April 10, 2013 - Norman Polmar lecture: The Death of the USS Thresher
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- Опубліковано 5 чер 2024
- Video recording is courtesy of Newport News Shipbuilding, Dept. O36 Training Services. DVD copies are available from The Mariners' Museum.
On April 10, The Mariners' Museum commemorated the 50th anniversary of the sinking of the USS Thresher with renowned naval and intelligence consultant and author, Norman Polmar. Taken from his book, The Death of the USS Thresher: The Story Behind History's Deadliest Submarine Disaster, Polmar recounted the dramatic circumstances surrounding her implosion, which killed all 129 men on board, and the lessons the Navy learned. It was the first loss of a nuclear submarine in history and one which would later cause the Navy to send Dr. Robert Ballard, under the guise of the search for the RMS Titanic, on a top-secret mission to map and collect data on the nuclear fuel.
Norman Polmar has been a consultant to several senior officials in the Navy and Department of Defense, the Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and several U.S. Senators. Polmar has written or coauthored more than 50 books and numerous articles on naval, intelligence, and aviation subjects and is a columnist for Proceedings and Naval History magazines.
This lecture is made possible by the generous support of Tom and Nancy Clark.
My husband was aboard USS Alexander Hamilton SSBN 617 doing the same thing as Thresher out of shipyard. We lived in Mystic, CT. and felt the terror all felt and it still hurts to this day. Our boat was off the coast of New Jersey but we didn’t know about Thresher; so a boat down sent fear throughout Hamilton’s families. We prayed for all involved.
Why execute depth tests in 8000 ft of water? Would it not be better to select an area at about 1500 ft so that the sea bed could act as a safety net in case something went wrong. This could allow time for the crew to address the issue, or the surface team to effect a rescue rather then allowing the boat to reach and exceed crush depth.
My dad was on the Snook SSN 592. The loss of the Thresher and the Scorpion always made me feel lucky to be here. Could have easily been my dad down there.
Best evidence appears to point to a reactor scram due to a loss of the main collect pumps and loss of propulsion, compounding the incident was the inability to deballast at test depth. As an exsubmariner, I can well imagine the dread that crew members felt as the sub quickly slid towards crush depth. Death itself was instantaneous as the sub imploded in the space of less than a second. Unfortunately, hazards of the job that we all rode through the depths.
I would not want to crew a sub. I would take a ride on one, though.
I was on USS Permit at the time and all the silver brazing welds were checked when we got back to Mare Island. Believe more than 50% of the welds failed. Additionally, blowing MBT's at test depth resulted in the freeze up of all the high pressure air reducers and the ship moved maybe 5 feet.
Chuck Woods in your opinion, do you think that could be a factor or major point on the USS Thresher sinking?
Chuck, was freezing the reason for the introduction of Marotta MBT blow valves?
I served aboard SSBN 600 (Theodore Roosevelt), 3rd. Boat of George Washington class.
@@uralbob1 The icing occurred in the installed strainers and orifices upstream of the Mariotta Air Reducers that dropped air pressure from the 4500PSI in the Tanks to 3000PSI for entry into the MBT's. Thresher was the first boat to have 4500 PSI high pressure air tanks. The icing caused the strainers to collapse blocking air flow.
Thank you Chuck; this particular sub was rushed through refit and repairs and as a result replaced and added parts went un-inspected. In addition, overall inspections were cut short.... as I am retired military and old now, I can state with confidence those decisions were forced by the upper most echelons. This was during a delegate time as it was at the height of the Cold War and not long after the bay of pigs and Russia’s attempts to place missiles in Cuba.
@@uralbob1 no one cafes
It’s often overlooked but the fact that the boat went to test depth countless times without issue prior to the refit, logically implies that something had changed during the refit.
The boat appears to have been intact for many hours after propulsion loss and only very slowly drifted way below crush depth before it failed. We never be told but i feel sure that they know the cause. Sub safe was an admission that things had become slip shod as a result of the heat of the Cold War. Watch the recent sub brief episode that covers recently declassified material.
Were there any civilian engineers who "refused" to go for the final ride on the Thresher? I met an individual some years ago who told me her dad was one of two engineers who refused to go on the final test dive of the Thresher. She said it was customary for the engineers to go on the test dive. He warned his superiors that the Thresher would have a catastrophic failure and that the sea trails should not go forward. She said that after the disappearance of the Thresher, her dad was interrogated extensively by the FBI and the Naval Investigative Service. Her dad was accused of sabotage and other things. He had had a nervous breakdown. I got to talk to her dad once. He explained to me how the type of solder used on a pipe was the culprit and how it failed under pressure and shorted out other systems. He told me the Thresher disaster was preventable; there was no excuse for the loss of life. He had told me the engineers were all given a pin beforehand commemorating the building of the Thresher. The lady told me that after her father's death, she will write book on the Thresher Disaster.
You reminded me of the space shuttle Challenger disaster and the warning from one engineer was ignored of the O-ring design.
There were no soldered joints. The copper joints are brazed.
My brother said it was like a egg inside that you could hear her skins?
@@jimclark6256true but that's a distinction with very little difference.
Norman, Hope your hip surgery turned out well. The world is a safer place because of your work
An emergency blow from test depth without propulsion does not result in a rapid ascension even with adequate MBT blow systems. The boat will barely rise for quite some time, and then gather speed as it nears the surface. If you are in trouble and time is a factor, an emergency blow will not help you unless you have propulsion.
I disagree. A 688 I was on did a embt from test depth. We blew all the way to the surface. It did pick up speed as we went, and it was slow to start. But it was slow for a couple seconds and not for "quite some time." But once those chicken switches were hit we were going up
@@joecombs7468 usually in the UK embt is followed with a call to manouvering to make the battle short and full ahead the battle short bypasses all reactor protection
@@HamishMcIntosh well, in an actual emergency we blow all the way to the surface.
For a drill or test of the system we blow for 15 seconds. But reactor safety is always number one.
The death of the THRESHER had an enduring impact on me, more so than the TITANIC (which impacts people to this day). I was a kid at the time and knew some of the children of those aboard. It was a remarkable submarine.
That was a very well done presentation.
The men and women of the Silent Service are a very special breed. They have been involved in some of the most secret missions, under the most dangerous circumstances and they don't speak a word unless authorized. No Seal Team 6 bravado, just quietly and efficiently doing their jobs. They are true hero's in every sense of the word.
I think it was still a very terrifying experience for the crews before they died since they knew the submarine was sinking with the surrounding squeaky and cracking sounds before the final implosion occurred. This terrifying moment could last 15 minutes or longer. It is like facing a firing squad pointing at you for a couple minutes before the final shot takes place.
As one might imagine the loss of the Thresher was deeply felt by those of us in the Submarine Service. We knew that something was greatly wrong with what had occurred. Why did we feel that way ? Well, you see were serving on the U.S.S. Haddo, SSN - 604, a “Thresher” class submarine and were operating as normal.
What went wrong? Well, shortly after the loss of the Thresher the U.S.S. Sam Rayburn SSBN - 635 was about to go to sea on Sea Trails, just like the Thresher. The night before shake down the lower level engine room watch noticed the the lead seal on the wire holding the lagging collar that keeps the sea water piping condensation from occurring didn’t look right somehow. He checked and the seal had been compromised indicating that someone had accessed the main sea water piping. He slid the collar back and discovered that someone has used a grinder to weaken the piping. That piping has to withstand
Sea pressure at greater than rest depth! The intent of the saboteur was to cause the 14” diameter seawater piping to rupture when the Rayburn went deep, thereby causing it to sink.
We therefore knew that our Blue Crew almost suffered the same fate as the Thresher.
My brother had just came off the Thresher before it went down he knew over 120 of the men on board.
I was on the USS Haddock (SSN 621 Permit class) for 4 Years including an 18 Month Refueling overhaul. I can remember doing test depth dives which were always done slowly and carefully. After listening and reading the information about the Thresher I tend to think that they went about their test depth dive a little to quickly with a crew that had a lot of inexperienced sailors on board. I note that they were heavy and therefor didn't take the time to balance the boat as they dove. [We had a similar situation, as I remember it, we were on a deep dive and at about 700 feet we lost the reactor plant (I think it was from a drill mishap) . We sunk to somewhere > 800 ft before we did a full blow of the MBTs. I remember watching the depth gauge as I did a Fast Scram Recovery. We of course made it to the surface.] I think the Thresher had some event or issue with the electrical system, maybe loss of vacuum or turbine control problem which lead to a loss of the Main Coolant Pumps and a Rx scram. At test depth their MBT blow was ineffective and they sunk before they could recover the plant.
Hello - I did not serve in the Navy but the Army at the time when the M-16 rifle was rumored to include parts made by the Matell Toy Company. Any thoughts on the silver soldering joining pipes?
@@johnzeszut3170 Definitely a potential failure point, I believe later they were all replaced with a welded joints as part of subsafe concerns. The boat I was on had been through the subsafe refit and had improved hull penetrations like redundant isolation valves etc.Before my boat went through a refueling overhaul we had lots of drain pump and trim pump issued which is the only way to pump water out of the people tank. These kept us from going to (or staying at) sea many times. We were 3 years over due for our overhaul as SSBN's had priority. Maybe that's to much dirty laundry......
@@jimgraham3634 Thanks and I appreciate your response.
@@johnzeszut3170 Ian from Forgotten weapons here on UA-cam has an interview with Mr Sullivan (one of the designers of the M-16). I think you should check it out because it addresses the problems the M-16 got when introduced.
New documents were just a few days ago declassified that shine more light upon what happened with the USS Thresher. Everyone should look into them as they show some new horrific details about the loss of the Thresher and it shows now that the Navy lied to us! The Thresher did not just immediately implode and kill all of the crew, some of the men survived and were in communication with a search sub for days until the men on the Thresher perished. Now, the Navy couldn't have done anything about it as the Thresher sunk to some great depths and there wasn't a rescue crew that could reach her in time anyway. It's just so bizarre, look into it!
It imploded. The Sound was even recorded.
As an ex-Nuclear Operator (RO) and qualified Electrical Operator albeit on a later design US submarine, I find this theory to be a bit hard to swallow. Making an approach to test depth on sea trails myself I remember the manner in which it was performed and I can't see going into it heavy nor is the reason for loss of vital bus explained. I believe it is quite possible that the loss did in fact occur due to a seawater leak based on what was found on other subs of the time on their brazed joints. Also the loss of a non-vital electrical bus does not necessarily result in a reactor scram.
DuffyF56// We always went down to test Depth Light had to have Planes at about 5-10 degrees Down angle to stay down. AS an RO you known above a certain angle the reactors Scrams due to loss of MCP's. Agree MCP's our on a Vital electric Buss.
www.secnav.navy.mil/foia/readingroom/HotTopics/THRESHER%20RELEASE/THRESHER%20pg%201-300.pdf
She sent out 37 main sonar pings. She had power for 37 pings for up to almost a day. I'm only about half way through the comms transcripts of the Seawolf right now.
@@BaronFeydRautha #35 from the Statement of Findings of the Court of Inquiry. www.jag.navy.mil/library/investigations/USS%20THRESHER%20PT%201.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1EIukEo647aPYVLylyG_75TMA7j1GetqNlJyhWZTDFh-ONcSB8_T9saRw
@@DuffyF56 I get a 403 error. What information does the link have?
And after more research on this topic if the MCP were running in fast speed on an S5W and the non-vital buses were lost the reactor would SCRAM. Given all the other data that has come forward I retract my objections to the theory as stated above and believe it is certainly much more plausible than the BS being promulgated now stating the boat was sending out sonar pings for HOURS after the implosion was detected by multiple SOSUS stations, one as close as 30 miles away from where she sank.
failed silver brazing of seawater lines sprayed water on to and into switchboards causing a ground and they used to shut MS 1&2 on a scram and the EPM doesn't have enough power to overcome that much negative buoyancy
I thought that the HiPAC system didn't have moisture separators which led to the HP air lines freezing . Thus causing an ice plug to form inside the EMBT air lines leading to the ballast tanks due to the sudden rush of HP air ?
I remember seeing A-Ganger's checking the Mirrota valves with rubber mallots after doing quarterly Emergency Blow evolutions .
Anyway , I was grateful for the system enhancements that addressed this problem. This is one of the funnest experiences that I had while serving in the Submarine Service. Pride Runs Deep ! . . .
Isn't it amazing that this disaster has a familiar problem as:
Titanic- the use of iron bolts instead of steel to attach bulkheads inside the ship.
Iron,which contracts and expands more than steel causing the bulkheads to collapse sooner.
Had steel been used, who knows how much more time it would have bought for the Carpathia?
HMS Hood- Not reinforcing Hoods deck armor like the Brits were going to do,but didnt.
All but 2 sailors died needlessly.
Challenger- Rushing that launch when warned prior about freezing temps affecting the O rings in the solid rocket boosters.
But using cheap incapable materials to begin with.
Columbia- NASA NOT paying attention to the failure of the foam not adhering to the main fuel tank ( the real big one the shuttle was attached to) during liftoff.
NASA was warned about that too, prior.
Then when in orbit, the meeting with Linda Ham at Mission Control about the foam hit on the left wing causing a problem on re entry.
They could have redeployed Columbia to the ISS and waited there for another shuttle to get them.
They didnt.
Pearl Harbor- One.....Upper management not paying attention to radar showing MASSIVE flights of incoming planes coming in.
Two.....lining up battleships in an easy straight line for a duck shoot.
COVID-19-Partnering with an enemy like China to develop "gain of function" research on a biochem weapon.
Does anyone see an obnoxious deadly pattern here?
I see several.
The ISS was in the wrong orbit. Columbia did not have enough fuel to get to it.
This is an interesting discussion of the Thresher incident. Any idea why they lost a non-vital bus? I heard mention of frequency instability, but no possible causes for that.
Sure, the cause was the piping rupture/failure resulting in water spraying on Switchboards/generators/electrical components.
@@SaltiDawg2008 Bruce Rule specifically pointed out that there was no indication of water being the cause in the SOSUS data. The frequency instability was most likely caused by wear or an environmental condition such as pressure, humidity, or corrosion. This was the first depth test after the upgrades and there weren't thorough tests done prior to the depth test.
The theory of a burst pipe that you're referring to was just a theory made by the Navy Court Inquiry based purely on the pipe's history and failed tests. A burst pipe could easily gush out thousands of pounds of water per minute. If the problem was a burst pipe, it wouldn't have been considered a minor problem in the report they gave at 0913.
@@TheLockAndLoll The testimony of the previous captain of the ship was pretty stone evidence for this as well. Knowing what he calls minor and major is interesting as he had such experience on the sub. Whatever issue they had they were not declaring any sort of emergency at that time.
Of course it is also possible that whoever was sending the report was just told it was minor (and report that) and maybe didn't know how bad it was.
Frequency on the non-vital buss is controlled by the speed of the Turbine-generator supplying that buss. So it could have been a bad turbine governor or other control circuitry from the EPCP. I wonder why they had the scram. The MG-TG tie breaker should have tripped isolating the MG (vital) buss from any transients or they should have done that manually. They died because the SOP followed by the Reactor Operator called for him to immediately close the Main Steam Stops if the reactor scammed! No steam no serious propulsion. IIRC, the EPM (emergency propulsion motor) was somewhere between 150 or 450 hp, a long way from 15,000. Can't remember the EPM procedure but it involved declutching the shaft and dropping the EPM brushes and probably an electrical breaker realignment too.
@@SaltiDawg2008 Theory, not fact. But I believe you are correct.
I’ve studied this for years and never realized she’d been to test depth 40 times.
Daniel Summey// You Usually go to certified test Depth once for each op. Sometimes prior some times after.
Have you read the new declassified information about this incident ?
Edited to add the documents for you, i figured since you have studied the incident you may want to read it. s3.documentcloud.org/documents/20986255/tresher9_10_reduced.pdf
Wonder how people in this video will react to the news that someone was alive for at least 24hrs on the Thresher.
They won’t because they weren’t.
@@scottl9660 incorrect my dude. Navy just released more of the investigation findings two days ago. Newly declassified info says that the USS Seawolf made contact with the Thresher after her incident.
ua-cam.com/video/HV5FGTxIU4Q/v-deo.html
@@scottl9660 you were lied to, sorry bud
@@scottl9660 37 Pings www.secnav.navy.mil/foia/readingroom/HotTopics/THRESHER%20RELEASE/THRESHER%20pg%201-300.pdf
As for that one guys question. The EMBT pipes always freeze over during a blow, but the ice does not block the air from going through the valves. The Thresher had screens over the opening of the valve the ice froze on the screens.
pre subsafe the pipes smaller too
Therefore once ice formed on the screens, air passage stopped ! SubSafe changes were: Remove reducers and go to straight 4,500 psi ballast blow . Picture of COLLAPSED CONE AND SCREEN was EVIDENCE of icing problem !
@@SteveWright-oy8ky yes & no. They did get rid of the screens. But they didn't get rid of the reducers and dump 4500 psi straight into the ballast tank. They changed the pressure it was reduced to.
(I was a plankowner on a 688).
@@joecombs7468 Thanks for the heads up !
Lest we forget on this day, 10 April 1963, 129 souls.
Wasn't the diving plane picture actually a film issue?
Can tell he put it together a couple hours earlier in a restaurant.
Outstanding presentation, I'm sure you would have done a much better job.
At 1,300 feet I believe the pressure is about 590 psi (according to Wolfram Alpha). So 3,000 psi compressed air would seem to still be sufficient. However the vents and/or mechanisms were blocked by ice or other problems.
44 PSI at 100 feet 44 PSI every 100 feet thereafter.
608 was 4500 psi 659 was 3000 psi so i think the thresher was also 4500psi
If something was seriously going wrong the Thresher crew should have been all the time on the underwater phone informing the Skylark, not just transmitting a few messages.
Touching intro.
I was on the James Madison SSBN 627 when the Thresher was lost - I will never understand why you do a test dive of 1300 feet in 8500 feet of water - unless you are more concerned about an enemy recovering your technology than you are about the men on board ! I loved the Sub Service ,
but left after my extended enlistment because of this distrust in the government's motives.
MBT Blow air Pressure 3000 PSI SSN SSBN 4500 PSI. (When I was in 1970-76) I Believe SSN now use 4500 PSI. I believe the Angle had a Big Part of the Reactor SCRAM. I read the report. Also the Lack of Air Dryers had a Part to Play.
It had 4500 psi but when through a 4500 to 3000 reducer before entering the MBT. That's standard on boomers & fast boats
The sosus data was examined when Thresher sank, just as they did 5 years later for Scorpion.
If there had been flooding the sosus would have detected the sound.
What sosus did detect was that in the last 2 minutes before the MCPs shut down the speed fluctuated 5 times, then the pumps shut down.
It's more likely the buss became unstable and that shut down the main coolant pumps.
Also
The Thresher was not out of trim. These deep diving nuclear powered boats are negatively buoyant at test depth. They teach you that at submarine school and it's just one more bit of data you learn while doing your quals onboard. Skipjack class had more reserve bouyancy. Rickover reduced reserve bouyancy after the Skipjack class. Not a lot negatively buoyant, but enough you aren't going to the surface with the epm or spm alone.
But an army guy wouldn't know that.
If I recall correctly we didn't start with the negative ballasting and speed restrictions until the sub-safe changes came in. Prior to that below a certain depth you could go as slow as you wanted and just adjust the ballast normally. Afterwards IIRC it was several thousand pounds light and enough speed with a very noticeable down bubble to keep your deph.
@@JackBunce when I was in we always had an up bubble when at test depth so to maintain depth.
@@joecombs7468 I was in 61 to 68. I After 65 on the 654 (ssbn) we started keeping the boat light and fast below 750 ft
@@JackBunce I was in 80 to 88. The boat was always slightly negatively buoyant at those depths
On sea trials with Rickover aboard the CO got yelled at when after a scram at 750 feet he planed up to 150 while I sorted the casualty. Then Rickover accused me of playing with his reactor plant!
What does an instability in an electrical bus sound like? SOSUS must be incredibly sensitive.
SOSUS detected the fluctuation in the speed of the high speed Main Coolant Pumps. From that, they were able to infer an instability in the electrical bus, which suggested an ongoing casualty.
At 15:54ish collapse depth 19,000ft?
Misspoke 1300+(50%) 1,950ft
Curious that the US navy and every documentary about the Thresher maintain the story about the failure of a silver brazed pipe now we have this revelation from Bruce Rule that it was a "line instability in the starboard electrical bus" that caused the reactor to scram just when they needed it most.
The reactor can produce power LONG after the reactor is scrammed. (See Fukushima meltdown). The casualty procedures called for the steam stops to be shut as part of the scram resulting in a loss of power to the screw. That procedure was changed as a result of the investigation into the loss of the Thresher.
I have to say.......... I am glad the Apollo program had different managers.......... although they did lose Apollo 1 in the fire, sadly.
I served on Permit class boats USS Gato SSN 615 OMG I Cannotimaging what my fellow submariners went through
I served in the Army. I would not want to crew a sub, Pete.
I've read Polmar's "Thresher" book. It is interesting however you are not going to learn any astounding information nor the actual cause of the disaster - no one knows that. Again the book is pedestrian but a quick and informative read.
How often does the Navy inspect the wreckage?
I don't buy that they didn't take on water.
However I do understand what he's saying.
Captain reported "minor difficulty." Taking on ANY water at test depth would not have been described as minor - restarting the reactor MIGHT have been.
@@johngordonmeade361 Not to mention the lack of flooding on Skylark and Sosus acoustic data collected.
@@johngordonmeade361 Nonsense!
You Never do a Test depth dive Out of Trim or Heavy. From what I read She was Extremely Heavy aft.
John// Noting is Minor at Test Depth. a Reactor scram and Heavy, and No MBT Blow......Your Dead just don't know it yet.
God bless the men and there families of the USS Thresher!
This guy missed the point. It could not blow ballast due to the mix of old and new designs of the pressure and orifice sizes. The screen the high air pressure had to go through got so cold, it iced over. Once the screen iced over, the ship could not blow ballast and thus could not emergency surface. The reactor shutdown functioned as it should, thus no propulsion. But, the blowing of the ballast system did not work properly. This killed them.
If it wasn't water intrusion, why was it sinking?
Термоклин словила на скорости и по нему кинуло на глубину(раздавило). Меня однажды на испытании биротального подводного средства доставки на 13 узлах кинуло с 80метров на 193! я думал сдох фонари раздавило и кровь думал вскепит при подъёме, ан нет около 13 минут без сознания и добавил азота в ребризор,.Аппарат, увы потерян((
Scorpion?
Why would you allow a sub to be at NEGATIVE BUOYANCY at such dangerous depths ? Begging for a problem to occur ! Have to maintain propulsion just to keep from sinking ! WHY ? A BAD and FATAL FLAW in the operation of a sub !
The Russians didn't sink the Scorpion, the US Navy Dept. sank it
wait.. a reactor scram does not make a su b heavy.. and nthey wont go to test depth heavy.. they will go ilight and fly down to that depth.. so losing power wont cause you to sink FLOODING WILL.
Have you read the declassified reports on this event? 37 Pings. There were people alive on the Thresher for at least a day. She sent out 37 main sonar pings. She had power.
Thank you.....Sir, Finally the truth after ....many to long years..... I am Submarine qualified..1971 thru 1975 Only Disagreement is your definition of Test depth and designed Depth Design Depth is the max do not exceed.. Look up Max strength of X (HY 80 ) How many can PSI MAX OP DEPTH AND DESIGN depth,... divided by 44 PSI of steel made of depth per 100 feet. you have you answer.You forgot The air under pressure is reduced per 100 feet. Now you know why we Always try to trim light at any depth..... Need to fight to keep her down.... , Once you have an upper trim you our going up , Then you fight to keep Her down Dive your Depth XXXX Boat .5 or 1 degree down bubble.
Mr. Polmar’s theory doesn’t quite add up in my opinion. He seems to think the Thresher was lost because the crew had done such a poor job maintaining neutral buoyancy that the test dive was unrecoverable once the reactor SCRAMmed and the crew were unable to blow main ballast. He doesn’t include the possibility of flooding and/or shorting of the electric buses, even though the poor reliability of the silver braze joints is well known. I think the theory of the sinking advanced by James Bryant, Captain. USN, retired, is much more plausible.
Mr.Polar : need to revise your dissertation on THRESHER with the vid & book ; "37 PINGS "
Annoying speaker. These men deserved more respect. He said that he put the presentation together in a restaurant a few hours earlier. It shows..
He probably was just trying to be funny and made the audience more relaxed. He failed as a comedian to be funny, but nevertheless a good speaker on the subject matter of the sinking of a high tech submarine.
I interpreted it differently than you when he said that "I put the presentation together in a restaurant a few hours earlier." I think what Norman was trying to say is that "I put together all these abundant of information is a very short period of time in a short moment of notice for such a complex subject matter." Simply put, he was trying to show off his vast knowledge to impress the audience.
No. it does not show, I'm sure you would have done a better job, you are a fool if you think that presentation was put together in a restaurant.
I wish these people would pronounce mariner and submariner correctly.
This guy makes the usual mistake and that is pronouncing the word so that the marine part sounds like the word marine in 'marine life' (so, pronounced mar eene).
The correct pronunciation is sub - mar in - er, pronounced as it is broken down: 'in', instead of 'eene'.
how the hell does a scram sink a submarine? your NUTS!
With the new document dump on the Thresher this lecture is a lie, WTG!!
SubBrief Video?
Great story telling, very detailed and entertaining. Sucks that old / sick people go to these as the hacking, coughing, sneezing, ear picking and whatnot kills the atmosphere. Sit still, stop figiting and making noise...otherwise great job sir!
no credit
I found his flippant tone most inappropriate.
I found his reference to the Russian subs to be inaccurate and perhaps slanted because of his time spent with them in Russia.
What is the purpose of going down to 1,800 feet? Crush depth 2,700 feet. If there is a problem at 1,800 feet, not much time or chance to rise safely. Also, rescue vehicle could only go to 800 feet. Submarines should not go below the depth of what an outside vehicle can go down and rescue them. If the submarine had gone to 1,800 feet 40 times, why keep going there and pressing your luck? Metal fatigues after being flexed so many times. Trying to blow, twisting small pipes, iced over screens. Couldn’t the design engineers have thought of this before risking men’s lives like this? As with aircraft design, I am glad we have modern computers now able to make many more calculations. Better manufacturing processing. Simulation environments, before risking human lives. Why not do initial tests with remote control, without humans on board! Way too dangerous a profession. Brave men.
I'm a submariner and I assure you "flippant" is far and away our primary tone. (c.f. The Submarine Song.) We're the last people on or under the sea to come over all pious. If Polmar, not a submariner, is >this< flippant, he gets a pass for fitting in as well as he does. I hope you get some day to meet and chat with Norman Polmar. He's an engaging, knowledgeable, and enjoyable fellow.
@@thomaspick4123 You're a total moron.
@@consubandon .... with zero operating experience and a vivid imagination!
37 Pings. This is not what happened to the USS Thresher. There were people alive on the Thresher. She didn't crush.
SO why was the crushing recorded a Day prior? Stop following random YOutubers...
@@TheLocomotionFan EXACTLY! Thank you.
losing propulsion does not sink a submarine.. your nuts flooding sinks a submarine.
Listen to what he said. The reactor scrammed - propulsion and everything else is lost - emergency battery only. Limited power. There are so many things that could have gone wrong - but if there was an electrical bus failure which caused a short to ground on a floating bus you have to sort the issue *before* restarting the reactor(s) - try to restart the reactor and it'll scram itself. A loss of propulsion won't *sink* the boat, but it'll make it much harder and slower to surface. If a valve opens when it shouldn't or fails... I think it was the British Navy almost? lost a sub when an inspection cock on a torpedo tube had been painted over - crewmen thought the tube was dry - it was open to sea and the silly bastards opened the loading hatch.
Then you had high test peroxide torpedoes.
Someone else has mentioned weld failures - going deep is *cold* welded joints don't like temperature changes. Electrics aren't keen.
Personally I suspect a submarine version of fatigue - like with the comet airliner - she'd done multiple deep runs, had been topside for a long time and *first* deep dive something failed. "trying to blow" might not mean she couldn't - it might mean that an EB wasn't enough - because water was inside. Too much negative buoyancy and it wouldn't have to be a massive leak - leaking into bilges slowly would be enough and might have eventually triggered a reactor scram. If she didn't have a auxiliary propulsion system or the batteries couldn't be cross linked because of a major bus issue... No propulsion - no flow over the planes (which is what controls depth) no counter to negative buoyancy from engine power and no recovery.
All conjecture of course.
shoddy workmanship or quality conrol sunk the thresher
the design must have been good (other than redundancy) because the darn thing did 40 test dives previously.
Norman seems very enamored with the way Russians build submarines.
Let's take a look.
Mmmmm
United States was the first with new technology and consistently held an edge over the Soviet Union despite always being out numbered.
Mmmmm
What about safety?
Hundreds of Soviet sailors dead from radiation.
Numerous major reactor accidents.
And the Soviets losing about twice as many nuclear subs and 2 to 3 times as many diesel subs.
Tell ya what Norman
You stick with the Solviet way of doing things & I'll stick with the American way of doing things.
Soviet Union (or even Russia today) probably cares less about loss of human life in exchange for rapid technology development to achieve victory in the cold war. As you probably know, the casualties of the soviet union arm forces during WW2 was much higher than the German counterpart (3 times higher?) because the life of soviet soldiers were not valued as much as the western countries do as long as they can achieve victory at the end.
LISTEN TO WHAT HE SAID AND NOT WHAT YOU THINK HE SAID.
@@jimclark6256 I did not put words in his mouth. He talked about Soviets looking at submarines as one complete system, and he was pretty impressed by that. The shielding, particularly on early Soviet nuke boats, is only a fraction of what it is on United States boats. Which explains the radiation health problems of Solviet submariners that American submariners did not have.
I'm not a "fan" of submarines, my daddy did not serve on submarines. I am a submariner. I have been through construction of a submarine, I have studied submarines for half a century, I spent a decade going to sea on them. I was crew on two and went to sea on 4 others for a patrol, and I have been onboard the submarines of three other nations.
He also said our submarine rescue is third rate. No it is not. The submarine rescue capacity of the United States Navy is the best in the world. The problem with submarine rescue is over 90% of the ocean floor is thousands of feet below the crush depth of navy submarines.
There are several things he said that were not quite correct.
You need to stop being a groupie and just taking as fact everything anyone says from a podium.
The problem with Soviet (and presumably Russian Federation) submarines is not the design, but rather super shady manufacturing, lack of maintenance and a conscript navy. Doesn't matter how good you design a submarine if it's going to be manufactured poorly, not maintained and run by inexperienced crew.
@@pjeng1 Then why Soviet/Russian designs have escape bezels that can hold the entire crew?
classified...early Soviet scaler wave quantum electromagnetic eletronic component toaster. Or should i say Friar (fryer)like a Catholic. The timing is your clue. And it probably wasn't a little fuse. More likely a mother board. Zapped by an embarassed kruschev. Recently the same technology was used on Malaysia MH 370 and either reciprocated or again used on the recent EgyptAir flight 804. Your clue? Both pulses were sent at the exact moment when there was an aircraft controller country swap. Right at the no-mans land when the originating country passes tracking to the landing country. Why? look at the passenger list on MH 370. Look at the passenger ethnicity, the country who is looking to pay egypt back and look at the number of people. Essentially two superpowers paying back a group of Europeans and Egypt.