Just seeing if you were aware of the fact that they just turned the USS Oriskany into a man-made Reef. Also, do you think it's more cost-effective to scrap old ships, or turn them into reefs? And what are the pros and cons?
Long question short: just how is a ship's speed measured? I assume it's calculated with a combination of machinery RPM, time, and distance, but I've heard of ships being designed for 22 knots and actually making 23.5 for example. As I'd be hard pressed to tell the difference between 75-100 km/h in my car without a speedometer how is such a precise measurement arrived at, at sea, in a 30,000t battleship? haha Towing a knotted rope?
Given its a Force Z video. Might as well ask a force Z question. What would have happened if force Z had comprised of all of the royal navys battlecruisers instead of POW and Repulse. Say denmark straight went slightly differently and with different ships instead of hood but the outcome of bismarck being sunk remained the same meaning hood survives longer. If hood repulse and renown been detached to asia (and in an alternate scenario if incomparable had been built and sent in this scenario). As repulse with a competant captain and her high speed seemed to be able to at least avoid attacks since she couldnt deter them. This alternate force wouldve been far more valuable in the role of a fast coastal defense fleet. How would this scenario have progressed through the war?
The hulk of the pree dreadnought HMS Hood still exists as a breakwater. Are there any plans to raise and restore it as a museum? Would it be possible? Also has the wreck of HMS Captian been found? Thanks!
I'm Malaysian, Force Z was actually been mentioned in our school history book, and our local defence magazine published an article about Force Z, this when I was 15 y/o back in 2013. They gain my respect for those who went down with the ship protecting Malaya at that time.
Every time the subject comes up, my mind backs away, because of the impending tragedy to be described. I have to grit my teeth and listen out of deep respect for those sailors.
My grandad served on the Repulse but by a stroke of luck, developed peritonitis and was put off in Gibraltar while the ship was on her way down on her ill-fated journey. I'd love to find a crew manifest with his name on it, but sadly the only ones I could find are the ones with the crew who were lost. I think it's this reason that the loss of the Repulse strikes me more than the others - my grandad undoubtedly had friends on there. Sadly, he passed long before I was an age to ask him any questions, and he rarely spoke of his war experiences to my dad.
I hear you. I had an uncle who survived the sinking of the USS Astoria, and I can only wonder about how he felt about his friends who died that night. He never spoke of it.
@@tomdog5265 Yes! Apparently my great-grandma was initially told he was dead, so it was a tremendous surprise when he returned home! Although my dad has a document indicating his postings, we've sadly lost a medal which my dad tells me proved he was in the Arctic Convoys.
My fathers uncle survived the sinking of the Glorious off Norway. He had been ill when she sailed and was on convalescent leave at home when the news was announced on the radio, ( it was just after the escape at Dunkirk and the whole family was listening.). Dad, at 93, still remembers the look of loss on his face, he had served in the Med on carriers pre war and lost all his friends that he served with. He died shortly after the war from asbestosis contracted while insulating HMS Bradford (a lend lease American destroyer) on its conversion into British service during its voyage from Canada to the Med. Thank you for reminding me of my family history, it is so quickly forgotten.
Both my Grandfather (former USMC who's enlistment expired Feb 1941- so he reenlisted in the USN Mar 41- Good Timing) and my Dad (25th inf Vietnam) were Combat Vets who didn't talk about their Service for YEARS. My Dad didn't open up about his Combat experience until I was in high school (I'm pushing 50 now) in the 90s. My Dad especially took the Afghanistan Withdrawal hard, as it reminded him of Saigon 1975. Don't know why Countries don't learn their lesson (s) from history and keep repeating their mistakes.
An eerie and ( and lucky ) instance where it's good not to be mentioned in dispatches. My father ( merchant marine, at the time ) was in San Diego at a time when an older, more savvy crew-member advised him, " We gotta gettta get off this ship ! The next leg of this voyage is to Murmansk and that place is a shooting gallery ! " So down the hawser they went, the captain screaming all the while, "I'll have you back ! " They escaped, ship went down, all-hands lost, none left but me to telll the tale. "Til the sea gives up her dead, let us spare a prayer for them that hasn't returned. Ave Maria, Stella Maris..
Thank you for this refreshing analysis! Too often, when we see discussions about the battle for Malaya and the demise of Force Z, it's reduced to British gross underestimation of Japan's military capacities and the alleged incompetence of Adm. Phillips in the face of air power, most of the time also scorching Royal Navy's doctrine on the way (as if airpower had not been a thing in the Med. for the past 18 months). There's so much more to this event, you made me want to dig it even more.
1941 was a bad year for the Royal Navy. Hood, Prince of Wales, Barham, Repulse, and Ark Royal, all lost. Valiant and Queen Elizabeth damaged. Yet despite all that we still had capital ships to spare with more being built all the time. I think the Repulse was a lovely looking ship, British battlecruisers definitely had a look of beauty about them, and its a shame her status as a war grave is being abused now.
Plus Royal Oak was lost earlier. Also around the 42 "we are running low on ships" time frame Nelson was damaged in the Mediterranean and Ramilees was damaged in Madagascar and that's just what I personally know of there could even be more
@@toddwebb7521 don't forget Warspite who as usual was busy happily taking pretty much everything the Germans and Italians and random rocks could throw at her haha
My wife's great uncle was a boy seaman on the POW. We lost him 10 years ago - it would have been great to have got him up to Rosyth for the build for the latest POW.
Out of curiosity: which destroyer? My paternal grandfather was a marine on Prince of Wales and got off a similar way (HMAS Vampire). Ultimately though he was captured at Singapore and spent the rest of his war building railways for the Japanese.
There are some accounts of naval and Roy marine personnel attempting to surrender to Japanese forces after the sinking of both the Prince of Wales and Repulse were executed. Some Royal Marines from the striken ships joined the retreating Argyle and Sunderland Highlanders to form a composite unit The Plymouth Argyles .
There are so many stories of "extraordinary bad luck" in naval combat I begin to think it's pretty normal. The number of chance happenings with Force Z - everything from the weather to false landing reports to misunderstood signals about air cover to a catastrophically bad torpedo hit - the entire theater could have unfolded differently as you touch upon. This was one of my favorite of your videos. Your statement about the only two fast capital ships available which could serve as the core of a fleet in the theater being lost and the uselessness of the "R"s does remind me of the comments you made regarding scrapping HMS Tiger instead of an "R". I agree to disagree with you on that one! Moreover, Tiger was such a pretty ship. I would be interested for you to do a lengthy video of the battles of the Java Sea & the fall of the Dutch East Indies and cover the details of ABDACom - the Allied fiascos continue, but also could have gone a better direction (and there was a fair bit of bad luck there, too). If you are ever interested in some 3D animation I have some pretty good models of the ships in the theater (from Tenedos to PoW/Repulse and the ABDACom ships) and I am collaborating to make mods for the game "War on the Sea" with these ships. It would be pretty easy to make some sequences of, eg Bettys doing attack runs on PoW, or Haguro launching Long Lances at Doorman's fleet.
People missunderstand statistics. They tend to think these events are bad luck,but they are not. They tend to count as "time of events"only the time when something really happened. In reality every second of every day is a chance of something bad happening. If you spend 4 years with nothing bad happening then something bad happens, that is not bad luck.. that is GOOD luck. When you have dozens of ships in a war scenario, it is unreasonable to not have bad events happen.
The British were too haughty and underestimated their enemy throughout history. They underestimated the African natives in Africa and they underestimated the Japanese forces in South East Asia. As if they didn't learn any lessons from past history mistakes. Shameful attitiude they inherited that bought their downfall in history books.
@@y2000ad1 Morale building is found in many armies. Soldiers, especially those in leadership positions, are supposed to project superiority in their attitudes...disdain for the enemy and his weaponry, confident racial assumptions, strident assertions about one’s own preparations, plans, capability, equipment, etc. Japan’s successes in the early stages of the war resulted in a lot of puzzled, agonized rethinking for the Allies. One harsh lesson learnt from this tragic loss, and from similar ones elsewhere, was that the day of the battleship was over. A few small, fragile planes could sink those huge, intimidating, well-armed, enormously expensive symbols of power
@@y2000ad1 Did you actually listen to this video? The British and the Americans had a pretty accurate estimate of Japanese capabilities. On the other side of the world Britain was fighting for her life (and yours too); further resources were just not available.
Great video. Armoured Carriers also have some very good videos on the loss of Force Z with survivor's accounts. Such a shame the wrecks have been subjected to illegal salvage recently
When you think about it, many naval engagements are a matter of bad luck ... HMS Hood took a "one in a million" hit from Bismarck; Bismarck took one bad torpedo from a single biplane; the first hit on Scharnhorst took out her rear radar; PQ 17 was scattered due to Tirpitz sailing out (and hitting a rock), the Channel Dash against all odds ...
Very true, in war luck is often just as if not more important than skill. I will note the more I learn the more I think Hood had a gun malfunction that sunk her but either way, shifty luck.
Yeah... In all those examples that you listed, if you'd been playing a war game or whatever and came up with these outcomes, you'd have been laughed out of the room (or court-martialled) 🥲 Reality is often stranger than fiction 🙃
@@MrNicoJac Well, I am playing World of Warships ... and I go so far to say: "I've seen it all !" Until something else - usually extremely stupid or lucky - happens. It is fair to say that I've done my bits of stupidity and genius, often within the same match. If you can't take a joke, don't join the Navy ... 🙂
Yes. We don't often think of capital ships achieving successes in combat by maneuvering, it's more often by absorbing enemy fire or hitting targets accurately.
it was possible which who was the HMS Repulse's officer-commanding to wit one Captain William Tennant which was promoted to Flag-rank which who in my opinion did every possible way of twisting to constantly to avoiding the Type-91 anti-ship torpedoes But the land-based Nell and Betty-bombers IJNFAA squadron-leaders which given to turn the tight-bomber cockpit with the Japanese's version of unprintable blue-murder along-with rather a long-screed about what he would do something rather unpleasantly done to the gaijin captain with his samurai-sword ETC So the bomber-squadron commander communicated to be smother the gaijin warship m a n u v e r a b i l i t y The HMS Repulse which who was well and truly stuck in a Hobson's choice Turn to port get struck by the barrage of the port-side Tennant which who knew that Repulse's Achilles-heel The Repulse didn't received a complete re-build like her sister-ship The PoW which who was having more modern anti-torpedo defense The now helpless Repulse which who didn't have the anti-torpedo-defenses because the Renown-class battle-cruiser which who was being of the First-World-War and without the WW-II land-based aircraft when they weren't being able to m a n u v e r i n g Captain Tennant which who did the brave-thing to order everybody up from below and then the Type-91 laid her open flooding the engineering and the boiler-room The Repulse's casualties which who was i think heart-breaking for Captain Tennant's internal peace of mind because he had known most of the junior-officers and many junior-ratings Along the many of senior chief-petty-officers which who had made the Repulse a happy-ship And i think what the illegal scrap-metal merchants which who were doing robbing the burial-place of so many officers and sailors which who was being dismantling the final resting place of the King-George the Fifth class battleship and the Renown-class battle-cruiser Prince of Wales and Repulse Go with God and may they Rest In Peace Always
Thank you for this information. While many stories exist about the sinking, the early part of the story isn't well known. Phillips is usually portrayed as a stuffy British admiral who just didn't understand modern combat. It helps to know that he was trying to execute a pre-existing plan and that there was a major intelligence failure on the threat posed by Japanese airpower.
In WWII, disrupting enemy landings with surface combatants was a high risk-high reward operation. Phillips was not outdated in his thinking and many Japanese Admirals would try similar operations against the Americans. The problem is that the enemy wouldn't be doing landings if he wasn't stronger than you are in the air and at sea.
2 points Drach Thanks for the video, and I appreciate that your perspective doesn't begin with thinking that the subjects are idiots or horrible, but that they are somewhere in the positive end of the spectrum. And because those false presuppositions are absent, we actually learn
Fascinating! Also good to hear mention of Force H, especially HMS Renown, as my dad served on it all the way through the war. I remember my Dad telling me how upset he was when he heard Repulse had gone. Apparently it was a toss up as to which ship he would be assigned, Renown or Repulse, as they were sister ships. God bless them all.
As usual, very well explained. It's such a shame that these two great ships are now being plundered for their metals, regardless of their status as war graves.
@@stc2828 How would you feel if someone dug up your dead grandmother for their wedding ring? Apart from being disrespectful, it's theft and illegal under international law.
@@timgosling6189 A wedding ring is tiny and has almost no other economic value. You realize even a cemetery would get built over after some years or all the city would be covered with cemetery and no place for people to live. For a sunken warship, it's an absurdly large chunk of metal to be wasted. We could salvage and bury human remains properly before salvaging the metal ofcourse.
@@stc2828 except they're not even doing that, respectfully dealing with the dead who still lie there first- bones are often found by the scrap metal workers amidst the bits of rusty cut-up metal that're crudely torn from the wrecks, and they're just told by their bosses to keep quiet about it and keep working. As for the matter of the metal-salvaging itself, it doesn't matter how justified or sensible you feel it is, it's still completely illegal and something never done elsewhere to war-graves, ONLY to the ships unfortunate enough to be sunk in East-Asian waters, and around Malaysia in particular, not just with these two British battleships but with WW2 warship wrecks of EVERY nationality, American, Japanese, Dutch, French, Australian, New Zealander, you name it if they sank anywhere near there they've been looted, DOZENS of ships, maybe HUNDREDS by now
@@stc2828 seriously, how would you feel about it if you had a family member who'd gone down with one of those ships, or ANY historic shipwreck to have gone down in those waters within living memory, and you went to the site to drop a commemorative wreath or flag over the wreck and to pay your respects, only to discover a bunch of f*cking pirate scumbags with apparently no consciences or senses of respect had completely torn the wreck apart to a state where it was no longer recognisable, or indeed taken it from the seabed entirely? Solely for the scrap-value of the rusting steel, with no regard for it's historical or familial meaning, just seeing them SOLELY as "big lumps of metal"? And the various components and sections of hull aren't carefully removed by any slow methodical process, oh no, they're literally RIPPED from the wrecks with giant cutting-claws
Thanks for this documentary. As an amateur historian I always wondered why the two battleships and their escorts were operating in enemy controlled airspace. Great job, very easy to understand.
I’m always impressed with the logical strategies that the Royal Navy developed, as explained by Drach. In the case of Force Z, it didn’t work out that well, but, based on the information available, it was still a good plan. Centuries of experience showing itself.
Luck decides so much. If not for that one-in-a-million shell at Denmark Strait, Hood and Prince of Wales could have beaten Bismarck. If Force Z hadn't been detected, or if not for those critical hits, they could've survived. If Somerville had found the Kido Butai that night, the Japanese carriers could have been crippled or sunk. Midway is a classic example of how crucial luck can be. Washington at Guadacanal: imagine a Long Lance hitting her in that chaos. Tactics, equipment, training, all of it matters, but simple circumstance can ensure victory or defeat all in its own.
@@Cailus3542 Luck matters, of course, but I also think that we make our luck, so to speak. The Bismarck was aiming at the Hood, when it scored hits. Force Z was detected because the Japanese were looking for it. The Americans were “lucky” at Midway because the pilots were willing to keep searching for the Japanese carriers to the very limit of their fuel. The Japanese launched torpedoes, but Lee turned away in time. Bravery and skill mattered much more than luck, IMHO.
Something that's annoyed me since reading more up on Phillips is him being scapegoated for this catastrophe. Sure, as the admiral in charge, he wasn't blameless, BUT..He was certainly not the one primarily to blame, bad decisions in Whitehall, bad intel, and good ole fashioned bad luck, are all far more to blame than he was.
Putting a previously-retired RAF Air Marshal whose preceding job had been Governor of Kenya in as CinC was not a well-thought-out move either. It implies that London thought the Far East would be best defended by air forces, but then they did not send any. The needs of Home and the Med were much greater. The RN force they sent was most deficient in - air power. Phillips seems to have spent most of his WW1 time in destroyers, rising to command a cruiser. He also spent a lot of time in Whitehall on staff duties, where he gained the confidence of Churchill. When he read the conclusions of the first Board of Inquiry into the loss of the Hood, his criticism to Churchill was part of getting a second, more thorough Board of Inquiry convened. Small world.
Honestly, with what was happening to all the Allies in the Pacific and Asia from December 1941 until almost mid 1942, Phillips wasn't alone. Pretty much every Allied commander facing the Japanese was getting overwhelmed and embarrassed. MacArthur would conduct a horrific debacle for the defense of the Philippines, including allowing his strong air force that could have threatened IJN movement get destroyed on the ground on the first day. IMO it wouldn't have made much of a difference if POW and Repulse survived this attack. The British would finally know the kind of range and threat Japanese land based air power presented, longer than what intel led them to believe earlier. They probably would have made the IJA's push to Singapore itself a lot tougher with big 381mm & 356mm shells landing on their troops. But eventually the defense would fail. The US Pacific Fleet is belly up in Pearl Harbor, so the threat of the USN tying down a huge proportion of the IJN was horrifically out the window for the British in the Far East. And worst of all, if things were going badly for Singapore, that'd mean the carriers of the Kido Butai would show up and settle matters once and for all. This video mentions the good training by the IJN land based torpedo squadrons. The training and experience of the pilots of the Kido Butai at this stage of the war was damn good.
@@Warmaker01 Up sh*t creek without a paddle comes to mind. Still doesn't make it any fairer that they, after the fact, tried to blame him for what happened.
@@gregorywright4918 Note that I am not saying what he did was the right call in hindsight. In fact, in hindsight, the right call would have been to pull POW and Repulse (along with as much of the Asiatic Fleet as he could convince to follow them) back to Australia or Ceylon. But you know as well as I do that that was not a option he or Hart had in december 1941, no matter how much revisionist historians might try to argue otherwise. Their political chiefs would never have agreed to it.
A wholesome exchange of opinions. Fully agreed of all major points. Thanks for adding to the discusion, gentlemen. And not substracting from it. Cheers.
Really liked this video, interestingly at the same time, I have been reading a book by the squadron commander that led the Buffalo's who arrived too late. This is his own description: I thought of you when I read this quote from "Life's Too Short to Cry: The Compelling Story of a Battle of Britain Ace" by Tim Vigors - "During the next two days, gradually, the story of what had happened came out. Despite the fact that I had guaranteed to maintain a continuous daylight cover of six aircraft, the naval commander seemed to disregard this protection when he left port. On the morning of the second day the two battleships were picked up by a Japanese spotter plane who shadowed them out of gunshot range throughout the daylight hours. One of the reasons which was later given for the failure to call for air cover was the fact that the commander did not want to break radio silence. But as they were already being shadowed, to my mind, his excuse doesn’t hold much water. At this vital time, when the navy knew that an air attack must be imminent, I could not only have had at least six aircraft over them but I could also have called for the assistance of my old friends, 243 Squadron. I had arranged for them to act as a back-up should matters look like hotting up. In other words, by using an advance base I could probably have had at least twelve aircraft covering the fleet at the time they were attacked. The Japanese attacks employed waves of torpedo bombers. These aircraft were slow and vulnerable and, because of the extreme range from which they were operating, were not escorted by any fighters. Of course, even with twelve aircraft we would have been outnumbered but, with no fighter escort to worry about, we could have completely disrupted the attack. With the Japanese willing to adopt suicide tactics if necessary there is no doubt that both battleships would have suffered damage. Repulse, which carried considerably less armour plating round her hull than Prince of Wales, might even have been sunk. But the flagship which was capable of taking terrible punishment before collapsing below the waves, would undoubtedly have been saved and would have been able to have limped back to port. The presence of those two battleships in the area at that time was probably of more psychological importance than tactical, both to the enemy and to ourselves. Their sinking undoubtedly had a worse effect on the morale of the Allies than any event since the evacuation of Dunkirk. For the Japanese it meant that they had not only destroyed the core of the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor but had now also sunk the cream of the British Navy. No wonder their tails were high as their troops poured ashore on the beaches around Kota Baharu. The sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse finally brought home to the navy the absolute vital necessity of support from the air. But the lesson was an expensive one to learn." Start reading this book for free: a.co/cQ8bcEY
Best explanation I have ever heard... or read. Your scholarship continues to amaze and please. Thank you. I worked with (late 1990's) a gentleman who was a boy in Singapore at the time. His recollections of the morale effect of these losses were poignant. Yes. He spent a large part of the war years as a guest of the Japanese. Those stories he avoided.
I first knew about this from battlestation pacific and never could I find a lot of information about it when I was much younger, always thought these missions were unrealistic but.. Turns out I got surprised.
Classic game! All time favourite of mine, fondly remember flying a few metres above the ocean in an F4U, loaded with rockets, and zooming in to wreck Japanese troop transports.
@@1967sluggy It’s a very nostalgic game, it’s not perfect but it’s still fun. By the way, I’m looking for a way to do games with the same country on both sides, if anyone knows a mod or a modification of the files that could allow that, I’d be extremely thankful.
Prince of Wales: I'm sailing with an old battlecruiser... Repulse: I'm not that old! Prince of Wales: Practically unsupported, to engage an enemy. De javu Repulse: Déjà vu Prince of Wales: Peu importe
Thank you for sharing this detailed context to the loss of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. I have learned a lot from you and have come to a much greater appreciation of all naval history.
I've long argued that all you can really gleam from Force Z's demise is the fact that, sooner or later, the Golden BB comes for everyone. That hit on PoW that wrecked her outer port shaft was devestating...as was restarting the bloody thing, but what choice did they have? Survival depended on high speed to maneuver...given the same situation I'd have probably ordered the same. It's a hell of a sad story, in the end. but it's a great video that you've done showcasing it.
I built a model of Repulse (maybe MPC?) in the early ‘80s while on vacation to my grandparents lake house. I looked out at the lake and tried to visualize what this beautiful ship must have looked like in person. What a tragic end to two proud ships.
that it was but it was being arrogance against Japan and the end result one battleship and one battle-cruiser and 840 lives which who was sacrificed by that arrogance
This is so much better than the BS Soundbite version basically being taught in schools (herp-da-derp, adm Phillips was a dummy-head). While in reality; one bit of faulty intelligence (the laden range of Japanese Torpedo bombers), two faulty communications (availability of aircover and the nonexistent landings near Kuantan) and two spots of bad luck (the weather clearing and one nasty torpedo hit) was what killed Force-Z.
HMS Prince of Wales: a horse, a horse, my kingdom for a horse. The effect of that one torpedo hit in the first Japanese attack. Tragic. Subsequent events were nightmarish to the local populace. Maybe it was only a matter of time anyway, but we’ll never know. BTW, that one torpedo hit reminds me of the demise of the Bismarck.
The irony is that PoW was present to see Hood go up in flames with an unlucky shot, then to see the ship that inflicted that hit go down thanks to taking an aerial torpedo to the stern. Less than a year later, she herself would fall victim to an unfortunate stern aerial torpedo strike, with similar fatal consequences. Incidentally, both Yamatos also ended up taking stern aerial torpedo hits, though in their cases they remained operational after the hit and were instead overwhelmed by sheer number of torpedo hits.
The irony with Bismarck is its the classic carrier/battleship tactic discussed by so many before the war. The carrier's planes would damage the enemy battlefleet allowing your battlefleet the advantage upon meeting.
Thanks for presenting a more balanced view of this event. Hopefully this will go some way towards undoing some of the undeserved snarky criticism around force Z.
Everyone in the world, including, I suspect, many factions in the Japanese armed forces, thought battleships in open water couldn't be sunk by aircraft alone. Ironic that both Yamato class ended up going that way.
To be fair aircraft technology was advancing fast in that period so aircraft only produced were pretty much obsolete by the time they worked thru there way thru nations procurement processes .
@@matthewmayton1845 A mix of that, and also a massive underestimation of how much defensive weaponry was needed to ward off enemy aircraft. Lars Celander makes a very good point in his book that navies universally underestimated the need for and as a result underequipped their ships in the interwar and early war with anti-aircraft weaponry. By 1944 though, for the USN and RN the situation had flipped. Anti-aircraft weaponry had improved dramatically in quality and now was so prevalent that Japanese aircraft had been rendered mostly ineffective against the battleships.
@@dusting1391 Recognize that those mid-30s AA suites were designed to deal with mid-30s aircraft - when wooden biplanes were just beginning to be replaced with metal monoplanes. Both the Betty and the Zero were introduced in 1940.
Remember that the Yamato was ordered and laid down in 1937. By early 1940 the Japanese carriers were still using *biplanes*. And also realize that once Japan declared war on the US, the USN didn't lose a single Battleship. The closest the Japanese came was hitting the USS Pennsylvania with a bomber at night, 3 days before Japan surrendered.
This video, in my opinion, is perhaps the best, among your tremendous and already great library. These all should be required viewing at all military and naval colleges. Bravo sir Bravo!
Rum Ration Wednesday! Drink up me hearties yo ho! Rum Ration is the best thing about Wednesday even with Wednesday being "hump" day. Now let's enjoy listening to the loss of the Repulse and Prince of Wales on our lunch breaks and/or morning/afternoon commutes!
Excellent video -- thanks. My mind boggles when I think about how much harder it was to gather intel on adversarial forces back then. It's no wonder the earliest use of military air power was for reconnaissance. But sadly that didn't help Force Z when it came to that bogus landing report.
Naaaaa, he has done some more impressive stuff over the years. This one is just the "standard top quality". :-) I highly recommend the video on the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron and the Battle of Tsushima.
Thank you for all the work you put in. There is far more information here about what happened here than I ever learned in school about force Z. mostly it was used as an example of the superiority of aircraft over battleships but the way it was laid out here it seems like force Z actually had a chance barring a couple of bad surcumstances.
"...had a chance" was not in the realm of reality - just someone's wishful thinking. You don't have to have torpedoes to sink a battleship. High flying dive bombers with AP rounds can do the trick too. I do not think they had a chance once the left port unprotected. To me, it was mainly British arrogance that led to this fiasco, as well as the Royal Navy not paying attention to what Billy Mitchell proved almost 20 years earlier, and at Toranto, and at Pearl Harbor, which to me is just negligence in this case.
The bad luck was more with not knowing aircraft capable of killing battleships were within range of Force Z due to faulty intel, not with the actual sinking itself.
Many years ago, I played as the Allied Far East commander in a multiplayer SPI War in the Pacific board war game Dec 1941 scenario. As such, I was responsible for sortieing Force Z against the IJN in reply to the invasion of Malaya. From my point of view as a gamer, Force Z mission wasn’t to destroy the enemy. Armed with historical perspective I realized that my real mission was to ensure the survival of the battleships so that they could escape & be used later under more advantageous conditions. I tried everything to keep them alive. I was unable. If they sortied during daylight the Nells sunk them. If I sortied at night, the half dozen IJN subs lurking off Singapore intercepted them with Kondo’s Main Body ready to bat cleanup. My Force Z never got as far as the Main Body. That would have been most interesting.
Excellent. Accurate communication and good intelligence, so often get muttled in the fog of war. The legend so oft repeated was addressed well. Thank you.
Poor POW, first she lost her only surface engagement against Bismarck and latter became the first example of air supremacy over capital ships, truly an unfortunate ship.
@@d.olivergutierrez8690 How did POW loose the battle with Bismarck? POW scored the hits that sent Bismarck running home to mommy, instead of preceding out into the Atlantic. POW followed Bismarck after the battle and exchanged gun fire with Bismarck again. No hits were registered from either side.
Our Asiatic fleet was actually weak at the time and was essentially destroyed in the Battle of the Java Sea. We fought together heroically against hopeless odds. That is why I consider the UK and Australia to be our closest friends and allies.
I loved the video, I felt like I was in the planning room with the admiral. One suggestion i'd bring is that a visualization of the forces on a map would be helpful ⭐
My mother lost a cousin who was on the Prince of Wales, so it's a part of my family's story. When I heard that Chinese firms were stripping his grave for steel I thought "Yeah. That figures. That's the sort of thing that they would do." If it was a Chinese war grave they'd be screaming blue murder.
HMAS Vampire was a V-class destroyer of the Royal Navy (RN) and Royal Australian Navy (RAN). Launched in 1917. HMS Tenedos (Pennant number initially FA4 and later H04[1]) was an Admiralty 'S' class destroyer. Laid down on 6 December 1917, she was constructed by Hawthorn Leslie of Tyne, and was completed in 1918.
Looking at the Malaya campaign as a whole, I am amazed how incompetent was the coordination and execution for a nation that had been at war for two years. The RAF failed the RN badly, as they had in the Channel Dash, Crete evacuation. The AA on the ships was abysmal despite being upgraded. The list goes on. But, the Japanese were rather lucky with that 'hit' on PoW.
There were mistakes made. But your comments are very easy to make in hindsight. For example, the lack off AA. Where would you have taken guns and ammunition away from? To put on x or y ship? Remember, this isn't a computer game. You can't just churn out infinite numbers of weapons. There is a finite amount of everything that can be made. As a result I'm sure you would agree that you have to spread out your weapons and try and focus on where you hope the greatest threat is. The RAF failing the RN? I don't think so. The channel dash may have been a fiasco. But the RAF didn't fail the RN. They may have failed. But they weren't acting in support of the RN. They were in a defence of the nation role and of course were acting as recon against a sortee (which was expected to be into the Atlantic, not that it mattered on the night in question). Communication/coordination was actually a strong suit for the British Armed forces. Helped by the global empires communication links and by the streamlining of the 20s and the lead up to war. An obvious example of this on a local level would be the Dowding system. A theatre example would be that which Cunningham was so fortunate to have in the Mediterranean. Finally. It's important to remember that at this point. It wasn't a holy writ of war that ships had to have air cover. It is now. And it is now precisely [b]because[/b] things like the force z sinking happened. Had aircraft sunk ships? Yes of course. But it wasn't expected that capital ships would be live bait in open ocean without air cover. If anything the fighting in the med had proved that to be true. You may disagree. But I think that if you consider the situation as it happened. Your interpretation of the events is incorrect
@@AdamMGTF Trying to separate out the bias of hindsight is always important. Hence my major qualifiers: "campaign as a whole"" and "after two years at war". Even making allowances... and I'm mostly a WW1 guy where excuse-making is an industry... it's hard to accept. Naval issues: the Med had indeed seemingly proved ships in open ocean were very hard to sink, but major losses were only narrowly avoided (eg, HMS Illustrious) and the RN usually had a torrent of AA fire available, including specialist AA escorts. Force Z not only didn't have enough AA to defend itself, it inflicted minimal loss against attackers in large, slow aircraft that lacked armour or self-sealing tanks. Perhaps training rather than more guns was needed. But the more available option was to have escorts or air better co-ordinated air cover. Obviously, it's not like nobody thought of that, but the problems should have been overcome. The loss of Force Z as Drach notes denuded the SW Pacific of serious naval assets at a stroke... with the results that played out in subsequent weeks. Given how 'careful' the RN was in the Atlantic in two World Wars to not take risks, the same prudence seems not to have applied (while I accept Phillips had few options but to sail). Air issues: whatever happened, Force Z was going to be involved in fighting and almost certainly against an equal or better adversary. And the RN had every reason to respect the IJN's ability, not falling to the hubris that affected the other services. A strong air component was going to be needed, especially against any landing force. The lack of enthusiasm to co-ordinate this and see the hypothetical Force Z action as the decisive action of the whole campaign amazes me. Of course, the RAF/RAAF (we can debate the Channel Dash another time and place, but I strongly disagree with you on it) was probably the most hubris-affected of the services in the theatre, in part a legacy of the years of non-preparation and psychological neglect by Air Vice-Marshal Brooke-Popham. Japanese spies appear to have penetrated the service, and despite the suicidal bravery of many air crew it struggled to perform any of its tasks at all: it could not support the army, it could not inflict serious casualties on air raids against Singapore (despite the Battle of Britain), and it barely contemplated acting with Force Z in providing defence, attack or reconnaissance. Even after Z lot its carrier. The subsequent actions in which Japan swept Allied naval assets from the region were without air support, too, but by then all was chaos. You may be right and I'm being too harsh and using too much hindsight. Many of the worst Allied failures occurred before the first shots were fired, and almost nobody in any senior role excelled. So I may be wrong to be looking at details. But, a small and poorly-equipped Japanese force utterly humiliated a foe that had time to prepare and a lot of experience. It can't have been entirely bad luck and unforeseeable circumstances.
I've read Force Z needed an aircraft carrier ie. Indomitable but I always thought the only difference that would have made , is that Indomitable would have joined the HMS Repulse and the Prince of Wales at the bottom of South China sea .
Considering the difficulty the Japanese force had with two ships, I'd imagine with three targets they would have similar problems to the pearl harbor attack. That is, too much focus on some targets, not enough on others. Also, a fighter cap from Indomitable would have been able to severely disrupt the first attacks, which means Prince of Wales likely never takes that hit that killed her. Additionally, the tops available to catch any of the ships in pincer attacks with two extra targets to hit would be insufficient to do more than damage the torpedo protection, unless somehow a hit like the first on P of W happened. Conclusion, adding even a light carrier to the group probably means only one ship sunk at most, and a high chance all three escape with damage.
@@sillypuppy5940 Yeah, but bear in mind here these bombers were short on fuel and really only had one chance to make their attack, plus they were attacking piecemeal as they arrived rather than gathering into a single larger force--I think having British aircraft opposing them would have made a pretty significant difference here.
It's worth noting that a couple of months later a USN Wildcat CAP utterly smashed an attack by G4Ms against their group. Whether a small group of Fulmars would have done the same I'm not sure, rarely in the Malaya campaign were Allied air assets able to inflict more than token losses on Japanese bombers.
An excellent video, gives a good account of the plans Britain had wanted to carry out if they could and counters the myth that it was the arrogant British thinking two ships was all they needed to stop the Japanese. I have read some older books that are quite hard on Adm. Phillips, and I myself have thought that way too in the past, but I have come to see that given what he knew he mostly acted quite rationaily - the two big failings seem to be his refusual to let Singapore know he was under attack (he belatedly did tbf, albeit requesting destroyers) when radio silence was no longed needed, and some accounts mention him turning the fleet back around to investigate that small merchant ship they saw, wasting precious time. One element that made the casualties so much higher was that PoW's cinema room was being used as a medbay, and tragically a bomb hit it directly. Small note but I like how you didn't fall into the trap of saying Indomitable was due to be with them, the only evidence for that claim is one line in Churchill's memoirs as what he wanted to happen.
The arrogance was there though. Admiral Phillips was well known to despise the idea that airpower was nothing more than a joke. Pretty sure there is a quote from an Admiral Somerville confirming Phillips view.
Not absolving Phillips of all blame, he had also spent the entire war thus far in an office job and had no experience of the reality of modern combat - however as Drach points out no capital ship had been sunk by air-power yet, so in his mind his distane for airpower was correct
Perfect timing for me! I'm getting Empire of the Sun when GMT finishes their next print and I wanted to read up on Force Z since they have a mandatory suicide mission if the Japanese take the right steps. This makes things easier!
USS Lexington, Saratoga, and Enterprise would like to remind you that fleet carriers are fast, they are capitol ships, and at least for these three, stationed in the pacific in December of 41. That being said the work you are doing for naval history makes you a walking world heritage site, or at least a national treasure. Keep it up mate.
Lol, capitol ships, because they were Amercian ones. 🙂 The Royal Navy carriers were fast as well. If I'm not wrong, they were in the mid-30 knots range.
Hey Drach. Don't know where you're going in the US on your trip, but I HIGHLY recommend the USS Silversides museum in Muskegon, Michigan. It's an awesome museum with a near fully operational Gato class submarine. It takes about a day to get through everything on site.
"If the first torpedo had hit 50 feet forward..." = exactly the SAME "bad luck" the Bismarck experienced. If the Swordfish' ONLY hit were 50 feet forward, she escapes.
I've seen the first 30 minutes of this video about 10 times but I still haven't managed to finish it since I like to watch these videos at bedtime and I always fall asleep before the end.
Always a pet project of mine. I've been fascinated with Force Z most of my life and have read every book available on the topic. Excellent presentation (as usual) Drach. As with many other wartime topics, so much Monday morning Quarterbacking has been done on this one. The Fog of war, incorrect assumptions and expectations, poor timing and bad luck (for the RN) were all in play in causing this disaster.
I'm from Kuantan, Malaysia. I have many comments in regards to the war in the South East Asia but one thing I want to comment based on my opinion is with regards to the placement of the British navy and the troops. The biggest mistake the British and also with the Dutch was not focusing on Borneo island. Imagine if all the British Navy, Air Force and Army were focused on the island of Borneo, the Japanese won't be able to have a 'Sustained War'. Most of the oil supply for the Japanese were from the Borneo and also from Palembang. If the focus of the defence was at Borneo, the Japanese will lose out in war of attrition. There will be a long sustained 'Guadacanal' type battle in the Borneos with lesser loss of lives and equipments if the British defense was built around the island of Borneo. At the end of the day, due to the pride of Singapore (Fortress Singapore) and the wrong focus on it, the British lost almost everything in the Pacific.
So much wrong with this idea. Borneo wasn't the big oil producer, Sumatra was. Also, Singapore had a history as a massive trade post. This meant that industry, electrical power, communications, trained foreign manpower, shipwrights, a merchant marine... Was already there. The Brits spent a massive amount of money and industry to build a huge naval base capable of serving modern ships... But they would have had to spend oodles more money to build the same thing in Borneo where none of the infrastructure existed. The Japanese could isolate and starve Borneo by taking control of the islands around it. Singapore, by contrast, had a more secure line of communication across the Indian ocean or south towards Australia. Also, Borneo is massive. It is actually bigger than Malaya. Why this would end up being a smaller battle than the Malaya campaign is not clear.
@@porksterbob Let's say you are right in oil production, doesn't it means that the Allies have to defend the main resources and built it's defense around it? Anyway, Palembang is managed by the Royal Dutch Shell, which is part of Netherlands. As for the Brits, their main resources is the island of Borneo, which they managed in proxy. There is where their focus of defense supposed to be.
You are right in saying Borneo is massive. With the massive land mass size, guerrilla warfare and jungle warfare can be waged and it can have better outcome than a warfare in Singapore. Even if you have been to Borneo today, you will learn to respect mother nature. In Borneo, you will have unlimited food supply from the jungle, unlimited water supply and also unrestricted warfare can be easily waged against the occupiers. You will know that the tropical jungle can be extremely unforgiving if you don't know the ways of it. Take for example, many Japanese soldiers in Guadalcanal fell ill due to the tropical illness and diseases. However, with the help of the locals, you can survive the harsh jungle.
@@germ12319 The Brits main resource in their southeast asian colonies is RUBBER. The oil they get from Borneo was a nice to have, but they didn't need it. Nor was it enough for the Japanese. The Japanese want and need the Sumatran oil fields. Attacking Singapore and the British holdings is done for much the same reason that the Japanese attack the Philippines and bomb Pearl Harbor, they want to clear out any viable opposition early. The British would have to supply Borneo against Japan while being entirely in range of Japanese air power from Indochina and other areas. They would be supplying into an area that doesn't have a massive pre built naval base or dockyards with history of handling half of the commerce of Asia. The British could have done better on much of their defense, but Borneo isn't really the hinge. If the Japanese were to fail to take Borneo, for example, the British wouldn't be able to do anything with it. Taking the rest of the Dutch east indies would completely isolate the island and all of the necessities for fighting a war... like ammunition, would still need to be shipped from outside. There is a reason the Malaysian armed forces talk so much about Lt. Adnan. This is because the British had barely raised any local Malaysians as troops by the time of independence so they looked to a rare Malay Lt. There wasn't an infrastructure to turn the local population of Borneo into Commonwealth forces.
One has to think back to Billy Mitchell’s efforts. His theatrics undermined his message, but he was ultimately proved right. Force Z and the loss of the Yamato hammered home that speed and altitude has the advantage over armor.
Thanks for the video drach. I remember first reading about this when I was ten and its saddened me ever since. The tragic loss of two fine ships. iirc they knew about the radar for a few days, but only decided to fix it just before they sailed and by then it was two late. I wonder if this would've made a slight difference in the accuracy of the 5.25 guns?
Good episode. Funny how often the Japanese air attack on Clark Field on December 7 is often compared to Pearl Harbor - utter rubbish of course. The destruction of Force Z from a strategic point of view was in the same league of Pearl. And as Clausewitz reminds us, war is loaded with chance.
Not 'boned', but certainly in the thick of fighting. They had the Kreigsmarine more or less contained, but the Royal Navy still had to fight the Regina Marina and the Imperial Japanese Navy simultaneously, while also protecting convoys that stretched from the western Atlantic to Malta to the Arctic. The loss of Hood, Prince of Wales and Repulse in 1941, as well as the crippling of Queen Elizabeth and Valiant by the Italians, dramatically reduced the Royal Navy's surface fleet. Combined with the mauling of the American surface fleet at Pearl Harbour and the loss of the French surface fleet in 1940, the Allies were in genuine trouble. That said, it wasn't all doom and gloom. Britain still had plenty of ships of all types, including carriers and fast battleships, and was building more, just like the Americans. They actually sent a rather powerful fleet up to the Indian Ocean shortly thereafter (five battleships and two fleet carriers). The setbacks were shocking, but temporary all the same.
@@michaelblaszkiewicz7283 Not really. as that implies they were absolutely fucked. The RN was stretching and doing things pretty hard, but it wasn't "boned" anywhere nearly as badly as the Japanese or Germans by late 1944. Even at it's worst point, the RN was accomplishing strategic objectives and was a viable fighting force.
I find it so aggravating that the repulse and the other ships wrecks have been all but destroyed because of scrap scavengers, don’t have any respect for them
Rum Ration Wednesday! Drink up me hearties yo ho! Rum Ration is the best thing about Wednesday even with Wednesday being "hump" day. Now let's enjoy listening to the loss of the Repulse and Prince of Wales on our lunch breaks and/or morning/afternoon commutes!
My grandfather was on the Prince of Wales when Churchill met Roosevelt in August 1941. Churchill shook hands with the crew and grandad . He was not on the Prince of Wales when it sailed to the Far East 1941 as he had been given compassionate leave when my uncle Tony was born October 1941 . Died 1966 before I was born sadly. We have a painting of him, painted by an 83 year old some time back in the late 70s apparently, from the photograph we have of him. Hugely handsome.
So many times, it was a so-called lucky hit that did "unexpected" damage that crippled a capital ship. I don't see those hits as lucky. The ships are complex and there are many sensitive systems that can be damaged either directly or indirectly by transmitted shock and that potentially compounded by confusion and human error. Hood, Bismark, Prince of Wales, Ark Royal, Graf Spee, etc, etc were all doomed by the lucky it. The lucky hit happened over and over and it is easy to see why. Once in a while, a ship was crippled by such a hit and then was pounded but survived such as the South Dakota but she had resolute help and was also lucky not to be torpedoed. I shudder to think of what will happen to modern ships in heavy combat.
They're lucky because it's not something you can plan and account for as an attacker, and it's down to random chance. Yes most places you can hit on a ship have something important behind them. Not all of those will have something that exacerbates a ship's problems for the moment. Hood, Bismarck, Prince of Wales, etc. all suffered from entirely different "lucky hits" that affected them all differently on the path that led to the loss of the ships that in many cases, wouldn't have led to loss of the other ship. Hood's was a fluke that hit something that normally wouldn't have been exposed. Had it taken the lucky hits that crippled Bismarck (loss of fuel, damage to rudder, damage to fire control), it wouldn't have doomed her (at least not the same way). The hits that sunk Hood wouldn't have mattered as much for Bismarck (different layout for stowage, armour scheme, etc.) The sort of damage that crippled South Dakota would have been less effective on a ship that wasn't having major electrical problems and teething issues. Yes, these are absolutely "lucky" hits. You're just being silly and pedantic.
@@DuraLexSedLex You are just insulting for the sake of making an insult. Such a wonderful character. When crippling damage caused by a single hit is so common that it is a regular occurrence, then by definition we are not talking about luck anymore. It becomes an expected result of being hit. Very few of the hits are aimed to a specific point. They just want to hit anywhere they can and it just so happens that there are many places in which a single hit will do seriously disabling damage.
@@somewhere6 Except there are many instances of ships taking hits where it doesn't result in the dooming of the ship, and it is largely less dramatic. Warspite's beating at Jutland, the massive beatings the High Seas fleet took in general at Jutland, the Graf Spee wasn't even especially damaged by multiple hits, Exeter took a few hits at River Plate but continued fighting until Graf Spee's withdrawal. Multiple hits on ships where half the ship was disabled but the ship was still combat capable (especially in engagements in the pacific) The things you cite mostly stand out because the ship was lost as a result of that. Damage normally disables something in the ship, yes, but in most cases, the ship can continue to fight or if not fight, withdraw and be repaired. Ships lose bows and return home. Nelson got torpedo'd and needed repairs. "Lucky hits" that are cited are ones wherein the hit just happens to coincidentally strike in such a way that it does something very good for the other side, without being intended. Hence, "luck" If the shell from Rodney that took out Bismarck's Fire Control had instead hit a secondary gun and maybe knocked out the part of the secondary battery, it wouldn't be counted nearly as lucky.
Why would the hits PoW or Bismark received which damaged their propellers and rudders be considered 'lucky' in any way? I always considered them the fairly obvious outcome of the situation they were in. I am not in any way a naval tactician, so take this with a grain of salt, but it seems to me that when a ship is being attacked by torpedo bombers you have three options: do nothing and hope your enemy is too incompetent to make a proper attack run (or accept that you are likely to take multiple hits), turn into the torpedoes, or turn away from them. If your plan relies on the incompetence of the enemy you have bigger problems than those torpedoes and taking multiple hits from torpedoes is not a great plan either regardless of any defenses. Turning into the torpedoes decreases the chance for any spread to open gaps to pass through and reduces your time to react. Turning away gives the greatest chance to avoid any hits but means any hits are most likely to hit your propellers/rudders, which are not protected by armor, so any hits would obviously inflict damage commiserate with a hit to an unprotected area of the ship. Any damage to a propeller is going to slow the ship down and has a chance to damage rudders. PoW had a further issue when they restarted the shaft and it basically blendered a good portion of the ship. I don't see the initial damage being dooming in and of itself. The additional damage that ensued was from the situation the ship was in which prevented the full scope of the damage to be recognized prior to the more immediate requirement to increase speed. That isn't really a lucky hit; it's good tactics and combat prowess from the Japanese which created that situation. Which is kind of what they were trying to do; put the enemy into situations which create opportunities for your forces to exploit. Isn't that pretty basic combat strategy? Bismark was doomed regardless of the jammed rudder or damage to the fire control. The British could absolutely not afford to let that ship survive after the loss of Hood so while the damage reduced the ability of Bismark to avoid hits or return fire as effectively as it normally could, I don't see the ship having any other fate than being hunted down and sunk. Putting up a stronger resistance before being sunk is the best it was going to get. If anything the hit which doomed Bismark was the one it fired against Hood. So I guess in a way the one absolutely 'lucky' shot which doomed a ship actually doomed two. What I would consider the much more rare situation would be a ship getting torpedoed in the stern and NOT suffering some sort of propeller and/or rudder damage. That would be a lucky hit. Regarding Graf Spee I seriously doubt that any hits that ship took effected the fate of the ship in any meaningful way. As I understand the situation the ship was in, it had engaged in a fight with enemy combat ships and had depleted a large portion of its ammunition which limited any ability for it to engage in any further combat. Additionally, the British now knew exactly where the ship was and then performed a rather impressive bit of subterfuge which convinced the officers that any sort of escape was going to result in a fight which they didn't believe they had enough ammunition to engage in and would have been basically sentencing a large portion of the crew to death. I don't see that changing regardless of the damage the ship had sustained; though I might be overlooking a hit that did materially affect those factors. I would welcome any information that I did overlook or haven't considered, however. Apologies for the lengthy reply but it's always bothered me that so many people consider a single hit to be the sole determining factor in the loss of a ship in so many cases. Always struck me as ignoring some very critical factors which effect whether a single hit can doom a ship or not. The designers and builders of the ship, the ability of the crew to deal with damage to their ship (not to mention possible support from nearby friendly ships), and the ability/competence of the enemy to exploit that damage are part of a larger situation that the ship is in are the three most important ones I can think of but there are probably others which might be as important or possibly more. Removing the larger situation that a ship is in which is required to make a single hit (excepting the hit that Hood took, which is why I do consider that one to be 'lucky') fatal as opposed to merely one factor which contributed to the ship sinking ignores all of that. Remove the situation and the hit will most likely not be fatal as ships are generally rather hard to sink simply from their design and sailors are generally very good at making sure a single hit isn't going to sink their ship when they only have that one hit and no enemy trying to exploit that damage.
Phillips was one of the experts on naval airpower. He knew the risks, but also hoped that CAP would protect him. This was one of those "300 years to build a tradition" moments. Cowering while the Japanese landed unopposed would have been a bigger blow to the armour propre than losing the ships. The crews involved may have thought differently, if the question had been posed to them.
Where did you get "one of the experts on naval airpower"? I've read a bio on Phillips and a career summary and it looked to me like he majored in destroyers and staff work. Getting the Far East command may have been because of his staff work for Churchill (especially his criticism of the first Hood inquiry), but at the time he got it, it looked like a quiet backwater. Brooke-Popham may have been posted as CinC due to the expectation that the primary deterrence in the Far East would be RAF, but they did not transfer more modern planes for a proper air defense.
I chalk this up to the Royal Navy underestimating the capabilities of the Imperial Japanese Navy air arm. Sailing without active fighter cover was foolish in the extreme, it probably wouldn't have made much of a difference in the end but it was still stupid.
@@timgosling6189, true but it's still an unforced error to sail blindly into a prospective engagement without air cover. Force Z sailed from Singapore on reports of Japanese landings. They were seeking to disrupt these operations.
One major problem so many have is they look back with modern knowledge. You have to recall, up to this point major attacks against battleships had been done while they were in port and caught by surprise (Taranto and Pearl Harbor), not underway. The hunt for the Bismarck took the classic approach so many expected. Aircraft damaging the opponents battleship/line allowing your battleships an advantage. The US Navy adapted quickly only because they were forced to do so. Aircraft were also rapidly changing so capabilities were also increasing fast, The GM3 Nell was introduced in 1935 while the GM4 Betty was put in service in 1941.
Pinned post for Q&A :)
Just seeing if you were aware of the fact that they just turned the USS Oriskany into a man-made Reef. Also, do you think it's more cost-effective to scrap old ships, or turn them into reefs? And what are the pros and cons?
Long question short: just how is a ship's speed measured?
I assume it's calculated with a combination of machinery RPM, time, and distance, but I've heard of ships being designed for 22 knots and actually making 23.5 for example. As I'd be hard pressed to tell the difference between 75-100 km/h in my car without a speedometer how is such a precise measurement arrived at, at sea, in a 30,000t battleship? haha Towing a knotted rope?
Given its a Force Z video. Might as well ask a force Z question.
What would have happened if force Z had comprised of all of the royal navys battlecruisers instead of POW and Repulse. Say denmark straight went slightly differently and with different ships instead of hood but the outcome of bismarck being sunk remained the same meaning hood survives longer. If hood repulse and renown been detached to asia (and in an alternate scenario if incomparable had been built and sent in this scenario). As repulse with a competant captain and her high speed seemed to be able to at least avoid attacks since she couldnt deter them.
This alternate force wouldve been far more valuable in the role of a fast coastal defense fleet. How would this scenario have progressed through the war?
The hulk of the pree dreadnought HMS Hood still exists as a breakwater. Are there any plans to raise and restore it as a museum? Would it be possible? Also has the wreck of HMS Captian been found? Thanks!
Do you think you could cover the battle between the french Indochina fleet and the navy of Siam?
I'm Malaysian, Force Z was actually been mentioned in our school history book, and our local defence magazine published an article about Force Z, this when I was 15 y/o back in 2013. They gain my respect for those who went down with the ship protecting Malaya at that time.
Thank you. It was a shock to me when I learned that this had happened, though long ago in my case.
I remember this being covered in school history in 1983, in the UK for me. This was the first time I'd read any detail about any warship being sunk.
Awesome :)
Every time the subject comes up, my mind backs away, because of the impending tragedy to be described. I have to grit my teeth and listen out of deep respect for those sailors.
One of those was Admiral Tom Phillips aboard Prince of Wales--the highest ranking allied officer to be killed in action in the entire war.
My grandad served on the Repulse but by a stroke of luck, developed peritonitis and was put off in Gibraltar while the ship was on her way down on her ill-fated journey. I'd love to find a crew manifest with his name on it, but sadly the only ones I could find are the ones with the crew who were lost. I think it's this reason that the loss of the Repulse strikes me more than the others - my grandad undoubtedly had friends on there. Sadly, he passed long before I was an age to ask him any questions, and he rarely spoke of his war experiences to my dad.
I hear you. I had an uncle who survived the sinking of the USS Astoria, and I can only wonder about how he felt about his friends who died that night. He never spoke of it.
@@tomdog5265 Yes! Apparently my great-grandma was initially told he was dead, so it was a tremendous surprise when he returned home! Although my dad has a document indicating his postings, we've sadly lost a medal which my dad tells me proved he was in the Arctic Convoys.
My fathers uncle survived the sinking of the Glorious off Norway. He had been ill when she sailed and was on convalescent leave at home when the news was announced on the radio, ( it was just after the escape at Dunkirk and the whole family was listening.). Dad, at 93, still remembers the look of loss on his face, he had served in the Med on carriers pre war and lost all his friends that he served with. He died shortly after the war from asbestosis contracted while insulating HMS Bradford (a lend lease American destroyer) on its conversion into British service during its voyage from Canada to the Med. Thank you for reminding me of my family history, it is so quickly forgotten.
Both my Grandfather (former USMC who's enlistment expired Feb 1941- so he reenlisted in the USN Mar 41- Good Timing) and my Dad (25th inf Vietnam) were Combat Vets who didn't talk about their Service for YEARS. My Dad didn't open up about his Combat experience until I was in high school (I'm pushing 50 now) in the 90s. My Dad especially took the Afghanistan Withdrawal hard, as it reminded him of Saigon 1975. Don't know why Countries don't learn their lesson (s) from history and keep repeating their mistakes.
An eerie and ( and lucky ) instance where it's good not to be mentioned in dispatches. My father ( merchant marine, at the time ) was in San Diego at a time when an older, more savvy crew-member advised him, " We gotta gettta get off this ship ! The next leg of this voyage is to Murmansk and that place is a shooting gallery ! " So down the hawser they went, the captain screaming all the while, "I'll have you back ! " They escaped, ship went down, all-hands lost, none left but me to telll the tale. "Til the sea gives up her dead, let us spare a prayer for them that hasn't returned. Ave Maria, Stella Maris..
Thank you for this refreshing analysis! Too often, when we see discussions about the battle for Malaya and the demise of Force Z, it's reduced to British gross underestimation of Japan's military capacities and the alleged incompetence of Adm. Phillips in the face of air power, most of the time also scorching Royal Navy's doctrine on the way (as if airpower had not been a thing in the Med. for the past 18 months). There's so much more to this event, you made me want to dig it even more.
Like that remf laurence olivier.
Phillips should not be condemned so much. When he set sail, he was promised the support of fighters from land-based airfields
1941 was a bad year for the Royal Navy. Hood, Prince of Wales, Barham, Repulse, and Ark Royal, all lost. Valiant and Queen Elizabeth damaged. Yet despite all that we still had capital ships to spare with more being built all the time. I think the Repulse was a lovely looking ship, British battlecruisers definitely had a look of beauty about them, and its a shame her status as a war grave is being abused now.
Plus Royal Oak was lost earlier. Also around the 42 "we are running low on ships" time frame Nelson was damaged in the Mediterranean and Ramilees was damaged in Madagascar and that's just what I personally know of there could even be more
She was a very beautiful ship
@@toddwebb7521 don't forget Warspite who as usual was busy happily taking pretty much everything the Germans and Italians and random rocks could throw at her haha
i feel like my favorite ship, the Prince of Wales is just getting too much hate for a lot of unlucky things :(
I've always admired the design of the Repulse, even before I learned about her faith.
I just finished my bachelor thesis on the Royal Navy during 1941-42 in Asia, so this is a nice video to reflect on my own work🤓
curious what ur thesis was and how it compares or contrasts with this video?
cheers to all students of history!
I want to hear more
Thank's for this Drak, My Father was a Prince of Wales survivor and got off via the destroyer. RIP those who went down with their ships.
My wife's great uncle was a boy seaman on the POW. We lost him 10 years ago - it would have been great to have got him up to Rosyth for the build for the latest POW.
@@flym0 my father escaped Singapoor before it fell. He served for 29 years, leaving the RN in 1968. He died from a massive coronary aged 50 in 1974.
Out of curiosity: which destroyer? My paternal grandfather was a marine on Prince of Wales and got off a similar way (HMAS Vampire). Ultimately though he was captured at Singapore and spent the rest of his war building railways for the Japanese.
There are some accounts of naval and Roy marine personnel attempting to surrender to Japanese forces after the sinking of both the Prince of Wales and Repulse were executed.
Some Royal Marines from the striken ships joined the retreating Argyle and Sunderland Highlanders to form a composite unit The Plymouth Argyles .
Some went on too Special unit Z from the Survivers with a Mission!!!
There are so many stories of "extraordinary bad luck" in naval combat I begin to think it's pretty normal. The number of chance happenings with Force Z - everything from the weather to false landing reports to misunderstood signals about air cover to a catastrophically bad torpedo hit - the entire theater could have unfolded differently as you touch upon. This was one of my favorite of your videos.
Your statement about the only two fast capital ships available which could serve as the core of a fleet in the theater being lost and the uselessness of the "R"s does remind me of the comments you made regarding scrapping HMS Tiger instead of an "R". I agree to disagree with you on that one! Moreover, Tiger was such a pretty ship.
I would be interested for you to do a lengthy video of the battles of the Java Sea & the fall of the Dutch East Indies and cover the details of ABDACom - the Allied fiascos continue, but also could have gone a better direction (and there was a fair bit of bad luck there, too).
If you are ever interested in some 3D animation I have some pretty good models of the ships in the theater (from Tenedos to PoW/Repulse and the ABDACom ships) and I am collaborating to make mods for the game "War on the Sea" with these ships. It would be pretty easy to make some sequences of, eg Bettys doing attack runs on PoW, or Haguro launching Long Lances at Doorman's fleet.
People missunderstand statistics. They tend to think these events are bad luck,but they are not. They tend to count as "time of events"only the time when something really happened. In reality every second of every day is a chance of something bad happening. If you spend 4 years with nothing bad happening then something bad happens, that is not bad luck.. that is GOOD luck. When you have dozens of ships in a war scenario, it is unreasonable to not have bad events happen.
The British were too haughty and underestimated their enemy throughout history. They underestimated the African natives in Africa and they underestimated the Japanese forces in South East Asia. As if they didn't learn any lessons from past history mistakes. Shameful attitiude they inherited that bought their downfall in history books.
Timing is everything.
@@y2000ad1 Morale building is found in many armies. Soldiers, especially those in leadership positions, are supposed to project superiority in their attitudes...disdain for the enemy and his weaponry, confident racial assumptions, strident assertions about one’s own preparations, plans, capability, equipment, etc. Japan’s successes in the early stages of the war resulted in a lot of puzzled, agonized rethinking for the Allies. One harsh lesson learnt from this tragic loss, and from similar ones elsewhere, was that the day of the battleship was over. A few small, fragile planes could sink those huge, intimidating, well-armed, enormously expensive symbols of power
@@y2000ad1 Did you actually listen to this video? The British and the Americans had a pretty accurate estimate of Japanese capabilities. On the other side of the world Britain was fighting for her life (and yours too); further resources were just not available.
Great video. Armoured Carriers also have some very good videos on the loss of Force Z with survivor's accounts. Such a shame the wrecks have been subjected to illegal salvage recently
When you think about it, many naval engagements are a matter of bad luck ... HMS Hood took a "one in a million" hit from Bismarck; Bismarck took one bad torpedo from a single biplane; the first hit on Scharnhorst took out her rear radar; PQ 17 was scattered due to Tirpitz sailing out (and hitting a rock), the Channel Dash against all odds ...
Very true, in war luck is often just as if not more important than skill. I will note the more I learn the more I think Hood had a gun malfunction that sunk her but either way, shifty luck.
Luck is a massive factor in war, didn’t Napoleon state that he would rather have a lucky General than a clever one.
Yeah...
In all those examples that you listed, if you'd been playing a war game or whatever and came up with these outcomes, you'd have been laughed out of the room (or court-martialled) 🥲
Reality is often stranger than fiction 🙃
@@MrNicoJac Well, I am playing World of Warships ... and I go so far to say: "I've seen it all !" Until something else - usually extremely stupid or lucky - happens. It is fair to say that I've done my bits of stupidity and genius, often within the same match. If you can't take a joke, don't join the Navy ... 🙂
@@BMJ0877 What Boni meant was that a good general "creates" his own luck.
Man, HMS Repulse acquitted herself brilliantly with that masterful display of maneuverability.
Hello There
She was like the Yamato in her last fight, brilliant until the end
She had danced like a ballerina until the end.
Yes. We don't often think of capital ships achieving successes in combat by maneuvering, it's more often by absorbing enemy fire or hitting targets accurately.
it was possible which who was the HMS Repulse's officer-commanding to wit one Captain William Tennant which was promoted to Flag-rank which who in my opinion did every possible way of twisting to constantly to avoiding the Type-91 anti-ship torpedoes But the land-based Nell and Betty-bombers IJNFAA squadron-leaders which given to turn the tight-bomber cockpit with the Japanese's version of unprintable blue-murder along-with rather a long-screed about what he would do something rather unpleasantly done to the gaijin captain with his samurai-sword ETC So the bomber-squadron commander communicated to be smother the gaijin warship m a n u v e r a b i l i t y The HMS Repulse which who was well and truly stuck in a Hobson's choice Turn to port get struck by the barrage of the port-side Tennant which who knew that Repulse's Achilles-heel The Repulse didn't received a complete re-build like her sister-ship The PoW which who was having more modern anti-torpedo defense The now helpless Repulse which who didn't have the anti-torpedo-defenses because the Renown-class battle-cruiser which who was being of the First-World-War and without the WW-II land-based aircraft when they weren't being able to m a n u v e r i n g Captain Tennant which who did the brave-thing to order everybody up from below and then the Type-91 laid her open flooding the engineering and the boiler-room The Repulse's casualties which who was i think heart-breaking for Captain Tennant's internal peace of mind because he had known most of the junior-officers and many junior-ratings Along the many of senior chief-petty-officers which who had made the Repulse a happy-ship And i think what the illegal scrap-metal merchants which who were doing robbing the burial-place of so many officers and sailors which who was being dismantling the final resting place of the King-George the Fifth class battleship and the Renown-class battle-cruiser Prince of Wales and Repulse Go with God and may they Rest In Peace Always
Thank you for this information. While many stories exist about the sinking, the early part of the story isn't well known. Phillips is usually portrayed as a stuffy British admiral who just didn't understand modern combat. It helps to know that he was trying to execute a pre-existing plan and that there was a major intelligence failure on the threat posed by Japanese airpower.
He must had some brains to be in such a leadership,mangerment position.
From this presentation, a failure of intel and underestimation of the enemy.
In WWII, disrupting enemy landings with surface combatants was a high risk-high reward operation. Phillips was not outdated in his thinking and many Japanese Admirals would try similar operations against the Americans. The problem is that the enemy wouldn't be doing landings if he wasn't stronger than you are in the air and at sea.
2 points Drach
Thanks for the video, and
I appreciate that your perspective doesn't begin with thinking that the subjects are idiots or horrible, but that they are somewhere in the positive end of the spectrum.
And because those false presuppositions are absent, we actually learn
What I have learned from this is Repulse definitely put up a valiant effort in trying to evade everything thrown at her.
Fascinating! Also good to hear mention of Force H, especially HMS Renown, as my dad served on it all the way through the war. I remember my Dad telling me how upset he was when he heard Repulse had gone. Apparently it was a toss up as to which ship he would be assigned, Renown or Repulse, as they were sister ships. God bless them all.
As usual, very well explained. It's such a shame that these two great ships are now being plundered for their metals, regardless of their status as war graves.
Might as well find some use for them than sitting and rotting under the ocean.
@@stc2828 How would you feel if someone dug up your dead grandmother for their wedding ring? Apart from being disrespectful, it's theft and illegal under international law.
@@timgosling6189 A wedding ring is tiny and has almost no other economic value. You realize even a cemetery would get built over after some years or all the city would be covered with cemetery and no place for people to live. For a sunken warship, it's an absurdly large chunk of metal to be wasted. We could salvage and bury human remains properly before salvaging the metal ofcourse.
@@stc2828 except they're not even doing that, respectfully dealing with the dead who still lie there first- bones are often found by the scrap metal workers amidst the bits of rusty cut-up metal that're crudely torn from the wrecks, and they're just told by their bosses to keep quiet about it and keep working. As for the matter of the metal-salvaging itself, it doesn't matter how justified or sensible you feel it is, it's still completely illegal and something never done elsewhere to war-graves, ONLY to the ships unfortunate enough to be sunk in East-Asian waters, and around Malaysia in particular, not just with these two British battleships but with WW2 warship wrecks of EVERY nationality, American, Japanese, Dutch, French, Australian, New Zealander, you name it if they sank anywhere near there they've been looted, DOZENS of ships, maybe HUNDREDS by now
@@stc2828 seriously, how would you feel about it if you had a family member who'd gone down with one of those ships, or ANY historic shipwreck to have gone down in those waters within living memory, and you went to the site to drop a commemorative wreath or flag over the wreck and to pay your respects, only to discover a bunch of f*cking pirate scumbags with apparently no consciences or senses of respect had completely torn the wreck apart to a state where it was no longer recognisable, or indeed taken it from the seabed entirely? Solely for the scrap-value of the rusting steel, with no regard for it's historical or familial meaning, just seeing them SOLELY as "big lumps of metal"? And the various components and sections of hull aren't carefully removed by any slow methodical process, oh no, they're literally RIPPED from the wrecks with giant cutting-claws
Thanks for this documentary. As an amateur historian I always wondered why the two battleships and their escorts were operating in enemy controlled airspace. Great job, very easy to understand.
I’m always impressed with the logical strategies that the Royal Navy developed, as explained by Drach. In the case of Force Z, it didn’t work out that well, but, based on the information available, it was still a good plan. Centuries of experience showing itself.
Luck decides so much. If not for that one-in-a-million shell at Denmark Strait, Hood and Prince of Wales could have beaten Bismarck. If Force Z hadn't been detected, or if not for those critical hits, they could've survived. If Somerville had found the Kido Butai that night, the Japanese carriers could have been crippled or sunk.
Midway is a classic example of how crucial luck can be. Washington at Guadacanal: imagine a Long Lance hitting her in that chaos.
Tactics, equipment, training, all of it matters, but simple circumstance can ensure victory or defeat all in its own.
I would refer you to the famous quote by Mike Tyson. " Everybody's got a plan. Until they get punched in the face. "😒
@@Cailus3542 Luck matters, of course, but I also think that we make our luck, so to speak.
The Bismarck was aiming at the Hood, when it scored hits. Force Z was detected because the Japanese were looking for it. The Americans were “lucky” at Midway because the pilots were willing to keep searching for the Japanese carriers to the very limit of their fuel.
The Japanese launched torpedoes, but Lee turned away in time.
Bravery and skill mattered much more than luck, IMHO.
A total disaster. Stupid RN Officers.
@@WALTERBROADDUS That's why I prefer to "think on my feet".
Something that's annoyed me since reading more up on Phillips is him being scapegoated for this catastrophe.
Sure, as the admiral in charge, he wasn't blameless, BUT..He was certainly not the one primarily to blame, bad decisions in Whitehall, bad intel, and good ole fashioned bad luck, are all far more to blame than he was.
Putting a previously-retired RAF Air Marshal whose preceding job had been Governor of Kenya in as CinC was not a well-thought-out move either. It implies that London thought the Far East would be best defended by air forces, but then they did not send any. The needs of Home and the Med were much greater. The RN force they sent was most deficient in - air power.
Phillips seems to have spent most of his WW1 time in destroyers, rising to command a cruiser. He also spent a lot of time in Whitehall on staff duties, where he gained the confidence of Churchill. When he read the conclusions of the first Board of Inquiry into the loss of the Hood, his criticism to Churchill was part of getting a second, more thorough Board of Inquiry convened. Small world.
Honestly, with what was happening to all the Allies in the Pacific and Asia from December 1941 until almost mid 1942, Phillips wasn't alone. Pretty much every Allied commander facing the Japanese was getting overwhelmed and embarrassed. MacArthur would conduct a horrific debacle for the defense of the Philippines, including allowing his strong air force that could have threatened IJN movement get destroyed on the ground on the first day.
IMO it wouldn't have made much of a difference if POW and Repulse survived this attack. The British would finally know the kind of range and threat Japanese land based air power presented, longer than what intel led them to believe earlier. They probably would have made the IJA's push to Singapore itself a lot tougher with big 381mm & 356mm shells landing on their troops.
But eventually the defense would fail. The US Pacific Fleet is belly up in Pearl Harbor, so the threat of the USN tying down a huge proportion of the IJN was horrifically out the window for the British in the Far East. And worst of all, if things were going badly for Singapore, that'd mean the carriers of the Kido Butai would show up and settle matters once and for all. This video mentions the good training by the IJN land based torpedo squadrons. The training and experience of the pilots of the Kido Butai at this stage of the war was damn good.
@@Warmaker01 Up sh*t creek without a paddle comes to mind.
Still doesn't make it any fairer that they, after the fact, tried to blame him for what happened.
@@gregorywright4918 Note that I am not saying what he did was the right call in hindsight.
In fact, in hindsight, the right call would have been to pull POW and Repulse (along with as much of the Asiatic Fleet as he could convince to follow them) back to Australia or Ceylon.
But you know as well as I do that that was not a option he or Hart had in december 1941, no matter how much revisionist historians might try to argue otherwise. Their political chiefs would never have agreed to it.
A wholesome exchange of opinions. Fully agreed of all major points. Thanks for adding to the discusion, gentlemen. And not substracting from it. Cheers.
Best analysis I have ever heard and this action was a problem we studied in USN SWO school.
Really liked this video, interestingly at the same time, I have been reading a book by the squadron commander that led the Buffalo's who arrived too late. This is his own description: I thought of you when I read this quote from "Life's Too Short to Cry: The Compelling Story of a Battle of Britain Ace" by Tim Vigors -
"During the next two days, gradually, the story of what had happened came out. Despite the fact that I had guaranteed to maintain a continuous daylight cover of six aircraft, the naval commander seemed to disregard this protection when he left port. On the morning of the second day the two battleships were picked up by a Japanese spotter plane who shadowed them out of gunshot range throughout the daylight hours. One of the reasons which was later given for the failure to call for air cover was the fact that the commander did not want to break radio silence. But as they were already being shadowed, to my mind, his excuse doesn’t hold much water. At this vital time, when the navy knew that an air attack must be imminent, I could not only have had at least six aircraft over them but I could also have called for the assistance of my old friends, 243 Squadron. I had arranged for them to act as a back-up should matters look like hotting up. In other words, by using an advance base I could probably have had at least twelve aircraft covering the fleet at the time they were attacked. The Japanese attacks employed waves of torpedo bombers. These aircraft were slow and vulnerable and, because of the extreme range from which they were operating, were not escorted by any fighters. Of course, even with twelve aircraft we would have been outnumbered but, with no fighter escort to worry about, we could have completely disrupted the attack. With the Japanese willing to adopt suicide tactics if necessary there is no doubt that both battleships would have suffered damage. Repulse, which carried considerably less armour plating round her hull than Prince of Wales, might even have been sunk. But the flagship which was capable of taking terrible punishment before collapsing below the waves, would undoubtedly have been saved and would have been able to have limped back to port. The presence of those two battleships in the area at that time was probably of more psychological importance than tactical, both to the enemy and to ourselves. Their sinking undoubtedly had a worse effect on the morale of the Allies than any event since the evacuation of Dunkirk. For the Japanese it meant that they had not only destroyed the core of the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor but had now also sunk the cream of the British Navy. No wonder their tails were high as their troops poured ashore on the beaches around Kota Baharu. The sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse finally brought home to the navy the absolute vital necessity of support from the air. But the lesson was an expensive one to learn."
Start reading this book for free: a.co/cQ8bcEY
Best explanation I have ever heard... or read. Your scholarship continues to amaze and please. Thank you.
I worked with (late 1990's) a gentleman who was a boy in Singapore at the time. His recollections of the morale effect of these losses were poignant. Yes. He spent a large part of the war years as a guest of the Japanese. Those stories he avoided.
my father's foster brother died on HMS Prince of Wales. Thank you for the in depth look.
Captain with binoculars on the bridge,... "those seagulls are getting awfully big!"
🤣
Quick, throw crates of binoculars at them
awfully loud too
@@Arbiter099 load the Captains cutlery into the main battery
You turn out the best historical videos on UA-cam. Your narration is top notch also! Thumbs up X 2.
All of youtubes historical presenters should be praised, but Drak is their ruler
I first knew about this from battlestation pacific and never could I find a lot of information about it when I was much younger, always thought these missions were unrealistic but.. Turns out I got surprised.
Classic game! All time favourite of mine, fondly remember flying a few metres above the ocean in an F4U, loaded with rockets, and zooming in to wreck Japanese troop transports.
@@1967sluggy It’s a very nostalgic game, it’s not perfect but it’s still fun.
By the way, I’m looking for a way to do games with the same country on both sides, if anyone knows a mod or a modification of the files that could allow that, I’d be extremely thankful.
PS3 ??
Ah battlestations midway and pacific. Excellent games. I still play on Xbox under Wolfpackhowler1 if anyone ever wants to play.
@@animal16365 PC
I've never seen a square space ad elsewhere that matches ones you do . Take care sir.
Prince of Wales: I'm sailing with an old battlecruiser...
Repulse: I'm not that old!
Prince of Wales: Practically unsupported, to engage an enemy.
De javu
Repulse: Déjà vu
Prince of Wales: Peu importe
Deja vu, you mean, but heh. Yeah.
At least at Denmark Straits the British genuinely did have the upper hand.
@@Cailus3542 no he spelled correct
@@sugarnads just so confidently incorrect lol
Thank you for sharing this detailed context to the loss of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. I have learned a lot from you and have come to a much greater appreciation of all naval history.
I've long argued that all you can really gleam from Force Z's demise is the fact that, sooner or later, the Golden BB comes for everyone. That hit on PoW that wrecked her outer port shaft was devestating...as was restarting the bloody thing, but what choice did they have? Survival depended on high speed to maneuver...given the same situation I'd have probably ordered the same.
It's a hell of a sad story, in the end. but it's a great video that you've done showcasing it.
I built a model of Repulse (maybe MPC?) in the early ‘80s while on vacation to my grandparents lake house. I looked out at the lake and tried to visualize what this beautiful ship must have looked like in person. What a tragic end to two proud ships.
All of those beautiful ships... Axis and Allied both. And of course the souls aboard...
that it was but it was being arrogance against Japan and the end result one battleship and one battle-cruiser and 840 lives which who was sacrificed by that arrogance
This is so much better than the BS Soundbite version basically being taught in schools (herp-da-derp, adm Phillips was a dummy-head). While in reality; one bit of faulty intelligence (the laden range of Japanese Torpedo bombers), two faulty communications (availability of aircover and the nonexistent landings near Kuantan) and two spots of bad luck (the weather clearing and one nasty torpedo hit) was what killed Force-Z.
Three spots of bad luck:
Getting spotted by that sub
HMS Prince of Wales: a horse, a horse, my kingdom for a horse.
The effect of that one torpedo hit in the first Japanese attack. Tragic. Subsequent events were nightmarish to the local populace. Maybe it was only a matter of time anyway, but we’ll never know.
BTW, that one torpedo hit reminds me of the demise of the Bismarck.
The irony is that PoW was present to see Hood go up in flames with an unlucky shot, then to see the ship that inflicted that hit go down thanks to taking an aerial torpedo to the stern. Less than a year later, she herself would fall victim to an unfortunate stern aerial torpedo strike, with similar fatal consequences.
Incidentally, both Yamatos also ended up taking stern aerial torpedo hits, though in their cases they remained operational after the hit and were instead overwhelmed by sheer number of torpedo hits.
The irony with Bismarck is its the classic carrier/battleship tactic discussed by so many before the war. The carrier's planes would damage the enemy battlefleet allowing your battlefleet the advantage upon meeting.
Thanks for presenting a more balanced view of this event.
Hopefully this will go some way towards undoing some of the undeserved snarky criticism around force Z.
"Rising Sun, Falling Skies' by Jeffrey Cox is an excellent source to learn more about the Java Sea campaign
Everyone in the world, including, I suspect, many factions in the Japanese armed forces, thought battleships in open water couldn't be sunk by aircraft alone. Ironic that both Yamato class ended up going that way.
I suspect most navies underestimated the capabilities and potential of aircraft being able to sink capital ships.
To be fair aircraft technology was advancing fast in that period so aircraft only produced were pretty much obsolete by the time they worked thru there way thru nations procurement processes .
@@matthewmayton1845 A mix of that, and also a massive underestimation of how much defensive weaponry was needed to ward off enemy aircraft. Lars Celander makes a very good point in his book that navies universally underestimated the need for and as a result underequipped their ships in the interwar and early war with anti-aircraft weaponry. By 1944 though, for the USN and RN the situation had flipped. Anti-aircraft weaponry had improved dramatically in quality and now was so prevalent that Japanese aircraft had been rendered mostly ineffective against the battleships.
@@dusting1391 Recognize that those mid-30s AA suites were designed to deal with mid-30s aircraft - when wooden biplanes were just beginning to be replaced with metal monoplanes. Both the Betty and the Zero were introduced in 1940.
Remember that the Yamato was ordered and laid down in 1937. By early 1940 the Japanese carriers were still using *biplanes*. And also realize that once Japan declared war on the US, the USN didn't lose a single Battleship. The closest the Japanese came was hitting the USS Pennsylvania with a bomber at night, 3 days before Japan surrendered.
This video, in my opinion, is perhaps the best, among your tremendous and already great library. These all should be required viewing at all military and naval colleges. Bravo sir Bravo!
It's amazing to think how easily this could have changed
Hated how Prince of Wales ended like this. I wish it lived longer
Rache ist ein Gericht, das am besten kalt serviert wird.
POW will end up in the scrapyard just like other KGV class BBs if it survived the japanese attack.
Between her and the Hood, British battleships had really bad luck getting hit in exactly the wrong place at the start of a battle.
@@rictusmetallicus no thanks Bismarck fan
@@jayvee8502 that's a fate i preferred to her. Rather than get sunk and get looted by bad salvagers years after
It's a good Wednesday when there's a new Rum Ration!
Yup can t disagree with that 😇😂
Rum Ration Wednesday! Drink up me hearties yo ho! Rum Ration is the best thing about Wednesday even with Wednesday being "hump" day. Now let's enjoy listening to the loss of the Repulse and Prince of Wales on our lunch breaks and/or morning/afternoon commutes!
Excellent video -- thanks. My mind boggles when I think about how much harder it was to gather intel on adversarial forces back then. It's no wonder the earliest use of military air power was for reconnaissance. But sadly that didn't help Force Z when it came to that bogus landing report.
As always Drach, you have presented a very interesting subject and you have made it entertaining and informative. Thank you very much, sir.
Wow! That certainly “opened my eyes fully”. Didn’t know about all that background information.
A great detailed explanation there. Thanks!
Another great video Drach. You really do a great job at narration and conveying all important information.
This is your Best work thus far. 🎬 Amazing attention to detail.
Naaaaa, he has done some more impressive stuff over the years. This one is just the "standard top quality". :-) I highly recommend the video on the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron and the Battle of Tsushima.
Very well done indeed, and a vidication of the thinking behind the tragic outcome.
"During the whole war I never received a greater shock." - Winston Churchill
Ah...Fall of Tobruk?
@@mikhailiagacesa3406 "It was a bitter moment. Defeat is one thing; disgrace is another."
@@mikhailiagacesa3406 maybe a close second but definitely number 2
Thank you for all the work you put in. There is far more information here about what happened here than I ever learned in school about force Z. mostly it was used as an example of the superiority of aircraft over battleships but the way it was laid out here it seems like force Z actually had a chance barring a couple of bad surcumstances.
"...had a chance" was not in the realm of reality - just someone's wishful thinking. You don't have to have torpedoes to sink a battleship. High flying dive bombers with AP rounds can do the trick too. I do not think they had a chance once the left port unprotected. To me, it was mainly British arrogance that led to this fiasco, as well as the Royal Navy not paying attention to what Billy Mitchell proved almost 20 years earlier, and at Toranto, and at Pearl Harbor, which to me is just negligence in this case.
The bad luck was more with not knowing aircraft capable of killing battleships were within range of Force Z due to faulty intel, not with the actual sinking itself.
Many years ago, I played as the Allied Far East commander in a multiplayer SPI War in the Pacific board war game Dec 1941 scenario. As such, I was responsible for sortieing Force Z against the IJN in reply to the invasion of Malaya. From my point of view as a gamer, Force Z mission wasn’t to destroy the enemy. Armed with historical perspective I realized that my real mission was to ensure the survival of the battleships so that they could escape & be used later under more advantageous conditions. I tried everything to keep them alive. I was unable. If they sortied during daylight the Nells sunk them. If I sortied at night, the half dozen IJN subs lurking off Singapore intercepted them with Kondo’s Main Body ready to bat cleanup. My Force Z never got as far as the Main Body. That would have been most interesting.
Excellent. Accurate communication and good intelligence, so often get muttled in the fog of war. The legend so oft repeated was addressed well. Thank you.
All pilots! The enemy has no air cover! This will be a simple glorious victory!
Poor POW, first she lost her only surface engagement against Bismarck and latter became the first example of air supremacy over capital ships, truly an unfortunate ship.
@@d.olivergutierrez8690
How did POW loose the battle with Bismarck? POW scored the hits that sent Bismarck running home to mommy, instead of preceding out into the Atlantic. POW followed Bismarck after the battle and exchanged gun fire with Bismarck again. No hits were registered from either side.
@@Ron52G because at the Denmark straight PoW was heavily damaged and Hood was sunk. That must count as a loss.
German tactical victory, British strategic victory since Denmark Strait was a step towards the sinking of Bismarck.
@@reactivearmour5126 I wouldnt call that a strategic victory but Ark Royals disabling of bismarks rudder was one.
Our Asiatic fleet was actually weak at the time and was essentially destroyed in the Battle of the Java Sea. We fought together heroically against hopeless odds. That is why I consider the UK and Australia to be our closest friends and allies.
Always loved HMS Repulse, even more so than her “too cool to not be extensively modernized” lead sister HMS Renown.
Same. Awesome name fr a ship
Same!
@@sugarnads In the category of awesome names, I think it is a shame that the US decided not to complete USS Reprisal.
Man standing lookout on the top of that tower with the ship doing any rolling must have been one hell of a ride!!
Yay. 50 mins for force Z. Cant complain about that
I loved the video, I felt like I was in the planning room with the admiral. One suggestion i'd bring is that a visualization of the forces on a map would be helpful ⭐
My mother lost a cousin who was on the Prince of Wales, so it's a part of my family's story. When I heard that Chinese firms were stripping his grave for steel I thought "Yeah. That figures. That's the sort of thing that they would do." If it was a Chinese war grave they'd be screaming blue murder.
pay back for the opium wars
wow forgetting the opium wars are we?
HMAS Vampire was a V-class destroyer of the Royal Navy (RN) and Royal Australian Navy (RAN). Launched in 1917.
HMS Tenedos (Pennant number initially FA4 and later H04[1]) was an Admiralty 'S' class destroyer. Laid down on 6 December 1917, she was constructed by Hawthorn Leslie of Tyne, and was completed in 1918.
Looking at the Malaya campaign as a whole, I am amazed how incompetent was the coordination and execution for a nation that had been at war for two years. The RAF failed the RN badly, as they had in the Channel Dash, Crete evacuation. The AA on the ships was abysmal despite being upgraded. The list goes on.
But, the Japanese were rather lucky with that 'hit' on PoW.
There were mistakes made. But your comments are very easy to make in hindsight. For example, the lack off AA. Where would you have taken guns and ammunition away from? To put on x or y ship? Remember, this isn't a computer game. You can't just churn out infinite numbers of weapons. There is a finite amount of everything that can be made. As a result I'm sure you would agree that you have to spread out your weapons and try and focus on where you hope the greatest threat is.
The RAF failing the RN? I don't think so. The channel dash may have been a fiasco. But the RAF didn't fail the RN. They may have failed. But they weren't acting in support of the RN. They were in a defence of the nation role and of course were acting as recon against a sortee (which was expected to be into the Atlantic, not that it mattered on the night in question).
Communication/coordination was actually a strong suit for the British Armed forces. Helped by the global empires communication links and by the streamlining of the 20s and the lead up to war. An obvious example of this on a local level would be the Dowding system. A theatre example would be that which Cunningham was so fortunate to have in the Mediterranean.
Finally. It's important to remember that at this point. It wasn't a holy writ of war that ships had to have air cover. It is now. And it is now precisely [b]because[/b] things like the force z sinking happened. Had aircraft sunk ships? Yes of course. But it wasn't expected that capital ships would be live bait in open ocean without air cover. If anything the fighting in the med had proved that to be true.
You may disagree. But I think that if you consider the situation as it happened. Your interpretation of the events is incorrect
All the best staff cadres were summoned to UK and North Africa...
Bottom line was there was already a war on, fighting two wars at once is difficult.
@@AdamMGTF Trying to separate out the bias of hindsight is always important. Hence my major qualifiers: "campaign as a whole"" and "after two years at war". Even making allowances... and I'm mostly a WW1 guy where excuse-making is an industry... it's hard to accept.
Naval issues: the Med had indeed seemingly proved ships in open ocean were very hard to sink, but major losses were only narrowly avoided (eg, HMS Illustrious) and the RN usually had a torrent of AA fire available, including specialist AA escorts. Force Z not only didn't have enough AA to defend itself, it inflicted minimal loss against attackers in large, slow aircraft that lacked armour or self-sealing tanks. Perhaps training rather than more guns was needed. But the more available option was to have escorts or air better co-ordinated air cover. Obviously, it's not like nobody thought of that, but the problems should have been overcome.
The loss of Force Z as Drach notes denuded the SW Pacific of serious naval assets at a stroke... with the results that played out in subsequent weeks. Given how 'careful' the RN was in the Atlantic in two World Wars to not take risks, the same prudence seems not to have applied (while I accept Phillips had few options but to sail).
Air issues: whatever happened, Force Z was going to be involved in fighting and almost certainly against an equal or better adversary. And the RN had every reason to respect the IJN's ability, not falling to the hubris that affected the other services. A strong air component was going to be needed, especially against any landing force. The lack of enthusiasm to co-ordinate this and see the hypothetical Force Z action as the decisive action of the whole campaign amazes me.
Of course, the RAF/RAAF (we can debate the Channel Dash another time and place, but I strongly disagree with you on it) was probably the most hubris-affected of the services in the theatre, in part a legacy of the years of non-preparation and psychological neglect by Air Vice-Marshal Brooke-Popham. Japanese spies appear to have penetrated the service, and despite the suicidal bravery of many air crew it struggled to perform any of its tasks at all: it could not support the army, it could not inflict serious casualties on air raids against Singapore (despite the Battle of Britain), and it barely contemplated acting with Force Z in providing defence, attack or reconnaissance. Even after Z lot its carrier. The subsequent actions in which Japan swept Allied naval assets from the region were without air support, too, but by then all was chaos.
You may be right and I'm being too harsh and using too much hindsight. Many of the worst Allied failures occurred before the first shots were fired, and almost nobody in any senior role excelled. So I may be wrong to be looking at details. But, a small and poorly-equipped Japanese force utterly humiliated a foe that had time to prepare and a lot of experience. It can't have been entirely bad luck and unforeseeable circumstances.
I've read Force Z needed an aircraft carrier ie. Indomitable but I always thought the only difference that would have made , is that Indomitable would have joined the HMS Repulse and the Prince of Wales at the bottom of South China sea .
I am inclined to think that too. CAPs can be overwhelmed if enough bombers are thrown at it.
Considering the difficulty the Japanese force had with two ships, I'd imagine with three targets they would have similar problems to the pearl harbor attack. That is, too much focus on some targets, not enough on others. Also, a fighter cap from Indomitable would have been able to severely disrupt the first attacks, which means Prince of Wales likely never takes that hit that killed her. Additionally, the tops available to catch any of the ships in pincer attacks with two extra targets to hit would be insufficient to do more than damage the torpedo protection, unless somehow a hit like the first on P of W happened. Conclusion, adding even a light carrier to the group probably means only one ship sunk at most, and a high chance all three escape with damage.
@@sillypuppy5940 Yeah, but bear in mind here these bombers were short on fuel and really only had one chance to make their attack, plus they were attacking piecemeal as they arrived rather than gathering into a single larger force--I think having British aircraft opposing them would have made a pretty significant difference here.
simply no.What would some fighters do to the Bettys and Nells with their fuel mostly consumed ?
It's worth noting that a couple of months later a USN Wildcat CAP utterly smashed an attack by G4Ms against their group. Whether a small group of Fulmars would have done the same I'm not sure, rarely in the Malaya campaign were Allied air assets able to inflict more than token losses on Japanese bombers.
An excellent video, gives a good account of the plans Britain had wanted to carry out if they could and counters the myth that it was the arrogant British thinking two ships was all they needed to stop the Japanese. I have read some older books that are quite hard on Adm. Phillips, and I myself have thought that way too in the past, but I have come to see that given what he knew he mostly acted quite rationaily - the two big failings seem to be his refusual to let Singapore know he was under attack (he belatedly did tbf, albeit requesting destroyers) when radio silence was no longed needed, and some accounts mention him turning the fleet back around to investigate that small merchant ship they saw, wasting precious time.
One element that made the casualties so much higher was that PoW's cinema room was being used as a medbay, and tragically a bomb hit it directly.
Small note but I like how you didn't fall into the trap of saying Indomitable was due to be with them, the only evidence for that claim is one line in Churchill's memoirs as what he wanted to happen.
The arrogance was there though. Admiral Phillips was well known to despise the idea that airpower was nothing more than a joke. Pretty sure there is a quote from an Admiral Somerville confirming Phillips view.
Not absolving Phillips of all blame, he had also spent the entire war thus far in an office job and had no experience of the reality of modern combat - however as Drach points out no capital ship had been sunk by air-power yet, so in his mind his distane for airpower was correct
Perfect timing for me! I'm getting Empire of the Sun when GMT finishes their next print and I wanted to read up on Force Z since they have a mandatory suicide mission if the Japanese take the right steps. This makes things easier!
USS Lexington, Saratoga, and Enterprise would like to remind you that fleet carriers are fast, they are capitol ships, and at least for these three, stationed in the pacific in December of 41.
That being said the work you are doing for naval history makes you a walking world heritage site, or at least a national treasure. Keep it up mate.
Lol, capitol ships, because they were Amercian ones. 🙂
The Royal Navy carriers were fast as well. If I'm not wrong, they were in the mid-30 knots range.
The problem being that carriers were not considered capital ships, despite being such in their actual capability.
Hey Drach. Don't know where you're going in the US on your trip, but I HIGHLY recommend the USS Silversides museum in Muskegon, Michigan. It's an awesome museum with a near fully operational Gato class submarine. It takes about a day to get through everything on site.
"If the first torpedo had hit 50 feet forward..." = exactly the SAME "bad luck" the Bismarck experienced. If the Swordfish' ONLY hit were 50 feet forward, she escapes.
A point relevant to the discussion, to be sure.
I've seen the first 30 minutes of this video about 10 times but I still haven't managed to finish it since I like to watch these videos at bedtime and I always fall asleep before the end.
This is the video most naval history pages need to have as mandatory watching.
Always a pet project of mine. I've been fascinated with Force Z most of my life and have read every book available on the topic. Excellent presentation (as usual) Drach. As with many other wartime topics, so much Monday morning Quarterbacking has been done on this one. The Fog of war, incorrect assumptions and expectations, poor timing and bad luck (for the RN) were all in play in causing this disaster.
The effect of this loss almost toppled Churchill and was felt for a considerable length of time during 1942.
I'm from Kuantan, Malaysia.
I have many comments in regards to the war in the South East Asia but one thing I want to comment based on my opinion is with regards to the placement of the British navy and the troops.
The biggest mistake the British and also with the Dutch was not focusing on Borneo island. Imagine if all the British Navy, Air Force and Army were focused on the island of Borneo, the Japanese won't be able to have a 'Sustained War'. Most of the oil supply for the Japanese were from the Borneo and also from Palembang. If the focus of the defence was at Borneo, the Japanese will lose out in war of attrition. There will be a long sustained 'Guadacanal' type battle in the Borneos with lesser loss of lives and equipments if the British defense was built around the island of Borneo.
At the end of the day, due to the pride of Singapore (Fortress Singapore) and the wrong focus on it, the British lost almost everything in the Pacific.
Excellent point.
So much wrong with this idea. Borneo wasn't the big oil producer, Sumatra was.
Also, Singapore had a history as a massive trade post. This meant that industry, electrical power, communications, trained foreign manpower, shipwrights, a merchant marine... Was already there. The Brits spent a massive amount of money and industry to build a huge naval base capable of serving modern ships... But they would have had to spend oodles more money to build the same thing in Borneo where none of the infrastructure existed.
The Japanese could isolate and starve Borneo by taking control of the islands around it. Singapore, by contrast, had a more secure line of communication across the Indian ocean or south towards Australia.
Also, Borneo is massive. It is actually bigger than Malaya. Why this would end up being a smaller battle than the Malaya campaign is not clear.
@@porksterbob Let's say you are right in oil production, doesn't it means that the Allies have to defend the main resources and built it's defense around it?
Anyway, Palembang is managed by the Royal Dutch Shell, which is part of Netherlands. As for the Brits, their main resources is the island of Borneo, which they managed in proxy. There is where their focus of defense supposed to be.
You are right in saying Borneo is massive. With the massive land mass size, guerrilla warfare and jungle warfare can be waged and it can have better outcome than a warfare in Singapore. Even if you have been to Borneo today, you will learn to respect mother nature. In Borneo, you will have unlimited food supply from the jungle, unlimited water supply and also unrestricted warfare can be easily waged against the occupiers. You will know that the tropical jungle can be extremely unforgiving if you don't know the ways of it. Take for example, many Japanese soldiers in Guadalcanal fell ill due to the tropical illness and diseases. However, with the help of the locals, you can survive the harsh jungle.
@@germ12319 The Brits main resource in their southeast asian colonies is RUBBER. The oil they get from Borneo was a nice to have, but they didn't need it. Nor was it enough for the Japanese. The Japanese want and need the Sumatran oil fields. Attacking Singapore and the British holdings is done for much the same reason that the Japanese attack the Philippines and bomb Pearl Harbor, they want to clear out any viable opposition early.
The British would have to supply Borneo against Japan while being entirely in range of Japanese air power from Indochina and other areas. They would be supplying into an area that doesn't have a massive pre built naval base or dockyards with history of handling half of the commerce of Asia.
The British could have done better on much of their defense, but Borneo isn't really the hinge. If the Japanese were to fail to take Borneo, for example, the British wouldn't be able to do anything with it. Taking the rest of the Dutch east indies would completely isolate the island and all of the necessities for fighting a war... like ammunition, would still need to be shipped from outside.
There is a reason the Malaysian armed forces talk so much about Lt. Adnan. This is because the British had barely raised any local Malaysians as troops by the time of independence so they looked to a rare Malay Lt. There wasn't an infrastructure to turn the local population of Borneo into Commonwealth forces.
One has to think back to Billy Mitchell’s efforts. His theatrics undermined his message, but he was ultimately proved right. Force Z and the loss of the Yamato hammered home that speed and altitude has the advantage over armor.
Just in time for a drach video nice
Best analysis of this incident I have seen. Thank you.
Thanks for the video drach. I remember first reading about this when I was ten and its saddened me ever since. The tragic loss of two fine ships. iirc they knew about the radar for a few days, but only decided to fix it just before they sailed and by then it was two late. I wonder if this would've made a slight difference in the accuracy of the 5.25 guns?
The loss of Prince and Repulse was heartbreaking. They were two beautiful ships.
Good episode. Funny how often the Japanese air attack on Clark Field on December 7 is often compared to Pearl Harbor - utter rubbish of course. The destruction of Force Z from a strategic point of view was in the same league of Pearl. And as Clausewitz reminds us, war is loaded with chance.
May these beautiful behemoths rest in peace.
The channel has helped me understand how truly boned the Royal Navy was by the end of 1941.
Not 'boned', but certainly in the thick of fighting. They had the Kreigsmarine more or less contained, but the Royal Navy still had to fight the Regina Marina and the Imperial Japanese Navy simultaneously, while also protecting convoys that stretched from the western Atlantic to Malta to the Arctic. The loss of Hood, Prince of Wales and Repulse in 1941, as well as the crippling of Queen Elizabeth and Valiant by the Italians, dramatically reduced the Royal Navy's surface fleet. Combined with the mauling of the American surface fleet at Pearl Harbour and the loss of the French surface fleet in 1940, the Allies were in genuine trouble.
That said, it wasn't all doom and gloom. Britain still had plenty of ships of all types, including carriers and fast battleships, and was building more, just like the Americans. They actually sent a rather powerful fleet up to the Indian Ocean shortly thereafter (five battleships and two fleet carriers). The setbacks were shocking, but temporary all the same.
@@Cailus3542 To go from undisputed master of the Seas in 1939, to on the back foot, doth still a boning make.
@@michaelblaszkiewicz7283 Not really. as that implies they were absolutely fucked. The RN was stretching and doing things pretty hard, but it wasn't "boned" anywhere nearly as badly as the Japanese or Germans by late 1944. Even at it's worst point, the RN was accomplishing strategic objectives and was a viable fighting force.
@@DuraLexSedLex Still boned.
@@grahamstrouse1165 Your definitions differ and are silly, but whatever.
Great video, learned lots once again. Very impressed that Repulse managed to dodge so many torpedoes.
I'm supposed to be picking my date up from the station. She can wait.
Lol, correct priorities 🤣
Wise choice 😂
Girls are temporary, history is eternal
Thx much for recounting this portion of history, and in particular the great analysis & insights you provide!
I find it so aggravating that the repulse and the other ships wrecks have been all but destroyed because of scrap scavengers, don’t have any respect for them
Thank you Drachinifel. I love your longer episodes, and watch nearly everything you do.
Rum Ration Wednesday! Drink up me hearties yo ho! Rum Ration is the best thing about Wednesday even with Wednesday being "hump" day. Now let's enjoy listening to the loss of the Repulse and Prince of Wales on our lunch breaks and/or morning/afternoon commutes!
This is an excellent in depth account of loss of force Z .
My grandfather was on the Prince of Wales when Churchill met Roosevelt in August 1941. Churchill
shook hands with the crew and grandad . He was not on the Prince of Wales when it sailed to the Far
East 1941 as he had been given compassionate leave when my uncle Tony was born October 1941 .
Died 1966 before I was born sadly. We have a painting of him, painted by an 83 year old some time
back in the late 70s apparently, from the photograph we have of him. Hugely handsome.
Respects to his service.
Brilliant Drach! Thank you.
Ah yes........Repulse's torpedoebeats.
Could've save her if those torp bombers stay occupied longer with PoW.
They were lucky that it wasn't Russian torpedo bombers from an imaginary Sci-Fi-CV attacking them. 🙂
incredibly well done video honoring some real legends
drachinifel upload 😳
Thanks, this answers a lot of questions and offers explanations I was unaware of until now.
So many times, it was a so-called lucky hit that did "unexpected" damage that crippled a capital ship. I don't see those hits as lucky. The ships are complex and there are many sensitive systems that can be damaged either directly or indirectly by transmitted shock and that potentially compounded by confusion and human error. Hood, Bismark, Prince of Wales, Ark Royal, Graf Spee, etc, etc were all doomed by the lucky it. The lucky hit happened over and over and it is easy to see why. Once in a while, a ship was crippled by such a hit and then was pounded but survived such as the South Dakota but she had resolute help and was also lucky not to be torpedoed. I shudder to think of what will happen to modern ships in heavy combat.
They're lucky because it's not something you can plan and account for as an attacker, and it's down to random chance. Yes most places you can hit on a ship have something important behind them. Not all of those will have something that exacerbates a ship's problems for the moment. Hood, Bismarck, Prince of Wales, etc. all suffered from entirely different "lucky hits" that affected them all differently on the path that led to the loss of the ships that in many cases, wouldn't have led to loss of the other ship.
Hood's was a fluke that hit something that normally wouldn't have been exposed. Had it taken the lucky hits that crippled Bismarck (loss of fuel, damage to rudder, damage to fire control), it wouldn't have doomed her (at least not the same way). The hits that sunk Hood wouldn't have mattered as much for Bismarck (different layout for stowage, armour scheme, etc.)
The sort of damage that crippled South Dakota would have been less effective on a ship that wasn't having major electrical problems and teething issues.
Yes, these are absolutely "lucky" hits. You're just being silly and pedantic.
@@DuraLexSedLex You are just insulting for the sake of making an insult. Such a wonderful character. When crippling damage caused by a single hit is so common that it is a regular occurrence, then by definition we are not talking about luck anymore. It becomes an expected result of being hit. Very few of the hits are aimed to a specific point. They just want to hit anywhere they can and it just so happens that there are many places in which a single hit will do seriously disabling damage.
@@somewhere6 Except there are many instances of ships taking hits where it doesn't result in the dooming of the ship, and it is largely less dramatic. Warspite's beating at Jutland, the massive beatings the High Seas fleet took in general at Jutland, the Graf Spee wasn't even especially damaged by multiple hits, Exeter took a few hits at River Plate but continued fighting until Graf Spee's withdrawal. Multiple hits on ships where half the ship was disabled but the ship was still combat capable (especially in engagements in the pacific)
The things you cite mostly stand out because the ship was lost as a result of that. Damage normally disables something in the ship, yes, but in most cases, the ship can continue to fight or if not fight, withdraw and be repaired. Ships lose bows and return home. Nelson got torpedo'd and needed repairs.
"Lucky hits" that are cited are ones wherein the hit just happens to coincidentally strike in such a way that it does something very good for the other side, without being intended. Hence, "luck"
If the shell from Rodney that took out Bismarck's Fire Control had instead hit a secondary gun and maybe knocked out the part of the secondary battery, it wouldn't be counted nearly as lucky.
Why would the hits PoW or Bismark received which damaged their propellers and rudders be considered 'lucky' in any way? I always considered them the fairly obvious outcome of the situation they were in.
I am not in any way a naval tactician, so take this with a grain of salt, but it seems to me that when a ship is being attacked by torpedo bombers you have three options: do nothing and hope your enemy is too incompetent to make a proper attack run (or accept that you are likely to take multiple hits), turn into the torpedoes, or turn away from them. If your plan relies on the incompetence of the enemy you have bigger problems than those torpedoes and taking multiple hits from torpedoes is not a great plan either regardless of any defenses. Turning into the torpedoes decreases the chance for any spread to open gaps to pass through and reduces your time to react. Turning away gives the greatest chance to avoid any hits but means any hits are most likely to hit your propellers/rudders, which are not protected by armor, so any hits would obviously inflict damage commiserate with a hit to an unprotected area of the ship. Any damage to a propeller is going to slow the ship down and has a chance to damage rudders.
PoW had a further issue when they restarted the shaft and it basically blendered a good portion of the ship. I don't see the initial damage being dooming in and of itself. The additional damage that ensued was from the situation the ship was in which prevented the full scope of the damage to be recognized prior to the more immediate requirement to increase speed. That isn't really a lucky hit; it's good tactics and combat prowess from the Japanese which created that situation. Which is kind of what they were trying to do; put the enemy into situations which create opportunities for your forces to exploit. Isn't that pretty basic combat strategy?
Bismark was doomed regardless of the jammed rudder or damage to the fire control. The British could absolutely not afford to let that ship survive after the loss of Hood so while the damage reduced the ability of Bismark to avoid hits or return fire as effectively as it normally could, I don't see the ship having any other fate than being hunted down and sunk. Putting up a stronger resistance before being sunk is the best it was going to get. If anything the hit which doomed Bismark was the one it fired against Hood. So I guess in a way the one absolutely 'lucky' shot which doomed a ship actually doomed two.
What I would consider the much more rare situation would be a ship getting torpedoed in the stern and NOT suffering some sort of propeller and/or rudder damage. That would be a lucky hit.
Regarding Graf Spee I seriously doubt that any hits that ship took effected the fate of the ship in any meaningful way. As I understand the situation the ship was in, it had engaged in a fight with enemy combat ships and had depleted a large portion of its ammunition which limited any ability for it to engage in any further combat. Additionally, the British now knew exactly where the ship was and then performed a rather impressive bit of subterfuge which convinced the officers that any sort of escape was going to result in a fight which they didn't believe they had enough ammunition to engage in and would have been basically sentencing a large portion of the crew to death. I don't see that changing regardless of the damage the ship had sustained; though I might be overlooking a hit that did materially affect those factors. I would welcome any information that I did overlook or haven't considered, however.
Apologies for the lengthy reply but it's always bothered me that so many people consider a single hit to be the sole determining factor in the loss of a ship in so many cases. Always struck me as ignoring some very critical factors which effect whether a single hit can doom a ship or not. The designers and builders of the ship, the ability of the crew to deal with damage to their ship (not to mention possible support from nearby friendly ships), and the ability/competence of the enemy to exploit that damage are part of a larger situation that the ship is in are the three most important ones I can think of but there are probably others which might be as important or possibly more. Removing the larger situation that a ship is in which is required to make a single hit (excepting the hit that Hood took, which is why I do consider that one to be 'lucky') fatal as opposed to merely one factor which contributed to the ship sinking ignores all of that. Remove the situation and the hit will most likely not be fatal as ships are generally rather hard to sink simply from their design and sailors are generally very good at making sure a single hit isn't going to sink their ship when they only have that one hit and no enemy trying to exploit that damage.
Awesome video. Can you do one on the HMAS Perth and the Battle of Sundra strait?
Phillips was one of the experts on naval airpower. He knew the risks, but also hoped that CAP would protect him. This was one of those "300 years to build a tradition" moments. Cowering while the Japanese landed unopposed would have been a bigger blow to the armour propre than losing the ships.
The crews involved may have thought differently, if the question had been posed to them.
Where did you get "one of the experts on naval airpower"? I've read a bio on Phillips and a career summary and it looked to me like he majored in destroyers and staff work. Getting the Far East command may have been because of his staff work for Churchill (especially his criticism of the first Hood inquiry), but at the time he got it, it looked like a quiet backwater. Brooke-Popham may have been posted as CinC due to the expectation that the primary deterrence in the Far East would be RAF, but they did not transfer more modern planes for a proper air defense.
@@gregorywright4918 Honestly, I don't remember. All I can say is I read it somewhere about fifty years ago.
I chalk this up to the Royal Navy underestimating the capabilities of the Imperial Japanese Navy air arm. Sailing without active fighter cover was foolish in the extreme, it probably wouldn't have made much of a difference in the end but it was still stupid.
no, this was the japanese land air force
EVERYBODY was surprised by how effective the Japanese air arm was against ships in the open ocean. Even the Japanese.
There's a difference between stupid and operating without complete information.
@@Duke_of_Petchington, it was land based IJN aircraft.
@@timgosling6189, true but it's still an unforced error to sail blindly into a prospective engagement without air cover. Force Z sailed from Singapore on reports of Japanese landings. They were seeking to disrupt these operations.
I get it. But seriously I already pay for no commercials. Love what you do. I’m a schmuck so I will continue watching.
A Chinese ship just got caught looting these wrecks
One major problem so many have is they look back with modern knowledge. You have to recall, up to this point major attacks against battleships had been done while they were in port and caught by surprise (Taranto and Pearl Harbor), not underway. The hunt for the Bismarck took the classic approach so many expected. Aircraft damaging the opponents battleship/line allowing your battleships an advantage. The US Navy adapted quickly only because they were forced to do so.
Aircraft were also rapidly changing so capabilities were also increasing fast, The GM3 Nell was introduced in 1935 while the GM4 Betty was put in service in 1941.
I need to play Battlestations: Midway again.
Try War In The Pacific: Admiral's Edition. Complex, but includes major logistics considerations. See if you can save Force Z.
Left work.... put this on.... traffic sucked.... video ended as I put the car in park. Perfection!
God rest the souls of those brave men.