Great interview! One thing I noticed recently that ties together some threads in this interview is that objectivism about aesthetic value is MUCH more popular among people who study aesthetics than among the general philosophical population.
There is a major problem here in that there are two different claims about realism. There is realism about objective, intrinsic prescriptivity. There is realism about objectively true moral claims that do not depend on the beliefs or desires of the agent. (Moral claims are propositions.) I once participated in two debates at the same time. In one debate I defended moral anti-realism. In the other, I defended realism. Yet, I defended the same position in both debates. In the first debate I argued that there is no such thing as objective, intrinsic prescriptivity. In the other I argued that the rightness or wrongness of an act is entirely independent of my beliefs, desires, or attitudes of any kind. There were moral facts when I was born, and moral facts will survive my death. What makes these views compatible is that moral facts do not depend on objective, intrinsic prescriptivity. It is wrong for me to drive while drunk. In saying this, I am saying that people generally have reasons to manufacture external and internal reasons that would disincline people to drive while drunk. External reasons in the forms of criminal law and social sanctions - things that people have reason to avoid but which others will make true if the individual is caught driving while durnk. Internal reasons in the form of feelings of guilt or shame, or simple aversions to performing acts of the type considered wrong such as drunk driving. It is relevant to note that internal reasons are manufactured using praise and condemnation. You cannot reason an individual into having a new internal reasons. I follow Hume on this. You teach the acquisition of internal reasons by your praise and condemnation of certain types of actions. And, you manufacture internal reasons to perform or not perform act TYPES, not act TOKENS. The fact that one can identify an act token that there is no reason to condemn does not imply that people have no reason to reject the act type. (Relevant to trolley problems and Jonathan Haidt's example of incest, if you are familiar with it.) In saying that something is wrong, am I saying that in realizing that it is wrong that I have a reason not to do it? Absolutely not! (This qualifies me as a moral externalist). Saying that others have reasons to manufacture reasons for me not to do something is fully compatible with me NOT having a reason to do it - and with their attempts to manufacture reasons for me not to do it having failed. If I can avoid the external reasons (by not getting caught) and have no internal reasons not to do it, then I have no reason to refrain from that action. Yet, it is still wrong. Because it is still true that people generally have reasons to manufacture reasons (external and internal) for people not to perform acts of that type. I am also a reductionist about reasons. "You ought to do X" implies "There is a reason for you to do X", and "There is a reason for you to do X" implies "There is a desire that would be served by your doing X". Note: "There is a desire that would be served" does not imply "I have a desire that would be served". Philosophers are often getting this confused. They switch from "there is a moral reason" to "the agent has a reason" as if they are synonymous. They are not. "There is a reason" implies "there is a desire that would be served . . . " and "I have a reason" implies "I have a desire that will be served..." Unless and until somebody is the only creature in existence with desires, these are not co-extensive. So, "There is a moral reason for me not to drive while drunk" does not imply "I have a reason not to drive while drunk". But it DOES imply that others have reasons to cause me (and everybody else) to have a reason not to drive while drunk. This generates a pro-tonto ought, an ought that can be outweighed by other reasons. Different types of ought claims (prudential ought, moral ought, epistemic ought) refer to different relationships between doings and desires. Practical ought relates doings to the desires that I have. Moral ought relates doings to the desires that people generally have reasons to cause everybody to have. Epistemic oughts have to do with promoting true belief, which is instrumentally useful in the fulfillment of desires. Not only can I be mistaken about what the reasons that people generally have reasons to manufacture, whole societies can be mistaken. People generally had reasons to manufacture reasons not to drive while drunk long before they were fully appreciated, and have reasons to manufacture reasons not to spank children that, even today, few people appreciate.
Don Loeb’s statement that no one thinks there’s a fact of the matter about which ice cream flavor is best is strange to me. I think if you directly asked people if they think there’s a fact of the matter, they’d say no, but just because laymen tend to understand the term “fact” as referring to something objective. But if “fact” just refers to a true proposition, it seems pretty plausible to me that many, maybe even most, people do in fact think there’s facts about such a thing in a subjectivist/relativist sense. If “X is the best ice cream flavor” just means “X is my favorite ice cream flavor”, there’s clearly a fact of the matter there. I’m not aware of any empirical data on what people are expressing when they make statements about the taste of food, but it seems plausible at least that people are individual subjectivists when it comes to matters such as those.
Why assume there are conceptual commitments behind how we talk? I think if you're collecting data about someone doing moral-talk (e.g. moral judgements, moral fact listing, cognitive looking moral arguments) you could create a model to describe and predict that person's talk, and even describe and predict how that person talks about how they account for their moral-talk (e.g. Utilitarianism, naturalism, theological accounts). Neither seem related to whether that person has in fact got conceptual commitments behind their speech. The only time you get conceptual commitments coming in is if the researcher's model has them, as they're not directly measurable. I don't see how we could show them as necessary for any purpose of explaining the data. I just don't see how it has to be assumed. If the best models have them they have them, if they don't they don't. Even if the individual is convinced of their own model, that's some reason to like that model, but it says nothing about whether it's the best one we know of. My guess about what's going on here, is a sort of cultural norm where it's considered dehumanising to dismiss or contradict someone's self reports about their mind. These "intuitions" are given a veto power, or a sliding amount of weight depending on how factors like how offended someone might be or how many individuals share them or just whims I guess. It would be very interesting to study whether that cultural norm exists, what it looks like, and how it differs between peoples and over time/place. I don't think it's uncommon for clinical psychologists to unintentionally offend patients or cause a drop in trust or a large amount of confusion, simply by stating a clear observation informed by their expertise about the patient that the patient disagrees with. I'm reminded of Wittgenstein's interest in therapy as similar to his idea philosophy, and my preference would also be that academic philosophy, like clinical psychology, doesn't shy away from questioning based on something like that cultural norm. EDIT: I would guess a clinical psychologist would "warm someone up" before saying a truth that offends, but academics is much lower stakes. I understand lecturers being gentle on some topics with first year students - where I studied, every first year subject started with a disclaimer that it could be offensive. But between academics, especially in philosophy, a pressure not to offend a colleague by merely disagreeing with them seems counterproductive.
Great question. I don't think there are substantive conceptual commitments behind how we talk. I endorse a view of language expressed in The Language Game Christiansen and Chater and Chater's view of cognition in The Mind is Flat.
I tend to think that asking people whether they are realist or anti-realist is a waste of time. Why? First, even philosophers are confused about the term. Ask me if I am a realist or anti-realist about morality and my response will be . . . "That depends. Are you asking me if I am a realist about objective, intrinsic prescriptivity? Or are you asking me if I am a realist about objectively true moral propositions?" On the matter of objective, intrinsic prescriptivity, I am an anti-realist. On the question of objectively true moral propositions, I am a realist. Yet, most philosophers do not distinguish the two questions. And they have constructed 1000 theories, realist and anti-realist alike, trying to give the same answer to both questions - and they all fail. If philosophers are confused, what can we expect from non-philosophers? Second, ask people who know how to ride a bike how they keep their balance. The vast majority will give you the wrong answer. Not only will their answer be wrong, they will believe that it is right. (People maintain their balance by turning the front wheel and allowing their momentum to carry them back and forth over the center of gravity. You can observe this by - as they slow down - they turn the front wheel more and more violently.) Yet, they know how to ride a bike. Similarly, knowing how to do morality doesn't require knowing that one does it in a particular way. I learned how to do morality as a toddler - as I learned my primary language. I learned that terms like "like" or "hate" (and gastronomical values) related objects of evaluation the desires of the individual. I also learned that terms like "wrong" and "obligation" do not. I don't know about you, but when my parents told me that taking other people's things without asking them, or writing on the walls, or hitting people, was wrong, there was NOTHING to suggest that my correct use of the term said anything about my beliefs, desires, or judgments. The same was true when I heard people talk about others. "Wrong" made no reference to the psychological states of the person accused, or of the accuser. It made reference to what people generally had reasons to condemn. NOT what people generally believed they had reason to condemn - that could be mistaken as well. I found myself surrounded by people who claimed that those actually condemning something were wrong to do so. I learned that the way to defeat a claim of wrongness was NOT to make assertions about the psychological states of the accused or the accuser. To defeat a claim of wrongness, one had to show that people do not, in fact, have reasons to condemn those who perform acts of that type. Even if they were not aware of that fact. And those reasons to condemn do not depend on strange metaphysical value properties. They depend on the fact that acts of that type tend to kill, maim, or otherwise harm people - and that is what gives them reasons to praise or condemn.
Don is really cool. I saw his conversation with peter railton and that was awesome. Hope this conversation is great too.
Are you going to have Dr. Loeb again, Lance? I'm looking forward to it
Not sure. Hope so.
Great interview! One thing I noticed recently that ties together some threads in this interview is that objectivism about aesthetic value is MUCH more popular among people who study aesthetics than among the general philosophical population.
Yea. But moral realism isn't. Strange.
13:37 😊
Thanks Don !
There is a major problem here in that there are two different claims about realism.
There is realism about objective, intrinsic prescriptivity.
There is realism about objectively true moral claims that do not depend on the beliefs or desires of the agent. (Moral claims are propositions.)
I once participated in two debates at the same time.
In one debate I defended moral anti-realism. In the other, I defended realism. Yet, I defended the same position in both debates.
In the first debate I argued that there is no such thing as objective, intrinsic prescriptivity. In the other I argued that the rightness or wrongness of an act is entirely independent of my beliefs, desires, or attitudes of any kind. There were moral facts when I was born, and moral facts will survive my death.
What makes these views compatible is that moral facts do not depend on objective, intrinsic prescriptivity.
It is wrong for me to drive while drunk. In saying this, I am saying that people generally have reasons to manufacture external and internal reasons that would disincline people to drive while drunk.
External reasons in the forms of criminal law and social sanctions - things that people have reason to avoid but which others will make true if the individual is caught driving while durnk.
Internal reasons in the form of feelings of guilt or shame, or simple aversions to performing acts of the type considered wrong such as drunk driving. It is relevant to note that internal reasons are manufactured using praise and condemnation. You cannot reason an individual into having a new internal reasons. I follow Hume on this. You teach the acquisition of internal reasons by your praise and condemnation of certain types of actions. And, you manufacture internal reasons to perform or not perform act TYPES, not act TOKENS. The fact that one can identify an act token that there is no reason to condemn does not imply that people have no reason to reject the act type. (Relevant to trolley problems and Jonathan Haidt's example of incest, if you are familiar with it.)
In saying that something is wrong, am I saying that in realizing that it is wrong that I have a reason not to do it?
Absolutely not! (This qualifies me as a moral externalist).
Saying that others have reasons to manufacture reasons for me not to do something is fully compatible with me NOT having a reason to do it - and with their attempts to manufacture reasons for me not to do it having failed. If I can avoid the external reasons (by not getting caught) and have no internal reasons not to do it, then I have no reason to refrain from that action.
Yet, it is still wrong. Because it is still true that people generally have reasons to manufacture reasons (external and internal) for people not to perform acts of that type.
I am also a reductionist about reasons.
"You ought to do X" implies "There is a reason for you to do X", and "There is a reason for you to do X" implies "There is a desire that would be served by your doing X".
Note: "There is a desire that would be served" does not imply "I have a desire that would be served". Philosophers are often getting this confused. They switch from "there is a moral reason" to "the agent has a reason" as if they are synonymous. They are not. "There is a reason" implies "there is a desire that would be served . . . " and "I have a reason" implies "I have a desire that will be served..." Unless and until somebody is the only creature in existence with desires, these are not co-extensive.
So, "There is a moral reason for me not to drive while drunk" does not imply "I have a reason not to drive while drunk". But it DOES imply that others have reasons to cause me (and everybody else) to have a reason not to drive while drunk.
This generates a pro-tonto ought, an ought that can be outweighed by other reasons.
Different types of ought claims (prudential ought, moral ought, epistemic ought) refer to different relationships between doings and desires. Practical ought relates doings to the desires that I have. Moral ought relates doings to the desires that people generally have reasons to cause everybody to have. Epistemic oughts have to do with promoting true belief, which is instrumentally useful in the fulfillment of desires.
Not only can I be mistaken about what the reasons that people generally have reasons to manufacture, whole societies can be mistaken. People generally had reasons to manufacture reasons not to drive while drunk long before they were fully appreciated, and have reasons to manufacture reasons not to spank children that, even today, few people appreciate.
Don Loeb’s statement that no one thinks there’s a fact of the matter about which ice cream flavor is best is strange to me. I think if you directly asked people if they think there’s a fact of the matter, they’d say no, but just because laymen tend to understand the term “fact” as referring to something objective.
But if “fact” just refers to a true proposition, it seems pretty plausible to me that many, maybe even most, people do in fact think there’s facts about such a thing in a subjectivist/relativist sense.
If “X is the best ice cream flavor” just means “X is my favorite ice cream flavor”, there’s clearly a fact of the matter there. I’m not aware of any empirical data on what people are expressing when they make statements about the taste of food, but it seems plausible at least that people are individual subjectivists when it comes to matters such as those.
Why assume there are conceptual commitments behind how we talk?
I think if you're collecting data about someone doing moral-talk (e.g. moral judgements, moral fact listing, cognitive looking moral arguments) you could create a model to describe and predict that person's talk, and even describe and predict how that person talks about how they account for their moral-talk (e.g. Utilitarianism, naturalism, theological accounts). Neither seem related to whether that person has in fact got conceptual commitments behind their speech.
The only time you get conceptual commitments coming in is if the researcher's model has them, as they're not directly measurable. I don't see how we could show them as necessary for any purpose of explaining the data. I just don't see how it has to be assumed. If the best models have them they have them, if they don't they don't. Even if the individual is convinced of their own model, that's some reason to like that model, but it says nothing about whether it's the best one we know of.
My guess about what's going on here, is a sort of cultural norm where it's considered dehumanising to dismiss or contradict someone's self reports about their mind. These "intuitions" are given a veto power, or a sliding amount of weight depending on how factors like how offended someone might be or how many individuals share them or just whims I guess. It would be very interesting to study whether that cultural norm exists, what it looks like, and how it differs between peoples and over time/place.
I don't think it's uncommon for clinical psychologists to unintentionally offend patients or cause a drop in trust or a large amount of confusion, simply by stating a clear observation informed by their expertise about the patient that the patient disagrees with. I'm reminded of Wittgenstein's interest in therapy as similar to his idea philosophy, and my preference would also be that academic philosophy, like clinical psychology, doesn't shy away from questioning based on something like that cultural norm.
EDIT: I would guess a clinical psychologist would "warm someone up" before saying a truth that offends, but academics is much lower stakes. I understand lecturers being gentle on some topics with first year students - where I studied, every first year subject started with a disclaimer that it could be offensive. But between academics, especially in philosophy, a pressure not to offend a colleague by merely disagreeing with them seems counterproductive.
Great question. I don't think there are substantive conceptual commitments behind how we talk. I endorse a view of language expressed in The Language Game Christiansen and Chater and Chater's view of cognition in The Mind is Flat.
@@lanceindependent I'll take those as recommendations and give them a read. Have you considered a short video on recommended reading?
@@patrickwrites That's a good idea. I'll throw it on my list of video ideas.
common Lance W
I tend to think that asking people whether they are realist or anti-realist is a waste of time.
Why?
First, even philosophers are confused about the term. Ask me if I am a realist or anti-realist about morality and my response will be . . . "That depends. Are you asking me if I am a realist about objective, intrinsic prescriptivity? Or are you asking me if I am a realist about objectively true moral propositions?"
On the matter of objective, intrinsic prescriptivity, I am an anti-realist. On the question of objectively true moral propositions, I am a realist.
Yet, most philosophers do not distinguish the two questions. And they have constructed 1000 theories, realist and anti-realist alike, trying to give the same answer to both questions - and they all fail.
If philosophers are confused, what can we expect from non-philosophers?
Second, ask people who know how to ride a bike how they keep their balance.
The vast majority will give you the wrong answer. Not only will their answer be wrong, they will believe that it is right. (People maintain their balance by turning the front wheel and allowing their momentum to carry them back and forth over the center of gravity. You can observe this by - as they slow down - they turn the front wheel more and more violently.)
Yet, they know how to ride a bike.
Similarly, knowing how to do morality doesn't require knowing that one does it in a particular way.
I learned how to do morality as a toddler - as I learned my primary language.
I learned that terms like "like" or "hate" (and gastronomical values) related objects of evaluation the desires of the individual.
I also learned that terms like "wrong" and "obligation" do not.
I don't know about you, but when my parents told me that taking other people's things without asking them, or writing on the walls, or hitting people, was wrong, there was NOTHING to suggest that my correct use of the term said anything about my beliefs, desires, or judgments.
The same was true when I heard people talk about others. "Wrong" made no reference to the psychological states of the person accused, or of the accuser. It made reference to what people generally had reasons to condemn.
NOT what people generally believed they had reason to condemn - that could be mistaken as well. I found myself surrounded by people who claimed that those actually condemning something were wrong to do so.
I learned that the way to defeat a claim of wrongness was NOT to make assertions about the psychological states of the accused or the accuser. To defeat a claim of wrongness, one had to show that people do not, in fact, have reasons to condemn those who perform acts of that type. Even if they were not aware of that fact.
And those reasons to condemn do not depend on strange metaphysical value properties. They depend on the fact that acts of that type tend to kill, maim, or otherwise harm people - and that is what gives them reasons to praise or condemn.
Ciao 👋