Brilliant! Thanks for posting this riveting talk. Professor Andrew Lambert draws together individual elements of history that we thought we knew well and rewrites them into new and broadly encompassing perspectives that shed light on grand strategy, military blunders and pierce the fog of war and history.
So the Brits could prepare their own poison gas quite readily in 1915 because they'd planned for it but using u-boats as effective weapons against merchant shipping is something they couldn't account for because it was technically a war crime? I think the admiralty failed on this one and Dr. Lambert is giving it too much credit
Very interesting. I have studied the Dardanelles operation, its conception and execution. Mr Lambert has provided key background info into the origins of strategic failure in the British high command. Thanks.
Why was Helligoland Island, considered of no strategic use for the Navy and exchanged with the Germans? The entente cordialle contributed to the British mindset that the French were somehow our allies that had to be supported against the Germans.
I really fail to see how this plan doesn't result in disaster by around 1916 during the Battle of Verdun. Without the major commitment to a large British Army in Flanders, France would be defeated by around that time, assuming they even last that long.
France could've just retreated from Verdun given it's lack of major strategic importance. Also, While France may have lost the war, it may have lost it at a lesser cost than it paid to win it in the long run.
@@joeblow9657 The attack may not even be coming via Verdun, or if so….then would be joined by other attacks further west. Point is France would be overwhelmed by 1916. Well France would lose an awful lot; from crushing indemnities (probably would be the equivalent to paying for another year of war), to losing all the coal & iron ore in the northern regions, to being subsumed into a German economic scheme for the continent, etc. I mean the German plans for France, at least in the September Memorandum, we’re quite dire, they wanted to ensure France would never rise again.
@@sitskrieg317 Good question.... LOL I see your point. I'd just say let's redefine it as a a nice to have place rather than a militarily or politically important place and just do whatever. IDK You bring up a good point.
"...the escapist British refusal in the 1930s to accept the obvious lesson of the Great War that the security of France and the Low Countries depended on there being a powerful British army on the Western Front"- Corelli Barnett, _The Collapse of British Power_ I think you're right, and this refusal to acknowledge the lessons of the Great War continues in modified forms to this very day
@@gandydancer9710 You’re aware it was the BEF that was the force in between the gap of the German 1st and 2nd Army?? It was literally the BEF that forced the retreat.
@@Cotswolds1913 LOL! The French Fifth Army has somehow disappeared from your account of the battle, which is typical of Brit-centric historiography. See, e.g., Waterloo. Anyway, there were 64 French divisions and 6 British divisions involved in 1st Marne. Had the BEF not been there there would have been French units posted to its position and those would have been additional units sent into the gap. Or the relevant elements of the 5A could have sufficed. The outcome was not sensitive to such minor adjustments.
@@gandydancer9710 Most of the French 5th Army is not in the gap, but facing the German 2nd Army. They had like a single corps in the gap if I remember right.
@@Cotswolds1913 You're not taking in my point. Had the BEF not been in France the arrangement of French divisions would have been different and the forces available to push into the gap would have been different. But when von Kluck's overestimation of the disarray of the French forces resulted in the opportunity it would still have been taken advantage of because the French (and not the British) recognized it. And, again, the part of the line supposedly defended by the Brits would have been assigned to SOMEone French in the counter-historical scenario. Maybe just forces they hadn't wasted on the Battle of the Frontiers because of the need to cover the absence of the BEF.
Britain accepted naval parity with the US at the Washington naval conference meant the end of any pretense of British naval "supremacy" (by definition there ain't no "supremacy" when you have an equal), one can argue that way before that, it's already implicitly over when US Congress decided to fund a navy "second to none" cuz the US could outbuild post-WWI British Empire easily, that's why everyone got essentially summoned to washington to accept a treaty limiting their own navies.
IN MY OPINION THOUGH THE DEMISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE ARE MANY AND VARIED IF THERE IS ONE MAN WHO WEAKENED THE EMPIRE IT IS CHURCHILL GALLIPOLI CRETE SINGAPORE ARAKAN NEED I SAY MORE
Oh my god, this is so interesting and so very Naval-head-fart. Its always telling when somebody writes a "if only they'd done this but they were morons". Seven Years War? Yes Britain won, but that's also because it lucked out with the Miracle of the House of Hohenzollern (i.e. Russian Tsarina dies, new Tsar is Prussia Fanboy) ending the ground war on favourable terms. Britain loses great power wars without a Continental strategy based on coalition building see American war of Independence. In WW1 that meant above all backing the French on the ground, and naval outmaneuvers don't work if your enemy has internal lines of communication. D-day worked because air superiority pins Germany daylight mobility, the Americans provide a plurality of ground forces and 80% plus of Germany forces are stuck in the East. That's not true in 1914-1918. Also a Balkans strategy could work because it did, Salonica takes Bulgaria out with Ottomans and Austria not far behind and Ludendorff gives up because he knows that means no more Romanian oil.
So much certainty, yet so many assumptions on how, and why in your post... "Yes Britain won, but that's also because it lucked out with the Miracle of the House of Hohenzollern"... Russia was not in a place where it could effectively change British goals, that "miracle" is a Prussian Miracle, because it means Prussia is not wiped out, but had it happened Great Britain would have been in a position to continue the war, it might have been called the 8 years war, or the 9 years war instead, but the overall result was pretty much done due to British grand strategy (partly because no one else really had a cohesive strategy for anywhere outside of Europe). "Britain loses great power wars without a Continental strategy based on coalition" but a coalition strategy does not demand big British armies, the Napoleon wars sees only one kinda small British army operating in Spain for most of the time, and small raiding forces in the Mediterranean Sea. The Crimean war equally sees a somewhat small British army on the Crimean front, while British naval units operate in the Black Sea, the Baltic and the Pacific... In fact what is talked about is closer to how Britain has conducted war-operations close to 150 years at that point, than what you so certain claims is the only way to win. "In WW1 that meant above all backing the French on the ground"... Britain does not contribute in any meaningful way to the ground war until mid 1916... In that Had the naval option been adopted in start 1915, The British would have been able to start operations in the Baltic, around the same time the Somme happened. France really needed to conduct its war a little more careful, but they were certainly in a position to do so, even in 1918 where the British have the largest army in British history, France still outnumber the British in the number of Armies, Divisions and so on. "naval outmaneuvers don't work if your enemy has internal lines of communication"... That is because you are thinking in terms of army goals (take ground, destroy the enemy army and so on), but that is not how naval warfare work. Naval warfare is mostly about hitting your enemy in the economy. No nation is selfsufficient in materials and in the case of Germany, iron/steel, food, Horses and chemicals was brought in from Scandinavia, mainly Sweden, and all of that trade was done by ship... If a British fleet is in the area, it can blockade German trade, the same way it blockaded trade from Germany from the rest of the world... If you don't think that is significant, then you need to read up on how a war economy works. "Also a Balkans strategy could work because it did, Salonica takes Bulgaria out with Ottomans and Austria not far behind and Ludendorff gives up because he knows that means no more Romanian oil." You are putting in way too much in Salonica... Sure Bulgaria was knocked out because of it, but lets not pretend that Bulgaria was great and important part of the overall war. Austria is as much knocked out of Salonica, as it is by the Russian offensives in 1916, and political turmoil in the empire, due to all the number nationalities that wants to go indepentent. The Ottomans equally has so many problems that putting it down to Salonica is a bit of a stretch, and again, neither Austria or the Ottomans are the main power. As for Ludendorff giving up over Oil... WW1 is not WW2, oil is a strategic resource, but not in any way as important as it becomes in WW2. Ludendorff does not give up when he sees that he no longer can get oil, he breaks down because Germany at this point is starving, the German army is defeated in the field and German war production is falling apart due to lack of skilled workers, lack of materials and so on... And the lack of material is what the Baltic strategy would have hit... The German army is far less of a problem, when it cannot shoot enough shells with its artilleri due to a lack of shells, guns and tactical mobility (horses).
Operation Overlord was primarily a British operation, with the British commanding all the ground, sea and air forces. The Battle of Normandy was primarily a British planned and led campaign with the British providing the majority of the troops and ships. The Royal Navy had overall responsibility for Operation Neptune, the naval plan. Of the 1,213 warships involved, 200 were American and 892 were British; of the 4,126 landing craft involved, 805 were American and 3,261 were British. 31% of all U.S. supplies used during D-Day came directly from Britain, while two-thirds of the 12,000 aircraft involved were also British, as were two-thirds of those that landed in occupied France. The British Empire and Commonwealth provided the most troops and the US didn’t have the most overall troops in France until after the Battle of Normandy had been decided. Eisenhower’s appointment was purely political. No one would put such an inexperienced man in charge of all ground forces. Monty was in command of *all* ground forces and was the architect of the 5 beach invasion plan and the overall strategy of the Normandy day campaign. Not only did Monty replan and serve as Allied Ground Forces Commander for Overlord, the largest seaborne born invasion in history, he also replanned the Alllied invasion of Sicily, the largest seaborne invasion in history before that. The plan Overlord by Frederick Morgan was revised by Montgomery, like the original plan for the invasion of Sicily. Both would have led to complete disaster before Monty’s revision. This is something a lot of people don’t seem to be aware of. Monty was the one that made the Overlord plan what it was. The plan was originally just 3 divisions and army Corp landing on some beaches together. He changed the plan from 3 to 5 beaches and from 3 divisions to 8 correctly arguing that 3 beachheads would’ve been too narrow a front and such an attack could be easily rolled up on both flanks. And instead of one airborne division, it should be 3 airborne divisions to assist while each army corp of the British and Americans should have their own beaches to ease organization. And he emphasized Cherbourg as the key. The Allies prevailed in Normandy using Monty’s invasion plan and his ground strategy. On Normandy: _”That the COSSAC plan for a 3-divisional assault in ‘Overlord’ was a recipe for disaster now seems undeniable. Had Alexander been appointed to command the land forces in the invasion, would Morgan’s COSSAC plan have been enacted? Monty was not alone in recognizing its flaws, as will be seen, but he was alone in having the courage and conviction to see that it was thrown out and a better plan adopted. He had done so at Alam Halfa, he had done so gain over ‘Husky’ and whatever mud was slung at him, he was determined that he would do so over ‘Overlord’. For Morgan’s ‘Overlord’ plan, the result of one and a half years of research and discussions, had no prospect of succeeding, as Morgan’s planners themselves confessed…_ _....and by presenting such a clearly defined strategic plan for the battle there can be no doubt that Monty brought to his Allied land, sea and air forces a unity of purpose and conception that was remarkable - and often confused later with Eisenhower’s role as Supreme Commander.”_ -Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. *In the summer of 1944 60% of German tank strength was in France.* Caen had more German tanks per mile than Kursk. In just a few miles 8 Panzer divisions in a very small area of front. *Caen had the highest concentration density of German tanks ever seen in WW2.* These were pitted against British and Canadian armour. At Kursk the Panzer divisions were spread out over a much wider area and were not concentrated as densely as around Caen. At Kursk the Germans were attacking over a near 50 mile front. There were EIGHT Panzer Divisors in the Caen area by the end of June 1944 and FIVE lines of anti tank-guns. The Germans kept sending more and more Panzer divisions around the Caen area as June went on and into July. These were the Panzer divisions deployed to the Caen area: ♦ 21st Panzer Division (117 Panzer IVs) ♦ Panzer Lehr Division (101 Panzer IVs, 89 Panthers) ♦ 2nd Panzer Division (89 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers) ♦ 116th Panzer Division (73 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers). In reserve just behind the front ♦ 1st SS Panzer Division (98 Panzer IVs, 79 panthers) ♦ 9th SS Panzer Division (40 Stugs, 46 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers) ♦ 10th SS Panzer Division (38 Stugs, 29 Panzer IVs) ♦ 12th SS Panzer Division (38 Stugs, 29 Panzer IVs) ♦ Tiger Battalion SS101 (45 Tigers) ♦ Tiger Battalion SS102 (45 Tigers) ♦ Tiger Battalion 503 (45 Tigers) Source: Bernages Panzers and the Battle for Normandy and Zetterling’s Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness. And at Kursk there were still battalions of Panzer IIIs with 50mm guns in the Panzer divisions. In Normandy all the tanks, tanks destroyers and assault guns all had at least 75mm L/48 guns. Only two battalions of Panthers at Kursk. The British and Canadians took on and destroyed the bulk of the German armour. Montgomery, having control of all armies gave the US forces an infantry role. The Americans who were not equipped or experienced to face massed German armour,were given primarily an infantry role by Montgomery- the Americans met very little armour in WW2. The US forces didn’t face any German armour until June 13th, and that was only a mere battalion of assault guns. *The British destroyed about 90% of German armour in the west overall.* The Allies prevailed in Normandy using Monty’s invasion plan and his ground strategy. This was a great success. Montgomery had envisioned a 90 day battle with all forces reaching the Seine. He emphasized Cherbourg, making it clear that the British would hold as many German divisions as possible in Caen or it’s outskirts while the Americans take Cherbourg and go south to break the front without any German Panzer divisions nearby. Result? Exactly that. It happened ahead of schedule and with 22% less casualties than predicted. _Not even Stalingrad could match the strategic scale of the German defeat in Normandy……._ _....By containing the bulk of the enemy armour and best infantry opposite Dempsey, and giving Bradley time and space to bring the greater numerical strength of the American divisions into battle on the western flank, Monty had out-generalled von Rundstedt, Rommel, Hausser and von Kluge who, limited by the edicts of Hitler, had insufficient strength to defend British, American and Pas de Calais sectors in equal strength. Compared with Hitler’s conduct, the impatience of Eisenhower, Tedder and Churchill had proved merely tiresome to the Ground Forces Commander, and had not affected the course of the battle. Montgomery’s victory was, without doubt in even Hitler’s mind, the decisive battle of the war: ‘the worst day of my life,’ as Hitler remarked on 15 August 1944 as the true dimensions of the catastrophe in Normandy became apparent._ -Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. In Normandy the Allies captured twice the number of troops taken by the Russians at Stalingrad, and all were German. Of the 2,500 German armoured fighting vehicles thrown into Normandy, barely two dozen escaped. Two armies were annihilated: by any reckoning a stunning victory. D-Day plus 90 was 4 September 1944. Monty said Paris would be liberated on D-day plus 90. It was liberated on D-Day plus 80. General Miles Dempsey took Brussels, 183 miles from Caen, on D-Day plus 89. Dempsey took Antwerp, 253 miles from Caen, on D-Day plus 90. In the words of an American author, Ike & Monty: Generals at War, 1994, Norman Gelb: _”By holding on the left and breaking out on the right, Montgomery had produced a triumph.“_
@@johnpeate4544 Wow, what a wall of text defending an off-topic crap claim. No, Overlord and Normandy were overwhelmingly an American operation. The British operation was Dieppe. The difference in scale and success was Made in the USA.
@@MrBandholm Your premise of Baltic success is absurd. British surface units committed there would be sunk if they offered battle to the entire High Seas Fleet (available through the Kiel Canal) and any expeditionary force on the Continent would be exterminated by the far larger German army made available simply by going on defense-only temporarily against the French. The idea that Britain would attempt such a folly is the only remotely plausible justification I've ever seen for Germany's otherwise-useless naval program.
@@gandydancer9710 Err no. Ground forces commander: Montgomery Air commander: Leigh-Mallory Naval commander: Ramsay. Originally Morgan’s plan and Monty rewrote the plan for D-Day and it was Monty’s brilliantly successful plan for Normandy, coming in ahead of schedule and with less casualties than predicted. Now calm down and pick up your pacifier.
Lambert is always worth listening to if you want to learn how things really worked. Excellent broadcast. Thanks for posting.
Andrew Lambert, absolutely shines. Fascinating, and compelling..
Brilliant! Thanks for posting this riveting talk. Professor Andrew Lambert draws together individual elements of history that we thought we knew well and rewrites them into new and broadly encompassing perspectives that shed light on grand strategy, military blunders and pierce the fog of war and history.
So the Brits could prepare their own poison gas quite readily in 1915 because they'd planned for it but using u-boats as effective weapons against merchant shipping is something they couldn't account for because it was technically a war crime? I think the admiralty failed on this one and Dr. Lambert is giving it too much credit
Professor Lambert is always a treat to listen to. If this plan were to go ahead, it's possible that my country (USA) is not part of WW1.
Very interesting. I have studied the Dardanelles operation, its conception and execution. Mr Lambert has provided key background info into the origins of strategic failure in the British high command. Thanks.
Professor Lambert.
@@mycroft1905 Why do you imagine anyone is obliged to use that title?
Hey Nathan, haven't seen anything new from u lately. R u still doing utube?
K23 would have made a hell of a riverboat home. Were any of them converted after the war?
Excellent talk.
22:15 where was he in 1918 when Germany invaded British Africa ?
Brilliant
Andrew is always worth listening to....and refreshingly controversial
Always refreshingly controversial or just particularly this lecture? He seems controversial here from the comment below.
@@NathanWatsonzero anything other than Churchill is a sainted genius is controversial.
11:20 I knew it was him not because I have any history smart but because It was a bad idea
Why was Helligoland Island, considered of no strategic use for the Navy and exchanged with the Germans? The entente cordialle contributed to the British mindset that the French were somehow our allies that had to be supported against the Germans.
Prob because it was traded for African colonial rights in the 1880s, before any German naval build up
I really fail to see how this plan doesn't result in disaster by around 1916 during the Battle of Verdun. Without the major commitment to a large British Army in Flanders, France would be defeated by around that time, assuming they even last that long.
France could've just retreated from Verdun given it's lack of major strategic importance. Also, While France may have lost the war, it may have lost it at a lesser cost than it paid to win it in the long run.
@@joeblow9657 The attack may not even be coming via Verdun, or if so….then would be joined by other attacks further west. Point is France would be overwhelmed by 1916.
Well France would lose an awful lot; from crushing indemnities (probably would be the equivalent to paying for another year of war), to losing all the coal & iron ore in the northern regions, to being subsumed into a German economic scheme for the continent, etc. I mean the German plans for France, at least in the September Memorandum, we’re quite dire, they wanted to ensure France would never rise again.
@@joeblow9657 That sounds cool in theory how the hell would you convince France to retreat though
@@sitskrieg317 Good question.... LOL I see your point. I'd just say let's redefine it as a a nice to have place rather than a militarily or politically important place and just do whatever. IDK You bring up a good point.
"...the escapist British refusal in the 1930s to accept the obvious lesson of the Great War that the security of France and the Low Countries depended on there being a powerful British army on the Western Front"- Corelli Barnett, _The Collapse of British Power_
I think you're right, and this refusal to acknowledge the lessons of the Great War continues in modified forms to this very day
And the British did absolutely make a difference at the Marne.
They had no significant effect on the outcome.
@@gandydancer9710 You’re aware it was the BEF that was the force in between the gap of the German 1st and 2nd Army?? It was literally the BEF that forced the retreat.
@@Cotswolds1913 LOL! The French Fifth Army has somehow disappeared from your account of the battle, which is typical of Brit-centric historiography. See, e.g., Waterloo. Anyway, there were 64 French divisions and 6 British divisions involved in 1st Marne. Had the BEF not been there there would have been French units posted to its position and those would have been additional units sent into the gap. Or the relevant elements of the 5A could have sufficed. The outcome was not sensitive to such minor adjustments.
@@gandydancer9710 Most of the French 5th Army is not in the gap, but facing the German 2nd Army. They had like a single corps in the gap if I remember right.
@@Cotswolds1913 You're not taking in my point. Had the BEF not been in France the arrangement of French divisions would have been different and the forces available to push into the gap would have been different. But when von Kluck's overestimation of the disarray of the French forces resulted in the opportunity it would still have been taken advantage of because the French (and not the British) recognized it. And, again, the part of the line supposedly defended by the Brits would have been assigned to SOMEone French in the counter-historical scenario. Maybe just forces they hadn't wasted on the Battle of the Frontiers because of the need to cover the absence of the BEF.
I would argue that Japan ended England’s naval supremacy by making the US build a zillion ships
Britain accepted naval parity with the US at the Washington naval conference meant the end of any pretense of British naval "supremacy" (by definition there ain't no "supremacy" when you have an equal), one can argue that way before that, it's already implicitly over when US Congress decided to fund a navy "second to none" cuz the US could outbuild post-WWI British Empire easily, that's why everyone got essentially summoned to washington to accept a treaty limiting their own navies.
IN MY OPINION THOUGH THE DEMISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE ARE MANY AND VARIED IF THERE IS ONE MAN WHO WEAKENED THE EMPIRE IT IS CHURCHILL GALLIPOLI CRETE SINGAPORE ARAKAN NEED I SAY MORE
You need to stop typing in CAPS.
Also, I see no particular reason to lay British losses on Crete or in the Arakan Campaign at Churchill's door.
Oh my god, this is so interesting and so very Naval-head-fart. Its always telling when somebody writes a "if only they'd done this but they were morons". Seven Years War? Yes Britain won, but that's also because it lucked out with the Miracle of the House of Hohenzollern (i.e. Russian Tsarina dies, new Tsar is Prussia Fanboy) ending the ground war on favourable terms. Britain loses great power wars without a Continental strategy based on coalition building see American war of Independence. In WW1 that meant above all backing the French on the ground, and naval outmaneuvers don't work if your enemy has internal lines of communication. D-day worked because air superiority pins Germany daylight mobility, the Americans provide a plurality of ground forces and 80% plus of Germany forces are stuck in the East. That's not true in 1914-1918. Also a Balkans strategy could work because it did, Salonica takes Bulgaria out with Ottomans and Austria not far behind and Ludendorff gives up because he knows that means no more Romanian oil.
So much certainty, yet so many assumptions on how, and why in your post...
"Yes Britain won, but that's also because it lucked out with the Miracle of the House of Hohenzollern"... Russia was not in a place where it could effectively change British goals, that "miracle" is a Prussian Miracle, because it means Prussia is not wiped out, but had it happened Great Britain would have been in a position to continue the war, it might have been called the 8 years war, or the 9 years war instead, but the overall result was pretty much done due to British grand strategy (partly because no one else really had a cohesive strategy for anywhere outside of Europe).
"Britain loses great power wars without a Continental strategy based on coalition" but a coalition strategy does not demand big British armies, the Napoleon wars sees only one kinda small British army operating in Spain for most of the time, and small raiding forces in the Mediterranean Sea. The Crimean war equally sees a somewhat small British army on the Crimean front, while British naval units operate in the Black Sea, the Baltic and the Pacific... In fact what is talked about is closer to how Britain has conducted war-operations close to 150 years at that point, than what you so certain claims is the only way to win.
"In WW1 that meant above all backing the French on the ground"... Britain does not contribute in any meaningful way to the ground war until mid 1916... In that Had the naval option been adopted in start 1915, The British would have been able to start operations in the Baltic, around the same time the Somme happened. France really needed to conduct its war a little more careful, but they were certainly in a position to do so, even in 1918 where the British have the largest army in British history, France still outnumber the British in the number of Armies, Divisions and so on.
"naval outmaneuvers don't work if your enemy has internal lines of communication"... That is because you are thinking in terms of army goals (take ground, destroy the enemy army and so on), but that is not how naval warfare work. Naval warfare is mostly about hitting your enemy in the economy. No nation is selfsufficient in materials and in the case of Germany, iron/steel, food, Horses and chemicals was brought in from Scandinavia, mainly Sweden, and all of that trade was done by ship... If a British fleet is in the area, it can blockade German trade, the same way it blockaded trade from Germany from the rest of the world... If you don't think that is significant, then you need to read up on how a war economy works.
"Also a Balkans strategy could work because it did, Salonica takes Bulgaria out with Ottomans and Austria not far behind and Ludendorff gives up because he knows that means no more Romanian oil."
You are putting in way too much in Salonica... Sure Bulgaria was knocked out because of it, but lets not pretend that Bulgaria was great and important part of the overall war. Austria is as much knocked out of Salonica, as it is by the Russian offensives in 1916, and political turmoil in the empire, due to all the number nationalities that wants to go indepentent. The Ottomans equally has so many problems that putting it down to Salonica is a bit of a stretch, and again, neither Austria or the Ottomans are the main power. As for Ludendorff giving up over Oil... WW1 is not WW2, oil is a strategic resource, but not in any way as important as it becomes in WW2. Ludendorff does not give up when he sees that he no longer can get oil, he breaks down because Germany at this point is starving, the German army is defeated in the field and German war production is falling apart due to lack of skilled workers, lack of materials and so on...
And the lack of material is what the Baltic strategy would have hit... The German army is far less of a problem, when it cannot shoot enough shells with its artilleri due to a lack of shells, guns and tactical mobility (horses).
Operation Overlord was primarily a British operation, with the British commanding all the ground, sea and air forces. The Battle of Normandy was primarily a British planned and led campaign with the British providing the majority of the troops and ships.
The Royal Navy had overall responsibility for Operation Neptune, the naval plan. Of the 1,213 warships involved, 200 were American and 892 were British; of the 4,126 landing craft involved, 805 were American and 3,261 were British. 31% of all U.S. supplies used during D-Day came directly from Britain, while two-thirds of the 12,000 aircraft involved were also British, as were two-thirds of those that landed in occupied France.
The British Empire and Commonwealth provided the most troops and the US didn’t have the most overall troops in France until after the Battle of Normandy had been decided.
Eisenhower’s appointment was purely political. No one would put such an inexperienced man in charge of all ground forces.
Monty was in command of *all* ground forces and was the architect of the 5 beach invasion plan and the overall strategy of the Normandy day campaign.
Not only did Monty replan and serve as Allied Ground Forces Commander for Overlord, the largest seaborne born invasion in history, he also replanned the Alllied invasion of Sicily, the largest seaborne invasion in history before that.
The plan Overlord by Frederick Morgan was revised by Montgomery, like the original plan for the invasion of Sicily. Both would have led to complete disaster before Monty’s revision. This is something a lot of people don’t seem to be aware of.
Monty was the one that made the Overlord plan what it was. The plan was originally just 3 divisions and army Corp landing on some beaches together. He changed the plan from 3 to 5 beaches and from 3 divisions to 8 correctly arguing that 3 beachheads would’ve been too narrow a front and such an attack could be easily rolled up on both flanks. And instead of one airborne division, it should be 3 airborne divisions to assist while each army corp of the British and Americans should have their own beaches to ease organization. And he emphasized Cherbourg as the key.
The Allies prevailed in Normandy using Monty’s invasion plan and his ground strategy.
On Normandy:
_”That the COSSAC plan for a 3-divisional assault in ‘Overlord’ was a recipe for disaster now seems undeniable. Had Alexander been appointed to command the land forces in the invasion, would Morgan’s COSSAC plan have been enacted? Monty was not alone in recognizing its flaws, as will be seen, but he was alone in having the courage and conviction to see that it was thrown out and a better plan adopted. He had done so at Alam Halfa, he had done so gain over ‘Husky’ and whatever mud was slung at him, he was determined that he would do so over ‘Overlord’. For Morgan’s ‘Overlord’ plan, the result of one and a half years of research and discussions, had no prospect of succeeding, as Morgan’s planners themselves confessed…_
_....and by presenting such a clearly defined strategic plan for the battle there can be no doubt that Monty brought to his Allied land, sea and air forces a unity of purpose and conception that was remarkable - and often confused later with Eisenhower’s role as Supreme Commander.”_
-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.
*In the summer of 1944 60% of German tank strength was in France.* Caen had more German tanks per mile than Kursk. In just a few miles 8 Panzer divisions in a very small area of front. *Caen had the highest concentration density of German tanks ever seen in WW2.* These were pitted against British and Canadian armour. At Kursk the Panzer divisions were spread out over a much wider area and were not concentrated as densely as around Caen. At Kursk the Germans were attacking over a near 50 mile front.
There were EIGHT Panzer Divisors in the Caen area by the end of June 1944 and FIVE lines of anti tank-guns. The Germans kept sending more and more Panzer divisions around the Caen area as June went on and into July. These were the Panzer divisions deployed to the Caen area:
♦ 21st Panzer Division (117 Panzer IVs)
♦ Panzer Lehr Division (101 Panzer IVs, 89 Panthers)
♦ 2nd Panzer Division (89 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers)
♦ 116th Panzer Division (73 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers). In reserve just behind the front
♦ 1st SS Panzer Division (98 Panzer IVs, 79 panthers)
♦ 9th SS Panzer Division (40 Stugs, 46 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers)
♦ 10th SS Panzer Division (38 Stugs, 29 Panzer IVs)
♦ 12th SS Panzer Division (38 Stugs, 29 Panzer IVs)
♦ Tiger Battalion SS101 (45 Tigers)
♦ Tiger Battalion SS102 (45 Tigers)
♦ Tiger Battalion 503 (45 Tigers)
Source: Bernages Panzers and the Battle for Normandy and Zetterling’s Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness.
And at Kursk there were still battalions of Panzer IIIs with 50mm guns in the Panzer divisions. In Normandy all the tanks, tanks destroyers and assault guns all had at least 75mm L/48 guns. Only two battalions of Panthers at Kursk.
The British and Canadians took on and destroyed the bulk of the German armour. Montgomery, having control of all armies gave the US forces an infantry role.
The Americans who were not equipped or experienced to face massed German armour,were given primarily an infantry role by Montgomery- the Americans met very little armour in WW2. The US forces didn’t face any German armour until June 13th, and that was only a mere battalion of assault guns. *The British destroyed about 90% of German armour in the west overall.*
The Allies prevailed in Normandy using Monty’s invasion plan and his ground strategy. This was a great success. Montgomery had envisioned a 90 day battle with all forces reaching the Seine. He emphasized Cherbourg, making it clear that the British would hold as many German divisions as possible in Caen or it’s outskirts while the Americans take Cherbourg and go south to break the front without any German Panzer divisions nearby.
Result?
Exactly that. It happened ahead of schedule and with 22% less casualties than predicted.
_Not even Stalingrad could match the strategic scale of the German defeat in Normandy……._
_....By containing the bulk of the enemy armour and best infantry opposite Dempsey, and giving Bradley time and space to bring the greater numerical strength of the American divisions into battle on the western flank, Monty had out-generalled von Rundstedt, Rommel, Hausser and von Kluge who, limited by the edicts of Hitler, had insufficient strength to defend British, American and Pas de Calais sectors in equal strength. Compared with Hitler’s conduct, the impatience of Eisenhower, Tedder and Churchill had proved merely tiresome to the Ground Forces Commander, and had not affected the course of the battle. Montgomery’s victory was, without doubt in even Hitler’s mind, the decisive battle of the war: ‘the worst day of my life,’ as Hitler remarked on 15 August 1944 as the true dimensions of the catastrophe in Normandy became apparent._
-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.
In Normandy the Allies captured twice the number of troops taken by the Russians at Stalingrad, and all were German. Of the 2,500 German armoured fighting vehicles thrown into Normandy, barely two dozen escaped. Two armies were annihilated: by any reckoning a stunning victory.
D-Day plus 90 was 4 September 1944.
Monty said Paris would be liberated on D-day plus 90. It was liberated on D-Day plus 80.
General Miles Dempsey took Brussels, 183 miles from Caen, on D-Day plus 89.
Dempsey took Antwerp, 253 miles from Caen, on D-Day plus 90.
In the words of an American author, Ike & Monty: Generals at War, 1994, Norman Gelb:
_”By holding on the left and breaking out on the right, Montgomery had produced a triumph.“_
@@johnpeate4544 Wow, what a wall of text defending an off-topic crap claim.
No, Overlord and Normandy were overwhelmingly an American operation.
The British operation was Dieppe.
The difference in scale and success was Made in the USA.
@@MrBandholm Your premise of Baltic success is absurd. British surface units committed there would be sunk if they offered battle to the entire High Seas Fleet (available through the Kiel Canal) and any expeditionary force on the Continent would be exterminated by the far larger German army made available simply by going on defense-only temporarily against the French. The idea that Britain would attempt such a folly is the only remotely plausible justification I've ever seen for Germany's otherwise-useless naval program.
@@gandydancer9710
Err no.
Ground forces commander: Montgomery
Air commander: Leigh-Mallory
Naval commander: Ramsay.
Originally Morgan’s plan and Monty rewrote the plan for D-Day and it was Monty’s brilliantly successful plan for Normandy, coming in ahead of schedule and with less casualties than predicted.
Now calm down and pick up your pacifier.