the Russian fleets in the Yellow Sea and Tsushima". There is no big difference in DOCTRINE between the Japanese attack on Midway and the US attack on the Marianas. Both seek to capture a strategically significant objective with a concentrated fleet action (as the most rational way) and there were hopes that a decisive blow could be struck against the enemy's fleet if it appeared (see the contemporary criticism of Spruance after the Philippine Sea for not pursuing the Japanese). It was just the US and Japanese TACTICAL dispositions that were different as they were shaped by the technology available to each at the time (the Japanese had no radar at the time hence they spread their destroyers around to provide early warning - the US later kinda did the same even with radar - posting forward the radar pickets - to provide earlier warning). A doctrine postulates how you use your forces once the war starts. It may influence the decision, but certainly not decisively, on whether a country will start a war with a given country or not.
Part of the Kantai Kessen doctrine was the assumption that the enemy forces, whether US or UK, would be coming at them with a superiority of forces. The plan to deal with this was the "whittling down" tactics. Subs would start this, so they were positioned way ahead and had to preserve their torpedoes for the major targets like battleships and carriers. Long-ranged land-based naval air units were also a part of the advanced forces, as well as hit-and-run attacks by the carrier forces aimed at the enemy carrier fleet. Training in night operations was focused on the lighter forces so that they could take part in "whittling down" the enemy main fleet before it could get to the critical area, where it would finally be met by the battleship line in Main Battle. The ironic part of all this is that this is exactly what the US did to the Japanese in the cascading battles around Leyte Gulf - subs and aircraft doing long-range recon and getting early hits in (goodbye flagship Atago), air power being used to whittle down the incoming heavies (goodbye Musashi), then the climactic clash of the battle lines - which sort-of happened at Surigao (there wasn't much left of the Japanese battle line), but not at San Bernardino like it should have, thanks to Halsey's distraction and mis-communications. It was left to the little guys, again, to hold the line until the big ones could come back - but then the enemy lost their nerve, gave up and sailed away. Which is probably what Kantai Kassen was aiming for, even if they could not "whittle down" the enemy fleet enough to defeat it like at Tsushima. But the single-minded focus on preparing, equipping, and training for this war-winning clash, and the glory gained in making sure your own attack damaged one of the enemy's primary ships, explains a lot of Japanese actions, from the airmen's over-focus on battleships at Pearl Harbor, the sub's over-focus on carriers and battleships around Guadalcanal at the expense of all the smaller supply ships allowed to slip through, to the light-weight construction and lack of armor in Japanese naval aircraft (in order to increase their range and maneuverability). Escorting civilian merchantmen was hardly thought about before the war, despite the stark example of what the U-boats did to their former ally the UK in WW1 and their similarity as island nations needing overseas resources. Vital destroyers could not be spared from their jobs with the fleet, and no one had built any dedicated escorts until they were forced to by increasing losses. Radar and sonar were neglected until they saw how the Allies were using them to defeat their highly-trained forces. And they did not have the training program, particularly for airmen, to replace their losses because they were hoping their pre-war plan would be enough to either bring them a quick, decisive victory or so bloody the enemy that they had to fall back and end up in a stalemate.
The tradition of a monarch knighting people on the battlefield definitely lasted into the 20th century. I heard somewhere that King George V knighting General Monash on the Western Front circa 1917 was the last time this happened, but I later heard that there might have been a later instance.
Time 54. SNORKELS vs RADAR The Kriegsmarine tried to counter radar detection of snorkeling U-boats by applying radar absorbing material on the snorkel head - one of the earliest known uses of RAM. Also, the keel depth of the snorkeling submarine could be adjusted. This was a judgment call. Obviously, the greater the height of the snorkel head and mast exposed above the water surface, the greater the chance of detection, but if the height is reduced too much, waves will pass over the snorkel head (intake valve). Automatic float valves prevented the sea water from entering and the diesels would draw air from inside the boat, causing a partial vacuum, until the wave passed, and the float valve re-opened. In U.S. Guppy diesel boats during the early days of the Cold War (showing my age) the diesels were designed to safely operate in a vacuum up to six and half inch’s mercury (Hg), although the enginemen back aft might shut their engines down before you reached the limit. This was called a ‘flame out’ and was a black mark on the luckless diving officer. Standard aircraft altimeters located throughout the boat indicated the amount of vacuum (1000 feet of “altitude” is approximately one inch Hg, so the limit was 6500 feet.) When submerged on the battery, and below periscope depth, ship speed of only three knots was common to conserve energy. Normally, the bow and stern planes (and rudder) were hydraulically powered, but to further conserve power (and reduce noise) they might be shifted to manual (hand) operation (this is why the control wheels were so large). When snorkeling speeds of up to 10-12 knots were possible. The effectiveness (lift) of the diving planes varies as speed squared, and the bow and stern planes men had to be careful to minimize movement of the planes. Else the boat might broach (partially surface) or descend rapidly to 100 feet or more until control was regained. Once again, black marks for the unlucky diving officer.
Thanks, Barry. This comment was excellent. I grew up on navy bases. Just about my favorite place on any navy base, was the library. I was and still am fascinated by naval vessels. I would look up the ships my father had served on. Not only that, but I have worked as a marine electrician on ships from the Spruance class destroyers, and some older fast attack boats at Ingalls. Then there was a 4 month job on the USS Saratoga, when she was docked at Mayport, Fl. That was an interesting experience. What A piece of steel! It is ironic that I have learned a great deal from viewers comments. I now will go an look up the Guppy diesel boats. Thanks again Barry.
Since you seem to know what's what... In my reading of accounts of WWII U-boat operations, the crews often reported that they found the constant changes in air pressure inside the U-boat as it used the snorkel to be very uncomfortable. Were any steps ever taken to reduce or eliminate that problem (other than trying to make sure the snorkel never submerged) or was it just something that later generations of diesel boat crews had to live with?
@@silentotto5099 Think about it practically - a diesel engine needs a certain amount of air to keep running, where else are you going to get the air if the snorkel float closes? Shutting off the engine won't work intermittently, "floating" the snorkel on the waves won't work if the sub is making any headway. You would need some sort of powered bellows to suck extra air into bladders while it is unblocked, then some sort of instantaneous pressure valve to switch the diesels to the bladders when it is blocked - but where would you put the bladders in the tight confines of a sub?
@@gregorywright4918 What you describe, some sort of pressure container holding enough compressed air to run the diesels for a short period of time and which is replenished when the snorkel is above the waves is what I was thinking about. Subs got bigger post-war, so there might have been enough space for such a system. As crews disliked running on a snorkel so much, I was wondering if any sort of system was looked into. Apparently the answer is no. Thanks.
At 48:30 you talked about the Atlanta and the possibility to save her. I've read that the torpedo hit also cracked her keel. Moving her would have just made her break up somewhere else.
I was wondering when the drydock was coming out and find that UA-cam unsubscribed me from the channel sometime after the livestream yesterday! No wonder I didn't get a notification...
Regarding ranging fire on an ABX layout, I'd have thought there was distinct advantage compared to ABXY. One volley of six shots followed by a volley of three makes it easier to distinguish which volleys are yours and which volley which. There are several reports of confused fall of shot where ships couldn't work out which was their fall of shot, so firing off differing numbers of shells might help distinguish.
I always assumed the real advantage of AB+X more or less just comes down to the displacement needed to reach at least 8 guns is less than what they needed to get to 8-guns for AB+XY and in the treaty era the displacement limits basically pushed the navies that wanted to be really compliant to favor AB+X to reach their overall armor thickness goals and shorten the belts.
On the subject a Taranto followup, I read somewhere when it was suggested to the aircrews, there was a mutter from the back of the room "Chr*st, they only asked the Light Brigade to go once!"
Good stuff! On Japanese shortfalls, besides ASW. Yes, they were innovative about amphibious warfare, BUT their naval fire support was behind. Their initial successes rarely had to face really determined beach defenses such as the Germans and Japanese later developed. I really doubt that Japan could have pulled off an equivalent to Tarawa. Their use of submarines was also very closely tied to fleet operations. A ROUGH description would be that the IJN sub force was run by the Klingons. There was much honor in attacking a major fleet unit, but it seems much less emphasis on commerce raiding. A really active Japanese submarine presence between the Solomons and the Watchtower support bases might have affected the land campaign much more than going after the Wasp and North Carolina (for instance).
We were all behind in amphibious warfare in 1941-42. We wouldn’t have been able to pull off Tarawa before Nov., 1943. Tarawa was a close run fight as it was, in spite of the fact we outnumbered the Japanese in every category. I think it should be noted the Japanese successfully conducted multiple amphibious operations before Midway.
@@TraditionalAnglican The US Marines had built the doctrine and the air-ground cooperation, but the Navy was not very well equipped or proficient in operations until after RAdm Turner (former head of War Plans) experienced the practical difficulties firsthand at Guadalcanal. There were only a few specialized ships in IJN (or were they IJA?), and they were focused on DEI operations. Their bungled first assault on Wake Island showed how poorly they were prepared for opposition.
Free societies produce more people capable of innovative thinking. I wonder how the (not-so-crypto-) fascists in the Great Reset community plan to avoid their technocratic utopia's descent into late-Soviet decay.
Japanese Confusion at Guadalcanal - For an example of this confusion, just look at the fate of the Japanese 35th Infantry Brigade, under Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi. 35th Brigade arrives on Guadalcanal between 29 Aug and 4 Sept, is in position by dark on 12 Sept and after sunset 12 Sept, they started 2 days (nights) of fighting in an attempt to attack Henderson Field from the southwest but were stopped by US Marines at Lunga Ridge, losing 830 men in fighting a force at the Ridge that actually was only 830 or so men, the combined 1st Raider Battalion, 1st Provisional Parachute Battalion, 2/5 Marines and 1/7 Marines supported by the guns of 11 Marines and commanded by Lt Col Merritt "Red Mike" Edson, 1st Raider Btn. The confusion came during the day on 13 Sept when first the daily air raid by Japanese air elements from Rabaul and then the nightly naval shore bombardment by the "Tokyo Express" were directed about 5 miles or so east of Henderson Field (Kawaguchi's supply depot) because Kawaguchi had told superiors he would have the airfield secured on the 13th, but these daily attacks were corrected back to Henderson Field on 14 Sept. To add insult to injury the 1st Raider Battalion had raided Kawaguchi's supply depot at Taivu Point on 8 Sept.
Well if the Germans were allowed to keep Helgoland class there's a good chance the Deutschland class Panzersciffs would have had 12s and the Scharnhorsts would have had improved 12s similar to Alaska class. Also on the more speculative when the Germans considered going to bigger guns on the König class before determining they were too far along to go from 10 12s to 8 13.8s because the barbettes where already in place the ship builders did determine they could have went up to 320mm 12.6" guns with the shell system and barbettes made for the 12s. If they upgunned the Helgolands to those 320mm similar to what the Italians did with old 12" ships well the Helgolands may be a similar threat level to the upgraded WWI Italian ships and if the Germans where making 320 mm guns the Scharnhorsts could have wound up with improved 320mm guns which would put them on the same level of guns as the Dunkerque class but with the Scharnhorsts much better armour.
If course if they got to keep Nassaus instead well an 11" ship wouldn't have been able to do much that the predreads couldn't do, just slightly faster and a few more of those 11" guns for shore bombardments. I don't even think with improved Scharnhorst 11s they could have been a threat.
The Baracuda is believed to have never used its torpedos in anger. It struggled with 1800lb weight. The normal bomb load was 3 x 500 lbs or up to four depth charges. The Avenger could carry up to 4 500 lbs bombs or a Torpedo, all carried internaly. Rockets Radar and or extra tanks carried externally the RN in the Pacific preferred the Avenger..
Excellent as always. A couple of ideas for future Rum Rations..... The Battle of the Barents Sea (convoy JW51B) and, to follow on from your excellent vid about the development of carriers, and the one you did on the Zero, how's about one on the development of carrier aircraft? 👍🖖
The TBD Devastator had a Norden bomb-sight. The Navy in fact commissioned the Sight and was not happy the USAAC eventually got it also. The Devastator had prone bomb aimers position. the sighting windows being covered by doors. The Devastator was used in some successful level bombing missions. Usually carrying 2 500 lb bombs ( could carry up to 3 centrally, or up to 12 smaller bombs on wing racks )
Long after WWII, use of the Norden bombsight was resurrected during the Vietnam War, when Navy P-2s used it to accurately placed sensors along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
I was on an aircraft carrier when I was in the Navy. There’s nothing quite like cracking your knees (or head) on an armored water tight door frame while running up and down passageways during general quarters.
11:00 Even as a teenager in the 1970s interested in WW2, I don't remember having that impression of them. "Unarmored airplanes" and "doomed from the start" were the only negatives.
@24.22 During Korea Skyraiders were used to attack a dam with torpedos. Both Avengers and Swordfish probably did many more ASW attacks armed with depth bombs than they flew torpedo missions.
Drach, just in support of your answer as to the knighting on board the Golden Hind, prince Henry the navigator an his two older brothers were knighted in Ceuta, after the landing and taking of the city. The preference for a battlefield knightood survived to the end of the middle ages.
as always, great Drydock, BUT can you please provide some sort of label or caption to figures? For example, the photo of rolled drawings at minute 9:35 today's response to question re literature - what is it? drawings of ships? whose, USN or RN or ??. Where? Greenwich or ...?
Some have asserted that the IJN officer caste did not consider the "sitting ducks" allied transports/ merchantmen moored at Guadalcanal "worthy of their steel" which is a possibility. Given the fact that many Marines survived on captured rations in perilous times there early on, their IJA opponents may have wanted to replay that scenario later to their own advantage.
The Japanese were inferior in Repair ships though. Their only modernized one was Akashi. For all the praise given to them for their logistics at the start of the war most of their repair ships were less modernized than USN ones. That ended up being one of the critical factors of why they lost so many ships as time went on. Fleet Oilers are much easier to build in comparison.
Video Idea: What kind of tools and resources did Warships had in WW1/2 to repair battle damage on Sea? Did they had spare plates, shafts. Where they able to weld something?
Honestly if the Atlanta hadn't sunk outright its likely much of her equipment would have been salvaged in place especially all of the surviving guns and their fire control systems
Thank you for answering my question, and yeah those factors do explain why AA is so prevalent in pop culture while CAP doesn’t get the credit it deserves. This goes to show that firsthand accounts of veterans are NOT necessarily reliable (the Dunkirk Effect), and one must look at official reports over firsthand accounts. Now how to correct this misconception.... Re: Santa Cruz, that's actually one engagement where AA stole much of the credit from CAP (looking at you SoDak)-one of the worst examples of this, in fact. John Lundstrom's work conclusively proves that much of the American AA kill counts were serious exaggerations. Re: Japanese seeking decisive battle into late-war.....they weren't by that point. At the absolute latest they gave up post-Guadalcanal, if not post-Midway.
@@bkjeong4302 even the more "passive" defense of CAP had it's limits which is why part the US was sure they were going to take way more losses in the invasion of Japan from Kamikazes than they ever had before because they couldn't supress all the airfields.
In knighting on a ship (or battlefield) another working hypothesis could be that, politically, this establishes the Monarch as being of a higher rank, in the battle specifically. The visual representation of the Commander kneeling in front of his Sovereign also establishes visually that the Monarch therefore has more power than the Commander. Thus heading off comments of the 'Have fun storming the castle' variety. Taking this step immediately would help stave off political speculation of the 'grumbling masses' getting the idea that the Commander in question could possibly be more powerful than the current incarnation of the Government.
WRT the AB+X vs. AB+XY layout division, why didn't A+X with 4 gun turrets become more common (i.e. 11% loss in firepower vs nearly 1/3 of turret/barbette/shell handling weight and 11% of gun weight gone)? With the move to "All or nothing" armor schemes, minimizing the area that needed protection seems like it would pay huge dividends later on in battleship development.
I mean, the French tried that with the Richelieu-Class. 2 turrets with 4 barrels each, but both forward. They even included a bulkhead between the two pairs of guns, so a hit on the turret may only disable two of the guns. Nevertheless they wanted to build the third ship (Gascogne) with A-X-Layout, because they also needed the aft firing sector. I think that 3-gun-turret in A-B-X-Layout was congruent evolution in that time, as you can see with Italians, US, British (Lion and KGV), Japanese. I count out the Germans, as they had no experience.
And, your ship width goes up, the weight of the turret ( and it's associated training machinery, elevating machinery also go up. ). And even one hit that disables the training gear takes half your entire armament out of action.
The redundancy argument is highly reasonable; in my mind, the counter-argument is that a part of the weight savings could be spent on armor to produce overall more survivable turrets/barbettes.
@@lamwen03 The weight of an individual turret would increase, but that would be more than offset by the elimination of 33% of the main battery weight. Further, within an all or nothing armor scheme, there is one fewer barbette to protect with belt, which allows for a shorter length of belt.
That's not a hull number, it's their destroyer division number. You cannot see the stacks very well, but each has a different number of rings on the stack to denote their order in the division.
@Drachinifel A topic for a future vid - Small boat handling. I saw on the New Jersey's channel that the USN was not happy with the boat handling setup of the Iowa class and that led to me thinking about how Yamato/Mushashi had their boats internally. Was that a success? Was boat handling a common problem?
The Japanese had limited resources for mine clearance, at least in Hong Kong. My late father-in-law as a boy of about 12 was "conscripted" to aid in mine clearing. He survived, but a lot of young Chinese boys did not. Having no other skills, he continued the work for the British after the war. At least he had better resources and more respect from the British sailors.
I sense a theme to Drach's intersets. . . Armed & armo(u)red boat = Battleship. . Armed & armo(u)red tank = Landship. . Armed & armo(u)red knight = Manship. . Knight on an armo(u)red horse = Fast Manship.
WRT to the USS Atlanta it’s difficult to say in the absence of a readily accessible war damage report but I’m inclined to argue that if the progressive flooding which led to her loss can be controlled then she was salvageable. You have to remember she had only taken 1 torpedo something that was survived by other member of her class. The gunfire damage seems to have been mostly confined to the superstructure and as such did not seem to play a major part in compromising her structure or buoyancy. The survival of the USS Houston is perhaps a good example of the ability of a ship to survive major structural damage and loss of power. To be clear I’m not arguing that the crew should have been able to save her or that their efforts or damage control were lacking. Just that had they been successful in halting the flooding there is good reason to believe she could have been saved.
The USS Houston (CA-30) was hit by a total of 4 torpedoes during the Battle of Sunda Straight (28 Feb. - 1 Mar., 1942), 3 of them in rapid succession after she had started to lose headway. The damage would have been daunting even in an idea situation, but this was at the start of the war when everything was in short supply, & we were outnumbered & fighting shorthanded.
A, B, X also has less weight high up on the ship. The IJN was never enthusiastic about anything but fighting other warships. There was no glory in sinking transports or freighters. They weren't even that keen on hunting submarines.
Re: Level bombing from a torpedo bomber. The USN TBD Devestater was fitting for level bombing and had a set of bomb bay like doors in its belly for bomb sight aiming Source: Monograms 1:48 model kit 🤓
I have a book called "Flights of Passage" by Samuel Hynes who was a USMC Avenger pilot in the latter part of WW2, and almost all his missions were either bombing attacks on land targets or anti-submarine patrols carrying depth charges.
@@CharlesStearman yes Avengers did lots of bombing. I forget where I read about it, but the CVE based Avengers were doing so much bunker busting, that they were masterful in lobbing bombs into targets w good old "Kentucky windage" 😃. The interesting point about the TBD is that they were designed and fitted for level bombing.
By 1945 you only needed torpedo bombers to deal with the Yamato. Everything else could have been sunk by bombs and rockets. The -4 Corsair had an equal ordinance load to both the TBF/M and the SB2C. Once the Yamato went down you could have gone to an all F4U-4 airwing without giving up anything.
3 роки тому
The Avenger had a set of controls that could change the dispersal pattern of the bombs or depth charges to suit a particular target. Being able to carry bombs was far from an after thought, it was a well thought out and engineered specialty for torpedo planes by the mid-war period.
@52.21 Germany never adopted systematic operations research as the British and later the Americans did. Everything was at hoc, hence the AA Uboats etc.
during normal operations ships conduct their business according to "conditions " . We had conditions one thru five. Five being peacetime inport. The normal was condition three. A third of the war fighting capacity is manned at all times. IE if there are three main gun turrets one of them is fully manned and ready to go bang. CIC is fully manned always whether a TAO is on watch or not a Watch officer is present. After steering is manned during special sea detail and during general quarters. as examples. there are more.
Another thing the Japanese lacked was Submarine tenders. While their Submarines were large and had plenty of range and supplies a good submarine tender would have kept them on the frontline longer. Especially if they wanted to attack the West Coast.
When answering "why is American antiaircraft fire considered the main defense against Japanese air attacks in pop culture history," some accommodation must be made for 1940s American pop culture. In general, this was dominated by two words: "newsreels" and "film." Specifically to U.S. Navy pop culture history, this was dominated by two more words: "John Ford." The Hollywood director of Stagecoach and the Grapes of Wrath, Ford was commissioned into the U.S. Naval Reserve with the rank of commander (O-5) and sent to Midway just prior to the June 1942 battle. Naturally he and his cameramen filmed the Kido Butai's attack, and this footage formed the basis of the first film made about Midway--The Battle of Midway, released 14 September 1942. The film opens with shots of PBY Catalinas and B-17s, doing nothing to dispel the then-current notion that the USAAF contributed greatly to destroying Nagumo's carriers. While depicting naval strike aircraft lifting off from Yorktown-class carriers, stock footage of 1.1 inch "Chicago Pianos" and 5-inch guns opening up are interspersed. A massive pall of smoke is seen subbing in for the burning Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu; almost certainly this was actually an American ship on fire. Assuming VF-3, VB-3, VB-6 and VS-6 filmed their strikes on 4 June 1942, showing gun-camera and bombing of actual Japanese ships was out of the question. Using airborne film in American newsreels was VERY infrequent during the war because such images could be reverse-engineered by enemy intelligence services to determine actual American aircraft performance, and thus images of the largely ineffective 1.1 inch guns were used in John Ford's film. This continued throughout his naval career, which lasted until 1962 when he retired as a rear admiral. He and his longtime cinematographer Gregg Toland (who also was Orson Welles' cinematographer for Citizen Kane) directed the first full film about Pearl Harbor--1943's December 7th. But when Ford went ashore at Omaha Beach on 6 June 1944, the scale and horror of American casualties led to his superiors to not release much if any of Ford's footage. He instead helped film the concentration camps before directing the John Wayne film They Were Expendable the following year. American feature films centering on aircraft carrier operations during World War II were actually quite rare in the 1940s and 1950s--the only major release being 1949's Task Force. Vietnam and the 1960s in general soured Hollywood on triumphalist World War II films set in the Pacific, with the exception of depictions of Pearl Harbor and Midway (probably because of John Ford's wartime films). However, Americans were disdainful of the brass in film prior to Vietnam. John Wayne's atrocious 1951 film Operation Pacific, for example, has Wayne's sub skipper character solve the Mark 14 issues with no input from an Admiral Charles Lockwood character. American naval movies since 1942 have followed this script--more often than not centering on plucky submarine commanders and their crews against both the Japanese and the brass. Since 1943's supposedly excellent (but in reality abysmal) Destination Tokyo submarine films have dominated Pacific War pop culture. Hollywood storytelling was so slewed towards, air, land (chiefly in the ETO) and submarine operations; there were no feature films made centering on the triumphs in the Philippine Sea or at Leyte Gulf, and the one film entitled the Battle of Coral Sea is a submarine movie! Even as television became the major driver of American popular culture, this dismissive attitude towards American aircraft carriers and their flyers continued. The 1952-53 Victory at Sea series focuses far more on amphibious and submarine operations than fleet operations. It really wasn't until the introduction of documentaries on cable channels such as Discovery and the History Channel that carrier operations got their due in American pop culture outside of books and the occasional board and (much later) video game. So perhaps the views of soldiers on the ground at Dunkirk influenced the view of servicemembers in general, but the public back home was informed by John Ford. He is probably the reason Midway was not inside the pop culture blackout for over 50 years, and it is a testament to Roland Emmerich that he did not overlook the enigmatic Ford in 2019's Midway, which from a storytelling perspective was the best feature film made about American World War II carrier operations in 80 years. Sadly, that's not saying much...
Two questions, how did Germany not know their messages were being encrypted in WW2 when the same thing happened in WW1 such as at Jutland? We’re they just so arrogant they believed it impossible? And, when was the British code breaking in WW1 declassified? Was it before or after WW2?
The clasical explanation is that the thought Enigma was unbreakable therefore it had to be a spy. When they didnt found a spy security of the Kriegsmarine Enigma was increased but I dont know if todays research found a better explanation. Note the Kriegsmarine Enigma was improved several times during the war maybe they suspected Enigma was broken but i cant remember more about it.
@@gregorywright4918 yes but the Enigma M (Kriegsmarine Version Enigma )ended up with 4 if I rember correctly so it was the securest of the mass used Enigmas
I apologize if that sounds ignorant but is Action Stations, some sort of equivalent to General Quarters? the context it is used sounds like it is, it is just a term I am unfamiliar with.
One of the scenarios often discussed, in the "What if the IJN pressed on..." category, is Midway, where Yamamoto (in this conceit) brought up the Main Body (to join with the surviving carrier escorts), called down Hosogya's carriers from the Aleutians, as well as Kondo's heavy escorts, and pushed everything ahead to bombard the island and land troops. The question is whether the surviving aircraft on the Hornet and Enterprise, as well as Midway, along with any reinforcements that could have been flown up to them from Hawaii, have done enough damage to break the Japanese will (as in fact they did with the sinking of the Hiryu and then the Mikuma).
Even if they take Midway that just means even more overextended supply lines; not to mention they still can't catch the American carriers, which were the real prize of the operation.
@@bkjeong4302 I agree that Spruance would have kept TF16 out of surface action range, but the Japanese had two objectives; the capture of Midway (as a base from which to harass Hawaii and limit its usefulness as a base) and the destruction of the American fleet; and they never really really got straight which one was the primary goal. If the Japanese had taken the island and set up an airbase there (with Zeros and Bettys), even if it cost them a handful more of cruisers, it would have been one more obstacle that would have had to have been retaken before the USN could conduct any further offensive operations (such as Operation Galvanic in the Gilberts, etc.).
@@gregorywright4918 Yep, the Japanese stationed there were dealt with this way (though this resulted in the extinction of the Wake Island rail, because the Japanese ate them all to stave off starvation)
great work Drac ...again ....and may i commend you for NOT doing a Prince Philip special just yet ...click bait is not what you do it would as you say be crass ...while i am by no means a royalist i do hold respect for those who served and none can claim to have served more than the late duke
I want to say I love your normal videos, but like may I don't mind heard ship questions answered while trying to fall asleep. It isn't boring, just ya know. sips and more ships and more ships and more shops and history and more ships and first rates and ships and sailing and more ships. ⛵️
"Could USS Atlanta have been repaired, assuming the crew could get the flooding under control?" Drach: "Well, it was the flooding that really prohibited saving her..." Only Drach could stretch a simple "yes" into a wordy exposition.
Pissed .day off min wage health care worker Oswaldtwistle, My aunt Margaret was in the film Enigma .Margaret get him a taxi , M get him a cup of tea, She was a wren secatary to enigma from her 1st job end till the of the war GCHQ till retirement only pic Ive got is as a WO1 army , My Aunt Margaret was probobly the most important person from lancs in ww2 . Anyway I can point you to family members who know more im 55 , Im called Patrick ,UnclePat, the allies bomed a Nazi hq in the desert it was to kill a Sgt radio operator a sgt Bilko type My uncles biggest regret of the war was that he could not let the Jerries Know that he knew .and he was really sorry cause the jerry was great , He vowed that if he survied the war he would walk from London to Prinknash Abbey Gloucester, hes buried there , What good comes out of Nazareth. My Family
Manning them would be the first struggle, as the Army and Luftwaffe have first call on manpower, then training them in the Baltic would take a while. After that the Brits would have to bring the Med and Indian fleets back to counter them.
Pinned post for Q&A :)
Would a King G battleship with 3 quadruple turrets be worth the extra cost ? Assuming it was build like this from te start and not modified from real life built ships ?
Royal Navy battleline vs USN battleline in 1935
If Operation Ten-Go had succeeded - how useful would that actually have been, to have Yamato and the other ships beached as shore batteries? Similarly, how useful would an Allied shore battery on the north-west corner of Savo Island have been against the Tokyo Express?
The German ships of World war 2 seemed to have generally inferior anti aircraft weaponry compared to their allied contemporaries and be less than adequate in anti air defense. If you were in charge of German ship design what would you do make German naval anti aircraft defense up to par or superior to their allied contemporaries?
Bomb ketches, please. How and where they were used, perhaps a bit on non-British ones, and did they ever attempt to use their weapons on other ships?
Thanks for answering my question Drach, earlier than anticipated haha! That's more or less what I had concluded as well; always had a feeling when reading about her sinking that all the crew's efforts to save her was for naught, that torpedo hit was absolutely brutal. Figured that would be a great thought experiment on just how much a ship can be damaged before it's beyond repair.
I also had a low view of the Italian Navy for a long time as I considered them cowards and lacked good aim.
Your channel really puts things into perspective and changed my view.
That's the problem with history of pretty much any topic. There is a lot of context that's required to see the full picture. And sometimes there's not enough Source material for that to even be possible. Especially if it happened outside of living memory.
Fascinating and illuminating as always Drach! You're mention of the " electro-mechanical" fire control computers reminded me of an " electric calculator" my Father had saved from the trash, when he worked in the telephone industry. It was as big and heavy as an oversized typewriter that you plugged into a wall outlet. You could punch in calculations and hit the a button and the machine would jump, noisily and put up your solution in a window, with digits on dials I think...it was fun to mash away on as a kid!
He'd also saved an old oscilloscope which was a ton of fun, imagining a sonar screen, hunting subs....or a radar scope revealing an incoming raid...
These devices were in many cases, developed out of the wartime technology, and they deserve to be remembered. Thanks for reminding me ,anyway.....
Thanks again!
I swear, Drach and Bloke on the Range must be long lost brothers. Both are engineers, both have a strong interest and knowledge of military history, both have beards, both are great at explaining mathematical concepts, and both run excellent UA-cam channels.
I'm pretty sure Bloke on the Range is also an engineer. I, as an engineer, too, know that we studied a lot of math. Not just in math class, but applied to our physics classes, as well as engineering classes. In communications theory, we use convolution integrals, while most laymen think all math is convoluted.
@@michaelmoorrees3585 I’m studying data science and economics so I’m taking a decent amount of math courses. I wish more of my math professors had the ability to explain concepts.
@@michaelmoorrees3585 when I was in school for engineering, my physics instructor was the head of the department teaching out of his own book (well, who else can he trust to cover the subject properly?).
AC naval history and Drach are like the same person i worry I will have to seperate them before they fuse into one
34:20 AA is also more prominent in pop culture because there is a lot more stock footage of AA guns and crews shooting at and killing enemy planes. Thus right after the war movies could use this footage to beef up the action without having the cost of filming their own.
Also your CAP can not work in the same area that the AA is pounding away
@@glenchapman3899 Sometimes it did, as Drac mentioned.
@@glenchapman3899 And CAP footage from the deck looks boring; they had to declassify gun camera footage or make up their own POV footage to make it interesting...
In your talk about the air cap, you left out another huge difference between the aircraft and A.A. Ammunition. Aircraft carry a very limited supply and have to use it sparingly. That's why I love the story of a pilot who ran out of ammo, lowered his landing gear and beat a Japanese bomber to death with them.
His guns might have jammed or frozen, that was an issue for the Cactus Air Force early on, especially with Betties coming in at 29,000 feet for bombing raids.
I love the sound of Drach in the morning. It sounds like....HMS Victory.
'Napalm in the morning' was written by John Milius.
Who wrote and directed 'Red Dawn', 'Conan' and 'The Wind And The Lion'.
Who wrote the Indianapolis scene in 'Jaws'.
That's quite brilliant ☺️
Hhhhhhmmmmmms...........Victory.
Nice
I can't imagine that any ship of that age would smell pleasant. Grease, tar, sweat, Nelson's vomit...
Just discovered two great books Dreadnought Britain Germany & the coming of the great war & Castles of Steel Britain Germany & the winning of the great War both by Robert K Massie. I've got the audio versions and what I've listerned to so far is excellent.
If you haven't yet read Andrew Gordon's book "Rules of the Game" you'll enjoy it.
Maybe you could get Computerphile to co-op a video on the Argo clock? They did an excellent series on the Enigma :)
I would LOVE to see the inner workings of an analogue fire control computer explained. Especially a more complex arrangement like a later AFCT. That'd be fucking sick.
I can't believe that my old question got included. Thank you very much.
Love your vids. Been spoiled by longer drydocks filling multi hours. Best wishes to u what ever length we get
I am at a loss as to what to do Sunday morning on the short ones
I think one area the IJN totally ignored was to use their submarine force against merchant shipping - specifically the US/Pearl Harbor to Australia supply line. The supply chain was long enough as it was with really no submarine (or really any other) threat. Imagine if the US would have had to divert transports and supply ships several thousand miles out of their way, or divert escort assets to protect convoys to Australia. May not have affected the outcome of the war (other than maybe lengthening the Pacific War), but could it have affected the outcomes of both the Coral Sea and Midway battles? A more favorable outcome of these battles for the IJN could have had significant affects on events later in the war. Might be an interesting "what if" scenario similar to a discussion of "what if" the Type XXI U-Boat had started service in early 1944 instead of April/May of 1945.
Thank you answer #1. I always thought it was because the bow and stern were always the most uncomfortable part of the ship as they rose and fell the most. The midships portion would rise and fall the least!
In the age of sail the stern cabin under the quarterdeck was the captains, and the other officers cabins were clustered near or below (midshipmans on the bottom). The petty officers would have a place in the forecastle. The crew slept in rows of hammocks on the decks in between. Moving the officers away from the stern cabins to the middle of the ship was breaking centuries old traditions...
About the IJN not pressing on compared to the Army, Infantry is a lot easier to replace than a bunch of warships (at least without a ludicrous industry). If Japan is going to risk sacrificing a significant naval force, the damage inflicted needs to be worth it.
It’s very interesting to hear how your views of the Japanese navy have evolved over time. Growing up in the US and being a fan of the naval war in the Pacific from and early age my views of the Japanese Navy as a capable, advanced and skilled opponent especially at the outset of the war have been there from the beginning. Which makes me wonder what “popular” (for lack of a better term) British history is on the Pacific war vs that in the US.
You mentioned Shattered Sword and I would argue that it has been the most transformative work of history in the field that has been published. I say this because when you compare the accepted narrative of the Japanese side of the battle (most of which came from Prange and Fuchidia who we now know was a liar on an epic scale) to what the truth was they are very different. Not to mention the fact that we now know thanks to Shattered Sword that the conventional narrative of the Torpedo planes dragging the fighter cover down and paving the way for the dive bombers was also false.
Comment pretty much describes my impressions growing up in the US. I developed an interest in WWII as a pre-teen due to being bombarded with all the various war movies and TV series ever made being rebroadcast on TV which had left me with the impression the Japanese Navy were first rate until attrition took over. Nothing I read after developing that interest really changed that initial impression.
The one thing I do know about being an American, is that only the British yak on about the Battle of Trafalgar. Even in a book called Victory vs Redoutable, there's almost no information about Redoutable in it. And in a documentary called HMS Victory, when they get to the duel between HMS Victory and Redoutable, they talk about anything but HMS Victory as they endlessly praise Nelson's great genius the formation of all ships before skipping the duel and announcing Nelson was gunned down and that it was probably inevitable. There's just no self-reflection in these propaganda pieces or any interest in the French perceptive because the Victory / Redoutable duel was one of the most interesting in history and it's been hushed up because it's inconvenient to the propaganda of the Royal Navy. The victors definitely wrote the history on Trafalgar, unlike say Waterloo with French and British historians having equal fascination with.
@@Edax_Royeaux and this is relevant to the IJN how?
@@jetdriver Because the British would probably not have written much material in the Pacific War, having had embarrassing losses in it. You'd probably get distinctive American and Japanese history written about the Pacific War since both sides experienced major victories while the Royal Navy perspective about the Pacific War was probably quietly forgotten.
Jet Driver - I would tend to agree with you, though I would expand the reading list a bit. Zimm's book on Pearl Harbor opened my eyes to several unappreciated aspects of that battle and it's "perfect planning & perfect execution". Miller's War Plan Orange filled in a lot of the prewar US thinking, particularly the competition between the Thrusters and the Cautionary strategies in the 20s and 30s. Kaigun by Evens & Peattie filled in the prewar perspective of the IJN, and Sunburst by Peattie rounded that out with a focus on the naval air component, particularly the complementary aspects of the land- and sea-based forces. And Lundstrum's analysis of USN naval air campaigns straightened out a few misconceptions on how we stumbled our way to the top. These are all part of a "third wave" of historians taking another look at the Pacific War and it's calcified myths.
Last time I was this early the 5 minute guides were 5 minutes.
*laughs in fifteen minutes*
And robo voiced!
FAKE NEWS!!
They were never 5 minutes....
1:02:50
By 1944 the Japanese were on the strategic defense. Their airpower, both land and carrier based was not sufficient to support large amphibious offensives the likes of which they were conducting in 1941-42 (and back then it was against weak opposition - by 1944. US has filled the Pacific with combat units). Besides they got the resources they wanted in the Dutch East Indies and all they needed to do to win the war is to beat the Chinese while repelling Allied counterattacks. The Japanese were not SEEKING a decisive naval battle. Kantai Kessen assumed a war with US - which now was the case - and in such a war such a battle would be coming to Japan anyway and the doctrine was looking for ways to offset the US superiority.
One thing that seems to slip off of minds of people is that WAR IS NOT A LONG-TERM SUSTAINABLE STATE OF AFFAIRS FOR ANY COUNTRY! It is a huge burden on economy, production is focused on war materiel which, unless it conquers something, results in 0 return for the investment immediately (and in case of a loss the return is less and less long term - depending on how bad the loss was - and even a victory can return a net loss on investment). Meanwhile population growth decreases, treasury gets drained, mortality and inflation rises, productivity in many if not most spheres falls (many of the farmers and workers are at the front not producing...), trade and exports decrease... And the neutral powers, potential rivals are often making a ton of cash selling necessities to war parties at inflated prices. Think of a country at war as a man running. Running a 100 m dash at 41 km/h would be akin total war, but it can only be done for a a few minutes (akin a few years of war). A man running a marathon is akin USA in Vietnam - limited war commitment. The man can run for a couple of hours just as the country can sustain a limited war for up to a few decades, but the marathon runner still needs to stop and rest after those few hours of running. In the end a man can go farther by walking (peacetime) than by running in one go. But certain situations necessitate running. So war is a kind of a race. The invader chooses when the race starts, so it is usually better prepared, but also usually runs on an uphill track since he needs to be stronger to succeed and his supply lines are by default longer.
The attacker therefore needs to concentrate his forces on sea, air and land in such a way to achieve the necessary advantage. In addition US is stronger economically overall. Kantai Kessen doctrine has correctly recognized both and was looking for a way to turn the tables. In effect it says "If we fight US or UK, they'll come at us in consecutive big concentrated fleet efforts that outgun us. Let's see how we can defeat those the way we had to defeat the Russian fleets in the Yellow Sea and Tsushima". There is no big difference in DOCTRINE between the Japanese attack on Midway and the US attack on the Marianas. Both seek to capture a strategically significant objective with a concentrated fleet action (as the most rational way) and there were hopes that a decisive blow could be struck against the enemy's fleet if it appeared (see the contemporary criticism of Spruance after the Philippine Sea for not pursuing the Japanese). It was just the US and Japanese TACTICAL dispositions that were different as they were shaped by the technology available to each at the time (the Japanese had no radar at the time hence they spread their destroyers around to provide early warning - the US later kinda did the same even with radar - posting forward the radar pickets - to provide earlier warning).
A doctrine postulates how you use your forces once the war starts. It may influence the decision, but certainly not decisively, on whether a country will start a war with a given country or not.
Part of the Kantai Kessen doctrine was the assumption that the enemy forces, whether US or UK, would be coming at them with a superiority of forces. The plan to deal with this was the "whittling down" tactics. Subs would start this, so they were positioned way ahead and had to preserve their torpedoes for the major targets like battleships and carriers. Long-ranged land-based naval air units were also a part of the advanced forces, as well as hit-and-run attacks by the carrier forces aimed at the enemy carrier fleet. Training in night operations was focused on the lighter forces so that they could take part in "whittling down" the enemy main fleet before it could get to the critical area, where it would finally be met by the battleship line in Main Battle.
The ironic part of all this is that this is exactly what the US did to the Japanese in the cascading battles around Leyte Gulf - subs and aircraft doing long-range recon and getting early hits in (goodbye flagship Atago), air power being used to whittle down the incoming heavies (goodbye Musashi), then the climactic clash of the battle lines - which sort-of happened at Surigao (there wasn't much left of the Japanese battle line), but not at San Bernardino like it should have, thanks to Halsey's distraction and mis-communications. It was left to the little guys, again, to hold the line until the big ones could come back - but then the enemy lost their nerve, gave up and sailed away.
Which is probably what Kantai Kassen was aiming for, even if they could not "whittle down" the enemy fleet enough to defeat it like at Tsushima. But the single-minded focus on preparing, equipping, and training for this war-winning clash, and the glory gained in making sure your own attack damaged one of the enemy's primary ships, explains a lot of Japanese actions, from the airmen's over-focus on battleships at Pearl Harbor, the sub's over-focus on carriers and battleships around Guadalcanal at the expense of all the smaller supply ships allowed to slip through, to the light-weight construction and lack of armor in Japanese naval aircraft (in order to increase their range and maneuverability). Escorting civilian merchantmen was hardly thought about before the war, despite the stark example of what the U-boats did to their former ally the UK in WW1 and their similarity as island nations needing overseas resources. Vital destroyers could not be spared from their jobs with the fleet, and no one had built any dedicated escorts until they were forced to by increasing losses. Radar and sonar were neglected until they saw how the Allies were using them to defeat their highly-trained forces. And they did not have the training program, particularly for airmen, to replace their losses because they were hoping their pre-war plan would be enough to either bring them a quick, decisive victory or so bloody the enemy that they had to fall back and end up in a stalemate.
The tradition of a monarch knighting people on the battlefield definitely lasted into the 20th century. I heard somewhere that King George V knighting General Monash on the Western Front circa 1917 was the last time this happened, but I later heard that there might have been a later instance.
Time 54. SNORKELS vs RADAR
The Kriegsmarine tried to counter radar detection of snorkeling U-boats by applying radar absorbing material on the snorkel head - one of the earliest known uses of RAM. Also, the keel depth of the snorkeling submarine could be adjusted. This was a judgment call. Obviously, the greater the height of the snorkel head and mast exposed above the water surface, the greater the chance of detection, but if the height is reduced too much, waves will pass over the snorkel head (intake valve). Automatic float valves prevented the sea water from entering and the diesels would draw air from inside the boat, causing a partial vacuum, until the wave passed, and the float valve re-opened.
In U.S. Guppy diesel boats during the early days of the Cold War (showing my age) the diesels were designed to safely operate in a vacuum up to six and half inch’s mercury (Hg), although the enginemen back aft might shut their engines down before you reached the limit. This was called a ‘flame out’ and was a black mark on the luckless diving officer. Standard aircraft altimeters located throughout the boat indicated the amount of vacuum (1000 feet of “altitude” is approximately one inch Hg, so the limit was 6500 feet.)
When submerged on the battery, and below periscope depth, ship speed of only three knots was common to conserve energy. Normally, the bow and stern planes (and rudder) were hydraulically powered, but to further conserve power (and reduce noise) they might be shifted to manual (hand) operation (this is why the control wheels were so large).
When snorkeling speeds of up to 10-12 knots were possible. The effectiveness (lift) of the diving planes varies as speed squared, and the bow and stern planes men had to be careful to minimize movement of the planes. Else the boat might broach (partially surface) or descend rapidly to 100 feet or more until control was regained. Once again, black marks for the unlucky diving officer.
Thanks, Barry. This comment was excellent.
I grew up on navy bases. Just about my favorite place on any navy base, was the library. I was and still am fascinated by naval vessels. I would look up the ships my father had served on.
Not only that, but I have worked as a marine electrician on ships from the Spruance class destroyers, and some older fast attack boats at Ingalls. Then there was a 4 month job on the USS Saratoga, when she was docked at Mayport, Fl. That was an interesting experience. What A piece of steel!
It is ironic that I have learned a great deal from viewers comments. I now will go an look up the Guppy diesel boats. Thanks again Barry.
Since you seem to know what's what... In my reading of accounts of WWII U-boat operations, the crews often reported that they found the constant changes in air pressure inside the U-boat as it used the snorkel to be very uncomfortable. Were any steps ever taken to reduce or eliminate that problem (other than trying to make sure the snorkel never submerged) or was it just something that later generations of diesel boat crews had to live with?
@@silentotto5099 Think about it practically - a diesel engine needs a certain amount of air to keep running, where else are you going to get the air if the snorkel float closes? Shutting off the engine won't work intermittently, "floating" the snorkel on the waves won't work if the sub is making any headway. You would need some sort of powered bellows to suck extra air into bladders while it is unblocked, then some sort of instantaneous pressure valve to switch the diesels to the bladders when it is blocked - but where would you put the bladders in the tight confines of a sub?
@@gregorywright4918 What you describe, some sort of pressure container holding enough compressed air to run the diesels for a short period of time and which is replenished when the snorkel is above the waves is what I was thinking about. Subs got bigger post-war, so there might have been enough space for such a system.
As crews disliked running on a snorkel so much, I was wondering if any sort of system was looked into.
Apparently the answer is no.
Thanks.
Drydock and is my ultimate best bedtime stories, dear Sir. Finally!
Good news - - I'm only eight Drydocks behind!
I wish I had a Drydock backlog...
Bad news....they are all Patreon Drydock Marathons.
c'mon lad, put sumthin into it , ya we girl.
Slow down, to delay the point where you face an agonising four-day wait between one ‘live’ time Drach fix and the next😖
@@hisdadjames4876
I know that pain. I try to plug the gap by rewatching old drydocks.
At 48:30 you talked about the Atlanta and the possibility to save her. I've read that the torpedo hit also cracked her keel. Moving her would have just made her break up somewhere else.
Hope you are both now able to enjoy a sunny Sunday lunch at the Pub Drach, raises a Pint!
Awesome, my favorite thing to listen to while painting miniatures!
Thank you, Drachinifel.
I was wondering when the drydock was coming out and find that UA-cam unsubscribed me from the channel sometime after the livestream yesterday! No wonder I didn't get a notification...
😮
Regarding ranging fire on an ABX layout, I'd have thought there was distinct advantage compared to ABXY. One volley of six shots followed by a volley of three makes it easier to distinguish which volleys are yours and which volley which. There are several reports of confused fall of shot where ships couldn't work out which was their fall of shot, so firing off differing numbers of shells might help distinguish.
Very nice as always Drach. Thanks.
Drach. Proving learning to defend yourself against a pointed stick is useful!
I always assumed the real advantage of AB+X more or less just comes down to the displacement needed to reach at least 8 guns is less than what they needed to get to 8-guns for AB+XY and in the treaty era the displacement limits basically pushed the navies that wanted to be really compliant to favor AB+X to reach their overall armor thickness goals and shorten the belts.
On the subject a Taranto followup, I read somewhere when it was suggested to the aircrews, there was a mutter from the back of the room "Chr*st, they only asked the Light Brigade to go once!"
Wow. I started listening to this dry docked. I got so involved and before I new it. It was over.
Not too surprising...
It's a short one...🤣
Thanks a lot for answering my question.
Such a short Drydock. Really wired, when it doesnt end after 5 hours :)
Good stuff! On Japanese shortfalls, besides ASW. Yes, they were innovative about amphibious warfare, BUT their naval fire support was behind. Their initial successes rarely had to face really determined beach defenses such as the Germans and Japanese later developed. I really doubt that Japan could have pulled off an equivalent to Tarawa. Their use of submarines was also very closely tied to fleet operations. A ROUGH description would be that the IJN sub force was run by the Klingons. There was much honor in attacking a major fleet unit, but it seems much less emphasis on commerce raiding. A really active Japanese submarine presence between the Solomons and the Watchtower support bases might have affected the land campaign much more than going after the Wasp and North Carolina (for instance).
We were all behind in amphibious warfare in 1941-42. We wouldn’t have been able to pull off Tarawa before Nov., 1943. Tarawa was a close run fight as it was, in spite of the fact we outnumbered the Japanese in every category.
I think it should be noted the Japanese successfully conducted multiple amphibious operations before Midway.
@@TraditionalAnglican The US Marines had built the doctrine and the air-ground cooperation, but the Navy was not very well equipped or proficient in operations until after RAdm Turner (former head of War Plans) experienced the practical difficulties firsthand at Guadalcanal. There were only a few specialized ships in IJN (or were they IJA?), and they were focused on DEI operations. Their bungled first assault on Wake Island showed how poorly they were prepared for opposition.
Free societies produce more people capable of innovative thinking. I wonder how the (not-so-crypto-) fascists in the Great Reset community plan to avoid their technocratic utopia's descent into late-Soviet decay.
Japanese Confusion at Guadalcanal - For an example of this confusion, just look at the fate of the Japanese 35th Infantry Brigade, under Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi. 35th Brigade arrives on Guadalcanal between 29 Aug and 4 Sept, is in position by dark on 12 Sept and after sunset 12 Sept, they started 2 days (nights) of fighting in an attempt to attack Henderson Field from the southwest but were stopped by US Marines at Lunga Ridge, losing 830 men in fighting a force at the Ridge that actually was only 830 or so men, the combined 1st Raider Battalion, 1st Provisional Parachute Battalion, 2/5 Marines and 1/7 Marines supported by the guns of 11 Marines and commanded by Lt Col Merritt "Red Mike" Edson, 1st Raider Btn. The confusion came during the day on 13 Sept when first the daily air raid by Japanese air elements from Rabaul and then the nightly naval shore bombardment by the "Tokyo Express" were directed about 5 miles or so east of Henderson Field (Kawaguchi's supply depot) because Kawaguchi had told superiors he would have the airfield secured on the 13th, but these daily attacks were corrected back to Henderson Field on 14 Sept. To add insult to injury the 1st Raider Battalion had raided Kawaguchi's supply depot at Taivu Point on 8 Sept.
Well if the Germans were allowed to keep Helgoland class there's a good chance the Deutschland class Panzersciffs would have had 12s and the Scharnhorsts would have had improved 12s similar to Alaska class.
Also on the more speculative when the Germans considered going to bigger guns on the König class before determining they were too far along to go from 10 12s to 8 13.8s because the barbettes where already in place the ship builders did determine they could have went up to 320mm 12.6" guns with the shell system and barbettes made for the 12s. If they upgunned the Helgolands to those 320mm similar to what the Italians did with old 12" ships well the Helgolands may be a similar threat level to the upgraded WWI Italian ships and if the Germans where making 320 mm guns the Scharnhorsts could have wound up with improved 320mm guns which would put them on the same level of guns as the Dunkerque class but with the Scharnhorsts much better armour.
If course if they got to keep Nassaus instead well an 11" ship wouldn't have been able to do much that the predreads couldn't do, just slightly faster and a few more of those 11" guns for shore bombardments. I don't even think with improved Scharnhorst 11s they could have been a threat.
The Baracuda is believed to have never used its torpedos in anger. It struggled with 1800lb weight. The normal bomb load was 3 x 500 lbs or up to four depth charges. The Avenger could carry up to 4 500 lbs bombs or a Torpedo, all carried internaly. Rockets Radar and or extra tanks carried externally the RN in the Pacific preferred the Avenger..
Excellent as always. A couple of ideas for future Rum Rations..... The Battle of the Barents Sea (convoy JW51B) and, to follow on from your excellent vid about the development of carriers, and the one you did on the Zero, how's about one on the development of carrier aircraft? 👍🖖
The TBD Devastator had a Norden bomb-sight. The Navy in fact commissioned the Sight and was not happy the USAAC eventually got it also. The Devastator had prone bomb aimers position. the sighting windows being covered by doors. The Devastator was used in some successful level bombing missions. Usually carrying 2 500 lb bombs ( could carry up to 3 centrally, or up to 12 smaller bombs on wing racks )
Long after WWII, use of the Norden bombsight was resurrected during the Vietnam War, when Navy P-2s used it to accurately placed sensors along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
I was on an aircraft carrier when I was in the Navy.
There’s nothing quite like cracking your knees (or head) on an armored water tight door frame while running up and down passageways during general quarters.
11:00 Even as a teenager in the 1970s interested in WW2, I don't remember having that impression of them. "Unarmored airplanes" and "doomed from the start" were the only negatives.
@24.22 During Korea Skyraiders were used to attack a dam with torpedos. Both Avengers and Swordfish probably did many more ASW attacks armed with depth bombs than they flew torpedo missions.
Drach, just in support of your answer as to the knighting on board the Golden Hind, prince Henry the navigator an his two older brothers were knighted in Ceuta, after the landing and taking of the city. The preference for a battlefield knightood survived to the end of the middle ages.
as always, great Drydock, BUT can you please provide some sort of label or caption to figures? For example, the photo of rolled drawings at minute 9:35 today's response to question re literature - what is it? drawings of ships? whose, USN or RN or ??. Where? Greenwich or ...?
Some have asserted that the IJN officer caste did not consider the "sitting ducks" allied transports/ merchantmen moored at Guadalcanal "worthy of their steel" which is a possibility. Given the fact that many Marines survived on captured rations in perilous times there early on, their IJA opponents may have wanted to replay that scenario later to their own advantage.
There is also the question of dwindling ammo supply...
The Japanese were inferior in Repair ships though. Their only modernized one was Akashi. For all the praise given to them for their logistics at the start of the war most of their repair ships were less modernized than USN ones. That ended up being one of the critical factors of why they lost so many ships as time went on. Fleet Oilers are much easier to build in comparison.
Thank you for answering my question.
So I now have an official Lord-Admiral pronunciation of my name.
Books that gave me an "Ah-ha" moment:WARSHIPS AFTER WASHINGTON/LONDON.
Video Idea: What kind of tools and resources did Warships had in WW1/2 to repair battle damage on Sea?
Did they had spare plates, shafts. Where they able to weld something?
Honestly if the Atlanta hadn't sunk outright its likely much of her equipment would have been salvaged in place especially all of the surviving guns and their fire control systems
Thank you for answering my question, and yeah those factors do explain why AA is so prevalent in pop culture while CAP doesn’t get the credit it deserves. This goes to show that firsthand accounts of veterans are NOT necessarily reliable (the Dunkirk Effect), and one must look at official reports over firsthand accounts. Now how to correct this misconception....
Re: Santa Cruz, that's actually one engagement where AA stole much of the credit from CAP (looking at you SoDak)-one of the worst examples of this, in fact. John Lundstrom's work conclusively proves that much of the American AA kill counts were serious exaggerations.
Re: Japanese seeking decisive battle into late-war.....they weren't by that point. At the absolute latest they gave up post-Guadalcanal, if not post-Midway.
I think the Japanese were hoping to make the campaign so costly for us that we’d sue for peace instead of continuing to fight.
@@TraditionalAnglican Yeah that was their goal.
@@bkjeong4302 even the more "passive" defense of CAP had it's limits which is why part the US was sure they were going to take way more losses in the invasion of Japan from Kamikazes than they ever had before because they couldn't supress all the airfields.
In knighting on a ship (or battlefield) another working hypothesis could be that, politically, this establishes the Monarch as being of a higher rank, in the battle specifically. The visual representation of the Commander kneeling in front of his Sovereign also establishes visually that the Monarch therefore has more power than the Commander. Thus heading off comments of the 'Have fun storming the castle' variety. Taking this step immediately would help stave off political speculation of the 'grumbling masses' getting the idea that the Commander in question could possibly be more powerful than the current incarnation of the Government.
WRT the AB+X vs. AB+XY layout division, why didn't A+X with 4 gun turrets become more common (i.e. 11% loss in firepower vs nearly 1/3 of turret/barbette/shell handling weight and 11% of gun weight gone)? With the move to "All or nothing" armor schemes, minimizing the area that needed protection seems like it would pay huge dividends later on in battleship development.
Well, in that situation losing one turret would mean losing half your firepower.
A positive of 4 double turrets over 2 quads is this redundancy.
I mean, the French tried that with the Richelieu-Class. 2 turrets with 4 barrels each, but both forward. They even included a bulkhead between the two pairs of guns, so a hit on the turret may only disable two of the guns.
Nevertheless they wanted to build the third ship (Gascogne) with A-X-Layout, because they also needed the aft firing sector.
I think that 3-gun-turret in A-B-X-Layout was congruent evolution in that time, as you can see with Italians, US, British (Lion and KGV), Japanese. I count out the Germans, as they had no experience.
And, your ship width goes up, the weight of the turret ( and it's associated training machinery, elevating machinery also go up. ). And even one hit that disables the training gear takes half your entire armament out of action.
The redundancy argument is highly reasonable; in my mind, the counter-argument is that a part of the weight savings could be spent on armor to produce overall more survivable turrets/barbettes.
@@lamwen03 The weight of an individual turret would increase, but that would be more than offset by the elimination of 33% of the main battery weight. Further, within an all or nothing armor scheme, there is one fewer barbette to protect with belt, which allows for a shorter length of belt.
@42:55 why do all three of those ships appear to have the same hull number on their bows?
That's not a hull number, it's their destroyer division number. You cannot see the stacks very well, but each has a different number of rings on the stack to denote their order in the division.
@Drachinifel A topic for a future vid - Small boat handling. I saw on the New Jersey's channel that the USN was not happy with the boat handling setup of the Iowa class and that led to me thinking about how Yamato/Mushashi had their boats internally. Was that a success? Was boat handling a common problem?
The Japanese had limited resources for mine clearance, at least in Hong Kong. My late father-in-law as a boy of about 12 was "conscripted" to aid in mine clearing. He survived, but a lot of young Chinese boys did not.
Having no other skills, he continued the work for the British after the war. At least he had better resources and more respect from the British sailors.
How about a video on the landing craft used on D-day!
I sense a theme to Drach's intersets.
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Armed & armo(u)red boat = Battleship.
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Armed & armo(u)red tank = Landship.
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Armed & armo(u)red knight = Manship.
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Knight on an armo(u)red horse = Fast Manship.
very well put Sir.
I just noticed that the photo at 45:00 has the same ship from three different views made to look like three ships in formation.
Key point of the AA vs. CAP - Kamakazi.
WRT to the USS Atlanta it’s difficult to say in the absence of a readily accessible war damage report but I’m inclined to argue that if the progressive flooding which led to her loss can be controlled then she was salvageable.
You have to remember she had only taken 1 torpedo something that was survived by other member of her class. The gunfire damage seems to have been mostly confined to the superstructure and as such did not seem to play a major part in compromising her structure or buoyancy. The survival of the USS Houston is perhaps a good example of the ability of a ship to survive major structural damage and loss of power.
To be clear I’m not arguing that the crew should have been able to save her or that their efforts or damage control were lacking. Just that had they been successful in halting the flooding there is good reason to believe she could have been saved.
The USS Houston (CA-30) was hit by a total of 4 torpedoes during the Battle of Sunda Straight (28 Feb. - 1 Mar., 1942), 3 of them in rapid succession after she had started to lose headway. The damage would have been daunting even in an idea situation, but this was at the start of the war when everything was in short supply, & we were outnumbered & fighting shorthanded.
@@TraditionalAnglican And far from an American base or other repair facilities...
A, B, X also has less weight high up on the ship.
The IJN was never enthusiastic about anything but fighting other warships. There was no glory in sinking transports or freighters. They weren't even that keen on hunting submarines.
As for Drachinifel's invitation to meet him at the Medieval Re-creation event.... never meet your heroes. Or is that never BEAT your heroes?
I am a reactor for the war of 1812, a rifleman. I don't think he would want to meet me in the field.
Re: Level bombing from a torpedo bomber. The USN TBD Devestater was fitting for level bombing and had a set of bomb bay like doors in its belly for bomb sight aiming
Source: Monograms 1:48 model kit 🤓
I have a book called "Flights of Passage" by Samuel Hynes who was a USMC Avenger pilot in the latter part of WW2, and almost all his missions were either bombing attacks on land targets or anti-submarine patrols carrying depth charges.
@@CharlesStearman yes Avengers did lots of bombing. I forget where I read about it, but the CVE based Avengers were doing so much bunker busting, that they were masterful in lobbing bombs into targets w good old "Kentucky windage" 😃. The interesting point about the TBD is that they were designed and fitted for level bombing.
The Kates that blew up the Arizona were level-bombing from 3,000 meters using modified 16" shells from the Nagatos.
By 1945 you only needed torpedo bombers to deal with the Yamato. Everything else could have been sunk by bombs and rockets. The -4 Corsair had an equal ordinance load to both the TBF/M and the SB2C. Once the Yamato went down you could have gone to an all F4U-4 airwing without giving up anything.
The Avenger had a set of controls that could change the dispersal pattern of the bombs or depth charges to suit a particular target. Being able to carry bombs was far from an after thought, it was a well thought out and engineered specialty for torpedo planes by the mid-war period.
Illustrious was awesome.
@52.21 Germany never adopted systematic operations research as the British and later the Americans did. Everything was at hoc, hence the AA Uboats etc.
during normal operations ships conduct their business according to "conditions " . We had conditions one thru five. Five being peacetime inport. The normal was condition three. A third of the war fighting capacity is manned at all times. IE if there are three main gun turrets one of them is fully manned and ready to go bang. CIC is fully manned always whether a TAO is on watch or not a Watch officer is present. After steering is manned during special sea detail and during general quarters. as examples. there are more.
Another thing the Japanese lacked was Submarine tenders. While their Submarines were large and had plenty of range and supplies a good submarine tender would have kept them on the frontline longer. Especially if they wanted to attack the West Coast.
51:25 Certainly the charts they had of the area were small scale, not large. Small scale = large area, large scale = small area.
There's some serious PIDOOMA moments in this episode.
Drach, can you record your Mediaeval re-enactment?
When answering "why is American antiaircraft fire considered the main defense against Japanese air attacks in pop culture history," some accommodation must be made for 1940s American pop culture. In general, this was dominated by two words: "newsreels" and "film." Specifically to U.S. Navy pop culture history, this was dominated by two more words: "John Ford."
The Hollywood director of Stagecoach and the Grapes of Wrath, Ford was commissioned into the U.S. Naval Reserve with the rank of commander (O-5) and sent to Midway just prior to the June 1942 battle. Naturally he and his cameramen filmed the Kido Butai's attack, and this footage formed the basis of the first film made about Midway--The Battle of Midway, released 14 September 1942.
The film opens with shots of PBY Catalinas and B-17s, doing nothing to dispel the then-current notion that the USAAF contributed greatly to destroying Nagumo's carriers. While depicting naval strike aircraft lifting off from Yorktown-class carriers, stock footage of 1.1 inch "Chicago Pianos" and 5-inch guns opening up are interspersed. A massive pall of smoke is seen subbing in for the burning Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu; almost certainly this was actually an American ship on fire.
Assuming VF-3, VB-3, VB-6 and VS-6 filmed their strikes on 4 June 1942, showing gun-camera and bombing of actual Japanese ships was out of the question. Using airborne film in American newsreels was VERY infrequent during the war because such images could be reverse-engineered by enemy intelligence services to determine actual American aircraft performance, and thus images of the largely ineffective 1.1 inch guns were used in John Ford's film.
This continued throughout his naval career, which lasted until 1962 when he retired as a rear admiral. He and his longtime cinematographer Gregg Toland (who also was Orson Welles' cinematographer for Citizen Kane) directed the first full film about Pearl Harbor--1943's December 7th. But when Ford went ashore at Omaha Beach on 6 June 1944, the scale and horror of American casualties led to his superiors to not release much if any of Ford's footage. He instead helped film the concentration camps before directing the John Wayne film They Were Expendable the following year.
American feature films centering on aircraft carrier operations during World War II were actually quite rare in the 1940s and 1950s--the only major release being 1949's Task Force. Vietnam and the 1960s in general soured Hollywood on triumphalist World War II films set in the Pacific, with the exception of depictions of Pearl Harbor and Midway (probably because of John Ford's wartime films).
However, Americans were disdainful of the brass in film prior to Vietnam. John Wayne's atrocious 1951 film Operation Pacific, for example, has Wayne's sub skipper character solve the Mark 14 issues with no input from an Admiral Charles Lockwood character. American naval movies since 1942 have followed this script--more often than not centering on plucky submarine commanders and their crews against both the Japanese and the brass. Since 1943's supposedly excellent (but in reality abysmal) Destination Tokyo submarine films have dominated Pacific War pop culture. Hollywood storytelling was so slewed towards, air, land (chiefly in the ETO) and submarine operations; there were no feature films made centering on the triumphs in the Philippine Sea or at Leyte Gulf, and the one film entitled the Battle of Coral Sea is a submarine movie!
Even as television became the major driver of American popular culture, this dismissive attitude towards American aircraft carriers and their flyers continued. The 1952-53 Victory at Sea series focuses far more on amphibious and submarine operations than fleet operations. It really wasn't until the introduction of documentaries on cable channels such as Discovery and the History Channel that carrier operations got their due in American pop culture outside of books and the occasional board and (much later) video game.
So perhaps the views of soldiers on the ground at Dunkirk influenced the view of servicemembers in general, but the public back home was informed by John Ford. He is probably the reason Midway was not inside the pop culture blackout for over 50 years, and it is a testament to Roland Emmerich that he did not overlook the enigmatic Ford in 2019's Midway, which from a storytelling perspective was the best feature film made about American World War II carrier operations in 80 years.
Sadly, that's not saying much...
Hi could you do a five minute guide on either the goathland or whitby class ships?
Two questions, how did Germany not know their messages were being encrypted in WW2 when the same thing happened in WW1 such as at Jutland? We’re they just so arrogant they believed it impossible? And, when was the British code breaking in WW1 declassified? Was it before or after WW2?
The clasical explanation is that the thought Enigma was unbreakable therefore it had to be a spy. When they didnt found a spy security of the Kriegsmarine Enigma was increased but I dont know if todays research found a better explanation. Note the Kriegsmarine Enigma was improved several times during the war maybe they suspected Enigma was broken but i cant remember more about it.
@@nichtvorhanden5928 They added an extra rotor to the Army and Luftwaffe versions.
@@gregorywright4918 yes but the Enigma M (Kriegsmarine Version Enigma )ended up with 4 if I rember correctly so it was the securest of the mass used Enigmas
I apologize if that sounds ignorant but is Action Stations, some sort of equivalent to General Quarters? the context it is used sounds like it is, it is just a term I am unfamiliar with.
Correct: Action Stations is British for General Quarters
@@Crazyfrog41 thank you
One of the scenarios often discussed, in the "What if the IJN pressed on..." category, is Midway, where Yamamoto (in this conceit) brought up the Main Body (to join with the surviving carrier escorts), called down Hosogya's carriers from the Aleutians, as well as Kondo's heavy escorts, and pushed everything ahead to bombard the island and land troops. The question is whether the surviving aircraft on the Hornet and Enterprise, as well as Midway, along with any reinforcements that could have been flown up to them from Hawaii, have done enough damage to break the Japanese will (as in fact they did with the sinking of the Hiryu and then the Mikuma).
Even if they take Midway that just means even more overextended supply lines; not to mention they still can't catch the American carriers, which were the real prize of the operation.
@@bkjeong4302 I agree that Spruance would have kept TF16 out of surface action range, but the Japanese had two objectives; the capture of Midway (as a base from which to harass Hawaii and limit its usefulness as a base) and the destruction of the American fleet; and they never really really got straight which one was the primary goal. If the Japanese had taken the island and set up an airbase there (with Zeros and Bettys), even if it cost them a handful more of cruisers, it would have been one more obstacle that would have had to have been retaken before the USN could conduct any further offensive operations (such as Operation Galvanic in the Gilberts, etc.).
@@stuartwald2395 Or they can just bypass it and starve it out?
@@bkjeong4302 Like Wake?
@@gregorywright4918 Yep, the Japanese stationed there were dealt with this way (though this resulted in the extinction of the Wake Island rail, because the Japanese ate them all to stave off starvation)
great work Drac ...again ....and may i commend you for NOT doing a Prince Philip special just yet ...click bait is not what you do it would as you say be crass ...while i am by no means a royalist i do hold respect for those who served and none can claim to have served more than the late duke
I want to say I love your normal videos, but like may I don't mind heard ship questions answered while trying to fall asleep. It isn't boring, just ya know. sips and more ships and more ships and more shops and history and more ships and first rates and ships and sailing and more ships. ⛵️
How effective would the U.S Submarine Service have been had Japan used the same tactics and equipment as the allies used in the atlantic
In compensation, do you give the US better torpedoes?
Honestly, Drach, any Captain that wasn't within one ladder of the bridge..? Only six ships and 32 years experience, but I doubt it...
hmm, how about if you made a bomb that was the same mounting as a torpedo, but just made of bang,- no motor?
I'm having a really bad day, seeing a new dry dock posted brought a smile to my face and will be a welcome distraction :-)
with regard to HMS Effingham - Poles wouldn't have needed maps or charts:)
Only an hour? Is he ill?
"Could USS Atlanta have been repaired, assuming the crew could get the flooding under control?"
Drach: "Well, it was the flooding that really prohibited saving her..."
Only Drach could stretch a simple "yes" into a wordy exposition.
The scroll room of the Parliamentary Archives is one of my favorite archives. No naval records there, (perhaps some stuff from HenryVIII)
*hires people to poke Drach with a stick*
Officer's quarters arn't just in the most comfortable position on the ship, they are generally very close to the ships armoury.
Pissed .day off min wage health care worker Oswaldtwistle, My aunt Margaret was in the film Enigma .Margaret get him a taxi , M get him a cup of tea, She was a wren secatary to enigma from her 1st job end till the of the war GCHQ till retirement only pic Ive got is as a WO1 army , My Aunt Margaret was probobly the most important person from lancs in ww2 . Anyway I can point you to family members who know more im 55 , Im called Patrick ,UnclePat, the allies bomed a Nazi hq in the desert it was to kill a Sgt radio operator a sgt Bilko type My uncles biggest regret of the war was that he could not let the Jerries Know that he knew .and he was really sorry cause the jerry was great , He vowed that if he survied the war he would walk from London to Prinknash Abbey Gloucester, hes buried there , What good comes out of Nazareth. My Family
1st like at least
What would happen if You give the Entire Z plan fleet to the Germans for free in 1939
they sit in port because they do not have the fuel for them
Assuming they have fuel for themselves
Manning them would be the first struggle, as the Army and Luftwaffe have first call on manpower, then training them in the Baltic would take a while. After that the Brits would have to bring the Med and Indian fleets back to counter them.
Regarding the Japanese in ww2, just watch this scene. I'll let GySgt Basilone sum it up.
ua-cam.com/video/1XBCumSQOnQ/v-deo.html
102nd