Searle's point about the fundamental mistake in the philosophy of perception is very compelling. We don't see the 'seeing' of the object - we see the object directly. The object stimulates a visual experience in our minds - the 'seeing' - but that experience is something we have, not something we see. When he states the point so plainly, it seems completely obvious.
Ok, no problem. But his response to the argument from illusion/hallucination is that you can make the difference between them but he doesn't give any criterium how, he just says he can while he admitted he never had a hallucination. Here he needs some good argument, which he doesn't provide. If the phenomenal experience is exactly the same how do you differenciate between a veridic experience (where the object you perceive is actually there) and the illusion/hallucination (wher the object you perceive isn't there, according to him you see nothing in this case). Seems to me that this route is impossible to argue for unless you can say something about the apparatus of perception or the ontology altogether. But he doesn't, he just wants the naive realist position without a good argument for direct eprception. This is exactly where big thinkers like Descartes, Hume or Kant etc. understood the skepticism and led them to "crazy" explanations (crazy according to John). I think everybody wants to beleive this naive common sense account of perception but it doesn't work well if you look closely and it's not even that hard to spot the problem.
22:51 "...but it doesn't follow that you don't see the real world" But it does follow that you're not seeing the world as it is, but you're only seeing it as it appears to a creature with a certain sensory apparatus (ie to yourself), right? In other words, you're not seeing it in all the (infinite?) ways that it's possible to see the things.
@Bagpuss Bagpuss Hello. Thanks for the thoughtful and thorough response, sorry about replying so late. Yes, you understand my point well. As for your last sentence: this is my criterion because this includes all aspects of the object that is perceived. I'm not saying it's practically possible to perceive in this detail for any observer, but a perfect knowledge of the observed object must contain this information. Anything that doesn't contain all of this information is NOT a perfect perception of the object, because it leaves out an aspect of the observed object (eg it leaves out what it would be like to look at the observed object from a different distance with different lighting, or hearing how certain sounds echo off of it by listening to the sounds with a certain kind of ear (ie using echolocation), etc). If you perceive an object, what happens is you translate some input into perception (eg lightwaves), and since our senses can process only a small amount of any input (eg the human eye can only detect wavelengths from 380 to 700 nanometers), our perception is incomplete/imperfect. And this is the key idea: a perfect perception of an object must by defintion contain all possible sensory inputs that can be perceived of an observed object because that exhausts all aspects of the observed object. Perception = inputs + sensory organs + brain (these 3 only if materialism is true), and all possible variations of these 3 make up all of the aspects of an observed object. You write "I see my hand before me here and now, yet you say I cannot claim I see my hand unless I also see it in every conceivable way": you CAN see your hand, but it's an incomplete picture of your hand. You see it with your eyes in a certain lighting while being in a waking state, but for example a gorilla would see something else under a different lighting while being in an altered state (eg while being drugged). We all DO see a small aspect of reality, but never the whole of it.
@Bagpuss Bagpuss Hello. :) Thanks for the reply. Yes, I restated my requirement, but in order to get across my point as to why it's the correct standard, even though it's impossible to reach. As I wrote: "And this is the key idea: a perfect perception of an object must by defintion contain all possible sensory inputs that can be perceived of an observed object because that exhausts all aspects of the observed object." In other words, the same object can look flat from one angle and round from another, blue in one lighting and red in another, etc. If you took a picture of it in all possible visual combinations, then all of these pictures would add up to how the object looks like (assuming you had an impossible camera, etc). Think about it this way: which photo album of a person would be more complete: the one that has only 1 photo, or the one that has hundreds of photos from all different angles taken at different times, etc? This is why I'm saying that my impossible standard is the only correct one, because we always agree that the more information you have on something, the more accurate your knowledge on it, and the most accurate knowledge you could have of an object is if you could satisfy my impossible condition. "it requires that any particular observer be observing the universe from no particular point of observation" Nope, this isn't something I wrote. If you don't perceive anything, then there's no input, and input is one of the variables of perception. "you think that seeing the world as it is somehow must exclude seeing it from a point of view" Nope, also not true. I'm saying it must include ALL possible points of view, and not exclude any single one.
@Bagpuss Bagpuss Hello again. Apologies for the long comment, most of it is just quotation from your comments (marked with ">"). > I notice that in your reply to me you have changed the content of your claim. In response to my original reply to your initial comment, you abandoned your original claim, which was supposed to be a criticism of Searle's claim that perception is always from a point of view but that from that fact, that particularity of point of view, "...it doesn't follow that you don't see the real world". And I notice that you deleted your comment, in which you said that I just restated what I initially wrote. Which means I can't have abandoned my original claim, otherwise how could you say that I've restated it? I still have your comment saved in my Gmail (UA-cam sent it there automatically): "In your reply you simply seem to be restating your impossible requirement." > You moved instead to talking about "perfect knowledge", which is a phrase Searle has, to the best of my knowledge, never used in relation to perceptual intentional states or ever claimed it as something that our perceptions give us. I take this shift as an admission that my criticism of your initial claim was correct. You could only defend your requirement that someone claiming perceptual knowledge of the real world has to be "seeing it in all the (infinite?) ways that it's possible to see the things", which was supposedly a criticism of Searle, by abandoning your misplaced (and misplaced because he isn't talking about "perfect knowledge" at all) criticism of what Searle is actually saying, and instead switching to talking about what you yourself think is required for "perfect knowledge". Whether or not Searle has used the phrase "perfect knowledge" in the sense I'm using it is of no interest to me. What interests me is what follows or doesn't follow from Searle's claim. There was also no shift on my part, as I've shown above. > Since my intent in replying was only to show that your criticism of Searle was misplaced and thus fails, and since I have done that and since you seem to be aware that I have done that in virtue of your shift to talking about your own views of "perfect knowledge" rather than anything Searle is claiming, I think there is nothing more for me to say here with regard to this particular issue.. See above. > According to you, unless I have "perfect knowledge" of my hand which I see before me, I'm making only an imperfect knowledge claim, which gives me "incomplete picture of..[my]..hand". Correct. > According to you, in order for me to meet the "correct standard" for a knowledge claim, which is a "perfect knowledge" claim, I must not only in fact see my hand but also see my hand from every logically conceivable point of view, and not only every logically conceivable point of view from which I could see my hand, but every logically conceivable point of view from which every actual creature in the universe could see my hand and from which every logically conceivable but not actual creature could see my hand. Correct. > You freely accept that this standard is not "practically possible" to meet for any particular observer. Correct. > I would say that it is a standard that is not even logically possible to meet for any observer. I can only perceive things from my point of view - it is logically impossible for me even to see things from another human's point of view, that is their point of view not mine still less is it possible for my point of view to be the point of view of a non-existent but logically possible gas-cloud creature logically-possibly inhabiting a far flung galaxy. Partly correct: for a limited being such as you and me, this is practically impossible, but it would be logically possible for an omnipotent or omniscient being to perceive an object from all of its aspects. I'm not claiming that there is such a being, but it would be logically possible for it to do so, if it exists. Perhaps I should've written earlier that I was talking about flesh and bone creatures only. You're also confusing practically possible with logically possible: it would be practically impossible for you to view the world from my eyes, but that doesn't mean that it's logically so. It is logically possible for a being to perceive the aspects of an object which you and I perceive, thereby gaining the exact same knowledge that you and I gain separately. I've checked the video again, and Searle puts it very clearly here: 26:30-27:32 : in other words, all of "the features of the object and the character of the experience" constitute what an object looks like. The totality of its potential to generate sensory inputs ("the features of the object"), + sensory organs + brain (assuming there's no immaterial soul). This is what I'm talking about. > Your standard thus embodies a self-contradiction. Incorrect, see above. > Noticeably, there is no reason you give to justify this claim that it is the "correct standard" except that any particular "imperfect" perceptual knowledge claim will be inconsistent, or perhaps merely different, with/from a different claim being made by a different observer or a different claim made by the same observer under different perceptual conditions. Referring back to your own example, right now my hand looks like this to me but right now to a gorilla across the room from me, under different lighting my hand looks different. However I do not see, and you do not say why, this involves any inconsistency or mere difference such that it would undermine a genuine knowledge claim. This might be a source of our misunderstanding. I'm not claiming that only my perfect standard provides knowledge of the world, but only that it provides all possible knowledge of the world. Clearly certain practically possible standards are also acceptable, and there are degrees of accuracy even between those (eg if I look at large triangle from a moving car, it may look blurred, even though it has straight edges). > Assuming that neither of us are having hallucinations of any kind, and assuming the gorilla could speak or use sign language to communicate its perceptual knowledge, these perceptual knowledge claims are both true and correct and totally consistent with each other even though different: I say "my hand looks like this to me" and the gorilla says "his hand looks like this to me". I can make the same kind of refutation regarding situations of the same observer making different perceptual knowledge claims under different perceptual conditions. Nothing here supports your "correct standard" claim. What supports my standard is the fact that neither of you see all aspects of your hand, as I've shown above. > You say "my impossible standard is the only correct one" but since the impossibility is both practical and logical, and since the standard is anyway actually irrelevant to veridical knowledge claims, it cannot be so. Perhaps I should've been as specific there as I was everywhere else (except for 1 sentence, see below) where I was talking about my standard. At all other points I wrote that it's the "perfect" one: * "but a perfect knowledge of the observed object must contain this information. Anything that doesn't contain all of this information is NOT a perfect perception of the object, because it leaves out an aspect of the observed object" * "a perfect perception of an object must by defintion contain all possible sensory inputs that can be perceived of an observed object because that exhausts all aspects of the observed object" * "We all DO see a small aspect of reality, but never the whole of it." Here I explictly say that when you see your hand, you do get a somewhat accurate picture, but it's imperfect: "you CAN see your hand, but it's an incomplete picture of your hand" Here I also should've written "perfect" standard instead of "correct": "in order to get across my point as to why it's the correct standard," but from the other explicit statements one can clearly see that I consider other standards correct as well (some more than others), and mine as the perfect one. In fact, you've just proven that you DO know that I'm talking about perfect knowledge: "According to you, in order for me to meet the "correct standard" for a knowledge claim, which is a "perfect knowledge" claim, " > Thanks for the instructive and enjoyable interaction. I'd like to thank you as well, I also enjoyed it. :) Although I'm not sure in what way you mean instructive. I'd gladly read your response, but depending on its length and the time I have available, I may not be able to respond to it in length (I'd try to give at least a short response, that I can promise). Reading your comments, reflecting on them, and writing this response took me over an hour, and I don't always have that time available. Out of curiosity: did you study Philosophy at an institution, or are you also just studying it as a hobby? Have a nice day.
@Bagpuss Bagpuss Hello again. Yes, your replies are long enough, but now I try to change things up and write a shorter reply. :) I think I've found a way to cut the Gordian Knot, I'm interested to know what you think. Imagine looking at a rose with your naked eye. Now imagine putting on sunglasses, and then looking at the rose. Now imagine touching the rose. Now imagine repeating all 3 actions while in an altered state of consciousness. In all 6 cases, the imagine in your mind of the rose would be different. If we repeated the same process but with a different object (eg a tulip), the image would be different again, but not just because of changes in your sensory apparatus and brain, but because of changes in the observed object (a rose in the first case, and a tulip in the second case). The difference between the two objects is what kinds of sensory information they provide, and the difference between the 6 methods is how they process sensory information (6 methods because sight with naked eye, sight with sunglasses, and touch in a normal state of consciousness, and these 3 repeated while being high: so a change in the senses and brain processes). The perfect image of an object contains all possible ways that an image of it can be formed in the mind of an observer. Let's stop here for a moment. Is there anything here that you disagree with? Have a nice day.
@Bagpuss Bagpuss Hi. I'm not sure if UA-cam showed my last reply, but I'm pasting it here, but first: as for what you say about the logical impossibility of perceiving an object from all points of view, what I mean by that is perceiving everything that can be perceived about it. So everything that your and my sensory apparatus can perceive about it, as well as the sensory apparatus of every other logically conceivable being. It's like taking a picture from all different angles and distances, under all possible lightings with all possible types of lenses etc. The totality of all those pictures would make up all the visual experiences. Now you do the same for the other senses. For some reason you didn't understand this point, but hopefully now you do. Imagine looking at a rose with your naked eye. Now imagine putting on sunglasses, and then looking at the rose. Now imagine touching the rose. Now imagine repeating all 3 actions while in an altered state of consciousness. In all 6 cases, the imagine in your mind of the rose would be different. If we repeated the same process but with a different object (eg a tulip), the image would be different again, but not just because of changes in your sensory apparatus and brain, but because of changes in the observed object (a rose in the first case, and a tulip in the second case). The difference between the two objects is what kinds of sensory information they provide, and the difference between the 6 methods is how they process sensory information (6 methods because sight with naked eye, sight with sunglasses, and touch in a normal state of consciousness, and these 3 repeated while being high: so a change in the senses and brain processes). The perfect image of an object contains all possible ways that an image of it can be formed in the mind of an observer. Let's stop here for a moment. Is there anything here that you disagree with? Have a nice day.
21:38 How do you differenciate it!? What's the criteria? That you think you can tell it apart? That's not a very good argument to me or to thinkers that took the "crazy" routes to explain perception. Until we have no criteria to tell apart veridic for illusory or hallkucinated phenomenal experiences, naive realism has no ground. Common sense is not an argument unfortunately.
I don’t understand Searle’s account that that we can know we are having a visual experience of something that exists outside ourselves and the visual experience is not just what happens in the brain. If we know the exact physical processes in the brain that occur when looking at a desk, theoretically then same physical processes could be manipulated to occur with no desk out there and by definition they are equivalent with no way to tell which visual experience included actually looking at a desk. I think he said, “we can tell” and wish the interviewer asked how. Assuming he meant something else since it seems obvious.
Thank you very much for a great conversation on intentionality ; Experience, Conscience, colour and perception. Prof John Searle.
Searle's point about the fundamental mistake in the philosophy of perception is very compelling. We don't see the 'seeing' of the object - we see the object directly. The object stimulates a visual experience in our minds - the 'seeing' - but that experience is something we have, not something we see. When he states the point so plainly, it seems completely obvious.
Humans see a totality of state of affairs associated with the objects.
@@yohanj5239 Whoa there, why don't you buy me dinner first and we'll take it from there
Ok, no problem. But his response to the argument from illusion/hallucination is that you can make the difference between them but he doesn't give any criterium how, he just says he can while he admitted he never had a hallucination. Here he needs some good argument, which he doesn't provide. If the phenomenal experience is exactly the same how do you differenciate between a veridic experience (where the object you perceive is actually there) and the illusion/hallucination (wher the object you perceive isn't there, according to him you see nothing in this case). Seems to me that this route is impossible to argue for unless you can say something about the apparatus of perception or the ontology altogether. But he doesn't, he just wants the naive realist position without a good argument for direct eprception. This is exactly where big thinkers like Descartes, Hume or Kant etc. understood the skepticism and led them to "crazy" explanations (crazy according to John). I think everybody wants to beleive this naive common sense account of perception but it doesn't work well if you look closely and it's not even that hard to spot the problem.
Obviously false lol
You're asking excellent questions, I'm listening to this interveiw a second time now because it's so good. Thank you! :)
Brilliant. Thank you so much!
great interview, and interviewing!
Thank you for all of your videos!
22:51 "...but it doesn't follow that you don't see the real world" But it does follow that you're not seeing the world as it is, but you're only seeing it as it appears to a creature with a certain sensory apparatus (ie to yourself), right? In other words, you're not seeing it in all the (infinite?) ways that it's possible to see the things.
@Bagpuss Bagpuss Hello. Thanks for the thoughtful and thorough response, sorry about replying so late. Yes, you understand my point well. As for your last sentence: this is my criterion because this includes all aspects of the object that is perceived. I'm not saying it's practically possible to perceive in this detail for any observer, but a perfect knowledge of the observed object must contain this information. Anything that doesn't contain all of this information is NOT a perfect perception of the object, because it leaves out an aspect of the observed object (eg it leaves out what it would be like to look at the observed object from a different distance with different lighting, or hearing how certain sounds echo off of it by listening to the sounds with a certain kind of ear (ie using echolocation), etc). If you perceive an object, what happens is you translate some input into perception (eg lightwaves), and since our senses can process only a small amount of any input (eg the human eye can only detect wavelengths from 380 to 700 nanometers), our perception is incomplete/imperfect.
And this is the key idea: a perfect perception of an object must by defintion contain all possible sensory inputs that can be perceived of an observed object because that exhausts all aspects of the observed object. Perception = inputs + sensory organs + brain (these 3 only if materialism is true), and all possible variations of these 3 make up all of the aspects of an observed object.
You write "I see my hand before me here and now, yet you say I cannot claim I see my hand unless I also see it in every conceivable way": you CAN see your hand, but it's an incomplete picture of your hand. You see it with your eyes in a certain lighting while being in a waking state, but for example a gorilla would see something else under a different lighting while being in an altered state (eg while being drugged). We all DO see a small aspect of reality, but never the whole of it.
@Bagpuss Bagpuss Hello. :) Thanks for the reply. Yes, I restated my requirement, but in order to get across my point as to why it's the correct standard, even though it's impossible to reach. As I wrote: "And this is the key idea: a perfect perception of an object must by defintion contain all possible sensory inputs that can be perceived of an observed object because that exhausts all aspects of the observed object."
In other words, the same object can look flat from one angle and round from another, blue in one lighting and red in another, etc. If you took a picture of it in all possible visual combinations, then all of these pictures would add up to how the object looks like (assuming you had an impossible camera, etc). Think about it this way: which photo album of a person would be more complete: the one that has only 1 photo, or the one that has hundreds of photos from all different angles taken at different times, etc? This is why I'm saying that my impossible standard is the only correct one, because we always agree that the more information you have on something, the more accurate your knowledge on it, and the most accurate knowledge you could have of an object is if you could satisfy my impossible condition.
"it requires that any particular observer be observing the universe from no particular point of observation" Nope, this isn't something I wrote. If you don't perceive anything, then there's no input, and input is one of the variables of perception.
"you think that seeing the world as it is somehow must exclude seeing it from a point of view" Nope, also not true. I'm saying it must include ALL possible points of view, and not exclude any single one.
@Bagpuss Bagpuss
Hello again. Apologies for the long comment, most of it is just quotation from your comments (marked with ">").
> I notice that in your reply to me you have changed the content of your claim. In response to my original reply to your initial comment, you abandoned your original claim, which was supposed to be a criticism of Searle's claim that perception is always from a point of view but that from that fact, that particularity of point of view, "...it doesn't follow that you don't see the real world".
And I notice that you deleted your comment, in which you said that I just restated what I initially wrote. Which means I can't have abandoned my original claim, otherwise how could you say that I've restated it? I still have your comment saved in my Gmail (UA-cam sent it there automatically): "In your reply you simply seem to be restating your impossible requirement."
> You moved instead to talking about "perfect knowledge", which is a phrase Searle has, to the best of my knowledge, never used in relation to perceptual intentional states or ever claimed it as something that our perceptions give us. I take this shift as an admission that my criticism of your initial claim was correct. You could only defend your requirement that someone claiming perceptual knowledge of the real world has to be "seeing it in all the (infinite?) ways that it's possible to see the things", which was supposedly a criticism of Searle, by abandoning your misplaced (and misplaced because he isn't talking about "perfect knowledge" at all) criticism of what Searle is actually saying, and instead switching to talking about what you yourself think is required for "perfect knowledge".
Whether or not Searle has used the phrase "perfect knowledge" in the sense I'm using it is of no interest to me. What interests me is what follows or doesn't follow from Searle's claim. There was also no shift on my part, as I've shown above.
> Since my intent in replying was only to show that your criticism of Searle was misplaced and thus fails, and since I have done that and since you seem to be aware that I have done that in virtue of your shift to talking about your own views of "perfect knowledge" rather than anything Searle is claiming, I think there is nothing more for me to say here with regard to this particular issue..
See above.
> According to you, unless I have "perfect knowledge" of my hand which I see before me, I'm making only an imperfect knowledge claim, which gives me "incomplete picture of..[my]..hand".
Correct.
> According to you, in order for me to meet the "correct standard" for a knowledge claim, which is a "perfect knowledge" claim, I must not only in fact see my hand but also see my hand from every logically conceivable point of view, and not only every logically conceivable point of view from which I could see my hand, but every logically conceivable point of view from which every actual creature in the universe could see my hand and from which every logically conceivable but not actual creature could see my hand.
Correct.
> You freely accept that this standard is not "practically possible" to meet for any particular observer.
Correct.
> I would say that it is a standard that is not even logically possible to meet for any observer. I can only perceive things from my point of view - it is logically impossible for me even to see things from another human's point of view, that is their point of view not mine still less is it possible for my point of view to be the point of view of a non-existent but logically possible gas-cloud creature logically-possibly inhabiting a far flung galaxy.
Partly correct: for a limited being such as you and me, this is practically impossible, but it would be logically possible for an omnipotent or omniscient being to perceive an object from all of its aspects. I'm not claiming that there is such a being, but it would be logically possible for it to do so, if it exists. Perhaps I should've written earlier that I was talking about flesh and bone creatures only. You're also confusing practically possible with logically possible: it would be practically impossible for you to view the world from my eyes, but that doesn't mean that it's logically so. It is logically possible for a being to perceive the aspects of an object which you and I perceive, thereby gaining the exact same knowledge that you and I gain separately.
I've checked the video again, and Searle puts it very clearly here: 26:30-27:32 : in other words, all of "the features of the object and the character of the experience" constitute what an object looks like. The totality of its potential to generate sensory inputs ("the features of the object"), + sensory organs + brain (assuming there's no immaterial soul). This is what I'm talking about.
> Your standard thus embodies a self-contradiction.
Incorrect, see above.
> Noticeably, there is no reason you give to justify this claim that it is the "correct standard" except that any particular "imperfect" perceptual knowledge claim will be inconsistent, or perhaps merely different, with/from a different claim being made by a different observer or a different claim made by the same observer under different perceptual conditions. Referring back to your own example, right now my hand looks like this to me but right now to a gorilla across the room from me, under different lighting my hand looks different. However I do not see, and you do not say why, this involves any inconsistency or mere difference such that it would undermine a genuine knowledge claim.
This might be a source of our misunderstanding. I'm not claiming that only my perfect standard provides knowledge of the world, but only that it provides all possible knowledge of the world. Clearly certain practically possible standards are also acceptable, and there are degrees of accuracy even between those (eg if I look at large triangle from a moving car, it may look blurred, even though it has straight edges).
> Assuming that neither of us are having hallucinations of any kind, and assuming the gorilla could speak or use sign language to communicate its perceptual knowledge, these perceptual knowledge claims are both true and correct and totally consistent with each other even though different: I say "my hand looks like this to me" and the gorilla says "his hand looks like this to me". I can make the same kind of refutation regarding situations of the same observer making different perceptual knowledge claims under different perceptual conditions. Nothing here supports your "correct standard" claim.
What supports my standard is the fact that neither of you see all aspects of your hand, as I've shown above.
> You say "my impossible standard is the only correct one" but since the impossibility is both practical and logical, and since the standard is anyway actually irrelevant to veridical knowledge claims, it cannot be so.
Perhaps I should've been as specific there as I was everywhere else (except for 1 sentence, see below) where I was talking about my standard. At all other points I wrote that it's the "perfect" one:
* "but a perfect knowledge of the observed object must contain this information. Anything that doesn't contain all of this information is NOT a perfect perception of the object, because it leaves out an aspect of the observed object"
* "a perfect perception of an object must by defintion contain all possible sensory inputs that can be perceived of an observed object because that exhausts all aspects of the observed object"
* "We all DO see a small aspect of reality, but never the whole of it."
Here I explictly say that when you see your hand, you do get a somewhat accurate picture, but it's imperfect: "you CAN see your hand, but it's an incomplete picture of your hand"
Here I also should've written "perfect" standard instead of "correct": "in order to get across my point as to why it's the correct standard," but from the other explicit statements one can clearly see that I consider other standards correct as well (some more than others), and mine as the perfect one. In fact, you've just proven that you DO know that I'm talking about perfect knowledge: "According to you, in order for me to meet the "correct standard" for a knowledge claim, which is a "perfect knowledge" claim, "
> Thanks for the instructive and enjoyable interaction.
I'd like to thank you as well, I also enjoyed it. :) Although I'm not sure in what way you mean instructive. I'd gladly read your response, but depending on its length and the time I have available, I may not be able to respond to it in length (I'd try to give at least a short response, that I can promise). Reading your comments, reflecting on them, and writing this response took me over an hour, and I don't always have that time available.
Out of curiosity: did you study Philosophy at an institution, or are you also just studying it as a hobby?
Have a nice day.
@Bagpuss Bagpuss
Hello again.
Yes, your replies are long enough, but now I try to change things up and write a shorter reply. :) I think I've found a way to cut the Gordian Knot, I'm interested to know what you think.
Imagine looking at a rose with your naked eye. Now imagine putting on sunglasses, and then looking at the rose. Now imagine touching the rose. Now imagine repeating all 3 actions while in an altered state of consciousness. In all 6 cases, the imagine in your mind of the rose would be different. If we repeated the same process but with a different object (eg a tulip), the image would be different again, but not just because of changes in your sensory apparatus and brain, but because of changes in the observed object (a rose in the first case, and a tulip in the second case). The difference between the two objects is what kinds of sensory information they provide, and the difference between the 6 methods is how they process sensory information (6 methods because sight with naked eye, sight with sunglasses, and touch in a normal state of consciousness, and these 3 repeated while being high: so a change in the senses and brain processes). The perfect image of an object contains all possible ways that an image of it can be formed in the mind of an observer.
Let's stop here for a moment. Is there anything here that you disagree with?
Have a nice day.
@Bagpuss Bagpuss
Hi. I'm not sure if UA-cam showed my last reply, but I'm pasting it here, but first: as for what you say about the logical impossibility of perceiving an object from all points of view, what I mean by that is perceiving everything that can be perceived about it. So everything that your and my sensory apparatus can perceive about it, as well as the sensory apparatus of every other logically conceivable being. It's like taking a picture from all different angles and distances, under all possible lightings with all possible types of lenses etc. The totality of all those pictures would make up all the visual experiences. Now you do the same for the other senses. For some reason you didn't understand this point, but hopefully now you do.
Imagine looking at a rose with your naked eye. Now imagine putting on sunglasses, and then looking at the rose. Now imagine touching the rose. Now imagine repeating all 3 actions while in an altered state of consciousness. In all 6 cases, the imagine in your mind of the rose would be different. If we repeated the same process but with a different object (eg a tulip), the image would be different again, but not just because of changes in your sensory apparatus and brain, but because of changes in the observed object (a rose in the first case, and a tulip in the second case). The difference between the two objects is what kinds of sensory information they provide, and the difference between the 6 methods is how they process sensory information (6 methods because sight with naked eye, sight with sunglasses, and touch in a normal state of consciousness, and these 3 repeated while being high: so a change in the senses and brain processes). The perfect image of an object contains all possible ways that an image of it can be formed in the mind of an observer.
Let's stop here for a moment. Is there anything here that you disagree with?
Have a nice day.
At 12:10 -- "You can't see the seer" -- that's Derrida
21:38 How do you differenciate it!? What's the criteria? That you think you can tell it apart? That's not a very good argument to me or to thinkers that took the "crazy" routes to explain perception. Until we have no criteria to tell apart veridic for illusory or hallkucinated phenomenal experiences, naive realism has no ground. Common sense is not an argument unfortunately.
Acting. Acting on hallucinations has very different consequences than acting on realities. Won't digress here on causation though😊
I don’t understand Searle’s account that that we can know we are having a visual experience of something that exists outside ourselves and the visual experience is not just what happens in the brain. If we know the exact physical processes in the brain that occur when looking at a desk, theoretically then same physical processes could be manipulated to occur with no desk out there and by definition they are equivalent with no way to tell which visual experience included actually looking at a desk. I think he said, “we can tell” and wish the interviewer asked how. Assuming he meant something else since it seems obvious.
he is a genius
Thanks for this. Very interesting!
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Almost all philosophy is nothing more than mental masturbation, and that would be funny if it didn't produce so much harm.
Lol. There hasn't been ever anything more harmful to any society than anti-intellectualism.