I would love to see you two debate moral realism most moral realist do a poor job of articulating their points and I think you have a really unique ability to describe these things in a manner which makes sense
Thanks for this! I wanted to learn some of the basics of philosophy of science. Do you think you could also do a video on political philosophy or applied ethics?
When you do, please give a fair shake to Marxism, Marxism-Leninism, and so on (sniff sniff). It is surprising how many philosophers past and present leaned toward some variant or tendency of Marxism. Peter Railton, Kai Nielsen, and Alasdair MacIntyre to name some.
@@alexmarkadonis7179 It is surprising until you think deeply about how the kind of person who wants to be and is able to be a philosopher finds a common enemy with those on the left. Since they have a high intellect but in the book smarts kind of way, they often don't get as much praise and attention as they think they should. They notice that being really good at thinking about a philosophical problem and developing solutions to it is a skill that won't be nearly as materially rewarding (especially regarding money and fame) as, say, running a business really well, even if they, perhaps justifiably, find their own philosophical achievements more impressive than a lucrative and successful business, and this may seem quite unfair to them. Well, to vent at this from the right would do them no good, because the right would not spend much time and money listening to their complaints, and would prefer to tell them to find something profitable in the market if they want to benefit from their high book smarts. Regarding the left, however, their arms are wide open, being perceived victims of oppression whether based on gender, race, lack of talent, disabled status, etc. The left would love to see philosophers writing about how businesspeople make way more money than they should, and philosophers are often quite willing to write about this, and use their intellect to make these screeds look pretty, and share the cries of their ego with each and every word therein, and the non-philosophers on the left will appreciate the utility of them for rhetorical purposes and lo and behold, the philosopher has found a comfortable, lucrative job, at least for someone of their disposition. Those who have similar amounts of intellect to the philosopher but want to and are willing to put it into practice, would probably just do that... if they were to instead write right-wing philosophy about how people should just put things into practice rather than complain about them, then it would almost look hypocritical, because there they are, rigorously writing about putting things into practice for a living, which, persuasive as the argument may be written, is itself an activity that instantiates not putting things into practice. It isn't clear if it really is hypocritical, but it does seem like a strong conviction in the above belief would lead that person to go out and use their skills in a way that serves the market particularly well much more often than it would lead to them making a career out of writing about what they like about that idea, as writing about it to that extent takes away much precious time from implementing it, and these people, by being people, only have one life, after all. On the other hand, one's pursuit of becoming more and more resentful of their perceived oppressors and thereby letting their resentment compound, has no real point of desiccation, and can go on indefinitely as long as the audience continues to demand it, which in general is quite likely. Also, as philosophy fills up more and more with those types, it becomes easier and easier to think of those with different politics as clearly bad because of how many people in the field will be there to agree with that perception, in which case there might not be so much a high quality of any particular perception, but a high quantity of that kind of perception. That will make it easier to reject those with unpopular (in the field) views, as well as probably making it less attractive to some such person considering whether to become a philosopher who intends to regularly espouse views of such controversy, which then causes an even higher disparity and thus a higher resistance, causing a higher disparity and so on the feedback loop spirals.
Oh no!!! Please no lol 😂 I NEED this conversation but that mic noise is hurting my transcendental idealistic noumeal soul! It’s only 3 minutes in so here’s to the odds being in my favor 🤣 Edit: Definitely worth the full watch through! Your mind follows the ideas when it’s this good!
The reason why newtonian physics is still been used, is because the scope on which operate is it a successful theory. call it a false or wrong it seems to me rather arbitrary.
Newtonian mechanics is straightforwardly wrong about the underlying ontology of the world. Its picture of the structure of space-time, the relation between mass, light, space-time, etc., has been overthrown. Of course, it is (approximately) correct for a particular class of observables -- if it wasn't, it would never have been successful! Nobody doubts that science generates theories that are remarkably successful in allowing us to systematise, predict, and control the observable phenomena. The question is whether we account for this success by supposing that the theories correctly describe the world behind the phenomena.
@@KaneB Then it is arbitrary, if I just reject whats seems to be you notion of truth, then i don't see the wrongness of newtonian mechanics as long the scope is the proper one. If by using newtonian mechanics I can successfully describe/predict the motion of a ball, then at least that's knowledge (is that "the" truth?), it correspond to fact (is that "the" truth?), it is a satisfactory explanation (is that "the" truth?). But beyond that, so the ontology changes sometimes in "key" aspect sometimes in "accessory" aspect, so what?? there is a "pureness" about ontology that is required and it should remain over time?. Is pretty obvious that science is an accumulative case, and it success is only because it correspond to a reality that can be described in a particular way for a particular scenery, and as it goes, deeper and wider the description is (Yoda?). "The question is whether we account for this success by supposing that the theories correctly describe the world behind the phenomena." Isn't the phenomena part of the world?? what is fundamental about that world that is not in the phenomena??. Anyways, it seems to me that everything reduce to "truth".
@@diegonicucs6954 I don't understand your point. I'm using the term "truth" in the colloquial sense; I'm not assuming any particular philosophical analysis of the notion of truth. So I don't know what you mean when you suggest that you "just reject what seems to be your notion of truth". Newtonian mechanics is definitely true in certain respects (its description of the behaviour of observables) and definitely not true in other respects (e.g. its description of the underlying structure of spacetime). Both of these aspects are relevant to the realism debate. Newtonian mechanics offers a remarkably powerful picture of observable phenomena, but it does so via an underlying theoretical picture that has now been completely displaced. Nobody who uses Newtonian mechanics these days takes it as true in general. Even you don't, since you recognize that it is accurate only within a particular scope. Antirealists simply extend this kind of attitude to all other theories, including those that have not yet been displaced. "Isn't the phenomena part of the world??" Yes, but it's not *all* the world, at least not according to any sophisticated scientific theory. Theories proceed by postulating structures, entities, and mechanisms beyond what we directly observe. It is this aspect of theory construction that drives much of the disagreement between contemporary realists and antirealists.
@@KaneB Well then your response agree with what I say, call newtonian physics false or wrong is arbitrary. Im not sure what colloquial "truth" is, but I will say that a notion of truth is relevant in any philosophical view, and is relevant is we are going to claim that something is wrong or false. "but it does so via an underlying theoretical picture that has now been completely displaced." Again ontological commitments change, evolve, get smaller or bigger, don't see a problem with that. "Yes, but it's not all the world".Sure, no one is saying that it is, but the world does not necessarily require a description as a unity or "the world", it could be described as a compositions of things and interactions, and each piece a truth
@@diegonicucs6954 It's false in some respects and not false in other respects. There is nothing arbitrary about that judgement. It's not a problem that ontological commitments change. It is however relevant to the realism/antirealism debate, since what's in question in that debate is what attitude we should take to the ontological commitments of current theories.
So I'm not sure Kane is right that SR precludes idealism. Certainly the initial semantic claim he provided (there exists a mind independent reality), is at odds with idealism, but given some of what is said later, it seems what he means by mind independent is simply objective or something which all people would objectively pick out about the real world. Am I missing something here? Also glad to hear (if I followed correctly) that Kane is a constructive empiricist. That is the most lit form of anti realism.
It depends on how you want to define "realism". Usually it is defined so as to rule out idealism. Some people might define it more broadly though, so that idealism counts as a form of realism. I don't think anything important hangs on precisely which definition we use. What I mean by "mind-independent" is... well, mind-independent! I'm not sure which parts you are referring to, that you took to suggest a different meaning. But it's often the case that, when I'm talking off the top of my head, I'm not as precise in my speaking as I should be! So it could just be that I expressed myself in a sloppy way. Also, yeah, I'm a kind of constructive empiricist. Van Fraassen has had a big influence on my philosophical views on general.
Thanks so much for the reply! I haven't finished the interview yet but I am enjoying it. So when you initially said "mind independent" I took it in the way you apparently mean it (which I agree would seem to preclude idealism): there are things such that they would exist independent of minds. Obviously seeing as the idealist takes the mental to be fundamental this would necessarily preclude idealism. There is a more colloquial use of mind independent which it seemed as if you were using at one point (for instance when you talked about experience of color as an example of something which is not objectively true, to be contrasted with things which are objectively true no matter who experiences them), that is to say that there are things which are objective facts of the matter to all men, such that I may go up and see a car and you go and see a car and (assuming our cognitive faculties are functioning properly) both of us can make the true predication "there is a car here". On this other use of "mind independent" we can take to mean something like "some x is y independently of what a subject thinks". Now the latter not only does not necessarily preclude idealism, but it is widely compatible with some of what I take to be the better forms of it, like the one found in the work of Bradley. On these sorts of views, one cannot properly say, in the sense you are describing, that anything is mind independent, however, there are genuinely true facts of reality which are static so to speak irregardless of the observer. In addition, there are those (like Mike Jones and Johanan Raatz) who hold to physics based forms of idealism which would actually seem dependent on scientific realism in order to work. Now don't get me wrong, I don't take those views or arguments very seriously in the least, but it would seem to be an example of a kind of idealism which wouldn't work unless some form of SR is true. But perhaps I'm missing something here? I'm very new to phil science so that wouldn't surprise me. Anyhow, that's just what I thought you were saying, but now I think I follow you more clearly. Thanks again for the reply! :)
Understanding Philosophy of Science by James Ladyman; The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science [this one is amazing because it has papers by many of the leading experts in the field writing on the various topics and central issues in phil sci]; and Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues edited by Cover [one of my favorite Purdue profs! I've had him in like 4 classes], Curd, and Pincock
I second the Cover, Curd, and Pincock collection. It's an excellent introductory anthology... unfortunately, it's pretty pricey, at least here in the UK, though you might be able to find the first edition for a reasonable price. Another good anthology is Lange's "Philosophy of Science: An Anthology". Many of the articles collected in these are available freely online, so it might be worth just looking at the contents and googling each article! A good, straightforward introduction is Godfrey-Smith's "Theory and Reality". For a somewhat more eclectic introduction, I think Hacking's "Representing and Intervening" is unbeatable. It's a little dated now, but Hacking is an enormously entertaining writer and he puts more emphasis on scientific practice and experiment than most other introductions.
I find the argument that because science is becoming more systematized and interconnected, it has become impossible to make scientific progress by throwing out the idea of the electron (as an example) to be very interesting. Will we end up in a position where science can make no more meaningful progress and the only hope of further discoveries will be to start the process completely over? These ponderings might keep me up at night.
What do you have in mind when you say “progress?” That’s a rather loaded term used in many different ways by many different philosophers of science. For example, Kuhn would resist the idea that progress is achieved through predictive/explanatory novelty.
@@brianh4625 You say "progress" is a loaded term but this ignores context. "Progress" would only be a loaded term if I used it to persuade but my comment was not an attempt at persuasion but rather an expression of my thoughts and feelings. Of course "progress" is a value-laden and perhaps even an emotive word but I don't think that makes the word problematic, especially in this context. As for what I had in mind, do I need to have anything particular in mind? Could I not say "progress" and just mean 'progress, however it's defined' or 'that which most people would agree is progress' or 'that which seems like progres to me'? Don't get me wrong, it's a fair question but, as you say, the word can be used in many different ways so surely it can be used ambiguously and vaguely. As for what Kuhn says, well I'm tempted to quote Gone with the Wind.
@@Paradoxarn. I don't know much about emotive force when it comes to these things. They are just concepts, and technical ones at that. As such, they are ripe for analysis and scrutiny. I suppose it *does* matter what you have in mind by "progress" since making the claim that progress is "impossible," and I assume the context here is a discussion of the philosophy of science, including the notion of scientific "progress." If what one means by "progress" is simply work-a-day scientific practice, then I see no threat to scientific progress. If what you mean is theory articulation, that doesn't seem threatened either. If what you mean is a the kind of disruptive revision of theoretical commitments represented by, for example, throwing out the electron, then claiming that such a move is "progressive" seems contentious, if not whiggish, depending on whether what means by "progressive" is "convergence on the truth." Certainly we wouldn't want just any old change to be considered "progressive" since then the term would fail to pick out anything or distinguish between different kinds of scientific change (for example, progressive or degenerative change). The philosophers who contributed to these discussions, e.g., Kuhn, Popper, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Laudan, Agassi, and others, all had different account of what scientific progress is. The credibility of the impossibility claim rests on the notion of "progress," for according to some it may be exceedingly implausible that progress is rendered impossible by the interdependence of theories as that interdependence itself may turn out to be a hallmark of progress. On other accounts, it may not be so implausible to claim that scientific progress is frustrated by theoretical interdependence (i.e., unification). All that said, there's good reason to believe that there is no such interdependence and that the sciences are relatively siloed even if they pay lip-service to their cousins. Cartwright, Feyerabend, Longino, and other advocates of theoretical pluralism would likely argue such a point. I've not attributed any motive to you, whether that's to persuade or simply share your feelings. You articulated what I found to be an interesting thought, so I chose to engage (in good faith) just to pick your brain.
Sorry I don't know much about Philosophy of science literature But What? Scientists are always working everyday scientists Trying to discover things and creating new technology Doing Scientific research they're making Scientific Progress
@@deathnote4171 Not all research is successful. As consumers of science’s products, the picture of science we don’t see the day to day failures and often the only “failures” (if we want to call them that) are the relatively rare cases of revolutions. But here’s something to consider: must scientific progress be characterized by the accumulation of knowledge? How are we to think of scientific changes that are not cumulative or even require us to discard previous results or phenomena to be explained? Not all scientific change is constructive/cumulative. And in working labs, striving for novelty is not encouraged nor is it likely to be funded unless there’s some crisis in science; there’s a lot of pressure to operate within previously accepted theoretical frameworks as opposed to breaking new ground aimed at upsetting 100 years of accepted cosmology; the expectation is that scientists work with those frameworks and apply them, refining but not essentially altering them. Work-a-day science is drudgery, not revolutionary (which partially explains why revolutions are so rare).
Newtonian mechanics is not a 'false theory'. It's application is limited. How can a false theory be useful? You admit usefulness but state falseness. Another strange phenomenon.
@@Sui_Generis0 Your loading gun example proves something but it is not a scientific schema. Most of the industrial revolution was on the basis of Newtonian Mechanics. It worked. After Einstein no ody believed in the universality of Newtonian Mechanics. If I were designing a train today, I would use NM not relativistic mechanics hence it is not a false theory. It's scope is well defined. The problem with anti-realists is that they deny the existence of an external world and that our mathematical models (NM being an example) are approximations to reality depending on the context of use. Metaphysics has degenerated into a Berklian distopia of fallen trees that were silent when they fell. Therein lies madness.
i belive in god becuase there just has to be a god. if there is no god then i must be god. but im not god so there is god. god does exist .. if god doesnt exist i dont want to live anymore!
Why don't you both slow down? Many nonsensical statements are slipping through. There are knock down arguments in philosophy. You have not learnt from the history of philosophy. Idealism is dead. Anti-realism is dead. We lead our lives in a realist world.
One of the main problems with anti-realists is that they tend to be much more willing to justify atrocities. Be it with the early critics of Ontology in Nazi Germany, or the Post-Structuralists fascinated by and supporting Iran’s shift to Radical Islam, or the despotic Third World Liberation movements such as those in Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Mozambique, Uganda, Angola, the CAR, and later Rwanda.
What? Maybe I'm missing something, but I don't see the link between scientific anti-realism and all of those. Maybe you are talking about anti-realism in a whole, and not scientific anti-realism.
Two of my favorite non-theist UA-camrs
The most important cross-over event of the year...
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I'm less conciliatory. Realism is simply wrong. It has appeal on many fronts, but in the end an honest, rational person will conclude it's untrue.
The way he put Realism is perfect!
I would love to see you two debate moral realism most moral realist do a poor job of articulating their points and I think you have a really unique ability to describe these things in a manner which makes sense
I think I am a moral realist but not sure so me wanting this debate is self interest lol
Not a debate a discuss I made too many assumptions going into this video oh no scientific realism is false
stoked for this
Thanks for this! I wanted to learn some of the basics of philosophy of science. Do you think you could also do a video on political philosophy or applied ethics?
Good suggestion! I’ll probably do that at some point in the future, but I don’t know precisely when.🙂
When you do, please give a fair shake to Marxism, Marxism-Leninism, and so on (sniff sniff). It is surprising how many philosophers past and present leaned toward some variant or tendency of Marxism. Peter Railton, Kai Nielsen, and Alasdair MacIntyre to name some.
@@alexmarkadonis7179 It is surprising until you think deeply about how the kind of person who wants to be and is able to be a philosopher finds a common enemy with those on the left. Since they have a high intellect but in the book smarts kind of way, they often don't get as much praise and attention as they think they should. They notice that being really good at thinking about a philosophical problem and developing solutions to it is a skill that won't be nearly as materially rewarding (especially regarding money and fame) as, say, running a business really well, even if they, perhaps justifiably, find their own philosophical achievements more impressive than a lucrative and successful business, and this may seem quite unfair to them.
Well, to vent at this from the right would do them no good, because the right would not spend much time and money listening to their complaints, and would prefer to tell them to find something profitable in the market if they want to benefit from their high book smarts. Regarding the left, however, their arms are wide open, being perceived victims of oppression whether based on gender, race, lack of talent, disabled status, etc. The left would love to see philosophers writing about how businesspeople make way more money than they should, and philosophers are often quite willing to write about this, and use their intellect to make these screeds look pretty, and share the cries of their ego with each and every word therein, and the non-philosophers on the left will appreciate the utility of them for rhetorical purposes and lo and behold, the philosopher has found a comfortable, lucrative job, at least for someone of their disposition.
Those who have similar amounts of intellect to the philosopher but want to and are willing to put it into practice, would probably just do that... if they were to instead write right-wing philosophy about how people should just put things into practice rather than complain about them, then it would almost look hypocritical, because there they are, rigorously writing about putting things into practice for a living, which, persuasive as the argument may be written, is itself an activity that instantiates not putting things into practice. It isn't clear if it really is hypocritical, but it does seem like a strong conviction in the above belief would lead that person to go out and use their skills in a way that serves the market particularly well much more often than it would lead to them making a career out of writing about what they like about that idea, as writing about it to that extent takes away much precious time from implementing it, and these people, by being people, only have one life, after all.
On the other hand, one's pursuit of becoming more and more resentful of their perceived oppressors and thereby letting their resentment compound, has no real point of desiccation, and can go on indefinitely as long as the audience continues to demand it, which in general is quite likely. Also, as philosophy fills up more and more with those types, it becomes easier and easier to think of those with different politics as clearly bad because of how many people in the field will be there to agree with that perception, in which case there might not be so much a high quality of any particular perception, but a high quantity of that kind of perception. That will make it easier to reject those with unpopular (in the field) views, as well as probably making it less attractive to some such person considering whether to become a philosopher who intends to regularly espouse views of such controversy, which then causes an even higher disparity and thus a higher resistance, causing a higher disparity and so on the feedback loop spirals.
Arif Ahmed?
Oh no!!! Please no lol 😂 I NEED this conversation but that mic noise is hurting my transcendental idealistic noumeal soul! It’s only 3 minutes in so here’s to the odds being in my favor 🤣
Edit: Definitely worth the full watch through! Your mind follows the ideas when it’s this good!
The reason why newtonian physics is still been used, is because the scope on which operate is it a successful theory. call it a false or wrong it seems to me rather arbitrary.
Newtonian mechanics is straightforwardly wrong about the underlying ontology of the world. Its picture of the structure of space-time, the relation between mass, light, space-time, etc., has been overthrown. Of course, it is (approximately) correct for a particular class of observables -- if it wasn't, it would never have been successful!
Nobody doubts that science generates theories that are remarkably successful in allowing us to systematise, predict, and control the observable phenomena. The question is whether we account for this success by supposing that the theories correctly describe the world behind the phenomena.
@@KaneB Then it is arbitrary, if I just reject whats seems to be you notion of truth, then i don't see the wrongness of newtonian mechanics as long the scope is the proper one. If by using newtonian mechanics I can successfully describe/predict the motion of a ball, then at least that's knowledge (is that "the" truth?), it correspond to fact (is that "the" truth?), it is a satisfactory explanation (is that "the" truth?).
But beyond that, so the ontology changes sometimes in "key" aspect sometimes in "accessory" aspect, so what?? there is a "pureness" about ontology that is required and it should remain over time?. Is pretty obvious that science is an accumulative case, and it success is only because it correspond to a reality that can be described in a particular way for a particular scenery, and as it goes, deeper and wider the description is (Yoda?).
"The question is whether we account for this success by supposing that the theories correctly describe the world behind the phenomena."
Isn't the phenomena part of the world?? what is fundamental about that world that is not in the phenomena??.
Anyways, it seems to me that everything reduce to "truth".
@@diegonicucs6954 I don't understand your point. I'm using the term "truth" in the colloquial sense; I'm not assuming any particular philosophical analysis of the notion of truth. So I don't know what you mean when you suggest that you "just reject what seems to be your notion of truth".
Newtonian mechanics is definitely true in certain respects (its description of the behaviour of observables) and definitely not true in other respects (e.g. its description of the underlying structure of spacetime). Both of these aspects are relevant to the realism debate. Newtonian mechanics offers a remarkably powerful picture of observable phenomena, but it does so via an underlying theoretical picture that has now been completely displaced. Nobody who uses Newtonian mechanics these days takes it as true in general. Even you don't, since you recognize that it is accurate only within a particular scope. Antirealists simply extend this kind of attitude to all other theories, including those that have not yet been displaced.
"Isn't the phenomena part of the world??"
Yes, but it's not *all* the world, at least not according to any sophisticated scientific theory. Theories proceed by postulating structures, entities, and mechanisms beyond what we directly observe. It is this aspect of theory construction that drives much of the disagreement between contemporary realists and antirealists.
@@KaneB Well then your response agree with what I say, call newtonian physics false or wrong is arbitrary. Im not sure what colloquial "truth" is, but I will say that a notion of truth is relevant in any philosophical view, and is relevant is we are going to claim that something is wrong or false.
"but it does so via an underlying theoretical picture that has now been completely displaced." Again ontological commitments change, evolve, get smaller or bigger, don't see a problem with that.
"Yes, but it's not all the world".Sure, no one is saying that it is, but the world does not necessarily require a description as a unity or "the world", it could be described as a compositions of things and interactions, and each piece a truth
@@diegonicucs6954 It's false in some respects and not false in other respects. There is nothing arbitrary about that judgement.
It's not a problem that ontological commitments change. It is however relevant to the realism/antirealism debate, since what's in question in that debate is what attitude we should take to the ontological commitments of current theories.
So I'm not sure Kane is right that SR precludes idealism. Certainly the initial semantic claim he provided (there exists a mind independent reality), is at odds with idealism, but given some of what is said later, it seems what he means by mind independent is simply objective or something which all people would objectively pick out about the real world. Am I missing something here?
Also glad to hear (if I followed correctly) that Kane is a constructive empiricist. That is the most lit form of anti realism.
It depends on how you want to define "realism". Usually it is defined so as to rule out idealism. Some people might define it more broadly though, so that idealism counts as a form of realism. I don't think anything important hangs on precisely which definition we use.
What I mean by "mind-independent" is... well, mind-independent! I'm not sure which parts you are referring to, that you took to suggest a different meaning. But it's often the case that, when I'm talking off the top of my head, I'm not as precise in my speaking as I should be! So it could just be that I expressed myself in a sloppy way.
Also, yeah, I'm a kind of constructive empiricist. Van Fraassen has had a big influence on my philosophical views on general.
Thanks so much for the reply! I haven't finished the interview yet but I am enjoying it.
So when you initially said "mind independent" I took it in the way you apparently mean it (which I agree would seem to preclude idealism): there are things such that they would exist independent of minds. Obviously seeing as the idealist takes the mental to be fundamental this would necessarily preclude idealism.
There is a more colloquial use of mind independent which it seemed as if you were using at one point (for instance when you talked about experience of color as an example of something which is not objectively true, to be contrasted with things which are objectively true no matter who experiences them), that is to say that there are things which are objective facts of the matter to all men, such that I may go up and see a car and you go and see a car and (assuming our cognitive faculties are functioning properly) both of us can make the true predication "there is a car here". On this other use of "mind independent" we can take to mean something like "some x is y independently of what a subject thinks". Now the latter not only does not necessarily preclude idealism, but it is widely compatible with some of what I take to be the better forms of it, like the one found in the work of Bradley. On these sorts of views, one cannot properly say, in the sense you are describing, that anything is mind independent, however, there are genuinely true facts of reality which are static so to speak irregardless of the observer.
In addition, there are those (like Mike Jones and Johanan Raatz) who hold to physics based forms of idealism which would actually seem dependent on scientific realism in order to work. Now don't get me wrong, I don't take those views or arguments very seriously in the least, but it would seem to be an example of a kind of idealism which wouldn't work unless some form of SR is true. But perhaps I'm missing something here? I'm very new to phil science so that wouldn't surprise me.
Anyhow, that's just what I thought you were saying, but now I think I follow you more clearly. Thanks again for the reply! :)
Nice!
Why exactly is Kane B a scientific anti-realist? Is it because he thinks scientific theories (and the evidence for these theories) are misleading?
Excellent! Any good book recommendations on philosophy of science?
Understanding Philosophy of Science
by James Ladyman; The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science [this one is amazing because it has papers by many of the leading experts in the field writing on the various topics and central issues in phil sci]; and Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues edited by Cover [one of my favorite Purdue profs! I've had him in like 4 classes], Curd, and Pincock
I second the Cover, Curd, and Pincock collection. It's an excellent introductory anthology... unfortunately, it's pretty pricey, at least here in the UK, though you might be able to find the first edition for a reasonable price. Another good anthology is Lange's "Philosophy of Science: An Anthology". Many of the articles collected in these are available freely online, so it might be worth just looking at the contents and googling each article!
A good, straightforward introduction is Godfrey-Smith's "Theory and Reality". For a somewhat more eclectic introduction, I think Hacking's "Representing and Intervening" is unbeatable. It's a little dated now, but Hacking is an enormously entertaining writer and he puts more emphasis on scientific practice and experiment than most other introductions.
Theory and Reality by my compatriot Peter Godfrey-Smith
Representing and intervening by Ian Hacking and Arguing about science by Alexander Bird
I find the argument that because science is becoming more systematized and interconnected, it has become impossible to make scientific progress by throwing out the idea of the electron (as an example) to be very interesting. Will we end up in a position where science can make no more meaningful progress and the only hope of further discoveries will be to start the process completely over? These ponderings might keep me up at night.
What do you have in mind when you say “progress?” That’s a rather loaded term used in many different ways by many different philosophers of science. For example, Kuhn would resist the idea that progress is achieved through predictive/explanatory novelty.
@@brianh4625 You say "progress" is a loaded term but this ignores context. "Progress" would only be a loaded term if I used it to persuade but my comment was not an attempt at persuasion but rather an expression of my thoughts and feelings. Of course "progress" is a value-laden and perhaps even an emotive word but I don't think that makes the word problematic, especially in this context.
As for what I had in mind, do I need to have anything particular in mind? Could I not say "progress" and just mean 'progress, however it's defined' or 'that which most people would agree is progress' or 'that which seems like progres to me'? Don't get me wrong, it's a fair question but, as you say, the word can be used in many different ways so surely it can be used ambiguously and vaguely. As for what Kuhn says, well I'm tempted to quote Gone with the Wind.
@@Paradoxarn. I don't know much about emotive force when it comes to these things. They are just concepts, and technical ones at that. As such, they are ripe for analysis and scrutiny.
I suppose it *does* matter what you have in mind by "progress" since making the claim that progress is "impossible," and I assume the context here is a discussion of the philosophy of science, including the notion of scientific "progress." If what one means by "progress" is simply work-a-day scientific practice, then I see no threat to scientific progress. If what you mean is theory articulation, that doesn't seem threatened either. If what you mean is a the kind of disruptive revision of theoretical commitments represented by, for example, throwing out the electron, then claiming that such a move is "progressive" seems contentious, if not whiggish, depending on whether what means by "progressive" is "convergence on the truth." Certainly we wouldn't want just any old change to be considered "progressive" since then the term would fail to pick out anything or distinguish between different kinds of scientific change (for example, progressive or degenerative change). The philosophers who contributed to these discussions, e.g., Kuhn, Popper, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Laudan, Agassi, and others, all had different account of what scientific progress is. The credibility of the impossibility claim rests on the notion of "progress," for according to some it may be exceedingly implausible that progress is rendered impossible by the interdependence of theories as that interdependence itself may turn out to be a hallmark of progress. On other accounts, it may not be so implausible to claim that scientific progress is frustrated by theoretical interdependence (i.e., unification). All that said, there's good reason to believe that there is no such interdependence and that the sciences are relatively siloed even if they pay lip-service to their cousins. Cartwright, Feyerabend, Longino, and other advocates of theoretical pluralism would likely argue such a point.
I've not attributed any motive to you, whether that's to persuade or simply share your feelings. You articulated what I found to be an interesting thought, so I chose to engage (in good faith) just to pick your brain.
Sorry I don't know much about Philosophy of science literature But
What? Scientists are always working everyday scientists Trying to discover things and creating new technology Doing Scientific research they're making Scientific Progress
@@deathnote4171 Not all research is successful. As consumers of science’s products, the picture of science we don’t see the day to day failures and often the only “failures” (if we want to call them that) are the relatively rare cases of revolutions. But here’s something to consider: must scientific progress be characterized by the accumulation of knowledge? How are we to think of scientific changes that are not cumulative or even require us to discard previous results or phenomena to be explained? Not all scientific change is constructive/cumulative. And in working labs, striving for novelty is not encouraged nor is it likely to be funded unless there’s some crisis in science; there’s a lot of pressure to operate within previously accepted theoretical frameworks as opposed to breaking new ground aimed at upsetting 100 years of accepted cosmology; the expectation is that scientists work with those frameworks and apply them, refining but not essentially altering them. Work-a-day science is drudgery, not revolutionary (which partially explains why revolutions are so rare).
Newtonian mechanics is not a 'false theory'. It's application is limited. How can a false theory be useful? You admit usefulness but state falseness. Another strange phenomenon.
Something can be useful but false. It's useful to believe every gun is loaded when handling guns even though that's false
@@Sui_Generis0 Your loading gun example proves something but it is not a scientific schema. Most of the industrial revolution was on the basis of Newtonian Mechanics. It worked. After Einstein no ody believed in the universality of Newtonian Mechanics. If I were designing a train today, I would use NM not relativistic mechanics hence it is not a false theory. It's scope is well defined.
The problem with anti-realists is that they deny the existence of an external world and that our mathematical models (NM being an example) are approximations to reality depending on the context of use.
Metaphysics has degenerated into a Berklian distopia of fallen trees that were silent when they fell. Therein lies madness.
@@Sui_Generis0 In addition, your example is flawed. You don't believe every gun isoaded. You behave as if the guns are all loaded. Quite different.
i belive in god becuase there just has to be a god. if there is no god then i must be god. but im not god so there is god. god does exist .. if god doesnt exist i dont want to live anymore!
Sorry but God cannot exist
Two dead-end and self-contradictory philosophies battle out nothing for nothing. This is why philosophy is dead.
@existenceuniversityAnd why do you think so?
@@euphoria2832 Because they are Self-contradictory
@@ExistenceUniversitycould you expand more on your answer?
Why don't you both slow down? Many nonsensical statements are slipping through. There are knock down arguments in philosophy. You have not learnt from the history of philosophy. Idealism is dead. Anti-realism is dead.
We lead our lives in a realist world.
As long as it feels good they believe it. Magical thinking is all they have
One of the main problems with anti-realists is that they tend to be much more willing to justify atrocities. Be it with the early critics of Ontology in Nazi Germany, or the Post-Structuralists fascinated by and supporting Iran’s shift to Radical Islam, or the despotic Third World Liberation movements such as those in Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Mozambique, Uganda, Angola, the CAR, and later Rwanda.
What? Maybe I'm missing something, but I don't see the link between scientific anti-realism and all of those. Maybe you are talking about anti-realism in a whole, and not scientific anti-realism.
yeah bro Feyerabend was really gung ho on that Nazi shit
@@KyssifrotI was kinda stupid back in the day