So in the rawls lottery ticket example would a better hypothetical be "what would you do if you knew the ticket was a winner but you didn't know if you were going to be Huemer or Rawls?"
It is funny Richard says you can tweek utilitarianism or general welfarism by constraining it to accommodate moral dessert. That would not be a minor tweek at all. A society based on utilitarianism for example would be much different from a society based on utilitarianism plus moral dessert.
Quality discussion! I just wondered about a thought experiment. Lets say 5 people want to kill one person P. P has a gun and could defend himself with it (let's say the 5 can only be stopped by being shot). Would consequentialism imply that P should not defend himself, because 5 persons dead is worse than 1?
The consequences of actions are very hard to determine. Sometimes it is easier to ask what world (or society) would be better. A world where someone would not defend himself when being assaulted from different individuals, or one where someone does. Given the human nature, i think it's better (better consequences) if people defend themself.
I'm more than 15 minutes in and the sound of the clicks is really annoying. Also, the moderator is obviously doing something else instead of following the discussion, which isn't cool and quite distracting. For similar future events, it is better to mute the ones who aren't speaking.
I was following the discussion. Muting isn't practical during the open conversation. I was occasionally reading messages that people were sending me for questions, hence, it may have seemed like I wasn't/
Fair enough regarding the messages. But why do you think it isn’t practical to mute while the other person is speaking? This practice is the norm in professional online meetings to avoid unnecessary distractions (unless it is an interactive discussion between 2 people). It takes just a click to unmute once the speaker finishes his part.
I don't really understand the hoping that you would push the fat man thing. When I first read Huemer's thoughts on that in "Knowledge Reality and Value," I kind of understood what he was saying. However, I quickly realized that no, I should hope he doesn't push the fat man because it would be wrong to do it. If it were, e.g., a family member on the track, then yeah it would make sense for me to hope that he did it. But in general, no.
But if it's killing 1 to prevent 5 killings then a perfectly moral impartial observer should hope for killing one, because from their standpoint 1 killing to save 5 is less bad than or equal to 1 indiscriminate killing which is less bad than 5 killings.
@@deliberationunderidealcond5105 Sure. Pushing one fat man off to save 5 people is less bad than: - Pushing the fat man off, killing him, and saving no one as there is no one tied to the track. Which is less bad than: - Shooting all 5 of the people tied to the track with no trolley coming. And we should hope that the person does the first rather than the others if only given those choices. As in, imagine the whole universe explodes if they don't do one of those things. Then we should hope he does the first thing. But it doesn't follow that if we add this option, we shouldn't hope that he picks this one instead: - Not pushing the fat man off and letting the 5 people die. This is the correct decision because it would be the correct decision for you. Imagine you were the person standing behind the fat man. It would be wrong for you to do it. Therefore, it seems wrong to "hope" that someone else does it. The only exception would seem to be if it's your family members tied to the track or something like that. Then it would make sense to hope that they would push the fat man off even if it would be ultimately wrong of them.
@@SolarxPvP You're missing the point of the scenario described. If you accept that A) A third party observer should find 1 murder to save 5 as less bad or equally bad to 1 indiscriminate murder B) A third party observer should prefer 1 indiscriminate murder to 5 indiscriminate murders. then you'd have to accept the following C) A third party observer would find one murder to save five preferrable to five murders. IF that's true then D) A third party observer would hope you would murder 1 to prevent 5 other murders.
@@deliberationunderidealcond5105 (A) Yes (B) Yes (C) Yes (D) Doesn't follow if the person behind the bridge isn't murdering the people on the tracks. Killing vs. letting die.
@@SolarxPvP D does follow. If the third party observer would prefer one murder to five murders, then they'd prefer a world in which a person committed one murder to prevent 5 to another one in which they didn't.
@@deliberationunderidealcond5105 If a participant in a competition thought his opponent would gain more than he would by winning, he should lose on purpose. An army shouldn't kill 5 enemy soldiers to save 1 of its own.
@@tomrobertson6747 Do you think there would be more joy in the world if people threw games whenever they thought their opponent would like winning marginally more?
@@deliberationunderidealcond5105 I assume not. If everyone always did it and it was common knowledge, spectators would know the competition wasn't real and the wins would be artificial. Maybe there's a qualitative moral difference between that and one person doing it once without anyone else knowing about it.
"the hypothetical contract is not worth the paper it is not written on" lmao
Im now way more unsure about what i should base my morals on than i was before
Brilliant and insightful example at 29:00
I am starting to feel this wasn't such a "famous" debate after all, but looks quite interesting nonetheless. Good call.
So in the rawls lottery ticket example would a better hypothetical be "what would you do if you knew the ticket was a winner but you didn't know if you were going to be Huemer or Rawls?"
It is funny Richard says you can tweek utilitarianism or general welfarism by constraining it to accommodate moral dessert. That would not be a minor tweek at all. A society based on utilitarianism for example would be much different from a society based on utilitarianism plus moral dessert.
It is still a minor tweak of the theory, the consequences of the theory if practiced bear no relevance on how simple a minor a tweak it is.
Quality discussion!
I just wondered about a thought experiment. Lets say 5 people want to kill one person P. P has a gun and could defend himself with it (let's say the 5 can only be stopped by being shot). Would consequentialism imply that P should not defend himself, because 5 persons dead is worse than 1?
The consequences of actions are very hard to determine. Sometimes it is easier to ask what world (or society) would be better. A world where someone would not defend himself when being assaulted from different individuals, or one where someone does. Given the human nature, i think it's better (better consequences) if people defend themself.
yes
@@joshridinger3407 You agree that P should not defend himself?
@@ovrava I had a similar thought with regard to the organ donor thought experiment.
@@purikurix i would if i were a strict well-being maximizing consequentialist. but i'm not.
right to life is not right not to be killed, it's right not to be MURDERED
I'm more than 15 minutes in and the sound of the clicks is really annoying. Also, the moderator is obviously doing something else instead of following the discussion, which isn't cool and quite distracting.
For similar future events, it is better to mute the ones who aren't speaking.
I was following the discussion. Muting isn't practical during the open conversation.
I was occasionally reading messages that people were sending me for questions, hence, it may have seemed like I wasn't/
Fair enough regarding the messages. But why do you think it isn’t practical to mute while the other person is speaking?
This practice is the norm in professional online meetings to avoid unnecessary distractions (unless it is an interactive discussion between 2 people). It takes just a click to unmute once the speaker finishes his part.
I don't really understand the hoping that you would push the fat man thing. When I first read Huemer's thoughts on that in "Knowledge Reality and Value," I kind of understood what he was saying. However, I quickly realized that no, I should hope he doesn't push the fat man because it would be wrong to do it. If it were, e.g., a family member on the track, then yeah it would make sense for me to hope that he did it. But in general, no.
But if it's killing 1 to prevent 5 killings then a perfectly moral impartial observer should hope for killing one, because from their standpoint
1 killing to save 5 is less bad than or equal to 1 indiscriminate killing which is less bad than 5 killings.
@@deliberationunderidealcond5105 Sure.
Pushing one fat man off to save 5 people is less bad than:
- Pushing the fat man off, killing him, and saving no one as there is no one tied to the track.
Which is less bad than:
- Shooting all 5 of the people tied to the track with no trolley coming.
And we should hope that the person does the first rather than the others if only given those choices. As in, imagine the whole universe explodes if they don't do one of those things. Then we should hope he does the first thing. But it doesn't follow that if we add this option, we shouldn't hope that he picks this one instead:
- Not pushing the fat man off and letting the 5 people die.
This is the correct decision because it would be the correct decision for you. Imagine you were the person standing behind the fat man. It would be wrong for you to do it. Therefore, it seems wrong to "hope" that someone else does it. The only exception would seem to be if it's your family members tied to the track or something like that. Then it would make sense to hope that they would push the fat man off even if it would be ultimately wrong of them.
@@SolarxPvP You're missing the point of the scenario described. If you accept that
A) A third party observer should find 1 murder to save 5 as less bad or equally bad to 1 indiscriminate murder
B) A third party observer should prefer 1 indiscriminate murder to 5 indiscriminate murders.
then you'd have to accept the following
C) A third party observer would find one murder to save five preferrable to five murders.
IF that's true then
D) A third party observer would hope you would murder 1 to prevent 5 other murders.
@@deliberationunderidealcond5105
(A) Yes
(B) Yes
(C) Yes
(D) Doesn't follow if the person behind the bridge isn't murdering the people on the tracks. Killing vs. letting die.
@@SolarxPvP D does follow. If the third party observer would prefer one murder to five murders, then they'd prefer a world in which a person committed one murder to prevent 5 to another one in which they didn't.
Neither the critic nor the defender does a very good job, I'm afraid.
Neither is your "critique"
A utilitarian has to say that all forms of competition are bad.
Why?
@@deliberationunderidealcond5105 If a participant in a competition thought his opponent would gain more than he would by winning, he should lose on purpose. An army shouldn't kill 5 enemy soldiers to save 1 of its own.
@@tomrobertson6747 Do you think there would be more joy in the world if people threw games whenever they thought their opponent would like winning marginally more?
@@deliberationunderidealcond5105 I assume not. If everyone always did it and it was common knowledge, spectators would know the competition wasn't real and the wins would be artificial. Maybe there's a qualitative moral difference between that and one person doing it once without anyone else knowing about it.
@@tomrobertson6747 So then utilitarianism wouldn't endorse it!
please get yourself a good microphone : (
The fact that Richard Y. Chappel has a PhD means that absolutely everyone, including pets and small forest creatures, is entitled to a PhD.
This is ridiculous. Richard is crazily smart and quite accomplished.
lmao how could you possibly imply this guy is dumb. I watched the video after reading this comment expecting him to be stupid but he was super smart.
@@crab6084 Same here, I thoroughly enjoyed his arguments!