Why No German Reinforcements at Stalingrad?
Вставка
- Опубліковано 15 кві 2018
- Sixth Army was starved of reinforcements at Stalingrad, but it wasn't because the Germans had run out of manpower. No, they had the replacements - they just didn't send them to 6th Army! But why is this the case? Let's explore this.
Check out the pinned comment below for more information, notes, links, and sources.
Don't forget to subscribe if you like history or gaming! And hit the little bell icon to be notified when videos like this are uploaded.
Please consider supporting me on Patreon and help make more videos like this possible / tikhistory
*Extra Notes, Links and Sources*
Despite the evidence given in the video, I have no doubt that some of you will still argue that the Germans couldn’t, or indeed, didn’t replace their losses suffered in 1941 by the summer of 1942. Some will probably complain that Germany was (by as early as 1942) at the bottom of the manpower barrel. But this was simply not the case. The following quote from Liedtke explains that Germany actually squandered her available manpower -
“Regardless of the heavy losses sustained over the previous year, the Wehrmacht as a whole had witnessed a net increase of about 1.1 million personnel by 1 July 1942. However, despite the urgency of defeating the Soviet Union as quickly as possible, which should have resulted in a ruthless prioritization towards meeting the needs of the Army, large consignments of personnel were still allocated to the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine.” - Enduring the Whirlwind, Page 209
This, and the evidence presented in the video, points us firmly in the direction of mismanagement and poor staff-work. Germany had the manpower, but didn’t use it correctly.
Also to note, the Germans created an additional 22 divisions in 1942. This was at a time when their other divisions weren’t at full strength. This fact is often used as a point against the explain why they didn’t have enough manpower. In reality, with an almost 3,000 kilometer front, which was about to expand to 4,100 kilometers, Germany needed both to reinforce her existing divisions, and create more divisions. So to say that they were wrong to create 22 new divisions is the wrong conclusion to come too, especially when you consider some of these divisions were made from elements of other veteran divisions.
Either way, why is Army Group Centre being prioritised in terms of reinforcements over Army Groups A and B? This does not make any sense, regardless whether you agree or disagree with the manpower situation. I’d love to hear your thoughts so let me know.
If you would like book recommendations for further reading, the two books I suggest you pick up are Citino’s “Death of the Wehrmacht” and Liedtke’s “Enduring the Whirlwind” - both of which cover the Operation Blau period quite well.
*Links*
Citino’s lecture on the “Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns in 1942.” ua-cam.com/video/UNDhswF1GKk/v-deo.html
My “Your Perception of the WW2 Eastern Front is Wrong” video ua-cam.com/video/B-ZHH770WLs/v-deo.html
My “The Numbers Say it All | The Myth of German Superiority on the WW2 Eastern Front” video ua-cam.com/video/_7BE8CsM9ds/v-deo.html
Another thank you goes out to my Patreons. If you would like to support me in creating these videos, please take a look at my Patreon page www.patreon.com/TIKhistory
*Selected Sources/Bibliography*
Citino, R. “Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942.” University of Kansas, 2007.
Glantz, D. House, J. “The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 1. To the Gates of Stalingrad. Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August 1942.” University Press of Kansas, 2009.
Glantz, D. “When Titan’s Clashed.” University Press of Kansas, 2015.
Hayward, J. “Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler’s Defeat in the East 1942-1943.” University Press of Kansas, 1998.
Liedtke, G. “Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943.” Helion & Company LTD, 2016.
“Germany and the Second World War: Volume VI/II, The Global War.” Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Research Institute for Military History) Potsdam, Germany. Oxford University Press, 2015.
Thanks for watching, and thanks for commenting!
At Stalingrad I think it boils down to the average Russian being tougher than the average German.
tstocker, you're really looking to start an argument aren't you :D
I dont disagree but the Kriegs marine was not beaten at this point, the uboats were still efective. The luftwaffe needed Personal too, despite being in the defense in europe but extensive use to support troops in africa and so on. The thing that comes to my mind is Germany should have taken the flaks from the homefront and supplied them to their allies at the flanks of stalingrad.
TIK Another great video!
But I do have one criticism (nothing to do with the content, just presentation): maybe not put your face in the thumbnail of every video. I hate when people do that; comes across as clickbait (the annoying kind).
Other than that:
Keep up the good work!
is there a point to be made that german replacements where less trained/experienced than the soldiers they replaced? (especially volksturm units)
von Manstein said; "amateurs are praised by tactics and strategy in war, real experts always care about logistics"
Real experts don't lose wars twice!
@@blueshirtman8875 HAhahaha! Yeeessss! That's the truth, the bitter truth!
@@blueshirtman8875 Real experts don't start them in a first place...
@@florianfloditt2881 Please be kind enough to explaiain that comment? Thanks in advance.
@@blueshirtman8875 a smart man solves problems, a genius prevent them becoming a problem.
The whole operation was doomed to fail in a first place. The Germans knew from the beginning that their logistics couldn't cover a front line that far and that they didn't have enough resources without the Ukraine. But they couldn't get the Ukraine without beating Russia first. Getting the oil in a war was just not possible. Therefore no way to win. It was a gamble and the Germans bet that the Russian would have failed before the winter. That didn't happen and all operations from that point were Pyrrhus-battles to maintain the nazi-partie at power as long as possible.
Manstein must have been aware of it, as he was in the inner circle of high command.
The generals tried to create the myth of a clean Wehrmacht and sell their Pyrrhus-victories as the result of their genius mind. But that was just marketing...
Just a shame that they sacrificed so many life's for a lost cause and their "glory"
I studied history and ww2 for 23 years. I have never heard someone talking about that. GREAT WORk
Check out Liedtke's Enduring the Whirlwind book. I think you may enjoy it 😊
I have wondered this, especially lately upon seeing a map with where the divisions were and where the lines were. It screams "encirclement coming, reinforce flanks now or GTFO!"
The logistics of distance & winter are pointers l think-why they should have had more re-enforcement. I like what General Yang said in book The Art of War: not to attack cities as they rapidly drain resources & men. Appears true.
Who was studying from for 2 decades? There has been dozens or more of books written on these battles, and this one is unique?
WW2 is like most things, a complete fake....
..one man can not start a war nor can he rebuild the economy, it was the Crypto Master..the very same Master that is dicking our foreheads today!
Hitler(Germany) = Big-boys "kidnapping of a nation", trying to eliminate the Bolshevik revolution (great threat to capital and to the old Monarchs of Europe). In essence...it was just another false-flag-whore, money piling blood sacrifice to the pagan Gods...Paganismuss never ended
Hitler was a first-class junky, consuming in all....70+ substances. Entire Nazi Germany was on methamphetamines.
Hitler was bagging Poland only for the Danzig corridor (years). In theory, a Bloody road/train corridor would save the war in the west :P
Most of Wehrmacht truck engines ware courtesy of Hanry Ford, the little .... kept a picture of Hitler in his office.
Zyclon-B was a gift from the Rockefeller.
Luftwaffe would be grounded from day 1 if the Yanks would not provide some additive for the fuel.
Tirpitz, enigma, Treaty of Versailles, Pearl Harbor, war-trials....all insider jokes
Nazi eugenics program is an American "copy-paste".
General Paton hated Jews, guess what was the souvenir he took back to the states...a copy of the "Nurenberg Laws". I wonder whos the proud owner of Goering`s blue Mercedes, etc?
Crypto Master was predicting the Holocaust...the starvation and extermination of" 6 million Jews" at least 35 years prior happening.
After the war, most of the SS were smuggled out of Europe by the Vatican.
Goering`s, Hitler`s and Himmler's right hands were all American spies...drugging and controlling them! Himmler`s personal shaman turned Himmler into a complete puppet, he even bought 60K jew from him as payment for his treatment.
In the winter of 41 Wehrmacht sent one-third of the Russian front back to German factories, i guess it makes sense to burn millions-of-souls in such a hurry then?
As seen in the above videos, the entire war was a colossal joke....German supply couldn't provide any serious offensive...doomed from the start, a complete madness
....sick Frankist idea of having fun! Implementation of "4-BAAL" declaration, IS-RA-EL....the purification through transgression?
Would add some links but the Crypto-master is deleting them
..someone is still on the crusade?? From the ancient, medieval, the Napoleonic, WW`s and the Iraqi wars!!!
TIK Imagine you are a Commander of any unit at this time. You have your task and you need everything you can get to have better chances and you would try to do so for your troops - for good reasons. With that number of divisions and frontlines, Berlin has requests for resupply from Northern Africa up to Norway, from the coastline to England to the endless frontlines in the east. As this commander, you have experienced how thousands of your men have been killed in battle, you want to prevent more deaths in your ranks and you know every other General tries this for his own troops. What happens now is a distortion of reality. the Generals begin to overate their difficulties (not even on purpose). In that situation, it depends on who is more CONVINCING to Hitler. In one of your episodes, you described Paulus as a General who is not the man who stands up and argues, well...there it is. It was difficult for the HQ to determine the grand picture with all real needs and Center Group has outlined their situation more convincing than army goup south.
You make a very good point. Same applies with vehicle losses. Graebner at Arnhem took the wheels off his half-tracks so he could claim they weren't fit for transport elsewhere. This is the only reason he had any trucks at all on day one of Market Garden (being the only unit in 9th SS Panzer Division that had armoured fighting vehicles). It's not hard to imagine this was going on all over the place.
Of course huge role in who gets what was played be personal contacts, old favours was called, old school budies were helping each other, personal relations ships and old anymosities played also as well . . .
Berlin: Paulus! Great job! Really driving those Reds at Stalinigrad. So do you need anything?
Paulus: Thank you, yes...We...
Berlin: Fine, fine...Listen I've got that pain in the ass Halder on the other line so ...
Paulus: Yes, but re enforcements are...
Berlin: Right, good of you to offer. I'll ask him what he needs. **CLICK**
I was thinking the same thing. I’m just getting into this subject, but my first thoughts were politics, the reports, and the reporting schedule.
It almost looks like the staff were making sufficient progress into September. Then something happened during September, they wrote up their report, and requested reinforcements going into October.
I wouldn’t personally ask for more staff if I was confident in our progress, while other teams were struggling. Most don’t want to be the squeaky wheel, so I’d like to see a timeline of September and get an idea for what changed for whoever was in charge.
I’d also like to see that compared to whoever was in charge on the Soviet side in September in Stalingrad - See if they were more confrontational in getting reinforcements when they needed them.
@Fabio Erklärt, There is no such thing as a "good excuse." So difficult as it were, they were expected to know how to conduct war. Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz would have spanked these administrators good and hard for poor planning and poor execution. Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz would never have allowed this kind of catastrophe.
Mannstein's 11th Army had been scheduled to accompany Paulus' 6th Army in the Stalingrad Attack. However, Soviet Aircraft from Crimea were bombing the Oil Supplies in Romania. Hitler gave the capture of Crimea a top priority. The 11th Army quickly took Crimea except for Sevastopol. Mannstein's 11th Army began its siege towards end of October, and expected to take the City by Christmas 1941, which would have left plenty of time to join the attack on Stalingrad. However, Sevastopol held out for 280 days up into July 1942. It was desperate fighting accompanied by the War cry "Sevastopol Never Surrender". It did not surrender but ran out of defenders with the loss of 250,000 casualties. Even with no ammunition the soldiers linked arms and charged the German Forces. The 11th Army suffered significant casualties to take Sevastopol, and was unable to accompany the 6th Army at Stalingrad -- possibly changing the course of the War. Sevastopol is one of only 4 cities distinguished as a Hero City of the Soviet Union. The 11th Army was rested with Army Group Central.
D Nickaroo actually the 11th army was sent to army group north to try to capture Leningrad but the Soviets struck first and the army became embroiled in defensive fighting it was split among the 16th and 18th armies
the 11th army was sent to Crimea first. it was not sent to the north. Mannstein was, not the entire army. most of the 11th army was lost in crimea
TheLastOne the 11th army was sent northwards after the capture of Sevastopol because Hitler changed his mind and wanted to capture Leningrad
TheLastOne the 11th army's losses in the battle of Sevastopol was 27412 dead,wounded and missing out of a force of around 200000 men.the army was not destroyed,its success at Sevastopol convinced Hitler to try to capture Leningrad and part of it was sent along with von manstein was sent to army group north,the rest was split between army group centre and army group south
well that's according to the western sources. if you check the Russian/Soviet sources that's way different number from both sides.
27k is to little for such a battle. in fact he lost most of his army.
when Hitler send his comgratulations on capture of Sevastopol, Mannstein said: "one more such a victory and my fuhrer will have no soldiers left".
You've hit on a point that according to Kenneth Macksey in his book “Why the Germans Lose at War", has plagued the Prussian Army from the beginning: poor emphasis on logistics. Macksey argues that the Prussian idea is a short war concentrating on movement and that long logistical trains were never emphasized. This failing then was transmitted to the Wehrmacht through the predominance of Potsdam Prussian trained officers. Remember, Hitler complained that his generals did not understand the "economic aspects of war"; it seems he was right.
I've not read that book, but it does sound as though Robert Citino is taking up where Machsey left off. Have you read Citino? I generally agree that Hitler wasn't wrong about his generals not understanding the strategic and economic aspects of the war. They were trained to view it as an operational and tactical art, not a grand strategic campaign, which Hitler certainly viewed it as, and which lead him into conflict with his generals (most notably Halder, which shaped his post-war leanings, and thus our understanding of the war).
Yes, it seems Halder has had an enormous influence on the perception of Hitler, and perhaps Hitler was not the inept fool he has been made out to be.
"Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics" - Gen. Robert H. Barrow
"Questions of supply can exert on the form and direction of operations, as well as the choice of a theatre of war and the line of communication.” - Clausewitz
After watching his videos i think Maybe Stalin making sure that his generals fear him is not such a bad thing after all
It seems as if Prussian doctrine is the land variant of Alfred T. Mahan's Fleet doctrine. Winning a decisive battle vs. fighting a longer campaign.
Halder, the same man who wasn't able or willing to supply Rommel in North Africa wasn't willing or able to supply Paulus in Stalingrad. We might see a trend here...
Yes, exactly. Although some of what he says about Rommel might be true.
We need to understand how the command structure worked,OKH was the Army's general staff,ie Russian front,OKW was the staff for the armed forces. Rommel was technical reported to the OKW,not the OKH just another layer of BS for Rommel to contend with why it was set-up that way is has more to do with Hitler and the way he kept any military institution from becoming too powerful.
Phil Hsueh yes they had broken Enigma but in late 42 early 43 italian tankers were getting Thur just to the wrong ports, ports they no longer held.Point was Rommel essentially had to go it alone when he went to Hitler,no OKH to have his back,at times the OKH could address some issues in house unless they we're counter maned ,The debalce in N Africa became knowing asTunnis grad in OKH, could read von Luck he had some interesting things to say about it. It's an ok read,just a little bit sugar coated.von Luck served in Russia went to Africa then France ended up s POW in Russia,but it's somewhat self servicing.
That might be something to looking to the German Army lost between 400;000 to 600;000 front line troops from 42 10 and 43 5. These we're some of the best they had.
Lets see if I can see a trend here...Who approved halder command of the 6th. Certainly was not me. Judging by
by outcome, it was a fine decision.
Halder despised Rommel and Halder always thought that Africa was truly a sideshow. He hated wasting the resources. Oh, and yea, some of what Halder said about Rommel was clearly true.
Sir, thank you for your videos. Having been in the U.S. Army for over 23 years (and still working with them after a total of 32 years), I can share some light on this subject. There is one central character I can identify that would place the success or failure directly to his decisions regarding the entire scenario.. Chief of Staff of the German Army High Command Franz Halder. His original goal was to attack Moscow and capture the capitol to win the war. The fact that Hitler dismisses him and orders the attack to go south instead, sets in motion the next phases... 1) While Hitler is ordering attacks and movements to the South, Halder still controls the reinforcements, and the SUPPLIES to the AIRLIFT that would be crucial to the success of Stalingrad, and thus the entire Caucas campaign for the oil. 2) Halder is directly undermining Hitler's efforts to show the attack in the South was a bad idea, and that he has the resources already in place in Army Central to take Moscow, and will use this to force Hitler to obligate the next focus on Halder's objective. 3) The removal of combat forces from Army Group South, after their initial push to be deployed there, is showing his contempt for the overall plan of Hitler, and further supporting my assumption. 4). He woefully under staffs the replacements to the operational units, to force them into a defensive-only posture, and will not supply the units with the means to obtain the objective. 5) Halder's shortcoming is that he underestimates Paulus and the units under his command to push forward and attack at all costs. By the time Halder realizes he is grinding his flank to become non-combat effective, he is risking Army Group Central's ability to protect itself, so he reluctantly supports the South, but too late.
Thank you, very interesting read. He was so petty that he would throw a major wrench in the works. Maybe hitler should've purged instead
Very interesting theory.!
When I watched this with an Anthropological lens, I was hypothesizing that someone must have been purposely undermining the operation for some reason. I am currently reading german soldier diaries and other primary source data to learn the soldier mindset. From these alone, there were MANY reasons Hitler could have had people working againist him. Especially after throwing a wrench in the push for Moscow. And I came upon this! The 8th book, I'm near the end of Moscow Tram Stop, Assistenzarzt Haape.
i just found your channel and as a fellow history enthusiast i have to say your channel is amazing! keep up the awesome work youre doing!
This is clearly off-topic but, man, you deserve a Nobel prize. I wish we had a beer or two some day and discuss history. This is what the Internet in its finest is supposed to be: an endless continuity of eye opening ideas challenging everything you know and forcing you to re-evaluate. I'll be watching your content until I die ;-)
well said
Nobel prize? No disrespect to this author person who does some very detailed work + bar graphs, but please, a nobel prize for a detailed research paper?
obama got a nobel peace prize for simply existing
Capt, can you be a little more specific with your reply? You do get bonus points for making up a new word that the world will little note or remember.
--
There are dozens of videos out here on this subject... How hard can it be NOW, after the numerous numbers of others have written on this for decades, to put this event together. The biggest deal NOW is to come up with a new angle on these events. We even have videos to come with the writings and ideas.
Put, I guess that put(s) him ahead of you?
As my grandfather arrived at the borders of Stalingrad only 3 men of his company were still alive (from 140 men). He had shown me very clear how hard and taff the fight was at the approche of the 6. Armee in Summer.
Nico Schmidt i hope your grandpa made it out ok he was a true hero and deserves the highest in praise
@@stevensedillo6996 really?
and what business had your grandpa in the USSR anyway ? Why would he fight for?
@@theopot5798 Because it was clear that USA and Britain were about to gang up on Germany again so they needed more resources to fight them.
@@AK-hi7mg I am Turkish and I love Germany. We were allies in WWI. Why the fuck would you think a Turk would hate the Germans? He's probably some butthurt pole.
Just re-watching some of your previous Stalingrad / oost front videos in preparation for the main course when its completed in a couple of weeks ( no pressure there ) . I am really looking forward to your forthcoming work . Nice one - keep it up TIK .
I've been binge watching you since I discovered your channel today. I consider myself a history enthusiasts. You have given me a lot of fuel for thought. I thank you for that! Please continue your work. On another note... I enjoy your audio and visual gifts.
Score one for TiK logistics..[heh,heh..]
After watching this video I can only think: WTF Halder, WTF...
Personally I don't even buy the argument that logistics was the main problem to get reinforcements to the Don bend and Stalingrad just beyond. TIK I don't know if you are familiar with how the Germans reinforced there divisions in the field, but I will explain regardless because of my argument.
Basically every German infantry division was raised from a number of regiments which originated from a certain part of Germany. Germany was divided into a number of military districts called Wehrkreis. These conscripted, trained and raised regiments which in turn where formed into divisions within the Wehrkreis. This meant that divisions originated from a certain part of Germany with its own local customs, dialect etc. When mobilised and deployed these divisions still had there ties to there Wehrkreis. This is where there corresponding Erzatsheer units, the replacement army where located for the units in the field. One such tie where reinforcements. These where trained and marched in battalion size to a division and distributed there over the units. This ensured that the division remained homogenic in terms of manpower. It also was meant to encourage the acceptance of replacements into the ranks. They came from the same region, they might know each other from back home, same customs etc. Forging the brotherhood right from the start so that veterans would also look out over them to keep them alive and make them wise to the do's and don't of combat. It was a very good system in that regard.
Therefore in the German system a replacement is not a statistic to be send somewhere at random. No, they are recruited and deployed to divisions tied to the same Wehrkreis. That makes the process of replacement not very flexible. That of course works both ways. Now TIK, you demonstrated that the Germans where reinforcing all over the line. That makes sense with this system. It however does not explain why 6. Armee was starved of reinforcements. I don’t know to which Wehrkreis the divisions in Stalingrad where tied, but I can hardly imagine that there respective Wehrkreis ran out of reinforcements and all others didn’t. To me it seems that the troops in Stalingrad basically got denied reinforcements because some other divisions belonging tot he same Wehrkreis, but in a whole different army of even army group got priority for some bizar reason. It would make sense if the units in Stalingrad belonged tot the same Wehrkreis as the units fighting the battles of Rzhev, but that sounds rather unlikely seeing as there where seventeen German Wehrkreis.
So I am back tot the original point, WTF Halder, WTF…
This is just a massive strategic blunder. If you attack with one army group, make sure they get reinforcements because they will lose the most men. Sure, the Rzhev sector needed reinforcements because of constant Soviet attack, and so did Leningrad, but the south needed it more.
This also puts into perspective why the Germans attacked Stalingrad, and why they stalled. I think I have some reason to doubt that Paulus would have attacked if he knew he would not be reinforced any time soon. The city was destroyed and well within artillery range so why bother if you can't make up losses? Sure, taking the city shortens the lines and covers the flank, but the prime objective of the entire army group was flank security and blocking the Volga, not taking the city. That objective could be done without taking the city. Denying any traffic on the river for a prolonged period would virtually cripple the Soviets. This because they would lose access to 90% of there fuel production, regardless of German success in the Caucasus. That fact alone should have been worth sending tens of thousands of replacements of just keeping some divisions in the area as a reserve and deploying them, rotating a few battered divisions out when necessary. Holding positions along the Volga would have killed off virtually the entire Soviet tank and air force, as well as cripple there economy. I would trade the Rzhev sailiant for it and order a withdraw, no questions about it.
Yes hindsight, I know. Still, the OHK must have known about Soviet fuel production and there shipping via the Volga.
Good point about the Wehrkreis system. Thanks for commenting :)
No problem, glad I can help out a bit with a small part of the puzzle. Got my own degree in military history and what you are doing is seriously good and refreshing. Maybe a bit hurtful for the inner "German army fanboy" inside me which got me into history in the first place, but I can't change that. I already accepted that the Panther tank was kinda bad, so I think I will also survive this. :P
Now it would be interesting if you could trace the divisions in Stalingrad to there respective Wehrkreis and figure out if there is a connection with Rzhev or another major but largely forgotten battle in 1942. I however have no idea where to start that search. I know that the Germans numbered some divisions along with first infantry regiment, and the first few regiments corresponded with the Wehrkreis, but that is about it. So for example the German 1. Infanterie-Division was from East Prussia because Wehrkreis I. That only gets you so far. Pretty sure the German army had more than seventeen divisions and a few motorised and Panzer divisions which generally didn't have a specific Wehrkreis where they originated from.
DaniëlWW2
Thank you for your information about the Wehkreis system. I have a question about it: do you know if that system was also used to the Waffen SS? I suspect not because there were lots of foreigners and foreign born Germans but I could be wrong. I'm asking this because if the Waffen SS wasn't subjected to this system their replacement pool would be much more flexible and hence used, at least at a divisional level, to replace or help army divisions in need of reinforcements.
In that light sending two elite SS division from Army Group B sounds even more weird.
I agree, especially about the Rhezev whithdrawal, wich came directly after and as a result of Stalingrad kinda. Rhezev forces should have withdrawn in the beginning of the campaign, firstly to distract troops near moscow, later to reinforce stalingrad. It is easier to defend a place after you have withdrawn a bit from it.
ALSO about logistics, the Germans should had scavenged other groups transport trucks to increase supply output.
Don't forget the German's faced an assault at Velikie Luki which required reinforcements. And how much manpower was wasted towards reinforcing a hopeless situation in North Africa after Operation Torch?
When you had the feeling you had to support one channel and you see it exceeds your expectations and you feel happy for a well reserved success!
Thanks for the support, it really is making the difference :)
"the reasons the Germans lose the battle of Stalingrad is because of poor staff work, the German general staff are the ones to blame for this disaster" I love these type of videos you put out TIK
Hey I just wanted to let you know this is an amazing video. Really well put together and a great explanation. I am impressed!
One more excelent video !!!!. TIK your are lighting, with hard data, proper analysis and conclutions about Stalingrad`s shadows. Congratulations !!!
ok as some1 who has kina stumbled into TIK over the last week or so, generally iv got good feelings about these videos i like that you dont try and appeal to the lowest intellectual denominator and you have faith that your viewers can manage an attention span slightly longer than a gerbil (long in-depth videos exploring multiple different viewpoints and interpretations, without the tedious moral lording over that some see as the victors almost mandatory prerogative, many thumbs up).
HOWEVER when your using graphs, stats, and other material that has ovs been researched (not just direct quotes), an on-screen reference, or caption reference or reference in the description section below would be great. Im not saying that you made them up or anything nefarious of that nature but references are reassuring to a cynical viewer and would certainly make me feel better. even if ppl dont actually check them their good to have.
keep up the good work (y)
Good point, I'll try include that from now on. In this video I used "Enduring the Whirlwind" by Liedtke for the stats. Now the official German history does also provide stats that are similar for this period. But they are different in a few ways. So Liedtke could actually be wrong. However, as I said to another commenter, the stats provided in the official German history for the same period appeared to be flawed, and looked as though they overstated losses (which then doesn't fit with other stats I have from many other books). So to me, Liedtke's stats appear to be more reliable, but I could be wrong. Either way, the only issue with the stats is the loss numbers, not the replacement numbers, which still favour Army Group Centre.
Also, thanks for the constructive criticism :)
Only just discovered your site and I have to say I find your videos well researched and fascinating. Your honestly up there with the expert historians.
Phenomenal research. I just watched this for the second time after about a year, during which I had opportunity to watch a lot of presentations on Stalingrad including interviews with David M. Glantz. This video is even more brilliant than I Had realized.
The Stalingrad video spree is still alive and well I see? Nice! Was a good video, keep ehm coming TIK.
Yes! It won't be Stalingrad every week, but it's all about working towards that bigger goal of the Battlestorm Stalingrad documentary. These little videos are helping me do the research and form the opinions and test the waters for the eventual culmination of all ideas and concepts into that big video.
This is an excellent presentation - I learnt quite a bit about reinforcement and loss numbers from watching.
Good to hear! :)
Definitely one of the more exceptional and insightful Tik videos, which are great and backed already.
The management and then even blame going on against the southern group are stunning.
Great video love learning about the little things in history. This stuff is truly so interesting. Keep up the awesome videos!!!!
Another interesting, informative and original vid presenting information that I'd never heard about and explaining what it means in relation to the battle and the war in the east. Well done TIK, you are such a great help to those of us interested in knowing what really happened and why. So many of us think we know the how, what and where of WW2 but really we know very little more than the headlines and understand even less. I'd just like to say thanks again, your work is well worth supporting.
Well, German losses were heavy across the entire front, and Stalingrad was the farthest away from the German logistical center. Plus, I don't think they expected the Soviet Far East forces to redeployed all the way to Stalingrad, and for all these mechanized forces to materialize and launch a fresh counteroffensive in the winter
Gotta be some truth here since the RUS troops did appear from the east(?) and surround an entire famed(?) invading army by surprise?
If they didn't expect that, it doesn't speak very well of their mid to long term planning capacity...
@@TheBayzent, Indeed, the Germans had seemingly poor intelligence gathering on the Soviet Union interior and far east. It seems they did not detect the coming hoards of commie/socialists. The commie/socialists seem to better comprehend the Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz lessons on war.
@@WJack97224 Seemingly is not half of it german intelligence missed entire army groups. And going off the numbers counter intelligent proved it would seem that the Red Army should have been destroyed multiply time now. Plus the Uk was Feed intelligence to the soviets about the german movement whenever they could.
@@kraigisboss, Root cause or symptoms? The Nazis and Japanese War Lords failed because they were infected with Satan's evil. And then they failed to heed the warnings of Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz. The demographics, logistics, geography and insecure communications doomed to failure the warmongers; they never had a chance.
Love your videos man I got bummed out when I watched all of them and realized there's no more!
Yeah, most of my videos are gameplay videos, which don't appeal to everyone. But there's going to be new videos every Monday :)
I respect your choice of putting gameplay videos since it seems like this is how you started the channel. May I suggest that you put them all in a different channel? There are so many of them and we have to sort thru them to find non/gameplay videos. I am pretty sure that you will augment views on past videos this way. Cheers from Canada buddy and keep up the awesome work!
Just found your channel. I studied the Eastern front in college, and you have some very compelling arguments to demand some different thinking. Excellent.
Phenomenal research. I just watched this for the second time after about a year, during which I had opportunity to watch a lot of presentations on Stalingrad including interviews with David M. Glantz. This video is even more brilliant than I knew a year ago.
I guess all of those comments about the German General Staff being second to none during World War II was in fact an overstatement.
Absolutely. This coming Monday's video will help address this, at least partly.
250txc it was the case to the last day they fought to the death idiot Bolshevik. Bolsheviks will be hunted so worry about yourself and we’re here to stay.
No! That's one of the truest things you'll ever read. Even the allies admitted they were constantly out-generaled (One British General said "Every army, including ours had very good generals. But the German army had TEN TIMES as many very good generals.") You have to blame Hitler for the eventual defeat of Germany - for the causes I would say try out the works of James Dunnigan who explains every factor.
Just a little!
No......it was true......but it was also true that infiltration of OKW by the soviets was on the highest level
I never got into Stalingrad too much.. so this series is very interesting!
Keep up the good work =)
Glad to hear, and don't worry, I will :) It's a great battle to study for several reasons, not least because there's so much going on, and it's linked in with the whole summer offensive in 1942, plus the overall strategic situation. It's also one of the (if not the biggest) turning points of the war.
TIK yes, been studying WW2 for years and always thought that its obsolete to fight Red Army in a snow without proper winter clothing.. :D
Edit: sickening replacement rates...
Jim lastname yeah.. :/
@@TheImperatorKnight Replacements for Army group B, did they include also Hungarian units, or you meant only on German ones ?
Nice job. Really enjoy the graphs as they really aid in understanding the numbers. You showed that the manpower was available to support AGB, but forces were pulled away...in spite of the heavy losses AGB suffered.
Excellent review of “another viewpoint.” Thanks for your time.👍
A big mistake Germans made was to treat Soviet and other peoples in occupied territories so badly. Many Soviets didn't like Stalin or the communists at all and would have gladly helped Germans, but once Germans came, they were treated like animals, imprisoned and killed. Soon, almost everyone left alive was actively working against them, which in turn also meant sabotaging supply convoys. Nazis were too close minded to win the war, there was nothing but defeat waiting for them at the end, even if they managed to take either Moscow or Stalingrad.
True. A major and fatal mistake to oppress those territories, because they all hated Stalin when the Wehrmacht first got there. It was in fact welcomed originally with flowers, as "liberators."
Very gooe point they should have treated people better who would have supported them we would have taken soviet union proof that arrogance never prevails stay humble and success is,around the corner
Unfortunately this was very unlikely because this was not a war like the First World War. Hitler made it clear this was a war of extermination and indeed many of the soldiers would have been brought up to believe they were superior, and the propaganda they received told them they were fighting inferior 'asiatic' forces, which intensified later in the war. Indeed much of the senior planning deliberately suggested that the food would be taken from the captured population and it was predicted millions would starve as a consequence. It is an interesting area, as there was still a huge amount of collaboration despite the harsh treatment- e.g. Einsatzgruppen units, Hiwis, Vlasov's Army, SS Cossack units etc.
If instead the German populace had instead had tougher conditions, without so many consumer goods and additional food taken from occupied lands (admittedly this would reduce morale) then occupying forces would not have been so tied down dealing with disgruntled occupied people. This is of course all speculation.
How Were the Germans Supposed to Know?
Excellent analysis.
Great video. I think the reason Army Group Center was receiving the reinforcements was because at this time the Germans also wanted to keep the Rhev salient because it was only about 200 miles away from Moscow. It was a valuable strategic location to maintain but ended never being fully exploited. The Soviets were constantly launching large scale attacks at this sector. The German 9th Army at Rhev was holding the Soviets off but was taking heavy losses.
thanks for Your videos and the analysis, data and sources. Hard work I'm sure, to eat all the information and then to present it as you do. keep it up !
This excellent series ( I believe your treatment of Operation Crusader will be the definitive account available online) has done a lot, but this particular contribution on Stalingrad breaks new ground which outshines all of its previous videos. Great!
Just extraordinary. You shine a light on this conflict like no other. The deficit in supply to this primary objective would beggar belief were the argument not backed up so convincingly. I find myself almost gasping in astonishment. A period i thought i knew well and was so well documented there's nothing more to say until, that is, you enter the debate. Its striking that you can effect an almost visceral response to a well worn subject with such insights. I wont say new insight for the facts are there all along. You bring them to the fore, making history anew. A commentator below jokingly suggested making you professor of history in his fictional dictatorship. I would humbly suggest this to be a real career option for you at any progressive university. My heart felt thanks to you, sir.
Thank you for your great comment. Very encouraging :) I'm getting my ideas from the books and sources, although I am also forming my own conclusions. Assuming you want to know more, I'd recommend the books "Enduring the Whirlwind" by Liedtke and "Death of the Wehrmacht" by Citino. Also anything by David Glantz. Can't go wrong with Glantz!
Thanks i'll make a note of those authors. Like a lot of people i've got a pile of reading to do. Recently got through a huge volume on ancient Egypt, but i'll put your suggestions on my to read list. Thanks again.
I want to second this. TIK is amazing; his explanations are truly incisive. I too have read over this area - several books on Stalingrad alone along with many on WWII European theater. I know the history pretty well for a non-specialist; and I must say that TIK does an amazing job digging up the important data and coming at arguments from the point of view of neglected perspectives. It looks to me more and more like the war was lost before June 22, 1941 due to complete lack of proper planning, logistics, supply, weather forecasting, and intel - they didn't even know about the T-34! You can fault Eisenhower all you want but he understood the importance of logistical supply of large armies in the field. Case Blue reveals the Germans still didn't get it after Typhoon fails for lack of winter clothing! Keep it up TIK - you do a great job!
TIK Yeah, Robert Citino's books are really good.
+OraPro Nobis - I think you are going a bit far with your conclusions. Germans were masters of maneuver, which is primarily a logistical exercise. You need planing and brilliant execution for such a thing to succeed.
How about simply underestimating the resilience of Soviet resistance? You don't need much to make this kind of mistake, and it also explains Halder's and Manstein's frustration with never ending Soviet hordes.
In this view, Germans more or less correctly estimate their logistical needs and shortcomings, and also correctly predict the outcomes of initial battles. They just incorrectly expect Soviets to crumble.
I like this view better, because it does not require for Halder or Manstein to be idiots. Which is a hard sell to me, I'll admit that freely.
Love your videos and appreciate your hard work
Thank you Mason, it's really good to hear :)
It does open up the question that the whole scenerio of this part of history has not been fully explored. It is a good eye opener.👍👍👍
Oh wow, your historical analysing work is amazing!
Very good video TIK, in my opinion from research over the last year i read heavily into why Army Group Centre got the replacements and even veteran divisions in late 1942. The russian Stavka was conducting a stragetic offensive in late July (First Rzhev-Sychevka Offensive and later Operation Mars in November-December) and lasted all the way into September. This was waged against Models 9th Army, 2nd Panzer Army, 3rd Panzer Army which was fighting a heavy fighting over the Rzhev-Viazma sailent which was bleeding german forces in the reigon. Replacements here were quite plentyful here but germans commited over 25 divisions half of Army group centre in dealing with this penertration on the front near Sychevka particularly with counterattacks by Panzer divisions. Ill agree Halder had a strong idea and even hitler to this degree on holding the ground near moscow for "future operations". Hitler even said "Someone," he stated, "must collapse. It will not be us!" about the situation for Von Kluge's Army Group Centre who he himself was loyal to Hitler.
Leading the russians Western Front Zhukov and Kallilin Front was Konev, as know the russians were not imaganitive with the attacks but artillery and consistent attacks weared the germans down over time even though fresh reinforcements were replacing losses this is why it quickly became the Rhzev Slaughterhouse however partisan, airborne and cavalry deep pentration operations put the german forces under pressure since the start of the year and the germans had only just dealt with this threat (Operations Seydlitz, Hannover 1 and Hannover 2).
Thanks Peter, great explanation. I'll be looking into Rzhev soon :)
To add to Peter's suggestion above, an additional factor may be that Army Group Center had started that 1942 campaigning season at a significantly lower "baseline" of strength than formations in the South. I'm pretty sure the relevant volume in the semi-official "Germany and the Second World War" describes how only the units of Army Group South were able to be brought up to something approaching full strength before the start of operations, while those at Center could remain at levels as low as 50%. Thus, those very heavy offensives Peter mentions above were inflicting losses on units that were already severely weakened, so that, conceivably, it required an above-normal level of replacements and reinforcements to keep them fighting. Put another way, that disproportion of reinforcements you show being sent to Center in July-October may in part have been simply the delayed price to pay for the disproportion of reinforcements sent to South in March-June.
Fantastic episode.
Wow, I have been reading about WW2 most of my life, and I have heard none of this. This represents a data-driven view of history that we have not really seen before. Great job!
I was going to post the exact same things - that Army Group Centre was under heavy attack, and that it had barely survived the Winter Offensive - but I was beaten to the punch. But the overall weakness of AG Centre, coupled with the Ryzev fighting, points to a true point of contention between Halder & Hitler regarding the defensibility of the Ryzev salient in the first place. Halder was arguing all summer that Ryzev needed to be evacuated so that troops could be freed up for AGs A & B, and perhaps he used the distrubution of the replacements as a ploy to make his point. “See, I don’t have troops to send to the south b/c I have to send them all to Ryzev!” Hitler could have suspected that Halder was exaggerating, but couldn’t prove it, so left Halder’s replacement distribution in place along with the command to hold the line. And AG B were the the victims of the high-level power play.
The Russian summer attack at Rzhev Viazma (the meat grinder ) according to Georgy Zhukov had exactly this purpose not to let Germans send enough reinforcements to Stalingrad Very good point from your part
Here's the quote from the semi-official German history I was thinking regarding Army Group Center units starting the 1942 the campaigning season at a significantly lower strength level than those of South:
"By 1 May the Army General Staff expected the army in the east to be short of no fewer than 625,000 men, most of these vacancies being in the fighting forces. For the infantry divisions of Army Groups North and Centre--as Halder demonstrated to Hitler in April--this meant a shortfall of no fewer than, respectively 4,800 and 6,900 men per division. Only in the more highly favoured infantry divisions of Army Group South was it hope to limit vacancies initially to 2,400 per unit and then eliminate them entirely by the opening of the operation. Even so, Halder, in full agreement with the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, estimated the diminution of infantry combat efficiency, to the scale of losses by the end of April, at 60 per cent of initial strength for Army Group South and at no less than 65 percent for the other two army group. (...) If, in these circumstances, the Organization Department nevertheless considered possible 'a full personnel replenishment of Army Group South, staggered in time in accordance with operational intentions', then this could only be at the price of shortened training periods and a temporary further rise in personnel shortfalls in the sectors of Army Groups North and Center." (Germany and the Second World War. Volume VI: The Global War", p 864, but see also diagram of losses and replacements per Army Group on pp.865-67).
This is to fully excuse Hader or anything, but I think it might make it less incomprehensible that such a Center was receiving such large numbers of replacements even as Army Groups A and B were pushing ever deeper into the Caucasus and towards the Volga. The units at Center was at lower starting level of strength, and (as several other commenters have noted) suffered heavy losses throughout the year from the various Rzhev offensives. (The continued grotesque underestimation of Soviet reserves by German intelligence might conceivably have played a part here as well: since arguably the advances by South and the scale of losses suffered by Center suggested that such Russian reserves as remained were in the central area, justifying prioritizing reinforcements to the latter until it was, as it turned out, too late.)
I am not so sure Halder is to blame. Here's my take:
1-In the original plan Army Group B is just guarding the flank
2-The battles of Rzhev take place until early october (Army Group Center)
3-Model's 9th army is involved in the heavy fighting in Rzhev and he is a notorious unit grabber and hoarder who can get Hitler to give him what he wants
4-The bulk of the red army is still in front of Moscow
5-In Hitler's eyes, Stalingrad becomes important only once he realizes that the TRUE objective of the campaign, the Baku oils fields, are definitively out of reach
For french historian Jean Lopez, Stalingrad's importance grows with every german defeat: the Caucasus, El-Alamein, Operation Torch ... Until the capture of the city becomes the only possible good news he can give to the german people.
Late to the party but I'm liking this explanation
Will, you lost me on item #3
@@anthonyivanaglugubjr.2645 there was an attempt to break through to them after the encirclement by guderian's panzers but it ultimately came up short of opening a gap to retreat through. If this is what you are asking, yes they did try to help them. Not all that hard but that's all they could spare in the area.
Of course attrition hurt Germany far far more than the USSR. Not just because of vast quantitative difference overall but quality. USSR had a handful of good units. For Germany, most of them could be considered good units.
@willou 86
I am with you in your 5 points!! but not with the Jean Lopez's interpretation.
Stalingrad was a huge success of the Soviets because they saw an opportunity and had known how to achieved it.
For #2 given, then Germany should have vacated the caucuses to throw those former caucus units in to the Stalingrad effort.
I already comnented on this video that the preferred attacking strength of 3.00:1.00 in ground forces was not even remotely close to being accomplished let alone even a break even ratio.
Germany needed to learn that "quantity is a quality of its own"-Josef Stalin.
There generally are not enough firepower-multipliers during the the WWII era weapons to compensate for a significantly deficient attacking ground force.
First Time I've ever heard this. Very thought provoking. Excellent Work.
Dude, i love your videos... Listening while in the office, i trully enjoy them :D
Ok, these observations are brilliant, thank you so much for breaking the numbers down. I've been reading about Stalingrad and Operation Blau for forty years, and have not seen the simple, by Army Group #'s, replacement breakdown like this before. But maybe I can offer an explanation.
I don't think Halder alone can be scapegoatted here. I think I read,- memory hazy- that the German General Staff was very much of against pursuing Operation Blau, even when it was being considered by Army Group South as a single entity (wrong strategic axis entirely). Furthermore, as the plan evolved and split Army Group South into two, these two subsequent entities were ill-advised formations doing ill-advised work (from the point of view of the German General Staff) at the end of an extremely long supply line, different gage tracks, no petrol, and armored formations already out of gas, BEFORE the replacement issue you described so well comes up. As you pointed out, it took Paulus 2 weeks to be reinforced with the petrol he needed to keep moving. SO simple conclusion, they could get guns and butter, or bodies, but not both. And they were not well prioritized because:
Again- problem was that the strategic axis makes no sense even to a layman, forget a schooled staff officer- (Glantz does break this down somewhat in some diagrams, but does not address this issue specifically). The push SHOULD have been at Moscow, and not on the Southern Flank, extending AND SPLITTING the flank into areas of poor supply, infrastructure and reinforcement capacity. I believe Hitler made a political decision to push for Operation Blau, but this was about resource management (oil) and insisted on an operational/strategic focus that no one thought advisable- and I think his hand in turnj was forced by some fuel agreement renegotiations with the Romanians (from whom he's getting most of his oil at this point).
In other words, if you look not at German replacement rates, but German oil production and anticipated needs for this period, you'll understand why he wants to push at the oil fields. This is not post 1944 crazy Hitler, but the guy with the Big Picture still in mind.....But the German General Staff was absolutely not in agreement, and obviously they knew they could scarcely supply what was there to begin with. They weren't stupid, nor that slow to react if you really think about it.
In any large scale organization, reported losses from one quarter are then adjusted on the next. Many current corporations are too large and too many layers exist to react DAILY to what is going on. No army is that nimble. No one has that picture accurately, until the month is over and the tallies are added up. You cannot remake military replacement policy change in a month. So I think the Wehrmacht reacted as quickly, indeed quite quickly for an organization that would make Walmart look small, in a quarter, to the losses they projected inaccurately for. It was too little too late, but I don't think it was but two things: Institutional paralysis, and an overall reluctance strategically to buy into a 'plan' that was no 'plan' at all, but a reaction to a political (and strategic supply) need. Because as you point out, the replacement policy was inexplicably AWAY from the tip of the spear.
Lastly, and I think this might be also a point to consider-the Germans did the unthinkable in Russia, and they managed the early part of the war with, what by middle 1942, might be considered 3 reasonably experienced Army Group staffs.
Where did the 4th materialize from, or were AG A and B essentially skeleton halves of what was once AG South's command and staff structure? Either way, you would have had half the experience, doing twice the labor, on a front not well supplied to begin with, for a seriously compromised strategic direction, split in two, requiring accurate replacements and supplies would have been impossible. Rememer each AG might have somewhere between 200 and 500000 men, could have been considered the equivalent of most small countries entire armed forces, to be run on the move, in combat, thousands of miles from home. I doubt these were efficient formations, by German standards (meaning quite efficient compared to the rest of us).
Great comment! And I agree. Have you read any sources that specifically said the German General Staff didn't want to go south? I'd like to read them so I can give specific examples (other than Halder)
I’ll look for citations, pretty sure I can find at least one mention if not many. As I said though, Glantz partitions the strategic ‘axes’ through which invasion made the most sense. Blau made no sense: it’s goals weren’t clear and dividing forces is a military no-no. I’m on the road so anecdotal is all I can offer but I’ll buzz you back timely. But if Blau was craziness, then Stalingrad was folly on top of folly, because as it turns out, AG A literally made it to Asia, where Stalingrad was a meat grinder of absolutely no strategic importance, save name. You pointed out how much of AG A and B’s losses were even in August, crazy out of whack. Only thing I can think of is a certain dictator’s obsession with the other. AG B was supposed to be defensive. What the Hell? And the Germans took no other city similarly in WW2, they’d encircle with Pz Armee. I think you’re seeing High Command deal with an unexpected and unprojected loss total because of Stalingrad and then scramble to fix. 2-3 months is still pretty impressive given what all was going on, the magnitude of Barbarossa, and the sheer size of the Wehrmacht (and Red Army).
@@tampabaycanuck64 Cutting off the Soviet Oil supplies is not folly.
The Soviets had put most of their reinforcements on the Moscow direction, attacking Moscow again isn’t going to provide much benefit.
Halder is surreptitiously loading Army Group Center to take Moscow. This was Halder's obsession.
The more I get to know about Halder, the more I'm convinced he is the main one to blame for German defeat on the Eastern Front.
In a way, having more panzer forces and troop reserve for sure helped Army group center to resist Mars operation.
Put the reinforcement in the South, and AGC would maybe have been the one being surrounded instead of 6th Army.
But you're point is quite spot on. If the South offensive was so important, the Rijev saillant should have been evacuated to shorten lines and make more troups available for AG B.
Very true ! He constantly harassed Hitler about Moskow ! Hitler was against the Moskow stuff. But Hadler had many supports among the generals ( Von Bock, Von Leeb Von Rundstedt) the OKH was a mess but certainly because it is impossible to determine a decisive military Gola in Russia.
Well Army Group Center was facing Operation Mars from the Soviets and even with the large reinforcements, barely held. So had the largest reinforcements gone to Stalingrad, AGC may well have collapsed, which would have collapsed the whole front.
@@WheelsRCool Yeah this should be def be mentioned. Its now a question of should army group center have held the Rzhev salient or abandoned it like they did the following year to shorten their line and free up troops. Its hard to imagine anyone capable of enacting this actually favoring it in early summer 1942 with the successes of the 2nd battle of kharkiv and the pocket/salient clearing in Rzhev. They would have really had to think outside the box, foresee future problems, question the importance of Moscow, admit that the superior german troops weren't perfect and could lose, and give land back to the soviets. I"m assuming Hitler would reject anything involving giving back the precious lebensraum.
Very illustrating to enlighten the question. Thanks for this explanations, TIK! You changed my view to "madman" Hitler, Stalingrad and WW2 overall.
Thank you! I can understand your frustration at the end. I see this very often, that there are no factual analysis of the historical events are being done. But there are more and more people making the effort to cover this. The same is also the case with the ancient history.
The U.S. Army has (its on you tube) an in-depth study of the house to house close combats in the later stages of the fight for Stalingrad. I was shocked at how few men were fighting each other in those buildings when each side had access to tens of thousands of other men just a few miles away. You did a good job of enlightening others on the poor disposition of German army. Congratulations.
First of all Stalingrad was full of subways, Tunnels and unnoticed flak and strong points a single movement is could be a disaster and In last month near by Red October factory and bread factory troops concentration is low comparative to other areas because of an intal about an counter attack in volga and palus only get about 1000 men in a week to replase losses in southern sector and he was very picky to safe his losses where most of fighting was done around mama a cragen and Stalingrad factory halls
Also about 3700 tanks, 600 stukas, 800do17 bomber's and about 6 lakh solders with 4000 gun for a city less than 5 km wide and 14 in lenght
First of all, thank you very much for this explanation. The german army simply at that time of the war ran out of fuel. They went there by horses and on foot like in the first world war. Russia was just too big for them. Please continue with your detailed numbers and statistics. These facts count the most. I used to live and work in the UK a few times and 30 years ago I have been basically allover UK for travelling. I really appretiate your videos. Greetings from Lüneburg in Lower Saxony
Thus series is absolutely riveting. Incredible work, bravo!!!!
Man you deliver the facts and I enjoy your stuff. Very Nicely Done.
Interesting theory.
Don't ask me where to get the data, but one "proof" of the theory would be a study of the routes and equipment used to supply B and the 6th Army, and the carrying capacity of that system and vehicles. These facts are crucial to your analysis.
Your spot on that's crucial to the finding why
You are 100% correct about AG B guarding the flank. The offensive was into the Caucasus.
Glad to hear you agree, Kev :)
A very interesting analysis and one I have not seen before in such detail. Thanks.
Great work, great analysis.
Congrats.
Greetings from Brazil.
Awesome job as usual.
Thanks sir!
Its an interesting theory that the Germans could have taken Stalingrad, but this is not important. Why do it at all, the Germans was at its best when they did their blitzkrieg, they should never have involved themselves in Stalingrad but moved around it and put up a siege at a fair distance, then kept on to achieve their goals. Stalingrad had no importance as long as the Germans could control the Volga and what did go in and out of Stalingrad. I will not go deeper into this unless anyone want to discuss it.
I suspect they could have overrun the city quickly if they'd been equipped for city combat eg flamethrowers and grenades
Right, this city was not overly important but the oil fields to the south were important. All I have read seems to point to AH making another bad call that helped save the world from him and his kind.
Imagine the germans at the open volga banks around stalingrad in the beginning of winter. Is it a better position?
Stalingrad was vital for the Wolga ports.
It important to secure oil line in further south..
i also think Stalingrad itself represent important sense of value against bolshevik.
It name before after tsar.
Idk it is true or false, regarding ex tsar empire anti-bolshevik support hitler with money to free them from Bolsheviks.
I really enjoyed the video. You have a very gifted way of presenting historical data. Whether I agree with your argument or not I will continue to watch your UA-cam channel
I like your channel Its a nice change in how the war is explained and illustrated , thanks !
Halder is the Hotzendorf of his time.
Only if Hotzendorf then went on to have a major influence in all post-war histories of the war, because unfortunately Halder definitely did and we're paying the price for it now.
Loving this series. This is the first I have heard about the lack of reinforcements. I am curious about a couple things. Did the logistics issue at the start of Blau result from the Soviet offensive on Kharkov in May 42? Did this battle cause stockpiles meant for Blau be used and depleted? The casualty information is also interesting. I have heard the battle for the Don bend was much more brutal than typically lead to believe. This is backed up by the casualty reports. And could Hitlers belief the Soviets were beat because of early successes of Blau against disorganized units that took part in the Kharkov offensive contributed to the lack of reinforcements? By the time they figured it out, it was too late? They took units off the line and afaik they were destined for Leningrad because they thought the Soviets were beat.
You'll be happy to know that I pretty much answer all of this in this coming Monday's video :)
What a great history channel!!! I love that you are referred to alternative sources and not just to Beevor and guys like Beevor...
I am sorry but Beevor gives no numbers in his book on Stalingrad . His book is incredible because he mentions plenty of witnesses.
You are so riveting to watch, and listen to. Thank you.
Excellent presentation! Very good to point out that Germans were replacing their losses, but replacements were poorly distributed. It is also worth keeping in mind that the Soviets did not have an inexhaustible reservoir of manpower, since the Germans had deprived them of a significant portion of it, through occupation of the western USSR.
I agree, thanks for bringing that up.
Yes - one such was a distant relative of mine. Myalik Ivan Pavlovich was born in 1926, in what was then Poland. Then came 1939 and the border moved, leaving him in the Belorussian SSR. Then the Germans came for 3 years, then the Russians returned in 44. The Soviets inducted him into the army and he had to serve for 7 years, most of it occupation duty in East Germany. He returned home in 1951, but someone in the village accused him of being a kulak, so he was sent to clear forest in Siberia for 10 years. He came home in 61, but was sent back to Siberia for another year, for good measure, before they permitted him to remain in his native village. How many of us today could endure what they did in WW2?
Well the Soviet Union wasn’t Russia. It was a Bolshevik cancer killing of ethnic Russians and replacing them with turks tatars and mongols. That’s where they got there manpower.
You better saying keeping in mind that the Germans did not have enough soldiers to replace them active manpower killed on the field or they not have the logistic to reallocate them from Germany to Stalingrad, although russian lost a entire army up to Stalingrad, yet they don't have any problem to build another army armed with tens of thousands of tanks T34 .
Germans army say : hey we killed almost 10.000.000 of your soldiers!
Soviet army: hold my beer i can bring you another 20.000.000 army soldiers from Urals to Volga till we fight here at Stalingrad:D:D
Not to say that Italian and Romanian and Hungary army was equipped so poor, with rifles from WW 1 and no antitank guns and no tanks, the russian break the Stalingrad line front just right there with them tanks and just imagine no antitank guns, you have to shoot T34 with your riffle from WW1, that was a massacre.
That was German Army fault that they can think that Italian and Romanian and Hungary army can hold the line in front of T34 with rifle from WW1.
Also Germans lack in logistical, clothes and tanks run without fuel.
I think that agreement Lens Lee with US took a important place in the equation, Stalin received from US :food closes ammunition planes trucks trains and others
Another important place in equation was oil, the single source and only one for Germany was Romania oil field of Ploiesti. And guess what they will lose that to, After US come in actions, from may to august 1944 they assault Romania oil field Ploiesti using 1000 planes against 30 planes!
From those 30 planes : 10 was romanians fighters pilots equipped with BF109, and only 20 was germans fighter pilots, wtf germany can only supply 20 plane BF109 to defend the oil field imagine!
Erich Hartmann best ace german pilot was send it to Romania, in his memory or interviews he say they have to fight 1 BF109 against 20-30 P51 Mustang plane. In 3-4 month US planes destroyed entire oil field Ploiesti. Next US planes will destroy German Industry to, US plane bombing by daylight and UK plane by night. So that is no more oil and no more industry to produce.
Also i was reading a story about russian breaking the front line at Stalingrad from memory of Romanian Ace Fighter Pilot he say there it was russians was braking through with them news tanks T34 on our romanians line, what should we do with no antitank guns, then that Captain Romanian Ace Fighter Pilot come with idea let's turn 2-3 of our planes with top front against the russian tanks and use machine guns from plane to shoot at it. Until russian they get caught what was going up we will use other fighter planes to get out of here. So that was how that Romanian Ace Fighter Pilot was saving all the romanians pilots from that airfield of death. Later in august 1944 he will die defending Romanian oil field Ploiesti while fighting his BF109 against 20-30 P51 Mustang.
Probably one of the best videos that explains the story of the 6th armies struggles a must watch
Very interesting and informative- thank you.
I'm late to the party, but the Rzhev was the main factor attracting most of the replacements in the Army group Center.
yes, the summer Rzhev battles, where the Soviets launched massive attacks against AGC and frequently achieved penetrations that had to be counterattacked and sealed off are the clear answer why German reinforcements were prioritized to Army Group Center. These battles were prioritized by Zhukov, and the germans knew that if they were expelled from the salient, all hope of ever taking Moscow would be lost. So the germans had to pour in reinforcements; eventually this escalation became known as the "meatgrinder". Meanwhile, it was felt that 6 Army had things in hand, despite it's losses. Only one or two people hit on this, while so many comments here are utterly clueless. And to refute TIk's point, the fact that forces had to be stripped from A and B and sent to Center in order to reinforce them against the furious soviet attacks PROVES that the germans did not have the manpower to carry out all of it's objectives on offense while still maintaining an adequate defense outside of Moscow.
In answer to the case of the lack of replacements being sent to 6th Army for Stalingrad is that they were being sent to reinforce the Divisions of 9th Army (& 3rd Pz) in the Rzhev Meat Grinder.
The 1st Soviet Rzhev-Sychevka Offensive launch late July 42 & heavy fighting continued until early October was a really near run thing especially in August and on the 1st of September von Kluge flew to Hitler to reiterate the assessment by Model that the 9th Army was at the point of collapse... & those extra 50k in AGC probably helped to repulse Mars in another close call for 9th Army at the same time as her sister offensive Uranus resulted in the pocketing of 6th Army at Stalingrad.
OTOH I don't think the extra 50k or half of them or 3-4 extra Divisions being sent to 6th Army instead of going to AGC during the fighting for Stalingrad making it successfully clear the city prevents it from being surrounded, its elongated position with very long extended flanks held by inferior Axis Allies would have still been as it was too disadvantageous IMHO. Preventing that calamitous situation somehow might have made a difference... if only 4th Pz Army had of stormed Stalingrad instead of being re-directed to the South, or stronger flaks held with those detached 11 Divisions IDK?
Also regarding Halder, wasn't he fired by Hitler because he was warning against 6th Army going into such a precarious position at Stalingrad and was informed by FHO that there were 1 million plus Soviet troops not on the front that could be used by Stalin to re-create the result that led to Tzaritsyn being renamed in his honour through his defeat of Anton Deniken there in the Civil War.
Really enjoying your videos my dude!
The study of history is the study of discourse. You, sir, are part of our great attempt to find some "truth" and understanding through the use of what we have. Thanks for the video!
Hey, TIK, I was wondering if you'd come across any information in your research pertaining to the use of 'psy-ops' by the Soviets during the siege - particularly anything substantial on the information relayed in Beevor's book about the use of loud-speakers "the ticking of a metronome with 'sinister' tango music and appeals by German communists encouraging soldiers to defect including "every seven seconds a German soldiers dies on the Eastern Front. Stalingrad - Massengrab". I was always fascinated by the account but apparently so was the rest of the internet and the apocryphal retelling of the story and the resultant hyperbole surrounding have spread like a bad case of the clap. I've only been able to trace it back to Beevor's book, though I've seen one filmed account of a German vet attesting to the "Stalingrad - Massengrab" part.
So far I haven't come across anything. It has certainly not been seen as a significant factor if it happened. Beevor does get things wrong, but saying that I've been surprised by finding out that certain things he said which appeared to be incorrect on the surface when I read them, turned out to be true. So psy-ops could be a thing.
That's very interesting, actually. Both about Beevor and about Ulbricht lol. Picking the account apart, I have heard of the Soviets using metronomes through loudspeakers before, specifically during the siege of Leningrad. "The Beating Heart of Leningrad" - or so the story goes, used to either warn the civvies of impending arty or to let the civvies know the Red Army hadn't withdrawn from the city (I can't remember which, tbh). If so, I have to wonder if the metronome wasn't used in a "psy-ops" role but more for a "public service" type of role - I could imagine a starving and freezing German kid on the frontline thinking the metronome is meant to perturb him - I could imagine it actually perturbing him after a while - but it's all imagination. What I've been looking for is a smoking gun, something from the office that handled the propaganda with the German Communists (and after the Siege Paulus and the captured German officers themselves) that basically details what their motivations were and their methodology. Russian archives might have something but heh, due to recent events I dunno when the next time those will be open like they were in the 90's.
I was wondering what would that chart look like for 1941? Given the battle of Moscow in the winter of 1941, then continuous Soviet counter-offensives + Rhzev early in 1942, it was Army Group Centre, I presume, that took most of the casualties. Perhaps the German staff was still in the momentum of recuperating the losses to Army Group Centre when July started?
Great video again. Thanks. 1 book I read (cannot remember which) said Hitler constantly changed his mind about priorities and objectives regarding the Eastern Front but thanks to yourself, Halder seems to have played a large part.
Cracking video, as always!
Am glad that its not 1942 and you Sir are not working for the German general staff. Really enjoyed it.
this is fascinating analysis.
If you're looking for opinions, I would question whether Halder redirected reinforcements in spite of the logistical limits, or because of it. It may have been logistically impossible to direct the supply and reinforcement necessary for A and B to achieve their objectives???
Vern Etzel Nope! For supplies maybe but not for reinforcements.
So you can reinforce without supply? Motorized units specifically?
I'm not saying it's a fact, I'm just interested in the possible limitation imposed by the rail system etc beyond Rostov
Vern Etzel 56000 men in 4 and 1/2 months is about 400 per day. Let's assume they were sending 200 tonnes of supplies daily to the sixth Army and we get 2 men for each tonne. That is not impossible.
My opinion is that Halder thought that the southern push will flounder and he will then can make the war winning strike against Moscow. Maybe with more researchers studying this anomaly we can have a more definitive answer.
Again, what about the logistical infrastructure for that region? Weekly train loads (you should probably work in weeks, not days) require a rail head with sufficient motor transport (or horse wagons) to deliver supplies to each Army.
Difficult to do with units fighting in the Caucuses. It's my understanding that the actual rail lines were few. Air interdiction might have been an issue as well.
Bottom line, and this my speculation: The entirely of AG South, broken into A and B, couldn't be sufficiently resupplied, so divisions were transferred away.
If this is wrong, then it was simply Halder's decision to not give priority to a major, critical offensive-- but I'm thinking TIK here is on the case, and we'll know more conclusively by the time his epic project is uploaded.
Another outstanding video. Thanks. The consumption of life in theses battles is breathtaking.
Fascinating! Great to hear facts I haven't heard before and great that the statistics are there.
You are so good at explaining nuanced ideas and events. I've shared your channel with all of my history nerd friends.
Thank you for sharing. If you enjoyed this one, I think you'll enjoy next Monday's video too
I would share it with my history nerd friends, but they are so nerdy that they would just throw they foulard dramatically over the shoulder and drink a cup of earl grey tea.
The Luftwaffe pounded Stalingrad incessantly leaving behind ironically wrecks in the city that became ideal defensive and ambush structures that tied down German forces in attrition battles. This wear them down and afforded the Soviet side the time and space to build up their forces for counter attacks on an already weakened German forces.
Wasn't that because they wanted to make sure the city would be ruined if they couldn't take it?
I really like that you put your sources in the pinned comment section. It clearly shows that it is based on facts, actual history. And not based from a biased point of view.
Just found your videos, really liking them, it's changed my view of the Eastern Front from a 'why did they do that, they couldn't possibly succeed' to realising that they came damn close to actually winning it. I also had no idea that the Soviets were actually outnumbered in total manpower around the time of Order 227.
Something that occurs to me is that for the losses/replacements; with the numbers, I don't think even if the extra replacements that went to Army Group Centre had gone to Army Group B that they would have been able to replace all losses, though perhaps it would have been enough to win at Stalingrad.
No, because Chuikov would have been reinforced as well - the Stavka plan for Uranus *required* Stalingrad to be seen to be falling, but not actually fall, so it would keep the Germans where they could be trapped.
Hey TIK, would you recommend Glantz’s most recent abridged and shortened/condensed Stalingrad (2017) book?
Yes, definitely! It's not as in-depth as the others, but you're still getting much more than anything else on the battle.
TIK Thanks for the comment! :) I’ll pick it up later today.
Also, have you ever read John Keegan’s “The Second World War?” (General History, One Volume book on ww2) I’m reading it right now but the bibliography has no sources but rather book recommendations as decided and stated by the author. After your other book review that highlighted the importance of sources, I’m skeptical. Keegan says that he “Rather than supply an equivalent of such bibliographies, I [Keegan] have decided to offer a list of fifty books available in English which together provide a comprehensive picture of the most important events and themes of the war...”
Thoughts?
Yeah I think that was a bad call by Keegan. Sources should be standard. Secondary sources are great of course, but there's no excuse for not providing a bibliography. I haven't read his book though.
Also, just so you know, I deleted a couple comments on another video which I'd missed, but you'd responded to a couple hours ago. I'd rather not have far-right idiots spamming the comments so I'm straight up deleting and blocking them now (hate doing it, but I feel it's necessary). UA-cam doesn't like said topic and I don't want hate in the comments, so for the safety of the channel I'm playing it safe. I had to delete your comment, but you're obviously not blocked :)
TIK Thanks for your input on Keegan, and as to the other comment: I definitely feel it’s necessary and within your rights and abilities to delete those hate comments, since of course hate shouldn’t be here of all places (Censorship sucks, but sometimes it’s needed).
Anyways, I find it incredibly remarkable you have a full time job, manage to make these quality videos, reply to almost every comment, and still put in active effort to keep the comments hate-free (which is needed but sadly not done by most others). So keep up the good work TIK :)
Wow! - this is borderline ground breaking. I had no idea - talk about destroying the myth of German staff officer excellence.First Manstein and now the actual main planning body (Halder looks more muppet like after each video). Obviously so much more information has come to light since the end of the iron curtain, everything I read 20+ years ago is out of date. Those Wehrmacht officers got away with making it up to cover their reputations for so long...........
Sounds like you'll enjoy next week's video too :)
After these videos I'm starting to see the memories of Manstein, Halder (and others) as more fit to chronicle what was going on during the Cold War and at the respectable society of West Germany that about was going on during WW2.
In that sense their excellent sources for the 50's and early 60's
That's an interesting perspective. Especially considering Manstein was asked to advise on the founding of the Bundeswehr in the 50's.
Where were all the lower level officers who would have had inside information as to what was going on but without an agenda of protecting their reputation? Was it too politically toxic to even suggest that too much blame for the loss was being placed on Hitler?
Would one have been considered a "Hitler defender" to push back on that narrative? Would be interesting to know if there was even a single voice back in the first 10-15 years after the war that was calling BS. There certainly had to be some people at the time that had enough first hand knowledge to point fingers at someone other than the usual suspects. Of course, it would have taken quite a bit of courage for someone to offer a counter-narrative, but In later years where the price to pay would not be so hefty, you would think someone would come forward.
The numbers are helpful in pointing out how the decisions that were made worked against the war effort but all they really can do is suggest at various theories as to what processes produced these decisions. Maybe there were German officers in a position to know that did speak up but I have not heard any of these people cited in support of any of the theories that contradict the standard explanation for German losses.
As to the junior officers who knew what was going on - based on TIK's vid the other week - I would imagine most of them were dead.
Always a fun and educational video. Awesome accompaniment for breakfast! :)
Hey Agrippa! How's it going???
Outstanding Video, highly interesting Thank you so much.
As for the matter at hand, I would put the blame on Staff (messed up) and Logistics equally.
@TIK One very important thing I don't think that very much military history really brings out is that large numbers of soldiers are not 'teeth arms' (ie, infantry, armour, artillery and engineers). Infantry tend to take 70% plus, of losses and most of the rest are armour, engineers and artillery. A lot of soldiers involved in supply, admin etc, while doing vital jobs, normally take very few losses. It is really worthwhile, when you can, to look at actual combat losses by arm and especially infantry, that ALWAYS do most of the dying.
I agree, but sadly I don't have the statistics/sources to do this for the whole of Blau :(
Thats true 99 but during total war, that can and will change. Pencil-pushers, as well as adsorbents and old men, will be taking bullets before it is over.
yes and no. you see ... Col. Adam (was responsible for Reinforcements as the 1C-Officer of the 6.Army) constantly begs for men and officers and went to Berlin 2 times and to Winnytza 3 or 4 times to put pressure on his superiors. with little to no result. and he also is constantly complaining how little food and ammunition supply the 6. Army got.
Paulus decided to even leave the majority of horses behind on the Don-River because there was not enough food the feed all the horses (A TERRIBLE DECISION ! because these horses could helped a lot in the encirclement to keep the men alive )
a second thing is: the reinforcements are not nearly as good as the men lost. most of them are poorly trained, a lot with no fighting experience. and most important : the huge lack of good sergeants and lower rank officers. if you loose those highly skilled men of the inter-war-period you cannot simply replace them by promoting soldiers.
Thank u for bibliography n links...
Hi mate. Enjoying your videos. What books on ww2 would you recommend?
Hey TIK! Great video as always. Taught me alot of new things and cleared up some myths. I hate to ask questions like this, but when can we expect the Soviet Side on Stalingrad video? The battle of Stalingrad always fascinated me in terms on how it came to happen from The Soviet side and I don't think there is a better UA-cam channel that could cover it better then you :) thanks alot for your work and keep it up!
It will happen. But I want to clear things up some more things on the German side before I move to the Soviet side. That way, it'll put the Soviet side into more context.
Righto! Thanks for the reply!
This just continues to prove that the Germans absolutely sucked at the operational and strategic levels. They were great tacticians but the Soviets were vastly superior at strategy although they sucked at tactics. I also did an interview with a university professor that pretty much confirms what we are both trying to convey to the wider public. Obviously he may have his biases since he is half Eastern Europe, but alas TIK, we are getting there.
that is a brilliant analogy.
^ that is a terribly atrocious and inaccurate statement. They won at Kursk precisely because of their elastic defense strategy coupled with the redeployment of an entire reserve front behind. Can you prove anything you say? Do you even know the distinction between the operational theater and tactics? German general staff even initiated operation barbarossa knowing that they couldn't supply their lines. Only guys complaining were logicians.
"They won at Kursk precisely because of their elastic defense strategy coupled with the redeployment of an entire reserve front behind"...
But how much did the Russians know, because of the British? At that time the British code-breakers pretty much read every dispatch the German army was sending... It stands to reason that they gave a lot of that information to the Russians.
It would be wrong to take anything away from the blood the Russians spilled... But likewise it would be unjust to claim that the Germans "absolutely sucked at the operational and strategic levels".
It isn't an unjust claim. Look at how maskirovka worked.
'"This just continues to prove that the Germans absolutely sucked at the operational and strategic levels. They were great tacticians but the Soviets were vastly superior at strategy " yep we saw that "brilliant Soviet strategic leadership" in 1941 and 1942, minus Stalingrad...they lost so much men and equipment that any other smaller european army would literally stop existing in such circumstances...yet Stalin barely blinked and meatgrinded his way to Berlin...hardly impressive...The Soviets could afford to loose army after army and battle after battle, the Germans couldnt afford any mistakes...thats it. The size was first and foremost reason the USSR was victorious, everything else is vastly less important.'
Losing men in battles is in the tactical sphere, but the Soviets were superb in front wise troop placement which is why they were able to manage 10:1 ratio battles whilst only having 1.5:1 ratios in frontline strength. You seem to not know the difference.
NICE BREAKDOWN TIK, GREAT WORK SIR
another wholesome video! thank you
I think the main reason that Army Group Center received majority of the reinforcements is because German High Command anticipated main Soviet offensive to take place there. Rzhev Vyazma offensive saw some of the most intense fighting of the war. Also, Operation Mars carried out by the Soviets, probably reinforced their belief that Army Group Centre would see the bulk of the fighting. Soviets used Operation Mars as a diversion for Operation Uranus and encirclement of 6th Army.
Yeah, when I saw the rate of reinforcements to Army Group Center, my immediate thoughts were about the Rzhev Meatgrinder.
Amazing. I'm an Historian although my professional interests are about another epoch but I fully agree that revisionism should be a constant if we want to be serious on our field.
Keep the good work. We need more.
Glad you agree! What's your area of focus?
History of Ideas: everything in Western thought is of interest for me.
Although for the moment I'm writing books about the Portuguese Maritime Expansion (XV-XVI centuries): in my country that's where the publishing money is... Also one of the biggest mysteries of History is how a people as numb as mine was capable of discovering half of the planet and unleash globalization. Trying to figure out why is entertaining and helps paying the rent.
World War II was my first love in History and I remain faithful to it. :)
Igigix
Excellent information
I'm enjoying your videos. It's giving me a better view of the war and the weakness of the Prussian General Staff. They're lack of strategic awareness was really an unfortunate shortcoming in the war. Also seeing the other half of the German high command I'm beginning to see the fight wasn't just Hitler squawking incoherent orders but a battle between priorities. Could you do something about the luftwaffe?