Thanks for the explanation! I have two immediate thoughts- the first is that linking stakes to knowledge isn't so much a measure of true belief itself as it is a measure of how much it matters that a belief is correct. The second is that context can be nested (like 'focus') and the sceptic might claim that their context is the broadest possible - it is, after all, philosophical - and hence the only one that never truly goes away.
1) Firstly, knowledge is a lot more than true belief, your belief has to be connected to the truth in some appropriate way. Secondly, if that's the case then you need to explain to the contextualist why it is that we do attribute knowledge less frequently when the stakes are higher. Maybe it's a psychological bias, or there's some conversational rule that allows us to falsely use the word 'knows' when the stakes are low, or does not allow us to use the word 'knows' when the stakes are high even if it's technically correct. That is probably the most common response philosophers have to contextualism. 2) The most popular version of contextualism, relevant alternatives, says that every context selects a set of possibilities that it is not proper to ignore, and all others may be properly ignored, for instance sceptical scenarios in non-sceptical settings. Either a possibility is proper to ignore or it is not; by definition of contextualism only one context can apply at a time. Furthermore, the idea of the sceptical context applying all the time is not really consistent with the ideas of contextualism, though sceptics certainly say that high standards for knowledge exist all the time. Contextualism is about the meaning of the word 'know' changing, so to say that a context applies all the time regardless of our awareness of it is a bit like saying 'well actually when we say love, we are always talking about romance'.
@@cloudfrost8403 I can see how contextualism could work as a theory of meaning, but I suspect that risks it collapsing into relativism. If we accept that security is important (a psychological bias, perhaps, but I'll assume it's a sensible one) would we then be duty bound to determine which meaning renders us most secure, and if we somehow managed that, to agree that this meaning of knowledge is, at the very least, more important than me "knowing" where I left my hat? Anyway - I'll really have to read around this more before the comments section devolves into a series of my unseemly amateur ravings :)
Yes, according to contextualism, the stakes affect how good your evidence has to be in order for your true belief to count as knowledge in that context. It's true that sceptical contexts are broad - they include scenarios that more everyday contexts don't include. But that doesn't mean that is always the relevant context. Analogy: if you go to the fridge and all the cans of beer are gone, you can truly say 'all the beer is gone', even though there remains beer elsewhere in the world. The idea is that the elsewhere-beer (in the supermarket etc) isn't then contextually relevant to that utterance. Similarly, when you're wondering whether your keys are in your pocket or in your bag, the possibility you're dreaming, or a brain-in-a-vat, isn't contextually relevant. (So says the contextualist, anyway.)
@@AtticPhilosophy Well, now I am wondering if, when I dreamed last night that my keys were in my pocket, I really knew that they were in my pocket, even though I'd actually put them in my bag just before I went to sleep. I might also have thought that "All the beer *in my fridge* is gone", but like many of us, I'm way to lazy to spell all that out. :) I'm picking my way through Mr Lewis's rules at the moment. The relationship between context and finitude (subjective/objective) strikes me as potentially interesting. Thanks again for clearly introducing me to this topic!
I'll be honest, I expected to agree with this more than I did. The idea that your level of knowledge of a Bank closing time changes based on how desperate you are to make a deposit doesn't feel right. The way I see it, it's more about levels of confidence than levels of knowledge, and different circumstances require different levels of confidence. If I need to deposit this money tonight, I don't suddenly go from knowing to not knowing, but my level of confidence no longer meets the requirements and therefore I seek greater assurances. I feel like this approach also allows for "highest possible degree of confidence" to be acceptable. Whether I am in a reality or a perfect simulation of a reality is by definition indistinguishable, but I have the highest possible degree of confidence that I am not. Even if that degree of confidence is rather low, and the stakes are rather high, I am forced to accept it as knowledge because there is no way to achieve greater certainty. Or is that actually contextualism after all and I just didn't understand?
The term Possibilities of Error throws me off a bit - I am thinking of the concept as: what you can consider to genuinely know about depends on different contexts. Mathematics and concepts of physics can be ''known'' about in the context of building rockets, because these components of knowledge can be relied upon to build a functioning rocket (in the sense of your video, this can be reworded as - we can trust mathematics to help us build rockets because the mathematical knowledge is sufficient to satisfy the high stakes required when building rockets). However, when we consider whether we can really trust these fields as knowledge in the sense that Descartes describes knowledge as - something that we cannot ever doubt, that for example, an evil demon has put into our minds these theories of mathematics and physics - then in that context we can consider to not trust mathematics as knowledge.
Would you say that contextualism just gives a semantic analysis of the term ‘knowledge’ as opposed to giving a metaphysical description of knowledge? Thank you
Definitely a semantic analysis, but I think it also explains partly what knowledge is metaphysically. Part of the view is that there’s no one thing that is knowledge: rather, different properties count as ‘knowledge’ in different contexts.
Ah, thank you, Contextualism seems to have a very interesting and relieving point of view on knowledge! I have a question though, what exactly is the difference between contextualism and relativism ? Is contextualism a form of relativism, since whether you "know" something or not is relative to the context ?
'Contextualism' is a view specific about knowledge, whereas 'relativism' is usually put forwards about truth, ie that what's true (and hence what you can know) is relative to perspective, or culture, or whatever. Is that what you had in mind by relativism? That kind of relativism is quite radical, whereas contextualism about knowledge isn't - it's compatible with objective truth, for example.
If i am just a brain in a vat, then this is my reality- it’s as real as it gets without the mad scientists intervening. To debate such a thing would lead to despair If I’m just dreaming, then I’m going to either imagine the skeptic bursts into flames and if that doesnt work, ignore him
No! If you're a BIV, then what *seems* real and what *is* real differ sharply. There is a difference that matters, since few would willingly want to become a BIV.
David Lewis, "Elusive Knowledge"
That’s the one! Not the first paper on contextualism, but my favourite!
Thanks for the explanation! I have two immediate thoughts- the first is that linking stakes to knowledge isn't so much a measure of true belief itself as it is a measure of how much it matters that a belief is correct. The second is that context can be nested (like 'focus') and the sceptic might claim that their context is the broadest possible - it is, after all, philosophical - and hence the only one that never truly goes away.
1) Firstly, knowledge is a lot more than true belief, your belief has to be connected to the truth in some appropriate way. Secondly, if that's the case then you need to explain to the contextualist why it is that we do attribute knowledge less frequently when the stakes are higher. Maybe it's a psychological bias, or there's some conversational rule that allows us to falsely use the word 'knows' when the stakes are low, or does not allow us to use the word 'knows' when the stakes are high even if it's technically correct. That is probably the most common response philosophers have to contextualism.
2) The most popular version of contextualism, relevant alternatives, says that every context selects a set of possibilities that it is not proper to ignore, and all others may be properly ignored, for instance sceptical scenarios in non-sceptical settings. Either a possibility is proper to ignore or it is not; by definition of contextualism only one context can apply at a time. Furthermore, the idea of the sceptical context applying all the time is not really consistent with the ideas of contextualism, though sceptics certainly say that high standards for knowledge exist all the time. Contextualism is about the meaning of the word 'know' changing, so to say that a context applies all the time regardless of our awareness of it is a bit like saying 'well actually when we say love, we are always talking about romance'.
@@cloudfrost8403 I can see how contextualism could work as a theory of meaning, but I suspect that risks it collapsing into relativism. If we accept that security is important (a psychological bias, perhaps, but I'll assume it's a sensible one) would we then be duty bound to determine which meaning renders us most secure, and if we somehow managed that, to agree that this meaning of knowledge is, at the very least, more important than me "knowing" where I left my hat? Anyway - I'll really have to read around this more before the comments section devolves into a series of my unseemly amateur ravings :)
Yes, according to contextualism, the stakes affect how good your evidence has to be in order for your true belief to count as knowledge in that context. It's true that sceptical contexts are broad - they include scenarios that more everyday contexts don't include. But that doesn't mean that is always the relevant context. Analogy: if you go to the fridge and all the cans of beer are gone, you can truly say 'all the beer is gone', even though there remains beer elsewhere in the world. The idea is that the elsewhere-beer (in the supermarket etc) isn't then contextually relevant to that utterance. Similarly, when you're wondering whether your keys are in your pocket or in your bag, the possibility you're dreaming, or a brain-in-a-vat, isn't contextually relevant. (So says the contextualist, anyway.)
@@AtticPhilosophy Well, now I am wondering if, when I dreamed last night that my keys were in my pocket, I really knew that they were in my pocket, even though I'd actually put them in my bag just before I went to sleep. I might also have thought that "All the beer *in my fridge* is gone", but like many of us, I'm way to lazy to spell all that out. :) I'm picking my way through Mr Lewis's rules at the moment. The relationship between context and finitude (subjective/objective) strikes me as potentially interesting. Thanks again for clearly introducing me to this topic!
I'll be honest, I expected to agree with this more than I did. The idea that your level of knowledge of a Bank closing time changes based on how desperate you are to make a deposit doesn't feel right.
The way I see it, it's more about levels of confidence than levels of knowledge, and different circumstances require different levels of confidence. If I need to deposit this money tonight, I don't suddenly go from knowing to not knowing, but my level of confidence no longer meets the requirements and therefore I seek greater assurances.
I feel like this approach also allows for "highest possible degree of confidence" to be acceptable. Whether I am in a reality or a perfect simulation of a reality is by definition indistinguishable, but I have the highest possible degree of confidence that I am not. Even if that degree of confidence is rather low, and the stakes are rather high, I am forced to accept it as knowledge because there is no way to achieve greater certainty.
Or is that actually contextualism after all and I just didn't understand?
The contextualist idea is that, in high-stakes contexts, you need a higher standard of evidence, not just more confidence (which may be misplaced!)
The term Possibilities of Error throws me off a bit - I am thinking of the concept as: what you can consider to genuinely know about depends on different contexts. Mathematics and concepts of physics can be ''known'' about in the context of building rockets, because these components of knowledge can be relied upon to build a functioning rocket (in the sense of your video, this can be reworded as - we can trust mathematics to help us build rockets because the mathematical knowledge is sufficient to satisfy the high stakes required when building rockets). However, when we consider whether we can really trust these fields as knowledge in the sense that Descartes describes knowledge as - something that we cannot ever doubt, that for example, an evil demon has put into our minds these theories of mathematics and physics - then in that context we can consider to not trust mathematics as knowledge.
Thanks for introducing me to so many useful concepts!
You’re welcome!
Would you say that contextualism just gives a semantic analysis of the term ‘knowledge’ as opposed to giving a metaphysical description of knowledge?
Thank you
Definitely a semantic analysis, but I think it also explains partly what knowledge is metaphysically. Part of the view is that there’s no one thing that is knowledge: rather, different properties count as ‘knowledge’ in different contexts.
Ah, thank you, Contextualism seems to have a very interesting and relieving point of view on knowledge!
I have a question though, what exactly is the difference between contextualism and relativism ? Is contextualism a form of relativism, since whether you "know" something or not is relative to the context ?
'Contextualism' is a view specific about knowledge, whereas 'relativism' is usually put forwards about truth, ie that what's true (and hence what you can know) is relative to perspective, or culture, or whatever. Is that what you had in mind by relativism? That kind of relativism is quite radical, whereas contextualism about knowledge isn't - it's compatible with objective truth, for example.
@@AtticPhilosophy ok thank you!!
@@AtticPhilosophy ok, I understand, thank you!
Just awesome ❤️
Thanks!
If i am just a brain in a vat, then this is my reality- it’s as real as it gets without the mad scientists intervening. To debate such a thing would lead to despair
If I’m just dreaming, then I’m going to either imagine the skeptic bursts into flames and if that doesnt work, ignore him
No! If you're a BIV, then what *seems* real and what *is* real differ sharply. There is a difference that matters, since few would willingly want to become a BIV.
thanx
You’re welcome!