It seems absurd to suggest that demystifying the makeup of fire therefore changes the experience of its heat and its light. It cannot reasonably be suggested that the phenomenal association of heat and light is effected by the belief in its makeup
I was one driving along a motorway when an invisible duck flew into my windscreen! I detected the presence of an object and was aware of its position, speed and tragectory but had no physical details about it. I guess my brain processes identified the potential danger of the situation and dedicated resources to determining the best course of action rather than identifying the object. This was no trick or optical illusion, my front-seat passenger indeed saw the duck (this is how I know it was a duck). If the no-gap objection is correct then because it seemed to be that the duck was invisible, it must have actually been invisible. The problem is I don't believe in invisible ducks. I do believe in Illusionism.
As far as I can see, illusionism only claims that there is not an extra quality in the experience beyond what can be described in purely materialistic terms. I do not see the difference between illusionism and physicalism, nor I do see the difference between quality dualism and any type of physicalism that is realist about qualia.
Illusionism is a kind of physicalism, in the sense that it claims that subjective experience can be fully accounted for respecting the current scientific constraints that motivate a physicalist worldview. In previous videos Frankish has considered some differences between illusionism and other forms of physicalism (including the qualia realist variety), so you might wanna check them out.
The illusionist denies that qualia exist and claims that they are an illusion. The realist physicalist accepts that qualia exist but says they are still physical, which is a view that I believe Frankish successfully reveals as incoherent.
@@fred8097 Whats the actual difference though? This is where I struggle the most. The physicality says 'yes I know colours aren't 'real', and we represent them along with pain etc', that is experience. The illusionist says 'yes, colours aren't real, and neither is pain etc, but our brain makes us feel as though we are having experience'. What is the difference? Feels like the illusionist is adding that 'extra bit' similar to the diet qualia.
@@Jensen8918 the difference is: if physicalists agrees, that when we describe our psychological, behavioral, physiological and etc. reactions, produced by pain, there is still something left, some "what-it-likeness", ineffable, private, subjective experience, what pain is for us. Illusionists simply denies that there's something left.
It seems absurd to suggest that demystifying the makeup of fire therefore changes the experience of its heat and its light. It cannot reasonably be suggested that the phenomenal association of heat and light is effected by the belief in its makeup
I was one driving along a motorway when an invisible duck flew into my windscreen! I detected the presence of an object and was aware of its position, speed and tragectory but had no physical details about it. I guess my brain processes identified the potential danger of the situation and dedicated resources to determining the best course of action rather than identifying the object. This was no trick or optical illusion, my front-seat passenger indeed saw the duck (this is how I know it was a duck).
If the no-gap objection is correct then because it seemed to be that the duck was invisible, it must have actually been invisible.
The problem is I don't believe in invisible ducks. I do believe in Illusionism.
As far as I can see, illusionism only claims that there is not an extra quality in the experience beyond what can be described in purely materialistic terms. I do not see the difference between illusionism and physicalism, nor I do see the difference between quality dualism and any type of physicalism that is realist about qualia.
Illusionism is a kind of physicalism, in the sense that it claims that subjective experience can be fully accounted for respecting the current scientific constraints that motivate a physicalist worldview. In previous videos Frankish has considered some differences between illusionism and other forms of physicalism (including the qualia realist variety), so you might wanna check them out.
The illusionist denies that qualia exist and claims that they are an illusion. The realist physicalist accepts that qualia exist but says they are still physical, which is a view that I believe Frankish successfully reveals as incoherent.
@@fred8097 Whats the actual difference though? This is where I struggle the most. The physicality says 'yes I know colours aren't 'real', and we represent them along with pain etc', that is experience. The illusionist says 'yes, colours aren't real, and neither is pain etc, but our brain makes us feel as though we are having experience'. What is the difference?
Feels like the illusionist is adding that 'extra bit' similar to the diet qualia.
@@Jensen8918 the difference is: if physicalists agrees, that when we describe our psychological, behavioral, physiological and etc. reactions, produced by pain, there is still something left, some "what-it-likeness", ineffable, private, subjective experience, what pain is for us. Illusionists simply denies that there's something left.