Why Pickett's Charge? Robert E. Lee's disastrous decision at Gettysburg | US Civil War | american
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- Опубліковано 15 лис 2020
- Why did Robert E. Lee order Pickett's Charge?
This is a common question in American history. Lee was an excellent tactician, but he made a terrible error on July 3, 1863 which lost him the Battle of Gettysburg.
My thoughts on why Lee might have made such a disastrous decision are thus:
1) He had done daring operations before, like Chancellorsville, and they had worked in the past
2) He knew he couldn't keep the war going on indefinitely, because the South could not replace the manpower nor did it have the industry to compete with the North. He had to win decisively and fast.
3) The North was very close to securing the Mississippi River, which would cut the Confederacy in half. Lee possibly thought his back was against the wall.
4) He had never really seen the Army of Northern Virginia lose.
Lee made a terrible blunder at Gettysburg, but it remains his one major blunder throughout the war. Decisions like PIckett's Charge happened often, such as the North's disastrous assault at Fredericksburg or the Crater.
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You really deserve a great compliment. I have been reading military history for more than 45 years, and your explanations and analysis are among the best.
Thank you for all your videos!
Hey, great video with a lot of interesting context surrounding this famous event!
Thank you!
Excellent summary. Thank you!
Thank you!
I stood at Pickets Charge and thought I can't believe someone would be so stupid to think that 15,000 men could go almost a mile on open ground up hill and think it would work.
Perhaps one reason why Lee appears so brilliant and in my opinion is over-rated is not solely due to his own tactical genius but is made to appear as genius due to the shear in competence of so many Northern generals. McClellan had many opportunities for a decisive victory over Lee and squandered them all. This speaks more to the incompetence of McClellan than to the genius of Lee. Lee was lucky. The South should have been defeated well before Gettysburg. Not to say that Lee was an idiot. He certainly was a competent and skilled general. But his feats have been mythologized and romanticized. In the case of Gettysburg over-confidence and sheer arrogance were key factors in Lee's foolish decision to doom thousands to their death on the 3rd day. Once the North finally did get a competent general in Grant (who also made some bad decisions and doomed men to needless death in the Overland campaign) , Lee was defeated pretty quickly once Grant took charge.
Anyway thanks for a good video. Your points about Lee are plausible and valid.
We share the same opinion of both Lee and Union generals he faced before Grant.
Says you. Who retreated from Sharpsberg ? Who formed a army to defeat Lee at Sharpsberg ? You know not what you speak !
I disagree, sort of, with this assessment. By that I mean you go from one end of the spectrum to the other - either genius or lucky fool. However, remember that Lee was nicknamed "Granny Lee" by the soldiers at the start of the war due to his caution in the West Virginia area. It wasn't until his appointment as Commander of the Army of Virginia during McClellan's Peninsula campaign that he was able to demonstrate his full ability. Lucky? God, I hope to always serve under a lucky Commander! You have to remember that Lee served with a lot of the older, more senior officers in the Northern army. He knew them, knew their capabilities and their short-comings. I feel that he was also one of the better engineering officers on the Southern side. What astounds me more about Gettysburg was not allowing Pickett's charge to go ahead, but rather his failure on the 2nd day, to instruct Longstreet to take the Little and Big Roundtop's in order have an enfilading position on the heights. That was his real failure at Gettysburg. And that was why Pickett's charge was a disaster.
@@marklaplante8675
I never actually called Lee genius, I was speaking more about the overblown "genius of Lee" and speaking in the 3rd person or how others often time refereed to him. You mention McClellan's Peninsula campaign and once again the question begs to be asked: Was it truly Lee's "genius" ? -full ability as you call it- or McClellan's shear incompetence and indecisiveness? Personally I feel very strongly like it's the latter rather than the former and a decent general with even a modicum of tactical abilities would have beaten Lee much earlier. Look at how many times McClellan failed to act at decisive moments during his campaign when he had a clear advantage in men, material, and excellent battlefield, and tactical advantages. Yet again and again he failed to act. Sat on his hands with an army of over 90,000 strong!!
Upon further reflection I think we are both incorrect. People have studied this battle inside and out so I defer to their expertise but I think it's safe to say that a large consensus is that it was NOT either Pickett's charge or Lee not instructing Longstreet to take the Roundtop's. There was not any one "real failure" of Lee's at Gettysburg but multiple failures and factors and of course brilliant successes by the North was another factor, that lead to his defeat. We, as historians cannot simply point to any one factor and say this, or that is the "reason for failure". It's almost always multiple factors. History is not black and white and simply does not work that way. At the end of the day, Lee's "genius" was put to the test at Gettysburg and it was here that the shortcomings of his "genius" were revealed.
Cheers!!
@@danield831 Excellent summation.
Thank you for your excellent work!
Much appreciated!
Your videos are awesome!
Thank you!
It's nice to put a face to the voice. Keep up the great work!
Thank you!
Union had about 150 cannons firing on the confederate column
x average 2 shots per minute
x 10 minutes Reb column stayed near and beyond Emmitsburg road
= 3,000 cannon shots, half of which canister, give or take
Lee also ordered the attack on Malvern Hill in 1962, which was a mistake similar to Pickett's charge at Gettysburg. Sent an attack straight into the teeth of massed artillery file and got thousands of men mowed down. Lee was no more immune to impatience and rash decisions than any other commander in the war.
Oops - meant 1862, not 1962.
Malvern Hill is more complex, he gave a discretionary order to a brigade commander to attack if the artillery was effective on Union defenders, and then the army would support him. The brigadier pushed against some Union skirmishers at the bottom of the hill, which was reported to Lee (who was ironically away from the field investigating the possibility of a flanking move) as a successful push to the top of the hill by Magruder. He ordered the attack on that basis, which set off a series of uncoordinated assaults by other divisions without him personally there to direct.
Obviously a total disaster, but it's more poor staff work and subordinate incompetence than rash decision making. He is ultimately responsible for this of course, and to Lee's credit both improve after the 7 Days.
My God! Thank you. A dispassionate, realistic look at a battlefield mess that isn’t tainted with should have would have. No opinions or unnecessary dialogue. Thank you. Do this people, this is history and then you dig into it, learn it first.
I’m not sure Lee was enough of a master strategist to see the picture of the whole war as clearly as he’s given credit for. Lee had the men and the logistics to send reinforcements to Vicksburg to try and break that siege. From a strategic perspective that was the meaningful battle. In May or early June Grant had 3 understrength corps, and Johnson had a gathering army north of Jackson. At that moment a large Confederate force in his Grant’s rear combined with the Army of Vicksburg could have broken the siege. He didn’t make that choice and on July 3 about the time the Confederate artillery stopped at Gettysburg flags of truce fluttered over the works at Vicksburg. Grant and Winfield Scott had the vision for how the war could play out and so Grant and Banks took the Mississippi River, enlisted tens of thousands of US Colored Troops who garrisoned the river towns and fought the guerrilla war in the countryside while Grant took his now large army and headed east. Early Civil War historians largely miss this, their eyes full of the stars of the genius of Lee. Turns out Lee wasn’t the master strategist that Grant was.
Yea suckered by the regalia always gets the best of southern sympathizers
As Lee once said about all of the smart-ass newspaper editors who criticized the movements of the Confederate forces, and how it was a shame that all of the best generals were newspaper editors for they saw all of the mistakes that the generals made beforehand and that they should trade jobs. You sound like one of them. First of all, Lee along with many other people in the South, understood the circumstances very well and the need for a decisive victory in the field to destroy / capture / neutralize the main federal army in the east. Lee new from the very beginning that the clock was running out. He predicted in the late summer of 1863 that if he could not wear down and bleed Grant enough before he was forced into a siege around Richmond then it was only a matter of time. Furthermore Lee did not have command of all Confederate troops until the last very last month or two of the war. Once again like so many others you're all seeing it all knowing with hindsight, but in reality you probably do not have enough sense to chop wood or tote water for most people back then.
@@jaydubbyuh2292 On the other hand there is scholarship from Tim Smith, Ed Bearss, Ron Chernow, and others that support my thesis. It's all moot because it played out the way it did and the what if school of history is exactly that. Savas-Beatty, the small Civil War publisher out of California, has an interesting book coming that has historians getting into the minutia of a lot of the what ifs, what if Jackson had lived, what if Lee had followed Longstreet's advice at Gettysburg, the dozens of what ifs related to Antietam. The minutia involves a lot of depth that the what-iffers don't know or take into account. Might be an interesting read for someone casting aspersions about dumb ass newspapermen towards people he doesn't know.
I always wondered why Johnson never attacked Grants rear? My question to you is this, if Lee ordered Johnson to attack Grant, would it have been done? Why would he even need Lees permission? It’s obvious that Pemberton wanted him to do this, to help him break out of Vicksburg. Was Lee aware of the siege and that Johnson was basically doing nothing?
@@DA-bp8lf Good question and one historians have pondered. I don't think there is anything that states explicitly why Johnston delayed, but it must have been at least partly because of the number of troops because Lee was aware of the situation and was asked to do something to help with Vicksburg, specifically to sen Johnston troops. His reasons for not directly supporting have been covered a lot since he wrote them down. Gettysburg was supposed to be partly a diversion to attract Grant's troops east. Obviously that didn't work.
I have been to Gettysburg and seen the ground of Picketts charge. Although I am proud to be named after Robert E. Lee, and am a US ARMY Veteran, I was astonished that anyone would have charged across that ground under those circumstances. It was as much a killing ground as the worst battles in WW1. I do understand that desparate circumstances can cause men to do desparate things. The Japanese lost countless men in suidcidal Bonzai frontal assaults in WW2. The battle fatigue on both sides must have been enormous after Gettysburg fell silent .
Some say Lee had a cold but he was always full of hubris.
As Jeff mentions starting at 3:30 , Wilcox and Wright's men did successfully advance over the same ground and crested Cemetery Ridge for a short time late the day before (July 2nd), but they didn't have any support and had to retreat. So, it wasn't as impossible a mission as some make it out to be; Wilcox and Wright already had shown it could be done. That has to have been on Lee's mind when he contemplated his options for the following day, having already had major attacks on both of the Union flanks beaten off.
@@TomG1555 The assault on the second day was under different circumstances, different troops, strengths, etc. lt also had the benefit of being the first.
The assaults during WW 1 were mostly unwise and so were the Banzai charges.
Even Frederick the Great started warning in his later writings about conducting too many frontal assaults.
The Confederates can be given some credits for preparing the charge with the largest artillery bombardment in the Western Hemisphere at the time, but that artillery preparation also alerted the Union troops of what was coming.
A modern infantry commander commanding the same troops and facing the same troops with rifle muskets and cannons would most likely have his men crawl in the dark, open up with artilleryfire at dawn and have his men rush the last distance.
Since the Confederates had a local superiority of men, a more modern conventional infantry attack across open groud might have worked. Still, the Union had one more corps in reserve and they would still likely have repulsed the charge.
@@thabomuso2575 Well said.
Lee was never going to ultimately prevail in a series of set piece frontal assaults and he ought to have known that. Both of his large forays into Northern territories, Antietam and Gettysburg, resulted in devastating and irreplaceable losses of ranks, and likely shortened the war. Lee was clever when the overall posture was the defense of known ground. Very clumsy with his scant resources when it came to invasion.
Gaines Mill?
@@edwardclement102 Lee took very heavy casualties at Gaines Mill. In the end, Porter withdrew...which he was going to do whether there was a battle or not.
I have been a student of that war all of my life, especially being a Virginian & descended from that generation with ancestors maternal and paternal fighting for the Confederation of Southern States. I believe Tom Carhartt, in his book, Lost Triumph, has explained as good as anyone Lee's intention on the third day. With the loss of a copy of his orders the previous fall, prior to the Battle of Antietam, Lee was reluctant to divulge his intentions unnecessarily. Yes, I agree with Tom Carhartt that Lee intended to have Stuart make a pincher movement on the rear of the Federal center, while being attacked / distracted in front by Picket's assault. It is truly amazing how George Custer's relatively small force, stopped JEB Stuart dead in his tracks. Of course, Lee took responsibility for his failures at Gettysburg, and gave credit to his lieutenants and his men for his successes.
''Virginian & descended from that generation with ancestors maternal and paternal fighting for the Confederation of Southern States"
Nothing to be proud of!
The South was lucky that Lincoln was such a great and magnanimous president. A different president may have put the whole Confederate leadership along with the Generals on the gallows for sedition. And rightly so!!
@@danield831 The bastard "Lincoln", whose biological father was Abraham Enloe, demonstrated his true colors, via his words & deeds: His Constitutionally and rationally repugnant words & deeds prior to the war he initiated and conducted. He & his damned red republican regime caused the Founding Fathers and Patriots of our secession from the British Empire, to roll over in their graves. The whole issue was/is about power & control. By an accident of population density, unremedied by legislation, the South generated the majority of revenue for the Federal Govt, and the North eas able to decide its expenditure, which went to, " internal improvements", all of which were in the North. The South did not like it, but chalked it up to the cost of being in the Union. When the soft communist / red-republican Lincoln proposed the essential doubling of the Federal import/export tax rate, no one believed that such a deranged, bastard, crooked railroad lawyer could get elected. The conservative party which was the Democrat party, but northern and southern, ran their own candidates and then a third John Bell jumped in under the Constitutional Union party, and split the conservative about three ways enabling the leftist wacky bastard Lincoln to win on a plurality. In his inaugular dress he declared his intentions to use Force for one object: to collect the federal revenues from the state of South Carolina and any other state that had seceded. In obedience to truth and honesty I will give the devil his due and commend Lincoln for telling the banking establishments to go to hell and issuing greenbacks. But his few decent deeds do not expunge his criminal and dastardly wore upon the South. Of the red radical Republicans he was a moderate and most of the radicals like Stevens, philips, Stanton we're glad that he was out the way when he was shot yet they used him as a martyr and his death as an excuse to further plunder the South economically, culturally, and socially. If you are not a descendant of a southerner who suffered at the hands of the goddamn federal government, you're nothing but a hot air hypocrite idiot. Lincoln and the red Republicans political heir are embodied in the leftists of the day who have traded names and labels several times since the war between the states. Today's so-called Democratic party is the exact same party of Lincoln. Any shallow-minded or ignorant food who thinks that the Republicans of today are the same as the red Republican Jacobins of the 1860s needs a lesson in history.
ABSOLUTELY!!! Stuart was to attack the rear
I don't think that the cavalry attack was part of a much larger plan by Lee. I think that he thought he had much better troops and that the union would fold as it always had done. He underrated the union troops and overrated his ability to win every time against the odds. He should not have ignored Longstreet whose idea of attacking the Left flank would probably have won the day for the Confederates. Why would you attack men on better ground, with a long march while under the guns of the Union, to finally fight against Union soldiers who have enriched their positions? It was hubris, plain and simple.
Well said.
This move reminds me a lot of the Japanese attack at Midway. In both cases, some basic principals taught by Sun Tsu half a millennium earlier. The 'high ground' it a major advantage, and an advantage intelligence information makes the difference.
I liked your educated theories and believe them to be on point. Weak at the center was a prevailing thought because the flanks had been so attacked. But this seems weak. A gamble. A spirited one. It’s a fascinating real study.
They brook the line, where was the support?
I love your videos, which I only discovered recently, and I agree with you regarding what Lee was most likely thinking on 3 July 1863. The question for me is this: why, after the failure at Gettysburg, and knowing that this had been the Confederacy's final hope, did he continue the war for nearly another two years instead of recommending immediate peace negotiations, however disadvantageous? He could have avoided a great deal of pointless bloodshed and the devastation of the South.
The terms for peace had to include independence for the South, something the north was inflexible on. By mid to late 1863 the north committed itself to 'total war' to raze the South to the ground. The South offered to end slavery in late 64 and Jan. 65 but Lincoln refused these offers, he wanted total subjugation.
I am shocked that such an older, experienced commander would make such an impulsive decision. I think he just got tired of the stalemate of the war, and just made a disastrous move to break the stalemate.
Yes, a part of me wonders if Lee was rolling the dice that day. I also think he was in a strange position. He had attacked all day on July 2, and the Union lines had not broken. It was strange territory for him.
It's actually pretty consistent with several of his other major decisions: the attack at Malvern Hill; the bizarre decision to give battle at Antietam; the rush to give battle at Chancellorsville.
I think the reason that Picketts charge may stand out while bad Union moves at Fredericksburg don't is that the repeated charges at Fredericksburg tipped the battle and Gettysburg may have tipped the war. It was still a long time coming but it was the start of an eventual defeat by the Confederates.
One thing that keeps getting overlooked is that Lee wanted very much to redo the "strike from the rear" by sending the cavalry around behind the Union and threaten the line of supply and retreat back to Washington. Pickett's charge was to be a kind of pincer with the cavalry strike at close to the same time. But George Custer prevented that with his full bore charge into the Confederates. Meade did not have to worry about his backside. Couple that with the Union Artillery playing their part to the T. Just as in most games the one who wins makes the fewest mistakes. It is a crying shame that Grant was not in charge at Gettysburg or Lee would have found himself but worse like the Confederate forces high tailing it back to Corinth. Except they would have ran smack dab into flooded rivers. With the reinforcements that the Army of the Potomac had gotten after Gettysburg Lee would have likely been smashed to bits. Imagine being downstream of the Confederates with their back to the river and a Union Army led by Grant! A very reversed Shiloh on the first day. Might have been more like Lake Trasimene.
Well, the thing is, that the Union Artillery would be a danger to any full frontal charge was a no-brainer. So I think the key blunder was to order the charge simply on the hope that the confederate bombardment had disabled the artillery. That was too big an issue simply speculate on. Without being dead sure that the artillery was disabled, even a successful charge might have brought with it so many losses that the position would have been intenable.
@@ohauss I think Lee has showed repeatedly he was willing to take losses that almost every Union commander would consider slaughter to achieve his goals. Winning is all that mattered. Even more so if he was willing to invade the North to try and score a major victory. Had Custer et. al. not stopped the rear attack, even with high losses in the front following the artillery bombardment. Lee was more than willing to sacrifice them. Testament to the other commanders, especially Longstreet that thought even if all of the three efforts went off they would still get the infantry would still get the crap kicked out of them.
Lake Trasimene? I see you are a man of class.
@@Hadrian_S HEHEHEHE!
I tend to agree but give Meade a little credit -- he had a shrewd eye for the terrain and (more or less) wisely distributed the resources at hand.
Foote's assertion that 'Lee's blood was up' is valid as any explanation of his decision.
That is definitely a possibility.
Blood was up from a fever though
Lee learned the wrong lessons from Chancellorsville.
First of all, Jackson's flank attack was not a "surprise" to anyone but O.O. Howard. First he was warned and ordered to prepare by Hooker. Next he was repeatedly warned by his own pickets. He still refused to take action.
Second, all Jackson accomplished with his flank attack was the rout of a single corps. The Union line stabilized and continued to fight effectively for two more days.
Third, it's likely that Hooker withdrew not because he was beaten, but because he had suffered a massive concussion. When he held his council of war, his corps commanders voted to stay and continue the battle, which would have been ruinous for Lee.
Now, did Lee know some or all of those things? I don't know. I would hazard a guess that *no one* at that time understood how seriously concussions can impair a general's judgement. But whether through ignorance or hubris or perhaps some of both, he drew the wrong conclusions from the battle.
Just my take, of course.
When a war is stalemated and you are starting to lose, you should go to guerilla tactics, but I don't know if his troops had the training to do that.
From what I've read about Lee and the progress of the war at that stage that I'm of the firm opinion that Lee realised this was his last chance to make occur the significant event that he had been tasked to create to force the Northern leaders to the treaty table. Due to how Gettysburg had developed he knew there was no way he could now pull back and go around the Union Army to attack Washington. Thus if he didn't win Gettysburg he would be involved in a fighting withdrawal that would result in huge loses and end up with entrenched positions and further huge loses. That meant he had to win at Gettysburg or be totally defeat soon afterward. Thus he saw the situation as being one last throw of the dice at a win, and his last chance to force a decisive battle win to bring the North to Treaty Talks. Lee had previously been able to turn battles into significant wins by doing the unexpected and thought he could do it again, thus he ordered the charge.
From the reports of the battle and the charge I've often felt that it was a 'close run thing' as another famous general once described a similar desperate battle, but it failed to do what Lee wanted, and thus ended the battle as a loss.
I've often wondered how many more years the war would've continued if Lee had refused to back up his lead forces and simply pulled everyone back on the first day to continue his movements to the north to circle around more. While doing so would've lost many men at the time, I feel it would've given Lee the opportunity to pick better ground to fight on later.
Lee could have created a defensive position on and about Oak Hill. It is a commanding position, as it gives one a view of all of its approach routes. So, he had been on great ground at Gettysburg, and he did not use it to force the AoP to attack him.
Therefore, one has to ask what his intentions were in going into Pa. ?
He stated them very clearly:
His first intention was to get out of Northern Va. and relieve the country there from the presence of both his and the Union armies.
The second was also logistical. To get supplies.
Third... To thwart any offensives the US Command may have had in mind in Virginia after Chancellorsville.
Fourth... to give battle and damage the enemy as much as possible.
This is what Lee said, and the campaign lines up with these intentions.
He gave his army 10 months respite from attack, tons of cattle, pigs and other much needed supplies via the Pennsylvania Campaign. That is, it achieved all of its operational intentions, and was, therefore, a success by the measure stated for it by its commander!
PS: I have figured out some of the logistics, and the one I remember most clearly is that an army his size with its animals, required, at least, one million gallons of water a day. That's an Olympic sized pool, at least, of water every day.
So, there was no just roaming around here, there, and everywhere! And he would have needed all of the cattle he was sending back to Va. to keep roaming around Pa., as well...
Thus, thwarting his operational intentions...
Well said, Ernest! That's what I was about to write when I found your comment. Lee was faced with being slowly and inevitably whittled down by superior force. Or, he could try a long shot at breaking the Union lines with a, "Hail marry pass", when his army was at its peak strength. Yes, it was a desperation move but it had some chance of success. Any other move lead to certain eventual defeat. A success at Gettysburg, right at that time, could have had huge political ramifications in the North. The mood of the people in the North was leaning towards ending the war and a Confederate victory right then might have brought on a negotiated peace.
On a different subject. It always bothers me that almost everyone, even the well educated, refer to this conflict as the "Civil War". Yeah, I know the "victor writes the history". But, in my view, the States that formed the Confederacy, succeeded legally from the Union. There is no prohibition in the United States Constitution against succession. This war was clearly a war of aggression against the newly formed Confederate States of America.
To me this is an important distinction today because people in general have completely lost sight of the fundamental building blocks of the original United States Constitution. It was built upon the principle of sovereign States. Few if any States would have ever signed on to a constitution that could be turned into a suicide pact against them if conditions changed. The principle of leaving the Union was the main safeguard to prevent an out of control Federal government.
Lee thought the Union Army at Gettysburg would break and run...they didn't.
Napoleon thought the allied army at Waterloo would break and run....they didn't.
@@timottes334Stealing food is a very bad plan for marching an army into enemy territory. Lee had huge losses as most of the time that could not be replaced for cattle.
@@snotnosewilly99Waterloo did not matter at all as two further army much stronger marched against Napoleon. So if he would not have bern finished at Waterloo they would have done it at another place and time.
Lee may have been counting on JEB Stuart's cavalry when he sent them to come in from behind but they were stopped by George Armstrong Custers cavalry who were outmanned but fought the better battle and Custer may have had the new repeating rifles haven't read much about this encounter.
Custer's cavalry did have Spencer repeating rifle at Gettysburg.
But, it's ludicrous to think Lee would believe Jeb 'little' Stuart would flank the Union Army. Ewell's 2nd Corp already tried to charge up well defended Union fortification at Culp's Hill and East Cemetery Hill failed miserable on 2nd day of the Gettysburg. It's utter nonsense to think Stuart would charge up the steep fortified hill with cavalry when an entire infantry Corp failed.
Go Wolverines!
@@Joseph-eh4rs Stuart did infact flank the Union army and if you have been to the East Cavalry Battlefield you would see he didn't have to charge uphill. If Custer had not been there only the 1st NJ and 2nd PA would have been there. They were dismounted firing from woods on both of Stuart's flanks with Custer attacking from the center.
Stewart to attack from the rear if not stoped cold by Custer.
Stuart did in fact circle around the Union army with his cavalry corps and was in position to attack the Union rear as picket made his frontal assault. Custer had been ordered to move to the left flank and protect it. Stuart was moving through woods to stay concealed. He ordered his officers to do the same, but some came into the open and were seen. Custer remained where he was and gave battle. Stuart was in column formation and could not bring his full force to bear. The first regiment Custer sent forward as skirmishers and had the new repeating rifles. Custer one regiment at a time led 3 cavalry charges against. My great great uncle was with the 1st NJ Cavalry. They were in the woods on Custer's left flank, dismounted firing into Stuart's column as it came forward. Custer had delayed Stuart long enough that Pickett's attack was over and there was no reason to continue fighting, so Stuart withdrew. The plan had been for Southern artillery to blow hell out of the center of the Union line, then have the cavalry and infantry make a combined attack on the center at the same time in order to cut the Union Army into two. The artillery overshot a fell harmlessly, Stuart failed to reach the Union rear, and Pickett was cut to pieces. Too many people believe Lee was fool enough to make a straight on frontal assault across a mile of open ground with only infantry. Had Custer not disobeyed direct orders to move to the far left flank, and had the artillery not had a problem with fuses for their shells burning 2 seconds too long, the outcome of the 3rd day would have been quite different.
Advised that the Yankees were closing in on Vicksburg, Lee said he had two choices: attack or surrender. He chose the attack. At Gettysburg he was not himself. His heart was acting up and like all of his men, the diet of green corn and unripe cherries taken from the fields had upset his stomach. However he knew that his army might be able to get between the Union Army and Washington, leading to a negotiated peace. Thus, he risked all.
I think you're on to something. Lee must have known that he couldn't keep refilling the ranks even if he successfully held back the Army of the Potomac. Even with shocking, decisive victories, the casualties were so high that the south woudn't be able to keep it going forever.
Most cherries are ripe by July. Don't know about corn that far north but I've read Lee had a cold infection.
@@sofly7634 He had a serious heart condition which eventually killed him. There is no way of knowing which cherries might or might not have been ripe in PA in the summer of 1863. The Confederates also ate unripe apples and peaches on their march.
lf only his heart had given out in 1862.
@@frankmiller95 Maybe yours will give out in 2022.
An unasked question is whether Lee and Meade were acquainted with each other from their service in the US Army, and whether Lee formed some of his assumptions based on what he knew s of Meade’s character. This is not the main reason at all but one possible element.
That is interesting. I definitely think Lee knew Meade was cautious, but a more in-depth look into their previous relationship could shed some light on the strategy employed.
I believe Lee said of Meade, he won’t make mistakes and will take advantage of ours. That kind of sums it up.
Lee had most of his success against the Dud McClelland! Hooker was all talk and no trousers and the later days of Chancellorsville cost Lee excessive casualties that the south could not afford.
The notion that Lee had an overall strategy for the war as a whole is not supported by any evidence - he was a Virginian first and always
I think people give Lee credit for keeping the war going for much longer than the odds would predict. If the Union wasn't so successful in the west, the political will for the war may have faded in the North. It took Lincoln a long time to find a general who wasn't spooked by Lee.
@@JeffreytheLibrarian thanks for a host of many very well presented and argued video's.
I fully agree with your well nuanced and evidence based way of wheighing both the grand picture and the details.
We know now that he could of turned the flank. Yet Lee couldn't know that for shure. If he weakend his centre in order to do that, he could be in the same problem as what he hoped for to do to the Union.
He did in effect do what Napoleon had wanted to do at Waterloo. Punch through the centre indeed for probably the same reasons you state. He needed a clear win just as much as Lincoln at that very moment in time. The ellections. Hope the North throws in the towl.
He couldn't be shore that a Union would do just that, knowing the opposing general must be pressed for a win and the Union in the West under Grant was agressive. So he was right to fear an agressive Union army commander against him.
Hindsight.
@@JeffreytheLibrarian my opinion on McClelland is real simple, when Lee lost his orders he was given the gift of the war. I think, he could do a force march attack while the ANV was seperated, cut them off from VA and probably put a pretty dent in the CSA war effort. I do not think it would have ended the war, because even with Richmond falling, high dessertions the CSA would not surrender. They brought children and old men to fight in 64 to replace the losses. Think at Hampton Rds the war could have been over a few months early and saved lives would have been saved.
@Ross Leahy, Completely agree.
@@outdoorlife5396 Having studied Antietam extensively, it is my opinion that any Union general other than McClellan, even his mediocre predecessors and successors until Grant would likely have crushed Lee and the ANV at Antietam under the same circumstances.
'Frontal Attack' Lee was so prudent?
Lee managed to shorten the war by ordering glorious attacks that the South loved but could not afford.
*Lee ignored his generals’ pleas not to launch a front assault over a mile of open ground! For supposedly being a brilliant military tactician, Lee ended up sending his young men to slaughter in Pickett's Charge - instead of living to fight another day! They were cannon fodder for the Union guns on the high ground! The battle - and the war - were lost in one fateful decision!*
To think of a General today graduating from West Point then abandoning his post to go against and orders to kill the men he once swore to protect, at the very least, would be a tragedy.
It was heartbreaking for many of them. And many remained close friends despite the conflict. It was the same in the Revolution. Washington served with Thomas Gage in the British Army during the French and Indian War, and then they were on opposites sides as old men during the Revolution.
@@JeffreytheLibrarian That's a good comparison.
@@JeffreytheLibrarian Perhaps you should read the letter written by Parliamentary General Sir William Waller to his close friend and Royalist opponent Sir Ralph Hopton during the English Civil War...
"That great God who is the searcher of my heart knows with what a sad sense I go upon this service, and with what a perfect hatred I detest this war without an enemy;... We are both upon the stage and must act such parts as are assigned us in this tragedy, let us do it in a way of honour, and without personal animosities."
JEB didn't get er done!
Classic Napolion tactics. If the range on your muskets is 100 yards, the get two shots and then you can close. But riffles had a range of 300 yards. When they opened up a withering fire, they got mowed down. I am amazed that Armistead reached the wall and took the guns. What a feat. But he didn't have the strength to hold it at that point.
At Chancellorsville Jackson is a aggressive commander. Hooker beat his self. Hooker found out it is not easy as it looks. I believe Lee was thinking if he could put Washington in jeopardy, he could force an end to the war. Vicksburg needed to be reenforced, the whole campaign was a gamble. Lee had been repulsed on the left and right, so even when over a mile on open ground, a double fence to slow down the troops was just against military logic. He made the choice. I think Lincoln would have dug trenches around DC, like the CSA did Richmond. Difference is they could pull men and materials to reenforce DC. The war was over after July 63, I think the Confederate government should have made peace
I think you're right that Lee wanted to take the initiative and bring the fight to the North. Washington would likely be impenetrable, however, the rebels were really close to Harrisburg.
@@JeffreytheLibrarian True, but did you ever notice when Jackson died, the hopes for confederate victory kind of went down the tubes with him? You could make that argument. But really I think Grant and Sherman had endless resources and a one to punch that was not going to stop. Look at the losses Grant had in the Wilderness, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor. He just kept right on til he got to Petersburg
RE Lee won so many times because Union side had too many incompetent generals. If Grant was at Chancellorsville, he would not had won even if OO Howard messed up. At Gettysburg, as long as the leader is one from Meade/Renolds/Hancock, he is in trouble. So he basically didn’t anticipate that Union will run out of bad generals
Cheers Jeffrey. Nice to actually see you after only getting to hear you on your many superb videos. Re: Lee - Lee was more lucky than good, he had the good fortune of being opposed by mostly mediocre fully intimidated leaders of the Army of the Potomac. Even after Gettysburg Meade had eight going on nine months to bring the Army of Northern Virginia to bear but he didn't, or more accurately, wouldn't. He, like his predecessors was too scared. Gettysburg was an excellent example of Lee's puzzling slackness as an offensive general - the wincing error of indecisive orders to new to command officers and splitting up his forces hither, thither, and yon (he apparently learned nothing from Antietam) were not the mistakes of a general who too many think of as a "genius". Defensively Lee was better and more in his element but Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan were more than his match, heresy I know, but far more accurate than the Marble Man mythology that was for so long the received, knee-jerk dogma. Cheers!
Thanks for watching! I appreciate the comments. It's definitely an advantage to defend. Oftentimes, Lee is characterized as "prudent," and this isn't really true. At his core he was a dice roller. This is seen at Malvern Hill, Gettysburg, Chancellorsville, and Antietam, the latter of which many wonder why he backed himself up against the Potomac River. I think the credit to Lee comes because he kept the war going for so long. He kept it going on in Virginia longer than his colleagues in the western theater. He delivers a crushing defense at Fredericksburg, a shocking victory at Chancellorsville, and a big win at Bull Run II. I don't see how July 3 could have gone well for the rebels in an attacking posture against any sector. The Union had good ground along the whole field, and more men. I think Lee hit a strange wall at the end of Day 2. He had fought for two days, and the Army of the Potomac hadn't retreated. It must have been a strange situation for General Lee. This time the fight was in Pennsylvania, and it was the Union side that wasn't going to retreat. The fact that he was down to his last unused division--Pickett--is a good indication that it was time to retreat or at last switch to a defensive posture. Day 3 was his worst decision of the war. There's no way men can move over open ground like that and attack--of all things--the center of the enemy's line. I remember being an 8th grader and wondering, "Even if the rebels made it onto Cemetery Ridge, wouldn't they just be standing in middle of the whole Union Army?"
Lee went up against a lot of sub-par Union commanders. McClellen, McDowell, Burnside, and Hooker.
Lee was a gambler and took some enormous risks. Eventually, the house wins.
Lee's original plan of campaign (made clear by Lee's after action report and Longstreet's memoirs) in June of 1863 was to maneuver the AotP into attacking the AoNV and defeat that attack. In effect, he attempted to carry out a strategically offensive campaign which was defensive tactically. To do this, Lee needed timely information as to the strength and location of the AotP. Only Stuart's cavalry possessed the mobility to get out and obtain this information.
Stuart's ability to do this was compromised- not by Stuart, but by Lee. Lee violated the military axiom of "one force, one objective", and gave Stuart two objectives for one force. Lee did this by instructing Stuart to gather both information and provisions. These two objectives were contradictory in nature because gathering information required mobility which only cavalry could provide- but gathering provisions would inevitably impede that very mobility. Thus, excelling at one made accomplishing the other more and more unlikely. Furthermore, Lee made it clear in his orders to Stuart that he wished Stuart to gather provisions not simply for the three brigades which Stuart had with him, but for the AoNV as well. Probably the worst aspect of Lee's orders to Stuart was that these two objectives coincided in time- and Stuart literally lacked the time to accomplish first one, and then the other.
Lee's lack of information resulted in the unexpected meeting engagement between advanced elements of the AoNV and the AotP on 1 July. The minor Confederate victory was actually a disaster for Lee's plan of campaign. In this meeting engagement, elements of the AoNV attacked and defeated elements of the AotP. In so doing, Lee's army assumed not only the strategic offensive, but now, the tactical offensive as well. Having been attacked and defeated, the AotP was now unlikely to simply go over to the tactical offensive in turn.
Two additional factors made a Union counterattack even more unlikely. The first was that the AotP had a newly appointed commander in General George G. Meade (an appointment which Lee had been made aware of). Meade assumed command of an army already in motion, and- as one historian put it- he was faced by a man who had been "the ruin of McClellan, Pope, Burnside, and Hooker". The second factor was that the two recent offensives by the AotP- and Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville- had resulted in a bloody repulse in the first battle, and a stunning counterattack and defeat in the second. In their entirety, these factors combined to make a Union counterattack unlikely in the extreme.
This saddled Lee with a tactical initiative which he had never wanted- and now, two time constraints operated against him. The first was that the strategic objective of the campaign had been to relieve pressure on the Confederate defenders at Vicksburg- and Vicksburg had been placed under siege before Lee's campaign had even gotten underway. The second was that the AoNV had been foraging off of enemy territory, and Lee's foraging parties could not operate in the immediate presence of the AotP. Lee was now reduced to living off of the stocks in the army's supply train, so he could not remain in any one area for more than 3-5 days. Since the army had not foraged since Lee's concentration order of 29 June, the clock was ticking for Lee.
It appears clear in retrospect that Lee had little confidence that Meade would launch an attack of his own, and Longstreet's suggestion of a flanking maneuver- while tactically possible to carry out- stood little chance of eliciting a Union counterattack. These factors explain Lee decision to execute what became known as Pickett's Charge.
Several points: What about the claim that Generals Ewell and Longstreet both disobeyed orders the day or two before. Also, what factor did Jeb Stuart arriving late have ? I have heard that Union guns at Gettysburg often were new repeating Spencer rifles, guns the South did not have. Would Stonewall Jackson have saved the day ? Finally, Ive read that Union Gen. Meade actually refused to claim that he had won the battle when he telegraphed to Lincoln the next day about the battle.
Interessante
Victory Disease is the answer apart from Longstreet most of the Confederate Generals were for an Offensive against Meade as their men were also eager for offensive action too and despite orders not to engage the Union Army but await for the CSA Army to arrive,concentrate and examine the Battlefield in detail but AP Hill in particular let his Corps off the Leash allowing them to dictate the Battle field instead of Lee Himself.
Your videos are always a joy to watch. For some unexplained reason, Lee would not listen to common military sense regarding flanking the Federals when Longstreet strongly, and correctly, urged it initially. A large number of Confederates including John Bell Hood were wounded or died for that miscue. Picket’s charge was an even greater and foolish waste of men. It is inexplicable and inexcusable, and nobody ever flat out says that Lee really and truly f- ed up. Every strategy that Longstreet came up with, was superior military thinking.
Thank you for the nice comment. I think Lee had a number of things going against him. One, he had to attack, as oppose to defend. Two, he didn't have Stonewall. Three, he was used to winning (an important characteristic is realizing when you've been bested and cutting your losses). Four, the Army of the Potomac had all the right people at exactly the right place in good position.
I used to think that too. Then someone challenged me to look at a map and name what roads Lee would have taken to move around Meade's left. The answer is: Unless Meade sat on his thumbs doing nothing, there was no way Lee was getting around him. Meade had the interior lines of communication and, as it happened, he wasn't sitting on his thumbs. He was a pretty decent general - maybe not brilliant enough to go on the offensive in Virginia without Grant's guidance, but certainly good enough to fight a strong defensive campaign.
Ha, interesting Washington was accustomed to defeat. I didn't know that.
It was easier for Lee to stay a straight-A student when he had Thomas Jackson there to answer the hardest questions. Jackson would not have hesitated at the base of Culp's Hill the way Ewell did.
There were a number of lunatic frontal assaults in the CW like Malvern Hill, Franklin, and Cold Harbor.
Yes, Pickett's Charge is one of many disasters. Most Civil War battles had something like Pickett's Charge.
Also, Lee had a poor strategic concept in which he imagined himself striking a single, decisive blow that would force the Union to capitulate. By this point in the war he should have known better. The Confederacy needed to beat Lincoln at the ballot box, and to do that they had to conserve enough strength that the outcome was in doubt in late 1864. Gettysburg, among other battles, squandered that possibility.
This is an excellent insight into Lee's probable thinking. Another precedent is that he had discombobulated McClellan during the Seven Days Battles by attacking him head on. Lincoln had just placed the untried General Meade in charge of the Union army. Lee must have figured he could be discomfited the way McClellan had. btw. Lincoln wrote after the Battle of Fredericksburg: "We lost 12,000 men and the Confederates lost 5,000. If we keep up that ratio we have enough men to win the war." Lincoln oversimplified, because the heavy Union casualties undermined the morale of the people at home. However, he was on the side where losing more than two-to-one in one battle would not lose him the whole war. Lee was fighting on the side with the shoestring were losing 6,500 of his very best officers and men in Pickett's Charge may have been enough by itself to tip the Confederates past the point of victory in the war as a whole. That is why it is remembered as the distillation into one event that lost the war for the South.
Yes, Grant understood this cold calculus, and knew that he just had to keep advancing, no matter the horrible casualties.
@@JeffreytheLibrarian Grant was the classic grind-them-by-attrition general of a side with superior resources, whereas Lee, Jackson, and Forrest were the classic shock-and-awe generals who combine slender resources with mobility to destabilize and destroy an enemy's superior forces. Lee employed the strategy crudely at the late stages of the at Seven Days and Gettysburg, but it is understandable why he stretched the point. Whenever the Confederates hunkered down on the defensive --- in West Virginia, at Forts Henry and Donnellson, at Vicksburg, at Missionary Ridge, at Atlanta, and finally at Richmond / Petersburg, they were defeated, often losing entire armies. The Union armies, when firmly led by the likes of Grant and Sherman, had the numbers to outflank and even surround (as at Henry, Donnellson, and Vicksburg) the Confederates in static positions and either force them to abandon the field or be captured in place.
@@JeffreytheLibrarian btw. I'm enjoying your presentations of many battles. They are clear and insightful and deepening my understanding, even though I've studied them for 55 years. I am going to look at your presentation of Shiloh now. Thanks for taking the time and effort to put these together.
I think it was arrogance. Lee had manhandled Federal generals before and perhaps he was a little too self assured with Meade and company.
That being the case, Lee needed to maneuver, not continue frontal attacks. He needed another Chancellorsville - Jackson's masterpiece, not another Fredericksburg, Burnside's Blunder.
What "backup"? He sent all he had with no second wave.
Time was not on Lee's side he was losing he had to win big or go home.
@@TomTom-rh5gk So why select losing tactics? The South needed Frederick the Great, not Lee or Hood. The South could not afford battle after battle losing a larger percentage of its troops than the United States. Do the math. They needed to bleed the U.S. on the defense and hope for war weariness to remove the War party from control. Champion Hill, Antietam, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg - defeat by being bled to death. The U.S. was not Mexico.
@@thomaslinton1001 So why select losing tactics?
Lee was winning until he ended up in Gettysburg at the bottom of a hill. He won every time he advanced so why not now? We know in 2021 that charging up a hill was foolish but Lee didn’t know. Lee had no choice. If Lee waited his troops would starve and more Northern troops would arrive. If he left the field it would have turned victory into a rout.
What would we be saying now if Lee secretly met a time traveler who showed him the results of Picket’s Charge and Lee turned tail and ran? At the very least he would have been relieved of his command.
@@thomaslinton1001 The South needed Frederick the Great, not Lee or Hood.
Frederick the Great was a rationalist. His greatest contribution to the military was modernizing Prussia’s economy and bureaucracy. The Confederacy was based a romantic medieval fantasy. Frederick the Great wouldn’t last a day with his reforms. The South's irrational premises doomed it to failure.
Think of Israel versus the Arab dictatorships. The Arab dictatorships could easily beat Israel if they became modern democracies but then there would be no reason to fight Israel.
@@thomaslinton1001 The South could not afford battle after battle losing a larger percentage of its troops than the United States. Do the math. They needed to bleed the U.S. on the defense and hope for war weariness to remove the War party from control.
“Bleeding to death?” give me a break. The economy was grown faster than ever. People were getting rich. No one gets tired of getting rich.
Only today’s historians are war-weary because they want the Civil War to end so they can finish their books and send it to the publisher.
The pundits simply can’t tell the difference between 1864 and 1964. The Civil War and Vietnam were very different wars.
In a bleeding battle between the anemic man and the healthy man the anemic man always loses. Northern soldiers became less war-weary the longer they fought. The longer people fight the angrier they get. If the Democrats won and ordered the soldiers home the Grand Army of the Republic would have burned Washington and made Grant president.
Remember what Sherman did when the South fought a defensive war?? An agrarian society can’t afford to fight a defensive war. The invading army burns the crops and the soldiers who are needed to plant crops and take in the harvest are busy fighting.
The South needed a big victory and a stalemate. They need an armistice with no fighting but always the threat of war. They need a Cold War with the North.
One can dream.
This was Lee's second invasion of the North after Antietam. That battle ended in withdrawal back to Virginia. On Day 3 at Gettysburg Lee decided there was not going to be a withdrawl, it was going to be a win or loose roll of the dice with Picket's Charge.
When your dice can't roll anything but snake eyes, that isn't a real choice.
6000 losses in Pickett's charge over open ground in artillery that fires from three sides. This was to be expected.
It was a straight up Leroy Jenkins move
The fundamental problem is that precisely because the Confederacy was outnumbered, even a victory could come at too high a price. A case could be made for the charge if the Union artillery had indeed been disabled. But with the numbers being what they were, a charge based on couldashouldawoulda wasn't bravery, it was folly.
It's always a bigger gamble to go on the offensive, and you are right, being outnumbered makes the odds even worse.
@@JeffreytheLibrarian Lee was also badly outnumbered at Chancellorsville. And to boot split his army. How did that work out?
@@bobporch Luck was the determinant there. lf Hooker hadn't lost his nerve and froze, the ANV would have suffered a crushing defeat.
@ohaus - This "disabling" attempt ignored the reality that the charge could be attacked from three sides by artillery. So the confederates bever had the means to silence the union artillery. It was utter incompetence to send the men to be slaughtered.
More worship--not just of Lee but Stonewall Jackson, US Grant, and the whole lot. Robert Robert, below, has it right, except that he is too polite: only an idiot would send troops across the ground that Pickett's Charge covered (by the way, it is interesting to note that neither Pickett or any of his staff received any wounds; in fact, no one could recall even seeing them--they probably found a small out-building to hide in during the charge). Lee allowed his troops to be trapped between the Union forces and the Antiem Creek (only McClellan's ineptitude--he never brought up over a third of his forces---allowed the South to escape. At Fredericksburg, Stonewall Jackson brought his troops out from behind the wall and 10,000 casualties resulted. As to Chancellorville, you said that Lee ordered Stonewall's troops to march AT NIGHT around the Union troops; they marched in the daytime. And that, as they say, is a difference between night and day. By the time Stonewall's troops reached the back of the Union troops, the daylight was almost over. They literally ran out of daylight and most of the Union troops survived intact. The Generals of the Civil War never launched a night attack, no sappers, no raiders were sent to blow up supplies, no setting fire to a field (if the soldiers' of the South had thought to burn the grass in front of Pickett's Charge, they would have had a good chance of success--and yes, I have been there). The over-riding determinate of the Civil War was the introduction of the Spencer repeating rifle. It allowed soldiers to inflect enough casualties to break the South.
The Spencer was used in very small numbers, even if you also count the Henry. Certainly it was vital at Chickamauga, where Wilder's brigade performed dramatically well, but the Spencer doesn't come close to being the "over-riding determinate".
1) the bend in the union line at cemetary hill made sense to attack. A bend is a weak point because superior numbers can overwhelm that single spot. If Lee wanted to engage or roll the dice on an engagement, I see why Cemetery Ridge was in consideration.
2) Lee's personal strength became his undoing - lee's incredible work ethic developed into chronic sleep deprivation between June 1962 when he took command of ANV and July 1963. Anyone's judgement under such stress could easily fray, to say nothing of Lee's record of strong tactical desicion making over that time frame
3) i hope my comments added something useful to the discussion - im very impressed with and reassured in humanity by this chat
Thank you so much for those nice comments. I think Lee was exhausted, and I think he wanted the war over. He was also down 2 corps commanders: Stonewall was dead, and AP Hill was ill. And he was without cavalry scouts. Also, he really hadn't had a time before when the Army of the Potomac just wouldn't budge. And this turns the question around: at Gettysburg, the Confederates encountered a Union Army that was determined and resolved. Every step of the way, from Buford's stand, to Reynolds' stand, to Greene at Culp's Hill, to Chamberlain at Little Round Top, to Hancock at Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge, Meade's army on those three days was probably the best army in the world. Everyone was above and beyond.
On point 1, weighing against that was the Union had the short interior lines which Meade used on days 2 and 3 of Gettysburg. Something that was part of Lee’s success when he fought in Virginia.
1.) Running into prepared artillery fire from three sides makes no sense. The barrage was the clear message to the union were the attack will happen. So the union artillery played along fell silent and waited for the attack to bleed them dry from all sides.
By day’s end, Pickett’s casualties, including killed, wounded, and captured, numbered 2,655, or about 42 percent of his men. Pettigrew lost 2,700 men (62 percent) and Trimble 885 (52 percent).
Lee had no good options left by day three at Gettysburg. Maneuvering in the presence of the enemy was impossible d/t the location (deep in Union territory and needing to secure lines of supply and communication back down the valley) and the fact that he was facing a larger and more mobile opposing force. The state of Confederate horses by this point in the war hindered their mobility greatly and the new superiority of Union Cavalry in both mobility and firepower (with healthy horses and repeating rifles) meant that any attempt at maneuver in the presence of the enemy by Lee would have most likely resulted in a much greater disaster than Pickett's charge itself. The entire ANV would have in great jeopardy if this were attempted. So Lee's choices by day three, were 1) take your best shot at winning today, on this ground, with forces as deployed or 2) simply accept a strategic defeat by breaking off the battle and retreating back down the valley without taking a last throw of the dice. Lee chose to throw the dice rather than simply accept a failure of his strategic objectives without any further offensive actions.
Yes, I think you're right. Lee was there to win, not to prolong the conflict.
Some degree of maneuvering could have been still tactically beneficial. Goading parts of the Union forces to break the line would likely have been feasible (cf. Sickles) and allowed to chew them up bit by bit rather than yelling "HULK SMASH!!!" when you're not really the Hulk.
Though all in all, the whole campaign was questionable. An offensive campaign with inferior forces is not particularly likely to succeed and even if it does, more likely to end in a pyrrhic victory than major achievements.
BS If Lee listened to Longstreet, the Confederacy might actually be a separate nation now. Think about how this would have played out if Lee was killed on the first day. Longstreet was not a vain-glorious douche-bag like Lee.
@@princeofcupspoc9073 Nor a self righteous, sanctimonious, slave holding, albeit, well mannered, bigot.
@@princeofcupspoc9073 Longstreet's suggestion was not a viable option by 3 July. Lee's plan of campaign was to entice the AotP into attacking the AoNV- and the disastrous meeting engagement of 1 July had all but ruined any possibility of that taking place. Moreover, the AoNV was foraging off of enemy territory and couldn't remain in any one area for more than 3- 5 days- and it hadn't foraged since Lee's concentration order of 29 June. Lastly- the primary strategic objective of the entire campaign was to achieve enough of a success to force the Union to lift the siege of Vicksburg, and Vicksburg was placed under siege before Lee's campaign even began. Lee's assault on 3 July was the only option which he had left.
It's one of two correct actions which Lee made during the campaign (the other being the decision to attack on 2 July). Otherwise, the major mistakes of the campaign- actually carrying out an offensive in the east to resolve a situation in the west, using too much time in the march north, and (above all) giving his cavalry commander two objectives for one small force- were all made by Lee.
Maybe Lee’s thinking was not as acute as before because he had had a major heart attack. Despite this he has taken to the field. Do we really know how he was feeling that day or even the preceding days?
Some say that Lee's "blood was up," and some have wondered if Lee was not feeling well. He may have been frustrated that his Day 2 efforts weren't successful. He had never been in that situation before, where his actions had run up against a wall.
Was is realy the mindset of Lee or was it a nervous Davis putting pressure on Lee to archive a decisive battle?
I think you're right that the pressure was on for something decisive to happen for the South in the east, especially with the war in the west essentially lost for the south by summer 1863.
Classic high ground advantage, the Union forces organized themselves very well coordinating artillery and rifle fire to maximum effect, Lee misread the odds of success very badly, just a very sad day of needless loss of life. A retreat and then a mass movement to the Union's right flank would have been a better idea, but it's easy for me to say.
... who wanted to attack on September 18, 1862. Hyper aggressive and imprudent.
Well said.
The worst thing that can happen to a coach is to lose. The worst thing that can happen to a coach is to win.
"A goalie (or pitcher) is only as good as his last game."
I am a bit surprised that you did not mention the Eastern Cavalry Field and how George Armstrong Custer held off a flanking attack by J.E.B Stuart's cavalry. As Jay Dubbyuh noted below, Tom Carhartt, in his book, Lost Triumph, made a good case that it was Robert E. Lee's intention on the third day to combine Pickett's charge with the Stuart lead flanking attack down the Baltimore Pike to disrupt the middle of the North's position. I agree with Tom Carhartt that Lee intended to have Stuart attack the rear of the Federal center, while Picket's assault attacked the front of the line. George Armstrong Custer's relatively small cavalry force of Wolverines and other midwesterners held off JEB Stuart's much greater cavalry force. Lee then took responsibility for his failures at Gettysburg, and never said anything about Stuart's failure versus Custer. I think we owe Custer a great deal for his leadership and heroic actions on that day.
It is fair to assume Lee imagined Stuart's cavalry action would force Meade to scramble whatever reserves were on hand. Unfortunately, not only did it fail to force Meade's hand, but the Union center crushed the assault without the need for significant reinforcement.
Lee's plan was inexcusably bad. He intended four things to happen: (1) Stuart to draw off Union reserves. (2) Confederate artillery to silence the Union artillery. (3) Pickett's charge to seize the center ground. (4) The attack right to destabilize the Union left sufficiently that it would likely collapse from even a weak threat from the broken center. If the efforts of the 3rd day fail to achieve 4 of 4 of these goals, disaster for the ANV is guaranteed. Lee went 0 for 4.
Custer had to retreat disorderly and he commanded only a giny force. He was only one following orders and many more protected the flank.
The cavalry maneuver by Stuart is rightly considered a hail mary. His men and mounts were exhausted, the trip around Meade's army was long, and the only hope of success was that the Union cavalry would be sitting in their tents watching Netflix instead of doing usual cavalry things like scouting, screening, and protecting the flanks and rear.
Lee should have learned the lesson of Washington. The lesson that Ho Chi Mihn and Giap learned.
When confronted by a numerically and logistically superior foe, you don't have to win. You just can't lose.
As disastrous as Gettysburg was, it did bear significant fruit for the Confederacy in that it kept the Union army out of Virgina for almost a year. The A.N.V. was as strong as it was ever going to be when Grant began his equally disastrous spring of '64 campaign. In 30 days, he loses the equivalent of the entire A.N.V. Mary Lincoln summed up Grant the best. " The U.S. in his name is reported to mean Unconditional Surrender, and while that may be true, for me it shall always be Unspeakable Slaughter. For if butchery were the goal, I could lead troops as well"
If the breach in Meade's line could have been exploited on 3 July, Meade would've been destroyed in detail. But the command structure was utterly destroyed and a Confederate soldier gave the most heartbreaking cry ever uttered by any soldier in any war. He looked back for reinforcements that weren't there and cried out " For God's sake! Why don't they come?!"
Deo Vindice.
Mary Lincoln is not reliable source of military analysis.
Grant lost as many men in a single campaign as his predecessors had done in the previous 3 years, with one major difference: at the end of his campaign - in less than 50 days, in fact - Lee was trapped in Petersburg, where his army would sit and starve for the remainder of the war.
Grant also repeatedly ordered his subordinates to perform intelligent operational maneuvers, and repeatedly saw his subordinates fumble badly.
Take Benjamin Butler, for example...a man in command of the Army of the James, who had no business carrying a musket let alone leading an army.
@@aaronfleming9426
True. But even a broken clock is right twice a day.
@@marksellers4875 True. But Mary Lincoln wasn't right in this case.
Also, the ANV was significantly stronger at several points prior to the Overland campaign, including at Gettysburg. What might Lee have been able to do throughout '63 and '64 without the losses of Gettysburg? Perhaps send another whole division to Bragg before Chickamauga?
Gettysburg was lost for the confederacy when Ewell didnt take Culps hill on day one. Yes I have the advantege of hindsight and I dont know the condition of the men, horses or supplies BUT the north was entrenched on high ground and Lee knew this. He must have known this was unwinable. Trying to manuever to better ground was no less suicidal than fighting days two and three at Gettysburg.
It was in Lee’s genetic makeup to ATTACK. That aggressiveness had served him very well time and again. He needed this war to end and fast. It makes sense if you look at through that prism.
Lee' had to have a victory. Now Grsnt at Vicksburg was choking that city and not to try something to balance that well could have been on Lee's mind. Was that practical ?Unless the Army of NV took Washington D.C. No But as a diversion maybe though it might into a total disaster. An even bigger one than Picketts charge was.
Lee lost 20% of his men overall and this is one of the highest losses of any General in the war. Problem is the confederacy coukd not afford to loose nen fir nothibg as Lee never achieved any strategic objective. Beating an army that gets refilled is useless.
He may have thought that, but he didn't know that. What he needed to do was make the war miserable enough for the Northern public to dump Lincoln and the Republican's in the '64 elections. A brief survey of successful insurgencies through the ages shows that going on offensive campaigns and taking on larger armies in tactically disadvantageous situations is not a winning strategy.
Lee was running out of options by day 3 of the battle. He basically could disengage, attack or try to go around like Longstreet recommended. He was counting on the artillery barrage and his cavalry to open up the Union center on day 3. The problem is when you are attacking a mile over open ground you are going to lose 1/3rd to 1/2 of your men. The same thing happened at Malvern Hill to Lee, the confederate army at Franklin (due to John Bell Hood) and to the Union Army at Fredericksburg and Cold Harbor. I don't care how brave your men are (and Lee's men were very brave). Your soldiers can't fight well after they are blasted with double cannister from cannon and massed infantry fire. Lee should have know his because he was commanding at Malvern Hill and at Fredericksburg. He saw what massed fire could do to attacking troops. Monday morning quarterbacking is always easier and I'm no different. If the attack did work Lee probably figured he could win the war and get the union to sue for peace. Give the Union credit for winning the battle also, especially where they lost most of the battles against the Army of Northern Virginia up until that time. The Union Army was great also. Give Meade and the Union credit for winning the battle. Give Custer's Calvary a lot of credit also, they were outnumbered like 10:1 and checked the confederate Calvary charge in back of the center of the union line. The problem with war is when a general makes a bad decision, thousands of people can die (or tens of millions after numb nuts Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941). Lee should have tried to out maneuver the Union at Gettysburg instead of head on assaults on all 3 days of the battle. Lee couldn't afford to lose a quarter of his army. He couldn't replace troops the way the union could.
Lee invaded for supplies, but only lack of it in 1865 forced him to surrender, he rejected guerrilla warfare.
This idea that large scale frontal assaults were doomed to failure in that war is false. This take always ignores large scale frontal attacks that were successful. Lee also commanded at Gaines Mill and Chancellorsville, where his commands achieved victory attacking fortified positions. We give Grant and Thomas credit for winning the battles outside Chattanooga, when they were attacking up some of the most daunting geographical positions in the war. Longstreet, despite being remembered today as the guy who was reasonable and wanted to fight on the defensive, earned his reputation through some of the largest, most successful grand assaults of the war-Gaines Mill again, 2nd Manassas, and Chickamauga.
Furthermore, even though tactically, frontal assaults could be costly, the strategic situation favored attack. To sit idle in a defensive posture was very dangerous-especially when doing so in enemy territory, with the danger of having your line of supply, communication and retreat cut off. Surrendering the initiative to the enemy, and giving them a chance to dictate terms could have disastrous effects. The best example of this is Joe Johnston’s Atlanta campaign. He desperately wanted to fight his own “Fredericksburg”. The problem is, the enemy doesn’t really have to comply. They can simply turn your position and force your withdrawal. Even in this case when they DID get a tactical defensive victory at Kennesaw Mountain, it bore almost no strategic fruit, as Sherman still was in excellent position to simply turn Johnston off of that Mountain through maneuver.
So there’s a reason why Civil War commanders chose frontal assaults. And despite this popular modern idea that it was a stubborn refusal to stray from the “Old Napoleonic style” of warfare, it made good sense, and DID sometimes work out.
The incident on cemetery hill on the second day doesn't get the attention that it deserves. Gen. Wright's brigade did manage to get on to cemetery hill, but eventually had to withdraw because he was getting no support from Posey and Lang's brigades on his immediate right and left. Lee was let down by Gen. Mahone, who disobeyed his superior officer's order (Gen. Anderson) to support Wright. I have often wondered if, in ordering the charge on the third day, Lee might have been attempting to do with three divisions what a single brigade had accomplished the day before.
Yes, the rebels made it to ridge on day 2, and Lee was convinced that the only failure in the strategy was that the attacks were not in concert. Day 3 was an attempt to get those attacks in concert.
Lee witnessed/led AoNV at Battle of Malvern Hill and lost. Attacking entrenched enemy on high ground was suicidal but attacked any way. poor tactics
Lee witnessed/led AoNV at Battle of Fredericksburg and won. Attacking entrenched enemy on high ground was suicidal but Burnside attacked any way poor tactics
not one but TWO battles Proving - DO NOT attack entrenched enemy on high ground, but stupid Lee did it any way
Lee- WW1 trench warfare frontal attacks Longstreet WW2 maneuver pick ground of your choosing, not the enemy's, like Sun Tzu said centuries ago
And Longstreet ordered his men to attack entrenched enemies at Battle of Fort Sanders by underestimating fortification of Fort Sanders. He lost badly even though the Rebels outnumbered the Federals by 1 to 6.
Three Confederate armies surrendered to General Grant.
Fort Donalson in February of 1862.
Vicksburg in July of 1863.
Appomattox in April 1865.
How many Union armies surrendered to Lee? ZERO!
Lee knew he had to win, and win quickly. He was out on his own, a long way from reliable lines of supply and communications. Basically, he was on a raid in force, not a campaign of conquest. He had what ammountion he had, and whatever he could capture, but he couldn't count on any help from home. He was counting on foraging off the people of Maryland and Pennsylvania for food. Hoped for reinforcements in the form of volunteers from, especially Maryland (considered sympathetic to the south) to swell his ranks, but they failed to materialize.
If he tried to go around the Union Army he risked being caught in movement and easily cut to pieces, by the larger Union Army, who would also have the advantage of interior lines. If he marched on Washington, there there thousands of Union troops who had never been engaged waiting to defend the city.
No, the enemy was here. He had to fight him...here. He'd tried the left...He'd tried the right and failed in both places. The center was the only place left. Or, he could retreat back to Virginia, again risking being caught on the road, and cut to pieces, which probably should have happened after Pickets Charge, but Meade seems to be just happy to have managed to not lose, and made no serious effort to follow up on his victory.
Good video. Thanks.
He may have *thought* that, but he didn't *know* that. What he *needed* to do was make the war miserable enough for the Northern public to dump Lincoln and the Republican's in the '64 elections. A brief survey of successful insurgencies through the ages shows that going on offensive campaigns and taking on larger armies in tactically disadvantageous situations is not a winning strategy.
It looks like Lee had some great luck with his previous battles ,some very good fortune until he got to Gettysburg .
I agree. He hit a wall at Gettysburg, and he never recovered thereafter.
@@JeffreytheLibrarian very good reply thanks Freind 👍
Actually, Lee's decision to forbid Longstreet and Hood from taking the Round Tops was just as bad. The Union didn't even have any men on the Round Tops, all the South had to do was to take the undefended heights and then rain down artillery terror on Cemetery Ridge. The whole Union line would probably have collapsed. But Lee insisted on a direct assault on Cemetery Ridge, which failed.
But they did attack Little Round Top. I believe it was a Union officer, General Warren I think, who spotted the Confederates moving towards LRT. He ordered Union troops to defend the position and they did just that.
You're assuming that the Union would not have moved to secure LRT if Hood/Longstreet had moved toward them earlier in the day. But that's a baseless assumption.
A librarian.....
All because of Jeb... riding around, telling villagers he didn't use tobacco in any form.
By no means all. Stuart had no idea there would be a meeting engagement at Gettysburg, and a wider sweep would sow more consternation in the North.
Lee was full of himself. He got cocky and lost plain and simple.
Picket failed because the point of his attack was defended by 4 regiments of Philly dudes. They probably had brass nuckles and chains LOL
The motivation of Lee at Gettysburg is similar to the motivation of Yamamoto at Pearl Harbor. In both wars, the industrial power of the US would eventually win out. Lee and Yamamoto knew this, so they gambled all on a single knock-out strike. Both failed. Pickett's charge turned into a slaughter, and Yamamoto missed the US carriers, fuel tanks, and decoding operations at Pearl.
I think this is wrong. It wasn't inevitable that the US would win in either case, and in fact in spring after Gettysburg, Lincoln thought that he would lose reelection, and a peace Democrat might have been elected.
I would not recommend reading history backwards and assume the future was inevitable. At Gettysburg, Lee had seen frontal assaults would occasionally work, especially if the defender over protects the flanks. I don't know if you are exactly saying this, but I just want to say that it wasn't a desperate haymaker.
Yes, not inevitable. As shown by North Vietnam, you can win a war simply by not losing. Suing for peace was the strategy of the South, and it also became the strategy of Japan during WWII. But as long as the stronger side is willing to do what it takes to fight to the end, the conclusion is inevitable. If the North was willing to keep Lincoln in office and keep fighting, the end was predetermined. And from his time living in the US, Yamamoto suspected that the US would never quit, so he correctly surmised that a lucky knock-out blow was the only way to win the war. Unfortunately for him, he missed the carriers, oil tanks, and decryption facility at Pearl Harbor.
While Pearl Harbor did fail it wasn’t like the Japanese suffered great casualties. Both Gettysburg and Midway were the turning points of the war, when the Kido Butai lost 75% of its carriers there was no winning. Lee was never going to win after Gettysburg, I don’t think Lee could’ve ever won but at the point of late 1863 Lee has lost so many men and commanders that just can’t be replaced.
The Civil War was like a precursor to WW1 in the way that land didn’t really matter, it wax about destroying the enemy until their will to fight dwindles. If Lee wanted any shot at winning he should’ve listened to Longstreet, Antietam was already a major offensive loss for Lee, meanwhile anytime the Union attacked in the East prior to 1864 Lee won.
I know Midway was a key victory for America, but I have come to see the Battle of the Philippine Sea (not Midway or Guadalcanal) as the key victory in the Pacific War. Carriers and submarines were really the only ships that truly mattered in the Pacific War, although neither side fully understood this at the beginning. Philippine Sea was key because Japan lost so many planes and pilots that its carriers would never again be an effective force. Japan had no time left to train new pilots or build new planes. And once naval power was lost, the door was open for America to proceed all the way to Japan.
If you look at the shear numbers, Longstreet’s assault on day two of Gettysburg is far bigger of a charge and more successful than “Picket’s Charge”!
Longstreet's attack on Day 2 was huge. And some of the units crossed the same ground that would be trod the next day at Pickett's Charge. Some even made it to Cemetery Ridge.
Go to the ground. That is, the Gettysburg Battlefield. Then go to Lee's Hq on or just behind Seminary Ridge. Then turn and look towards McPherson Ridge... then beyond...
What you will see are the mtns that are The Army of Northern Virginia's screen to get back to Fredericksburg, Va. That is... they're pretty damn close to the battlefield!!
Therefore...
Lee wasn't a moron. He knew that he had not damaged the Army of The Potomac enuff in two days of battle to stop it from following him hard , so he did something to damage it more!
Therefore...
200 cannon bombardment. 15, 000 man assault. Not his original plan, but he had to do something, and he gave the insubordinate Longstreet an even more thankless task than the original plan to damage the AOP more... A commander has to do what a commander has to do sometimes!!
Lee's overriding concern was the safety of his army after being fixed with the enemy.
We know that even after Pickett/Pettigrew/Trimble... Meade gave a pretty good chase of the ANV, and were it not for the weather... Meade may have snagged it!!
So, you can say Lee was an idiot, but history shows that to be untrue. You can say he had the runs, but the runs don't make one do insane things. One can say as the narrative laden and stupid historians say... " his dander was up. "
Lee was a brilliant commander, and his army was his life. Thus, its safety was paramount, and there was no way he could've thought that he could keep the AOP off of him on retreat, unless he damaged it more...
PS : And if anyone buys the notion that Lee thought the attack was LIKELY to succeed, they need to put the pipe down. Ummm... he was a mathematician, engineer and had commanded at Maryes Heights... ya know, lol!
Also... Lee tells Rodes and Early to come back to WEST of the Mtns when he thinks the AoP is closing on his dispersed army!
He wants to, obviously, head back to Virginia prior to the battle even taking place...
He's done nothing in and around Gettysburg to prepare for battle, lol! And there are many ways in which he could have done that!!
However, events intervened.
It seems to me... that Hill was intended to go down Chambersburg Rd to screen for Rodes and Early as they made their way back NORTH of that road.
Hill gets in over his head and forces Rodes and Early to drop... TO PROTECT THEIR RETREAT...
Thus, we get the battle forced on Lee.
We can make up whatever we want about Lee's intentions, like most "historians " do!!
But there are records that " historians " are supposed to pay attention to! There are logistical necessities that any commander must pay attention to! That " historians " are supposed to be aware of!
He stated his intentions. His campaign matched his intentions - the massive trail of supplies going back to Virginia... The great dispersion, the arc towards Harrisburg... was to hopefully drag it out so that as many supplies as possible could get back to Virginia!
Lee tells Rodes and Early to come back WEST of the mountains!
Hill goes down the Chambersburg Pike in a screen to protect them as they take the roads north of Chambersburg Rd!
Thus... Lee dont wanna fight at Gettysburg.... because he isn't prepared and KNOWS IT!!
The last intention of the Pennsylvania Campaign was to do battle!
Lee certainly wasn't a moron. JFC Fuller called him an "operational past-master"; he was an excellent engineer; and was clearly a powerful motivator.
But, he also wasn't a world-class military genius. He has numerous significant errors on his record, including poor strategic conceptualization, weak staff work, an unhelpful sense of honor, and a propensity for avoidable bloodbaths. Everything at Gettysburg fits into the pattern of Lee's weaknesses.
@@aaronfleming9426 That's idiotic.
Tell Dwight D. Eisenhower when you se him that Lee wasn't a world class military genius!
Lee's helped design the CSA strategy of war... which made it possible for the severely outmanned and out equipped CSA to stay in the war, and bleed the USA as much as was possible!
The invasion of Pennsylvania gave the ANV provisions that allowed it to sit for 10 moths until the Overland Campaign began in May of 1864.
That invasion was a brilliant move for that reason & because it battered & bled the AoP, and it took both armies out of N. Va for a time.
Go stand on McPherson Ridge or Oak Ridge at Gettysburg... & look due west... & you will see why Lee attacked as he did on July 3rd!!
If I have to tell you the reason after July 1's & July 2's results... you don't know much!!!
You probably think that Lee was intent on attacking Harrisburg or dropping down to attack DC in the Pa Campaign like most of the idiot historians do!!
The CSA strategy did not allow for such & those cities were never going to be attacked by Lee or any other CSA army, lol!
You probably think Lee fought on July 3rd because his " dander was up " like the idiot narrative spinning historians say!!!
You probably think like the idiot historians that George McClellan was a slow, weak general!
Maybe be specific in your criticisms & I will respond to them one by one.
So you are saying HUBRIS was Lees downfall
There is an element of hubris, but I think that is natural after so many successes.
@@JeffreytheLibrarian Whatever the reason...a good number of men died that day
Like your comments Lee was good but over rated . He didn't see the big picture and did not ever tell what his goal was in the North. He was good in defensive but at that time any private was good in defense. On the offense he wasn't that good.
Famous author David Martin says it may be possible that Lee may have thought the 6th Corps was not on the field on July 3rd. He had prisoners from every other corps, but not the over 12,000 man 6th corps. He also suggests that it’s not outside the realm of possibility that he was unaware that the AOP had also been reinforced by the Vermont brigade, the Harper’s Ferry cowards brigade, another brigade in the 12th corps who commanders name eludes me right now, and two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserves. That’s around 20,000 men Lee may not be aware are on the field waiting to meet him. Take those men out of the equation, the charge on the 3rd has a much better chance of success. Of course they where there, but Lee may not of known that.
No everyone in Picket's charge was a dead men walking. The 6000 losses were to be expected when you run into prepared artillery that shoots from three sides.
Lee knew the North would wear down the South into defeat. He went North to win the war not another battle. He and Davis wrote time and again about the strategy of " war weariness" to gain a negotiated settlement. As the election was approaching Lincoln was in real danger of losing the election to Democrats who were ready to end the war. The greatest disaster of Gettysburg was the poor attitude of Stuart splitting his cavalry and leaving Lee blind as to the AOP's movement and forces. Lee was destroyed by petty jealousy and quarrels between his officers.
Lee's main problem was that he lost sight of his strategic goals and reverted back to trying to win a battle. Longstreet was right in that they should have got between the Union Army and Washington and forced them to attack a position of strength.
@@petergaskin1811 If it hadn’t been for the one spy Longstreet hired to hunt for Union forces and he alerting the ANV of of the danger they were in Lee’s army may well have been destroyed piecemeal.
Pretty accurate and I want to add to his explanation.
A major fatal mistake made by Gen. Pickett is a failure to obey Longstreet's order not to charge toward to the Union line until the weak flank collapse. Pickett was too early to advance his infantry, and that allowed the Union to fire their cannons as soon as his charge went closer and closer.
In addition, Union Gen. Meade ordered his men not to kill Gen. Pickett to prove that Lee's disastrous decision to do Pickett's Charge by hitting Gen. Armistead instead to take him out of the equation of Pickett's Charge so the Confederate loses him, that's Pickett's right hand man of the charge.
Had Pickett was killed during the Pickett's Charge instead of Gen. Armistead, Confederate would instantly had to retreat the advancement of the Confederate and allow Union to take Gettysburg from the Confederate. Lee's remaining Pickett's infantry would have been preserved and Gen. Longstreet would have been relieved from his duties of the Confederate by sending him back to his family and never again be the General of the Confederate. That would have been useful for reinforcement to the Battle of the Second Bull Run on Confederate side and would have had a chance to win the Civil War.
The odd of winning Gettysburg for both sides are slim. Union had 2% chance to win Gettysburg, while Confederate has a chance to win at 1%. It would be close to a stalemate (97% chance), meaning either sides would have took Gettysburg had it not for Second Day of Gettysburg Battle disaster by both sides. Second Day was Lee's second major mistake that could have sent Confederate to lose a war, but lucky that his men retreated from the Little Hill and Large Hill. Had Confederate continued the fight on both hills, on the Second Day of Battle of Gettysburg, Lee would have surrendered to the Union at Gettysburg and lose the war. It is like what Obi Wan Kenobi said to Anakin Skywalker, "I have the higher ground".
I'm pretty sure Meade wasn't on the front line calling out the targeting of individual generals...
Only the Pennsylvanian reserved fought with Spenser guns in Gettysburg, so Lee was lucky because his Army's causalty would have been twice higher in the second day if the bigger % of the Meade's Army would have used Spencer guns and nobody would have discussed about Pickett and his soldiers today! Lincoln tried to help the inventor, but the Army'ordenance leader did not assist the Spencer gun. Rosencrans tried to get Spencer guns out of the normal logistic, but he get few guns so Chicamagua's catastrophic root case could be the few Spencer guns (Thomas was there luckily).
Had Pettigrew's division of close to 8,000 men continued their charge on Cemetery Ridge instead of fleeing the battlefield in fear, Pickett may have had a chance. Pettigrew's men fleeing the battlefield doomed Pickett's charge and by inference- Lee's plan.
How many men would have actually reached the ridge? Half of the 15,000 men in the assault were killed or wounded, including a large majority of the brigade commanders. In addition, by July 3 Meade had an additional corps in reserve to reinforce the US lines.
@@jimiverson3085 Of the 4.800 under Pickett 4,200 were killed, wounded or captured. Of the 8,000 under Trimble/Pettigrew the number was 2.,300. You do the math- who did the fighting and dying that day???
@@kenbash2951
There is still the basic math problem - about 6,000 men might have reached the hilltop (more continuing the attack = more killed and wounded) to face a full Union corps in reserve behind the front line. And there were no Confederate resources available to back them up.
@kenbask2951 The union artillery smashed them to pieces abd whatever would have reached the union lines would run into the fresh reserves behind that would have taken them prisoner or no one would have made it back.
Pickett's men faced the EXACT same artillery as Pettigrew and Trimble's. They just had more balls.@@TorianTammas
I think that just saying that Robert e Lee knew that he needed to win then and there is not a good explanation. It doesn't mean that Lee couldn't have found a better way to win there and then. It doesn't explain a bad tactical decision. Robert e Lee and the Confederates could possibly have won the battle by attacking the Left flank and then enfilading the union troops after taking one or both of the round tops. He didn't have to win then and there by attacking a dug in position by means of a march through open ground while under artillery barrage. As I said in my other comment I think it was hubris, plain and simple.
Many would agree with you that Lee underestimated the Union defenders he was going up against.
The South started the war because the South was dying economically. The South was losing so Lee had to chance it all on one last throw of the dice.
Yes, I think Lee knew the longer it went on, the more the odds went against him.
Lee was over confident.
He believed his army was invincible.
Longstreet on the other hand seen the reality of the situation.
He also was under the delusion that
GOD was on his side, he needed to read Scripture more carefully.
"Love your enemies pray for those who dispitefully use you"
Lee was not a great general.
The north always knew what his plans were because they all studied together at west Pont.
The middle and lower ranks were able to salvage victory from his mistakes.
Lee was not going to admit defeat and retreat with 15 Virginia regiments that had not bled at Gettysburg. Through hindsight we know that the charge was ill-advised, but it must have made a strong impression on General Meade because for the next ten months Meade seemed unwilling to order such frontal attacks against Lee, much to Lincoln's frustration. So the charge bought the Confederacy a 10 month respite in Virginia until Grant began his Overland Campaign.
Yes, there is something to that. Lee, I think, was used to his strategy working, and the Union decided it was not budging at Gettysburg.
Lee is over-rated as a general. He was the Revolutionary War Gates of the Civil War South. Way to aggressive, continually ordering frontal assaults, and didn't understand Sun Tzu, "know yourself and know your enemy." He didn't have the troops or industry the north did to support his army, but lead it like a Union General. Victory or defeat, he would lose a higher percentage of troops than the enemy many times. George Washington understood to win against England, his main goal was to keep the army alive; Lee seems to take the same outlook as we did in Vietnam - win enough tactical engagements, and the strategic victory will follow.
Lee was arrogant. When you win, you keep on winning, til you lose.
Reasons: this charge was a Napoleonic tactic that worked for Napoleon in several battles. Another, is that the South had only enough ammunition for a three day major battle and may explain Lee's decision onJuly 3rd, 1863.
It worked in the day when the range of infantry weapons was about 100 yards. By the Civil War, the effective range of infantry weapons was more like 400 yards, along with increased range for artillery weapons. By that time, frontal assaults were essentially doomed, a lesson that had still not dawned on military commanders in 1914.
@@jimiverson3085 ...or 1916, during the Somme.
No Napoleon was an artillery officer and he orchestrated the artillery. He never came up with an attack in the center and hope the enemy artillery does not smash you into pieces man.
Lee repeated Waterloo.
Lee's strategy on the 3rd day was brilliant. I just wasn't executed. There were 3 components of which Picket's Charge was only one. The second was a massive artillery bombardment of the Union center. Because the South did not have smokeless gunpowder, Alexander who commanded the artillery, could not see that his guns were over shooting the Union line. Most shells fell harmlessly in the Union rear. The 3rd component is where Lee should have destroyed the Union army. It called for a movement not unlike Chancellorsville. Stuart's entire cavalry corps was to sweep around the Union rear and attack the Union center at the same time as Picket hit from the front. Stuart who was not present until the evening of the 2nd day, was stopped cold by George Custer's Michigan Brigade supported by the 1st NJ and 2nd PA cavalry regiments. Custer himself led 3 charges against the head of Stuart's Corps which was in column formation and could bring its full force to bear. Custer disobeyed a direct order to move his brigade to the extreme left of the Union line to protect the flank. Had he not saved the Union Army from being cut in half and swept away he would have been court martialed. An interesting footnote is that on 22 June Custer commanded a single cavalry troop. Suddenly orders came through making him a brigadier general and putting him in command of the 4 regiments of the Michigan Brigade: obviously a very fortuitous blunder at the War Department.
I don't think anybody had smokeless powder in the 1860s. Pretty sure that wasn't invented until the 1880s in France
@@narichey1981 You are correct but the point was that as soon as the South opened the canon fire they no longer could see the target. Thus they did not realize they were over shooting the target. Also, canon were not advanced with the infantry which was a military norm in that era.
And the Confederates had pretty much run out of cannon ammunition after their bombardment. Otherwise they'd have been firing as the troops advanced. And the Union artillery general had had his guns cease firing slowly, one at a time. Smart.
@@bobporch When i have no artillery observer and no way of checking that i hit that target then any idea to sikence the guns of the enemy failed before the first shot. So all they did was alarm the union where the attack would come. The only way to support infantry with artiĺery while they attack over open field would have been to fire on the artillery to distract or force the other artillery into cover even as this likelyhood to hid them was low. Even this could have failed as it was of little real effect and more moral.
The frontal assault had worked for Lee in the Mexican American war and he had successfully used it in the Civil war. Lee is overrated, he was good when in friendly country but did less well both times he invaded the North. Lets give credit to Gen Mead too, he anticipated Lee's attack and had his troops in position.
Longstreet's idea of attacking right was probably a winning move on the home turf of Virginia, but it was suicide to attempt on that setting in Pennsylvania.
Winning on enemy soil was tough. Most generals who attempted it did poorly or failed completely. There is a very short list of commanders who were proven competent at this endeavor, and Lee is not on that list. Lee is very good, but overrated. Calling him the best is like calling a baseball/football manager/coach whose team has never won a playoff game the best -- getting to the playoffs is good, but it is not enough to be rated great.
@@ComradeOgilvy1984 Great analogy. As you said fighting on land you know with a friendly population willing to help is a huge plus. Lee also depended on his generals too much and as attrition removed some of the best Lee still acted like it was the early war.