A good addition to this video would be an analysis of modern notions of causality as expressed Bayesian nets, Judea Pearl's work (The Book of Why, e.g.)
Hume: But you see constant conjunction of a perceived law and the result. With the law I can do an armchair analysis and derive everything from logic alone. Therefore, I am able to predict the world with minimal assumptions based upon observation. So the cause and effect relationship is derived from persistence of the observed law as an assumption. Using Bayes Law, for instance, on can place more and more strict bounds on the probability that the regularity is, in fact, a feature of the result. The point is that what we call this regularity is unimportant. The regularity is what is important, and in the nature of thought, the regularity forms its own form of cause and effect. Note that I can make correct predictions based upon long strings of nonhomogeneous regularity laws. This suggests, at the very least, that there is some very compelling connection between the assumed laws and the results or effects. Which is to say, the experience of compiling the indirect evidence of cause leading to effect that we are attempting to establish is very like a proof by contradiction, but the proof cannot terminate, only become more probable.
It seems like Hume’s argument fails because it assumes we’re just passively observing the environment, or something. But the modern interventionist account of causality emphasizes that we test causal hypotheses by intervening in the world
Isn't Hume's argument epistemological (can we know mind-independent laws of cause and effect)? While causal realism is metaphysical or ontological view (is there laws of causation at work out there in the mind-independent world?)
There are different interpretations of Hume's argument. In fact, some people even claim that Hume defended causal realism! See the discussion on this page, for example: www.iep.utm.edu/hume-cau/ Under the interpretation that I'm assuming for the purposes of this video (that is, philosophical objections to causal realism as a metaphysical thesis), the crucial point is that Hume treats necessary connection as a psychological phenomenon which is then projected onto the objects. Necessary connection is not "in the world", hence causal realism is false. But yes, there are other ways of interpreting Hume, and maybe I should have made that clear in the video.
With regard to Hume.............That by which Hume was able to formulate his proposition and the context in which it functioned and was considered, defines certain necessities that he could not deny OR HE COULD NOT HAVE FORMULATED IT TO BEGIN WITH. Either it is, or it ain’t. 1. He chose to employ in his proposition the concepts of billiard balls specifically to the exclusion of all other things. This cannot be questioned. This means by definition that he had to have recognized and acknowledged the physical characteristics of all of those entities from which he chose the billiard balls or how could he have decided on the billiard balls as opposed to something else such as crochet balls? So the assertion of the form and function of all of those entities in material reality that he had to have perceived (or again, he could not have made the distinct choice he did) was that by which he was able to choose. That he claimed to recognized only sense impressions does not alter the point. There is no escaping this. 2. In that he had to have recognized the characteristics of the billiard balls or the sense impressions of them, again, the only means by which he could have chosen them to the exclusion of all else, he had to have known that motion was not one of those characteristics. First, motion is not tangible (but rather a phenomenon) as is all of that by which the billiard balls were defined in their physicality or the sense impressions which were drawn from them. Secondly, were motion a characteristic of billiard balls, both not just one would have been moving. That the one ball was moving then has to have been the effect of a cause of that motion having been imparted. There is no escaping this. 3. Then, that he had to have known that motion had to have been imparted to the moving ball, he had to have understood that that which imparted that motion was itself a moving entity for which motion was also not a characteristic. I am sorry but this is cause and effect, like it or not. What Hume did in the formulation of his theory was akin to “appealing to truths to formulate a position which denied truth”. He doesn’t get to have done that any more than the rest of us. That entities are distinct, they are that by their characteristics. That they are distinct, they are chosen for their characteristics because each imposes a specific effect from which to choose. The balls were chosen because they would roll, the reality of that to which he had to have surrendered, a given because they were his choice. He did not choose bricks or the like because they wouldn’t roll, necessary to the purpose of the analogy. That recognition in part defeats his theory of no cause and effect. A final point…..the proposition that ball 1 hitting ball 2 would cause it to move, is inductive only in the most general context of consideration. However, in a sub-context where we consider that motion had to have been imparted to the moving ball, it is deductive. His theory makes no sense.
As for Sharavardy, are models rely on un random chance. When two billiard balls strike they each deform contiguesly as a peessure wave moves through them. Now we move closer to the composition of the balls through whicv the preasure wave moves. These balls are made of crystal bound to each other by a chemical cement likely a diffrent cristsl although it could be a glass. Let us zoom closer in to the crystal latice points. Here lies a molecule or atom bound in place by electrostatic forces. Coveilent, ionic, vandervalls, or hydregen bonds. These bonds are maintained in equilebrium at a certain distance the pressure wave changes this distinance and as the vall returns to equilibrium a net acceleration and heat are observed. But furter still we zoom and now we see that there is mostly empty space and rather it is electrons and nuclei getting closer and furter and thus exchanging photons that are models describe. Intrestingly this final step has a random relationship to time photon absorption and emission are completely random in time snd space sl dpeakkn h ic instsniouse cause is non sensical cause is statistically spread through time and space.
Presumably the empericest denies the existences of energy. From which a rather obvious casual relationship follows. A causes B just in case A transfers energy to B. This allows for at least one sort of observabke casual reaction. For istances after a cue ball, x, has striked a pool ball, z, x will slow and z will speed up. So that at least in observable impacts the object slowing can be saif to cause the object becoming faster. Further more we could extend cause ation to include the slowing of an object. To be clear causality is not reflective. As in our example the cue ball causes the pool ball to become faster and the pool ball causes the cue ball to become slower. Note that in this case i have only described a relationship between observables. I have not postulated a neccesaty. Clearly this limits tge scope of causal relationship but the imperasist is already commited to agnosticism towards unobservables. Unubservsble causes do not exist. Other observable causes may invlude change in direction. We may also say that someting has caused an object to accellerate, change direction move slower or faster, even if we cannot observe the cause as theses changes seem to always have a cause. Then again that maybe postulating the existence of an unobservable in virtue only of consistency.
TLDR remove necessity. Just define a list of causel relationships. Slowing and becoming faster when in pairs, cooling and heating, etc as observables can be defined as causes.
In physics a causes b means a's energy deminidhed and b's energy h as increased. An electron absorbes the energy of a photon thd photon ceases to exist , the electron increases its energy level after some random amount of time the electron releases that energy as a new photon. This is the expkanation of a number of interacyilns in the universe including jow objects push each other as is the case for thd billiard balls. Russell is correct in saying equations of motion are time simetrical but there us a rather fundamental statistical inequality S(t_0)>=S(t_1) if t_0
The scientist whishes to make a function between a feature space and a prediction space. Our model is the manifold described by this function. There is no problem of spesificity here. But scienyist are in the buisness of finding relavent features. It is more than enough to have a model that is good enough predicting with in a certain range how the top k features determine a value.
Mutual manifestation seems likely. Perhaps, everything is relational. However, if we start from the beginning, how does one unmoved-mover split and become many different movers? Causal relations only work with partners, but how do the partners arise in the first place?
Hello Kane, so glad you have made these videos. They are so interesting sometimes I don´t know where to begin. Thanks and congratulations.
A good addition to this video would be an analysis of modern notions of causality as expressed Bayesian nets, Judea Pearl's work (The Book of Why, e.g.)
Nice summary of Russell paper, in the middle part of the talk.
Maybe instead of Heisenberg's, we may speak of Russell's uncertainty principle? :D
Petition: Kane B should change his name to Turbochad the Magnificent.
Cool video dude, keep it up.
Thank you, Kane, this is extremely helpful
Loved this one Kane B!!
Hume: But you see constant conjunction of a perceived law and the result. With the law I can do an armchair analysis and derive everything from logic alone. Therefore, I am able to predict the world with minimal assumptions based upon observation. So the cause and effect relationship is derived from persistence of the observed law as an assumption. Using Bayes Law, for instance, on can place more and more strict bounds on the probability that the regularity is, in fact, a feature of the result. The point is that what we call this regularity is unimportant. The regularity is what is important, and in the nature of thought, the regularity forms its own form of cause and effect.
Note that I can make correct predictions based upon long strings of nonhomogeneous regularity laws. This suggests, at the very least, that there is some very compelling connection between the assumed laws and the results or effects. Which is to say, the experience of compiling the indirect evidence of cause leading to effect that we are attempting to establish is very like a proof by contradiction, but the proof cannot terminate, only become more probable.
It seems like Hume’s argument fails because it assumes we’re just passively observing the environment, or something. But the modern interventionist account of causality emphasizes that we test causal hypotheses by intervening in the world
Isn't Hume's argument epistemological (can we know mind-independent laws of cause and effect)?
While causal realism is metaphysical or ontological view
(is there laws of causation at work out there in the mind-independent world?)
There are different interpretations of Hume's argument. In fact, some people even claim that Hume defended causal realism! See the discussion on this page, for example: www.iep.utm.edu/hume-cau/
Under the interpretation that I'm assuming for the purposes of this video (that is, philosophical objections to causal realism as a metaphysical thesis), the crucial point is that Hume treats necessary connection as a psychological phenomenon which is then projected onto the objects. Necessary connection is not "in the world", hence causal realism is false. But yes, there are other ways of interpreting Hume, and maybe I should have made that clear in the video.
With regard to Hume.............That by which Hume was able to formulate his proposition and the context in which it functioned and was considered, defines certain necessities that he could not deny OR HE COULD NOT HAVE FORMULATED IT TO BEGIN WITH. Either it is, or it ain’t.
1. He chose to employ in his proposition the concepts of billiard balls specifically to the exclusion of all other things. This cannot be questioned. This means by definition that he had to have recognized and acknowledged the physical characteristics of all of those entities from which he chose the billiard balls or how could he have decided on the billiard balls as opposed to something else such as crochet balls? So the assertion of the form and function of all of those entities in material reality that he had to have perceived (or again, he could not have made the distinct choice he did) was that by which he was able to choose. That he claimed to recognized only sense impressions does not alter the point. There is no escaping this.
2. In that he had to have recognized the characteristics of the billiard balls or the sense impressions of them, again, the only means by which he could have chosen them to the exclusion of all else, he had to have known that motion was not one of those characteristics. First, motion is not tangible (but rather a phenomenon) as is all of that by which the billiard balls were defined in their physicality or the sense impressions which were drawn from them. Secondly, were motion a characteristic of billiard balls, both not just one would have been moving. That the one ball was moving then has to have been the effect of a cause of that motion having been imparted. There is no escaping this.
3. Then, that he had to have known that motion had to have been imparted to the moving ball, he had to have understood that that which imparted that motion was itself a moving entity for which motion was also not a characteristic. I am sorry but this is cause and effect, like it or not.
What Hume did in the formulation of his theory was akin to “appealing to truths to formulate a position which denied truth”. He doesn’t get to have done that any more than the rest of us.
That entities are distinct, they are that by their characteristics. That they are distinct, they are chosen for their characteristics because each imposes a specific effect from which to choose. The balls were chosen because they would roll, the reality of that to which he had to have surrendered, a given because they were his choice. He did not choose bricks or the like because they wouldn’t roll, necessary to the purpose of the analogy.
That recognition in part defeats his theory of no cause and effect.
A final point…..the proposition that ball 1 hitting ball 2 would cause it to move, is inductive only in the most general context of consideration. However, in a sub-context where we consider that motion had to have been imparted to the moving ball, it is deductive. His theory makes no sense.
As for Sharavardy, are models rely on un random chance. When two billiard balls strike they each deform contiguesly as a peessure wave moves through them.
Now we move closer to the composition of the balls through whicv the preasure wave moves. These balls are made of crystal bound to each other by a chemical cement likely a diffrent cristsl although it could be a glass. Let us zoom closer in to the crystal latice points. Here lies a molecule or atom bound in place by electrostatic forces. Coveilent, ionic, vandervalls, or hydregen bonds. These bonds are maintained in equilebrium at a certain distance the pressure wave changes this distinance and as the vall returns to equilibrium a net acceleration and heat are observed. But furter still we zoom and now we see that there is mostly empty space and rather it is electrons and nuclei getting closer and furter and thus exchanging photons that are models describe. Intrestingly this final step has a random relationship to time photon absorption and emission are completely random in time snd space sl dpeakkn h ic instsniouse cause is non sensical cause is statistically spread through time and space.
Incredible
Presumably the empericest denies the existences of energy. From which a rather obvious casual relationship follows. A causes B just in case A transfers energy to B. This allows for at least one sort of observabke casual reaction. For istances after a cue ball, x, has striked a pool ball, z, x will slow and z will speed up. So that at least in observable impacts the object slowing can be saif to cause the object becoming faster. Further more we could extend cause ation to include the slowing of an object. To be clear causality is not reflective. As in our example the cue ball causes the pool ball to become faster and the pool ball causes the cue ball to become slower.
Note that in this case i have only described a relationship between observables. I have not postulated a neccesaty. Clearly this limits tge scope of causal relationship but the imperasist is already commited to agnosticism towards unobservables. Unubservsble causes do not exist. Other observable causes may invlude change in direction. We may also say that someting has caused an object to accellerate, change direction move slower or faster, even if we cannot observe the cause as theses changes seem to always have a cause. Then again that maybe postulating the existence of an unobservable in virtue only of consistency.
TLDR remove necessity. Just define a list of causel relationships. Slowing and becoming faster when in pairs, cooling and heating, etc as observables can be defined as causes.
In physics a causes b means a's energy deminidhed and b's energy h as increased. An electron absorbes the energy of a photon thd photon ceases to exist , the electron increases its energy level after some random amount of time the electron releases that energy as a new photon. This is the expkanation of a number of interacyilns in the universe including jow objects push each other as is the case for thd billiard balls.
Russell is correct in saying equations of motion are time simetrical but there us a rather fundamental statistical inequality S(t_0)>=S(t_1) if t_0
Nice!
Time is dense space is dense and causal chains are dense.
great!
Amazing
The scientist whishes to make a function between a feature space and a prediction space. Our model is the manifold described by this function. There is no problem of spesificity here. But scienyist are in the buisness of finding relavent features. It is more than enough to have a model that is good enough predicting with in a certain range how the top k features determine a value.
love it
Could you make a video on how you support direct realism please
Jeff Nipard shouted You out on his instagram hes a fitness youtuber
3:26
Moore
House of cards
Mutual manifestation seems likely. Perhaps, everything is relational. However, if we start from the beginning, how does one unmoved-mover split and become many different movers? Causal relations only work with partners, but how do the partners arise in the first place?
Seriously people read calculouse.