als je 3 jaar in het archief van de MIVD mag rond snuffelen en er een boek over mag schrijven mag je echt wel een informele conferentie over mogelijke vage dreigingen en ontwikkelingen online zetten
@Ministerie van Defensie Late post maar de topic blijft interessant. Heeft NL ook een afdeling op MASINT zoals de Amerikaanse tegenhanger DIA? Of is dit rechtstreeks een sub-unit van de MIVD?
SIGINT en Cyber zijn twee verschillende domeinen die elkaar kunnen overlappen. SIGINT is het verzamelen van inlichtingen uit signalen, die digitaal of analoog kunnen zijn. Cyber kan ook SIGINT bevatten, maar gaat ook om bijvoorbeeld het beschermen van netwerken, of beveiligen van informatie. De complete digitale omgeving.
@@defensie Dus de transitie van SIGINT naar Cyber binnen de context van inlichtingen houdt in dat de niet-overlappende segmenten elkaar niet tegenstrijden? Is het ook correct om aan te nemen dat Cyber meer aanvallend kan zijn dan Signals? En dat het domein van 'Internet of Things' meer met Cyber betrokken is dan SIGINT?
Klopt inderdaad wat betreft de transitie van SIGINT naar Cyber. Cyber is niet meer aanvallend. En wat betreft je laatste vraag: dat hangt ervan af wat je in dat domein wil doen of weten. Interesse? bit.ly/3PnRDvp
"A network can only be detected by a network" - Yes, but a network can only be detected when it moves, and a network thats detected can be spoofed and easily fooled, especially when those within the network have their goals / 'kpi's' known by the opfor. the 'darksiders' are getting a lot of love, and a lot of shiny toys - but the mivd/aivd should remember that when every tool you have looks like a hammer, every problem starts to look like a nail. How about some love for the 'lightsiders' in HUMINT who barely got a mention - how can they be supported by the 'darksiders' and is there a way for these new technological innovations to act as 'force multipliers' for those operating and recruiting in the field? The title is 'Fog of war' - but no commentary on how the fog of war can be used defensively, or, that the conflict in Ukraine has dispersed much of that fog as China is now able to gather real world data on Nato tactics, weapon systems, conflict preperation, e-war & psyop capabilities etc. On the topic of China, what's the plan when they blow gps/galileo out of the sky? When China produces, delivers to the front-line and deploys 1,000,000 drones to the battlefield a day. Or when the "great wall of peoples army" lands 2 million men in Poland (A possibility now that Russia has aligned fully with China) Patricia mentioned the ability to look into the phone and emails of the 'high ranking military adviser' - against a threat as existential as China, whats on his phone is not as important as whats on his mind. recal Japan at the end of ww2. the Americans put Kyoto on the nuke list, and the general in charge kept taking it off - why? because he had spent a summer there with his wife before the war, and felt the city was too beautiful and too unique to level with a nuke. How can Nederland be the Kyoto if Europe? How can the value set of the Chinese be modified, from civilian to xi himself that sure - stealing tech and potentially attacking the west to serve China's needs is for the greater glory of China, but doing those things to Nederland, well that just wouldn't be a very 'Chinese way of behaving' - is it perhaps time to do the maths on the pro-'s and con's for Nederland and the people of Nederland, of throwing Taiwan under the bus? Bringing it back to the 'senior advisors phone' - the emails he's reading on that device, are not as interesting as the adverts he's being served ;-) after all if China decide to land 200,000 troops and a drone swarm into the country on an offensive operation, whether they land in Amsterdam or Rotterdam, on Monday or Thursday, expected or unexpected is going to mean very little when the chips are down. How those giving the orders, and carrying out the orders feel about Nederland will impact the realm and its people. On the topic of disinformation: while a populace perceives disinformation campaigns are being conducted by the 'home team' against them, they will always be susceptible to disinformation from abroad. I fear its a case of live by the sword, die by the sword on that one - a bitter pill to swallow, but only because pushing propaganda onto your own population goes down like such sweet sweet honey. How can we use the 'soft touch' capabilities of the AIVD to switch the 'destroy youth' toktok algorithm used in the west, replaced with the 'promote skills' tiktok algorithm used in China? I believe this to be achievable, and would represent an absolute win for the future capabilities of all of the Dutch ministries, including the ministry of defence . The red flag of Chinese nationalism is not going to be stopped, so let's colour some of those stars Orange ;-)
He is dit wel veilig om op UA-cam te zetten
als je 3 jaar in het archief van de MIVD mag rond snuffelen en er een boek over mag schrijven mag je echt wel een informele conferentie over mogelijke vage dreigingen en ontwikkelingen online zetten
Defensie beschermt wat ons dierbaar is!
@Ministerie van Defensie Late post maar de topic blijft interessant. Heeft NL ook een afdeling op MASINT zoals de Amerikaanse tegenhanger DIA? Of is dit rechtstreeks een sub-unit van de MIVD?
1:54:00 Maar wat is het verschil tussen SIGINT en Cyber?
SIGINT en Cyber zijn twee verschillende domeinen die elkaar kunnen overlappen. SIGINT is het verzamelen van inlichtingen uit signalen, die digitaal of analoog kunnen zijn. Cyber kan ook SIGINT bevatten, maar gaat ook om bijvoorbeeld het beschermen van netwerken, of beveiligen van informatie. De complete digitale omgeving.
@@defensie Dus de transitie van SIGINT naar Cyber binnen de context van inlichtingen houdt in dat de niet-overlappende segmenten elkaar niet tegenstrijden?
Is het ook correct om aan te nemen dat Cyber meer aanvallend kan zijn dan Signals? En dat het domein van 'Internet of Things' meer met Cyber betrokken is dan SIGINT?
Klopt inderdaad wat betreft de transitie van SIGINT naar Cyber. Cyber is niet meer aanvallend. En wat betreft je laatste vraag: dat hangt ervan af wat je in dat domein wil doen of weten. Interesse? bit.ly/3PnRDvp
"A network can only be detected by a network" - Yes, but a network can only be detected when it moves, and a network thats detected can be spoofed and easily fooled, especially when those within the network have their goals / 'kpi's' known by the opfor.
the 'darksiders' are getting a lot of love, and a lot of shiny toys - but the mivd/aivd should remember that when every tool you have looks like a hammer, every problem starts to look like a nail. How about some love for the 'lightsiders' in HUMINT who barely got a mention - how can they be supported by the 'darksiders' and is there a way for these new technological innovations to act as 'force multipliers' for those operating and recruiting in the field?
The title is 'Fog of war' - but no commentary on how the fog of war can be used defensively, or, that the conflict in Ukraine has dispersed much of that fog as China is now able to gather real world data on Nato tactics, weapon systems, conflict preperation, e-war & psyop capabilities etc.
On the topic of China, what's the plan when they blow gps/galileo out of the sky? When China produces, delivers to the front-line and deploys 1,000,000 drones to the battlefield a day. Or when the "great wall of peoples army" lands 2 million men in Poland (A possibility now that Russia has aligned fully with China)
Patricia mentioned the ability to look into the phone and emails of the 'high ranking military adviser' - against a threat as existential as China, whats on his phone is not as important as whats on his mind.
recal Japan at the end of ww2. the Americans put Kyoto on the nuke list, and the general in charge kept taking it off - why? because he had spent a summer there with his wife before the war, and felt the city was too beautiful and too unique to level with a nuke.
How can Nederland be the Kyoto if Europe?
How can the value set of the Chinese be modified, from civilian to xi himself that sure - stealing tech and potentially attacking the west to serve China's needs is for the greater glory of China, but doing those things to Nederland, well that just wouldn't be a very 'Chinese way of behaving' - is it perhaps time to do the maths on the pro-'s and con's for Nederland and the people of Nederland, of throwing Taiwan under the bus?
Bringing it back to the 'senior advisors phone' - the emails he's reading on that device, are not as interesting as the adverts he's being served ;-)
after all if China decide to land 200,000 troops and a drone swarm into the country on an offensive operation, whether they land in Amsterdam or Rotterdam, on Monday or Thursday, expected or unexpected is going to mean very little when the chips are down. How those giving the orders, and carrying out the orders feel about Nederland will impact the realm and its people.
On the topic of disinformation: while a populace perceives disinformation campaigns are being conducted by the 'home team' against them, they will always be susceptible to disinformation from abroad. I fear its a case of live by the sword, die by the sword on that one - a bitter pill to swallow, but only because pushing propaganda onto your own population goes down like such sweet sweet honey.
How can we use the 'soft touch' capabilities of the AIVD to switch the 'destroy youth' toktok algorithm used in the west, replaced with the 'promote skills' tiktok algorithm used in China?
I believe this to be achievable, and would represent an absolute win for the future capabilities of all of the Dutch ministries, including the ministry of defence .
The red flag of Chinese nationalism is not going to be stopped, so let's colour some of those stars Orange ;-)