As an American, the story of Yorktown, from being damaged at Coral Sea, moving heaven and Earth to patch her up in time to meet her fate at Midway, and all the damage she took along the way, is one of the greatest examples of competence, ingenuity, and bravery in our history. Their efforts spared Enterprise and Hornet any damage at Midway. To the crew of Yorktown, thank you gentlemen.
As an American, as a son of a Vietnam veteran, who joined, not drafted, I find your sentiment heartwarming and yet useless. I would not exist if my mom and dad had not met in D.C. in '68, and yet I have gotten nothing from it other than hardship. My dad joined and got screwed, and screwed himself, aren't we all human, my mom was there on her own, working for the government, trying to get away from being the oldest of 13 children (catholic). I find your sentiment simplistic. I still suffer from the aftermath of that American war. Pride has no place with survival. The sooner the following generations understand that, the better.
@@DrAlexClarke I didn't say it was going to be unjustified ranting. I've barely started the vid, but damage control is bad enough without quite the amount of extra ways on carriers for things to get "exciting" even during "normal" accidents even without accounting for enemy action. It's almost a surprise that no one had anything go catastrophically wrong leading to the loss of a ship even before the war.
Been by a former carrier sailor, I can say that one of the most important elements of effective damage control is…TRAINING. In the U.S. Navy, even U.S. Airedales were required to attend aviation firefighting school prior to every operational tour. I went through it three times, and although it wasn’t what I’d call “fun”, it was necessary. Fire is the biggest danger aboard a carrier, and history has demonstrated in lost lives the importance of training. In boot camp we all watched, “Ordeal by Fire” ( USS Forrestal fire ). As you pointed out “we” ( carrier sailors ) have had to learn and re-learn many difficult lessons.
I think a big contributor in the USN, the “up or out” policy ( high-year tenure ). You loose the corporate knowledge of experienced sailors because they didn’t play the “promotion lottery” very well. I had to retire at 20-years, even though I had numerous qualifications and was an instructor. In an aside, I’d also say the development of centralized damage control was crucial during WW2. The USN called it, “Central Station” ( now Damage Control Central ). On a SS carrier central station is manned by LCDR during GQ. The ship had extensive casualty repair equipment, shoring, repair lockers, AFFF stations, sound-powered phones. And, most importantly, “repair lockers” manned by highly trained damage control teams. The U.S. has suffered 4 catastrophic fires since WW2 on carriers, and only demonstrates that your seconds away from a major conflagration if even the most simple mistake or oversight by just one poorly trained or careless sailor is made. Any thoughts on the BHR in San Diego? WHAT A FIASCO!!! IMHO…
The fact is the USN has an active DC party in WWII especially for their carriers, but in the 1960s when conflicts were low intensity, especially in Vietnam, the fires on board Forrestal showed how the USN went into more of passive DC, especially there's only few or specialized DC trained personnel, that is why the fires are so hard to extinguish when most of DC crews were dead in the initial explosion, resulting in catastrophic structural damage to the carrier. After the Forrestal fire the US went back to training ALL of the crew to understand or react to damage and fires on the ship.
I’m not certain how much the USN learned from the loss of Lexington at Coral Sea, but reams of manuals were filled with what was learned from the saving of Yorktown during the same action, and the near-saving of her at Midway. Enterprise benefitted greatly from her sister’s experiences.
One key thing the US learned after Coral Sea was draining aircraft fuel lines and pressuring them with inert gas. The suggestion for which came from a junior enlisted sailor.
One idea for damage prevention. Came from LtCdr Elias B “Benny” Mott. Who was gunnery officer on Enterprise. He advocated for more Oerlikons on Enterprise. Up to removing the belt armour to free up the weight.
The Dean of the Episcopal Cathedral I attended in my younger days was the Chaplain on the Wasp and was with Captain Sherman and the last group of officers to abandon ship, once it had been confirmed that all possible wounded and other crew were off. He was then assigned to the West Virginia and was discharged in 1946 with the rank of Captain. He also received the Bronze Star and the Purple Heart.
That was an absolutely fascinating discussion. 3 1/2 hours, to be honest it didn't seem quite long enough to me. I probably need to seek help for my World War II addiction.
Finally finished this (boy it's been a couple of days for me). One thing this really reinforced for me is how what sets the USN and RN apart is that both have significant learning cultures in WW2. Expecting to go into war with everything figured out seems like folly, but being able to sustain learning experiences and adapt is essential.
I play him at 1.75 speed about 2 hours. His material is good but he has a habit of going too slow at times and repeating himself on points too much. He has put me asleep a few times and I love history.
@@charlesmaurer6214 I put the long format videos on when I'm doing an epic baking session. Delicious food smells and English accents talking about war are a fixture in my house.
@@TrickiVicBB71 He needs an editor and perhaps needs to prepare better with a script that is cleaned up rather than rambling on. Smart guy but needs to work on his presentation.
The worst wrongs are certainly Courageous being doing the job of a small expendable escort carrier and Glorious being lax in a combat area and intelligence not being shared to the fleet commanders. Not putting units in harms way when the risk doesn't match the need is the best form of Damage control. But also some much prewar experience is lost with those ships.
Really enjoyed this video, thank you. Idea for a future series: Damage control in the [insert period - Age of Sail - Ironcled age - ww1 - ww2 - post war] - it could show the development in theory and technique (both doctrine and equipment with which to carry it out) as time progressed.
I don't think anyone else agrees w me but carriers are actually support ships. They support the task force. Yes they have offensive assets, but in terms of scouting, fighter cover, amphibious protection, they are a support asset for the rest of the task force. Even today there is a mutual protection scheme at work. Does the task force exsist to protect the carrier allowing it to punch, or does the carrier exsist to cover the taskforce allowing it to punch
Americans did go with electric engine designs from the New Mexico class until the Colorado class. They also used this system in Destroyer escorts. Even the elderly USS Langley was a turbo electric drive. The USS Lexington class was also Turbo electric driven. The pro was better subdivision and easier maintenance. The con was weight penalties and cost as well as them using too much internal space compared to traditional steam turbines.
BZ Dr. Clarke. Wow, this was a marathon session. I'd try to answer your question about the widespread adoption of electric drive, but it would turn into a shameless plug for my own work. 🙂 I will say that the fact that many navies are adopting it now (albeit as much due to massively increased electrical loads from other systems as for propulsion redundancy) speaks volumes about the desirability of the concept.
A long while ago a submariner patiently explained to big mouthed me why it was sensible to call out a washing machine mechanic to fix the London Big Eye.
It would be very interesting to compare and contrast Illustrious with Franklin. Based on the evidence, the British carriers ability to take a beating and continue to operate is much better than the USN. Obviously, lots of factors in play; armored flight decks vs. armored hangar deck being a big factor from my limited knowledge.
I think the Yorktown got so much attention given to her half because they expected to not have to waste torpedoes on her and half because the US really could use a good story of fighting a ship to the absolute last and never giving up at about that point of the war. So it's somewhat sunk cost fallacy and somewhat that everyone involved wanted to believe that they were in a navy that just would not give up badly enough that nobody decided to give up on the ship. Honestly, I'm not surprised that the navy that has "don't give up the ship" as part of its founding myth tends to take damage control with the same unwillingness to back down when there's something big at stake as destroyer captains tend to have.
I'll have many, just off to Scandinavia with him on the ScandiShip trip www.ship-shape.org.uk/ And we have series of us chatting with Jamie Seidel, our third musketeer from Bilgepumps, from ages ago (this is part 1 of 3) ua-cam.com/video/RYWtmQ3dVRw/v-deo.html
Yes, all true...and this also indicates the wisdom imparted by Admiral Moffett to institute his 1920s rule (later becoming mandated by federal legislation that became effective in 1927) that all aircraft carrier commanding officers must be either a trained Naval Observer or Naval Aviator before taking command of a carrier. Future Admiral Ernest J. King was among the first class mandated to take Naval Aviator training in 1926-27, in order to command USS Wright followed by USS Lexington. The degree that the USN held on to its crippled carriers long after they had been knocked permanently out of the war (not necessarily sunk--Yorktown was, but Franklin and Bunker Hill effectively became deadweight after their dates with destiny) might have reflected King's volcanic temper, who seems to have hit the ceiling in Norfolk upon learning that his former command had sunk in the Coral Sea...did he perhaps believe Admiral Aubrey Fitch (who, like King, was a Johnny-come-lately who had earned his naval aviator wings in 1929) hadn't done enough to save Lexington, such as order the Australian vessels attached to Fletcher's force to tow the flaming hulk into Sydney instead? This might also explain why Fitch was sent to uselessly take command of Saratoga's task force after Coral Sea, rather than permit Fletcher to take along the excellent Coral Sea OTC (officer in tactical command)... The Royal Navy obviously couldn't adopt the USN carrier commander policy during the interwar years, due to RAF control of the FAA until 1939, but not adopting a similar policy even after the war began might have cost the British carriers. American carrier commanders had been forced since Saratoga and Lexington had been commissioned in 1927 to go through extensive, formal education before taking command of a carrier...either the new skipper was a long-time naval aviator like John Towers, George Murray or Marc Mitscher and thus had to be taught ship command vs aircraft command (including the specifics of carriers having high metecentric heights)...or surface officers had to go through extensive naval aviator training (eventually it became frowned upon for selected carrier commanders to not have earned their naval aviator wings) and the Johnny-come-latelys were also grilled on carrier differences and specifications as the 40-something or 50-something officers underwent grueling flight training. This system worked brilliantly--Yorktown's Captain Buckmaster earned his wings at age 47 while Admirals Halsey and McCain earned theirs at age 52 and served as distiguished carrier captains and carrier task force commanders...
On your point on the RN, let's consider this in 1939, when they are setting up their own training programs and getting things organised, they are rapidly expanding the fleet, you want to take a dozen or so senior captains out of operational rotation for months, take a dozen or so pilot/observer training slots and that's going to improve things how? The problem for the USN was air minded naval officers which that program solved, the problem for the RN in 1939 was they were very air minded but it was the difference in damage control - and I'm not sure how months of being trained to be an aviator is going to help with aircaft carrier damage control: as I said in the video they needed a damage control course with lots of demonstrations, about a week or so at most, before they take command to visually imprint on them that a carrier is different. Being trained as an aviator is not going to help in ridding you of the mantra inscribed in your soul by every other ship in the fleet you have served in/commanded for 20+ years that when it comes to damage control, that the enemy lets in water not you, because only the carriers of this period had the metecentric height to make that necessary. The program you describe would have been useful in 1920s & 1930s to strengthen understanding of aviation in the fleet, but in 1939, thanks to the work of Admiral Henderson, that was pretty darn good. However, whilst they had done the testing, had the doctrine/operational methods & even built the ships in such a way they could be relatively easily counter flooded - they lost the core of the generation of officers they'd innoculated with that, with the loss of Courageous & Glorious, they spend much of the rest of the war catching up on that, getting there broadly speaking by 1942. Hope that answers your question.
@DrAlexClarke I was thinking more from a holistic approach--aircraft carriers were (and remain) such different combatants than other surface ships, extensive formalized training clearly was needed prior to an officer who had never commanded a carrier before taking command--this extends both to aviators having no experience with shiphandling, ship management AND shipboard damage control of any kind (think John Towers and Marc Mitscher when they were promoted to O-6); and surface officers with no experience with aviation operations, let alone carrier-specific damage control (think Ernest J. King, Kelly Turner, Bill Halsey, John "Slew" McCain and Elliot Buckmaster). Let's approach this from the reverse course--would a naval aviator make a good destroyer skipper without extensive retraining? Here too is not a hypothetical--Donald Macintyre, RN started out in destroyers before becoming a naval aviator in 1928 and serving aboard numerous British carriers before a flight injury in 1935 forced him to return to destroyers. Was Macintyre simply so capable, filled with natural ability that he became one of the top RN sub hunters during the Second World War, including capturing top-scoring U-boat CO Otto Kreschmer...or was the naval aviator Macintyre taught this at HMS Osprey as the British antisubmarine school was coming under the influence of Frederic John Walker? Scratch the thought that British carrier captains could only become well-rounded aviation officers after the 1939 hand-off of the FAA from the RAF to the RN...Macintyre remained a Royal Navy officer his entire career, indicating other Royal Navy officers could have become Johnny-come-latelys like King, Halsey, McCain and Buckmaster in the 1920s and 1930s...they just, bizarrely, decided against offering or ordering others to follow the Macintyre career path. Seems likely the path was not permitted for senior officers, as Denis Boyd (Illustrious' first CO) likely would have jumped at the chance, having applied for pilot training at Eastchurch in 1911 (and being denied). The interconnected nature of the interwar FAA was a remains confounding, however. Describing the Fairey Albacore as an expression of Royal Navy strike doctrine is only true because the FAA was turned over to the RN the year after the Albacore and Bristol Beaufort first flew. The fact that the RAF was just as eager to equip Coastal Command with deadly Bristol torpedo bombers as the RN was to put Fairey equivalents on British carriers was what made British anti-shipping night strike capability a possibility, as Bomber Command developed Kriegsmarine-killing night strike capabilty concurrently. While this was quite convenient for both the FAA and RAF during the war, the land-based focus severely hampered British carrier fighter aircraft. One of the most common sayings in Second World War Naval Aviator circles was "a water-cooled airplane makes as much sense as an air-cooled submarine," in reference to the much greater durability on average of radial engines compared to inline engines that the RAF and USAAF preferred for their fighters. The fact that the FAA flew inline-powered Fulmars and Seafires helped immensely in deploying the Corsair, but here the British missed a golden opportunity due to eschewing the Macintyre model. The Anglo-French Purchasing Board began buying American military aircraft in 1938 (becoming the British Purchasing Commission after the Fall of France), and the F4F entered British service due to an existing French order for the Wildcat. North American pitched the Mustang to the BPC in April 1940, the month before the prototype F4U first flew. Chance Vought would not begin building production Corsairs for another two years (no more airframes at all would be constructed until the summer of 1942)...imagine if the BPC (or RN directly) had approached Vought in 1940 to procure the bent-wing bird to form the core fighter strength of the Illustrious-class as the armored carriers were commissioned? This is why carrier commanding officers NEED to be naval aviators--they become carrier admirals, and then policymakers. The British were the launch customer of the F4F and P-51--they really should have been the same for the F4U. A 1940 FAA order for F4Us probably wouldn't have been available for Illustrious and Formidable in early-to-mid 1941, but without a doubt they would have been available for Pedestal.
@DrAlexClarke Don't get me started. I hope you have the saga of Zuikaku lined up for the best examples of IJN damage control, because she pioneered the hiding-in-a-rain-squall-during-a-furious-carrier-battle technique during the Battle of the Coral Sea, and expressed the core ethos of damage control two years later in the Philippine Sea: "Thus stricken the Shokaku lost stability, turned over, and sank. The Zuikaku was only slightly more fortunate than her sister and escaped destruction by only the narrowest of margins. During the course of the battle the carrier was hit several times by bombs from U. S. carrier planes and, while material damage was small, the bomb hits started fires in the hangar deck which speedily became unmanageable and threatened to spread over the entire ship. Damage control parties attacked the flames with bubble extinguishers but could make no progress and, when the flames continued to gain, the order to “Abandon Ship,” was given. However, before this command could be completely executed encouraging reports came from the fire fighters and the order was countermanded. Eventually the fires were brought under control and extinguished and the crippled carrier returned to Kure for extensive repairs." www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1952/june/shokakus-pearl-harbor-leyte-gulf Call me crazy, but I think this is the essence of Second World War damage control--extensive formalized training coupled with formal and informal drills, from the admiral down to each and every seaman. Like pilots must trust the mechanics that work on their aircraft, command staff must trust their damage control parties and countermand orders given if the experts say otherwise.
The loss of Hermes reads like a Shakespearean tragedy - whatever could go wrong did - yet everything had been done with the best of intentions and the resources available at the time. Similarly, the captain of Ark Royal went out of his way to prevent loss of life but lost the ship. Eagle was a catastrophe - but Operation Pedestal was a meat grinder and the convoy had to get through no matter what - hence the presence of three Fleet Carriers - something had to give. Courageous was a strange mix of naiveity and overconfidence given that the war was only two weeks old and they thought they were in a relatively safe area (somebody should have remembered Aboukir, Cressey and Hogue). For me, the only one of the Royal Navy carriers that was lost absolutely needlessly (and through borderline rank incompetence) was Glorious.
You seem so sure. I wish for that luxury. The more I search for history, the more I question. You did not have a dad that fought and survived, your brother is not Downne's Syndrome that you had to take custody of while your dad was alive.
As an American, the story of Yorktown, from being damaged at Coral Sea, moving heaven and Earth to patch her up in time to meet her fate at Midway, and all the damage she took along the way, is one of the greatest examples of competence, ingenuity, and bravery in our history. Their efforts spared Enterprise and Hornet any damage at Midway.
To the crew of Yorktown, thank you gentlemen.
As an American, as a son of a Vietnam veteran, who joined, not drafted, I find your sentiment heartwarming and yet useless. I would not exist if my mom and dad had not met in D.C. in '68, and yet I have gotten nothing from it other than hardship. My dad joined and got screwed, and screwed himself, aren't we all human, my mom was there on her own, working for the government, trying to get away from being the oldest of 13 children (catholic). I find your sentiment simplistic. I still suffer from the aftermath of that American war. Pride has no place with survival. The sooner the following generations understand that, the better.
@@brandonlyon8632 Your opinion is duly noted but pathetic.
I heard "Heads up, there may be some ranting", double checked the length... Yeah, there's going to be some ranting.
I tried my best to restrain it to the points it was necessary...
@@DrAlexClarke I didn't say it was going to be unjustified ranting. I've barely started the vid, but damage control is bad enough without quite the amount of extra ways on carriers for things to get "exciting" even during "normal" accidents even without accounting for enemy action. It's almost a surprise that no one had anything go catastrophically wrong leading to the loss of a ship even before the war.
Been by a former carrier sailor, I can say that one of the most important elements of effective damage control is…TRAINING. In the U.S. Navy, even U.S. Airedales were required to attend aviation firefighting school prior to every operational tour. I went through it three times, and although it wasn’t what I’d call “fun”, it was necessary. Fire is the biggest danger aboard a carrier, and history has demonstrated in lost lives the importance of training. In boot camp we all watched, “Ordeal by Fire” ( USS Forrestal fire ). As you pointed out “we” ( carrier sailors ) have had to learn and re-learn many difficult lessons.
It's the relearning part which annoys me the most, for me that's a failure of command for a navy to forget lessons which have been learnt at such cost
I think a big contributor in the USN, the “up or out” policy ( high-year tenure ). You loose the corporate knowledge of experienced sailors because they didn’t play the “promotion lottery” very well. I had to retire at 20-years, even though I had numerous qualifications and was an instructor. In an aside, I’d also say the development of centralized damage control was crucial during WW2. The USN called it, “Central Station” ( now Damage Control Central ). On a SS carrier central station is manned by LCDR during GQ. The ship had extensive casualty repair equipment, shoring, repair lockers, AFFF stations, sound-powered phones. And, most importantly, “repair lockers” manned by highly trained damage control teams. The U.S. has suffered 4 catastrophic fires since WW2 on carriers, and only demonstrates that your seconds away from a major conflagration if even the most simple mistake or oversight by just one poorly trained or careless sailor is made. Any thoughts on the BHR in San Diego? WHAT A FIASCO!!! IMHO…
The fact is the USN has an active DC party in WWII especially for their carriers, but in the 1960s when conflicts were low intensity, especially in Vietnam, the fires on board Forrestal showed how the USN went into more of passive DC, especially there's only few or specialized DC trained personnel, that is why the fires are so hard to extinguish when most of DC crews were dead in the initial explosion, resulting in catastrophic structural damage to the carrier. After the Forrestal fire the US went back to training ALL of the crew to understand or react to damage and fires on the ship.
I’m not certain how much the USN learned from the loss of Lexington at Coral Sea, but reams of manuals were filled with what was learned from the saving of Yorktown during the same action, and the near-saving of her at Midway. Enterprise benefitted greatly from her sister’s experiences.
One key thing the US learned after Coral Sea was draining aircraft fuel lines and pressuring them with inert gas. The suggestion for which came from a junior enlisted sailor.
One idea for damage prevention. Came from LtCdr Elias B “Benny” Mott. Who was gunnery officer on Enterprise. He advocated for more Oerlikons on Enterprise. Up to removing the belt armour to free up the weight.
The Dean of the Episcopal Cathedral I attended in my younger days was the Chaplain on the Wasp and was with Captain Sherman and the last group of officers to abandon ship, once it had been confirmed that all possible wounded and other crew were off. He was then assigned to the West Virginia and was discharged in 1946 with the rank of Captain. He also received the Bronze Star and the Purple Heart.
You forgot the crew saved the Ice cream. Calories and cooling while waiting for help.
Richard B. Frank's quip was that Enterprise always had a guardian angel in her air group.
After bombing Enterprise.
Random Japanese admiral: "It's no use! Bombing her doesn't sink her, only makes her angrier!"
That was an absolutely fascinating discussion. 3 1/2 hours, to be honest it didn't seem quite long enough to me. I probably need to seek help for my World War II addiction.
Finally finished this (boy it's been a couple of days for me). One thing this really reinforced for me is how what sets the USN and RN apart is that both have significant learning cultures in WW2. Expecting to go into war with everything figured out seems like folly, but being able to sustain learning experiences and adapt is essential.
Three and a half hours of Doc Clarke? Heck yeah.
I play him at 1.75 speed about 2 hours. His material is good but he has a habit of going too slow at times and repeating himself on points too much. He has put me asleep a few times and I love history.
@@charlesmaurer6214 I put the long format videos on when I'm doing an epic baking session. Delicious food smells and English accents talking about war are a fixture in my house.
@@alistercrowe8531 Like you I tend to do something else too, I do find the higher speed option in the player a big plus in his case though.
Same. 1.75 speed and do something or I be snoozing
@@TrickiVicBB71 He needs an editor and perhaps needs to prepare better with a script that is cleaned up rather than rambling on. Smart guy but needs to work on his presentation.
Watching (listening to) Dr. Alex getting 'exercised' is entertaining in itself, never mind the educational aspect of this great vid!
I'd say this is one of your best.
The worst wrongs are certainly Courageous being doing the job of a small expendable escort carrier and Glorious being lax in a combat area and intelligence not being shared to the fleet commanders. Not putting units in harms way when the risk doesn't match the need is the best form of Damage control. But also some much prewar experience is lost with those ships.
Really enjoyed this video, thank you.
Idea for a future series: Damage control in the [insert period - Age of Sail - Ironcled age - ww1 - ww2 - post war] - it could show the development in theory and technique (both doctrine and equipment with which to carry it out) as time progressed.
That was kind of the plan with the title... but they do take a lot out of me...
Power runs pumps and pumps solve a lot of problems.
Like you dont have enough to do. A KSS on damage control would be great.😊
If you look at it from the Japanese point of view, they were certain that they'd sunk Yorktown 3 times.
Also why they made a few mistakes thinking we didn't have carriers.
And they were certain they sunk Enterprise 3-6 times as well.
I wonder if they thought they sank Saratoga or realized she kept getting patched up after collecting her various torpedoes?
3:22:30 You forgot the VERY important point of being on a ship with the name of Enterprise in your summing up.
I respect that your dad designed, my dad faught
I don't think anyone else agrees w me but carriers are actually support ships. They support the task force. Yes they have offensive assets, but in terms of scouting, fighter cover, amphibious protection, they are a support asset for the rest of the task force. Even today there is a mutual protection scheme at work. Does the task force exsist to protect the carrier allowing it to punch, or does the carrier exsist to cover the taskforce allowing it to punch
Americans did go with electric engine designs from the New Mexico class until the Colorado class. They also used this system in Destroyer escorts. Even the elderly USS Langley was a turbo electric drive. The USS Lexington class was also Turbo electric driven. The pro was better subdivision and easier maintenance. The con was weight penalties and cost as well as them using too much internal space compared to traditional steam turbines.
my dad getting totally confused in the jungles of Vietnam affects my son, answer big, smart man
BZ Dr. Clarke. Wow, this was a marathon session.
I'd try to answer your question about the widespread adoption of electric drive, but it would turn into a shameless plug for my own work. 🙂
I will say that the fact that many navies are adopting it now (albeit as much due to massively increased electrical loads from other systems as for propulsion redundancy) speaks volumes about the desirability of the concept.
A long while ago a submariner patiently explained to big mouthed me why it was sensible to call out a washing machine mechanic to fix the London Big Eye.
DRC, can you also compare what happened to Indomitable with the torpedoing of the Lexington 2, Intrepid, and Independence in 43 & 44?
It would be very interesting to compare and contrast Illustrious with Franklin. Based on the evidence, the British carriers ability to take a beating and continue to operate is much better than the USN. Obviously, lots of factors in play; armored flight decks vs. armored hangar deck being a big factor from my limited knowledge.
If you look at the wrecks of Yorktown and Hornet. They’re preserved in incredible condition. In some ways like Enterprise they still won’t die.
After recovering from the dive bombers, Buckminster should have turned and ran.
So would Ranger and Bearn also be one of those puppies you talk about?
I think the Yorktown got so much attention given to her half because they expected to not have to waste torpedoes on her and half because the US really could use a good story of fighting a ship to the absolute last and never giving up at about that point of the war. So it's somewhat sunk cost fallacy and somewhat that everyone involved wanted to believe that they were in a navy that just would not give up badly enough that nobody decided to give up on the ship. Honestly, I'm not surprised that the navy that has "don't give up the ship" as part of its founding myth tends to take damage control with the same unwillingness to back down when there's something big at stake as destroyer captains tend to have.
Please have a conversation with Drachinifel.
I'll have many, just off to Scandinavia with him on the ScandiShip trip www.ship-shape.org.uk/
And we have series of us chatting with Jamie Seidel, our third musketeer from Bilgepumps, from ages ago (this is part 1 of 3) ua-cam.com/video/RYWtmQ3dVRw/v-deo.html
Yes, all true...and this also indicates the wisdom imparted by Admiral Moffett to institute his 1920s rule (later becoming mandated by federal legislation that became effective in 1927) that all aircraft carrier commanding officers must be either a trained Naval Observer or Naval Aviator before taking command of a carrier.
Future Admiral Ernest J. King was among the first class mandated to take Naval Aviator training in 1926-27, in order to command USS Wright followed by USS Lexington. The degree that the USN held on to its crippled carriers long after they had been knocked permanently out of the war (not necessarily sunk--Yorktown was, but Franklin and Bunker Hill effectively became deadweight after their dates with destiny) might have reflected King's volcanic temper, who seems to have hit the ceiling in Norfolk upon learning that his former command had sunk in the Coral Sea...did he perhaps believe Admiral Aubrey Fitch (who, like King, was a Johnny-come-lately who had earned his naval aviator wings in 1929) hadn't done enough to save Lexington, such as order the Australian vessels attached to Fletcher's force to tow the flaming hulk into Sydney instead? This might also explain why Fitch was sent to uselessly take command of Saratoga's task force after Coral Sea, rather than permit Fletcher to take along the excellent Coral Sea OTC (officer in tactical command)...
The Royal Navy obviously couldn't adopt the USN carrier commander policy during the interwar years, due to RAF control of the FAA until 1939, but not adopting a similar policy even after the war began might have cost the British carriers. American carrier commanders had been forced since Saratoga and Lexington had been commissioned in 1927 to go through extensive, formal education before taking command of a carrier...either the new skipper was a long-time naval aviator like John Towers, George Murray or Marc Mitscher and thus had to be taught ship command vs aircraft command (including the specifics of carriers having high metecentric heights)...or surface officers had to go through extensive naval aviator training (eventually it became frowned upon for selected carrier commanders to not have earned their naval aviator wings) and the Johnny-come-latelys were also grilled on carrier differences and specifications as the 40-something or 50-something officers underwent grueling flight training.
This system worked brilliantly--Yorktown's Captain Buckmaster earned his wings at age 47 while Admirals Halsey and McCain earned theirs at age 52 and served as distiguished carrier captains and carrier task force commanders...
On your point on the RN, let's consider this in 1939, when they are setting up their own training programs and getting things organised, they are rapidly expanding the fleet, you want to take a dozen or so senior captains out of operational rotation for months, take a dozen or so pilot/observer training slots and that's going to improve things how?
The problem for the USN was air minded naval officers which that program solved, the problem for the RN in 1939 was they were very air minded but it was the difference in damage control - and I'm not sure how months of being trained to be an aviator is going to help with aircaft carrier damage control: as I said in the video they needed a damage control course with lots of demonstrations, about a week or so at most, before they take command to visually imprint on them that a carrier is different. Being trained as an aviator is not going to help in ridding you of the mantra inscribed in your soul by every other ship in the fleet you have served in/commanded for 20+ years that when it comes to damage control, that the enemy lets in water not you, because only the carriers of this period had the metecentric height to make that necessary.
The program you describe would have been useful in 1920s & 1930s to strengthen understanding of aviation in the fleet, but in 1939, thanks to the work of Admiral Henderson, that was pretty darn good. However, whilst they had done the testing, had the doctrine/operational methods & even built the ships in such a way they could be relatively easily counter flooded - they lost the core of the generation of officers they'd innoculated with that, with the loss of Courageous & Glorious, they spend much of the rest of the war catching up on that, getting there broadly speaking by 1942.
Hope that answers your question.
@DrAlexClarke I was thinking more from a holistic approach--aircraft carriers were (and remain) such different combatants than other surface ships, extensive formalized training clearly was needed prior to an officer who had never commanded a carrier before taking command--this extends both to aviators having no experience with shiphandling, ship management AND shipboard damage control of any kind (think John Towers and Marc Mitscher when they were promoted to O-6); and surface officers with no experience with aviation operations, let alone carrier-specific damage control (think Ernest J. King, Kelly Turner, Bill Halsey, John "Slew" McCain and Elliot Buckmaster).
Let's approach this from the reverse course--would a naval aviator make a good destroyer skipper without extensive retraining? Here too is not a hypothetical--Donald Macintyre, RN started out in destroyers before becoming a naval aviator in 1928 and serving aboard numerous British carriers before a flight injury in 1935 forced him to return to destroyers. Was Macintyre simply so capable, filled with natural ability that he became one of the top RN sub hunters during the Second World War, including capturing top-scoring U-boat CO Otto Kreschmer...or was the naval aviator Macintyre taught this at HMS Osprey as the British antisubmarine school was coming under the influence of Frederic John Walker?
Scratch the thought that British carrier captains could only become well-rounded aviation officers after the 1939 hand-off of the FAA from the RAF to the RN...Macintyre remained a Royal Navy officer his entire career, indicating other Royal Navy officers could have become Johnny-come-latelys like King, Halsey, McCain and Buckmaster in the 1920s and 1930s...they just, bizarrely, decided against offering or ordering others to follow the Macintyre career path. Seems likely the path was not permitted for senior officers, as Denis Boyd (Illustrious' first CO) likely would have jumped at the chance, having applied for pilot training at Eastchurch in 1911 (and being denied).
The interconnected nature of the interwar FAA was a remains confounding, however. Describing the Fairey Albacore as an expression of Royal Navy strike doctrine is only true because the FAA was turned over to the RN the year after the Albacore and Bristol Beaufort first flew. The fact that the RAF was just as eager to equip Coastal Command with deadly Bristol torpedo bombers as the RN was to put Fairey equivalents on British carriers was what made British anti-shipping night strike capability a possibility, as Bomber Command developed Kriegsmarine-killing night strike capabilty concurrently.
While this was quite convenient for both the FAA and RAF during the war, the land-based focus severely hampered British carrier fighter aircraft. One of the most common sayings in Second World War Naval Aviator circles was "a water-cooled airplane makes as much sense as an air-cooled submarine," in reference to the much greater durability on average of radial engines compared to inline engines that the RAF and USAAF preferred for their fighters. The fact that the FAA flew inline-powered Fulmars and Seafires helped immensely in deploying the Corsair, but here the British missed a golden opportunity due to eschewing the Macintyre model.
The Anglo-French Purchasing Board began buying American military aircraft in 1938 (becoming the British Purchasing Commission after the Fall of France), and the F4F entered British service due to an existing French order for the Wildcat. North American pitched the Mustang to the BPC in April 1940, the month before the prototype F4U first flew. Chance Vought would not begin building production Corsairs for another two years (no more airframes at all would be constructed until the summer of 1942)...imagine if the BPC (or RN directly) had approached Vought in 1940 to procure the bent-wing bird to form the core fighter strength of the Illustrious-class as the armored carriers were commissioned?
This is why carrier commanding officers NEED to be naval aviators--they become carrier admirals, and then policymakers. The British were the launch customer of the F4F and P-51--they really should have been the same for the F4U. A 1940 FAA order for F4Us probably wouldn't have been available for Illustrious and Formidable in early-to-mid 1941, but without a doubt they would have been available for Pedestal.
@indplt1595 this will be a fun scuttlebutt...
@DrAlexClarke Don't get me started. I hope you have the saga of Zuikaku lined up for the best examples of IJN damage control, because she pioneered the hiding-in-a-rain-squall-during-a-furious-carrier-battle technique during the Battle of the Coral Sea, and expressed the core ethos of damage control two years later in the Philippine Sea:
"Thus stricken the Shokaku lost stability, turned over, and sank.
The Zuikaku was only slightly more fortunate than her sister and escaped destruction by only the narrowest of margins. During the course of the battle the carrier was hit several times by bombs from U. S. carrier planes and, while material damage was small, the bomb hits started fires in the hangar deck which speedily became unmanageable and threatened to spread over the entire ship. Damage control parties attacked the flames with bubble extinguishers but could make no progress and, when the flames continued to gain, the order to “Abandon Ship,” was given. However, before this command could be completely executed encouraging reports came from the fire fighters and the order was countermanded. Eventually the fires were brought under control and extinguished and the crippled carrier returned to Kure for extensive repairs."
www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1952/june/shokakus-pearl-harbor-leyte-gulf
Call me crazy, but I think this is the essence of Second World War damage control--extensive formalized training coupled with formal and informal drills, from the admiral down to each and every seaman. Like pilots must trust the mechanics that work on their aircraft, command staff must trust their damage control parties and countermand orders given if the experts say otherwise.
...and therefore, I find you wanting
Praise be to the almighty algorithm!
I couldn't give 2 shits about Maggie Smith when it comes to war
The loss of Hermes reads like a Shakespearean tragedy - whatever could go wrong did - yet everything had been done with the best of intentions and the resources available at the time. Similarly, the captain of Ark Royal went out of his way to prevent loss of life but lost the ship. Eagle was a catastrophe - but Operation Pedestal was a meat grinder and the convoy had to get through no matter what - hence the presence of three Fleet Carriers - something had to give. Courageous was a strange mix of naiveity and overconfidence given that the war was only two weeks old and they thought they were in a relatively safe area (somebody should have remembered Aboukir, Cressey and Hogue). For me, the only one of the Royal Navy carriers that was lost absolutely needlessly (and through borderline rank incompetence) was Glorious.
War is not something to be proud of. I am a son of a veteran.
Is there an English language version of this video somewhere?
No sorry, only the Alexese original
War ruins families and generations
War is ugly and terrible, and yes, sometimes necessary, but never proud of.
You have more work to do sir
And so, you had the luxury of searching your own path to become a PHD. I have a problem with that.
You seem so sure. I wish for that luxury. The more I search for history, the more I question. You did not have a dad that fought and survived, your brother is not Downne's Syndrome that you had to take custody of while your dad was alive.