A little note here that I did not add damage repair as a form of defense as the video focused on countermeasures that prevent a hit - damage repair is something for another video/channel.
The US navy concept of "damage control" includes both ability to avoid secondary damage and temporary repair. It even includes resilience measures. It should be noted that damage control is a very high priority in US navy.
Ah man, the thing about detection range reminded me of something. Many, many years ago I was volunteering to help organize some OSRD documents at the Library of Congress and stumbled across a report in Division 14, radar, about the Navy wanting a radar that could detect a ship from 100 miles away. It said the antenna had to be 5,000 feet up in the air. It then said that they could put it on a 5,000 foot mast, but this was considered impractical, so instead it should be in a plane flying at 5,000, and I kid you not there was a hand drawn picture of a ship with a 5,000 foot mast and an Avenger flying next to it. It was really funny and I wish I had written down its OSRD number.
@@HalfLifeExpert1 The OSRD stuff was all in the Technical Reports and Standards section last time I was there, which I think is open by appointment. Using the Library of Congress is more complicated than regular libraries. Unfortunately I recall Division 14 being one of the biggest ones. Lotta reports on magnetrons... Lotta other cool stuff as well, like malaria, metallurgy, optics, pretty much any science research that wasn't the Manhattan Project, although that was still technically under the OSRD IIRC. Need to look into going back sometime.
Sorry, not buying your story. The horizon at 5000 ft is only 50 miles, not 100. And nobody outside of the internet would suggest using a ship's mast a mile tall vs. just putting up a tethered balloon that would actually work.
They hit picket ships on the edges of the fleet alot due to the absolutely wicked AA fire with proximity fuses. It was all but impossible for them to get through to the main ships of the fleet, although it occasionally happened.
And it was h*ll for the picked ship on the edges. It was very rough duty with quite heavy casulties. In some sense, it can be compared to being the first wave, your chances to survive were reduced significantly if you had this duty.
Many of the pilots had little to no training. I have many questions: Would trying to get through the hellfire to get to the carriers have seemed futile? They knew they were not supposed to return. Could they have decided to attack the nearest ship and get something done instead of nothing? Wiser minds can answer the questions going through my mind. I am not clairvoyant ...
Yeah, the destroyer pickets took some serious damage. My late grandfathers ship (USS Stanley DD-478) was hit by on Ohka rocket kamikaze off Okinawa on April 13, 1945 (IIRC) while on radar picket duty. His ship got lucky in that the Ohka didn't explode but punched clean through the ship. A second Ohka was a near miss.
My Uncle was lost May 28, 45 off the coast of Okinawa. USS Drexler DD741. It was hit by two kamikaze planes. The first plane hit amidship starboard but reports from survivors said the ship could have survived that hit. A second plane had missed his target ship, his landing gear left a skidmark on A turret, then he flew over the Drexler and circled back hitting the aft 5” magazine. 3 minutes after the first hit and only 49 seconds after the second hit the ship was gone. I think 169 lost. Their job had been to protect Marines on landing craft. Bless those Marines for turning back under fire to rescue near 200 survivors. The last survivor passed in 2023.
My dad's ship, USS Thatcher DD-514, was hit by a kamikaze in 1945 - apparently aft of the bridge. I heard my dad talk about it briefly only once. As one might expect, he described utter chaos.
I think comparing the effectiveness of kamikazes in isolation makes no sense. Japan did not rely on kamikaze because they were effective, they did so because they considered them to be more effective than traditional methods. I suggest that a comparison should be made with the hits made using conventional methods.
Also, not considered is the possible effects that kamikaze attacks had on conventional attacks... maybe the suicide planes made the CAP go lower enabling conventional attacks from high altitudes?
@@TheStephaneAdam Cost estimates that ignore the resources required to create a capable Kamikaze pilot are useless; we can just as easily say, "Kamikazes were the most expensive weapon used by Japan, because they spent resource-intensive pilots to damage or destroy ships that had lost almost all tactical relevance, and would need to be scrapped after the war anyway." And these were not small costs: Japan spent resources it could very much not spare making and supplying airfields close enough to front lines to create veteran pilots, and these in turn needed ships for both supply and defense, along with ground support, magnifying costs immensely. When these pilots were thrown away for the sake of failing to accomplish any and all strategic objectives, every ounce of labor and time needed to create and protect them was wasted too. By the time Japan started using untrained pilots to lower costs, it was too late, because the nukes ended all chances of seeing if non-veteran pilots could be used cost-effectively.
Divine Wind also hastened the conversion of Navy fighter armament from .50 machine guns to 20mm cannon. They realized that simply punching lots of holes wasn't enough; they had to blast the enemy planes to pieces in the air. Same with ship-based AA--the Navy started developing 3" automatic cannon to replace the 40mm and 20mm guns.
@petesheppard1709 My Dad was on a destroyer in the battle of Leyte gulf. He said that you could fire at kamikaze with a 50 cal until it crashed into the ocean or went overhead low enough to jump up and touch and it never seemed to do much. His ship was never hit.
@@crazyoilfieldmechanic3195 Sounds like they managed to kill the pilot. I'm glad your dad got through without external wounds; I'm sure there were things he carried inside for the rest of his life. My dad was wounded aboard _Enterprise_ in '42, and while a good man and parent, his war didn't end until the day he died.
@petesheppard1709 yeah he said he had seen the pilot dead and the plane on fire. His words were "they would just keep coming at you". I never asked about it again. Thanks for the kind words, I'm glad your Dad made it home as well, sorry he carried so much with him. My Dad was good about it unless I asked too many questions or a war movie set him off some. So many people today have long forgotten all our Dads went through for us to have the good life. My Dad would have been VERY upset about russia and Ukraine and I am glad he never saw it.
If I recall correctly, after the Falklands war, analysis indicated that attacking troop and supply ships had more of an impact on the British fleet than attacking heavily armed battle ships. If troops don't arrive they cannot contribute to the invasion. 18.37
Aren't WW2 (since no missiles) troop ships (supposed to be) in the center, surrounded by warships? I haven't yet watched the video, but it seems that you'd have a harder time getting to them than even aircraft carriers. And once you sink them, hitting transports is easier. Hypothetically.
@@RonJohn63 they would be until the day of the invasion of Japan. The troop transports would be closest to shore and more vulnerable than the warships.
As in land warfare, where interdiction of the soft logistics chain is overall a more effective use of airpower than attacking hardened or well-defended combatant positions.
Great warriors win battles, great logistics win wars, historical data has shown that time after time wars were changed by logistics or lost by failure to adapt to the situation...
@stephencrockard7093 this was really core to the US fight and Victory at Guadalcanal. The US Navy and Marine Pilots largely denied the Japanese ability to reinforce and resupply their force on Guadalcanal. The Japanese forces on Guadalcanal ran out of food, medicine and ammo as the campaign went on.
It's a funny thing but I understand that their Loyalty To The Emperor and their Devotion To Country overcame all of that, enabling the sinking of 100 American carriers! At least that's what was in the reports...
Remimded me of the old movie, "Tora-Tora-Tora": the officers were drilling the pilots on their ability.to recognize ships expected to be at Pearl.Harbor. they were quite fast to recoginize the picture but.when an aircraft carrier picture was shown, the pilots were quiet then one memtion a US N aircraft.carrier (I forgot the name). The officer doing the drills jokingly said ( in Japanese) "Idiot, this is your own ship".
You wonder if maybe they just didn't have enough experience to recognize what a big ship actually looked like. A destroyer would have multiple funnels and multiple turrets all spitting out fire and seem pretty large and imposing, if you'd never actually seen a big ship before you might not realize how much bigger a cruiser or battleship could be.
The impact was huge for freedom of movement, too. Even the AAA costs likely exceeded the attacking aircraft significantly and the human life cost was in Japan's favour. If they'd gotten their tunnel launch sites in the mountains running that 30 mile warning requirement would push the allied ships to at least 50 miles or so from shore. It's a real pain to deal with Japan's topography too. And the inherent risk running air screens, each carrier landing being quite hazardous, never mind the weather. I wouldn't say countermeasures were 'effective' but they did everything possible to minimise it- it was still a gigantic morale blow for the sailors. Compared to the u-boat threat this was much more significant and difficult to deal with. Once you lose more airmen to conventional attacks it only makes sense.
This was a choice related to weight and stability for the carriers. The American carriers had bigger air wings, the hanger deck cieling was higher both advantages over the RN carriers that had the greater weight of teel at flight deck level.. The Flight deck is high; I now that the Essex class carriers were not as high as the Forestal but when the Iowa and Forestal were tied up at North Island in the 60's the Iowa's deck was maybe a 4th as high as the Forestal. So the tons of deck armor in battleships is way lower than even the hanger deck of a WWII carrer. Keeping the armor below the hanger deck saved a lot of top side weight But the experience of the British CV-'s against Japan convinced the USN that it was a poor choice and the Midway class was rebuilt with armored flight decks.. There is a joke that the Royal Navy's command for in coming kamikazes was "Man the Brooms". I believe that none of the hits on the RN armoured carriers broke through the flight deck armor and the flaming wreckage of kamikaze and whatever planes on deck could be shoved over the side with the miniature plane tugs, a bit more serious than brooms, and the flight deck ready for operations in minutes. While no USN fleet carriers were sunk explosions, on hanger deck level often set of more bombs and knocked many CV's were out of combat to return only for Operation Magic Carpet.
Not only are the DD's on the outer pickets, hence the higher numbers of Kamikaze attacks on them, but they are also much more numerous than BB's and CV's. A battle group would consist of roughly 15 flat-tops (CV, CVL), 8 BB's, 15 cruisers, and 75 dd's.
Absent the Atomic Bombs, the Kamikazes may have been more effective in November 1945, when when the invasion of the home islands would have kicked off with Olympic on the island of Kyushu. After the war we discovered: 1. They had correctly deduced where and about when we would land. 2. They had been stockpiling aircraft of all type, from frontline fighters and bombers to cargo and training planes. Including obsolete ones. Basically, anything that could take-off. While many would have been easy prey, Japan had accumulated approximately 10,000 flyable planes for the purpose. 3. Last, but worst, not least, they had a new strategy. Recognizing that attacking warships bristling with guns of all types had failed completely against the Battleships, Fleet Carriers and Cruisers that made such attractive targets they were NOT going to even try. Instead the new plan was to go after the troop ships. Even easier to sink than destroyers they contained the very men who were to land on the home island. My father was going to be on one of those troopships.
@@M1903a4 my dad, after serving in Germany, had actual battle maps for invading Japanese occupied China. Such maps had a little number at the top for estimated casualties, often a single digit number like 4.0. This number was 40. A typo? He asked? No
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07:52 Please stop giving me book recomendations. My Bookshelve is already overloadad and can only take so much! :)
Fantastic video! The only major point that needs to be considered is that while sinking a ship is clearly the desired outcome, and a hit is certainly sub-optimal, ultimately a mission-kill that neutralises the vessel is a key factor. If that vessel is out of the fight, it doesn't really matter if it is at the bottom of the ocean or being towed back to Uluthi or Pearl or San Diego. And particularly with the destroyer example, a DD hit by a kamikaze, even if not sunk, is almost always going to be completely hors d combat. Similarly while a hit is a useful metric for strike-rate effectiveness, but we only have to think of the darkly funny picture of the poor guy who tried to hit HMS Sussex and left nothing more that a looney toons imprint on the armour plate.
Another wartime lesson about the kamikaze and the 40 mm Bofors: post war the USN began replacing the 40 mm with the advanced 3”/50 MK 22 on mounts MK 27, 33 & 34. The conclusion was the kamikaze had to be smashed into bits a task a single or so 40 mm and smaller shell could not do. Like a guided mission today, a kamikaze wasn’t aff3cted by the psychological effects of tracers flying by. The 3”/50 shell was the smallest that at the time could carry a VT fuse. (Today 40 mm shells can be fitted with multi function fuses and the 40 mm today can be fitted in unmanned, fully automatic mounts such as the OTO-Breda 40/70 Fast 40 twins.) As for the famous 20mm Oerlikon the saying was, “when the 20s open fire it’s time to brace for impact.”
Kamikaze were effective when it came to create panic in aircraft carriers and other ships crews. Also using Nakajimas Ki-84 Hayates as a kamikaze was sheer stupidity and a waste of a good airplane!
there's the old adage , if a US carrier got hit by Kamikaze it was 6 months in dry dock if a British Carrier got hit, it was time to get the tea on and the brooms out the most effective countermeasure was the British use of Armoured Flight decks, which the US generally did'nt use
There is a MASSIVE size difference between the USS Saratoga (a Lexington Class Main Fleet Carrer) and the USS Bismark Sea (an Escort Jeep Carrier). The USS Saratoga for the most part survived a nuclear bomb blast during tests after the war! There was way more US Destroyers damaged & sunk due to the tactic of posting them as far out as possible for the early warning for the fleet giving them the time to scramble more fighters. The Japanese realized this and targeted them in mass first. The quality of the Japanese pilots training by this time was also extremely poor! Most could barely take off without crashing.
I believe the armored decks came about more as an acknowledgement that carriers of the time may have little warning to respond to an attack, and if they’re operating in the Med then they’d have to contend with land bases operating more and heavier aircraft on a continent instead of carriers and island airfields. The downside was their lower hangar height which limited what aircraft they could operate and thus their value as a carrier.
@@classifiedad1 Indeed. I believe there was an American naval officer serving as liaison to the Royal Navy. Regarding kamikazes he said something to the effect of, if an American carrier takes a kamikaze to the flight deck, it's six months in Pearl Harbor. If an RN carrier takes a kamikaze to the flight deck it's "sweepers, man your brooms." Different ships, built under different doctrines, fighting a war they probably weren't designed for. You fight with what you've got, not what you want.
VERY good video - minor nitpick: for the visualization, you had 4 individual months and then one multi--month group. It would have been nice if the Oct-Jan group had used averages on the graph to be more comparable to the individual months
Robin Rielly's book on Kamikaze attacks is a real eye opener. He lists all of the material used - aircraft, midgets submarines, special attack boats -; the attacks and tabulated losses of ships and personnel. All cribbed from official reports and first hand accounts. There comes a point when you as a reader ask yourself when is it going to end, for all that is holy. It's just attack after attack, one alarm after the other. The end figures for Allied casualties are simply staggering. You develop a new kind of respect for those folks manning the landing crafts used for the picket line and on resupply missions, too. Holy Moses on a Moped... Go read it. Cheers.
How do these numbers change when you include the UK and commonwealth BPF ships in the data? As the UK aircraft carriers had armoured flight decks they were often used closer inshore.
If games like War Thunder are in any manner comparable to real air warfare, I'd imagine kamikaze attacks are the closest, as the players aren't usually interested in surviving the attack as long as they get a hit. Having played such attacks against enemy fleet, I also notice the tendency to attack the first ship that spots the plane, simply because from the point you're spotted onwards, you're basically on borrowed time - even if you managed to survive the first ship's AA, you very likely won't survive the entire fleet others who are very aware of you by this point and will shoot you into pieces if you get anywhere near.
And yes, I know real air attacks weren't most of the time done with individual planes, but on the other hand, hitting the nearest ship may increase the chances of your squadmates getting past it. Or that's what one would think intuitively, at least.
Another excellent video. One thing I've been wondering about, so often I've heard people say that kamikaze were a tactic of pure desperation. On the other hand I heard from somebody who had actually studied the use of kamikazes that there was an actual pragmatic approach to the use of kamikaze - that losses of aircraft and pilots in conventional use were so high, that it mathematically, if one out kamikaze actually hit a ship, more damage for ten aircraft and pilots was inflicted than if the ten were lost without inflicting any damage. Do you know of any such statistics?
This analysis is correct. When they switched to these tactics, their success in regular c*mbat was extremly low, because of being outgunned and outclassed at this point. So yes, the Kamikaze did indeed more damage than would have been done if they would have fought conventionally. Ian Toll writes about it in his Pacific Crucible trilogy.
@@wedgeantilles8575 But I mean specifically, effectiveness per lives lost. The assumption is that in conventional warfare _some_ pilots will return, whereas with kamikaze, almost no pilots will return - yes, some did turn back because of mechanical failure, like engine problems, and land, but I imagine those were few and far between.
@@DerOrso During this time of war, not that many pilots returned anyway. They were running out of skilled pilots fast and green pilots got sl**ghtered out there. Kamikaze had the additional benefit, that you could achieve more with limited skills. Hitting a ship with torpedos or bombs was very difficult.
@@wedgeantilles8575 Very true. Trying to deliver a munition is such a way that you 1) have a good chance of hitting, and 2) have some chance of getting away, is harder than just "aim for the boat". The more one looks at the situation, the less crazy is sound. And when you consider, all Japan really wanted, overall, was to be included in the colonizing nations, like Britain, France, Holland, Portugal, Germany, and the US, and not be colonized like China. There were only the two choices, because the known colonizers always came and colonized every nation with exploitable resources they could; no exceptions. When you consider that only 90 years prior, Japan looked more like 17th century Europe, or even older, with only very limited technology, and 90 years later they actually lead the world in naval aviation, the most technologically advanced form of warfare in existence at the time. And all that because they were certain, they didn't want to be colonized.
The K-pilots were instructed to not target battleships or cruisers because their armor made them immune to serious damage by the slow flying planes. Many K-pilots flew multiple missions when they failed to find USN ships. That is one reason a substantial number survived the war. Dairies and post war interviews show many of the men knew their efforts were futile and flew the missions only because of intense pressure.
Great video as always. Very informative but it raised my curiosity. The Essex class had nominally 12*5 inch guns as heavy AA defense and those were the first line of ship self defense. How did the British carriers fare in that department? They had 16*4.5 inch guns with much of the same range and performance. Also, did the asymmetrical placement of the Essex 5 inch guns a factor in how the ships maneuvered to get the most guns to bear? I know it's a rabbit hole, but on the tactical level defending the ships, those questions must have had an influence.
Proximity fuse "qoute: How effective is the proximity fuse? The proximity fuse proved three to four times more effective than conventional time fuses, and night kill-ratios increased by 370%. In 1943, naval guns fired 36,370 antiaircraft rounds. Although only 25% used proximity fuses, these accounted for 51% of the kills.
16:18 Music is drowning out your words. Could not understand what percentage hit targets; had to do math to subtract the first two values from 100%. Answer: 17%?
3:25 Yeah, I was never the most well read about the Kamikaze attacks, but just from seeing general history, it did seem Destroyers bore the brunt of the attacks despite Capital Ships being the preferred targets. Carriers especially were what Japan were most worried about yet they were among the least to be attacked. I also know the USN even made it a point to push Destroyers out far away on Radar picket duty with Fighter Caps. Kamikazes were drawn towards them. This was acceptable to the US Navy because the Carriers were so valuable while the service had more Destroyers. Not to mention Carriers and Battleships tend to be in the center of USN air defense formations. So Kamikaze would have to deal with Fighter Caps, layers of Anti-Aircraft Fire, and then MAYBE get a shot to make a run against a Capital Ship. Also understandable that Kamikazes had good hit rates against Escort Carriers. They were small, cheaply made for fast construction and very slow. They would not have been bristling with AA guns compared to the larger, more heavily defended Fleet Carriers like Enterprise, Saratoga, and Essex-class. Even the Independence-class Light Carriers didn't fare badly like the CVEs because they were faster and had better AA guns, i.e. more 40mm Bofors than the Escort Carriers that tended to have lighter, weaker, shorter ranged 20mm Oerlikons. Worsening Kamikaze success rates as time went on is understandable. No matter the conflict your enemy is actually rather smart and will figure things out and get better.
I had a relative kill by a kamikaze during the war- he’s buried in his home town in Maine. By the way- he was of French descent. Fighting French haters is a full time job.
The USN thought process in the Post War because of the Kamikazes was to try to have a standoff high altitude interceptor carrier based fighters, either airborne, ship- or submarine borne early warning radar platform, armored flight deck and better structure for the carriers and lastly and most importantly, ship launched missile (SAM)which the USN spent millions of man hours and tons of money in development and research post WWII.
As is correctly pointed out in this video, the Japanese changed their tactics regarding what they considered to be the most effective use of kamikazes. At first, it was decided that American (and, later, British) aircraft carriers should be the primary targets. It was the planes on the carriers that dealt the most damage to Japanese targets. Carriers were a highly combustible mix of ordinance, fuel oil and avgas- and they were very large (though agile) targets. The size of the target was important because the level of training for most kamikaze pilots was abysmal. So, to the Japanese mind, potentially trading one inadequately-trained pilot and one obsolete aircraft for a carrier capable of carrying 70+ aircraft was more than a fair trade. But the carriers were extraordinarily difficult targets. Not only did they possess highly-trained fighter pilots flying up to date aircraft which were vectored via excellent radar onto incoming enemy aircraft, the ships themselves carried very heavy AA weapons. Further, the carriers were ringed with many other ships, all of which were also well-armed with AA weaponry. But there was one other tactic the US used that the Japanese were unaware of, at least at first. Radar was excellent, but it had a limited range. It was standard operating procedure for a carrier group to have aloft a combat air patrol from before dawn to after dusk 9and even at night if there was a night-flight carrier in the group). I think the warning time provided by radar was on the order of 20 minutes, which may- or may not- be enough time to launch additional fighters for defense. So we hit upon the idea of stationing destroyers many miles out from the main battle groups so as to provide earlier warning of incoming hostile aircraft. These were called "Picket" or "radar picket destroyers". The additional alert time these ships provided meant that incoming hostiles would face an even greater number of defending fighters. The Japanese had to reconsider their tactics to include a substantial effort to take out the picket destroyers so as to make attacks on the carriers themselves somewhat easier.
I find it a little curious that Light Cruisers were statistically the least attacked or the least hit. I'm fairly sure there would have been more of them around than heavy Cruisers, thanks to the 27 ship strong Cleveland class, and theit light and medium AA batteries were a bit weaker than that of Heavy Cruisers.
The main fleet carriers were likely the main intended targets for the Kamikazes, as by 1945, both Japan and the US were beginning to recognize and accept how important the Aircraft Carrier was to naval operations, even at the expense of the other vessels. The carriers could allow the fleets to strike farther and inflict damage at distances that a generation before would have required the ships to sail within gunnery range. However, Japan faced multiple problems in addition to things you mention... One that would actually only expand on things you mention would be on ship placement. Even excluding radar equipped picket ships, in the open sea, major ships like the fleet carriers and the battleships would often be at the center of the naval formation. Which would mean any attack, kamikaze or not, would essentially have to go over the entire fleet before getting to the target. And given the size of most warships (even the smaller ones) the formations could still be covering a vast area of ocean, meaning that it wouldn't be like in some video games where all the ships are packed together in a very narrow formation. Thus, an attack on a carrier would draw successive fire from ships at the outer edge of the fleet and then from additional ships as they moved inward... and damaged craft could end up going after other ships if damaged by shots fired because they've lost the integrity to fly on to the intended target. Some parts of this would change when a fleet comes into close proximity to the shore. As in places like Okinawa, the battleships... and potentially even the fast battleships like the USS Iowa, would likely be moved from the heart of the fleet to positions closer to the shoreline to use their main batteries against ground targets. They may still be shielded by other cruisers and destroyers, just as the carriers would be further out... but that would still be a development on much of the base naval formations that would then relate to amphibious operations. Which tactically, if things reach that point, that'd actually raise the importance of the supply and amphibious craft over the carriers as attacking those larger ships would be more with the intention of deterring landings in the first place. For Japan, however, this then presented other problems... as by 1945, the naval air arm and the regular air forces that had been so devastating to the Americans in 1941 to 1942 were long gone. They were starting to run short of planes, short of fuel, and short of trained pilots to fly them. And that training issue would be Japan's biggest worry... even if they had the planes and oil necessary. For, if the pilot is untrained or at least combat inexperienced, the odds of success would be considerably lower than if the pilot is fully trained and has at least survived one or two combat missions. Japan was running out of that and needed away to get as many pilots as possible. And that's where the whole kamikaze idea gained traction, in that a pilot who INTENDS to die doesn't require the extensive training to "dogfight" or line up the right attack run. The pilot just needs to know how to control the plane and find the target. That much lower level of training is bound to have given them trouble as the lower pilot quality would also likely mean that some of their strategic and tactical understanding with regard to what was the most important targets would also be mixed. That would in turn affect how these pilots respond to any and all countermeasures the Americans took.
The data shows 36% of kamikaze hits were on "other naval ships" That's a big category! And the category apparently excludes cargo ships, plus carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. So what other vessels would kamakazies be diving on?
Erm, 12mm cannon? did you mean 0.50 calibre machine guns which hadn't been considered viable AA weapons for long before 1944, or maybe 20mm cannon which were also out of favour late war, where the 40mm Bofors or for the RN the 2pdr pom-pom were the weapon of the day. That minor quibble aside enjoyed the video and please keep doing what you do :-)
Denominators are way too low for most of these figures to be statistically significant. One can’t make really ANY conclusions until N=32 at the very least.
I've read after action reports on Kikusui attacks and it's obvious that target inflation was rampant. Sighting a column of smoke equated to one aircraft carrier sunk. The observer pilots were shameless about this.
A great video despite of the klanging sound of kamikazah. Did the Naval Academy sign off on pronunciation. kah mah kah ay or kam i kah zee but not kah mah kaz ah. And definitely not a schwa at the end of kamikaze. In either London or New York it ends in a hard A sound. And definitely in the US Naval Port of San Diego. It's not unusual for foreign spellings to use e as an ay sound,,, you know the sound that the symbol E makes in civilized spelt languages like Spanish and German unlike English where we say Great Vowel Shift and blame all the confusion in spelling and pronunciation on Gutenberg. Or actually on the Dutch and Flemish printers in London in the 16th century.. My dad's cot or where it might have been is visible in the picture of the Big E's forward elevator hanging 100 meters above the deck in one ot the original turret toss style photos taken after a kamikaze hit through the flight deck. Fortunately he was at his gun.
Attacking capital ships is not the most effective use of a weapon system (unless it is REALLY big or REALLY capable (aircraft carriers or submarines) OR CAC assets. Obviously such targets will be heavily defended. The cold reality of a cost/benefit points to attacking logistics and landing craft. Shaping the battle space.
Why is he saying kamikaza like there’s some kind of a at the end? It’s kamikaze if you’re gonna make a documentary on something learn how to pronounce it.
A little note here that I did not add damage repair as a form of defense as the video focused on countermeasures that prevent a hit - damage repair is something for another video/channel.
why do you keep mispronouncing the word Kamikaze? there is no T or D in it.
@@RandomDeforgeMaybe Chris's pronunciation is closer to the Japanese original?
@@RandomDeforge how rude!
What was "sunk" for you? Many ships were total loss. Also important are severely damaged ships, especially those, that were repaired after the war.
The US navy concept of "damage control" includes both ability to avoid secondary damage and temporary repair. It even includes resilience measures. It should be noted that damage control is a very high priority in US navy.
Ah man, the thing about detection range reminded me of something. Many, many years ago I was volunteering to help organize some OSRD documents at the Library of Congress and stumbled across a report in Division 14, radar, about the Navy wanting a radar that could detect a ship from 100 miles away. It said the antenna had to be 5,000 feet up in the air. It then said that they could put it on a 5,000 foot mast, but this was considered impractical, so instead it should be in a plane flying at 5,000, and I kid you not there was a hand drawn picture of a ship with a 5,000 foot mast and an Avenger flying next to it. It was really funny and I wish I had written down its OSRD number.
A neat visualisation as to why airborne early warning is so helpful. Add satellites and you've got a neat big picture and operational package
Someone NEEDS to find this document and share it online.
Outstanding Pvt. Gump! 😂
@@HalfLifeExpert1 The OSRD stuff was all in the Technical Reports and Standards section last time I was there, which I think is open by appointment. Using the Library of Congress is more complicated than regular libraries. Unfortunately I recall Division 14 being one of the biggest ones. Lotta reports on magnetrons... Lotta other cool stuff as well, like malaria, metallurgy, optics, pretty much any science research that wasn't the Manhattan Project, although that was still technically under the OSRD IIRC. Need to look into going back sometime.
Sorry, not buying your story. The horizon at 5000 ft is only 50 miles, not 100. And nobody outside of the internet would suggest using a ship's mast a mile tall vs. just putting up a tethered balloon that would actually work.
They hit picket ships on the edges of the fleet alot due to the absolutely wicked AA fire with proximity fuses. It was all but impossible for them to get through to the main ships of the fleet, although it occasionally happened.
And it was h*ll for the picked ship on the edges. It was very rough duty with quite heavy casulties.
In some sense, it can be compared to being the first wave, your chances to survive were reduced significantly if you had this duty.
Many of the pilots had little to no training. I have many questions: Would trying to get through the hellfire to get to the carriers have seemed futile? They knew they were not supposed to return. Could they have decided to attack the nearest ship and get something done instead of nothing?
Wiser minds can answer the questions going through my mind. I am not clairvoyant ...
Yeah, the destroyer pickets took some serious damage. My late grandfathers ship (USS Stanley DD-478) was hit by on Ohka rocket kamikaze off Okinawa on April 13, 1945 (IIRC) while on radar picket duty. His ship got lucky in that the Ohka didn't explode but punched clean through the ship. A second Ohka was a near miss.
My Uncle was lost May 28, 45 off the coast of Okinawa. USS Drexler DD741. It was hit by two kamikaze planes. The first plane hit amidship starboard but reports from survivors said the ship could have survived that hit. A second plane had missed his target ship, his landing gear left a skidmark on A turret, then he flew over the Drexler and circled back hitting the aft 5” magazine. 3 minutes after the first hit and only 49 seconds after the second hit the ship was gone. I think 169 lost. Their job had been to protect Marines on landing craft. Bless those Marines for turning back under fire to rescue near 200 survivors. The last survivor passed in 2023.
@martinswiney2192 I'm sorry about your uncle but thanks for sharing that story.
My dad's ship, USS Thatcher DD-514, was hit by a kamikaze in 1945 - apparently aft of the bridge. I heard my dad talk about it briefly only once. As one might expect, he described utter chaos.
I think comparing the effectiveness of kamikazes in isolation makes no sense. Japan did not rely on kamikaze because they were effective, they did so because they considered them to be more effective than traditional methods. I suggest that a comparison should be made with the hits made using conventional methods.
Also, not considered is the possible effects that kamikaze attacks had on conventional attacks... maybe the suicide planes made the CAP go lower enabling conventional attacks from high altitudes?
@@augustosolari7721the cap was engaging at 10's of miles away well before any need to engage at low altitude.
Military History Visualized did just that, and yes Kamikaze were surprisingly cost effective.
@@TheStephaneAdam Cost estimates that ignore the resources required to create a capable Kamikaze pilot are useless; we can just as easily say, "Kamikazes were the most expensive weapon used by Japan, because they spent resource-intensive pilots to damage or destroy ships that had lost almost all tactical relevance, and would need to be scrapped after the war anyway."
And these were not small costs: Japan spent resources it could very much not spare making and supplying airfields close enough to front lines to create veteran pilots, and these in turn needed ships for both supply and defense, along with ground support, magnifying costs immensely. When these pilots were thrown away for the sake of failing to accomplish any and all strategic objectives, every ounce of labor and time needed to create and protect them was wasted too.
By the time Japan started using untrained pilots to lower costs, it was too late, because the nukes ended all chances of seeing if non-veteran pilots could be used cost-effectively.
Divine Wind also hastened the conversion of Navy fighter armament from .50 machine guns to 20mm cannon. They realized that simply punching lots of holes wasn't enough; they had to blast the enemy planes to pieces in the air. Same with ship-based AA--the Navy started developing 3" automatic cannon to replace the 40mm and 20mm guns.
@petesheppard1709 My Dad was on a destroyer in the battle of Leyte gulf. He said that you could fire at kamikaze with a 50 cal until it crashed into the ocean or went overhead low enough to jump up and touch and it never seemed to do much. His ship was never hit.
@@crazyoilfieldmechanic3195 Sounds like they managed to kill the pilot. I'm glad your dad got through without external wounds; I'm sure there were things he carried inside for the rest of his life. My dad was wounded aboard _Enterprise_ in '42, and while a good man and parent, his war didn't end until the day he died.
@petesheppard1709 yeah he said he had seen the pilot dead and the plane on fire. His words were "they would just keep coming at you". I never asked about it again. Thanks for the kind words, I'm glad your Dad made it home as well, sorry he carried so much with him. My Dad was good about it unless I asked too many questions or a war movie set him off some. So many people today have long forgotten all our Dads went through for us to have the good life. My Dad would have been VERY upset about russia and Ukraine and I am glad he never saw it.
@@crazyoilfieldmechanic3195 My dad absolutely hated hippies and draft dodgers.
If I recall correctly, after the Falklands war, analysis indicated that attacking troop and supply ships had more of an impact on the
British fleet than attacking heavily armed battle ships. If troops don't arrive they cannot contribute to the invasion. 18.37
Aren't WW2 (since no missiles) troop ships (supposed to be) in the center, surrounded by warships? I haven't yet watched the video, but it seems that you'd have a harder time getting to them than even aircraft carriers. And once you sink them, hitting transports is easier. Hypothetically.
@@RonJohn63 they would be until the day of the invasion of Japan. The troop transports would be closest to shore and more vulnerable than the warships.
As in land warfare, where interdiction of the soft logistics chain is overall a more effective use of airpower than attacking hardened or well-defended combatant positions.
Great warriors win battles, great logistics win wars, historical data has shown that time after time wars were changed by logistics or lost by failure to adapt to the situation...
@stephencrockard7093 this was really core to the US fight and Victory at Guadalcanal. The US Navy and Marine Pilots largely denied the Japanese ability to reinforce and resupply their force on Guadalcanal. The Japanese forces on Guadalcanal ran out of food, medicine and ammo as the campaign went on.
I visited USS Intrepid a few years ago, and will never forget it. It is a fantastic piece of history.
Kammi Kätze, the German cartoon character?
Yes, the very one
Kammi kammi kamilian, come and go something or other.
He's from Der Sendung mit der Maus?😂
traning some men to fly an airplane one way is a task, adding sophisticated ship recognition skills to that is a tall order.
It's a funny thing but I understand that their Loyalty To The Emperor and their Devotion To Country overcame all of that, enabling the sinking of 100 American carriers! At least that's what was in the reports...
Remimded me of the old movie, "Tora-Tora-Tora": the officers were drilling the pilots on their ability.to recognize ships expected to be at Pearl.Harbor. they were quite fast to recoginize the picture but.when an aircraft carrier picture was shown, the pilots were quiet then one memtion a US N aircraft.carrier (I forgot the name). The officer doing the drills jokingly said ( in Japanese) "Idiot, this is your own ship".
Fortunately, they didn’t improve with practice.
@@alexhubble question is how a kamikaze pilot could report his success.
You wonder if maybe they just didn't have enough experience to recognize what a big ship actually looked like. A destroyer would have multiple funnels and multiple turrets all spitting out fire and seem pretty large and imposing, if you'd never actually seen a big ship before you might not realize how much bigger a cruiser or battleship could be.
The impact was huge for freedom of movement, too. Even the AAA costs likely exceeded the attacking aircraft significantly and the human life cost was in Japan's favour.
If they'd gotten their tunnel launch sites in the mountains running that 30 mile warning requirement would push the allied ships to at least 50 miles or so from shore.
It's a real pain to deal with Japan's topography too. And the inherent risk running air screens, each carrier landing being quite hazardous, never mind the weather.
I wouldn't say countermeasures were 'effective' but they did everything possible to minimise it- it was still a gigantic morale blow for the sailors. Compared to the u-boat threat this was much more significant and difficult to deal with.
Once you lose more airmen to conventional attacks it only makes sense.
My grandfather's Destroyer came under attack by kamikazee multiple times on the picket line at Okinawa they paid those guys special attention
My grandmother's brother died on the U.S.S. Emmons off Okinawa coast, radar duty.
I think we should add that American Carriers had timber flight decks. The British carriers had armoured steel flight decks. hence the attrition.
The wooden flight decks could be repaired at sea with timber stored on board the carriers, and replenished by cargo ships bringing more.
This was a choice related to weight and stability for the carriers. The American carriers had bigger air wings, the hanger deck cieling was higher both advantages over the RN carriers that had the greater weight of teel at flight deck level.. The Flight deck is high; I now that the Essex class carriers were not as high as the Forestal but when the Iowa and Forestal were tied up at North Island in the 60's the Iowa's deck was maybe a 4th as high as the Forestal. So the tons of deck armor in battleships is way lower than even the hanger deck of a WWII carrer.
Keeping the armor below the hanger deck saved a lot of top side weight
But the experience of the British CV-'s against Japan convinced the USN that it was a poor choice and the Midway class was rebuilt with armored flight decks..
There is a joke that the Royal Navy's command for in coming kamikazes was "Man the Brooms".
I believe that none of the hits on the RN armoured carriers broke through the flight deck armor and the flaming wreckage of kamikaze and whatever planes on deck could be shoved over the side with the miniature plane tugs, a bit more serious than brooms, and the flight deck ready for operations in minutes.
While no USN fleet carriers were sunk explosions, on hanger deck level often set of more bombs and knocked many CV's were out of combat to return only for Operation Magic Carpet.
Not only are the DD's on the outer pickets, hence the higher numbers of Kamikaze attacks on them, but they are also much more numerous than BB's and CV's. A battle group would consist of roughly 15 flat-tops (CV, CVL), 8 BB's, 15 cruisers, and 75 dd's.
Absent the Atomic Bombs, the Kamikazes may have been more effective in November 1945, when when the invasion of the home islands would have kicked off with Olympic on the island of Kyushu. After the war we discovered:
1. They had correctly deduced where and about when we would land.
2. They had been stockpiling aircraft of all type, from frontline fighters and bombers to cargo and training planes. Including obsolete ones. Basically, anything that could take-off. While many would have been easy prey, Japan had accumulated approximately 10,000 flyable planes for the purpose.
3. Last, but worst, not least, they had a new strategy. Recognizing that attacking warships bristling with guns of all types had failed completely against the Battleships, Fleet Carriers and Cruisers that made such attractive targets they were NOT going to even try. Instead the new plan was to go after the troop ships. Even easier to sink than destroyers they contained the very men who were to land on the home island.
My father was going to be on one of those troopships.
It's doubtful they had the fuel to use those kamikazes.
@@WALTERBROADDUS Or the pilots.
@@gwtpictgwtpict4214 they had though. They specifically were preparing for it...
@@M1903a4 my dad, after serving in Germany, had actual battle maps for invading Japanese occupied China. Such maps had a little number at the top for estimated casualties, often a single digit number like 4.0. This number was 40. A typo? He asked? No
07:52 Please stop giving me book recomendations. My Bookshelve is already overloadad and can only take so much! :)
Loving this Hokisy inspired hairstyle 9:36
Ain't no spray, gel, or wax that can control this hair.
Ihave this same hair courtesy of my German Grandmothers side.
Fantastic video! The only major point that needs to be considered is that while sinking a ship is clearly the desired outcome, and a hit is certainly sub-optimal, ultimately a mission-kill that neutralises the vessel is a key factor. If that vessel is out of the fight, it doesn't really matter if it is at the bottom of the ocean or being towed back to Uluthi or Pearl or San Diego. And particularly with the destroyer example, a DD hit by a kamikaze, even if not sunk, is almost always going to be completely hors d combat. Similarly while a hit is a useful metric for strike-rate effectiveness, but we only have to think of the darkly funny picture of the poor guy who tried to hit HMS Sussex and left nothing more that a looney toons imprint on the armour plate.
Another wartime lesson about the kamikaze and the 40 mm Bofors: post war the USN began replacing the 40 mm with the advanced 3”/50 MK 22 on mounts MK 27, 33 & 34. The conclusion was the kamikaze had to be smashed into bits a task a single or so 40 mm and smaller shell could not do. Like a guided mission today, a kamikaze wasn’t aff3cted by the psychological effects of tracers flying by. The 3”/50 shell was the smallest that at the time could carry a VT fuse. (Today 40 mm shells can be fitted with multi function fuses and the 40 mm today can be fitted in unmanned, fully automatic mounts such as the OTO-Breda 40/70 Fast 40 twins.)
As for the famous 20mm Oerlikon the saying was, “when the 20s open fire it’s time to brace for impact.”
Practice makes perfect!
Kamikaze were effective when it came to create panic in aircraft carriers and other ships crews. Also using Nakajimas Ki-84 Hayates as a kamikaze was sheer stupidity and a waste of a good airplane!
That proximity fuse, which came out of the Tizard Mission, really made a difference and allowed the Allies to blast Japanese planes out of the sky
there's the old adage , if a US carrier got hit by Kamikaze it was 6 months in dry dock
if a British Carrier got hit, it was time to get the tea on and the brooms out
the most effective countermeasure was the British use of Armoured Flight decks, which the US generally did'nt use
Excellent, as always.
Excellent, you cleared up a lot of myths, and vagueness on the subject for me.
Decided to come back and finish watching this after watching the Unauthorized Pacific War History Podcast's episode about kamikazes.
There is a MASSIVE size difference between the USS Saratoga (a Lexington Class Main Fleet Carrer) and the USS Bismark Sea (an Escort Jeep Carrier). The USS Saratoga for the most part survived a nuclear bomb blast during tests after the war! There was way more US Destroyers damaged & sunk due to the tactic of posting them as far out as possible for the early warning for the fleet giving them the time to scramble more fighters. The Japanese realized this and targeted them in mass first. The quality of the Japanese pilots training by this time was also extremely poor! Most could barely take off without crashing.
I was going to add a comment, but all the good ones were taken. And, this is a good video.
You missed another escort carrier hit by Kamikaze. The USS St. Lo was also hit by Kamikaze. Skynea history did a great video about it.
@@darkusblader Not at Okinawa, though.
There are a lot of hits outside that specific part of the report which was focused on the later attacks
Armored flight decks came In handy for the UK carriers, any chance you can do a bit about there role?
I believe the armored decks came about more as an acknowledgement that carriers of the time may have little warning to respond to an attack, and if they’re operating in the Med then they’d have to contend with land bases operating more and heavier aircraft on a continent instead of carriers and island airfields.
The downside was their lower hangar height which limited what aircraft they could operate and thus their value as a carrier.
@@classifiedad1 Indeed. I believe there was an American naval officer serving as liaison to the Royal Navy. Regarding kamikazes he said something to the effect of, if an American carrier takes a kamikaze to the flight deck, it's six months in Pearl Harbor. If an RN carrier takes a kamikaze to the flight deck it's "sweepers, man your brooms."
Different ships, built under different doctrines, fighting a war they probably weren't designed for. You fight with what you've got, not what you want.
VERY good video - minor nitpick: for the visualization, you had 4 individual months and then one multi--month group.
It would have been nice if the Oct-Jan group had used averages on the graph to be more comparable to the individual months
Good point!
Robin Rielly's book on Kamikaze attacks is a real eye opener.
He lists all of the material used - aircraft, midgets submarines, special attack boats -; the attacks and tabulated losses of ships and personnel. All cribbed from official reports and first hand accounts. There comes a point when you as a reader ask yourself when is it going to end, for all that is holy. It's just attack after attack, one alarm after the other. The end figures for Allied casualties are simply staggering.
You develop a new kind of respect for those folks manning the landing crafts used for the picket line and on resupply missions, too. Holy Moses on a Moped...
Go read it.
Cheers.
How do these numbers change when you include the UK and commonwealth BPF ships in the data? As the UK aircraft carriers had armoured flight decks they were often used closer inshore.
If games like War Thunder are in any manner comparable to real air warfare, I'd imagine kamikaze attacks are the closest, as the players aren't usually interested in surviving the attack as long as they get a hit.
Having played such attacks against enemy fleet, I also notice the tendency to attack the first ship that spots the plane, simply because from the point you're spotted onwards, you're basically on borrowed time - even if you managed to survive the first ship's AA, you very likely won't survive the entire fleet others who are very aware of you by this point and will shoot you into pieces if you get anywhere near.
And yes, I know real air attacks weren't most of the time done with individual planes, but on the other hand, hitting the nearest ship may increase the chances of your squadmates getting past it. Or that's what one would think intuitively, at least.
Another excellent video.
One thing I've been wondering about, so often I've heard people say that kamikaze were a tactic of pure desperation. On the other hand I heard from somebody who had actually studied the use of kamikazes that there was an actual pragmatic approach to the use of kamikaze - that losses of aircraft and pilots in conventional use were so high, that it mathematically, if one out kamikaze actually hit a ship, more damage for ten aircraft and pilots was inflicted than if the ten were lost without inflicting any damage.
Do you know of any such statistics?
This analysis is correct. When they switched to these tactics, their success in regular c*mbat was extremly low, because of being outgunned and outclassed at this point.
So yes, the Kamikaze did indeed more damage than would have been done if they would have fought conventionally.
Ian Toll writes about it in his Pacific Crucible trilogy.
@@wedgeantilles8575 But I mean specifically, effectiveness per lives lost. The assumption is that in conventional warfare _some_ pilots will return, whereas with kamikaze, almost no pilots will return - yes, some did turn back because of mechanical failure, like engine problems, and land, but I imagine those were few and far between.
@@DerOrso During this time of war, not that many pilots returned anyway.
They were running out of skilled pilots fast and green pilots got sl**ghtered out there.
Kamikaze had the additional benefit, that you could achieve more with limited skills.
Hitting a ship with torpedos or bombs was very difficult.
@@wedgeantilles8575 Very true. Trying to deliver a munition is such a way that you 1) have a good chance of hitting, and 2) have some chance of getting away, is harder than just "aim for the boat".
The more one looks at the situation, the less crazy is sound. And when you consider, all Japan really wanted, overall, was to be included in the colonizing nations, like Britain, France, Holland, Portugal, Germany, and the US, and not be colonized like China. There were only the two choices, because the known colonizers always came and colonized every nation with exploitable resources they could; no exceptions.
When you consider that only 90 years prior, Japan looked more like 17th century Europe, or even older, with only very limited technology, and 90 years later they actually lead the world in naval aviation, the most technologically advanced form of warfare in existence at the time. And all that because they were certain, they didn't want to be colonized.
@@DerOrso Are you defending the Japanese empire??
The K-pilots were instructed to not target battleships or cruisers because their armor made them immune to serious damage by the slow flying planes.
Many K-pilots flew multiple missions when they failed to find USN ships. That is one reason a substantial number survived the war. Dairies and post war interviews show many of the men knew their efforts were futile and flew the missions only because of intense pressure.
Great video as always. Very informative but it raised my curiosity. The Essex class had nominally 12*5 inch guns as heavy AA defense and those were the first line of ship self defense. How did the British carriers fare in that department? They had 16*4.5 inch guns with much of the same range and performance.
Also, did the asymmetrical placement of the Essex 5 inch guns a factor in how the ships maneuvered to get the most guns to bear? I know it's a rabbit hole, but on the tactical level defending the ships, those questions must have had an influence.
Carriers are stuck at flank into the wind for most of flight quarters.
Proximity fuse "qoute: How effective is the proximity fuse?
The proximity fuse proved three to four times more effective than conventional time fuses, and night kill-ratios increased by 370%. In 1943, naval guns fired 36,370 antiaircraft rounds. Although only 25% used proximity fuses, these accounted for 51% of the kills.
You left out USS St. Lo, of Taffy 3 in the Battle of Samar. She was another escort carrier that was sunk by kamikaze.
16:18 Music is drowning out your words. Could not understand what percentage hit targets; had to do math to subtract the first two values from 100%. Answer: 17%?
Confirm 17%
Great video :) I was looking for your HMS Belfast one but couldn't find it, have you got a link?
3:25 Yeah, I was never the most well read about the Kamikaze attacks, but just from seeing general history, it did seem Destroyers bore the brunt of the attacks despite Capital Ships being the preferred targets. Carriers especially were what Japan were most worried about yet they were among the least to be attacked. I also know the USN even made it a point to push Destroyers out far away on Radar picket duty with Fighter Caps. Kamikazes were drawn towards them. This was acceptable to the US Navy because the Carriers were so valuable while the service had more Destroyers. Not to mention Carriers and Battleships tend to be in the center of USN air defense formations. So Kamikaze would have to deal with Fighter Caps, layers of Anti-Aircraft Fire, and then MAYBE get a shot to make a run against a Capital Ship.
Also understandable that Kamikazes had good hit rates against Escort Carriers. They were small, cheaply made for fast construction and very slow. They would not have been bristling with AA guns compared to the larger, more heavily defended Fleet Carriers like Enterprise, Saratoga, and Essex-class. Even the Independence-class Light Carriers didn't fare badly like the CVEs because they were faster and had better AA guns, i.e. more 40mm Bofors than the Escort Carriers that tended to have lighter, weaker, shorter ranged 20mm Oerlikons.
Worsening Kamikaze success rates as time went on is understandable. No matter the conflict your enemy is actually rather smart and will figure things out and get better.
The British Pacific Fleet showed that armored flight decks were effective against protecting aircraft carriers against Kamikaze attack.
I had a relative kill by a kamikaze during the war- he’s buried in his home town in Maine.
By the way- he was of French descent. Fighting French haters is a full time job.
The USN thought process in the Post War because of the Kamikazes was to try to have a standoff high altitude interceptor carrier based fighters, either airborne, ship- or submarine borne early warning radar platform, armored flight deck and better structure for the carriers and lastly and most importantly, ship launched missile (SAM)which the USN spent millions of man hours and tons of money in development and research post WWII.
War was over in Okinawa. I better Crack a book or two Thanks!
As is correctly pointed out in this video, the Japanese changed their tactics regarding what they considered to be the most effective use of kamikazes. At first, it was decided that American (and, later, British) aircraft carriers should be the primary targets. It was the planes on the carriers that dealt the most damage to Japanese targets. Carriers were a highly combustible mix of ordinance, fuel oil and avgas- and they were very large (though agile) targets. The size of the target was important because the level of training for most kamikaze pilots was abysmal. So, to the Japanese mind, potentially trading one inadequately-trained pilot and one obsolete aircraft for a carrier capable of carrying 70+ aircraft was more than a fair trade. But the carriers were extraordinarily difficult targets. Not only did they possess highly-trained fighter pilots flying up to date aircraft which were vectored via excellent radar onto incoming enemy aircraft, the ships themselves carried very heavy AA weapons. Further, the carriers were ringed with many other ships, all of which were also well-armed with AA weaponry. But there was one other tactic the US used that the Japanese were unaware of, at least at first.
Radar was excellent, but it had a limited range. It was standard operating procedure for a carrier group to have aloft a combat air patrol from before dawn to after dusk 9and even at night if there was a night-flight carrier in the group). I think the warning time provided by radar was on the order of 20 minutes, which may- or may not- be enough time to launch additional fighters for defense. So we hit upon the idea of stationing destroyers many miles out from the main battle groups so as to provide earlier warning of incoming hostile aircraft. These were called "Picket" or "radar picket destroyers". The additional alert time these ships provided meant that incoming hostiles would face an even greater number of defending fighters. The Japanese had to reconsider their tactics to include a substantial effort to take out the picket destroyers so as to make attacks on the carriers themselves somewhat easier.
Thanks from Canberra Chris. 🇦🇺
I find it a little curious that Light Cruisers were statistically the least attacked or the least hit. I'm fairly sure there would have been more of them around than heavy Cruisers, thanks to the 27 ship strong Cleveland class, and theit light and medium AA batteries were a bit weaker than that of Heavy Cruisers.
The main fleet carriers were likely the main intended targets for the Kamikazes, as by 1945, both Japan and the US were beginning to recognize and accept how important the Aircraft Carrier was to naval operations, even at the expense of the other vessels. The carriers could allow the fleets to strike farther and inflict damage at distances that a generation before would have required the ships to sail within gunnery range. However, Japan faced multiple problems in addition to things you mention...
One that would actually only expand on things you mention would be on ship placement. Even excluding radar equipped picket ships, in the open sea, major ships like the fleet carriers and the battleships would often be at the center of the naval formation. Which would mean any attack, kamikaze or not, would essentially have to go over the entire fleet before getting to the target. And given the size of most warships (even the smaller ones) the formations could still be covering a vast area of ocean, meaning that it wouldn't be like in some video games where all the ships are packed together in a very narrow formation. Thus, an attack on a carrier would draw successive fire from ships at the outer edge of the fleet and then from additional ships as they moved inward... and damaged craft could end up going after other ships if damaged by shots fired because they've lost the integrity to fly on to the intended target.
Some parts of this would change when a fleet comes into close proximity to the shore. As in places like Okinawa, the battleships... and potentially even the fast battleships like the USS Iowa, would likely be moved from the heart of the fleet to positions closer to the shoreline to use their main batteries against ground targets. They may still be shielded by other cruisers and destroyers, just as the carriers would be further out... but that would still be a development on much of the base naval formations that would then relate to amphibious operations. Which tactically, if things reach that point, that'd actually raise the importance of the supply and amphibious craft over the carriers as attacking those larger ships would be more with the intention of deterring landings in the first place.
For Japan, however, this then presented other problems... as by 1945, the naval air arm and the regular air forces that had been so devastating to the Americans in 1941 to 1942 were long gone. They were starting to run short of planes, short of fuel, and short of trained pilots to fly them. And that training issue would be Japan's biggest worry... even if they had the planes and oil necessary. For, if the pilot is untrained or at least combat inexperienced, the odds of success would be considerably lower than if the pilot is fully trained and has at least survived one or two combat missions. Japan was running out of that and needed away to get as many pilots as possible. And that's where the whole kamikaze idea gained traction, in that a pilot who INTENDS to die doesn't require the extensive training to "dogfight" or line up the right attack run. The pilot just needs to know how to control the plane and find the target.
That much lower level of training is bound to have given them trouble as the lower pilot quality would also likely mean that some of their strategic and tactical understanding with regard to what was the most important targets would also be mixed. That would in turn affect how these pilots respond to any and all countermeasures the Americans took.
By attacking the defending ships they hoped to make more guns fall silent & open the way for more damages! IMO
A most informative video.
One thing... Nobody is able to dig a foxhole in the deck of all the USN ships..
The data shows 36% of kamikaze hits were on "other naval ships" That's a big category! And the category apparently excludes cargo ships, plus carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. So what other vessels would kamakazies be diving on?
A mix of DE, DM, DMS and LSTs et al.
Erm, 12mm cannon? did you mean 0.50 calibre machine guns which hadn't been considered viable AA weapons for long before 1944, or maybe 20mm cannon which were also out of favour late war, where the 40mm Bofors or for the RN the 2pdr pom-pom were the weapon of the day.
That minor quibble aside enjoyed the video and please keep doing what you do :-)
Denominators are way too low for most of these figures to be statistically significant. One can’t make really ANY conclusions until N=32 at the very least.
I've read after action reports on Kikusui attacks and it's obvious that target inflation was rampant. Sighting a column of smoke equated to one aircraft carrier sunk. The observer pilots were shameless about this.
Thank you
The original "drone strikes"
Kamikaze tactics could have worked really well with veteran pilots.
A great video despite of the klanging sound of kamikazah. Did the Naval Academy sign off on pronunciation.
kah mah kah ay or kam i kah zee but not kah mah kaz ah. And definitely not a schwa at the end of kamikaze.
In either London or New York it ends in a hard A sound. And definitely in the US Naval Port of San Diego.
It's not unusual for foreign spellings to use e as an ay sound,,, you know the sound that the symbol E makes in civilized spelt languages like Spanish and German unlike English where we say Great Vowel Shift and blame all the
confusion in spelling and pronunciation on Gutenberg. Or actually on the Dutch and Flemish printers in London in the 16th century..
My dad's cot or where it might have been is visible in the picture of the Big E's forward elevator hanging 100 meters above the deck in one ot the original turret toss style photos taken after a kamikaze hit through the flight deck. Fortunately he was at his gun.
Attacking capital ships is not the most effective use of a weapon system (unless it is REALLY big or REALLY capable (aircraft carriers or submarines) OR CAC assets.
Obviously such targets will be heavily defended.
The cold reality of a cost/benefit points to attacking logistics and landing craft.
Shaping the battle space.
It depends :)
Why did kamikaze pilots wear parachutes?
I didn't understand if the Intrepid was struck by 5 planes 4 times or if 5 planes struck her over 4 separate incidents. 💁♂️🤔
The latter
@MilitaryAviationHistory Thank you, I even went back and listened to that part again but was still unsure.
You were probably sensible not to talk about ship survivability and the BPF's experience. Whole can of worms that!
DE did most of picket duty.
👍👍👍
Kamikatze.. 😸
Putting that in as a suggestion for a new pokemon
@MilitaryAviationHistory The god-cat.. 😸
Why is he saying kamikaza like there’s some kind of a at the end? It’s kamikaze if you’re gonna make a documentary on something learn how to pronounce it.
kammy katze? meowsai!!
Did you just get out of bed??😁
Kamikatze
lel that accent
\o/
I hate the way you pronounce kamikaze lol
You'd hate the real thing even more then ;)
How cute it is that you pronounce kamikaze like it is a Georgian family name. Like Eduard Shevardnadze