If corporations have free speech, why can’t they serve prison time and cease operations for a time. I understand the economic impact would be huge. It would make compliance cheaper than the consequences and fines of skirting procedures.
Yes, very bad decision making. Boeing tried to charge customers for redundant AOA sensor logic in the MCAS automation, when it should have been base-line just for safety. So one malfunctioning AOA sensor, coupled with pilots not realizing that they were fighting an automated system, could crash the plane.
You could say this about all self regulated businesses. It's like putting the coyote in charge of the chicken coop.there are lots of them .construction is one example
DEI Diversity, equity and inclusion. People get triggered by this because their theory is that hiring non white males leads to a lower quality of workforce.
As others have pointed out, the NTSB report shows the four bolts were not present. These small bolts do not directly hold the door plug in place. The door plug is held by a set of robust brackets and pins. The door plug must be lifted upward to release it from these brackets. The missing bolts prevent it from moving up. Any single bolt is sufficient, so the system is 4-way redundant. The error was that Boeing had removed the door plug after taking delivery of the finished fuselage from Spirit to address an unrelated mistake (5 misdrilled holes) and then, upon reinstalling the door, neglected to reinstall and inspect the 4 bolts. Humans make mistakes. The failure to reinstall the bolts was not the root-cause. As you point-out, the root-cause is systemic. There must be sufficient time and staff to do the job right. Double and triple checking must be done by independent inspectors. The list of shortcomings goes on and on. Corporate greed, and a shift from engineer focus to business focus, absolutely contributed to this and other 737 MAX (not to mention 787 Dreamliner) failures at Boeing. However, I’d argue the real root-cause is simple human complacency. Like the space shuttle disasters and numerous industrial and civil engineering disasters in the past, it is extremely difficult to justify safety dollars, resources and time over long periods (years and decades) when things are working fine. There were over 98 MILLION commercial jet departures in the U.S. in 2023 with ZERO lives lost. The last inflight U.S. commercial jet fatal accident was in 2009 (Colgan Air 3407). That was 14 years ago. Over 1 BILLION safe takeoffs and landings. How does one justify year after year continued high investment in safety protocols with a record like that? How do you argue that a cost reduction of 5% here and 3% there unduly puts lives at risk? How do you distinguish between a dollar well spent and a dollar wasted? I am not defending Boeing (or NASA or countless other organizations who fell into the same trap). We pay these organizations to provide their services safely. And I am as appalled as anyone (as an engineer, likely more so) to see how far Boeing has fallen. I am just pointing out that, as humans, we tend to focus our time, energy, and dollars on the problems immediately in front of us. After DECADES and BILLIONS of event free flights, should anyone really be surprised that Boeing got complacent and lapses are appearing?
I'm a B1/B2 engineer in Europe. The US talks money - as you do. Europe also speaks money, but will spend as necessary. The US only spends the money during the next maintenance evolution - and I know engineers who refuse to work with American companies for that reason. As an aircraft engineer I want the number of safe take off's to equal the number of safe landings in perpetuity, not we've done a billion so 200 dead is acceptable due to money reasons...
@@lastlion65 MCAS was an unknown automated system (-unknown to the crash victims-) operating in the background. The action that the pilots took (other than turning off the stab trim actuators) should have disengaged the autopilot(s). Maybe if they would have known about MCAS (which was kept out of the manuals), they would have taken a different set of actions. They also didn't know that MCAS became active once the flaps/slats were set to the cruise/0 position. In one instance, they did shut off the stab trim, but turned it back on because they had trouble manually trimming the airplane due to the high aerodynamic load on the stabilizer.
Boeing used to be the greatest innovative engineering company-- then it got rid of the engineering executive to replace it with MBAs when it merged with McDonnell Douglas, which put maximizing business profit for stock prices, and cutting corners as the priority. It has been that way ever since on all their aircract and aerospace ever since-- not just the 737 max. Investigate the Starliner that Boeing is trying to make-- failure after failure, it is embarrassing and scary that they think of putting humans into flying it some day... the entire thing should be cancelled!
Thanx for this video 👍🏻 One thing: The pilots of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, the second Boeing 737 MAX to crash due to issues related to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), were aware of the existence of the MCAS system by the time of their flight. Following the crash of Lion Air Flight 610, which was the first 737 MAX crash attributed to MCAS malfunctions, Boeing and aviation authorities had disseminated information about the MCAS system and issued directives on how to counteract its unintended activation. According to the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority’s preliminary report and further investigations, the pilots of Flight 302 attempted to follow the emergency procedures that Boeing had outlined, which included disabling the electric trim system, a part of the process for shutting off MCAS. However, despite these efforts, they were unable to regain control of the aircraft. The reports indicated that the pilots struggled to manually adjust the trim due to the aerodynamic forces acting on the aircraft’s control surfaces, which made manual trimming via the trim wheel extremely difficult if not impossible under the flight conditions they were experiencing.
The All-in Podcast covered this a a few weeks ago. Specifically about the relationship between legislators, federal agencies and Boeing and essentially all other big businesses with lobbyists in DC. America is crumbling and special interest is gobbling up profits & power over innovation and a vibrant future.
7:30 - it actually seems that the four bolts were not there at all! The construction of the door plug is such that these bolts don't bear the load but prevent the plug from sliding up and thus clearing the tabs that keep it shut. Think of a battery cover of a TV remote or such - the cover typically slids into grooves to keep it closed. Sometimes - in toys at least - there is also screw that does prevent the lid from sliding out of the grooves. The bolts are like that screw.
Yes, but nuts and bolts, no matter how secure (without welding them down), are always subject to the potential of vibration loosening. Had Boeing added something as simple mid bolt cotter pin to ensure they couldn't potentially unthread from vibrations then there would be no question as to if they were not installed at all or detached over time. That isn't exactly a costly redundancy, and likely would have put a set of eyes on the bolts yet one more time to ensure they were there. Redundancy, redundancy, redundancy on potential failure points like this make long life vehicles, like planes, safer in the long run.
@@billyoung9538 AFAIK - the bolts were supposed to have cotter pins. Seems at the moment that there was no problem with the *design* of the system. Instead the problem is *operational*. In short: the bolts were not installed (and cottered) at all after the door plug was closed - and the QA procedure did not catch that.
@@EneriGiilaan I thought I read elsewhere that cotter pins were not part of the design; however if they were, then that's most certainly a dead giveaway that they were never installed.
Further indication of the bolts not being installed - One of the reports I read indicated that Boeing admitted their production records should have documented the bolts being installed, but the record for that plane does not.
I wonder if it was forced to, if Boeing could even *make* a new blank slate airframe now, they've been recycling the same designs for so many decades and getting it "grandfathered" in I don't think they have enough real engineers left
You mentioned AA and the 737, but left off an airline that flies exclusively 737 and their interest and viability depending on operating a single type certificate Southwest. The discussions between SWA and the FAA forced the retirement of SWAs older type models 737-300 and 400 if they wanted to add the MAX to their operating certificate
Boeing has some major corporate governance problems going on, and developed very poor work practices simply because they were not willing to pay experienced engineers and workers what they were worth and spent way too much effort off-shoring and exporting work to third parties, and then trying to force those third parties to cut costs while allowing poor quality workmanship to continue. But... a few corrections here. First, the bolts were not loose. They were missing entirely... the bolts were never re-installed after the maintenance/repair to nearby rivets. And proof of this shows up in a picture taken by one of the maintenance workers documenting the work done on nearby structural members that necessitated removing the door-plug during the maintenance. They never reinstalled the bolts after putting the door-plug back in. Second, the bolts are not load-bearing. They do not "hold" the door in place. Pressure holds the door in place against opposing pins. The bolts simply prevent the door plug from sliding upward off the pins (which is how the door plug gets removed for maintenance). Loose bolts found in later inspections of other aircraft are a serious concern, but loose bolts were not the cause of the accident. Missing bolts were the cause. Since the bolts are not load-bearing it literally only takes one, loose or not, to prevent the door from dislodging from its structural pins. The design of the door-plug itself is not at issue. It is a reasonable, solid design. Unlike the MCAS mess where Boeing was so focused on keeping the same type rating for the Max as for prior models that they messed up the automation. Not only did they mess up the automation, but they made redundant AOA sensor logic a value-add extra feature that airlines had to pay for instead of base-line. Two culprits. The first was the MCAS override automation that prevented pilots from regaining control of the aircraft, and the second was not integrating data from both AOA sensors into the MCAS system from the start, so one bad AOA sensor could crash the plane. -Matt
It seems the corporate governance problems really took off after the merger with McDonnell-Douglas in 1996. Mc Donnell had a terrible reputation, in the industry, but shareholders loved their management, because they generated dividends by cutting margins.
@@TwoBitDaVincihes 100% not an airline pilot. I'm a pilot and I know I'm not qualified to discuss the 737 Max issues. I'm not sure why or how you thought you could. You kind of don't understand well how type certificates work, or why manufacturers opt to make models of planes they already had type certificated. You realize a brand new plane, has far more risk of an accident, than an older type certificated one that's been type certificated since the 50s.. A new plane would still look and fly similar to a 50s plane anyway, I'm talking a brand new one like imagine a 797. The 50s style has stuck and will remain that way. If you understand how jet airliners and jet engines work, you'd know that full power on engines makes the nose of the plane go up. MCAS was an unfortunate software flaw, but the plane itself, is absolutely fine and safe. The bean counters at boeing screwed things up, but the 737 itself is an airworthy plane. An airworthy isn't a general term, it's literally an FAA term. Airworthiness Directives or ADs are issued to manufacturers with problem planes, so they fix that problem. MCAS is fixed. The 737 is fine and safe. Even the new models. Pilots don't go around making videos about how doctors do doctor stuff, but non pilots constantly make videos on aviation and piloting as if they know what they're talking about. While your research was somewhat thorough, you still drew incorrect conclusions.. Also, the FAR is only for the US, therefore it has zero regulatory power over Ryan Air. And whenever people who don't understand aviation or how becoming a pilot works say "pilot training". I'm like. Ugh. Ok. So where do pilots go to get their magical pilot training? Being a pilot isn't a job. You don't get trained like it's on the job training. It's more like study and practice than training. And you don't just apply at an airline and get training directly in a jet for a couple dozen hours and boom your a pilot in an airline. But whenever "pilot training" is mentioned clueless people think that's how it works.
I too have a flight on American Airlines in a few days, interestingly enough it doesn't say what plane I am boarding😬. Thanks for explaining the MCAS issue, you did a better job than Frontlines explanation. It was nice knowing you😢.
The FAA after the MCAS fiasco and deaths, authorized airlines to not report to passengers/ticket buyers the model of the aircraft they will be flying. Corruption again at every alphabet agency.
There's sites where you can look up what aircraft flies a given flight. I looked up mine since I was flying a week after the door incident. I live a few miles from the Everett factory so my usual bias is at least a bit pro-Boeing, but I've never been happier to be on an Airbus haha.
Good summary. I have friends in the aviation safety industry who, when the Lion Air crash happened, all were dumbfounded when they found out it was because of the MCAS. These aviation safety experts had no idea what MCAS was and how it got installed on these airplanes without their knowledge, the knowedge of the operating airlines flight departments or the pilots who were flying them. Certainly this was criminal, but no one was held responsibe in any meaningful way (like being imprisoned.)
a lot of conjecture and speculation at 10:26. I highly doubt the aircraft maintenance manual included checking plugged doors for a pressurization issue. the other doors with seals affected by opening and closing, pressure controllers, pressure sensors and pressure valves are all likely to have been checked. Furthermore, there is documented evidence that alaska did troubleshooting (not ignoring behind closed doors).
Well, if we count the 737 predecessors it's even older. The 737 is based on the 727, which in turn is based on the 707, which in turn derived from the 367-80 from 1954. Well, guess how many of the current car designs are technically still going back to a 70 years old design, sharing the very same layout? 🤯😉
I think a key difference is that with cars, they just get easier and easier to drive as they evolve (to the point that they now drive themselves). The way you drive a car has barely changed at all over the decades other than the changes from manual to automatic to hybrid transmission. But stickshift is driven pretty much the same way today as the first ones that came out. No real need to "train" for new systems. It's not the same with airplanes. Pilots need to train for a million different failure scenarios
@@ipp_tutorIt doesn’t really matter how much training a pilot gets, if the MCAS overrides his commands. How can that be approved? The pilot is ultimately responsible for flying the plane.
They did not test the MCAS system adequately. According to this video they treated it as a plug-in software system between pilot and control surfaces that would comp for undesirable flight mode's. The engineers thought they understood what MCAS was all about. Boy were they wrong. Debugging a complicated software program is much harder than a person might think. Not-so-funny things can happen at the extreme edges of the flight envelope. I wonder if management shut down some complaining engineers who were arguing that MCAS is not ready?
@@ipp_tutorare you a pilot? I'm so tired of people who don't comprehend how someone becomes a pilot, always mention "more pilot training". What. Does. That. Mean? Where do pilots go to get this magical training? Millions of scenarios is a huge exaggeration. In fact pilots these days are garbage, they can't solve a problem in which they didn't "train" for that exact scenario. It's not like the older days where a sudden problem that wasn't "trained" for and wasnt on a checklist could be overcome by compotent pilots. Today's pilots just want a job and free travel and the only way they get into it is by applying for a loan at a pilot mill which only craps out garbage pilots. It doesn't matter how safe a plane is sometimes things go wrong, and having garbage career pilots doesn't help whatsoever
They weren’t loose bolts, they hadn’t even been fitted. The NTSB showed photographs of the mounting holes and there was no sign on the factory paint that they had ever been there.
A big issue is that Boeing subcontracts manufacturing of the fuselage to a third party manufacturer (Spirit Aerosystems), who use a different QA system, incompatible with that which Boeing use. Much of this is due to bean counters.
Blancoliro (Juan Brown) covers this and other aircraft accidents. The Boeing series of planes are closer to the ground. Airbus is higher off the ground (taller landing gear). Thus, when Boeing wanted to put larger engines on the aircraft, they had to put them further in front of the wing, which caused instability which was supposed to be corrected by computer control, but had issues causing the earlier 2 crashes. The 'door plug' incident is LIKELY because the door plug was slid into place, but the bolts holding the interlock were never installed. . Pilots DID notice that the 'cabin pressure' knob was set higher than it should have been to maintain pressure, so they KNEW that there was an issue (either a leak, or not enough pressure from the system). They DID make a note of it, every time the plane flew, but management either didn't get the memo, or ignored it. . I really hope this doesn't kill Boeing (and Spirit, their fuselage builder) as aircraft manufacturers. They have a backlog of probably 1600 aircraft - so the pressure is on Spirit to get the fuselage's 'out the door' as fast as possible. There are all kinds of issues, including extra holes drilled for non-matching bolt holes in the rear tail plug that point to issues at Spirit.
Actually every time the issue was noted down engineers checked into it. The system itself was exchanged twice from what I remember. But it's difficult to find a leak on the ground, where there is no pressure difference. But I always was curious as to why exactly the two seats in front of the plug were empty. Did the cabin crew notice something? Sadly the voice recorder was over written, that could have been a very interesting conversation?
@@jantjarks7946 The null pressure difference in the ground isn't a problem. They can (and do) easily pressurize the cabin at ground level to check for leaks. It's not an issue at all
I can't remember if it was Juan's channel or elsewhere but there was a picture of the plug after being re installed for the final time which showed the bolts missing. In addition , the holes where tho bolts screw into had UNDISTURBED PAINT which indicates bolts were never installed.
@@jantjarks7946 The problem possibly would not have been found simply by pressuring the plane at ground-level. Pressurization actually stops the leak and holds the door plug solidly in place. Plus, no vibration at ground level sitting in a hanger. The problem was happening during ascent, before pressurization created a large enough differential to solidly hold the door plug in place. Though there is also a question as to whether the door plug was even completely seated in the frame... that is currently an unknown. If it was not seated then it would have been a ticking time bomb at any altitude and the result would have been catastrophic if it had happened at 36000 feet. If it was seated, the door wasn't going to go anywhere at cruising altitude. Too much pressure differential for vibration to dislodge it. So at least in this case, the danger period was during the initial ascent... high engine vibration coupled with a low pressure differential. -Matt
@@davegreen7594might work better in a plane if you can pressurize the plane while the engines are shut down on the ground, much less interference. I can only imagine how much of a pain it is to use the same device in a active factory, so much stuff is probably making noise in that detection range that the poor device probably gets overwhelmed
Alaska Airlines did not randomly decide to ignore pressurization advisories. Boeing's documentation and Akaska's procedures tells them what they can and can't do. There is no way they had a concern about that door plug and flew anyway.
A very clear and succinct explanation of a technically complex system in the MCAS and Boeing’s role in hiding it to avoid further pilot training. Great job.
I will never forgive Boeing for the way they handled the MCAS debacle. The Company used to be run by Engineers, it's now ruled by Bean Counters. They have contracted some of their Engineering out to Mumbai, India. I'm sure the Indian Engineers are capable, but I'm concerned that it's no longer as possible for them to communicate to the Home Office Bean Counters a firm NO when they have an issue that might conflict with safety. Thank goodness my home town airline flys Airbus to the places I want to visit.
There are a couple you-tube channels dedicated to this sort of thing. One of them is run by a pilot who goes into some detail in a readily understandable way. It's called Mentour Pilot.
The better one will be the Blancolirio channel (Juan Browne). Though Mentour is good too, it tends to offer less technical explanations. Juan offers highly technical explanations made understandable to anyone.
These stories are so chilling. I have a hugely empathetic personality and recollections like this made me start to cry. It could have happened to any of us or our loved ones. 😢
Correct. The planes have two AOA sensors but the MCAS logic only used one or the other, it did not check the two sensors against each other. Boeing had made the dual-sensor logic a value-add feature that airlines could pay for, and most airlines had not opted for that feature. Boeing should never have done that... they should have integrated both AOA sensors into MCAS from the start as baseline. So in the case of MCAS, it was pure corporate greed that led to the deaths. In addition to that, the pilots did not have instruction and the cockpit did not have proper indication that MCAS was overriding their control inputs, which prevented the pilots from regaining control of the aircraft when MCAS went nuts due to the bad AOA sensor. A software problem. But also due to corporate greed because Boeing was trying to keep the original 737 type certificate intact for the Max and so wanted to make MCAS quietly operate in the background just generally. So again, Boeing made very bad decisions all in an effort to keep the blasted 737 type rating for the 737 Max. -Matt
Look Two Bit all those airlines have to do is pay their monthly "software maintenance and upgrade fees" to get the "latest firmware push" that allows the pilot to manually control the plane during an event of tailspin or imminent crash. That's all.
I am on vacation. Both flights to get here were in 737Max. The first 737Max9. On the Max9, the cabin pressure was very poorly controlled. Why can’t they close loop that thing?
I once worked at a medical manufacturing company with a broken culture. I didn’t think that this would happen when the product is life and death. It does. Greed undermines leadership. Leadership is the fertilizer that keeps the weeds down.
I worked as an engineer, chief engineer, sr. engineering manager and program manager for several major aerospace companies including Boeing, United Technologies, Honeywell and Parker Hannifin for 25 years. The video is well done and well researched. In regards to 737 Max incidents, the blame is with Boeing. The MCAS system was a total travesty. There are System Safety Assessments done and Design Assurance Levels assigned. Someone at Boeing had to blatantly sell the wrong classification to the FAA. It should have been a DAL A system which is “Catastrophic”. This would have driven independent sensor redundancy into the system without a common failure mode. This is not something that was difficult. The lives were sacrificed due to corporate greed. I did a write up before the investigation was done with my theory and it was correct. The door plug incident is still primarily Boeing’s fault. The sensors faults that the pilots and maintenance crews would experience have different levels of severity. Systems could be on a MMEL list and the aircraft would be allowed to dispatch with certain restrictions. I am assuming that the fault message was more of a warning message and determined to be a nuisance fault. Nuisance faults happen the time time and are difficult to diagnose. If it was on a subsystem, they could just replace the entire thing. Finding a pressure leak on the aircraft would seem to be difficult on the ground. I have worked with airlines that have had to clear MELs on the systems of my former companies and depending on the Functional Hazard Analysis and System Safety Assessment may not seem like a big concern. Alaska took some action because of the unknown but probably assessed the issue as a low DAL level problem. In reality, explosive decompression is not a minor failure. The Alaska engineers and maintenance personnel should have talked with the Boeing customer support. Boeing may have assessed a low impact. I do not know what happened behind the scenes but ultimate culpability resides with Boeing. That plane should have never been turned over to a revenue customer. I was angry with Boeing when I heard about this. I worked on the defense side and not with commercial aircraft but they were one of the poorest company cultures that I have worked for. They had some good engineers but also many that would not match up to the typical Tier 1 supplier like a Honeywell or United Technologies. I have worked with aerospace companies and certification bodies around the globe and I am extremely disappointed with Boeing. I worked a lot with Airbus and Embraer as well. Boeing was once the “gold standard “ but corporate greed took priority over technical and safety. Do not get me wrong. I believe that Boeing aircraft are safe but it should not take incidents like this to improve their quality and stop them from cutting certification corners. They are not the only company that has done this. I would have executives coerce the engineers into shipping products that barely passed ATP but showed functional concerns. This was done to make month end quotas. I have gotten negative feedback from leadership when I wrote a technical analysis that a subsystem failure mode could cause a fire. Long story but I appreciated the video. Air travel is safe and keeping the pressure on the industry will keep it reliable and reduce incidents like this.
Amazing video. You did a great job covering this topic. What a masterful explanation of why Boeing kept on making new versions of the 737. It's hard to measure who was greedier, if American Airlines or Boeing.
AA has nothing to do with the Max debacle. Look into the bill of sale terms Southwest had negotiated with Boeing. Boeing conceded that if Simulator differences training was required by the FAA on the Max Southwest would reportedly get a 1 million dollar rebate per airframe. This penalty alone drove Boeing managers to make decisions that were, in hindsight, incredibly stupid.
The ironic thing (well, another one) is that the impossible costly and lengthy regulation for certification of new planes was probably proposed by Boeing themselves through their lobbyist in DC to prevent new companies entering the market.
That was an outstanding video , you pretty much nailed it . Aviation has had 2 major obstacles that discourages the manufactures from modernizing their designs , government bureaucracy and lawyers . If an aircraft crashed do to a meteorite hitting it there would still be a lawyer somewhere trying to sue the aircraft's manufacturer .
We have a trip coming up that will have us on two 737s going out and two again coming back. One of them is supposed to be a Max 8. The other three are not published. But it is known that WestJet has both 737-800 and 737-700 in their fleet.
Out of all the research I've done on aircraft. The 737 Max 7 would be a private plane to own for me. For one the price, the Max 7 is around $100 Million. And Two, the range possibilities. The hazard issues are noted but not warranted.
Very good research!! I wonder in main steam media will ever do as much research as you have done here! I bet most people won't ever have this info.. This will be covered up because of airlines, boing, and government bottom line. From this research we can see that FAA, boing and airlines are all at fault. This means that revenue is more important than lives! And do we even have a choice not to fly boing any longer! I hope this video spreads quickly and people start to boycott boing!!
It's a big call to say that the airline decided to not use two seats because they were worried about a plug door. That would have required quite a few staff from various departments to arrange such a 'risk mitigation'. Also - why suspect a plug door - there are many more likely leak paths and any attempt to find them would have started elsewhere. If the plug door was suspected of leaking, an inspection would have been called for - having worked for an international airline, I find it inconceivable that any licenced engineer - let alone a team (as would have been involved) would have contemplated such an idea - or even thought that somehow only two seats would have been at risk in the event of such a massive depressurisation (if at cruising height). Also, while there has been talk of 'loose bolts', there hasnt been a report on which bolts. Also as the four bolts that lock the door down into its tracks act as stops, and have locking pins, they dont need to be 'tight' to do their job perfectly well.
Maybe the long certification process is causing more harm than good, encouraging the continued use of older less safe modified designs instead of newer designs.
WOW WOW WOW this is the best explanation of the MCAS system failures. They completely left it out and the pilots had no idea this system was countering for the engine re-positioning. People really should be in jail for that. And they tried to blame the pilots since they were from "3rd world" countries. SHAME!
Great video and a well deserved call-out. Should've kept the original title, bc you're right; AA and Boeing are greedily gambling with our lives. Safe Travels!
This is why healthy competition is necessary - in just about every industry, wherever one company utterly dominates a market, there is serious stagnation. In this case, Boeing was raking in cash using the same old design, and rather than invest that into engineering a better design, they just kept the revenue. Once an all-around better competitor comes along, suddenly the old leader is caught with their pants down and they have to figure out how to respond within a timely manner. That's difficult when you're talking something as large, complex, and life-threatening as an airplane.
The issue with competition is that eventually someone wins and Boeing won. The cost to get into the industry is simply too large for another plane manufacturer to get into the market while Boeing has incumbent advantage.
@@narvuntien Key word there was *healthy* competition. It's possible to have multiple companies all vying for #1 in the same market. In such situations, there's a lot more innovation, price-competitiveness, quality, efficiency, etc. Doesn't matter what the market is, they're all like this so long as there's always someone there stoking the fire.
In 2019 I was booked on a flight on China Eastern from Guangzhou to Beijing. I could see that they had flown 737 MAX planes on the route, but the booking site showed they were going to fly a 737-400 on it, in both directions. (Had it been a Max I'd have refused to go.) Anyway, day of the flight, and China Eastern had substituted the plane again - with an Airbus A320. This being China I'm sure I wouldn't have got a straight answer had I enquired, but I am curious as to why they made the second change, unless passengers were too scared of boarding anything saying "737" on it.
Thank you for this video. This is the first explanation for what happened that really seemed to fill in the relevant details without couching it in corporate-speak. For lll of the Libertarians out there who decry regulations; this is a perfect example of why we need regulations to protect the public safety from those whose primary motives are other than public safety first. Greed will forever override doing the right thing unless there are laws and rules in place that safeguard against it.
It is amazing that you know how to fix the problem! Why on earth the maintenance of Alaska Air doing? Also the Pilots are nuts because the took the thing so easy, then the management of Alaska is so clever to limit the flight of this airplane to short trips! My god those are wrong people working in this industry !!! Appreciate your presentation.
I am not disagreeing with anything you said but just adding , 1) that part of the decision might also have been the lion’s share of efficiency gains are from new engines 2) I thought Southwest was the airline pushing hard for no pilot retraining 3) I think there are people at Boeing that should have been charged criminally . There are documents showing they lied to the FAA about MCAS and how much authority it had, during certification process Even the head pilot later, wrote a memo saying something to the effect, “oops, I unknowingly lied to the FAA” and he never contacted them
Hi Mr. Da Vinci I'm new to the channel and thank you for video. What you are saying I agree 100%, just one thing though I too blame Alaska Airlines somewhat because of their oversight, I think when they knew and first heard about this problem with this particular aircraft, they should have got their flight engineers involved and checked it out. They have the equipment to check for pressure leak if they could not do anything then they would have gone to Boeing and ask for assistance, this plane should have been grounded from the start. I work with an Airline company and day after day, we are reminded about the overall super critical importance of safety in our line of work and this is certainly most definitely highlighted in our trainings whether it's online, virtual or classroom and it doesn't matter which department you work within the airline as everyone, whether you are a manager working managing a ticketing office or a cargo employee or even a simple ramp staff loading aircraft, it is quintessential that you know about safety so what bothers me the most is HOW an "Aircraft Manufacturer " who designs and builds aircraft could prioritise, revenue overall because they do not want Airbus to get the upper hand over QUALITY AND SAFETY which is suppose and needs to be the number one priority? Its OK I get they did not want to build a new aircraft from scratch as it would have cost millions and Airbus would have gained the upper hand. Fine but they should have done it the right way, the correct way the SAFE way and we would have not ended with a Catastrophic disaster.
@@LuisSierra42 yeah he said they shared responsibility, but he also said but theoretically the airline did not put anyone in those seats because they knew. It could be pure coincidence, but it could also have been done on purpose, until the conclusion of this investigation we can only guess.
I’ve read people seated next to that door on previous flights complained about noise. If Alaska Airlines suspected a leak at that door, and didn’t seat anyone there because of it, I don’t see that as a failure on their part. A noisy air leak in an airliner can be, and most often is, nothing more than an irritating noise. Like a noisy widow seal on your car. Leaving those seats empty might be just a kind gesture towards passengers. If a door seal noise problem is intermittent it may be impossible to find by doing a static test on the ground with no high speed exterior air flow, even if you simulate altitude pressure. And, with nothing to suggest otherwise it might not be enough to suggest there was even a remote chance of catastrophic failure. Alaska taking that plane off the long over water flights, and not seating anyone by door, seems like proper caution.
@Bitterrootbackroads OK, however my point that I'm saying is did they really perform the test, intermittent or not, I get what your saying don't get me wrong. Because to me it seems as if they were saying " this plane is new, it's not worth the time, we will not let it fly over water, and possibly probably if they knew coincidence or not block those two seats, we will not allow people to book them. To me if Alaska Airlines at least did the test, that alleviates them from any suspicion and the blame falls solely on Boeing.
Watch the video by Mentour Pilot about the leaking cabin pressure. He has a great explanation of why Alaska took the steps they did and why he, as a professional pilot would probably take the same steps.
Thing is these planes are still much safer than your car. There are so many redundant systems and pilot (2 min, working in well trained tandem) checks, that it takes quite a bit to reach the point where one crashes.
@@jjwallnutts No, but that sort of thing also happens. A cousin of mine had it happen to him. Was a few decades ago and I do have a LOT of cousins. The reason this is news is precisely because these sorts of things are so rare. "Today nothing unusual happened" doesn't sell papers nor collect views.
Technically, in the specic instance. Boeing forgot to put the bolts back into the airplane. Ultimately, Boeing workers removed the plug so Spirit could redo some rivets. Then Boeing did not reinstall the bolts into the plug.
The bolts were removed by Boeing for an unrelated fix (bad rivets near the door, which were found twice in the same place even after Spirit had supposedly fixed them), and never put back. Check the video from Mentour Pilot, there's a lot of detail there. The airline knew there were issues with pressurization, so they prevented the plane to fly over water. But this issue was not obvious to the pilots and seemed just like a fault of the main pressure controller, which has 2 redundancies, so they just switched for one of the spares and that apparently fixed the warnings on the cockpit. That deemed the apparent problem as not flight-critical (therefore, not so urgent as to ground the aircraft before a maintenance check). The possibility that the airline knew that this specific hidden door-plug had a problem and for that reason they didn't put passengers in front of it is just... a very serious conjecture. I doubt pilots would be willing to fly the aircraft at all if they knew about a potential fuselage compromise.
9:34 The "depressurisation incidents" referred to were warnings about a fault with the auto-pressure system. It has basically nothing to do with the door blowout. If Alaska had deliberately left those seats empty because they were worried about the door plugs, why were people seated in 26C and D, next to the same door plug on the opposite side of the aircraft? Are you suggesting that Alaska were fully aware not only that a door plug wasn't sealed properly, but also which one it was - and they didn't bother to install four bolts?? That's ridiculous.
I flew back from Las Vegas the very next morning into Portland. I flew out the day before the Duke door plug blew out. I flew back the next morning on Southwest a Max nine which is the same as a max eight the pilot come on and told us all to keep our seatbelt secured tightly that we were going to experience turbulence. We never hit any turbulence, and when we boarded the aircraft, they told us to spread out that we needed to make the plane More balanced, there was only 80 people on the aircraft. I noticed that they were moving people from those particular spots away from where the door plugs were that totally makes me angry now after the fact they knew about this problem and never told us they told us about the turbulence which was a lie. They knew that this had a problem and didn’t want us to be sucked out of the airplane when the plug blew out. What a disgusting bunch Southwest should be sued over that themselves.
09:20 - they complained , any issue with the aircraft even before Max they have to report to Boeing and Boeing advised them on what to do and if it's safe to fly further and so on, which probably they said it's okay and gave them some parameters that they can keep flying the aircraft as this could be due to a faulty sensor. Faulty sensors are usually the most common issue and in some cases aircrafts can fly like that for a short period of time, ofc depends if it's a known issue, risks and the list continues.
Your video emphasizes the link with the design engineering failures in the MCAS control system in the earlier fatal crashes, which is important. But I suspect that the final NTSB report, and the info released so far, will identify a different culprit it this latest accident. It is a failure in quality control (QC) and the broader quality management system (QMS). QC is a technical term used to refer specifically to quality inspection processes, to verify that a manufacturing step conforms to spec. QMS covers a broader range of processes, from design to assembly to inspection to delivery, as well as the auxiliary information systems, to ensure that a product is delivered with high quality. It seems that this failure did not involve the design engineers, but a completely different part of Boeing's organization, as well as its relationship with a key supplier Spirit Aerosystems, the now-independent company that operates the Wichita, Kansas plant that makes 737 fuselages (which Boeing spun-off around 2005).
Just stop whining about greed when simple incompetence is at the root. The regulatory process is just as much to blame. It's the FAA that considers a 737-100 and MAX-9 the 'same airplane'. I'd rather have a Pilot's consortium or union determine airworthiness over any bureaucrat who is easily bribed.
Ryanair said they're be having less flights this summer so flight prices will increase about 10%. Is this because some of their 737 planes will be grounded?
Could it have been possible that two people got sucked out of the plane? If the airline knew about the possible occurrence of the plug getting blown out why were the seats on the right side of the plane filled? Something just doesn't add up.
The door plug failure concerned me so I spent some time looking into it. It turns out that Boeing purchases the 737 fuselages from Spirit Airlines with the door plugs installed and was pressuring Spirit to deliver them faster. I had heard one comment that it was unclear who was supposed to do final inspection on those plugs since "Boeing has to remove them anyway". I work for a company where people's lives depend on our products and we take that seriously. People's lives also depend on Boeing's products and it does not seem like they take that seriously. The number of Quality Management Failures at Boeing (on the 737 and the Starliner) is absurd. Likely one reason is that in 2019 Boeing decided to move more toward a car manufacturing model and laid off 900 Quality Inspectors. I heard there was pressure to rehire them but the fact that they did it in the first place show where their priority is. And where was the FAA in this whole process? I am not a big fan of regulation but for companies the make products people's lives depend on, regulation in a must. Every change that could affect quality needs an independent review including process changes. Really the door plug is only the tip of the iceberg. There are other 737 airworthiness issues that on this aircraft that stem from not doing proper Risk and Quality assessments.
In this particular case the fuselage needed remedial work after delivery on some rivets or bolts or something that happened to be near the door plug, which required the removal of the door plug in order to do the work. The remedial work itself had nothing to do with the door plug mechanism or structure beyond the need to remove it in order to do the other work. So the initial installation of the door-plug by Spirit was not to blame. It was the failure to reinstall the bolts after completion of the remedial work and reinstallation of the door-plug that was to blame.
@@junkerzn7312 I heard that too but I think there evidently some confusion on the installation and inspection. There is a chance it came from Spirit without the bolts and confused the Boeing personnel but that should have been caught by an inspection procedure at Boeing - if there is one. Maybe the issue is that there is no way to perform the inspection after the install. If so, that seems like a design issue that should have been caught with an FMEA.
The foreign purchase planes did opt for the option of having Two AOA vanes. When there are two AOA vanes and the is a difference between the two it flashes on the MCAS. The foreign air Services skipped that $66,000. Option. Was major difference. With difference warning while having two AOA vanes the pilots would have turned off the MCAS. Manuals says when you get that warning the pilot is supposed to use his judgement as to the real angle of the plane is.
The fact that no one went to jail for MCAS is disgusting.
So true!!
If you are rich, the laws simply don't apply to you
If corporations have free speech, why can’t they serve prison time and cease operations for a time. I understand the economic impact would be huge. It would make compliance cheaper than the consequences and fines of skirting procedures.
rich people don't go to jail
It's aint just disgusting. It's America.
The mcas debockle is actually a bigger deal than the door situation because it reveals dangerous decision making .
DEI nonsense.
Yes, very bad decision making. Boeing tried to charge customers for redundant AOA sensor logic in the MCAS automation, when it should have been base-line just for safety. So one malfunctioning AOA sensor, coupled with pilots not realizing that they were fighting an automated system, could crash the plane.
And possibly criminal behavior. It’s one thing to make poor engineering decisions, it’s another to lie to the FAA about them
You could say this about all self regulated businesses. It's like putting the coyote in charge of the chicken coop.there are lots of them .construction is one example
Corporations have established that fatality rates are not only acceptable for doing business, but are also “negotiable”.
In a word: *YES* It's a rotten corporate culture. _retired airline pilot_
Do you think dei is partially responsible for the corporate culture ?
@katiegreene3960
Was Boeing asked to refit the plane with a new pronoun and a new gender assignment? If not, then no, dei is not responsible.
@@katiegreene3960 what means DEI ?
@@katiegreene3960 Doubt it, BOEING management is not exactly a diverse crowd
DEI Diversity, equity and inclusion. People get triggered by this because their theory is that hiring non white males leads to a lower quality of workforce.
I love the way you think, rational, organized and thorough and it shines through all your videos, not many opinions, rather educated guesses.
As others have pointed out, the NTSB report shows the four bolts were not present. These small bolts do not directly hold the door plug in place. The door plug is held by a set of robust brackets and pins. The door plug must be lifted upward to release it from these brackets. The missing bolts prevent it from moving up. Any single bolt is sufficient, so the system is 4-way redundant. The error was that Boeing had removed the door plug after taking delivery of the finished fuselage from Spirit to address an unrelated mistake (5 misdrilled holes) and then, upon reinstalling the door, neglected to reinstall and inspect the 4 bolts.
Humans make mistakes. The failure to reinstall the bolts was not the root-cause. As you point-out, the root-cause is systemic. There must be sufficient time and staff to do the job right. Double and triple checking must be done by independent inspectors. The list of shortcomings goes on and on.
Corporate greed, and a shift from engineer focus to business focus, absolutely contributed to this and other 737 MAX (not to mention 787 Dreamliner) failures at Boeing.
However, I’d argue the real root-cause is simple human complacency. Like the space shuttle disasters and numerous industrial and civil engineering disasters in the past, it is extremely difficult to justify safety dollars, resources and time over long periods (years and decades) when things are working fine.
There were over 98 MILLION commercial jet departures in the U.S. in 2023 with ZERO lives lost. The last inflight U.S. commercial jet fatal accident was in 2009 (Colgan Air 3407). That was 14 years ago. Over 1 BILLION safe takeoffs and landings. How does one justify year after year continued high investment in safety protocols with a record like that? How do you argue that a cost reduction of 5% here and 3% there unduly puts lives at risk? How do you distinguish between a dollar well spent and a dollar wasted?
I am not defending Boeing (or NASA or countless other organizations who fell into the same trap). We pay these organizations to provide their services safely. And I am as appalled as anyone (as an engineer, likely more so) to see how far Boeing has fallen. I am just pointing out that, as humans, we tend to focus our time, energy, and dollars on the problems immediately in front of us. After DECADES and BILLIONS of event free flights, should anyone really be surprised that Boeing got complacent and lapses are appearing?
So explain the reason, why pilots were not trained to disengage the MCAS system ? To me if this is true then it's jail time.....
@@lastlion65simply put no one can give a legit honest answer to that question. But we all know the real answer
I'm a B1/B2 engineer in Europe. The US talks money - as you do. Europe also speaks money, but will spend as necessary. The US only spends the money during the next maintenance evolution - and I know engineers who refuse to work with American companies for that reason. As an aircraft engineer I want the number of safe take off's to equal the number of safe landings in perpetuity, not we've done a billion so 200 dead is acceptable due to money reasons...
@@lastlion65 MCAS was an unknown automated system (-unknown to the crash victims-) operating in the background. The action that the pilots took (other than turning off the stab trim actuators) should have disengaged the autopilot(s). Maybe if they would have known about MCAS (which was kept out of the manuals), they would have taken a different set of actions. They also didn't know that MCAS became active once the flaps/slats were set to the cruise/0 position. In one instance, they did shut off the stab trim, but turned it back on because they had trouble manually trimming the airplane due to the high aerodynamic load on the stabilizer.
Thx for your contextualisation within psychological diagnosis. Brilliant.
Thank you for an educated examination of this topic. This is when your background really helps.
Boeing used to be the greatest innovative engineering company-- then it got rid of the engineering executive to replace it with MBAs when it merged with McDonnell Douglas, which put maximizing business profit for stock prices, and cutting corners as the priority. It has been that way ever since on all their aircract and aerospace ever since-- not just the 737 max. Investigate the Starliner that Boeing is trying to make-- failure after failure, it is embarrassing and scary that they think of putting humans into flying it some day... the entire thing should be cancelled!
The 737-MAX8, -MAX9, and especially the -MAX10 are what you get when you send a 737 to do a 757's job.
Your 737 max video is great, I forwarded your video to about 10 other folks, Thanks! Larry
I hope you also forwarded the video to Boeing and the FAA and Dennis Muilenburg and his $60m payoff hahahaha
This is the best MCAS explanation I have ever heard. Thanks.
No. It's not. Go watch actual pilots explain it. This guy doesn't understand what he's saying
Thanx for this video 👍🏻
One thing:
The pilots of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, the second Boeing 737 MAX to crash due to issues related to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), were aware of the existence of the MCAS system by the time of their flight. Following the crash of Lion Air Flight 610, which was the first 737 MAX crash attributed to MCAS malfunctions, Boeing and aviation authorities had disseminated information about the MCAS system and issued directives on how to counteract its unintended activation.
According to the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority’s preliminary report and further investigations, the pilots of Flight 302 attempted to follow the emergency procedures that Boeing had outlined, which included disabling the electric trim system, a part of the process for shutting off MCAS. However, despite these efforts, they were unable to regain control of the aircraft. The reports indicated that the pilots struggled to manually adjust the trim due to the aerodynamic forces acting on the aircraft’s control surfaces, which made manual trimming via the trim wheel extremely difficult if not impossible under the flight conditions they were experiencing.
Good point. Thanks.
The All-in Podcast covered this a a few weeks ago.
Specifically about the relationship between legislators, federal agencies and Boeing and essentially all other big businesses with lobbyists in DC.
America is crumbling and special interest is gobbling up profits & power over innovation and a vibrant future.
7:30 - it actually seems that the four bolts were not there at all! The construction of the door plug is such that these bolts don't bear the load but prevent the plug from sliding up and thus clearing the tabs that keep it shut. Think of a battery cover of a TV remote or such - the cover typically slids into grooves to keep it closed. Sometimes - in toys at least - there is also screw that does prevent the lid from sliding out of the grooves. The bolts are like that screw.
Yes, but nuts and bolts, no matter how secure (without welding them down), are always subject to the potential of vibration loosening. Had Boeing added something as simple mid bolt cotter pin to ensure they couldn't potentially unthread from vibrations then there would be no question as to if they were not installed at all or detached over time. That isn't exactly a costly redundancy, and likely would have put a set of eyes on the bolts yet one more time to ensure they were there. Redundancy, redundancy, redundancy on potential failure points like this make long life vehicles, like planes, safer in the long run.
@@billyoung9538 AFAIK - the bolts were supposed to have cotter pins. Seems at the moment that there was no problem with the *design* of the system. Instead the problem is *operational*. In short: the bolts were not installed (and cottered) at all after the door plug was closed - and the QA procedure did not catch that.
@@EneriGiilaan I thought I read elsewhere that cotter pins were not part of the design; however if they were, then that's most certainly a dead giveaway that they were never installed.
Further indication of the bolts not being installed - One of the reports I read indicated that Boeing admitted their production records should have documented the bolts being installed, but the record for that plane does not.
It sounds like there is no problem with design and a bit of a problem with human error.
If they had kept the 757 air frame, they would’ve had a perfect match for the more efficient engines.
I wonder if it was forced to, if Boeing could even *make* a new blank slate airframe now, they've been recycling the same designs for so many decades and getting it "grandfathered" in I don't think they have enough real engineers left
Nope.
You mentioned AA and the 737, but left off an airline that flies exclusively 737 and their interest and viability depending on operating a single type certificate Southwest. The discussions between SWA and the FAA forced the retirement of SWAs older type models 737-300 and 400 if they wanted to add the MAX to their operating certificate
I dropped my jaw every 2 minutes with this video, great job and thanks for sharing
Boeing has some major corporate governance problems going on, and developed very poor work practices simply because they were not willing to pay experienced engineers and workers what they were worth and spent way too much effort off-shoring and exporting work to third parties, and then trying to force those third parties to cut costs while allowing poor quality workmanship to continue.
But... a few corrections here. First, the bolts were not loose. They were missing entirely... the bolts were never re-installed after the maintenance/repair to nearby rivets. And proof of this shows up in a picture taken by one of the maintenance workers documenting the work done on nearby structural members that necessitated removing the door-plug during the maintenance. They never reinstalled the bolts after putting the door-plug back in.
Second, the bolts are not load-bearing. They do not "hold" the door in place. Pressure holds the door in place against opposing pins. The bolts simply prevent the door plug from sliding upward off the pins (which is how the door plug gets removed for maintenance).
Loose bolts found in later inspections of other aircraft are a serious concern, but loose bolts were not the cause of the accident. Missing bolts were the cause. Since the bolts are not load-bearing it literally only takes one, loose or not, to prevent the door from dislodging from its structural pins.
The design of the door-plug itself is not at issue. It is a reasonable, solid design. Unlike the MCAS mess where Boeing was so focused on keeping the same type rating for the Max as for prior models that they messed up the automation. Not only did they mess up the automation, but they made redundant AOA sensor logic a value-add extra feature that airlines had to pay for instead of base-line. Two culprits. The first was the MCAS override automation that prevented pilots from regaining control of the aircraft, and the second was not integrating data from both AOA sensors into the MCAS system from the start, so one bad AOA sensor could crash the plane.
-Matt
It seems the corporate governance problems really took off after the merger with McDonnell-Douglas in 1996. Mc Donnell had a terrible reputation, in the industry, but shareholders loved their management, because they generated dividends by cutting margins.
Great video, the Mentour Pilot channel does another great breakdown on this subject.
I have a degree in aerospace science. I am a lifetime career, Boeing airline captain. There is no way in. Hell you will catch me on a 737 max.
Appreciate your insight! What did you fly?
Switch to Airbus and save some face and dignity b4 you retire. When you do retire will you get a pay out of $60m like Dennis Muilenburg? lol
He's 100% not an airliner captain or even a pilot
@@TwoBitDaVincihes 100% not an airline pilot. I'm a pilot and I know I'm not qualified to discuss the 737 Max issues. I'm not sure why or how you thought you could. You kind of don't understand well how type certificates work, or why manufacturers opt to make models of planes they already had type certificated. You realize a brand new plane, has far more risk of an accident, than an older type certificated one that's been type certificated since the 50s.. A new plane would still look and fly similar to a 50s plane anyway, I'm talking a brand new one like imagine a 797. The 50s style has stuck and will remain that way. If you understand how jet airliners and jet engines work, you'd know that full power on engines makes the nose of the plane go up. MCAS was an unfortunate software flaw, but the plane itself, is absolutely fine and safe. The bean counters at boeing screwed things up, but the 737 itself is an airworthy plane. An airworthy isn't a general term, it's literally an FAA term. Airworthiness Directives or ADs are issued to manufacturers with problem planes, so they fix that problem. MCAS is fixed. The 737 is fine and safe. Even the new models. Pilots don't go around making videos about how doctors do doctor stuff, but non pilots constantly make videos on aviation and piloting as if they know what they're talking about. While your research was somewhat thorough, you still drew incorrect conclusions.. Also, the FAR is only for the US, therefore it has zero regulatory power over Ryan Air. And whenever people who don't understand aviation or how becoming a pilot works say "pilot training". I'm like. Ugh. Ok. So where do pilots go to get their magical pilot training? Being a pilot isn't a job. You don't get trained like it's on the job training. It's more like study and practice than training. And you don't just apply at an airline and get training directly in a jet for a couple dozen hours and boom your a pilot in an airline. But whenever "pilot training" is mentioned clueless people think that's how it works.
I too have a flight on American Airlines in a few days, interestingly enough it doesn't say what plane I am boarding😬.
Thanks for explaining the MCAS issue, you did a better job than Frontlines explanation. It was nice knowing you😢.
Knowing which plane you're flying should be mandatory!
The FAA after the MCAS fiasco and deaths, authorized airlines to not report to passengers/ticket buyers the model of the aircraft they will be flying. Corruption again at every alphabet agency.
Praying you have safe travels 🙏
There's sites where you can look up what aircraft flies a given flight. I looked up mine since I was flying a week after the door incident. I live a few miles from the Everett factory so my usual bias is at least a bit pro-Boeing, but I've never been happier to be on an Airbus haha.
@@j.f.fisher5318 👍I flew back on eagle, really small plane 36 rows was great experience.
Good summary. I have friends in the aviation safety industry who, when the Lion Air crash happened, all were dumbfounded when they found out it was because of the MCAS. These aviation safety experts had no idea what MCAS was and how it got installed on these airplanes without their knowledge, the knowedge of the operating airlines flight departments or the pilots who were flying them. Certainly this was criminal, but no one was held responsibe in any meaningful way (like being imprisoned.)
Good luck with your flight!
Excellent video and thank you for the detailed look into the 737.
a lot of conjecture and speculation at 10:26. I highly doubt the aircraft maintenance manual included checking plugged doors for a pressurization issue. the other doors with seals affected by opening and closing, pressure controllers, pressure sensors and pressure valves are all likely to have been checked. Furthermore, there is documented evidence that alaska did troubleshooting (not ignoring behind closed doors).
The pilot should be able to lock the overhead luggage compartments. That will greatly help the 90 sec escape time.
I agree... but i'm sure it's all down to cost
Such a great job explaining this in a simplistic way.
I remember seeing all these different 737's on the tarmac at work. It was an amazing and sad sight.
Well, if we count the 737 predecessors it's even older.
The 737 is based on the 727, which in turn is based on the 707, which in turn derived from the 367-80 from 1954.
Well, guess how many of the current car designs are technically still going back to a 70 years old design, sharing the very same layout?
🤯😉
I think a key difference is that with cars, they just get easier and easier to drive as they evolve (to the point that they now drive themselves). The way you drive a car has barely changed at all over the decades other than the changes from manual to automatic to hybrid transmission. But stickshift is driven pretty much the same way today as the first ones that came out. No real need to "train" for new systems. It's not the same with airplanes. Pilots need to train for a million different failure scenarios
@@ipp_tutorIt doesn’t really matter how much training a pilot gets, if the MCAS overrides his commands. How can that be approved? The pilot is ultimately responsible for flying the plane.
They did not test the MCAS system adequately. According to this video they treated it as a plug-in software system between pilot and control surfaces that would comp for undesirable flight mode's. The engineers thought they understood what MCAS was all about. Boy were they wrong. Debugging a complicated software program is much harder than a person might think. Not-so-funny things can happen at the extreme edges of the flight envelope. I wonder if management shut down some complaining engineers who were arguing that MCAS is not ready?
@@scotteladd2537MCAS was fixed.
@@ipp_tutorare you a pilot? I'm so tired of people who don't comprehend how someone becomes a pilot, always mention "more pilot training". What. Does. That. Mean? Where do pilots go to get this magical training? Millions of scenarios is a huge exaggeration. In fact pilots these days are garbage, they can't solve a problem in which they didn't "train" for that exact scenario. It's not like the older days where a sudden problem that wasn't "trained" for and wasnt on a checklist could be overcome by compotent pilots. Today's pilots just want a job and free travel and the only way they get into it is by applying for a loan at a pilot mill which only craps out garbage pilots. It doesn't matter how safe a plane is sometimes things go wrong, and having garbage career pilots doesn't help whatsoever
Excellent video once again!!!! Kudos to the team for speaking out the bitter truths like 'corporate greed over passenger safety.'
🙏
They weren’t loose bolts, they hadn’t even been fitted. The NTSB showed photographs of the mounting holes and there was no sign on the factory paint that they had ever been there.
A big issue is that Boeing subcontracts manufacturing of the fuselage to a third party manufacturer (Spirit Aerosystems), who use a different QA system, incompatible with that which Boeing use. Much of this is due to bean counters.
Blancoliro (Juan Brown) covers this and other aircraft accidents.
The Boeing series of planes are closer to the ground. Airbus is higher off the ground (taller landing gear). Thus, when Boeing wanted to put larger engines on the aircraft, they had to put them further in front of the wing, which caused instability which was supposed to be corrected by computer control, but had issues causing the earlier 2 crashes. The 'door plug' incident is LIKELY because the door plug was slid into place, but the bolts holding the interlock were never installed.
.
Pilots DID notice that the 'cabin pressure' knob was set higher than it should have been to maintain pressure, so they KNEW that there was an issue (either a leak, or not enough pressure from the system). They DID make a note of it, every time the plane flew, but management either didn't get the memo, or ignored it.
.
I really hope this doesn't kill Boeing (and Spirit, their fuselage builder) as aircraft manufacturers. They have a backlog of probably 1600 aircraft - so the pressure is on Spirit to get the fuselage's 'out the door' as fast as possible. There are all kinds of issues, including extra holes drilled for non-matching bolt holes in the rear tail plug that point to issues at Spirit.
Actually every time the issue was noted down engineers checked into it. The system itself was exchanged twice from what I remember.
But it's difficult to find a leak on the ground, where there is no pressure difference.
But I always was curious as to why exactly the two seats in front of the plug were empty. Did the cabin crew notice something?
Sadly the voice recorder was over written, that could have been a very interesting conversation?
@@jantjarks7946 The null pressure difference in the ground isn't a problem. They can (and do) easily pressurize the cabin at ground level to check for leaks. It's not an issue at all
@@ipp_tutor Sure, you can create a pressure difference, but not within the same range. At least not with the system aboard.
I can't remember if it was Juan's channel or elsewhere but there was a picture of the plug after being re installed for the final time which showed the bolts missing. In addition , the holes where tho bolts screw into had UNDISTURBED PAINT which indicates bolts were never installed.
@@jantjarks7946 The problem possibly would not have been found simply by pressuring the plane at ground-level. Pressurization actually stops the leak and holds the door plug solidly in place. Plus, no vibration at ground level sitting in a hanger.
The problem was happening during ascent, before pressurization created a large enough differential to solidly hold the door plug in place.
Though there is also a question as to whether the door plug was even completely seated in the frame... that is currently an unknown. If it was not seated then it would have been a ticking time bomb at any altitude and the result would have been catastrophic if it had happened at 36000 feet.
If it was seated, the door wasn't going to go anywhere at cruising altitude. Too much pressure differential for vibration to dislodge it. So at least in this case, the danger period was during the initial ascent... high engine vibration coupled with a low pressure differential.
-Matt
Boeing is a very dishonest company.
Damn good review! They need to have you explain this on network television, WELL DONE!
Ultrasonic acoustic detector? That looks awesome! I need one.
I use one it’s not as accurate as one would think it’s frustrating
Maybe I should clarify with all the noise in the factory you get lots of distortion, making it frustrating
@@davegreen7594might work better in a plane if you can pressurize the plane while the engines are shut down on the ground, much less interference.
I can only imagine how much of a pain it is to use the same device in a active factory, so much stuff is probably making noise in that detection range that the poor device probably gets overwhelmed
We do use it when the aircraft is pressurized, and the engines are off in the factory. Still get distortion.
Alaska Airlines did not randomly decide to ignore pressurization advisories. Boeing's documentation and Akaska's procedures tells them what they can and can't do. There is no way they had a concern about that door plug and flew anyway.
A very clear and succinct explanation of a technically complex system in the MCAS and Boeing’s role in hiding it to avoid further pilot training. Great job.
I will never forgive Boeing for the way they handled the MCAS debacle. The Company used to be run by Engineers, it's now ruled by Bean Counters. They have contracted some of their Engineering out to Mumbai, India. I'm sure the Indian Engineers are capable, but I'm concerned that it's no longer as possible for them to communicate to the Home Office Bean Counters a firm NO when they have an issue that might conflict with safety. Thank goodness my home town airline flys Airbus to the places I want to visit.
This was incredible!
Would appreciate if you shared it!
Will do!
High quality, dense with insight and a masterful presentation. Thx!
There are a couple you-tube channels dedicated to this sort of thing. One of them is run by a pilot who goes into some detail in a readily understandable way. It's called Mentour Pilot.
The better one will be the Blancolirio channel (Juan Browne). Though Mentour is good too, it tends to offer less technical explanations. Juan offers highly technical explanations made understandable to anyone.
Good work sir. Bravo.
Whether a plane, rollercoaster, or elevator, things are NEVER as safe as they tell you.
These stories are so chilling. I have a hugely empathetic personality and recollections like this made me start to cry. It could have happened to any of us or our loved ones. 😢
Thanks for your investigation, Ricky.
Great video. Answer to your question, I will never fly on the Max. I'm so grateful that all the travel I have to this year will be on Airbus.
It is telling that travel portals on the internet included the option to filter offers for "not 737MAX" bycustomer´s requests....
Can someone calculate the probabiliy of two free seats exactly in that position?
A lot of smoke in this story. What I see is us “government” asking for more lobbying $ from corporations or else…
If it had redundant angle of attack sensors then the issue with the MCAS would not have happened right?
Correct. The planes have two AOA sensors but the MCAS logic only used one or the other, it did not check the two sensors against each other. Boeing had made the dual-sensor logic a value-add feature that airlines could pay for, and most airlines had not opted for that feature.
Boeing should never have done that... they should have integrated both AOA sensors into MCAS from the start as baseline. So in the case of MCAS, it was pure corporate greed that led to the deaths.
In addition to that, the pilots did not have instruction and the cockpit did not have proper indication that MCAS was overriding their control inputs, which prevented the pilots from regaining control of the aircraft when MCAS went nuts due to the bad AOA sensor. A software problem. But also due to corporate greed because Boeing was trying to keep the original 737 type certificate intact for the Max and so wanted to make MCAS quietly operate in the background just generally. So again, Boeing made very bad decisions all in an effort to keep the blasted 737 type rating for the 737 Max.
-Matt
Look Two Bit all those airlines have to do is pay their monthly "software maintenance and upgrade fees" to get the "latest firmware push" that allows the pilot to manually control the plane during an event of tailspin or imminent crash. That's all.
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I am on vacation. Both flights to get here were in 737Max. The first 737Max9. On the Max9, the cabin pressure was very poorly controlled. Why can’t they close loop that thing?
I once worked at a medical manufacturing company with a broken culture. I didn’t think that this would happen when the product is life and death. It does. Greed undermines leadership. Leadership is the fertilizer that keeps the weeds down.
You will know, if you find yourself in a greed driven organization, because everything is bonkers.
I worked as an engineer, chief engineer, sr. engineering manager and program manager for several major aerospace companies including Boeing, United Technologies, Honeywell and Parker Hannifin for 25 years.
The video is well done and well researched. In regards to 737 Max incidents, the blame is with Boeing. The MCAS system was a total travesty. There are System Safety Assessments done and Design Assurance Levels assigned. Someone at Boeing had to blatantly sell the wrong classification to the FAA. It should have been a DAL A system which is “Catastrophic”. This would have driven independent sensor redundancy into the system without a common failure mode. This is not something that was difficult. The lives were sacrificed due to corporate greed. I did a write up before the investigation was done with my theory and it was correct.
The door plug incident is still primarily Boeing’s fault. The sensors faults that the pilots and maintenance crews would experience have different levels of severity. Systems could be on a MMEL list and the aircraft would be allowed to dispatch with certain restrictions. I am assuming that the fault message was more of a warning message and determined to be a nuisance fault. Nuisance faults happen the time time and are difficult to diagnose. If it was on a subsystem, they could just replace the entire thing. Finding a pressure leak on the aircraft would seem to be difficult on the ground.
I have worked with airlines that have had to clear MELs on the systems of my former companies and depending on the Functional Hazard Analysis and System Safety Assessment may not seem like a big concern. Alaska took some action because of the unknown but probably assessed the issue as a low DAL level problem. In reality, explosive decompression is not a minor failure. The Alaska engineers and maintenance personnel should have talked with the Boeing customer support. Boeing may have assessed a low impact. I do not know what happened behind the scenes but ultimate culpability resides with Boeing. That plane should have never been turned over to a revenue customer.
I was angry with Boeing when I heard about this. I worked on the defense side and not with commercial aircraft but they were one of the poorest company cultures that I have worked for. They had some good engineers but also many that would not match up to the typical Tier 1 supplier like a Honeywell or United Technologies.
I have worked with aerospace companies and certification bodies around the globe and I am extremely disappointed with Boeing. I worked a lot with Airbus and Embraer as well. Boeing was once the “gold standard “ but corporate greed took priority over technical and safety.
Do not get me wrong. I believe that Boeing aircraft are safe but it should not take incidents like this to improve their quality and stop them from cutting certification corners.
They are not the only company that has done this. I would have executives coerce the engineers into shipping products that barely passed ATP but showed functional concerns. This was done to make month end quotas. I have gotten negative feedback from leadership when I wrote a technical analysis that a subsystem failure mode could cause a fire. Long story but I appreciated the video.
Air travel is safe and keeping the pressure on the industry will keep it reliable and reduce incidents like this.
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Alaska Air Lines plans to Merge with Hawaiian Airlines. Boeing is the predominant Manufacturer of Flights from Hawaii to the Mainland.
Amazing video. You did a great job covering this topic. What a masterful explanation of why Boeing kept on making new versions of the 737. It's hard to measure who was greedier, if American Airlines or Boeing.
From what I've gathered. Southwest Airlines and Boeing are to blame for the 737 MAX fiasco.
AA has nothing to do with the Max debacle. Look into the bill of sale terms Southwest had negotiated with Boeing. Boeing conceded that if Simulator differences training was required by the FAA on the Max Southwest would reportedly get a 1 million dollar rebate per airframe. This penalty alone drove Boeing managers to make decisions that were, in hindsight, incredibly stupid.
The ironic thing (well, another one) is that the impossible costly and lengthy regulation for certification of new planes was probably proposed by Boeing themselves through their lobbyist in DC to prevent new companies entering the market.
I'm confused about the pressurisation issues prior to the blowout incident. Didn't the NTSB say they weren't connected?
Excellent vide as always man! 👍
That was an outstanding video , you pretty much nailed it . Aviation has had 2 major obstacles that discourages the manufactures from modernizing their designs , government bureaucracy and lawyers . If an aircraft crashed do to a meteorite hitting it there would still be a lawyer somewhere trying to sue the aircraft's manufacturer .
We have a trip coming up that will have us on two 737s going out and two again coming back. One of them is supposed to be a Max 8. The other three are not published. But it is known that WestJet has both 737-800 and 737-700 in their fleet.
Out of all the research I've done on aircraft. The 737 Max 7 would be a private plane to own for me.
For one the price, the Max 7 is around $100 Million.
And Two, the range possibilities.
The hazard issues are noted but not warranted.
Very good research!! I wonder in main steam media will ever do as much research as you have done here! I bet most people won't ever have this info.. This will be covered up because of airlines, boing, and government bottom line. From this research we can see that FAA, boing and airlines are all at fault. This means that revenue is more important than lives! And do we even have a choice not to fly boing any longer! I hope this video spreads quickly and people start to boycott boing!!
It's a big call to say that the airline decided to not use two seats because they were worried about a plug door. That would have required quite a few staff from various departments to arrange such a 'risk mitigation'. Also - why suspect a plug door - there are many more likely leak paths and any attempt to find them would have started elsewhere. If the plug door was suspected of leaking, an inspection would have been called for - having worked for an international airline, I find it inconceivable that any licenced engineer - let alone a team (as would have been involved) would have contemplated such an idea - or even thought that somehow only two seats would have been at risk in the event of such a massive depressurisation (if at cruising height).
Also, while there has been talk of 'loose bolts', there hasnt been a report on which bolts. Also as the four bolts that lock the door down into its tracks act as stops, and have locking pins, they dont need to be 'tight' to do their job perfectly well.
So a sudden depressurization magically opens the cockpit door? Brilliant, Boeing.
that´s on purpose to reduce the overall structural load on th airframe in an emergency. It´s actually sound engineering.
Excellent video. I've never heard this theory or the facts you base it on. Three Bits, at least.
Maybe the long certification process is causing more harm than good, encouraging the continued use of older less safe modified designs instead of newer designs.
19:37 I'd say if it's continental take a train, but safety doesn't seem very high on their list either...
Solid work. Looks like someone has been to the Mentor Now! School of UA-cam 😃
WOW WOW WOW this is the best explanation of the MCAS system failures. They completely left it out and the pilots had no idea this system was countering for the engine re-positioning. People really should be in jail for that. And they tried to blame the pilots since they were from "3rd world" countries. SHAME!
Great video and a well deserved call-out. Should've kept the original title, bc you're right; AA and Boeing are greedily gambling with our lives. Safe Travels!
This is why healthy competition is necessary - in just about every industry, wherever one company utterly dominates a market, there is serious stagnation. In this case, Boeing was raking in cash using the same old design, and rather than invest that into engineering a better design, they just kept the revenue. Once an all-around better competitor comes along, suddenly the old leader is caught with their pants down and they have to figure out how to respond within a timely manner. That's difficult when you're talking something as large, complex, and life-threatening as an airplane.
The issue with competition is that eventually someone wins and Boeing won. The cost to get into the industry is simply too large for another plane manufacturer to get into the market while Boeing has incumbent advantage.
@@narvuntien Key word there was *healthy* competition. It's possible to have multiple companies all vying for #1 in the same market. In such situations, there's a lot more innovation, price-competitiveness, quality, efficiency, etc. Doesn't matter what the market is, they're all like this so long as there's always someone there stoking the fire.
In 2019 I was booked on a flight on China Eastern from Guangzhou to Beijing. I could see that they had flown 737 MAX planes on the route, but the booking site showed they were going to fly a 737-400 on it, in both directions. (Had it been a Max I'd have refused to go.) Anyway, day of the flight, and China Eastern had substituted the plane again - with an Airbus A320. This being China I'm sure I wouldn't have got a straight answer had I enquired, but I am curious as to why they made the second change, unless passengers were too scared of boarding anything saying "737" on it.
just for fun: how many calls were sent to friends in the following hour so they go and delete browsing history and particular directories?
An ispection photo has been circulating online showing the bolts missing.
This video should be on 60 Minutes!!
Great work!
This is really eye-opening!
Our Bucket List Alaskan Cruse could have really been the bottom of the bucket. We flew on 4 of these.
Thank you for this video. This is the first explanation for what happened that really seemed to fill in the relevant details without couching it in corporate-speak. For lll of the Libertarians out there who decry regulations; this is a perfect example of why we need regulations to protect the public safety from those whose primary motives are other than public safety first. Greed will forever override doing the right thing unless there are laws and rules in place that safeguard against it.
It is amazing that you know how to fix the problem! Why on earth the maintenance of Alaska Air doing? Also the Pilots are nuts because the took the thing so easy, then the management of Alaska is so clever to limit the flight of this airplane to short trips! My god those are wrong people working in this industry !!! Appreciate your presentation.
I am not disagreeing with anything you said but just adding , 1) that part of the decision might also have been the lion’s share of efficiency gains are from new engines 2) I thought Southwest was the airline pushing hard for no pilot retraining 3) I think there are people at Boeing that should have been charged criminally . There are documents showing they lied to the FAA about MCAS and how much authority it had, during certification process Even the head pilot later, wrote a memo saying something to the effect, “oops, I unknowingly lied to the FAA” and he never contacted them
Hi Mr. Da Vinci I'm new to the channel and thank you for video. What you are saying I agree 100%, just one thing though I too blame Alaska Airlines somewhat because of their oversight, I think when they knew and first heard about this problem with this particular aircraft, they should have got their flight engineers involved and checked it out. They have the equipment to check for pressure leak if they could not do anything then they would have gone to Boeing and ask for assistance, this plane should have been grounded from the start. I work with an Airline company and day after day, we are reminded about the overall super critical importance of safety in our line of work and this is certainly most definitely highlighted in our trainings whether it's online, virtual or classroom and it doesn't matter which department you work within the airline as everyone, whether you are a manager working managing a ticketing office or a cargo employee or even a simple ramp staff loading aircraft, it is quintessential that you know about safety so what bothers me the most is HOW an "Aircraft Manufacturer " who designs and builds aircraft could prioritise, revenue overall because they do not want Airbus to get the upper hand over QUALITY AND SAFETY which is suppose and needs to be the number one priority? Its OK I get they did not want to build a new aircraft from scratch as it would have cost millions and Airbus would have gained the upper hand. Fine but they should have done it the right way, the correct way the SAFE way and we would have not ended with a Catastrophic disaster.
He did mention that Alaska Airlines shared responsibility
@@LuisSierra42 yeah he said they shared responsibility, but he also said but theoretically the airline did not put anyone in those seats because they knew. It could be pure coincidence, but it could also have been done on purpose, until the conclusion of this investigation we can only guess.
I’ve read people seated next to that door on previous flights complained about noise. If Alaska Airlines suspected a leak at that door, and didn’t seat anyone there because of it, I don’t see that as a failure on their part. A noisy air leak in an airliner can be, and most often is, nothing more than an irritating noise. Like a noisy widow seal on your car. Leaving those seats empty might be just a kind gesture towards passengers.
If a door seal noise problem is intermittent it may be impossible to find by doing a static test on the ground with no high speed exterior air flow, even if you simulate altitude pressure. And, with nothing to suggest otherwise it might not be enough to suggest there was even a remote chance of catastrophic failure. Alaska taking that plane off the long over water flights, and not seating anyone by door, seems like proper caution.
@Bitterrootbackroads OK, however my point that I'm saying is did they really perform the test, intermittent or not, I get what your saying don't get me wrong. Because to me it seems as if they were saying " this plane is new, it's not worth the time, we will not let it fly over water, and possibly probably if they knew coincidence or not block those two seats, we will not allow people to book them. To me if Alaska Airlines at least did the test, that alleviates them from any suspicion and the blame falls solely on Boeing.
Watch the video by Mentour Pilot about the leaking cabin pressure. He has a great explanation of why Alaska took the steps they did and why he, as a professional pilot would probably take the same steps.
Thing is these planes are still much safer than your car. There are so many redundant systems and pilot (2 min, working in well trained tandem) checks, that it takes quite a bit to reach the point where one crashes.
I hear you, but my door has never flown off my Ford 😂
@@jjwallnutts No, but that sort of thing also happens. A cousin of mine had it happen to him. Was a few decades ago and I do have a LOT of cousins. The reason this is news is precisely because these sorts of things are so rare. "Today nothing unusual happened" doesn't sell papers nor collect views.
In fact, the door incident happened 10 weeks after the plane had been delivered
Technically, in the specic instance. Boeing forgot to put the bolts back into the airplane. Ultimately, Boeing workers removed the plug so Spirit could redo some rivets. Then Boeing did not reinstall the bolts into the plug.
The bolts were removed by Boeing for an unrelated fix (bad rivets near the door, which were found twice in the same place even after Spirit had supposedly fixed them), and never put back. Check the video from Mentour Pilot, there's a lot of detail there. The airline knew there were issues with pressurization, so they prevented the plane to fly over water. But this issue was not obvious to the pilots and seemed just like a fault of the main pressure controller, which has 2 redundancies, so they just switched for one of the spares and that apparently fixed the warnings on the cockpit. That deemed the apparent problem as not flight-critical (therefore, not so urgent as to ground the aircraft before a maintenance check). The possibility that the airline knew that this specific hidden door-plug had a problem and for that reason they didn't put passengers in front of it is just... a very serious conjecture. I doubt pilots would be willing to fly the aircraft at all if they knew about a potential fuselage compromise.
9:34 The "depressurisation incidents" referred to were warnings about a fault with the auto-pressure system. It has basically nothing to do with the door blowout. If Alaska had deliberately left those seats empty because they were worried about the door plugs, why were people seated in 26C and D, next to the same door plug on the opposite side of the aircraft? Are you suggesting that Alaska were fully aware not only that a door plug wasn't sealed properly, but also which one it was - and they didn't bother to install four bolts?? That's ridiculous.
Check lists when properly applied and followed - work.
I flew back from Las Vegas the very next morning into Portland. I flew out the day before the Duke door plug blew out. I flew back the next morning on Southwest a Max nine which is the same as a max eight the pilot come on and told us all to keep our seatbelt secured tightly that we were going to experience turbulence. We never hit any turbulence, and when we boarded the aircraft, they told us to spread out that we needed to make the plane More balanced, there was only 80 people on the aircraft. I noticed that they were moving people from those particular spots away from where the door plugs were that totally makes me angry now after the fact they knew about this problem and never told us they told us about the turbulence which was a lie. They knew that this had a problem and didn’t want us to be sucked out of the airplane when the plug blew out. What a disgusting bunch Southwest should be sued over that themselves.
1:00 too much drama...
09:20 - they complained , any issue with the aircraft even before Max they have to report to Boeing and Boeing advised them on what to do and if it's safe to fly further and so on, which probably they said it's okay and gave them some parameters that they can keep flying the aircraft as this could be due to a faulty sensor. Faulty sensors are usually the most common issue and in some cases aircrafts can fly like that for a short period of time, ofc depends if it's a known issue, risks and the list continues.
Your video emphasizes the link with the design engineering failures in the MCAS control system in the earlier fatal crashes, which is important. But I suspect that the final NTSB report, and the info released so far, will identify a different culprit it this latest accident. It is a failure in quality control (QC) and the broader quality management system (QMS). QC is a technical term used to refer specifically to quality inspection processes, to verify that a manufacturing step conforms to spec. QMS covers a broader range of processes, from design to assembly to inspection to delivery, as well as the auxiliary information systems, to ensure that a product is delivered with high quality.
It seems that this failure did not involve the design engineers, but a completely different part of Boeing's organization, as well as its relationship with a key supplier Spirit Aerosystems, the now-independent company that operates the Wichita, Kansas plant that makes 737 fuselages (which Boeing spun-off around 2005).
Just stop whining about greed when simple incompetence is at the root.
The regulatory process is just as much to blame.
It's the FAA that considers a 737-100 and MAX-9 the 'same airplane'.
I'd rather have a Pilot's consortium or union determine airworthiness over any bureaucrat who is easily bribed.
I got a flight for may that got cancelled last month. I am thinking it might be because they wont let those planes fly.
Ryanair said they're be having less flights this summer so flight prices will increase about 10%. Is this because some of their 737 planes will be grounded?
Probably because internet flight portals included the option to filter results against 737MAX....
Great video 🎉
Another fantastic video!
looks like high speed rail network is much more safer than flying to me
Could it have been possible that two people got sucked out of the plane? If the airline knew about the possible occurrence
of the plug getting blown out why were the seats on the right side of the plane filled? Something just doesn't add up.
The door plug failure concerned me so I spent some time looking into it. It turns out that Boeing purchases the 737 fuselages from Spirit Airlines with the door plugs installed and was pressuring Spirit to deliver them faster. I had heard one comment that it was unclear who was supposed to do final inspection on those plugs since "Boeing has to remove them anyway". I work for a company where people's lives depend on our products and we take that seriously. People's lives also depend on Boeing's products and it does not seem like they take that seriously. The number of Quality Management Failures at Boeing (on the 737 and the Starliner) is absurd. Likely one reason is that in 2019 Boeing decided to move more toward a car manufacturing model and laid off 900 Quality Inspectors. I heard there was pressure to rehire them but the fact that they did it in the first place show where their priority is. And where was the FAA in this whole process? I am not a big fan of regulation but for companies the make products people's lives depend on, regulation in a must. Every change that could affect quality needs an independent review including process changes. Really the door plug is only the tip of the iceberg. There are other 737 airworthiness issues that on this aircraft that stem from not doing proper Risk and Quality assessments.
In this particular case the fuselage needed remedial work after delivery on some rivets or bolts or something that happened to be near the door plug, which required the removal of the door plug in order to do the work. The remedial work itself had nothing to do with the door plug mechanism or structure beyond the need to remove it in order to do the other work.
So the initial installation of the door-plug by Spirit was not to blame. It was the failure to reinstall the bolts after completion of the remedial work and reinstallation of the door-plug that was to blame.
@@junkerzn7312 I heard that too but I think there evidently some confusion on the installation and inspection. There is a chance it came from Spirit without the bolts and confused the Boeing personnel but that should have been caught by an inspection procedure at Boeing - if there is one. Maybe the issue is that there is no way to perform the inspection after the install. If so, that seems like a design issue that should have been caught with an FMEA.
It’s just the same as Challenger and Colombia. You take engineers out of decision-making positions, over value executives, and people die.
The foreign purchase planes did opt for the option of having Two AOA vanes. When there are two AOA vanes and the is a difference between the two it flashes on the MCAS. The foreign air Services skipped that $66,000. Option. Was major difference. With difference warning while having two AOA vanes the pilots would have turned off the MCAS. Manuals says when you get that warning the pilot is supposed to use his judgement as to the real angle of the plane is.