As a bit of an insomniac, I often listen to lectures to distract myself from endless lists of projects, worries, etc., and maybe learn something as well until the droning monotones lull me back to sleep. Unfortunately, Gary Gallagher's lectures are so interesting and full of passion, I'm now listening to one after another. Will have to figure out how to sleep at work.
As one who has studied this many years I have become convinced that at Gettysburg Gen. Lee was extremely at risk without Gen. Jackson and Gen. J.E.B. Stuart. However if he had continued fighting from the start before the blue had fully occupied perhaps he might have had more success. But there was very much happening there very quickly.Far too many Sons, Fathers, Husbands and Brothers gave up their lives at this terrible Battle!!May they always be remembered and honored. ❤️
@13:00 - Battlefield tactics - Walking in line towards entrenched enemy fire. It was slaughter. This persisted into the 1st World War. It wasn't until the development of machines like tanks, airplanes and handheld machine guns that the tactic of armies facing off at each other was replaced by mechanized blitz, Fire & Maneuver, as well as paratroopers dropped in the rear of the enemy, and in modern times, since Vietnam, infantry inserted at key locations by helicopter. Entrenchments still happen in war, it's just that these entrenchments are not as advantageous, or invulnerable, as they were before tanks, jets, and accurate artillery. Drones, increasingly, will be dominate on the battlefield, and in the air and on the seas.
Wish I was in the classroom…Lee had to attack on July 3rd. Lee and the entire army had to know Vicksburg was going to fall soon. Also, Lee said it himself-he had whooped the Union on the peninsula. He whooped the Union at 2nd Manassas. He whooped the Union at Fredericksburg. He whooped the Union at Chancellorsville. In less than a year, he had beat the union at every turn (Antietam was a draw and Lee had an army outnumbered 2 to 1). Even tho Lee always whooped their ass-he had gained nothing. His army’s high command was getting weakened after each battle. His army wasn’t getting bigger. The Union’s army was getting bigger. He had to attack. He had to drive the enemy or he would be in the same predicament he was already in.
Dr. Gallagher is lecturing on battlefield tactics of the Civil War to a bunch of MBA (business school) student. Is this a standard course at Darden Business School for business students? Or is it a extracurricular elective the business students can participate in? It seems to me to be an unusual teaching strategy, but innovative. Dr. Gallagher how did you or the administration Darden set this up? And why?
What can Professor Gallagher tell us about Day-Three and East Cavalry Ridge and Stuart/Hampton vs Generals Gregg/Custer and Stuart's intended approach into the backside of Cemetery Ridge? General Lee doesn't appear idiotic when you realize that Pickett-Pettigrew are the anvil and Stuart/Hampton are the heavy hammer, save Custer/Gregg interrupt Lee's two-prong plan on Day-Three at Gettysburg.
@@indy_go_blue6048 Excellent, sir. This is good to know, and thank you for cluing me in on this. This is a hot topic at my local group's ACW roundtable discussions. This subject among many as you might imagine. Thanks again.
@@kidhammer2567 YW. I'm sorry I couldn't have been more helpful and told you which video, but he has several of them here (YT) and I can't remember which one it was on. I hope you were able to find it.
At times Hubris would whisper into Lee's ear saying, "You can achieve anything you can imagine". And when that happened, General Lee refused to believe anything else.General Lee was told there were Union troops in Gettysburg, on June 30th. Lee dismissed this report as mistaken identity. General Lee knew that the Union troops were not Union troops, they were Militia troops instead.On July 2nd, General Lee issued his orders to attack both flanks at 4:00am. 8 hrs later, nobody had thought to send some of the cavalry south to collect some updated intel. And we all know that Longstreet would not attack until 12 hrs after, General Lee had issued those orders. Now we come to the 3rd day. With Hubris whispering to Lee about the great "Triumph's" that awaited victorious Romans, on their return to Rome. Is anybody else having flashbacks to Malvern Hill? Because I'm pretty sure General Lee had a couple of them, on that 3rd day of July, 1863. Maybe, General Lee should have had a slave stand behind him, and whisper into his other ear a warning: "that all glory is fleeting".
__"It is well that war is so terrible, [lest] we should grow too fond of it." -- Lee to Longstreet at Fredricksburg. Lee was not 'himself' before and during Gettysburg; looking at all the anecdotes from his subordinates, he acted like Maclellan or Hooker would in times of protracted stress and limited information... like Lee faced in Pennsylvania. The shock of Pickett's charge (note all the apologizing he did to everyone) and the return of Stuart (whom Lee had let off the leash with yet another vaguely-worded order) got Lee back in character. Speaking of vague wording, this class just turned into the usual sop to the managerial class' pathetic desire to compare themselves to military commanders. That's disgusting, I'm out. www.astro.sunysb.edu/fwalter/AST389/TEXTS/cyrano24.html
Actually there's zero proof that Lee ordered a dawn attack and plenty of proof that it wasn't ordered until 9 or 10am (depending on if he ordered it before or after he visited Ewell at 9:30, the point being though that the attack wasn't made until 6 hours after the latest possible time it was given. Lee was also upset that by the time Longstreet's final brigades (less Pickett) reached him, he still didn't have his men in position to march.
That was later that year, mid september, with the help of the I Corps and Longstreet. I guess the consideration was spring 1863 when the wheather goes mild enough to go on a campaign. Otherwise than that Lee invaded Maryland - Bragg invaded East Kentucky and East Tennessee. Lee got repulsed at Antietam and his army was almost destroyed because of overextending. Bragg fought Perryville to a draw then realized that he does not really have anything to do in Kentucky, there is as much rebel support there as in Maryland so he withdraws his army. He could have inflicted more damage to the federals but at the end of the day he would have had to withdraw anyway. Then he retook half of Tennessee. It wasn't abysmal but he always could have done much more than he did and his subordinates kinda all knew. On top of that his demeanor was really awful he constantly rebuked his commanders. The two combined caused that he became a hated man.
It's been called the "bitter victory" as Bragg completely threw away any and everything he could've gain with the victory, and just 2 months later the Union securely held Chattanooga (and all of TN) and the gateway to the heartland was wide open. But he was also failed twice during that early campaign; once when his army failed to attack at MacLemore (sp?) Cove prior to the battle and on the second morning of the battle when a dawn attack had been ordered. But it was still Bragg who failed to order a follow up then opted to besiege the vital town.
I think that Lee and the ANV had nothing but contempt for the AoP by July 1863. Once again they kicked their asses; soundly beating probably the best and the worst corps. I also don't think that Lee gave "hunkering down" more than a passing thought as it would mean giving up the "aggressive." He also couldn't know how badly Longstreet would fail him, nor that 3 corps (XII, II and III) were up and in position and that the V was just hours away and VI would arrive in the early afternoon.
It is unbelievable how detailed Americans study their civil war. And studets are not US army senior staff officers. We in Europe have our share of wars and civil wars but we don't study them so detailed..
I guess because the ACW is our (so far) one and only strictly "American" war and as historians pointedly state over and over, the effects of that war are still with us today. Poor Europe doesn't seem to have much of a history without a war somewhere on the continent.
Strange, that no one mentions the other catastrophic battle in the Eastern Theater in 1863, Fredericksburg. A corp commander remembering the disaster visited upon the Army of the Potomac attacking prepared positions would be reckless not to pause before considering attempting that feat a second time when that general was put in command of the army.
First, Fredricksburg occurred in December '62, close enough I guess, but Hooker had made so many changes with AoP during his four months in command it really wasn't the same army that Burnside had tried to destroy (figuratively speaking.) As Gary says several times, I think Lee seriously thought that his men could accomplish anything no matter what the odds or situation.
No one posits that maybe Lee was right but Day 3 was a combination of nonusual key failings and what looked like a golden opportunity to but their usual was missing. Superior intelligence on the field was missing. Artillery. Jeb Stuart. Longstreet being a jerk due to a general feeling of over confidence. In combination with the Union having a spine against Lee for a change created an 1985 Bears against Marino situation. Not listening and ripe for defeat.
It's so hard to watch these engaging lectures and not want to jump in and comment. So here's my two cents. I'm gonna use a funny comparison, but I think it holds merit. I play a lot of card games, and card games are unlike any other game. They aren't like video games, and they aren't like board games. In a card game you always want to do something to advance your "game state." In other words you want to make plays and moves that move your deck into a better position to win regardless of what your opponent does. Further, you never want to rely on a card that only works if your opponent does "X" because there is never a guarantee that your opponent will do "X." Your deck needs to have a goal and a gameplan, and constantly work towards that goal. In that regard Lee was using the ANV like a deck. His game plan was to attack, his goal was to engage and defeat Meade. Therefore he attacked, as it was the only way to ensure he advanced his game state. People always act like Meade would have attacked Lee on day 2 if Lee had hunkered down to defend. That's just not the case. Meade could've disengaged, called up more reinforcements, or strengthened his own defences. Lee took the initiative, he advanced his game state. He did not wait to see if his opponent would do "X" he made the safest play. The best example I can think of during the war of relying on your opponent to make your plan work is at first manassas. The confederates relied on the US to do "X" and and nearly got their asses handed to them. Never rely on your opponent to do anything to help you win.
Made would have had to have unrolled his line to attack. And lee was expecting it to come .he would have gotten caught In a double pincer.and been destroyed and played right into Lee's hands. At the river they were trying to entice meade to attact him.there .if he would have attacked at the patomic lee would have destroyed him
Prof. Gallagher certainly seems eager either to misrepresent what his students are saying or else focus on irrelevant details of what they say. Basically, he seems like a bit of a dick. I do enjoy his lectures but I'm glad I'm not actually in his classroom.
I fast forward it when the students were talking. I do not like this teaching format. The students are not learning anything when they are running their mouth.
As a bit of an insomniac, I often listen to lectures to distract myself from endless lists of projects, worries, etc., and maybe learn something as well until the droning monotones lull me back to sleep.
Unfortunately, Gary Gallagher's lectures are so interesting and full of passion, I'm now listening to one after another. Will have to figure out how to sleep at work.
Wonderful historian and teacher...a pleasure to listen to
Gary Gallagher is really impressive. I've never heard better presentations on the Civil War.
Gallagher holds your attention with great information and his presentation is so pointed and effective.
The professor that brings history to life and teaches great lessons!!
I would have loved to take his courses.
He knows how to teach! Kids are impressive.
As one who has studied this many years I have become convinced that at Gettysburg Gen. Lee was extremely at risk without Gen. Jackson and Gen. J.E.B. Stuart. However if he had continued fighting from the start before the blue had fully occupied perhaps he might have had more success. But there was very much happening there very quickly.Far too many Sons, Fathers, Husbands and Brothers gave up their lives at this terrible Battle!!May they always be remembered and honored. ❤️
@13:00 - Battlefield tactics - Walking in line towards entrenched enemy fire. It was slaughter. This persisted into the 1st World War.
It wasn't until the development of machines like tanks, airplanes and handheld machine guns that the tactic of armies facing off at each
other was replaced by mechanized blitz, Fire & Maneuver, as well as paratroopers dropped in the rear of the enemy, and in modern times,
since Vietnam, infantry inserted at key locations by helicopter. Entrenchments still happen in war, it's just that these entrenchments
are not as advantageous, or invulnerable, as they were before tanks, jets, and accurate artillery. Drones, increasingly, will be dominate
on the battlefield, and in the air and on the seas.
Excellent Lecturer👍
His chalkboard look like the ocean at night
That's your comment?
Wish I was in the classroom…Lee had to attack on July 3rd.
Lee and the entire army had to know Vicksburg was going to fall soon.
Also, Lee said it himself-he had whooped the Union on the peninsula. He whooped the Union at 2nd Manassas. He whooped the Union at Fredericksburg. He whooped the Union at Chancellorsville. In less than a year, he had beat the union at every turn (Antietam was a draw and Lee had an army outnumbered 2 to 1).
Even tho Lee always whooped their ass-he had gained nothing. His army’s high command was getting weakened after each battle. His army wasn’t getting bigger. The Union’s army was getting bigger.
He had to attack. He had to drive the enemy or he would be in the same predicament he was already in.
So, Luke made an A+ I gather?
Dr. Gallagher is lecturing on battlefield tactics of the Civil War to a bunch of MBA (business school) student. Is this a standard course at Darden Business School for business students? Or is it a extracurricular elective the business students can participate in? It seems to me to be an unusual teaching strategy, but innovative. Dr. Gallagher how did you or the administration Darden set this up? And why?
They were two special "leadership" seminars put on during the 1863 150th anniversary seasons. As to credit(s) I have no idea.
In one of these-I think the first in the series-he mentions something about it being an elective class.
What can Professor Gallagher tell us about Day-Three and East Cavalry Ridge and Stuart/Hampton vs Generals Gregg/Custer and Stuart's intended approach into the backside of Cemetery Ridge? General Lee doesn't appear idiotic when you realize that Pickett-Pettigrew are the anvil and Stuart/Hampton are the heavy hammer, save Custer/Gregg interrupt Lee's two-prong plan on Day-Three at Gettysburg.
He addresses that in some of his other lectures available here on YT.
@@indy_go_blue6048 Excellent, sir. This is good to know, and thank you for cluing me in on this. This is a hot topic at my local group's ACW roundtable discussions. This subject among many as you might imagine. Thanks again.
@@kidhammer2567 YW. I'm sorry I couldn't have been more helpful and told you which video, but he has several of them here (YT) and I can't remember which one it was on. I hope you were able to find it.
@@indy_go_blue6048 I thank you for all that you have offered me, and I will search and find it. Many thanks, always, sir. - KH
At times Hubris would whisper into Lee's ear saying, "You can achieve anything you can imagine". And when that happened, General Lee refused to believe anything else.General Lee was told there were Union troops in Gettysburg, on June 30th. Lee dismissed this report as mistaken identity. General Lee knew that the Union troops were not Union troops, they were Militia troops instead.On July 2nd, General Lee issued his orders to attack both flanks at 4:00am. 8 hrs later, nobody had thought to send some of the cavalry south to collect some updated intel. And we all know that Longstreet would not attack until 12 hrs after, General Lee had issued those orders. Now we come to the 3rd day. With Hubris whispering to Lee about the great "Triumph's" that awaited victorious Romans, on their return to Rome. Is anybody else having flashbacks to Malvern Hill? Because I'm pretty sure General Lee had a couple of them, on that 3rd day of July, 1863. Maybe, General Lee should have had a slave stand behind him, and whisper into his other ear a warning: "that all glory is fleeting".
__"It is well that war is so terrible, [lest] we should grow too fond of it." -- Lee to Longstreet at Fredricksburg. Lee was not 'himself' before and during Gettysburg; looking at all the anecdotes from his subordinates, he acted like Maclellan or Hooker would in times of protracted stress and limited information... like Lee faced in Pennsylvania.
The shock of Pickett's charge (note all the apologizing he did to everyone) and the return of Stuart (whom Lee had let off the leash with yet another vaguely-worded order) got Lee back in character. Speaking of vague wording, this class just turned into the usual sop to the managerial class' pathetic desire to compare themselves to military commanders.
That's disgusting, I'm out. www.astro.sunysb.edu/fwalter/AST389/TEXTS/cyrano24.html
Actually there's zero proof that Lee ordered a dawn attack and plenty of proof that it wasn't ordered until 9 or 10am (depending on if he ordered it before or after he visited Ewell at 9:30, the point being though that the attack wasn't made until 6 hours after the latest possible time it was given. Lee was also upset that by the time Longstreet's final brigades (less Pickett) reached him, he still didn't have his men in position to march.
It seems that Lee was perhaps awaiting Stuart?
@@johnd2058, what a dumb decision. The lectures were videotaped. Thousands of people besides the students have benefited from them.
I know Bragg was mediocre at best but Chickamauga is officially a victory of his.
That was later that year, mid september, with the help of the I Corps and Longstreet. I guess the consideration was spring 1863 when the wheather goes mild enough to go on a campaign.
Otherwise than that Lee invaded Maryland - Bragg invaded East Kentucky and East Tennessee. Lee got repulsed at Antietam and his army was almost destroyed because of overextending. Bragg fought Perryville to a draw then realized that he does not really have anything to do in Kentucky, there is as much rebel support there as in Maryland so he withdraws his army. He could have inflicted more damage to the federals but at the end of the day he would have had to withdraw anyway. Then he retook half of Tennessee. It wasn't abysmal but he always could have done much more than he did and his subordinates kinda all knew. On top of that his demeanor was really awful he constantly rebuked his commanders. The two combined caused that he became a hated man.
It's been called the "bitter victory" as Bragg completely threw away any and everything he could've gain with the victory, and just 2 months later the Union securely held Chattanooga (and all of TN) and the gateway to the heartland was wide open. But he was also failed twice during that early campaign; once when his army failed to attack at MacLemore (sp?) Cove prior to the battle and on the second morning of the battle when a dawn attack had been ordered. But it was still Bragg who failed to order a follow up then opted to besiege the vital town.
Bragg didn't win the Battle of Chickamauga. Rosecrans lost it.
I think that Lee and the ANV had nothing but contempt for the AoP by July 1863. Once again they kicked their asses; soundly beating probably the best and the worst corps. I also don't think that Lee gave "hunkering down" more than a passing thought as it would mean giving up the "aggressive." He also couldn't know how badly Longstreet would fail him, nor that 3 corps (XII, II and III) were up and in position and that the V was just hours away and VI would arrive in the early afternoon.
It is unbelievable how detailed Americans study their civil war. And studets are not US army senior staff officers. We in Europe have our share of wars and civil wars but we don't study them so detailed..
Or study but emphasis is not in military decisions and tactics but individual experiences and social effects..
@@kallekonttinen1738 it's American to want to study and reenact military engagements.
I guess because the ACW is our (so far) one and only strictly "American" war and as historians pointedly state over and over, the effects of that war are still with us today. Poor Europe doesn't seem to have much of a history without a war somewhere on the continent.
@@indy_go_blue6048 In Finland (my country) probably Winter War is similar "nation building war" and studied a lot but not as much as ACW..
Strange, that no one mentions the other catastrophic battle in the Eastern Theater in 1863, Fredericksburg. A corp commander remembering the disaster visited upon the Army of the Potomac attacking prepared positions would be reckless not to pause before considering attempting that feat a second time when that general was put in command of the army.
First, Fredricksburg occurred in December '62, close enough I guess, but Hooker had made so many changes with AoP during his four months in command it really wasn't the same army that Burnside had tried to destroy (figuratively speaking.) As Gary says several times, I think Lee seriously thought that his men could accomplish anything no matter what the odds or situation.
No one posits that maybe Lee was right but Day 3 was a combination of nonusual key failings and what looked like a golden opportunity to but their usual was missing. Superior intelligence on the field was missing. Artillery. Jeb Stuart. Longstreet being a jerk due to a general feeling of over confidence. In combination with the Union having a spine against Lee for a change created an 1985 Bears against Marino situation. Not listening and ripe for defeat.
It's so hard to watch these engaging lectures and not want to jump in and comment. So here's my two cents. I'm gonna use a funny comparison, but I think it holds merit.
I play a lot of card games, and card games are unlike any other game. They aren't like video games, and they aren't like board games. In a card game you always want to do something to advance your "game state." In other words you want to make plays and moves that move your deck into a better position to win regardless of what your opponent does. Further, you never want to rely on a card that only works if your opponent does "X" because there is never a guarantee that your opponent will do "X." Your deck needs to have a goal and a gameplan, and constantly work towards that goal.
In that regard Lee was using the ANV like a deck. His game plan was to attack, his goal was to engage and defeat Meade. Therefore he attacked, as it was the only way to ensure he advanced his game state. People always act like Meade would have attacked Lee on day 2 if Lee had hunkered down to defend. That's just not the case. Meade could've disengaged, called up more reinforcements, or strengthened his own defences. Lee took the initiative, he advanced his game state. He did not wait to see if his opponent would do "X" he made the safest play. The best example I can think of during the war of relying on your opponent to make your plan work is at first manassas. The confederates relied on the US to do "X" and and nearly got their asses handed to them.
Never rely on your opponent to do anything to help you win.
Made would have had to have unrolled his line to attack. And lee was expecting it to come .he would have gotten caught In a double pincer.and been destroyed and played right into Lee's hands. At the river they were trying to entice meade to attact him.there .if he would have attacked at the patomic lee would have destroyed him
Anderson Melissa Brown Frank Clark Sharon
Lopez Linda Harris Frank Perez Amy
estradeds
Prof. Gallagher certainly seems eager either to misrepresent what his students are saying or else focus on irrelevant details of what they say. Basically, he seems like a bit of a dick. I do enjoy his lectures but I'm glad I'm not actually in his classroom.
I fast forward it when the students were talking. I do not like this teaching format. The students are not learning anything when they are running their mouth.
estradeds /nd.D