Simply great - I'm reading the book (:-) trying to read....) and your videos are really helpful for repeating and understanding better! Thanks for your work!
Thanks for the videos, very helpful. You say that the object already arrives with significance, with examples such as the proofreaders illusion. Although i do somewhat agree that understanding is not simply an association of memories, you also say that the object is already imbued with significance. Surely this is not the case, as the object is devoid of any significance without our conciousness imbuing it with meaning. With the proofreaders illusion, the light reflects onto my retina, and goes through my nervous system and arrives into a background of understanding language. This background understanding is what gives the object any signification. The only way i can understand what merleau-ponty is saying is that this is done in some pre-reflective say, like you explained before. That it arrives to my perception already imbued with meaning, although that meaning has indeed been imbued by myself, not something in the world. Sorry for the wordy question, perhaps i could make it clearer but my brain is somewhat defective right now
That's exactly right and a good way to put it: the percept is imbued with meaning by the one doing the perceiving... but, and this is key, it doesn't, _it can't,_ appear any other way. Remember that MP is doing phenomenology, so he is concerned with describing actual, lived experience. If an object appears (which is to say, in experience) it will always already be full of significance. If it wasn't, it wouldn't, _it couldn't_ appear at all.
This is a just a question about the Muller-Lyer illusion. Even though they "look" different, I'm not sure that the illusion is about the perception of the lines. I don't think that a camera can record a comparison. It just registers and records changes in colour on a flat surface. And perhaps we do that too. But the illusion is not about that. We make the comparison by looking at the lines and asking ourselves about whether or not they are the same length. Aren't we making a judgement about two things we are perceiving? And isn't all illusion based on comparison? For example when we see a stick seem to bend in water and calling that an illusion, isn't that judgement made because we see the stick as straight when it is the air, or because if we go to grasp it it is not in the place we "see" it to be. (I'd love to know what other people think.)
Hi Alice - thanks for the comment. Sorry, I didn’t respond earlier. It seemed like you were looking for comments from other viewers, but it appears I don’t have the traffic to generate that kind of feedback, so you’re stuck with me! I agree that we are making a judgement between the two horizontal lines, and that it is only after the judgement (or comparison) that the illusion appears, but doesn’t our judgement tell us that one line is longer than the other only because of the way we perceive them; i.e. in a context that includes, and is affected by, the additional diagonal lines? To me, the illusion seems to arise from that original perception, although you’re right that there would be no illusion without a comparison. I guess, to a certain extent, it just depends where you want to put the emphasis. It’s also very interesting that you chose the bent straw illusion because I see that as an illusion of a completely different kind. The straw appears bent because of the properties of light, not because of our perception of it. A camera faithfully recording what is in front of it would be ‘deceived’ by the straw in the water illusion (if cameras _could_ be deceived) because this is just a straight-forward consequence of physical laws, but it wouldn’t be ‘deceived’ by the two horizontal lines in M-L because to be taken in by that illusion explicitly requires that the observer _not_ faithfully record what is before it; i.e. it requires the ability to perceive things in a wider context, imbued with a 'sense' dependent on that context.
@@absurdbeing2219 Thanks so much for your reply. And yes, they are very different kinds of illusions. I guess I was trying to work out in my own mind what an "illusion" is in relation to perception. My first answer was something in which two forms of perception do not coincide. In the first case, the perception of the same points on a ruler marking the end and the beginning and in the second grasping and seeing being differently located. In answer to your point about the context created by the diagonal lines, I wonder if this indicates that there are various levels which we lump under the idea of perception. I may be wrong (and perhaps M-P would say I have not been paying attention!), but I'm still inclined to believe that the retina does receive the raw information, much as a digital camera does (like in tiny discrete packages). Then we begin to make sense of it. I'm sure this is a very complex process with all sorts of bottom up and top down elements coming together. We are not conscious of these processes and so perception for our consciousness is the separation of the figure from the background etc as you have explained. I don't want to take your time. I'm just an ordinary person, not a philosopher. But I'm curious about these things and this reply has run away from me. In other words, you don't have to reply unless you want to!
Hi Alice - no problems. I'm not a professional philosopher either. I would just like to clarify one point in your response because it is something I think a lot of people misunderstand MP on. He doesn’t reject the idea that the eye receives raw information which is then processed by the brain, and that, in this sense, it absolutely _is_ like a camera. What he rejects is the notion that this qualifies as _perception._ Even treating this as a “level” of perception would be misleading. This is why no one says, “Cameras _perceive_ objects in focus,” because even though the camera lens takes in raw data which then gets processed to produce an image (like the eye and brain), it obviously isn’t _perceiving_ in the slightest; even at a ‘low’ level. (Obviously, none of this is a denial that this mechanical process is a pre-requisite for perception, or that disruptions to it would result in disruptions to perception) I wonder if you would have a problem with defining illusion (in relation to perception, so excluding things like the bent straw illusion), rather than a judgement or comparison, as a perception in which something appears to be present (or true) which is not present (or true) according to the raw sensory givens?
Oh, and another question about projection. I've just been walking my very excitable dog. I noticed something in the shadows that looked exactly like a small dog sitting on the grass. In fact, it was a water meter. I projected that image because I'm on the look out for small dogs. But I saw it clearly, right down to the bred!
I never read Merleau-Ponty. He sounds interesting. I should read about him. I’ve been reading Kierkegaard and Nietzsche lately. They fascinate me. Great video. Thanks!
Thanks. I found a lot of value in Kierkegaard too. I really recommend Merleau-Ponty. He is a very hard read, but definitely worth it. Hopefully by video 18, we'll all be Merleau-Ponty experts!
I've been accidentally having this discourse with a contemporary without realizing it. My thought is that because language is a shared experience and definition is an agreement, that metaphysical experience can never be truly shared with others. To me, this is what Socrates is talking about when he posits the coin thought experiment. If you can never know anothers mind, what is the value of spending time opining about something that is inherently unknowable? When the observable and knowable substance can be defined and agreed upon. Common language association, and shared immersive experience is necessary for definition to be similar. Otherwise sharing is impossible.
Two people are chatting as they walk through a plaza. They come upon a coin on the ground. The first reaches for it, saying I've never seen one like that before. The second stops him short and asks, what's on the bottom. The first responds, I just told you I've never seen it before. The second then asked what's on top. Surely, the first says, you can see what is on top as well as I can. The second then asked, would there be any value in spending time wondering about what is on the bottom when we could be deepening the topic of conversation regarding the side we both already agree upon?
Rather than this chapter, it sounds like you might be more interested in the last chapter of Part 2 (my video 15/18) where MP talks more about the Other and solipsism, concluding basically by saying there is a "lived solipsism" we can never overcome.
Sartre was right to say so. And calling philosophy a useless passion isn't the insult you think it is. In fact, philosophers would rejoice knowing that there is a dimension of human activity that doesn't need to have utility in order to be virtuous, important, or worthy, like art, and even science when it is not immediately connected to engineering and technics.
Simply great - I'm reading the book (:-) trying to read....) and your videos are really helpful for repeating and understanding better! Thanks for your work!
Thank you and good luck with the book. PhP really is a goldmine of phenomenological insights if you can put in the hard yards to pick them up.
Thanks for the videos, very helpful. You say that the object already arrives with significance, with examples such as the proofreaders illusion. Although i do somewhat agree that understanding is not simply an association of memories, you also say that the object is already imbued with significance. Surely this is not the case, as the object is devoid of any significance without our conciousness imbuing it with meaning. With the proofreaders illusion, the light reflects onto my retina, and goes through my nervous system and arrives into a background of understanding language. This background understanding is what gives the object any signification. The only way i can understand what merleau-ponty is saying is that this is done in some pre-reflective say, like you explained before. That it arrives to my perception already imbued with meaning, although that meaning has indeed been imbued by myself, not something in the world.
Sorry for the wordy question, perhaps i could make it clearer but my brain is somewhat defective right now
That's exactly right and a good way to put it: the percept is imbued with meaning by the one doing the perceiving... but, and this is key, it doesn't, _it can't,_ appear any other way. Remember that MP is doing phenomenology, so he is concerned with describing actual, lived experience. If an object appears (which is to say, in experience) it will always already be full of significance. If it wasn't, it wouldn't, _it couldn't_ appear at all.
@absurdbeing2219 Thanks for the clarification!
This is a just a question about the Muller-Lyer illusion. Even though they "look" different, I'm not sure that the illusion is about the perception of the lines. I don't think that a camera can record a comparison. It just registers and records changes in colour on a flat surface. And perhaps we do that too. But the illusion is not about that. We make the comparison by looking at the lines and asking ourselves about whether or not they are the same length. Aren't we making a judgement about two things we are perceiving? And isn't all illusion based on comparison? For example when we see a stick seem to bend in water and calling that an illusion, isn't that judgement made because we see the stick as straight when it is the air, or because if we go to grasp it it is not in the place we "see" it to be. (I'd love to know what other people think.)
Hi Alice - thanks for the comment. Sorry, I didn’t respond earlier. It seemed like you were looking for comments from other viewers, but it appears I don’t have the traffic to generate that kind of feedback, so you’re stuck with me!
I agree that we are making a judgement between the two horizontal lines, and that it is only after the judgement (or comparison) that the illusion appears, but doesn’t our judgement tell us that one line is longer than the other only because of the way we perceive them; i.e. in a context that includes, and is affected by, the additional diagonal lines? To me, the illusion seems to arise from that original perception, although you’re right that there would be no illusion without a comparison. I guess, to a certain extent, it just depends where you want to put the emphasis.
It’s also very interesting that you chose the bent straw illusion because I see that as an illusion of a completely different kind. The straw appears bent because of the properties of light, not because of our perception of it. A camera faithfully recording what is in front of it would be ‘deceived’ by the straw in the water illusion (if cameras _could_ be deceived) because this is just a straight-forward consequence of physical laws, but it wouldn’t be ‘deceived’ by the two horizontal lines in M-L because to be taken in by that illusion explicitly requires that the observer _not_ faithfully record what is before it; i.e. it requires the ability to perceive things in a wider context, imbued with a 'sense' dependent on that context.
@@absurdbeing2219 Thanks so much for your reply. And yes, they are very different kinds of illusions. I guess I was trying to work out in my own mind what an "illusion" is in relation to perception. My first answer was something in which two forms of perception do not coincide. In the first case, the perception of the same points on a ruler marking the end and the beginning and in the second grasping and seeing being differently located. In answer to your point about the context created by the diagonal lines, I wonder if this indicates that there are various levels which we lump under the idea of perception. I may be wrong (and perhaps M-P would say I have not been paying attention!), but I'm still inclined to believe that the retina does receive the raw information, much as a digital camera does (like in tiny discrete packages). Then we begin to make sense of it. I'm sure this is a very complex process with all sorts of bottom up and top down elements coming together. We are not conscious of these processes and so perception for our consciousness is the separation of the figure from the background etc as you have explained. I don't want to take your time. I'm just an ordinary person, not a philosopher. But I'm curious about these things and this reply has run away from me. In other words, you don't have to reply unless you want to!
Hi Alice - no problems. I'm not a professional philosopher either.
I would just like to clarify one point in your response because it is something I think a lot of people misunderstand MP on. He doesn’t reject the idea that the eye receives raw information which is then processed by the brain, and that, in this sense, it absolutely _is_ like a camera. What he rejects is the notion that this qualifies as _perception._
Even treating this as a “level” of perception would be misleading. This is why no one says, “Cameras _perceive_ objects in focus,” because even though the camera lens takes in raw data which then gets processed to produce an image (like the eye and brain), it obviously isn’t _perceiving_ in the slightest; even at a ‘low’ level. (Obviously, none of this is a denial that this mechanical process is a pre-requisite for perception, or that disruptions to it would result in disruptions to perception)
I wonder if you would have a problem with defining illusion (in relation to perception, so excluding things like the bent straw illusion), rather than a judgement or comparison, as a perception in which something appears to be present (or true) which is not present (or true) according to the raw sensory givens?
@@absurdbeing2219 Great! That's clarifying. Thanks. And thanks for all the hard work you've put into making these videos!
Oh, and another question about projection. I've just been walking my very excitable dog. I noticed something in the shadows that looked exactly like a small dog sitting on the grass. In fact, it was a water meter. I projected that image because I'm on the look out for small dogs. But I saw it clearly, right down to the bred!
I never read Merleau-Ponty. He sounds interesting. I should read about him. I’ve been reading Kierkegaard and Nietzsche lately. They fascinate me. Great video. Thanks!
Thanks. I found a lot of value in Kierkegaard too. I really recommend Merleau-Ponty. He is a very hard read, but definitely worth it. Hopefully by video 18, we'll all be Merleau-Ponty experts!
Excellent series thank you.Very helpful in my dissertation research IPA
Thanks Andy!
I've been accidentally having this discourse with a contemporary without realizing it. My thought is that because language is a shared experience and definition is an agreement, that metaphysical experience can never be truly shared with others. To me, this is what Socrates is talking about when he posits the coin thought experiment. If you can never know anothers mind, what is the value of spending time opining about something that is inherently unknowable? When the observable and knowable substance can be defined and agreed upon. Common language association, and shared immersive experience is necessary for definition to be similar. Otherwise sharing is impossible.
Two people are chatting as they walk through a plaza. They come upon a coin on the ground. The first reaches for it, saying I've never seen one like that before. The second stops him short and asks, what's on the bottom. The first responds, I just told you I've never seen it before. The second then asked what's on top. Surely, the first says, you can see what is on top as well as I can. The second then asked, would there be any value in spending time wondering about what is on the bottom when we could be deepening the topic of conversation regarding the side we both already agree upon?
Rather than this chapter, it sounds like you might be more interested in the last chapter of Part 2 (my video 15/18) where MP talks more about the Other and solipsism, concluding basically by saying there is a "lived solipsism" we can never overcome.
23:49 summary
Sartre has said,man is useless passion but l say philosophy is useless passion with no end,worst wastage of human potential
gtfo.
Sartre was right to say so. And calling philosophy a useless passion isn't the insult you think it is. In fact, philosophers would rejoice knowing that there is a dimension of human activity that doesn't need to have utility in order to be virtuous, important, or worthy, like art, and even science when it is not immediately connected to engineering and technics.
@@s.lazarus you are probably right, but it does not change what I said. By the way , utility is not my point.