I agree with Gadamer's accentuation of the importance of dialogue and the reliance communality has on the linguistic constitution of our world. Gadamer emphasizes the importance of experience, and its role in establishing a common knowledge of the world, leading to a common consciousness. I found it particularly interesting when Gadamer asserted that philosophy's generalizations within the modern sciences have made us blind to the task of finding a common language, a common mode of expression. In this sense, to Gadamer, philosophy seems to be ceaseless in its demand to understand the structure of the world, yet it does not possess the linguistic influence to convey effectively the truth that it seeks, especially in the historical distance. Simple logical conclusiveness is not everything, Gadamer, contends, and the thematization of logic limits the horizon of questions and therefore removes the ability to discern the emergence of the world that congenitally occurs in a linguistically formulated experience of the world. Gadamer seems to be contending that it is imperative to recognize the possible shortcomings and correctness of an opposing conversation partner's position, as well as an opposing theory's position. This, in turn, instantiates the art of thinking and allows one to extend beyond the simple-minded acceptance of ideas, and conduct a thorough analysis of the content of certain perceptions and theories.
Gadamer's conception of the "rational subject" capable of engaging in authentic dialogue (i.e., willing to fuse horizons with another interlocutor) seems unrealistic, idealistic, and utopian. In the polarized political situation of American politics, for instance, the idea of fusing horizons with someone else or communicating political beliefs across partisan lines appears more and more impossible everyday. Does Gadamer account for ideological barriers to situating oneself within the Open of disclosure, revelation, or unconcealment? Interpretation has significant potential to be skewed by pre-existing beliefs, prejudices, and biases toward others. How does Gadamer incorporate these problems of "understanding" within his hermeneutics?
If you are correct, we are all doomed.:) But seriously, in my old hermeneutics course, I would take a look at Apel, Habermas, and Ricoeur after Gadamer. Apel and Habermas insist on a level-differentiation with ideology critique (or psychoanalysis) as a deeper level underlying Gadamerian dialogue. Gadamer has various responses, which can be found in the Hermeneutic Reader and in his very essay in Philosophical Apprenticeships (among other places). His basic view is that Apel and Habermas are clinging to a desire for methodological assurance that is unachievable (even if desirable). But this remains a fundamental conflict. Ricoeur can be read as a sort of attempted "sublation" of this conflict (in papers such as those collected in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. (Ricoeur also brings structuralism into the discussion.) Then, on the other side, there are people like Derrida and Caputo who think that Gadamer's fusion of horizons is not sufficiently open to the other's horizon...
All you lecturers are A1.!
Thank you! I really enjoyed listening to your talk! I was not so interested in Gadamer before. Now I am!
@@KristinaPetersenKarlsson Glad you liked it!
I agree with Gadamer's accentuation of the importance of dialogue and the reliance communality has on the linguistic constitution of our world. Gadamer emphasizes the importance of experience, and its role in establishing a common knowledge of the world, leading to a common consciousness. I found it particularly interesting when Gadamer asserted that philosophy's generalizations within the modern sciences have made us blind to the task of finding a common language, a common mode of expression. In this sense, to Gadamer, philosophy seems to be ceaseless in its demand to understand the structure of the world, yet it does not possess the linguistic influence to convey effectively the truth that it seeks, especially in the historical distance. Simple logical conclusiveness is not everything, Gadamer, contends, and the thematization of logic limits the horizon of questions and therefore removes the ability to discern the emergence of the world that congenitally occurs in a linguistically formulated experience of the world. Gadamer seems to be contending that it is imperative to recognize the possible shortcomings and correctness of an opposing conversation partner's position, as well as an opposing theory's position. This, in turn, instantiates the art of thinking and allows one to extend beyond the simple-minded acceptance of ideas, and conduct a thorough analysis of the content of certain perceptions and theories.
i request you to please publish an article on philosophical hermeneutics.
That was very very useful. Thanks a lot 🥰🥰🥰
You are most welcome!
Great
Gadamer's conception of the "rational subject" capable of engaging in authentic dialogue (i.e., willing to fuse horizons with another interlocutor) seems unrealistic, idealistic, and utopian. In the polarized political situation of American politics, for instance, the idea of fusing horizons with someone else or communicating political beliefs across partisan lines appears more and more impossible everyday. Does Gadamer account for ideological barriers to situating oneself within the Open of disclosure, revelation, or unconcealment? Interpretation has significant potential to be skewed by pre-existing beliefs, prejudices, and biases toward others. How does Gadamer incorporate these problems of "understanding" within his hermeneutics?
If you are correct, we are all doomed.:) But seriously, in my old hermeneutics course, I would take a look at Apel, Habermas, and Ricoeur after Gadamer. Apel and Habermas insist on a level-differentiation with ideology critique (or psychoanalysis) as a deeper level underlying Gadamerian dialogue. Gadamer has various responses, which can be found in the Hermeneutic Reader and in his very essay in Philosophical Apprenticeships (among other places). His basic view is that Apel and Habermas are clinging to a desire for methodological assurance that is unachievable (even if desirable). But this remains a fundamental conflict. Ricoeur can be read as a sort of attempted "sublation" of this conflict (in papers such as those collected in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. (Ricoeur also brings structuralism into the discussion.) Then, on the other side, there are people like Derrida and Caputo who think that Gadamer's fusion of horizons is not sufficiently open to the other's horizon...