Eighty years on, and Britain is still trying try to whitewash its failure and disgrace. It was a shame then; it's a shame now. My grandfather said as much - and, no, he wasn't at Singapore. He was from Hong Kong. He was lucky to get to Australia in 1937, when the Japanese invaded Shanghai, where he worked. But he was torn to see his Hong Kong given up. If there's one thing to be gained from Singapore, it was that it was a wakeup call to the fact that Britain considered all its colonies - who had fought on its behalf for in so many conflicts - merely expendable. Yet it didn't stop his whinging at Curtin for bringing home our troops to what Britain was going to fail to do (despite its promises): defend Australia. Britain felt entitled to our soldiers, and felt entitled to our country sacrificing ourselves for Britain. We'd taken hits for Churchill's ego before in the last war. We weren't going to do it again, not when our homes were on the line.
The fact that Percival in 1942 could (2 years after the Wehrmacht successfully traversed the Ardennes into France) dismiss the possibility of a landward invasion by the Japanese amounts to one of the worst acts of hubris in military history.
Great Britain was fighting a desperate battle for survival trying to defend her island home against the Gernan onslaught. France which was deemed to have a superior Army crumbled in a few weeks , democracies which respect the antiwar sentiments of their public were slow to mobilise for all out war , where as, Germany and Japan were effectively under the control of their military leadership. In addition European domination of Asian countries which were not industrialised, for centuries, led them to believe that Asians were no match for Europeans in modern warfare. The defeat of the Russian navy by the Japanese almost forty years before pear harbour should have opened the eyes of military strategists, but deep rooted prejudice is hard to overcome .
The defence force in Singapore outnumbered the Japanese 3 to 1. They lost within weeks. They were foreigners defending a foreign land, and their lackluster effort in defending the country proved to Britain’s colonies that defence must be taken into their own hands. Percival was to blame, but not as an individual but as a foreigner who was left to protect a people who weren’t his own
@@willd4491 This is what happens when you factor in racial prejudice in military strategic planning. Nothing illustrates that more painfully than the demise of Force Z going on a sortie with no aircraft carrier support fully aware Pearl Harbor just happened. Only the captain of the HMS Prince Of Wales (in his last correspondence with his son) knew they weren't going to make it back.
I attended Singapore American School (SAS) in 1973-75, and lived in Bukit Timah. We had a Singaporean gentleman speak to our history class one day. He said that by the time the Japanese reached Singapore, most of their bicycles had worn out the rubber inner tubes and there were no spares. So they cycled along on just the metal rims. He said that when they came down the paved roads of Singapore it sounded like heavy tanks in the distance, which led to much confusion and panic in the ranks. He was captured and survived, but had nothing good to say about the way the Japanese treated the civilians and the captured troops.
My late Grandad surrendered there, his ship changed course from North Africa to Cape Town, then India and finally Singapore. He landed during a air raid and had surrendered within a week. He survived 3 years on the Burma Railway and passed away in 2001.
Your Grandad did very well to make it to 2001. My father was also captured in Singapore and also on the Burma railway. He died back in 1964. I don't remember him very well. One thing he said that puzzled me at the time. "Always remember, I was a just a private soldier, not an officer". Like many, he was an expat professional who was conscripted into the army just months before the invasion.
This sounds like a bit of an apologia for Percival. Not every city or front had Maginot Line quality fortifications, so talk of underinvesting in Singapore seems to merit more analysis. Some questions to ask: - When did the British begin the build up in Singapore (I assume things got accelerated in July of 1941 when the full oil embargo and freezing of assets commenced) - What were the quality of the troops and more important, the officers? - What training, war games, other preparations were carried out, to get familiar with the theater of operations? - What kind of intelligence did the British have on the Japanese prior to and during the invasion, notably on Japanese formations advancing rapidly down the peninsula? - Why no better showing of a flexible defense on their own ground, on the peninsula? - Were British forces road bound, and if so, why? Probably there are more questions to ask. At this point, I am inclined to say Percival should be assigned a good bit of blame for the disaster - he was the general commanding officer since at least May 1941, and it was his job to responsibility to prepare his forces and to conduct a strong defense of the colony. Otherwise, Singapore is at a pretty strategic location. Not sure I buy in to the point about the defense being more political and a point of prestige. Afterwards, the Japanese could support their efforts in Burma more effectively, while the Imperial Japanese Navy went on a bit of a tear in the Indian Ocean.
This channel has a massive British bias. Great channel, but it is biased. Historiography, WW2 in real time, and Kings and Generals all have a better less biased analysis of the British failure and collapse in SE Asia.
- The quality of the Indian Troops was as low as it could be. They were generally half-trained or less units that were pressed into service in Malaya;. The units in question were the leftovers after the Indian Army had been picked over several times to both form new units and to support units in the field in the middle east. The lower ranked officers (often up to Captain) were mostly immediate commissions with really no training or experience at all. The higher ranked officers in the unit were often peacetime captains pushed up into command of Battalions. I can't speak to the quality of the Australians. The Malaya brigades were just local defense troops. - The Indian Units had often been trained either for service in Afghanistan border regions or in more aird parts of India. The plan for most of the units deployed to Malay was originally them being sent to the middle east. - The British had minimal intelligence on the Japanese. Part of this was by intent. Regional intelligence collection was avoided out of concern it would push Thailand more fully into a Japanese alliance. - Why no more flexible defense? Lack of transport and mobility. But the biggest problem was the inability of British forces to hold a line. The Japanese would slip through their lines, get behind them and then they would retreat. This was a major problem in the far east well beyond Malaya. It was eventually tactically corrected by creating "box" formations months after the Malaya campaign and not retreating due to the Japanese getting through the line. They set up for all-around defense and forced the Japanese to take out the unit rather than the unit retreating to the next line. The ability of the Japanese to get behind the British in the jungle and to get through any defensive line was part of what went wrong in Malaya. - They were not "road bound" in terms of fighting or their deployments. As far as Burma goes, the invasion of Burma by the Japanese was launched and well underway during the Malaya campaign. The forces in Burma for defense were far worse than those available in Malaya. Burma was written off early and even the forces that were intended to be sent there (such as an Australian division) were not sent. The tactical problem in Burma was generally similar to Malaya. The Japanese would get through or behind the British/Indian lines and then the British would fall back. If the Japanese had been able to land a military force in India in 1942, the entire British administration might have collapsed in the same way it did in Malaya. To fight in Greece, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Ethiopia and Egypt, the British had stripped everything to be bone. And that was on top of a decade of neglect in terms of military spending in India and the far east. A better commander in Malaya would have figured out what the Japanese were doing and figured out a way to counter it as other commanders eventually did later. But the command in Malaya was addicted to the idea that form line, defend line and retreat if the enemy breaks through the line. One other thing though. Singapore as a fortress without Malaya in 1942 was defendable in my opinion. The whole idea of "fortress singapore" that Brtish still believed in was an extremely dated idea. If the Japanese reached the edges of the city, it was doomed to fall.
It would have helped if the British fought back. Australians were 17% of the force but 70% of the casualties. After the surrender the Japanese confirmed that the failure of the British to support the Australians and starving them of ammunition allowed their breakthrough.
The General is always at fault. Doubly so if the general decides to, "take what he can get", rather than resign forecasting woe should more investment in his or her command not be made. LTG Percival is a perfect example of why officers who enjoy their perks of office more than their duty should be avoided at all costs. He might have been the right general for peace, but he certainly was not the right general for war.
gave 2 much to sg importance to churcjill... sg only a trading post in the far east...no value to britian's war in europe...percial was a carrer soldier..unlike macarthur..."crazy whites standing in the noon sun..n drinking in raffles bar..."..sg was a mangrove swamp trading post this is all.
@@ifuknjk Singapore was vitally important to British interests in the far East. It was a major naval base and had shipyards. The closest ones after that were in Ceylon and South Africa.
Percival was an inept and also extraordinarily brutal leader of the Brits in the Irish war of independence, torturing republicans to death, dragging them behind lorries, burning houses, and behaving like the Japanese in WW2. He helped lose the war in Ireland too.
@@peterflynn9123 Anyone comparing 'British' soldiers (many of whom were just as Irish as the IRA terrorists) to the Japanese in WW2 lacks intelligence, knowledge, education, and reason. Percival, and the other generals were angels compared to their foe. Far from being brutal, they were never allowed to actually fight the IRA on any sort of level playing field. Despite that they crushed the IRA and brought them to the negotiating table. The British 'war' aim was to implement a form of Home Rule, which they essentially did. The IRA wanted a 32 county republic. Still waiting on that. There are letters in the late 1920s from Percival to Montgomery on the subject where Percival remarks that the subsequent Free State soldiers actually did what Percival and co had not been allowed to do, and deal with scum as scum.
A great uncle of mine who I think of quite often died at Singapore. He'd fought through WWI and won a military medal during the Somme and was killed when his troop ship was sunk. We still have his tankard on the mantlepiece and remember him and the other family members who didn't come home, or who only partly did. Lest we forget
Thank you, IWM, for producing this video. Congratulations for covering some major explanations that I believe made it easy for the general public to understand. Most of your verbal comments were also accurate. I must also thank the many online commentators for their posts that made interesting read, especially the personal experiences of their ancestors who were directly involved in the defence and fall of Malaya (including Singapore). Though these did not answer IWM's macro questions, they nevertheless added a refreshing micro-perspective of those who had fought on the ground. May future generations always remember their (of defenders') sacrifices with gratitude. Admittedly, within this online space, it's impossible to cover all factors that led to the fall of Singapore, for this topic has multi-faceted and multi-layered dimensions. They ranged from political, economic, military, institutional to political and military key decision makers and their men on the ground, both on the Allied and Axis sides. On one hand, short, pithy comments risk coming across as one-sided (unbalanced), opinionated, impressionistic or shallow. On the other hand, attempting a comprehensive and balanced summary, though courageous, still may not do full justice to this topic. For the more serious students of history, if one does not have access to all the primary evidences, the next best recourse is to refer to the professionals who have gained access to them. Over the decades, there are many books written on this topic. For a more holistic, balanced, nuanced and comprehensive view on the subject, I would recommend that they read, among many other excellent works, especially: (a) The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940-1942 by Professor Brian P. Farrell, NUS History, first published in 2006 by Tempus Publishing Limited; and (b) Churchill and the Lion City: Shaping Modern Singapore by Professor Brian P. Farrell (Editor); and (c) Colonel Masanobu Tsuji: The Mastermind behind Japan's Greatest Victory; Britain's Worst Defeat: The Capture of Singapore 1942. Since the release of Britain's cabinet papers to UK National Archives in the 1990s, there have been more revelations about Churchill's role in depriving Malaya of adequate defence, both in terms of quantity and quality of resources. These revelations were followed by scathing criticisms of Churchill. I am thus surprised that the question is still framed as "Is Percival to blame?" today, instead of "Is Churchill to blame?", since the release of the official documents over 20 years ago. In the annals of history, Percival more than Churchill continues to be associated with Singapore's fall in 1942. A more empathetic view towards Churchill is that any colonial master would naturally prioritise the protection of his homeland and home waters first, over some far-flung corners of the British empire. As the first law of human nature, survival and self-preservation comes first. If Britain were to surrender to Nazi Germany, the British empire would collapse instantly, and Axis partner Japan would simply walk into Malaya, as it did in Vichy French Indochina. But if only parts of the empire were to fall, no matter how "impregnable", strategic or humiliating, HQ Britain could still live to fight another day, leveraging on the industrial might and growing military prowess of the USA and USSR to help defeat the immediate threat; Nazi Germany first, and then Japan, the Pacific enemy. In response to the emotive undertones of some comments, especially those from the Far East, this is the reality of realpolitik that dominions of any colonial master have to confront. Otherwise, as post-WWII events bear out, fight for political independence from the colonial master.
Sadly Percival was no De Valette, the Grand Master of the Knights of Malta who held out against enormous odds against the Turks in 1565. A man of De Valette's determination and character may well have created a very alternative history of "the siege of Singapore". Singapore would probably still have fallen eventually, but its resistance would have been a source of pride and inspiration.
he was also no Kemal Ataturk who prevented the British naval force from crossing the straits in 1915. In case we want to stop portraying non-westerners like the Japanese and Turks as the villains.
@@davidlewis5312 You are correct but I am looking more at the character of the man, and how an inspirational leader can bring out exceptional qualities in every fighting man. I take the point that Ataturk is another example of such leadership.
A few comments from an armchair general. Percival’s defence in depth strategy could only work if there was a mobile defensive reserve to counter attack. Otherwise the more mobile Japanese attackers would always be able to gain local numerical superiority. So it appears the wrong strategy to start with. It appeared at no point did Percival consider counter attacking and thus ceded the initiative for the entire battle to the Japanese. He then incorrectly anticipated where the main thrust of the Japanese invasion of the island would take place and took too long to recognise it as the main thrust. Again he also had no organised reserves for a counter attack, despite having numerical superiority. Finally he fell for the Japanese bluff at the surrender negotiations. This was a complete failure of intelligence but also seemed to stem from a lack of proper reconnaissance to gain a true estimate of enemy strength over the entire campaign.
This type of defense only makes sense if one has good means of transport and can send relief forces quickly. It seems that he was too passive and had no plan on how to use his troops successfully.
Nope. Percival's attitude toward the Japanese itself, regarding them as inferior, shown that he already underestimated the enemy. With that kind of mindset, he already lost the war.
In contrast, General Kuribayashi during the defense of Iwo Jima worried about US capability. He had different mindset than his peers. The result was bloody carnage for the US Marines.
Exactly this. Was he under equipped on a theater that was far from the priority for the Allies? For sure, did he also took bad tactical decisions that ultimately lead to defeat? Yes, and that part is very much on his own .
A total of 556 personnel from the 2/15th were captured; they would spend three-and-a-half years in Japanese captivity, during which 294 men died. After the war ended in August 1945, the surviving members of the regiment were repatriated to Australia and the regiment was disbanded
Percival was sent to Singapore because he was viewed as a menace in the European theatre. After all, they thought even he couldn't lose Singapore. The Indian and Malayan forces were poorly trained and poorly lead. Their officers were afraid of the jungle so stayed on the roads and rubber plantations next to them. While the Australians used the jungle as did the Japanese. But poor logistics meant they had fighting withdrawal. Percival refused to take advice from his staff and when the Australians wanted to be reinforced as they could see the build up of the Japanese opposite their position. Even after the landing, they wanted to fight on but were ordered to surrender. He should have been court marshalled! Yes, circumstances were against him but he could have fought on this forcing the Japanese to withdraw to the mainland. Thus giving time for help to be sent from Australia.
No way could the BCEF in Malaya be supported in time from even as 'close' as from Australia. You may as well say McArthur should have held out until further deployment from San Francisco.
@@jirachi-wishmaker9242 Not the Troops but their English officers!! Indian and Maylaain soldiers weren't trusted to get beyond NCO's. Racism and snobbery were rife in the British armed forces! So, no disrespect for the poor troops but contempt for the leaders!
@N Fels Yes, the officers weren't the highest quality! That is what was saying can you comprehend English? If you don't know what you are talking about it is best not to say anything as it just shows your ignorance! Galah!
British love of 'procedures' played a huge part. Percival was simply unprepared and applied no strategy with what he had. Insufficient ground training and procedural limitations on equipment like antiaircraft guns being relocated to protect the ithsmus connecting Singapore to the mainland.
Percival was a war criminal during the Irish War of Independance, murdered civilians and pow's but was never brought to justice by Britain. Just like every other brit murderer really.
Actually, the most easiest campaign for the Axis. British and Dutch were too busy with affairs at mainland Europe. And what they had in their Pacific colonies were just colonial troops.. these troops meant to repel against local insurgencies.. but grossly lacked the ability of a conventional army to defend from foreign invasion. Look at the Japanese, as soon as they faced the real armed forces: US Marines & US successfully established the winning ground at Battle of Midway, the path to their defeat came very quickly.
@@timcahill4676 This is easily the biggest cope. The facts are the British still held numerical superiority in holdings in Asia...Couple that with the fact that the Japanese sometimes had inferior equipment (Such as them using bicycles instead of transport vehicles the British had)....Your point is quite mute. The British empire was impressive until you realize it took centuries to reach its height and you guys were mostly conquering backwards people who were fighting you with sticks and stones versus your modern guns. The Japanese on the other hand had reached its territorial peak in as little as 6 months whilst facing technologically on-par enemies, whom also had much more manpower than Japan did. To make matters even worse against Japan, the Japanese were doing all this while under a MASSIVE resource deficit particularly in oil AND still achieving victories in China. To any rational historian the Japanese empire is 100% more impressive than anything Britain did. Actually many soldiers in WW2 fighting for Britain believed the same. Over 100,000 British colonial soldiers had defected and fought for the Japanese against Britain instead......Approximately zero Japanese soldiers defected to the British side. lol
Percival was a leader in Bandon in the South of Ireland during the war of Independence. His actions were little different to those of the Japanese in WW2. He lost in Ireland too, so history shows him as serially inept as well as a war criminal .
I read about his actions in Ireland, and you're right, he was senselessly brutal, and absolutely incompetent as commander, not the right man for such a delicate position.
@@bermudezhg obviously. His staff work was actually top notch. It's why he went up through the ranks. He's the type of man you'd want to run your office. It's easy to judge with hindsight but with Japanese air & naval superiority not to mention hundreds of tanks I doubt any British officer could have held out. The best solution would probably have been to evacuate the troops but that might not have been possible with Japanese Air and naval superiority
It should be remembered that the 8th Australian division consisted of 2 infantry brigades only, instead of the normal established of 3 brigades. The 3 battalions of the other brigade were sent to separate locations in what is now Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. They were quickly overwhelmed by the Japanese when the time came. I have always wondered if the third brigade would have made any difference in the defense of Malaya.
It's a interesting question. If there had been an Australian brigade at Kota Bharu to defend the two RAAF Squadrons there, reinforce the Dogras (who put up an extraordinary fight) and cut off the Japanese flanking manouvre through the swamps, then perhaps at least the landing at KB might have failed. But it still would have been the only failed one of four landings. And if they were kept organic with 8Div, the early stuffing around and abandonment of prepared positions, and the later constant collapse of units on the Division's flanks, would still have meant the loss of Malaya, albeit perhaps with a few more Japanese casualties. The problems ran far, far deeper than anything one brigade could fix.
They were NOT quckly overwhelm ed at all , you should read ab out their engagment of the Japanese at Gemas and the retreat of the Australians that took place two weeks after that, resulting in a charge with just spades and axes against japanese machine gun emplacements....there is still a memorial to them on that spot. read about it.
Singapore A classified wartime report by Wavell released in 1992 blamed the Australians for the loss of Singapore.[28] According to John Coates, the report "lacked substance", for though there had undoubtedly been a lack of discipline in the final stages of the campaign-particularly among the poorly trained British, Indian and Australian reinforcements that were hurriedly dispatched as the crisis worsened-the 8th Australian Division had fought well and had gained the respect of the Japanese. At Gemas, Bakri and Jemaluang, "they achieved the few outstanding tactical successes" of the campaign in Malaya and although the Australians made up 13 per cent of the British Empire's ground forces, they suffered 73 per cent of its battle deaths. Coates argues that the real reason for the fall of Singapore was the failure of the Singapore strategy, to which Australian policy-makers had contributed in their acquiescence and the lack of military resources allocated to the fighting in Malaya.
Percival's reluctance to reinforce the northern part of Singapore Island for fear of creating a defeatist, defensive attitude was a poor choice. Given the lack of British armour and airpower Japan's rapid advance down the Malayan Peninsular is understandable, but even with the lack of northern defences on the island, the speed and relative ease of the Japanese crossing of the Johore Strait and final advance on Singapore has always shocked me.
Not wanting to frighten the population by building defences... that must have been a great consolation to them when after the defeat they were marched off to death camps.
My father, in the Royal Artillery commanding a 25 pdr Field Gun, was redirected from his way to North Africa, to Singapore, and was taken prisoner there. He was put on the Burma railway. He had a few things in his favour: he was super fit being a cup winning cyclist, he had generations of carpentry skills which the Japanese valued for construction of the bridges, and he had the savoir to avoid the worst malaria. He knew Ronald Searle, who hid his drawings of the murderous events in bamboo sections under the hut floors. He was moved to Japan late in the war, and put down mines to construct pit props. In both locations he saved other men’s lives by teaching them how to put a Japanese wood plane together, which was the test for carpentry skills. He saw the immediate aftermath of the Nagasaki bomb. The lowest moment for him was after the surrender, standing on a beach with his friend who was the only other survivor from the beginning that he knew, watching an American drop of supplies. A parachute didn’t open and when the drum hit the beach, the lid sprang off and decapitated his friend, standing next to him. Even after travelling round the world on his way home, including a train across the USA, he was like a skeleton on return, many boils, and slept for weeks. He was told he would never be able to have children, but soon began his three. He was still driving at age 88, and lived to 91, passing away in 2012. If my sister’s detailed, appalling short hand record of his memories ever get typed up, I think it will be quite worthwhile.
Churchill wrote that it no more occurred to him that Singapore had no landward defences than that a battleship could be launched without a bottom. But he added, he should have enquired. It was Percival's clear duty to improve those defences, and he had the means and time to do it. Civilian labour could have been conscripted. Underwater obstacles and deep bunkers could have been prepared. Water cisterns could have been built for rain run-off. Shells for the harbour guns could have been refilled and re-fused with high-explosive. (It's a myth that the guns could not be trained to fire on the strait. The problem was, they only had SAP shells for naval targets.) Barbed wire and cement was in plentiful supply. Food had been stockpiled, at least, and there was time and transport to send civilians south. Given a competent and energetic general, Singapore should have been able to hold out for at least six or eight months, and would have cost the Japanese far more, meaning that they would have to bring in resources from other theatres. But Percival was not that general. He actually forbade his engineers to construct better defences, giving as a reason that he did not want to depress civilian morale. That was idiotic, or worse. Norman Dixon's "The Psychology of Military Incompetence" contains a section on Percival's behaviour that seeks to explain it from psychological factors, but for me it is sufficient that he behaved in that way. It was, in my opinion, unconscionable that he was not court-martialed at the end of the war for his failure to do his duty, and was allowed to retire on full pension and write his highly self-exculpatory memoirs.
Churchill was the First Sea Lord starting in September of 1939 until he became PM in late May 1940 and would have been thoroughly familiar with the defenses of Singapore. His remark was disingenuous.
@@ifuknjk Wrong. The loss of Singapore led to the invasion and occupation of Burma, another English colony, and ultimately Bengal. Their Pacific fleet lost its most important base. It's loss was the catalyzing event for the independence movements across the British Empire.
@@sethdekooters7567 broken up of british empire was the signs of the times...like 2022 west broken up n asia whole again..biggest elephant is WW 3.. imminent or not n failure of climate change n mankind survival...or dino is dead
Years ago, I read a book about the surrender of Singapore. Because the news of the oncoming Japanese forces down the Malayan peninsula was censored, one man kept track of which branches of a certain bank were advertised in newspapers as having been closed. Of course, they were closed because they'd been captured by the Japanese.
I went to Singapore in 2017 for the 75th anniversary of The Fall. A very moving commemoration at the Commonwealth memorial in Kranji. The Chinese were viewed by the Japanese as supplying arms and/or money for arms to their fellow Chinese to fight the Japanese in the mainland country.
@@Jeffrey21058 well, firstly Singapore. We are our own successful nation now. And as for second place, that varies from person to person, though most of us do feel slightly more attached to Malaysia, since a lot of us have family or business there. In the end, it varies, but overall we try to be impartial and more rational
No. Most of the Chinese that complied and agreed not to conduct illegal guerilla warfare against the Japanese, in support of Mainland China, were spared. Those who refused in accordance to international law, were simply captured
My Great Uncles name turned up on a POW list for the railway of death in Thailand (which felt weird anyway as I am half Thai). I can only assume he was a part of this surrender. Unfortunately I never met him as he had a falling out with my grandfather. I salute him all the same.
The truth is that Singapore came a poor third in Mr Churchill's war effort. He was obssessed with North Africa and the sending of tanks, guns and aircraft on the Murmansk convoys to Russia. As for force Z, it is a good job the aircraft carrier never made it, if it had it would be lying on the bottom of the sea with the battleship and battle cruiser. I will say however that we should have fought a better war to save Singapore, but that I suppose comes down to inspired leadership.
Battle of Singapore shows that Japan was a formidable opponent when they were evenly matched with their enemy. They simply did not have the industrial output to match the United States.
Percival divided his forces to defend his airfields without having modern planes to put on them. And refused requests by his officers to build defences on the mainland .
strange that it was not mentioned that one of the British's greatest colonial strength also served the Japanese well, ROADS. British colonial surveyors built an excellent road network in Malaya that served them well during colonial rule, and their retreat, negating any effects the Malayan jungle might have. these same roads enabled the Japanese to advance on bicycle towards Singapore.
The higher ups are not there to give you want you want, but to only provide barely sufficient resources (emphasis on "sufficient"). The Generals job is to make their case, work the channels and develop the strategies and tactics to suit the situation. It seems that Percival neither stood up for himself or had any clue how to face an enemy. Blaming his superiors does not seem to be a valid defence on his part. The utterly magnificent defence of Imphal by Slim shows what a great General can accomplish against a superior Japanese force.
A British narrator talking about a British officer, but he uses the American "lootenant" pronunciation. Very odd. At least he says "Force Zed" rather than "Force Zee".
I always find it fascinating that in all these fall of Singapore videos no one ever mentions the insubordinations and defiance of LTC Duncan Maxwell of the Australian Army which played a critical role in why Singapore was lost. In the morning of 9 February, after the Japanese landed and broke through the lines of the adjacent 22nd Brigade, Maxwell sought to withdraw a portion of his forces, but Bennett denied him permission. Later in the day, with the Japanese now landing in his sector, Maxwell ordered them to withdraw from the causeway anyway, having already replaced his two battalion commanders, Galleghan and Boyes, with more compliant officers. This was despite the Japanese advance being hindered more than expected because of the robust defence mounted to this point. After the brigade's withdrawal the next day, it was temporarily attached to the 11th Indian Division by orders of the GOC Malaya, Lieutenant General Arthur Percival. However, soon Maxwell, on receiving orders from his now divisional commander to attack towards his abandoned sector, claimed that he had received differing orders from Percival. To divisional staff, he stated the orders came from Bennett. He was to move the brigade to recapture Bukit Panjang. Percival and Bennett both later denied any knowledge of these orders. In any event, the move failed and Maxwell's brigade began to break down into companies and platoons and retreated back into Singapore. Made a prisoner of war after the fall of Singapore, Maxwell was held by the Japanese in a camp on Taiwan. Here he conceded to another prisoner, Brigadier Arthur Blackburn who had been captured on Java, that he deliberately directed his men to retreat from the causeway to let the Japanese land unopposed as he considered his position to be hopeless. He was conscious of the lives of his men and did not wish to see them wasted defending British Malaya.
Another factor 5 million people in Malaya at the time was against the British. British realize this and thought Japan would allied with 5 million Malayan people, that's why British surrendered.
@@iamgreat1234 Yes, because the general populace at the time don't like the Japanese, but they certainly don't like the British more. So the Japanese took advantage of this and spread propaganda that Asia are for Asians but in reality the Japanese meant Asia for the Japanese. So once the local population population realised the Japanese are like the British but far, far worst, it was already too late. Edit: I am a Malaysian. This was what was taught in our history books at least.
Agree with Steve but even more they expected the enemy, battle-hardened troops to come from the jungle. Arrogance in leadership will cost you every time. Singapore was never a fortress to begin with
The fall of Singapore made us Singaporeans realize that no one will protect us other than ourselves... The British totally underestimated the japanese forces...
Very poor video. No mention of Operation Matador or the forbidding of employing this plan. Also totally ignored the fact that Percival's Chief Engineer, Brigadier Ivan Simsoner, repeatedly asked for permission to construct fixed defences in key positions. Percival dismissed these requests with the comment, "Defences are bad for morale." Percival seemed unaware that capitulation is bad for morale too. He was dealt a grotty hand, but he played that hand as poorly as it was possible for it to be played.
As an American I have a different perspective on this. Just as McArthur in the Phillippine's underestimated the Japanese the British also did too. Both were at the very end of the supply line of their country so got only what wasn't needed elsewhere before Dec. 7th 1941 and very little afterward. In both cases the decisions to hold out were more political them military as any good general who could see the "whole picture" would realize that both bases were going to be lost. It was only a matter of time as to how long they could hold out. Unfortunately the longer they held out the more soldiers would die. They were the ones that paid the price, not the generals.
Churchill made a decision in 1941 to focus military force on the middle east and run the risk of war with Japan with forces in Asia that amounted to a giant bluff. There was no navy, no aircraft, no anti-aircraft defense and the vast majority of the forces deployed to Malaya were third rate. The Indian forces in particular were either half-trained or were the remainder left behind in India when the units were stripped of good men for service in other units. They ran a giant bluff. The Japanese called their bluff. And they lost.
There was some Ack Ack - not enough, but not zero. My uncle was shipped out there in Nov 1941. He was a radar gun layer (radar operator) and joined 11 Battery of 3 Heavy Anti Aircraft Regiment, which was already out there.
The Japanese also had 200 tanks, the British had none. The British also had a traitor in their ranks by the name of Capt Patrick Heenan who gave the Japanese the daily recognition codes for the British air base at Alor Setar enabling them to destroy most of the British aircraft while still on the ground and in turn allowed the Japanese to gain air superiority. The Japanese didn't win with bicycles alone.
The British wanted the Indians and Singaporeans to sacrifice themselves first. But The Japanese attack from the back and exposed the white British command, so the surrendered immediately. Lucky the Japanese attacked from the exposed back otherwise many Indians and Singaporeans would hv died for the incompetent British command.
Not a word here in regard to General Gordon Bennett of the Australian forces who simply disappeared unlike Percival who stayed in charge to the end. The Australians lost all morale and actual leadership because of this. Bennett was cashiered on arrival in Australia - if he had been an Axis or Soviet general he would have been shot.
Why would you particularly mention this? More relevant was how he was want abrasive with the British and his general lack of diplomacy, plus a tendency to act without orders. His service record back to WW1 gives no hint of cowardice as you imply. Behind the scenes he was probably instrumental in council to Prime minister Curtin deciding to stand up to Churchill to insist that the 6th and 7th divisions be brought home. Facts are that Bennett made his plans to escape on Feb 15 when Percival made the decision that he would surrender . Obviously Bennett’s job as a fighting commander were over. His argument was that it was his duty to escape. Further he regarded himself of value to educate the rest of the Australian Army on tactics to defeat the Japanese in future battles. At this time he was not issued orders, so he could have stayed as a hollow tribute to morale. Instead he again acted without asking for orders. This decision tends to summarized as a coward. Had he stayed he would, like other senior ranks, be removed from representing his soldiers anyway, as Japanese control was about not having former leaders available for soldiers to defer to. The critical consideration here is that he never got along with Percival, and postwar Percival had to answer for his own military leadership. He subsequently wrote to Blamey , who also shared the same dislike for Bennett. This is where suggestions of cowardice gained traction and became arguable. In contrast less than a month later Douglas MacArthur did the same thing. Officially he was ordered to Australia. Argument has been that this order was issued retrospectively, to prevent morale issues and Wainwright later did more than his duty to keep dirt hidden. Amazing how popularity could out maneuver military proficiency.
@@BC-op7rj I notice you do not contradict my two points - Bennett was cashiered and his 'escape' led to a collapse in morale of the Australian forces. I mention it because once the Public Record allowed the circumstances of the Bennett 'escape' to be exposed it destroyed the myth that the Australian forces in Singapore had been 'betrayed' by the British a constant these of my early years post-War and a replay of Gallipoli myth. The majority of the BC&E casualties at Gallipoli were British and the majority of the BC&E force which went into captivity at Singapore were British.
@@uingaeoc3905 Prior you incited that Bennet was a coward and now you dodge that. Curtin actually gave a speech praising Bennett's escape. For those who did not escape there are mixed views. Most troops were in view that at least some escaped (as was a soldiers duty). Most criticism was civilian and of course Blamey and Percival elevating themselves post war by putting Bennett down. But that was 1945/6, not 1942/3. At one point in 1943 Australia believed the Japanese were planning to invade Western Australia. Many forces were transferred from the Eastern seaboard, to go under Bennett's command . After that Bennett was merely left to whither in a backwater command for the remainder of the war because Blamey was in charge and had is own issues. Australians betrayed by the British is a separate subject. IMO you are pulling strings on two separate bags and not catch either answer. Singapore was promised to be the keystone in defending Australia when the 2nd AIF went to the Middle East and Churchill broke promises. You probably need to better make your point concerning loss of morale. Men of the 6th, 7th and 9th Divisions were all trying to transfer in December-March to get a crack at the Japanese. Assume you mean just the 8th Div , not the entire AIF and AMF? Loss of morale after capture is incorrect. Yes no one wants to be a prisoner , but when the 8th went into captivity members made concerted efforts around camp hygiene and food. Men worked as pairs to survive. Meanwhile British, Indians and Dutch prisoners were more inclined to have moments of squabbles among the ranks. Their survival was mainly as individuals who made little effort to maintain hygiene for example. This is an example of how morale did not crumble in the Australian ranks. There was a predisposition among Australians then being better acclimatised to harsh independent living. Alternatively the British were mostly city folk and the Indians lacked medical staff and education to stay ahead of diseases as best they could. In short your assessment is just wrong. Australian morale did not crumble. and Bennett was not cashiered in 1942-43.. And I still have no idea what your destination is regards ANZAC legend being broken. That might be your agenda, ....whatever. The men here were on average born four years after Gallipoli. As for the numbers, no, India supplied the most prisoners, not Britain. Numbers were 38,496 United Kingdom, 18,490 Australian of whom 1,789 were killed and 1,306 wounded, 67,340 Indian and 14,382 local volunteer troops
'... the unprepared British...' in one sentence answers the question 'was Churchill to blame?' No, no more than any single man. Collective responsibility for the fall of Singapore has to go to the catastrophic failure over many years to recognise that the landward perimeter was an open back door to an enemy.
It was called a "Fortress city" for some reason. Churchill found that extremely confusing and I don't blame him. If its not sufficiently militarized and defensible then don't refer to it as a fortress city.
Usually we British manage to find some silver lining to a defeat e.g. a heroic last stand etc but Singapore seems to be 100% disaster and humiliation. Before the Internet it was quite hard to even find information about it was that deliberate?
Churchill was not to blame. The design of the fortifications was intended to defend against a sea borne attack, and when were they built? Long before Churchill became PM. The reason behind the attack will come from the sea was that the army general staff considered the jungle impassable, ergo an attacker would have to come from the sea. Add to that that the fresh water supply came from the mainland, the causeway was still passable to infantry at high tide - as it was covered by about 1 metre of water! Then complacency by the military - Polo rather than exercises, no attempt to see how inhospitable the jungle really was not; treating the local people as idiots - after all many of them lived in the jungle. When the Japanese did land on the mainland any resistance they met they went round, cutting each pocket of resistance off from reinforcements. I knew men who had marched off the troop ships into captivity. How they survived the hell they ended up in in places like Changi Jail, is a miracle in its self. RIP all those who fell.
The Japanese were clearly to strong at that stage, the best trained jungle fighters in the world. It wasn't the bicycle frontal attack that made the difference, it was IJN barges leap frogging down the coast of Malaya attacking well defended positions from the rear cutting supply lines, then again invading Singapore through the rear, in what was considered impenetrable mangrove swamp, nobody could stop them, that was of course, until they called the Aussies gutless, then it was on for young and old, setting the stage for Japans first land battle defeat at Milne bay, at the hands of the Australians, including my uncle Tommy and uncle Gilbert.
While Percival should be held accountable for his failures in Singapore, there should also be some acknowledgement that a major problem of the British Army is they just did not have the stomach to fight in the early years of the war, bad generalship all around and yet the conundrum of a shallow replacement pool for general officers...or you had Generals like Wavell and Auchinleck who suffered due to Churchill's meddling at the worst times for them. And the fact the Japanese were just better prepared, motivated, and lead by Yamashita
You should be ashamed of your comment for many British and Commonwealth troops fought hard and died in many war theaters around the world. They may have been losing but they were fighting. It is tough, active generals that create troops with spirit and he did not. Indeed he was a defeatist and possibly a coward.
It was a major oversight that tanks would be useless in jungles. Good roads in Malaya contribute to the east. How quick malaya fall contribute to the fall of Singapore. In Brit papers, they expect Malaya to last at least 1 year of warfare.
I think if the troops had known what would happen to them as POWs they would have never given in I think it was bad leadership from the top and an underestimation of the enemy
Another documentary I saw pointed out Yamashita brought less men, since he would have had to really stretch his rations otherwise, and didn't think that was worth the trade off
I've been on jungle warfare training exercises in Malaysia and it was not at all difficult to move in the jungle. There are plenty of roads that run from north to south and logging roads that run from east to west. Big enough for tanks. In case you are wondering, they aren't new roads. Percival was a mediocre General officer and kept his post only because almost no-one thought that there was a threat to British interests in South East Asia. All the major resources were kept for the European and North African theatres but Percival could have made much more effort to build up defences and ensure that a decent defence could be made in Malaya. But he didn't push it. The lack of tanks was one issue but the lack of anti aircraft guns was even worse. The effort to repulse the initial landings was half hearted and during the retreat there was no provision made to destroy the massive food and fuel stores the British had accumulated. The Japanese captured it all and Yamashita called it " The British Treasure ". Without it, his army's advance down the Malayan peninsula would have been much slower. Percival was completely fooled by the Japanese planning and in addition did nothing to destroy enemy observation posts in the soaring spires of the Sultan's palace. He thought it might make the Sultan side with the enemy if they were shelled. The Sultan had already signed a deal with the Japanese to save his own skin. During the build up to the amphib crossing, the Japanese drove empty trucks at night with their headlights on, to the place where Percival thought the crossing would be made. Then, they drove them back without lights and repeated it for a week. Percival fell for it and refused to imagine the attack would come elsewhere. Only local militia were posted where the real attack took place. Then, when the Japanese blew the islands' water supply with a bombing raid, Percival just decided to give up, obstensibly to save the civilian population from further bombing. The Australians mutinied and tried to put up a defence but were unable to do much as they had no heavy weapons. If Percival had put as much effort into preparations for defence, as he did in trimming his moustache, he might have won.
If you don't have supplies and reinforcements, there's no fortress that you can hold indefinitely. Moreover, it's just a waste of time trying to hold something that is clearly lost. The only merit in such endeavor is wasting enemy's time and resources. That was a motif of honor for this British commander. As Italian, I can relate with him. I mean, not like I'm a commander or something, but my soldiers in that war fought in similar conditions. Without back up, no ammunition, no guns or reinforcements, alone.
Very British explanation of their defeats in WW2. „It’s not because of incompetence of command, they were just underfunded and Japanese outnumbered during landings“. Pathetic.
Percival had no slightest idea how many enemies are there and could not create at least rudimentary trench defence in depth. He should had way more ammunition, especially artillery shells, and food then Japanese. Leningrad held, fully surrounded, for over a year. So, I might say, Percival was incompetent, and in same time probably too arrogant to ask assistance from his top officers on organizing Singapore island defences.
British incompetence was the reason why Singapore started pushing for self-rule shortly after WW2. Can’t trust others to defend your country. You have to defend your own country.
The British officers thought Japanese soldiers are inferior. This is a major reason for defeat in war. Never underestimate your enemy even if their color of skin is different.
Percival was not FORCED to surrender, he made the decision to surrender. Irrespective of the excuses he gave for his surrender, he did not even make an effort to defend Singapore or his troops. It was a shame that someone else was not in command, maybe there would have been a different outcome. I was not impresed the way that the officer at the start of the video just threw the British flag down in the dirt.
The defeat at Singapore was for the British Empire what the defeat at Adrianople was for the Western Roman Empire. A mortal psychological blow from which the Empire would never recover.
To be fair they did recover from it in 1944, Bill Slim showed up and the 14th army was reorganised, utterly smashing the Japanese at Kohima and Imphal.
Story is Australian Gunners heard Japanese forces across the Straits that night but were forbidden to fire. What if ALL British forces, including supply troops had just fixed Bayonets and charged the Japanese?
As Singaporean, i often wonder this as well. In schools we were taught we had a numerical advantage, as well as having the home ground advantage with out backs to the high ground @ Bukit Timah. The IJA relied so much on shock tactics utilizing their fighting spirit. Imagine if the Commonwealth forces did a banzai charge on them? The psychological effect of the 'weak willed' white man being disproven would have gone a long way, and could even plausably get Japanese commanders to stop and re-evaluate their situation, which could have led to a stalemate, or a seige - and perhaps allowing things to go very differently.
A German raider captured the ship carrying the report to London detailing Singapore's defenses and deficiencies. The Germans gave it to the Japanese. The Japanese thought it was a fake, but the info was good and they used it.
I actually never heard about this and I would consider myself a history buff! You always learn something new, thank you for sharing that piece of information. I’ll definitely have to do more research on that because I am in the process of making a video of the British defenses of Singapore against the IJA and IJN!
From all the reports the Brit forces never tried to commit to an offensive posture. Of course hindsight is always perfect but any junior officer would have known that if they lost Johore, Singapore was lost. No water supply, no food supply the forces cannot hold the island. Useless staff officers and paper generals. Brought nothing but shame onto the British army uniform.
In remeberance to the Malay Regiment who fought to their last breath for 2 days against the Japanese. They were left with only their bayonets and their bare hands but still fought.
This piece asserts that the pace of Japanese advance down the penninsula, which averaged 11 miles/day, was "incredible". American civil war era armies, with horses and mules for transport, were at times much faster. Glossed over was the rampant cowardice and dereliction of duty manifested by the English officer corp and the 8th Australian Division. England had been at war for over two years when Malaya was invaded yet their tactics were those of WW1. No effort was made to prepare Singapore Island for seige although both the time and resources were readily available. It was a pathetic performance.
My father had retreated via Shianghi and Hong Kong to end up fighting a rearguard action down the Malay Peninsula to be bottled up in Singapore. He never said much about what happened in Singapore but one comment was that the officers were all in the Mess getting drunk and the only time they were given an order was that there was an official escape party of 40 men, 20 from the East Surreys and 20 from the Leicestershires who were to take a Minesweeper and 2 launches from a mooring and escape. The minesweeper and a launch lasted a hour before they were sunk by aircraft and he turned up in Colombo 6 months later but never said what happened. He was sent up to Kohima, wondered why he got the Burma Star!- they could not afford to waste his experience of Jungle Warfare he was told.
that was Archibald Wavell wavell? 7:20 ... meeting the troops, black guy looks a tad worried, look at the sikh commander guy, he's pretty proud amazing history, thanks for such an excellent video again.... people can understand more about Britains colonial relationships if you look at these sorts of conflicts
Japanese doctrine of that time was based on British doctrine. Nothing they did in Malaya was to be unexpected. Percival, like most Pommy colonial officers of that time should not have been let off of the parade ground! If it had been Orde Wingate in charge for example the result would likely have been quite different. Australia and New Zealand were levied to pay for fortress Singapore but were let down badly by Churchill, his government, and Percival's total lack of a will to fight. Percival also displayed an inability to take advice from his subordinate officers whether British or Empire. The fact is Percival and his direct team lost Singapore by their lack of action, lack of communication, and any real plan to the contrary. The Japanese did not need to win Singapore, Percival gave it to them! The Japanese were as astounded as were the newly arrived Aussie diggers by Percival's decision's. To apologize for him as in this clip is pure revisionist crap! The capitulation at Singapore was shameful! In my part of the world it is looked at just like Gallipoli outcome of the first world war!
If Australia or New Zealand had been invaded the War could still have been won. If Britain had been defeated the War would have been lost. Maybe engage your brain before posting to the comments section
@@theoilandgasresourceportal2132 alas you are missing the point, maybe you need to engage your brain. With out the the empire and the USA's support Britain would have lost. The war in Asia was won by the colonials and the USA, with little help from Britain. The one situation that might have slowed the Japanese advance was Singapore if it had held out for some time. It didn't thanks to Percival and his lack of command and control. If you want to get picky it was the USA and the USSR that won the Second World War with the British Empire including Britain coming a very distant second. Would the British Empire have been able to beat the Axis? Most things I have read say maybe over extended time, we shall never know. The USA went onto a war footing after Dec 7th and out produced everyone else. Stalin's Russia paid in blood as too did China. Slim's and Monty's efforts in the North African dessert and Assam were sideshows as was the campaign up Italy. Would have the war been won if the British Empire was nullified by the USA or USSR on their own? The answer is yes...back to clip, Percival failed his duty when called to fight. It is that simple.
@@theoilandgasresourceportal2132 The UK depended heavily on the US and the support from Canada and all the other part of the Empire and their soldiers.
I recently returned from Singapore, and I visited the bunker in Fort Canning, the very place where the decision to surrender was made. I learned that Percival was not the incompetant nincompoop that some make him out to be. He asked for armour, and was given nothing. And as far as the northeast/northwest attack thing is concerned, he fell victim to a very intelligent Japanese bait and switch, where the Japanese concentrated their artillery against the weaker Aussie troops in the northwest, after feinting an island based invasion plan in the northeast. We, as the British, we're outclassed, outgunned and outfought by a savage (I mean that in a purely complimentary way) and determined enemy who were, by that stage, truly mastering jungle warfare. They had the fastest fighter planes in the world, sophisticated comms equipment, and light armour that would've made the Germans blush. It's a sad story, but Percival is not entirely to blame. His decision saved many, many lives, and MacArthur's push to place him within a metre of the Japanese surrender reflects the reality of the time, and just how much he was respected by those who knew of him and his actions.
Yamashita also wanted Percival to surrender quickly. In addition to being short on supplies, Yamashita knew that if the British held out it would force the Japanese Army into urban warfare, where the advantage lies with the defender. Despite Churchills incompetence (not much he touched was a success) he was right in the fact that if every British soldier killed a Japanese soldier before being overcome then the British would win. I think that it would have been a shortlived victory as the Japanese would still control Malaya and would let Singapore wither on the vine so to speak.
For me, Percivel was to be blamed partially. He kept retreating despite Churchill saying to hold their position in Singapore. He was bluffed by Yamashita’s Bluff. Prior the Japanese entering Thailand for safe passageway, German sank British warships that carried highly secretive documents regarding the Singapore Defensive blunder. They gave it to their Japanese counterpart Statically saying, it wouldn’t be practical to hold Singapore much longer because Japanese captured Sarawak, Sabah and Parts of Dutch East Indies like Balikpapan. Getting cut from allied shipping lane from Australia.
Let’s face it. The whole goddam country of England was screwed. The whole country looks up to the King - as if some monarch has all the answers - and there is very little in the way of free thinking leaders. Let’s just cut to the chase. When the majority of your weapons are pointing out to sea - because that’s where the British soldiers were told to point their guns - there in lies the problem. If you’re the guy who’s job it is to defend a location - defend it. The fact that so many British soldiers we’re captured so easily, suggests to me that no one had a clue what they were doing!
Singapore has an approximate active strength of over 71,000 full-time personnel and is capable of mobilizing over 352,500 reservists (aka. National Servicemen, or NSmen) in the event of national exigencies or a full-scale war.
There's literally no evidence that the British thought that they could defend Singapore 'because racism'. You just threw that part in because you know it's fashionable to call things racist right now.
An incredibly incompetent general with soldiers that needed a morale boost and good generalship. They got neither. Looking at the Japanese actions during and after the surrender, there is absolutely nothing, repeat, nothing they could - both then and later - be proud of. Our brave soldiers, sailors and airmen, allies and Singaporians sacrificed themselves in vain, but they shall never be forgotten.
Percival did nothing to the defence of Singapore. I think the only aggressive thing he did was taking his jacket off in Raffels club. The men wernt digging trenches and preparing defences. They roamed the bars on the Island drinking, and fighting.
I've read a book by one, and he said they felt betrayed by their officers. Firstly, they had been wanting to prepare defences during the Japanese advance, and were told not to, for fear of alarming the civilians, secondly, they were wanting to fight but ordered to surrender. Most of them never saw a Japanese soldier before they were marched into captivity, or fired a weapon in anger. [The Brave Japanese, by Kenneth Harrison.]
IJA before the invasion had prepared a lot. Most of them were experienced army with countless battles with China and well trained with jungle warfares. British side had 3x more soldiers but they heavily underestimated IJA including racial prejudice. They had to defend Malay Peninsula first but didn't even formed a proper defence line and kept backing off. Many of British army didn't even fought and just ran away. Japanese prepared thousands of bicycles and swept malay Peninsula at lightning speed Finally after conceding Malay Peninsula in only 4 weeks. Percival had to stop Japanese landing on Singapore at all costs. But Japanese general Yamasita tricked them, showing headlights of trucks moving left to right of the island at nights and suddenly attacked left side and successfully landed. The outcome was decided, and IJA kept coming inside blocking their water supplies. Churchill ordered Percival to fight till the last man like Stalingrad but he refused and surrendered with 85,000 men.
Was Percival to blame? Was he hamstrung by underinvestment in Singapore? Or were the Japanese too strong either way? Let us know what you think!
Eighty years on, and Britain is still trying try to whitewash its failure and disgrace. It was a shame then; it's a shame now. My grandfather said as much - and, no, he wasn't at Singapore.
He was from Hong Kong. He was lucky to get to Australia in 1937, when the Japanese invaded Shanghai, where he worked. But he was torn to see his Hong Kong given up.
If there's one thing to be gained from Singapore, it was that it was a wakeup call to the fact that Britain considered all its colonies - who had fought on its behalf for in so many conflicts - merely expendable. Yet it didn't stop his whinging at Curtin for bringing home our troops to what Britain was going to fail to do (despite its promises): defend Australia. Britain felt entitled to our soldiers, and felt entitled to our country sacrificing ourselves for Britain.
We'd taken hits for Churchill's ego before in the last war. We weren't going to do it again, not when our homes were on the line.
The fact that Percival in 1942 could (2 years after the Wehrmacht successfully traversed the Ardennes into France) dismiss the possibility of a landward invasion by the Japanese amounts to one of the worst acts of hubris in military history.
Great Britain was fighting a desperate battle for survival trying to defend her island home against the Gernan onslaught. France which was deemed to have a superior Army crumbled in a few weeks , democracies which respect the antiwar sentiments of their public were slow to mobilise for all out war , where as, Germany and Japan were effectively under the control of their military leadership. In addition European domination of Asian countries which were not industrialised, for centuries, led them to believe that Asians were no match for Europeans in modern warfare. The defeat of the Russian navy by the Japanese almost forty years before pear harbour should have opened the eyes of military strategists, but deep rooted prejudice is hard to overcome .
The defence force in Singapore outnumbered the Japanese 3 to 1. They lost within weeks. They were foreigners defending a foreign land, and their lackluster effort in defending the country proved to Britain’s colonies that defence must be taken into their own hands. Percival was to blame, but not as an individual but as a foreigner who was left to protect a people who weren’t his own
@@willd4491 This is what happens when you factor in racial prejudice in military strategic planning. Nothing illustrates that more painfully than the demise of Force Z going on a sortie with no aircraft carrier support fully aware Pearl Harbor just happened. Only the captain of the HMS Prince Of Wales (in his last correspondence with his son) knew they weren't going to make it back.
I attended Singapore American School (SAS) in 1973-75, and lived in Bukit Timah. We had a Singaporean gentleman speak to our history class one day. He said that by the time the Japanese reached Singapore, most of their bicycles had worn out the rubber inner tubes and there were no spares. So they cycled along on just the metal rims. He said that when they came down the paved roads of Singapore it sounded like heavy tanks in the distance, which led to much confusion and panic in the ranks. He was captured and survived, but had nothing good to say about the way the Japanese treated the civilians and the captured troops.
Those Japanese always had a tricks
My late Grandad surrendered there, his ship changed course from North Africa to Cape Town, then India and finally Singapore. He landed during a air raid and had surrendered within a week. He survived 3 years on the Burma Railway and passed away in 2001.
Wow. Dang.
Was he in the 18th Division ? If so it would have been better if he was diverted to Australia. To form the basis of counter attacking force.
Your Grandad did very well to make it to 2001. My father was also captured in Singapore and also on the Burma railway. He died back in 1964. I don't remember him very well. One thing he said that puzzled me at the time. "Always remember, I was a just a private soldier, not an officer". Like many, he was an expat professional who was conscripted into the army just months before the invasion.
@@johugra1 KOp
My sincere respects on your grandfather's service. I'm very glad he made it through and lived to a ripe old age.
This sounds like a bit of an apologia for Percival. Not every city or front had Maginot Line quality fortifications, so talk of underinvesting in Singapore seems to merit more analysis. Some questions to ask:
- When did the British begin the build up in Singapore (I assume things got accelerated in July of 1941 when the full oil embargo and freezing of assets commenced)
- What were the quality of the troops and more important, the officers?
- What training, war games, other preparations were carried out, to get familiar with the theater of operations?
- What kind of intelligence did the British have on the Japanese prior to and during the invasion, notably on Japanese formations advancing rapidly down the peninsula?
- Why no better showing of a flexible defense on their own ground, on the peninsula?
- Were British forces road bound, and if so, why?
Probably there are more questions to ask. At this point, I am inclined to say Percival should be assigned a good bit of blame for the disaster - he was the general commanding officer since at least May 1941, and it was his job to responsibility to prepare his forces and to conduct a strong defense of the colony.
Otherwise, Singapore is at a pretty strategic location. Not sure I buy in to the point about the defense being more political and a point of prestige. Afterwards, the Japanese could support their efforts in Burma more effectively, while the Imperial Japanese Navy went on a bit of a tear in the Indian Ocean.
This channel has a massive British bias. Great channel, but it is biased. Historiography, WW2 in real time, and Kings and Generals all have a better less biased analysis of the British failure and collapse in SE Asia.
- The quality of the Indian Troops was as low as it could be. They were generally half-trained or less units that were pressed into service in Malaya;. The units in question were the leftovers after the Indian Army had been picked over several times to both form new units and to support units in the field in the middle east. The lower ranked officers (often up to Captain) were mostly immediate commissions with really no training or experience at all. The higher ranked officers in the unit were often peacetime captains pushed up into command of Battalions. I can't speak to the quality of the Australians. The Malaya brigades were just local defense troops.
- The Indian Units had often been trained either for service in Afghanistan border regions or in more aird parts of India. The plan for most of the units deployed to Malay was originally them being sent to the middle east.
- The British had minimal intelligence on the Japanese. Part of this was by intent. Regional intelligence collection was avoided out of concern it would push Thailand more fully into a Japanese alliance.
- Why no more flexible defense? Lack of transport and mobility. But the biggest problem was the inability of British forces to hold a line. The Japanese would slip through their lines, get behind them and then they would retreat. This was a major problem in the far east well beyond Malaya. It was eventually tactically corrected by creating "box" formations months after the Malaya campaign and not retreating due to the Japanese getting through the line. They set up for all-around defense and forced the Japanese to take out the unit rather than the unit retreating to the next line. The ability of the Japanese to get behind the British in the jungle and to get through any defensive line was part of what went wrong in Malaya.
- They were not "road bound" in terms of fighting or their deployments.
As far as Burma goes, the invasion of Burma by the Japanese was launched and well underway during the Malaya campaign. The forces in Burma for defense were far worse than those available in Malaya. Burma was written off early and even the forces that were intended to be sent there (such as an Australian division) were not sent. The tactical problem in Burma was generally similar to Malaya. The Japanese would get through or behind the British/Indian lines and then the British would fall back.
If the Japanese had been able to land a military force in India in 1942, the entire British administration might have collapsed in the same way it did in Malaya. To fight in Greece, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Ethiopia and Egypt, the British had stripped everything to be bone. And that was on top of a decade of neglect in terms of military spending in India and the far east.
A better commander in Malaya would have figured out what the Japanese were doing and figured out a way to counter it as other commanders eventually did later. But the command in Malaya was addicted to the idea that form line, defend line and retreat if the enemy breaks through the line.
One other thing though. Singapore as a fortress without Malaya in 1942 was defendable in my opinion. The whole idea of "fortress singapore" that Brtish still believed in was an extremely dated idea. If the Japanese reached the edges of the city, it was doomed to fall.
It would have helped if the British fought back. Australians were 17% of the force but 70% of the casualties.
After the surrender the Japanese confirmed that the failure of the British to support the Australians and starving them of ammunition allowed their breakthrough.
The General is always at fault. Doubly so if the general decides to, "take what he can get", rather than resign forecasting woe should more investment in his or her command not be made. LTG Percival is a perfect example of why officers who enjoy their perks of office more than their duty should be avoided at all costs. He might have been the right general for peace, but he certainly was not the right general for war.
gave 2 much to sg importance to churcjill... sg only a trading post in the far east...no value to britian's war in europe...percial was a carrer soldier..unlike macarthur..."crazy whites standing in the noon sun..n drinking in raffles bar..."..sg was a mangrove swamp trading post this is all.
But he really should have done a better job. Not the problem but was a part of it. Philippines held out for almost 5 months.
@@ifuknjk Singapore was vitally important to British interests in the far East. It was a major naval base and had shipyards. The closest ones after that were in Ceylon and South Africa.
Percival was an inept and also extraordinarily brutal leader of the Brits in the Irish war of independence, torturing republicans to death, dragging them behind lorries, burning houses, and behaving like the Japanese in WW2. He helped lose the war in Ireland too.
@@peterflynn9123 Anyone comparing 'British' soldiers (many of whom were just as Irish as the IRA terrorists) to the Japanese in WW2 lacks intelligence, knowledge, education, and reason. Percival, and the other generals were angels compared to their foe. Far from being brutal, they were never allowed to actually fight the IRA on any sort of level playing field. Despite that they crushed the IRA and brought them to the negotiating table. The British 'war' aim was to implement a form of Home Rule, which they essentially did. The IRA wanted a 32 county republic. Still waiting on that. There are letters in the late 1920s from Percival to Montgomery on the subject where Percival remarks that the subsequent Free State soldiers actually did what Percival and co had not been allowed to do, and deal with scum as scum.
A great uncle of mine who I think of quite often died at Singapore. He'd fought through WWI and won a military medal during the Somme and was killed when his troop ship was sunk. We still have his tankard on the mantlepiece and remember him and the other family members who didn't come home, or who only partly did. Lest we forget
Mine too but was lucky and came home in 1944…!
It's a rule in every battle: Never EVER underestimate your enemy.
Percival Over estimated the strength of the Japanese.
@@anthonyeaton5153 overestimation is a bigger idiocy than underestimation.
As Tom Barry said of him, "I always knew he was a coward." Percival's only talent was torturing Irish prisoners in the Twenties.
The guy was a sadist. Pity Tom Barry never got him although a his reputation in tatters must have been hell for him. Which is good enough for me.
Not just prisoners, he liked to murder innocent civilians too John.
Thank you, IWM, for producing this video. Congratulations for covering some major explanations that I believe made it easy for the general public to understand. Most of your verbal comments were also accurate. I must also thank the many online commentators for their posts that made interesting read, especially the personal experiences of their ancestors who were directly involved in the defence and fall of Malaya (including Singapore). Though these did not answer IWM's macro questions, they nevertheless added a refreshing micro-perspective of those who had fought on the ground. May future generations always remember their (of defenders') sacrifices with gratitude.
Admittedly, within this online space, it's impossible to cover all factors that led to the fall of Singapore, for this topic has multi-faceted and multi-layered dimensions. They ranged from political, economic, military, institutional to political and military key decision makers and their men on the ground, both on the Allied and Axis sides.
On one hand, short, pithy comments risk coming across as one-sided (unbalanced), opinionated, impressionistic or shallow. On the other hand, attempting a comprehensive and balanced summary, though courageous, still may not do full justice to this topic.
For the more serious students of history, if one does not have access to all the primary evidences, the next best recourse is to refer to the professionals who have gained access to them. Over the decades, there are many books written on this topic. For a more holistic, balanced, nuanced and comprehensive view on the subject, I would recommend that they read, among many other excellent works, especially:
(a) The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940-1942 by Professor Brian P. Farrell, NUS History, first published in 2006 by Tempus Publishing Limited; and
(b) Churchill and the Lion City: Shaping Modern Singapore by Professor Brian P. Farrell (Editor); and
(c) Colonel Masanobu Tsuji: The Mastermind behind Japan's Greatest Victory; Britain's Worst Defeat: The Capture of Singapore 1942.
Since the release of Britain's cabinet papers to UK National Archives in the 1990s, there have been more revelations about Churchill's role in depriving Malaya of adequate defence, both in terms of quantity and quality of resources. These revelations were followed by scathing criticisms of Churchill. I am thus surprised that the question is still framed as "Is Percival to blame?" today, instead of "Is Churchill to blame?", since the release of the official documents over 20 years ago. In the annals of history, Percival more than Churchill continues to be associated with Singapore's fall in 1942.
A more empathetic view towards Churchill is that any colonial master would naturally prioritise the protection of his homeland and home waters first, over some far-flung corners of the British empire. As the first law of human nature, survival and self-preservation comes first. If Britain were to surrender to Nazi Germany, the British empire would collapse instantly, and Axis partner Japan would simply walk into Malaya, as it did in Vichy French Indochina. But if only parts of the empire were to fall, no matter how "impregnable", strategic or humiliating, HQ Britain could still live to fight another day, leveraging on the industrial might and growing military prowess of the USA and USSR to help defeat the immediate threat; Nazi Germany first, and then Japan, the Pacific enemy. In response to the emotive undertones of some comments, especially those from the Far East, this is the reality of realpolitik that dominions of any colonial master have to confront. Otherwise, as post-WWII events bear out, fight for political independence from the colonial master.
Sadly Percival was no De Valette, the Grand Master of the Knights of Malta who held out against enormous odds against the Turks in 1565. A man of De Valette's determination and character may well have created a very alternative history of "the siege of Singapore". Singapore would probably still have fallen eventually, but its resistance would have been a source of pride and inspiration.
Awesome point!
the Seige of Malta 1565 would make a great story in a video.
The guy was a scumbag auxiliary during the Irish war of independence known for torture.
well... perhaps but De Valette didn't have to deal with airplanes....
he was also no Kemal Ataturk who prevented the British naval force from crossing the straits in 1915. In case we want to stop portraying non-westerners like the Japanese and Turks as the villains.
@@davidlewis5312 You are correct but I am looking more at the character of the man, and how an inspirational leader can bring out exceptional qualities in every fighting man. I take the point that Ataturk is another example of such leadership.
As a Singaporean thank you for making this informational video!
A few comments from an armchair general. Percival’s defence in depth strategy could only work if there was a mobile defensive reserve to counter attack. Otherwise the more mobile Japanese attackers would always be able to gain local numerical superiority. So it appears the wrong strategy to start with. It appeared at no point did Percival consider counter attacking and thus ceded the initiative for the entire battle to the Japanese. He then incorrectly anticipated where the main thrust of the Japanese invasion of the island would take place and took too long to recognise it as the main thrust. Again he also had no organised reserves for a counter attack, despite having numerical superiority. Finally he fell for the Japanese bluff at the surrender negotiations. This was a complete failure of intelligence but also seemed to stem from a lack of proper reconnaissance to gain a true estimate of enemy strength over the entire campaign.
This type of defense only makes sense if one has good means of transport and can send relief forces quickly.
It seems that he was too passive and had no plan on how to use his troops successfully.
Nope. Percival's attitude toward the Japanese itself, regarding them as inferior, shown that he already underestimated the enemy. With that kind of mindset, he already lost the war.
In contrast, General Kuribayashi during the defense of Iwo Jima worried about US capability. He had different mindset than his peers. The result was bloody carnage for the US Marines.
I don't know why Wavell did not sack Percival & take command himself.
Exactly this. Was he under equipped on a theater that was far from the priority for the Allies? For sure, did he also took bad tactical decisions that ultimately lead to defeat? Yes, and that part is very much on his own .
A total of 556 personnel from the 2/15th were captured; they would spend three-and-a-half years in Japanese captivity, during which 294 men died. After the war ended in August 1945, the surviving members of the regiment were repatriated to Australia and the regiment was disbanded
Percival was sent to Singapore because he was viewed as a menace in the European theatre. After all, they thought even he couldn't lose Singapore. The Indian and Malayan forces were poorly trained and poorly lead. Their officers were afraid of the jungle so stayed on the roads and rubber plantations next to them. While the Australians used the jungle as did the Japanese. But poor logistics meant they had fighting withdrawal. Percival refused to take advice from his staff and when the Australians wanted to be reinforced as they could see the build up of the Japanese opposite their position. Even after the landing, they wanted to fight on but were ordered to surrender.
He should have been court marshalled! Yes, circumstances were against him but he could have fought on this forcing the Japanese to withdraw to the mainland. Thus giving time for help to be sent from Australia.
No way could the BCEF in Malaya be supported in time from even as 'close' as from Australia. You may as well say McArthur should have held out until further deployment from San Francisco.
@@uingaeoc3905 Two different things. I'm not saying saving Malaya but Singapore. The Philippines is like Malaya couldn't save it.
Indian & Malayan afraid of jungle...okay
@@jirachi-wishmaker9242 Not the Troops but their English officers!! Indian and Maylaain soldiers weren't trusted to get beyond NCO's. Racism and snobbery were rife in the British armed forces! So, no disrespect for the poor troops but contempt for the leaders!
@N Fels Yes, the officers weren't the highest quality! That is what was saying can you comprehend English? If you don't know what you are talking about it is best not to say anything as it just shows your ignorance! Galah!
British love of 'procedures' played a huge part. Percival was simply unprepared and applied no strategy with what he had. Insufficient ground training and procedural limitations on equipment like antiaircraft guns being relocated to protect the ithsmus connecting Singapore to the mainland.
The blatant truth is that the British did not regard the defence of Malaya seriously.
Percival was a war criminal during the Irish War of Independance, murdered civilians and pow's but was never brought to justice by Britain. Just like every other brit murderer really.
The Japanese conquest of SE Asia in several months is one of the most impressive military campaigns in history.
Apart from taking France, Belgium and the Netherlands in six weeks.
Britain had most of its strength in Europe and Africa so I don’t think it’s impressive as it looks at first glance
Actually, the most easiest campaign for the Axis. British and Dutch were too busy with affairs at mainland Europe. And what they had in their Pacific colonies were just colonial troops.. these troops meant to repel against local insurgencies.. but grossly lacked the ability of a conventional army to defend from foreign invasion. Look at the Japanese, as soon as they faced the real armed forces: US Marines & US successfully established the winning ground at Battle of Midway, the path to their defeat came very quickly.
Only because Europe was at war since 1939. Ask the Russians at Nomohan.
@@timcahill4676 This is easily the biggest cope. The facts are the British still held numerical superiority in holdings in Asia...Couple that with the fact that the Japanese sometimes had inferior equipment (Such as them using bicycles instead of transport vehicles the British had)....Your point is quite mute.
The British empire was impressive until you realize it took centuries to reach its height and you guys were mostly conquering backwards people who were fighting you with sticks and stones versus your modern guns.
The Japanese on the other hand had reached its territorial peak in as little as 6 months whilst facing technologically on-par enemies, whom also had much more manpower than Japan did. To make matters even worse against Japan, the Japanese were doing all this while under a MASSIVE resource deficit particularly in oil AND still achieving victories in China.
To any rational historian the Japanese empire is 100% more impressive than anything Britain did. Actually many soldiers in WW2 fighting for Britain believed the same. Over 100,000 British colonial soldiers had defected and fought for the Japanese against Britain instead......Approximately zero Japanese soldiers defected to the British side. lol
Percival was a leader in Bandon in the South of Ireland during the war of Independence. His actions were little different to those of the Japanese in WW2. He lost in Ireland too, so history shows him as serially inept as well as a war criminal .
He was actually an excellent staff officer. Agree on his role in Ireland where he committed what can be called war crimes
@@ropaul8006 excellent staff officer in peace times and even that's a maybe.
I read about his actions in Ireland, and you're right, he was senselessly brutal, and absolutely incompetent as commander, not the right man for such a delicate position.
Yep !! Percival was an "excellent" Staff Officer but not in the field, ...he was "excellent" in London Private Members’ Clubs
@@bermudezhg obviously. His staff work was actually top notch. It's why he went up through the ranks. He's the type of man you'd want to run your office. It's easy to judge with hindsight but with Japanese air & naval superiority not to mention hundreds of tanks I doubt any British officer could have held out. The best solution would probably have been to evacuate the troops but that might not have been possible with Japanese Air and naval superiority
Common defense design error for a port -- fortify the harbor greatly but under fortify the land side.
The huge guns on Sentosa island could turn 360° but didn't have any high explosive shells. So they were basicaly useless.
It should be remembered that the 8th Australian division consisted of 2 infantry brigades only, instead of the normal established of 3 brigades. The 3 battalions of the other brigade were sent to separate locations in what is now Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. They were quickly overwhelmed by the Japanese when the time came. I have always wondered if the third brigade would have made any difference in the defense of Malaya.
Of course it would not.
It's a interesting question. If there had been an Australian brigade at Kota Bharu to defend the two RAAF Squadrons there, reinforce the Dogras (who put up an extraordinary fight) and cut off the Japanese flanking manouvre through the swamps, then perhaps at least the landing at KB might have failed. But it still would have been the only failed one of four landings. And if they were kept organic with 8Div, the early stuffing around and abandonment of prepared positions, and the later constant collapse of units on the Division's flanks, would still have meant the loss of Malaya, albeit perhaps with a few more Japanese casualties. The problems ran far, far deeper than anything one brigade could fix.
They were NOT quckly overwhelm ed at all , you should read ab out their engagment of the Japanese at Gemas and the retreat of the Australians that took place two weeks after that, resulting in a charge with just spades and axes against japanese machine gun emplacements....there is still a memorial to them on that spot. read about it.
The Australians ran away casting away their arms and went on the rampage.
Singapore
A classified wartime report by Wavell released in 1992 blamed the Australians for the loss of Singapore.[28] According to John Coates, the report "lacked substance", for though there had undoubtedly been a lack of discipline in the final stages of the campaign-particularly among the poorly trained British, Indian and Australian reinforcements that were hurriedly dispatched as the crisis worsened-the 8th Australian Division had fought well and had gained the respect of the Japanese. At Gemas, Bakri and Jemaluang, "they achieved the few outstanding tactical successes" of the campaign in Malaya and although the Australians made up 13 per cent of the British Empire's ground forces, they suffered 73 per cent of its battle deaths. Coates argues that the real reason for the fall of Singapore was the failure of the Singapore strategy, to which Australian policy-makers had contributed in their acquiescence and the lack of military resources allocated to the fighting in Malaya.
It is said to never underestimate (or "undermisedtimate") your opponent.
Percival's reluctance to reinforce the northern part of Singapore Island for fear of creating a defeatist, defensive attitude was a poor choice.
Given the lack of British armour and airpower Japan's rapid advance down the Malayan Peninsular is understandable, but even with the lack of northern defences on the island, the speed and relative ease of the Japanese crossing of the Johore Strait and final advance on Singapore has always shocked me.
Not wanting to frighten the population by building defences... that must have been a great consolation to them when after the defeat they were marched off to death camps.
Defeat in detail is a well known military strategy. Percival, being a general should have prepared for that possibility.
My father, in the Royal Artillery commanding a 25 pdr Field Gun, was redirected from his way to North Africa, to Singapore, and was taken prisoner there. He was put on the Burma railway. He had a few things in his favour: he was super fit being a cup winning cyclist, he had generations of carpentry skills which the Japanese valued for construction of the bridges, and he had the savoir to avoid the worst malaria. He knew Ronald Searle, who hid his drawings of the murderous events in bamboo sections under the hut floors.
He was moved to Japan late in the war, and put down mines to construct pit props. In both locations he saved other men’s lives by teaching them how to put a Japanese wood plane together, which was the test for carpentry skills. He saw the immediate aftermath of the Nagasaki bomb. The lowest moment for him was after the surrender, standing on a beach with his friend who was the only other survivor from the beginning that he knew, watching an American drop of supplies. A parachute didn’t open and when the drum hit the beach, the lid sprang off and decapitated his friend, standing next to him.
Even after travelling round the world on his way home, including a train across the USA, he was like a skeleton on return, many boils, and slept for weeks. He was told he would never be able to have children, but soon began his three. He was still driving at age 88, and lived to 91, passing away in 2012.
If my sister’s detailed, appalling short hand record of his memories ever get typed up, I think it will be quite worthwhile.
Churchill wrote that it no more occurred to him that Singapore had no landward defences than that a battleship could be launched without a bottom. But he added, he should have enquired. It was Percival's clear duty to improve those defences, and he had the means and time to do it. Civilian labour could have been conscripted. Underwater obstacles and deep bunkers could have been prepared. Water cisterns could have been built for rain run-off. Shells for the harbour guns could have been refilled and re-fused with high-explosive. (It's a myth that the guns could not be trained to fire on the strait. The problem was, they only had SAP shells for naval targets.) Barbed wire and cement was in plentiful supply. Food had been stockpiled, at least, and there was time and transport to send civilians south.
Given a competent and energetic general, Singapore should have been able to hold out for at least six or eight months, and would have cost the Japanese far more, meaning that they would have to bring in resources from other theatres. But Percival was not that general. He actually forbade his engineers to construct better defences, giving as a reason that he did not want to depress civilian morale. That was idiotic, or worse.
Norman Dixon's "The Psychology of Military Incompetence" contains a section on Percival's behaviour that seeks to explain it from psychological factors, but for me it is sufficient that he behaved in that way. It was, in my opinion, unconscionable that he was not court-martialed at the end of the war for his failure to do his duty, and was allowed to retire on full pension and write his highly self-exculpatory memoirs.
wat if ..... sg fall.malaya fall etc.. even god could not stop japan's invasion in the pacific..
Churchill was the First Sea Lord starting in September of 1939 until he became PM in late May 1940 and would have been thoroughly familiar with the defenses of Singapore. His remark was disingenuous.
@@sethdekooters7567 singapore was NOT important to the british empire n churchill... only a trading post.....
@@ifuknjk Wrong. The loss of Singapore led to the invasion and occupation of Burma, another English colony, and ultimately Bengal. Their Pacific fleet lost its most important base. It's loss was the catalyzing event for the independence movements across the British Empire.
@@sethdekooters7567 broken up of british empire was the signs of the times...like 2022 west broken up n asia whole again..biggest elephant is WW 3.. imminent or not n failure of climate change n mankind survival...or dino is dead
The mapping of the coastal artillery guns at 7:48 is largely incorrect. Hopefully this can be accurately remapped for your viewers😀
Years ago, I read a book about the surrender of Singapore. Because the news of the oncoming Japanese forces down the Malayan peninsula was censored, one man kept track of which branches of a certain bank were advertised in newspapers as having been closed. Of course, they were closed because they'd been captured by the Japanese.
I went to Singapore in 2017 for the 75th anniversary of The Fall. A very moving commemoration at the Commonwealth memorial in Kranji.
The Chinese were viewed by the Japanese as supplying arms and/or money for arms to their fellow Chinese to fight the Japanese in the mainland country.
so So which country and region do the Chinese in Singapore like most now, is the origin of their ancestors PRC, Malaysia or Taiwan？
@@Jeffrey21058 like all the other hypocrites, its all about where the money is
@@ruleoftwo6174 yes,just as Interests
@@Jeffrey21058 well, firstly Singapore. We are our own successful nation now. And as for second place, that varies from person to person, though most of us do feel slightly more attached to Malaysia, since a lot of us have family or business there. In the end, it varies, but overall we try to be impartial and more rational
No. Most of the Chinese that complied and agreed not to conduct illegal guerilla warfare against the Japanese, in support of Mainland China, were spared. Those who refused in accordance to international law, were simply captured
My Great Uncles name turned up on a POW list for the railway of death in Thailand (which felt weird anyway as I am half Thai). I can only assume he was a part of this surrender. Unfortunately I never met him as he had a falling out with my grandfather. I salute him all the same.
All the documentary are of such high quality. I expect you to have more viewers... The UA-cam algorithm is not doing Their job.
The truth is that Singapore came a poor third in Mr Churchill's war effort. He was obssessed with North Africa and the sending of tanks, guns and aircraft on the Murmansk convoys to Russia. As for force Z, it is a good job the aircraft carrier never made it, if it had it would be lying on the bottom of the sea with the battleship and battle cruiser. I will say however that we should have fought a better war to save Singapore, but that I suppose comes down to inspired leadership.
Battle of Singapore shows that Japan was a formidable opponent when they were evenly matched with their enemy. They simply did not have the industrial output to match the United States.
Percival divided his forces to defend his airfields without having modern planes to put on them.
And refused requests by his officers to build defences on the mainland .
And people complain about the kind of force required in August 1945 to stop this madness. It actually required a second one for the "penny to drop".
strange that it was not mentioned that one of the British's greatest colonial strength also served the Japanese well, ROADS. British colonial surveyors built an excellent road network in Malaya that served them well during colonial rule, and their retreat, negating any effects the Malayan jungle might have. these same roads enabled the Japanese to advance on bicycle towards Singapore.
The higher ups are not there to give you want you want, but to only provide barely sufficient resources (emphasis on "sufficient"). The Generals job is to make their case, work the channels and develop the strategies and tactics to suit the situation. It seems that Percival neither stood up for himself or had any clue how to face an enemy. Blaming his superiors does not seem to be a valid defence on his part.
The utterly magnificent defence of Imphal by Slim shows what a great General can accomplish against a superior Japanese force.
A British narrator talking about a British officer, but he uses the American "lootenant" pronunciation. Very odd. At least he says "Force Zed" rather than "Force Zee".
I always find it fascinating that in all these fall of Singapore videos no one ever mentions the insubordinations and defiance of LTC Duncan Maxwell of the Australian Army which played a critical role in why Singapore was lost.
In the morning of 9 February, after the Japanese landed and broke through the lines of the adjacent 22nd Brigade, Maxwell sought to withdraw a portion of his forces, but Bennett denied him permission. Later in the day, with the Japanese now landing in his sector, Maxwell ordered them to withdraw from the causeway anyway, having already replaced his two battalion commanders, Galleghan and Boyes, with more compliant officers. This was despite the Japanese advance being hindered more than expected because of the robust defence mounted to this point. After the brigade's withdrawal the next day, it was temporarily attached to the 11th Indian Division by orders of the GOC Malaya, Lieutenant General Arthur Percival.
However, soon Maxwell, on receiving orders from his now divisional commander to attack towards his abandoned sector, claimed that he had received differing orders from Percival. To divisional staff, he stated the orders came from Bennett. He was to move the brigade to recapture Bukit Panjang. Percival and Bennett both later denied any knowledge of these orders. In any event, the move failed and Maxwell's brigade began to break down into companies and platoons and retreated back into Singapore.
Made a prisoner of war after the fall of Singapore, Maxwell was held by the Japanese in a camp on Taiwan. Here he conceded to another prisoner, Brigadier Arthur Blackburn who had been captured on Java, that he deliberately directed his men to retreat from the causeway to let the Japanese land unopposed as he considered his position to be hopeless. He was conscious of the lives of his men and did not wish to see them wasted defending British Malaya.
Should have have been drawn and quartered
Another factor 5 million people in Malaya at the time was against the British. British realize this and thought Japan would allied with 5 million Malayan people, that's why British surrendered.
@@iamgreat1234 Yes, because the general populace at the time don't like the Japanese, but they certainly don't like the British more. So the Japanese took advantage of this and spread propaganda that Asia are for Asians but in reality the Japanese meant Asia for the Japanese.
So once the local population population realised the Japanese are like the British but far, far worst, it was already too late.
Edit: I am a Malaysian. This was what was taught in our history books at least.
Agree with Steve but even more they expected the enemy, battle-hardened troops to come from the jungle. Arrogance in leadership will cost you every time. Singapore was never a fortress to begin with
The fall of Singapore made us Singaporeans realize that no one will protect us other than ourselves... The British totally underestimated the japanese forces...
Worse than that Churchill knew the dangerous situation and lied to Roosevelt. Love Singapore. Lived there for four years.
看你头像好像也是个中华胶（不是骂你，因为我也是一个香港蓝丝）
Very poor video. No mention of Operation Matador or the forbidding of employing this plan.
Also totally ignored the fact that Percival's Chief Engineer, Brigadier Ivan Simsoner, repeatedly asked for permission to construct fixed defences in key positions. Percival dismissed these requests with the comment, "Defences are bad for morale."
Percival seemed unaware that capitulation is bad for morale too.
He was dealt a grotty hand, but he played that hand as poorly as it was possible for it to be played.
As an American I have a different perspective on this. Just as McArthur in the Phillippine's underestimated the Japanese the British also did too. Both were at the very end of the supply line of their country so got only what wasn't needed elsewhere before Dec. 7th 1941 and very little afterward. In both cases the decisions to hold out were more political them military as any good general who could see the "whole picture" would realize that both bases were going to be lost. It was only a matter of time as to how long they could hold out. Unfortunately the longer they held out the more soldiers would die. They were the ones that paid the price, not the generals.
Churchill wasn’t exactly honest to Roosevelt about the strength (or lack of strength).
Churchill made a decision in 1941 to focus military force on the middle east and run the risk of war with Japan with forces in Asia that amounted to a giant bluff. There was no navy, no aircraft, no anti-aircraft defense and the vast majority of the forces deployed to Malaya were third rate. The Indian forces in particular were either half-trained or were the remainder left behind in India when the units were stripped of good men for service in other units.
They ran a giant bluff. The Japanese called their bluff. And they lost.
There was some Ack Ack - not enough, but not zero.
My uncle was shipped out there in Nov 1941. He was a radar gun layer (radar operator) and joined 11 Battery of 3 Heavy Anti Aircraft Regiment, which was already out there.
I remember learning this in history class and I always found it so funny that the brits lost to bicycles, I'm from Malaysia 😂
The Japanese also had 200 tanks, the British had none. The British also had a traitor in their ranks by the name of Capt Patrick Heenan who gave the Japanese the daily recognition codes for the British air base at Alor Setar enabling them to destroy most of the British aircraft while still on the ground and in turn allowed the Japanese to gain air superiority.
The Japanese didn't win with bicycles alone.
The British wanted the Indians and Singaporeans to sacrifice themselves first. But The Japanese attack from the back and exposed the white British command, so the surrendered immediately. Lucky the Japanese attacked from the exposed back otherwise many Indians and Singaporeans would hv died for the incompetent British command.
@@justonecornetto80 yeah yeah blah blab but they lost anyway
I thought so too! But well things already happened a long time ago so.
@@monke6475 if hearing the reality offends you don't bother coming here to learn
Not a word here in regard to General Gordon Bennett of the Australian forces who simply disappeared unlike Percival who stayed in charge to the end. The Australians lost all morale and actual leadership because of this. Bennett was cashiered on arrival in Australia - if he had been an Axis or Soviet general he would have been shot.
Obviously, something they wanted to keep quiet!
Why would you particularly mention this? More relevant was how he was want abrasive with the British and his general lack of diplomacy, plus a tendency to act without orders. His service record back to WW1 gives no hint of cowardice as you imply. Behind the scenes he was probably instrumental in council to Prime minister Curtin deciding to stand up to Churchill to insist that the 6th and 7th divisions be brought home.
Facts are that Bennett made his plans to escape on Feb 15 when Percival made the decision that he would surrender . Obviously Bennett’s job as a fighting commander were over. His argument was that it was his duty to escape. Further he regarded himself of value to educate the rest of the Australian Army on tactics to defeat the Japanese in future battles. At this time he was not issued orders, so he could have stayed as a hollow tribute to morale. Instead he again acted without asking for orders. This decision tends to summarized as a coward. Had he stayed he would, like other senior ranks, be removed from representing his soldiers anyway, as Japanese control was about not having former leaders available for soldiers to defer to.
The critical consideration here is that he never got along with Percival, and postwar Percival had to answer for his own military leadership. He subsequently wrote to Blamey , who also shared the same dislike for Bennett. This is where suggestions of cowardice gained traction and became arguable.
In contrast less than a month later Douglas MacArthur did the same thing. Officially he was ordered to Australia. Argument has been that this order was issued retrospectively, to prevent morale issues and Wainwright later did more than his duty to keep dirt hidden.
Amazing how popularity could out maneuver military proficiency.
@@BC-op7rj I notice you do not contradict my two points - Bennett was cashiered and his 'escape' led to a collapse in morale of the Australian forces. I mention it because once the Public Record allowed the circumstances of the Bennett 'escape' to be exposed it destroyed the myth that the Australian forces in Singapore had been 'betrayed' by the British a constant these of my early years post-War and a replay of Gallipoli myth. The majority of the BC&E casualties at Gallipoli were British and the majority of the BC&E force which went into captivity at Singapore were British.
@@BC-op7rj interesting retort
@@uingaeoc3905 Prior you incited that Bennet was a coward and now you dodge that. Curtin actually gave a speech praising Bennett's escape. For those who did not escape there are mixed views. Most troops were in view that at least some escaped (as was a soldiers duty). Most criticism was civilian and of course Blamey and Percival elevating themselves post war by putting Bennett down. But that was 1945/6, not 1942/3.
At one point in 1943 Australia believed the Japanese were planning to invade Western Australia. Many forces were transferred from the Eastern seaboard, to go under Bennett's command . After that Bennett was merely left to whither in a backwater command for the remainder of the war because Blamey was in charge and had is own issues.
Australians betrayed by the British is a separate subject. IMO you are pulling strings on two separate bags and not catch either answer. Singapore was promised to be the keystone in defending Australia when the 2nd AIF went to the Middle East and Churchill broke promises.
You probably need to better make your point concerning loss of morale. Men of the 6th, 7th and 9th Divisions were all trying to transfer in December-March to get a crack at the Japanese. Assume you mean just the 8th Div , not the entire AIF and AMF? Loss of morale after capture is incorrect. Yes no one wants to be a prisoner , but when the 8th went into captivity members made concerted efforts around camp hygiene and food. Men worked as pairs to survive. Meanwhile British, Indians and Dutch prisoners were more inclined to have moments of squabbles among the ranks. Their survival was mainly as individuals who made little effort to maintain hygiene for example.
This is an example of how morale did not crumble in the Australian ranks. There was a predisposition among Australians then being better acclimatised to harsh independent living. Alternatively the British were mostly city folk and the Indians lacked medical staff and education to stay ahead of diseases as best they could.
In short your assessment is just wrong. Australian morale did not crumble. and Bennett was not cashiered in 1942-43..
And I still have no idea what your destination is regards ANZAC legend being broken. That might be your agenda, ....whatever. The men here were on average born four years after Gallipoli. As for the numbers, no, India supplied the most prisoners, not Britain. Numbers were 38,496 United Kingdom, 18,490 Australian of whom 1,789 were killed and 1,306 wounded, 67,340 Indian and 14,382 local volunteer troops
'... the unprepared British...' in one sentence answers the question 'was Churchill to blame?' No, no more than any single man. Collective responsibility for the fall of Singapore has to go to the catastrophic failure over many years to recognise that the landward perimeter was an open back door to an enemy.
The fall of Singapore was the largest and best example of British reality. They see themselves as superior even when in failure
Great insightful episode
Yes Percival was to blame, along with all the upper class twits above him. Causing the torture and death of so many.
The Black and Tan man the "Rabbit" the guy who burnt Irish peoples homes but not very impressive when comes to fighting real soldiers
Well said.
“Lootenant General”??? You mean Lieutenant General, surely?
Germany invades France through Belgium: *Sabaton Ghost Division starts playing*
Japan invades Malaya: *Ghost Division: Kazoo cover starts playing*
The Japanese General looked alot more intimidating than The British one too
What had he done to train and prepare his own men? Why did he not learn form any of his mistakes?
I hope IWM can do one on the Malayan Emergency 1948-60
It was called a "Fortress city" for some reason. Churchill found that extremely confusing and I don't blame him. If its not sufficiently militarized and defensible then don't refer to it as a fortress city.
Churchill had to lie about Singapore’s strength to Roosevelt.
"It was a Matter of British Pride", I imagine these words are repeated quite oftentimes in IWM videos.
I would probably lay down my arms too if my uniform looked cringe as hell.
Usually we British manage to find some silver lining to a defeat e.g. a heroic last stand etc but Singapore seems to be 100% disaster and humiliation. Before the Internet it was quite hard to even find information about it was that deliberate?
Churchill was not to blame. The design of the fortifications was intended to defend against a sea borne attack, and when were they built? Long before Churchill became PM.
The reason behind the attack will come from the sea was that the army general staff considered the jungle impassable, ergo an attacker would have to come from the sea.
Add to that that the fresh water supply came from the mainland, the causeway was still passable to infantry at high tide - as it was covered by about 1 metre of water!
Then complacency by the military - Polo rather than exercises, no attempt to see how inhospitable the jungle really was not; treating the local people as idiots - after all many of them lived in the jungle.
When the Japanese did land on the mainland any resistance they met they went round, cutting each pocket of resistance off from reinforcements.
I knew men who had marched off the troop ships into captivity. How they survived the hell they ended up in in places like Changi Jail, is a miracle in its self.
RIP all those who fell.
The Japanese were clearly to strong at that stage, the best trained jungle fighters in the world. It wasn't the bicycle frontal attack that made the difference, it was IJN barges leap frogging down the coast of Malaya attacking well defended positions from the rear cutting supply lines, then again invading Singapore through the rear, in what was considered impenetrable mangrove swamp, nobody could stop them, that was of course, until they called the Aussies gutless, then it was on for young and old, setting the stage for Japans first land battle defeat at Milne bay, at the hands of the Australians, including my uncle Tommy and uncle Gilbert.
The Japanese weren’t actually good jungle fighters
While Percival should be held accountable for his failures in Singapore, there should also be some acknowledgement that a major problem of the British Army is they just did not have the stomach to fight in the early years of the war, bad generalship all around and yet the conundrum of a shallow replacement pool for general officers...or you had Generals like Wavell and Auchinleck who suffered due to Churchill's meddling at the worst times for them.
And the fact the Japanese were just better prepared, motivated, and lead by Yamashita
The Japanese had more and better equipment, better trained and battle hardened troops too.
You should be ashamed of your comment for many British and Commonwealth troops fought hard and died in many war theaters around the world. They may have been losing but they were fighting. It is tough, active generals that create troops with spirit and he did not. Indeed he was a defeatist and possibly a coward.
It was a major oversight that tanks would be useless in jungles. Good roads in Malaya contribute to the east. How quick malaya fall contribute to the fall of Singapore. In Brit papers, they expect Malaya to last at least 1 year of warfare.
I think if the troops had known what would happen to them as POWs they would have never given in I think it was bad leadership from the top and an underestimation of the enemy
They also had incredibly racist opinions on the Japanese which caused them to underestimate their opponents
Another documentary I saw pointed out Yamashita brought less men, since he would have had to really stretch his rations otherwise, and didn't think that was worth the trade off
I've been on jungle warfare training exercises in Malaysia and it was not at all difficult to move in the jungle. There are plenty of roads that run from north to south and logging roads that run from east to west. Big enough for tanks. In case you are wondering, they aren't new roads. Percival was a mediocre General officer and kept his post only because almost no-one thought that there was a threat to British interests in South East Asia. All the major resources were kept for the European and North African theatres but Percival could have made much more effort to build up defences and ensure that a decent defence could be made in Malaya. But he didn't push it. The lack of tanks was one issue but the lack of anti aircraft guns was even worse. The effort to repulse the initial landings was half hearted and during the retreat there was no provision made to destroy the massive food and fuel stores the British had accumulated. The Japanese captured it all and Yamashita called it " The British Treasure ". Without it, his army's advance down the Malayan peninsula would have been much slower. Percival was completely fooled by the Japanese planning and in addition did nothing to destroy enemy observation posts in the soaring spires of the Sultan's palace. He thought it might make the Sultan side with the enemy if they were shelled. The Sultan had already signed a deal with the Japanese to save his own skin. During the build up to the amphib crossing, the Japanese drove empty trucks at night with their headlights on, to the place where Percival thought the crossing would be made. Then, they drove them back without lights and repeated it for a week. Percival fell for it and refused to imagine the attack would come elsewhere. Only local militia were posted where the real attack took place. Then, when the Japanese blew the islands' water supply with a bombing raid, Percival just decided to give up, obstensibly to save the civilian population from further bombing. The Australians mutinied and tried to put up a defence but were unable to do much as they had no heavy weapons. If Percival had put as much effort into preparations for defence, as he did in trimming his moustache, he might have won.
If you don't have supplies and reinforcements, there's no fortress that you can hold indefinitely. Moreover, it's just a waste of time trying to hold something that is clearly lost. The only merit in such endeavor is wasting enemy's time and resources. That was a motif of honor for this British commander.
As Italian, I can relate with him. I mean, not like I'm a commander or something, but my soldiers in that war fought in similar conditions. Without back up, no ammunition, no guns or reinforcements, alone.
And by the way, Japanese Army wasn't a force to take easily. They was tough and strong.
In early 1941 the Australian Prime Minister was in Singapore and said that the Guns there were pointing the wrong way
8:23 soldier in the front has a thompson!
Very British explanation of their defeats in WW2. „It’s not because of incompetence of command, they were just underfunded and Japanese outnumbered during landings“. Pathetic.
Percival had no slightest idea how many enemies are there and could not create at least rudimentary trench defence in depth. He should had way more ammunition, especially artillery shells, and food then Japanese. Leningrad held, fully surrounded, for over a year. So, I might say, Percival was incompetent, and in same time probably too arrogant to ask assistance from his top officers on organizing Singapore island defences.
British incompetence was the reason why Singapore started pushing for self-rule shortly after WW2. Can’t trust others to defend your country. You have to defend your own country.
The British officers thought Japanese soldiers are inferior. This is a major reason for defeat in war. Never underestimate your enemy even if their color of skin is different.
Percival was not FORCED to surrender, he made the decision to surrender. Irrespective of the excuses he gave for his surrender, he did not even make an effort to defend Singapore or his troops. It was a shame that someone else was not in command, maybe there would have been a different outcome. I was not impresed the way that the officer at the start of the video just threw the British flag down in the dirt.
White flag was thrown.
The defeat at Singapore was for the British Empire what the defeat at Adrianople was for the Western Roman Empire. A mortal psychological blow from which the Empire would never recover.
To be fair they did recover from it in 1944, Bill Slim showed up and the 14th army was reorganised, utterly smashing the Japanese at Kohima and Imphal.
I think it was the Eastern Romans who were defeated at Adrianople, altho I might be wrong
@@CBfrmcardiff Correct.
Could you get a higher camera angle on your interviewees
Story is Australian Gunners heard Japanese forces across the Straits that night but were forbidden to fire. What if ALL British forces, including supply troops had just fixed Bayonets and charged the Japanese?
As Singaporean, i often wonder this as well. In schools we were taught we had a numerical advantage, as well as having the home ground advantage with out backs to the high ground @ Bukit Timah.
The IJA relied so much on shock tactics utilizing their fighting spirit. Imagine if the Commonwealth forces did a banzai charge on them? The psychological effect of the 'weak willed' white man being disproven would have gone a long way, and could even plausably get Japanese commanders to stop and re-evaluate their situation, which could have led to a stalemate, or a seige - and perhaps allowing things to go very differently.
A German raider captured the ship carrying the report to London detailing Singapore's defenses and deficiencies. The Germans gave it to the Japanese. The Japanese thought it was a fake, but the info was good and they used it.
I actually never heard about this and I would consider myself a history buff! You always learn something new, thank you for sharing that piece of information. I’ll definitely have to do more research on that because I am in the process of making a video of the British defenses of Singapore against the IJA and IJN!
@@expandedhistory Wish I could remember where I read that hope you can confirm.
@@glenirwin1110 Most definitely. Thanks for bringing that up on my radar!
@@expandedhistory If you confirm let me know. Read that a while ago. It explains a lot about how the Japanese Army knew where the weak points were.
From all the reports the Brit forces never tried to commit to an offensive posture. Of course hindsight is always perfect but any junior officer would have known that if they lost Johore, Singapore was lost. No water supply, no food supply the forces cannot hold the island.
Useless staff officers and paper generals. Brought nothing but shame onto the British army uniform.
In remeberance to the Malay Regiment who fought to their last breath for 2 days against the Japanese.
They were left with only their bayonets and their bare hands but still fought.
*LIAR*
This piece asserts that the pace of Japanese advance down the penninsula, which averaged 11 miles/day, was "incredible". American civil war era armies, with horses and mules for transport, were at times much faster. Glossed over was the rampant cowardice and dereliction of duty manifested by the English officer corp and the 8th Australian Division. England had been at war for over two years when Malaya was invaded yet their tactics were those of WW1. No effort was made to prepare Singapore Island for seige although both the time and resources were readily available. It was a pathetic performance.
Steady on old chap !! 😆
Read the real story on the 8th Div. they were responsible for the few positive results in that whole sorry campaign.
Alexander the great was able to March 18 miles a day on foot through marshlands, woods and mountainous terrain.
My father had retreated via Shianghi and Hong Kong to end up fighting a rearguard action down the Malay Peninsula to be bottled up in Singapore.
He never said much about what happened in Singapore but one comment was that the officers were all in the Mess getting drunk and the only time they were given an order was that there was an official escape party of 40 men, 20 from the East Surreys and 20 from the Leicestershires who were to take a Minesweeper and 2 launches from a mooring and escape. The minesweeper and a launch lasted a hour before they were sunk by aircraft and he turned up in Colombo 6 months later but never said what happened. He was sent up to Kohima, wondered why he got the Burma Star!- they could not afford to waste his experience of Jungle Warfare he was told.
that was Archibald Wavell wavell? 7:20 ... meeting the troops, black guy looks a tad worried, look at the sikh commander guy, he's pretty proud
amazing history, thanks for such an excellent video again.... people can understand more about Britains colonial relationships if you look at these sorts of conflicts
Japanese doctrine of that time was based on British doctrine. Nothing they did in Malaya was to be unexpected. Percival, like most Pommy colonial officers of that time should not have been let off of the parade ground! If it had been Orde Wingate in charge for example the result would likely have been quite different. Australia and New Zealand were levied to pay for fortress Singapore but were let down badly by Churchill, his government, and Percival's total lack of a will to fight. Percival also displayed an inability to take advice from his subordinate officers whether British or Empire. The fact is Percival and his direct team lost Singapore by their lack of action, lack of communication, and any real plan to the contrary. The Japanese did not need to win Singapore, Percival gave it to them! The Japanese were as astounded as were the newly arrived Aussie diggers by Percival's decision's. To apologize for him as in this clip is pure revisionist crap! The capitulation at Singapore was shameful! In my part of the world it is looked at just like Gallipoli outcome of the first world war!
If Australia or New Zealand had been invaded the War could still have been won. If Britain had been defeated the War would have been lost.
Maybe engage your brain before posting to the comments section
@@theoilandgasresourceportal2132 alas you are missing the point, maybe you need to engage your brain. With out the the empire and the USA's support Britain would have lost. The war in Asia was won by the colonials and the USA, with little help from Britain. The one situation that might have slowed the Japanese advance was Singapore if it had held out for some time. It didn't thanks to Percival and his lack of command and control. If you want to get picky it was the USA and the USSR that won the Second World War with the British Empire including Britain coming a very distant second. Would the British Empire have been able to beat the Axis? Most things I have read say maybe over extended time, we shall never know. The USA went onto a war footing after Dec 7th and out produced everyone else. Stalin's Russia paid in blood as too did China. Slim's and Monty's efforts in the North African dessert and Assam were sideshows as was the campaign up Italy. Would have the war been won if the British Empire was nullified by the USA or USSR on their own? The answer is yes...back to clip, Percival failed his duty when called to fight. It is that simple.
@@theoilandgasresourceportal2132 The UK depended heavily on the US and the support from Canada and all the other part of the Empire and their soldiers.
I recently returned from Singapore, and I visited the bunker in Fort Canning, the very place where the decision to surrender was made.
I learned that Percival was not the incompetant nincompoop that some make him out to be. He asked for armour, and was given nothing. And as far as the northeast/northwest attack thing is concerned, he fell victim to a very intelligent Japanese bait and switch, where the Japanese concentrated their artillery against the weaker Aussie troops in the northwest, after feinting an island based invasion plan in the northeast.
We, as the British, we're outclassed, outgunned and outfought by a savage (I mean that in a purely complimentary way) and determined enemy who were, by that stage, truly mastering jungle warfare. They had the fastest fighter planes in the world, sophisticated comms equipment, and light armour that would've made the Germans blush.
It's a sad story, but Percival is not entirely to blame. His decision saved many, many lives, and MacArthur's push to place him within a metre of the Japanese surrender reflects the reality of the time, and just how much he was respected by those who knew of him and his actions.
Yamashita also wanted Percival to surrender quickly. In addition to being short on supplies, Yamashita knew that if the British held out it would force the Japanese Army into urban warfare, where the advantage lies with the defender. Despite Churchills incompetence (not much he touched was a success) he was right in the fact that if every British soldier killed a Japanese soldier before being overcome then the British would win.
I think that it would have been a shortlived victory as the Japanese would still control Malaya and would let Singapore wither on the vine so to speak.
For me, Percivel was to be blamed partially. He kept retreating despite Churchill saying to hold their position in Singapore. He was bluffed by Yamashita’s Bluff. Prior the Japanese entering Thailand for safe passageway, German sank British warships that carried highly secretive documents regarding the Singapore Defensive blunder. They gave it to their Japanese counterpart
Statically saying, it wouldn’t be practical to hold Singapore much longer because Japanese captured Sarawak, Sabah and Parts of Dutch East Indies like Balikpapan. Getting cut from allied shipping lane from Australia.
I wonder "What if" Percival had chosen to fight on?
Let’s face it. The whole goddam country of England was screwed. The whole country looks up to the King - as if some monarch has all the answers - and there is very little in the way of free thinking leaders.
Let’s just cut to the chase. When the majority of your weapons are pointing out to sea - because that’s where the British soldiers were told to point their guns - there in lies the problem.
If you’re the guy who’s job it is to defend a location - defend it.
The fact that so many British soldiers we’re captured so easily, suggests to me that no one had a clue what they were doing!
Singapore has an approximate active strength of over 71,000 full-time personnel and is capable of mobilizing over 352,500 reservists (aka. National Servicemen, or NSmen) in the event of national exigencies or a full-scale war.
Suddenly, everybody in the comment section is a historical military analyst uh?
No, obviously, Churchill was the one. He should talk.
So basically if Percival stuck to his boss’s orders to fight to the last man, the Japanese wouldn’t have taken Singapore.
The sinking of Force Z was a huge disaster for the British. And it was a disaster for Singapore.
There's literally no evidence that the British thought that they could defend Singapore 'because racism'. You just threw that part in because you know it's fashionable to call things racist right now.
thank god ... he gave up. As Singaporeans... if he held out we would have been all dead. the man is a hero
When Americans, Brits and Germans lose the wars I become more sadness guy.😞😢
An incredibly incompetent general with soldiers that needed a morale boost and good generalship. They got neither.
Looking at the Japanese actions during and after the surrender, there is absolutely nothing, repeat, nothing they could - both then and later - be proud of.
Our brave soldiers, sailors and airmen, allies and Singaporians sacrificed themselves in vain, but they shall never be forgotten.
Percival did nothing to the defence of Singapore.
I think the only aggressive thing he did was taking his jacket off in Raffels club.
The men wernt digging trenches and preparing defences.
They roamed the bars on the Island drinking,
and fighting.
He was actively against it, going so far as to tell off Brigadier Simson for asking permission to build defences in the islands north sector.
Mind you look what we have in charge now UK.
I always wonder, what the general feeling of the remaining troops was, to surrender?
I've read a book by one, and he said they felt betrayed by their officers. Firstly, they had been wanting to prepare defences during the Japanese advance, and were told not to, for fear of alarming the civilians, secondly, they were wanting to fight but ordered to surrender. Most of them never saw a Japanese soldier before they were marched into captivity, or fired a weapon in anger. [The Brave Japanese, by Kenneth Harrison.]
@@stephenhosking7384 That's the impression I had, but without any real evidence!
IJA before the invasion had prepared a lot. Most of them were experienced army with countless battles with China and well trained with jungle warfares.
British side had 3x more soldiers but they heavily underestimated IJA including racial prejudice.
They had to defend Malay Peninsula first but didn't even formed a proper defence line and kept backing off. Many of British army didn't even fought and just ran away. Japanese prepared thousands of bicycles and swept malay Peninsula at lightning speed
Finally after conceding Malay Peninsula in only 4 weeks. Percival had to stop Japanese landing on Singapore at all costs. But Japanese general Yamasita tricked them, showing headlights of trucks moving left to right of the island at nights and suddenly attacked left side and successfully landed.
The outcome was decided, and IJA kept coming inside blocking their water supplies. Churchill ordered Percival to fight till the last man like Stalingrad but he refused and surrendered with 85,000 men.
Monty could not have failed better himself