Australia's Thermopylae: Were the Australians on the Kokoda Trail really outnumbered?
Вставка
- Опубліковано 6 вер 2024
- Australia's Thermopylae: Were the Australians on the Kokoda Trail really outnumbered?
With Peter Williams
Part of our WWII Myths series of short shows
• WWII Myths - A series ...
This is a new type of show for the channel. Our guest historian will examine a popular claim made about the Second World War and either confirm or debunk it. There probably won't be time for questions from viewers but we hope the shorter length will be popular.
The brave Australian Military Forces including the "Chocos" and Papuan Infantry Battalion were vastly outnumbered by the Japanese in the many clashes around Kokoda and Isurava in 1942. Is that the case, or is being outnumbered a myth?
Dr Peter Williams was born in Hobart, Tasmania. After some time living in Europe, North America and Japan he became a history teacher back in Australia. There he also worked for the Darwin Military Museum. He is the author of several WW1 and WW2 books including two on Kokoda.
The Kokoda Campaign 1942: Myth and Reality by Peter Williams
USA bookshop.org/a...
UK www.amazon.co....
Please click subscribe for updates and the bell icon for notifications
You can become a Patron and support us here / ww2tv
You can become a UA-cam Member and support us here / @ww2tv
Social Media links -
/ ww2tv
/ ww2tv
/ ww2tv
For First World War content follow our sister channel WW1TV
/ @ww1tvchannel
WW2TV Bookshop - where you can purchase copies of books featured in my UA-cam shows. Any book listed here comes with the personal recommendation of Paul Woodadge, the host of WW2TV. For full disclosure, if you do buy a book through a link from this page WW2TV will earn a commission.
UK - uk.bookshop.or...
USA - bookshop.org/s...
Patreon Brigadiers: Susan Yu
Become a WW2TV Brigadier and become part of this Hall of Fame
/ ww2tv
When I was in the Aust Army in Infantry in the early 70s, this is what we were told about Kokoda from vets who had been there.
The Japanese had artillery and had the high ground as well. They were battle hardened whilst most of the Australians were reservists and not as well trained at the time. They didn't have the same amount of battle hardened soldiers.
The Aussies always felt they were outnumbered because they were so spread out along the track in smaller groups than the Japanese had coming down the track. Majority of the battles were small skirmishes. And I have never heard anyone saying that the Aussies were outnumbered by the Japanese.
What really hurt the Japanese was the lack of supplies, because as they pushed down, the Aussies would remove or destroy any supplies to deny the Japanese. If the Japanese were supplied properly, they would have made it, mostly by being better armed with heavier weapons. That is the story I got from Vets who had been there, including my Uncle.
Your reply contradicts itself. Re being outnumbered and then no one saying they were outnumbered. I always heard that the Aussies were outnumbered. Just google the phrase Australians outnumbered at Kokoda. The other myth was that Australians died in lesser numbers per capita as POWs because the Aussies had "mateship" and the British did not. Yet The Brits survived in higher numbers by using the regimental system to survive. (Per Capita)
@@dulls8475 I said the Aussies were in smaller groups compared to the Japanese attacking them.
@@BatMan-oe2gh Not sure how that is relevant.
@@dulls8475 Not sure how your comment is relevant.
@@BatMan-oe2gh Nor me.
As an American/Canadian I don’t have much Kokoda baggage. I never contemplated numbers because the terrain restricted the number engaged by either side at any one time. What I was impressed by was that initially the Australians were just the reserve troops mobilized by necessity to face front line infantry. I’ve long held, like Guadalcanal, Kokoda didn’t happen in a vacuum. Without the US naval action in the Coral Sea Port Moresby was at risk which made Kokoda a nonstarter. Kokoda was also influenced by simultaneous actions on Guadalcanal which reduced the forces and logistics that Japan could bring to bear at either location. That is not to diminish the individual courage and tenacity the Australian soldiers displayed in that horrible environment but to contextualize the event.
The deployment of such low-grade troops is one of the more questionable decisions by the Australian High Command.
There were better trained troops in Australia, but they appear to have been retained for defence of the Australian continent.
The OC, New Guinea Force did identify poor training and morale as a very serious issue, and instituted a program of training and replacement of officers and NCOs , but was hamstrung by a need to prepare Port Moresby for the reinforcements and buildup to be expected when New Guinea became a priority.
His major labour force was the troops themselves.
The 39th Battalion engaged in the reconstitution with enthusiasm, the 53rd not so much, and the 49th with apparent reluctance. Their subsequent performance matches .
@@peterwebb8732
Wrong
They were in North Africa / Syria, captured in Singapore, in flying training, or flying in the RAF.
Australia had bugger all left at home.
The 39th, 49th and 53rd were all Militia units, with a variety of competence and training.
They were the result of the 1930's depression and austerity.
Lack of equipment, lack of funding, lack of training.
They were Aussie soldiers in a bad place at a bad time with bugger all to fight with and long lines of communication behind them by the time the were at Kokoda.
When the 7th div boys finally turned up close to Port Moresby, after a long hard fighting retreat, most of the 39th that could still walk unassisted, turned around and headed back up the line with the Men of the 7th, one of the 7th who witnessed this was my uncle, a veteran of north Africa and Syria.
@@davidwatson2399 No I’m not.I was referring to the deployment of the 39th, 53rd and 49th Battalions CMF to Port Moresby. They had minimal training, and poor morale. As CMF they had never been overseas.and had no experience other than that of some older Officers and NCOs who were veterans of WW1.
Their deficiencies were recognised and steps were taken to bolster their morale and increase their training and state of readiness, but circumstances denied them the degree of training that was normal for units deploying overseas, and their response to those efforts was variable.
That the 39th did respond so well was due to the strength of their leadership. The 53rd was not effective initially , but gained effectiveness as
they gained experience. The 49th was never fit for deployment (I have a theory as to why) and was subsequently broken up.
@@peterwebb8732
I am not arguing with any of that.
@@peterwebb8732 There were no better trained troops in Australia. The AIF (Australian Imperial Force) divisions were well trained and had volunteered for service outside Australia. The 6th, 7th and 9th divisions were in the Middle East and the 8th in Malaya and was captured at the fall of Singapore.
The CMF or militia divisions were for service in Australian territory, which at that time included Papua/New Guinea.
The Anzacs actually defended the pass at Thermopylae during the battle for Greece 24th and 25th April 1941. Anzac day
Australian headquarters mistakenly thought there was a narrow pass which could be defended like thermopylae. In fact it was a miles wide valley.
Yeah I love that fact, there was even a Battle of Thermopylae in WWII. really shows the epic scale of the conflict
I think Peter Williams is on the money with regard to Japanese weapons at this stage of the war. Not only was it artillery - they did have small mobile infantry guns. It was fairly light artillery of 70mm calibre. It was also the fact that the Japanese had medium machine guns and 80mm mortars. Also each Japanese infantry platoon had 3 grenade dischargers, which was also a handy weapon in the jungle. I think the Japanese had more fire power on the Kokoda trail than the Australian until Imita Ridge was reached and the Australian brought up their 25 pounders, in small numbers, and three inch mortars from the infantry battalion mortar platoons. Also by that stage the Australians were receiving air support. The reason this is an interesting point is that it has become the trend to sneer at Japanese infantry weapons - which lacks justification, in my view.
I'm no MacArthur hater, but it surprises me that he actually knew the size of the IJA force in this battle. The intel he had was not renowned for accuracy, nor his awareness of battlefield conditions in New Guinea.
MacArthur never visited the battle zone.
I think what was impressive about it was that it was a unit of Australian Militia that managed defeat battle-hardened Japanese marines.
WWII media propaganda?
Spot on, Tony.
The Japanese had heavier weapons but the 39th were not trained and learned on the job. One Japanese regiment, 2000 odd, against the 39th - 840+ fed piecemeal until Kokoda and then until the AIF troops were moved in - again piecemeal. Potts made the decision to undertake a fighting withdrawl. Then add in the conditions and supply problems. After Imita Ridge then the show was on the other foot where the recognised of attacking force of 3:1 came into being.
Raymond Paull's book from about 1965 clearly spells out the numbers.
The Aussies were untrained Militia when the Track kicked off. The Japanese were hardened marines having learnt their skills in their Asian tour.
I've read Williams' book and it's a solid piece of work. As far as the myth of the Japanese jungle fighter goes, the Japanese were somewhat better prepared for jungle conditions than the American or Commonwealth forces initially were, but were vastly inferior to indigenous jungle fighters like the Papuans, the Dayaks of Borneo, etc. The Western Allies benefit hugely from indigenous knowledge of the terrain.
There were indigenous people who sided with the Japanese too
@@cybertronian2005 Not many.
My father in law, Dick Slattery, was in the 2nd/14th battalion and fought along the Kokoda track, including in the battle of Isurava. Towards the end of his life I used to ask him about his experiences including at Isurava. His brief summary of his platoon’s part in the battle was “They made all these banzai charges and we killed 160 of them”. About his platoon commander, Butch Bissett, who died in that fight, he said “We couldn’t believe he had died. He was such a great man”. The defence at Isurava was initially just the 2/14th battalion although I have read that the 39th battalion which had been relieved, came back into the battle when things were going badly. At that part of the track, the Australian supply chain was at its longest, a problem encountered by the Japanese as they got closer to Port Moresby. I have the impression that the higher command in Australia had very little idea about the conditions the men were fighting under.
No it was initially the 39 th that was relived by the AIF
@@grahamlowe314 yes, the 2/14th relieved the 39th but according to some accounts I have read, when the battle was going badly the 39th joined the 2/14th in the battle.
including a group that had been cutoff at kokada and just regained the lines@@peteranson4021
They were wounded soldiers sent out of battle who heard that the 2nd 14th was having a hard time, most of them turned around and went back into battle.
I interviewed veterans of the 2/14 in 2008. All gone now. Most were in Melbourne, one in Castlemaine and another at Mt Eliza but I did a phone interview with Dudley Warhurst who was living in QLD.
Was Dick Slattery still around then?
I looked him up in the book The Second Fourteenth Battalion by W.B. Russell. Dick Slattery is mentioned as one of the underage recruits, 'in the sixteen and seventeen year groups'. He is mentioned as having been wounded in the Syria campaign.
At Christmas 1943, during a lull in the Shaggy Ridge fighting when the 2/14 was in reserve,The Akuba Lake Aquatic Sports Carnival, a swimming carnival and regatta of craft fashioned from whatever was available was organised on a lake. Many of the old timers shook their heads and said 'This will never do' 'The army's gone to the dogs' etc. But the 7th Division commander, Major General Vasey was the patron of the meeting.
'The event of the day was won by B company's frail craft, Atebrin [a drug used to treat and prevent malaria] propelled by L/Cpl Dick slattery and Pte peter Benson.'
If you are to accept the drift of this presentation you are left with the puzzle of how such a small unreinforced number of Japanese troops were intended to subdue Port Moresby on arrival. They weren't of course. It was to be their ability to reinforce and resupply from the much larger force available once the route was secured. In this, the use of the Thermopylae analogy is most apt. It becomes a contest of raw logistical support in a confined and hideous battle space. As soon as the line of Japanese advance was delayed at the end of their now much longer supply route, the terrain did its work and they were toast.
Based on the quality of that brief presentation, I would love to hear Peter do a deep dive into the various myths covered in his book.
Agreed
It would be interesting if Peter could do a longer show he has some interesting stuff.
Much of his “mythbusting” so far appears to be highly speculative and without adequate reference to context and conditions.
Sorry, but in dismissing the later parts of the campaign he is dismissing the lessons learned by the Australian (and Americans) which led to their eventual victory. There is a very distinct difference in experience, tactics and equipment between the Australian troops first sent up the Kokoda track, and the troops which eventually defeated the Japanese in New Guinea.
It is completely reasonable for Australians early in the campaign to regard the Japanese as better and more experienced at that form of warfare, and equally reasonable for a Japanese soldier who faced those same Australians later in the war, to conclude that the Australians were better. It’s not a “myth” It’s not false perceptions. It’s the way that armies developed.
It’s ironic to think that the previous video that I watched in this series was the one debunking the “man-on-man” superiority myth. As Robyn Prior argued most correctly, wars are fought by armies, with systems and tactics, not “man-on-man”.
@@peterwebb8732 Agree on your post. Taking all Japanese records as 100% factual. Well ....
@@peterwebb8732he's a bit cagey in this video but William's book is full of extensive archive based research backed up with specific statistics about the numbers on each side and the force they could bring to bear in each engagement. It's a very thorough demolition of much of the perceived wisdom of the Kokoda campaign
Thanks as always Woody - whatabout the Aussies and Brits fightinf together in West Timor Feb '42 .Sparrow Force less than 1,500 fighting 20,000- IJN and 1,000+ Japanese Paratroopers .
I have read many books on this subject and have never read where the Australians mentioned being out numbered, in fact several publications indicated that most battles were fought with similar numbers. I suggest you read David Cameron’s series of books in relation to the Kokoda campaign, there was no doubt that Japanese troops mastered the outflanking of the Australian forces during the battle and made use of heavier weapons something the Australians lacked , as for accuracy in Japanese reporting in one example the instance of the Raping and killing of the “ White” Missionary Women , Priests and innocent civilians from Gonna and Buna were reported to as being killed by Bombing not by Japanese Troops in offical Japanese records . As for “ dugout Doug” McArthur he along with the Australian Commander Blamey should have been held to account of the way they failed to support the forces facing the Japanese ,yes mistakes were made at the cost of young Australian lives , tell the full facts not just bits and pieces that one author dredged up.
I have read David W Cameron's books, and he has been a guest on WW2TV twice
The only Kokoda book I have read other than Peter William's is Kokoda by Peter Fitzsimmons which 100% repeats all the myths that Williams argues against, of Aussies being completed outnumbered, of it being their Thermopylae, of the Aussies inflicting higher casualties on their opponent, of lions led by donkeys etc. the one part where Fitzsimmons was on the money was emphasising the Japanese superiority in artillery and mountain guns
@@cybertronian2005 I would recommend on one point you fact check with the official casualty figures for both Australian and Japanese forces in relation to the entire campaign as per the Australian War Memorial official count as published by the actual unit histories that fought in the campaign, I also ,have read Fitzsimmoms account , while a good read I found it lacking, I would recommend if you are interested in further reading look at the books that can be purchased by the Australian War Memorial on this campaign
I had the privilege of knowing a veteran who fought the Japanese at the start he said they weren’t little people they were 6 foot high warriors but there replacements were just ordinary soldiers and they had the experience of fighting the Chinese but once our troops got experience they were more than a match for them and we had logistics and logistics win wars
From all accounts the average Japanese soldier was shorter than the average Aussie soldier. There were very tall Japanese soldiers and reports have stated they were from the northern Island of Hakkaido.
The Hypohysterical History channel has covered the Australian Army in New Guinea in a number of excellent longform videos 2-3 hours long). They are very well put together. I'd recommend watching them.
Equally, I'd like to see him on this channel. 😊❤❤❤😊
Several point to make.
Firstly, citing McArthur is hardly an argument-winning point given his oft-demonstrated disregard for information passed back up his chain of command and the subsequent difficulties experienced by American units in the Buna-Gona-Sanananda Campaigns, in which they had to learn from the disregard Australian experience. McArthur was behind the demands that Australian troops be ordered into remote areas without adequate training, equipment or support. Quoting him is deeply convincing
Secondly, the logistics difficulties experienced by the Australians should not be so lightly dismissed. They were dependent on human porters early in the campaign, and the further those porters have to march, the greater proportion of their load is taken up with their own food. The weight carried by both combat troops and native porters was a major concern. There was no capacity nor experience in aerial supply early in the campaign, and the development of aerial supply is one of the more interesting aspects of the campaign which Peter dismisses.
Thirdly, Peter seems to disregard the necessity to feed new units up the track unit by unit. There was no capacity to deploy and support all available troops. The Japanese had the initiative and there was no single choke-point as existed at Thermopylae. The Kokoda Gap was simply a low point that aircraft flew through and the track was a series of footpaths which facilitated outflanking…outflanking in the jungle may have been difficult, but it was the Japanese tactic right down through the Malay Peninsula, so they were neither inexperience nor incompetent at it.
Dismissing those issues, and the learning process that the Australians and Americans went through in order to defeat the Japanese, is not exactly the hallmark of high-quality analysis.
I don't disagree with any of that, but this was about the numbers of participants involved
@@WW2TV Ok… lets look at numbers.
We’ve already established that numbers in-theatre don’t always reflect the numbers in a particular operation.
Take that a step further and we understand that number in an operation do not necessarily reflect the number of troops any one unit faces. Part of the art of command is achieving concentration of forces and local superiority, even if you have no more men than the enemy. A platoon attacked by a company-sized unit is perfectly correct in saying that *they* were outnumber *in that action* even if the overall numbers available to either side were roughly equal. What I heard was Peter arguing that the troops simply exaggerated, without regard to the complexity of the battlefield and the effect of manoeuvres. That suggests to me that his analysis may be lacking, .
Ok…. Milit is the job of military intelligence to assess the numbers reported and make some judgement as to their reliability. Military Intelligence is also notorious for coming to the wrong conclusions, but when you are facing a confident and skilled enemy it is far more reasonable to over-estimate than under-estimate. What is not reasonable is to engage in the kind of sneering that McArthur and Blamey did from the safety of their remote offices. The troops in question took heavy casualties which, when applied to a veteran unit of known record, does not immediately suggest a “lack of aggression”.
@@WW2TV Ok… lets look at numbers.
We’ve already established that numbers in-theatre don’t always reflect the numbers in a particular operation.
Take that a step further and we understand that number in an operation do not necessarily reflect the number of troops any one unit faces. Part of the art of command is achieving concentration of forces and local superiority, even if you have no more men than the enemy. A platoon attacked by a company-sized unit is perfectly correct in saying that *they* were outnumber *in that action* even if the overall numbers available to either side were roughly equal. What I heard was Peter arguing that the troops simply exaggerated, without regard to the complexity of the battlefield and the effect of manoeuvres. That suggests to me that his analysis may be lacking, .
Ok…. Milit is the job of military intelligence to assess the numbers reported and make some judgement as to their reliability. Military Intelligence is also notorious for coming to the wrong conclusions, but when you are facing a confident and skilled enemy it is far more reasonable to over-estimate than under-estimate. What is not reasonable is to engage in the kind of sneering that McArthur and Blamey did from the safety of their remote offices. The troops in question took heavy casualties which, when applied to a veteran unit of known record, does not immediately suggest a “lack of aggression”.
@@WW2TV Ok… lets look at numbers.
We’ve already established that numbers in-theatre don’t always reflect the numbers in a particular operation.
Take that a step further and we understand that number in an operation do not necessarily reflect the number of troops any one unit faces. Part of the art of command is achieving concentration of forces and local superiority, even if you have no more men than the enemy. A platoon attacked by a company-sized unit is perfectly correct in saying that *they* were outnumber *in that action* even if the overall numbers available to either side were roughly equal. What I heard was Peter arguing that the troops simply exaggerated, without regard to the complexity of the battlefield and the effect of manoeuvres. That suggests to me that his analysis may be lacking, .
Ok…. Milit is the job of military intelligence to assess the numbers reported and make some judgement as to their reliability. Military Intelligence is also notorious for coming to the wrong conclusions, but when you are facing a confident and skilled enemy it is far more reasonable to over-estimate than under-estimate. What is not reasonable is to engage in the kind of sneering that McArthur and Blamey did from the safety of their remote offices. The troops in question took heavy casualties which, when applied to a veteran unit of known record, does not immediately suggest a “lack of aggression”.
It is well known that the militia initially sent up Kokoda were found wanting.
I can recommend James Eling's "The Principles of War" podcast series on the 53rd Battalion to expand on the challenges the untrained 19 year olds faced.
The best officers with WWI experience had been sent to North Africa. Instead of training the 53rd battalion had spent most of it time digging defences in Port Moresby.
I interviewed veterans of the 2/14 Battalion who were the first AIF (Australian Imperial force) battalion up the track to help the 39th Militia Battalion at Isurava. The 39th had made a fighting withdrawal from Kokoda and were up against battle hardened veterans.
The AIF troops had volunteered for overseas service and had returned from the Middle East. They had referred to the militia as 'chocos' or chocolate soldiers who would melt in the heat of battle. After Isurava they never again disparaged the 39th. All the veterans I interviewed are sadly gone now, but they were always welcome at 2/14 functions.
The 53rd were at another position on the other side of the valley divided by Eora creek and did not perform so well, but one of the 2/14 men said he had 'a lot of time for the 53rd'. They had been less well trained and prepared than the 39th.
From the Australian war memorial website:
The Aquitania arrived in Moresby on 3 January 1942 and the 53rd, as part of the defence of Port Moresby, was assigned to the area of Boera, Napa Napa, and the Napa Napa Peninsula. This was the worst area in Moresby for malaria and the battalion suffered badly from the disease over following months.
While in Moresby the battalion members received minimal or no training, as the 53rd was mostly used for work parties. The battalion did not receive any major training until July, when B and C Companies were sent to the Kokoda area. B Company went to Koitaki and C Company went to Itiki, acting as reserve for the 39th Infantry Battalion moving to Kokoda.
On 10 August the 53rd was ordered to relieve the 39th at Uberi. C Company moved forward to Uberi and then went on to Kokoda. While at Uberi C Company was given eight new Bren guns but received only a few hours instruction and not even the chance to fire their weapons. Three days later, B Company reached Uberi and also received new weapons with minimal instruction. Meanwhile, the rest of the battalion was preparing to move up the trail.
Poorly trained and ill-prepared, the 53rd was about to go into battle against experienced Japanese troops. Not surprisingly the battalion did not fare well and the Japanese infiltrated the 53rd's lines and bypassed some of their positions altogether. In one ambush, the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Ward and several other members of his headquarters staff were killed. Communication between the battalion's companies broke down and there was "confusion" as the Japanese showed their "superiority in all phases of jungle warfare". In fact, the confusion within the 53rd left a gap in the Australian line, leaving the way to Alola open. Fortunately, the gap was not exploited by the Japanese and was filled by the 2/16th Infantry Battalion. This was a nuisance, though, as the 2/16th could have been used elsewhere.
As for Macarthur, he never gave credit to the Australians. Australian victories in which Americans played no part were referred to as 'Allied victories'.
When the Australian had pushed the Japanese back to their landing beaches at Gona and Buna, the Australians took Gona but the Americans tasked with taking Buna and initially failed.
'The combat effectiveness of US forces, particularly the US 32nd Division, has been severely criticised. These factors were compounded by repeated demands from General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, for a rapid conclusion to the battle. The demands were more to politically secure MacArthur's command than for any strategic need. In consequence, troops were hastily committed to battle on repeated occasions, increasing losses and ultimately lengthening the battle...
MacArthur never visited the front during the campaign. He had no understanding of the conditions faced by his commanders and troops, yet he continued to interfere and pressure them to achieve unrealistic results.'
Buna was taken with the assistance of Australian infantry and Stuart light tanks.
The 39 th battalion saved Australia at isuarava
It was not found wanting
@@grahamlowe314 The 21st Brigade A.I.F. fought at Isurava and surrounds. If they had not arrived the 39th would have been wiped out. Not putting the 39th down.
@@righty.275
I am aware of the campaign
The mountain guns made things pretty uncomfortable. Also some of the millita using old gear such as Lewis guns and old grenades that wouldn't always go off wouldn't help.
The medical facilities comment surprised me. Realizing the Japanese were on par or better at treating illness and wounds until they ran out of supplies changes my view. I guess I've always had the vague idea that they barely had any concern for medical care at all, and that saki or a bullet were their only treatments.
In that difficult terrain, could a force much larger than a few thousand have been supplied or remained organized?
It is funny to imagine either side as jungle fighting experts. It must have been miserable for both sides. Kakoda was possibly the most miserable battlefield in human history.
Nah. The tennis court in Burma.
Heat or cold the eternal question. Stalingrad was pretty bad in winter months
@@rogerpattube True, General Winter has made many a Russian battlefield a kind of hell. I'll pass on battlefield service in both Russia and New Guinea if given the choice.
The only distinction I'll draw is that Stalingrad was flat and fed by a rail network. The conditions, outside of winter, were fairly mild and a massive army could be supplied reasonably well, until cut off. Meanwhile Kokoda was a thick jungle at high altitude with difficult walking trails the only supply routes, until supply by air became possible later in the New Guinea campaign. At Kokoda you had conditions no non-native would call mild, all year round with jungle and supply difficulties limiting the size of the forces, as well as animals, bugs, and disease trying to kill you. Provided you have food, medical care, and appropriate clothing at each location, I'd say Kokoda was worse, but Volgagrad in winter is no tourist spot either.
Thanks to the presence of the Papuan Infantry Battalion, the Australians had more access to jungle warfare "experts" than the Japanese did. Which is one of the reasons that they won.
After reading much about the battle of Kokoda I have never read that the Australians were out numbered. Better training, experience and equipment explain why the Japanese were so good. The fact that similiar numbers were involved is what my reading left me.
Those heavy long Lee Enfields instead of short "jungle" carbines ?
The idea that the Japanese were within 20-25 miles from the coast and could have captured Port Moresby is pure folly. Defences around the Port would have surely repelled any attack to the base! The Japanese logistics and supply lines would not be able to support the offensive! We do love Aussie stories, though.
Indeed
Interesting story about Kokoda not being visited during Peter's 1980 trip. During my first visit to Gettysburg in 1997 (4 years after release of the eponymous movie) there was no path or marker for the 20th Maine site on LRT. The guides had sorted out the location off trail and would take you to Chamberlain's position, however. Now of course, it is well marked, memorialized and on all the maps. The movie highlighted and cemented the outsized role of the engagement in the battle.
Knowing very little of Kokoda or New Guinea, the takeaway from this show is that historians need to check *all* sources and not repeat an opinion as fact year after year. Veterans of battles aren't lying, but their testimony must be verified. Amazed that no Australian historian had never checked the Japanese records till Mr Williams.
Suggest you read David Cameron’s detailed story of the campaign, there is more to the battles that Mr Williams mentioned and after reading numerous books on the subject I’m pretty sure Australian Historians did in fact check Japanese records not just the odd one here and there
Read a book called "The ANZAC" illusion.
As you stated you know very little of the Kokoda campaign, Mr Williams may be a author but I strongly recommend reading about the campaign from other sources, while not denying that the Japanese forces numbered around 10,000 at the time the majority was held at Buna and Gonna. The Japanese forces directly facing the Australians numbered around 4,000 including support troops, and fact, yes at times they out numbered the Australians. I stand by my statement that other authors did do research for their books and can’t recall any of the books I have read claiming the so called “ Myth” that they were out numbered, it’s a pity my relatives who actually did the fighting on the Track have passed, as I’m sure they would love to tell you the truth
@@frankegan4888 The myth will endure regardless of this.
True, maybe the presenter will come down and do a proper story on the subject instead of perpetuating or trying to bust the so called myth . I suppose those who are ignorant on the history of this battle will accept this small part as fact even if it dose not portray the correct facts. Unfortunately Kokoda is a fading memory along with other Pacific battles fought by Australians in Australia now which is a shame, it’s not to glorify the war but keep the respect of those who have gone before us, have a Merry Christmas
It wasn’t until 1992 that the Prime Minister of Australia Paul Keating decided to push Kokoda ahead of Gallipoli as the defining battle of Australian history. He didn’t succeed most Australians still go to Gallipoli. But from the early 1990’s onwards Kokoda became more and more visible in the Australian media. So much so that when Australian school children are taught about World War Two on the bombing of Darwin and Kokoda are referred to. Other battles in the Middle East like Tobruk or Crete are forgotten about.
Hope Paul busts the myth of North African campaign being 'Gentlemens' war'.
Many atrocities happened to local populations which were ignored.
Good suggestion
The 1942 plundering of Benghazi's Jewish Quarter springs to mind as well as the deportation of its inhabitants
The way he said "donkeys" made me chuckle because it almost seemed he was commenting on the questioner. I know he wasn't actually, that's just how my brain works.
Bicycles? I don't think it would have occurred to anyone in the 1940s to use them in roadless and steep mountains. In the intervening years, with the development of specialized mountain bikes, a good mountain bike might have been useful, but a 1940s era bicycle, probably not so much. (Mountain bikers today ride on slopes I'd hesitate to walk. If they could time travel to the battle, I suspect the crazier ones would have happily run messages and supplies back and forth).
Initially after the first landings the lead advance Japanese troops did in fact use bicycles to move onto Kokoda it, was after that they moved on foot as the country was not suited to bikes, alternative forms of transport was used to move supplies forward,
Miline Bay never gets the attention Kokoda does but the battle there was just as important as Kokoda. And the Japanese at Milne bay used tanks ! Which the Australian troops at Kokoda never had to face. Yet thanks to air support from our P.40 fighters we were able to drive them back from the airstrip. And the Japanese had to evacuate their forces. My father was there with an AIF battalion the 10th that was chewed up by the tanks. Yet in spite of that the Australian troops were able to counter attack.
I was brought here from a "short" of this episode. Got hooked. The strategy is working 😊
As a new discoverer of Australian contributions to WW2 this and Milne Bay operations are fascinating. Glad to have such a people as an ally.
Look up hypohystericalhistory for the most minute play by play in the New Guinea campaigns. Fantastic detail.
I never write this much in comments but this campaign has been an interest of mine for decades. I have a couple of comments.:
1. Of perhaps more than 20 books I have read about the campaign Peter's is the best overall appreciation. Of course, many others are valuable for particular aspects or incidents during the campaign. I discount the me too publications that re-hash others' work and make no original contribution.
2. With respect to how the Japanese dominated the Australians I'd suggest that in addition to artillery and mortars a couple of other factors come to mind:
a)The poorly trained 39th Militia had been in the field with poor supply and support for a long time and were debilitated. In fact they put up a remarkable fight considering.
b) The 53rd Militia were even more poorly trained than the 39th, poorly led and disorganised.
c) The AIF's crack 2/14th & 2/16th were fed into the battle piecemeal and after the defeat at Isurava were on the back foot for most of the retreat.
d) As the Japanese came to experience the Australians suffered from a nightmare logistical situation.
3. The Japanese had superior tactics, particularly at Isurava, Mission Hill and Ioribaiwa. In the latter, a dwindling Japanese force managed to spook the Australians, who had fresh units and reasonable supply, out of a good position; but it was their last hurrah.
3. I'd like to see someone who knows military tactics better than I analyse Brigadier Potts' handling of the battle at Isurava, the retreat and finally the battle of Mission Ridge after which he lost command. Particularly at Mission Ridge (Brigade Hill, Efogi), his dispositions seem hard to fathom. The Japanese flanking lodgement, possibly with some luck, completely destroyed the Australian position.
This in no way denigrates the Australians. Apart from the 53rd they fought hard and conducted a classic fighting retreat.
I can't remember if it was in Peter's book but it seems that Horii in advancing as far as he did was going against his orders to secure a position in the mountains to block any force coming over the Track/Trail until the Guadalcanal battle was resolved. In so doing he destroyed his force's ability to fulfill those orders.
Comment: though it could not be known at the time Horii never had a hope of taking Moresby. Even had he by a miracle got his force in good shape and well supplied to a position where he could attack Moresby it is highly doubtful he would have been capable of taking it. The Australian's fighting retreat which caused his force so much attrition meant that the task was impossible. His men fought magnificently and he wasted them. As a commander, Horii should be condemned for the folly of leading his men on such a forlorn enterprise.
That was Top Notch. I knew something, but not all.
Have listened to an account by a Japanese ace pilot and he quoted that seven thousand troops landed at Buna.
Here is what an Australian friend of mine let me know just a few days ago about his family's experience with the Kokoda Trail:
"My wife's uncle was a soldier on the Kokoda Trail, and her dad was a cook in the military hospital at the bottom of the trail. It was definitely a tough life there from the few stories we heard, but they were both reluctant to talk about those days. Without the support of the local native people, the situation would have been much worse. The Japanese soldiers were probably under even greater difficulty, as one soldier surrendered to the Aussies, because he was 'on the menu' for that day!😟"
I think you would have had to be very tough to even have survived all of that in 1942, regardless of what side you were on. 🤔😥
I never knew that the Australians left their Vickers guns behind. That sounds so screwy and improbable that I simply assumed they had brought them. Humping heavy weapons is very difficult in the jungle, but it's always worth it tactically.
Screwy to say the least.
My dad was in the 2/33rd Battalion 25th Brigade. They started up the kokoda Trail 10 September 1942 and fought all the way to Gona. They took one vickers machine gun and crew and one 3" mortar with two crews. A story behind this is the following:
19 October 1942. Fighting around Templetons Crossing the Mortar crew was being used to bomb the Japanese. A second crew who had not seen action asked their sergeant if they could get in to it of which they did. The new crew got into the mortar pit and commenced firing. On the third mortar being dropped down the barrel it exploded killing two crew outright with the third dieing shortly after. Results of mortars being dropped out of planes. Also the .303 bullets sometimes jammed in the rifles due to slight damage from drops from the planes.
I attended a lot of battalion reunions with my dad and on my own and never have I heard any vet state there were anywhere near 10,000 Japananes coming down the trail.
I have quite a few battalion books and none of them claim those numbers either.
My dad used to tell the funny side of being in the army at various places and he said while in New Guinea the troops were lucky if they knew what was going on in their platoon far less the bigger picture.
I once read a comment , admitedly about the Malayan campaign that the Japanese were not in fact highly trained in jungle warfare and the average Japanese soldier was as afraid of the jungle as anyone else ( A large percentage of them of course were city boys ) their advantage was purely that as a result of their training methods they would put up with horrible conditions a bit more stoicly .
They had training but what was more important, they had a set of working tactics that had been honed in China. The Aussies began with nothing, but gradually picked it up. After that they fought on much more even terms.
New Guinea was very much where the myth of the Japanese jungle fighter went to die. IJA and IJN personnel had no idea how to handle the Papuan Infantry Battalion or, later on, the Pacific Islanders Regiment, and were forever getting picked off by the "green shadows" as they dubbed the Papuan soldiers.
I can imagine you are not only fighting the Japanese but also the jungle.
Woody/Peter, Thanks for a brilliant presentation on a subject that I know little of. Learnt a lot! Thanks, Bob
Please dont base your opinion one one man’s story, if you are interested read David Cameron’s and a meriad of Australian authors series of books on the subject, it is a worth while read, not painting Australians as hero’s but the full story needs to be read
Oh no PAUL! Another 2 books for the "soon to be bought" list :D THANK YOU!
These myth buster episodes are awesome Woody. Great information with top notch historians! They are a home run!
Might be an idea to read the full history of the campaign not just base you opinions on one interview
Maybe if this historian was top notch I’d agree, haven’t read his book but from what I just saw I don’t think it would be too factual, way better historians stories out there on the subject
An excellent presentation. Some of Peter’s conclusions I am sure will stir up some controversy in Australia. Woody, I really appreciated your track or trail question. I was once severely chastised by someone for using the “wrong” word while commenting on one of your earlier shows on Kakoda.
I was always of the impression that most of the wartime Japanese records were destroyed in a B-29 fire bombing raid latter in the war.
Some, not most
14:35 agree the start was more interesting , with our huge numbers and logistics advantage vs the small Japanese force overextending itself the second half was a forgone conclusion , they where so done we basically chased them back to the bridgehead ....... Let that sink in chased a Japanese force
During the chase, as it was called, the Japanese stopped and fought.The biggest battle was at Ovi- Gorari ( 8 - 13 Nov) where 4000 Australian troops attacked 3000 Japanese troops.
They make out it was a walk in the park. It took from Late September to around 19 November for the 25th Brigade to get to the outskirts of Gona with other Battalions going to Sanananda. Hundreds killed, many hundreds more wounded and countless sick. When battalions are spoken of at the commencement of battle at Gona and Buna the battalions had been decimated. Battalions were down to company strength with most sick to some degree.
Easy to understand why those that fought in the jungle thought they were outnumbered. Must be so disorientating.
interesting presentation
Would love to see one of these about Hitler escaping to Argentine
Don't forget the other dumb myth of WW2: neutral Ireland was refuelling U-boats. Hitler fleeing to Argentina on a sub is more credible than that🤦
Peter commented on Japanese medical supplies run low towards the end of the campaign. Did the Japanese outrun their logistics ? How were Japanese logistics ? I imagine it was not a favoured posting (not martial enough) ?
Outrunning their logistics was an ongoing issue for Japan throughout the war.
they did well considering the fact that they were practically untrained and lacking in weaponry.
How would this Kokoda tick campaign have turned out if the Battle of the Coral Sea had gone to the Japanese. Would or could they have taken Moresby. What was expected of Horii’s Force? They were depleted by the conditions and the Aussies fighting withdrawal. Kokoda/Milne Bay/Guadalcanal/Coral Sea are strategically, from both sides, interwoven are they not? I walked the track in 2002 and have enormous respect for those of 39th Battalion, particularly Lt Col. Ralph Honner whom commanded the fighting at Isurava, and later wtith the battalion at Buna/Gona.
In the very earliest days of theKokoda campaign it was B Company of the 39th Battalion that was holding the track against Horii’s forces and one can say at Kokoda the Australians were outnumbered, out-fought and out-gunned. To make generalist statements for a campaign that was highly. fluid and changing as supply lines and forces committed on the Australian side is mis-leading. Lest We Forget.
How nice for comfortable historians to sit back and belittle the experience of the Australian soldiers who endured the Kokoda Trail (those who fought on it called trail, not track).
No belittling done. Just analysis
I don't think he is denigrating the Aussies. He simply says they were outfought and I agree. Then the tables turned and the Japanese were outdaught.
Yep, totally agree. As far as Kokoda Trail goes it was the official designation in 1942.
When the Australian finally reached close to the north coast many of the Japanese dead had clean new uniforms on. Reinforcement troops. At Gona barges could be heard coming and going removing Japanese wounded and bringing reinforcements.
Post Viewing Comment :
Totally agree and reinforced my perceptions of this campaign . The end bit talking about the lack of doctors and medical supplies rings true with my Pa's claims about the army .
fascinated to find out more from the Japanese side, looking forward to when he comes back 👏
The Australians were beaten on the Kokoda. That is new to me,if they were Port Moresby would have been under attack. I never read any reports of this.
Not at the end of the campaign, but yes they suffered seven defeats first
@@WW2TV seven?
That's how many Peter Williams believes@jamwri6718
@@WW2TV rewrite history.stupid.
@@WW2TV seven Peter Williams
Not only outnumbered but also inexperienced. They established WW2 Australian soldiers as the best jungle fighters in the world.
Well, the Chindits in Burma were the masters of jungle warfare. They were mainly gurkhas from Nepal. Reckoned to be the greatest infantry soldiers.
@@stanyeaman4824the Chindits were not mainly Gurkhas. There was Gurkhas battalions that were Chindits but The majority of Chindits units were British as the original force was formed from the British 70th infantry division
The major problem was Australian Militia were not as well trained and equipped as the Japanese who were hardened troupes after years of war.
Track. It's the Kokoda Track, not trail.
As Peter Williams stated, the Papual New Guinea government (it's their counrtry) call it Trail. BUT it doesn't matter - Track or Trail, same conclusions
Officially designated as Kokoda Trail in 1942. The Battalion flags have the battle honour of Kokoda Trail.
I think more so, as, it was our 4th grade rugby side, playing against there 1st grade side!
not a real defeat , a staged defensive withdraw designed to slow not stop. In the same way the japanese were not defeated but decided to withdraw to fight elsewhere.
At Isurava. Situation Reports. One Platoon in the 2/14th Battalion faced attacks all day by 100 to 200 Japanese at a time. Approximately 14 attacks all up. In that case they were certainly outnumbered. There were side tracks and other troops were sent to ensure the main body was not outflanked.
The 2/33rd Battalion ambushed a patrol of around 50 or so Japanese on the North side of Imita Ridge. From "The Footsoldiers, 2/33rd Battalion." William Crooks. 1971. Bill crooks was enlisted for the duration of the war and kept a diary every day. When writting his book he asked members of the battalion for reports and photos and required cooroberating evidence before using. Pluss the AWM situation reports from battalions, brigades and divisions.
According to Crooks no Japanese could have survived.
But according to a new age historian and his Japanese study only One Japanese was killed and a few wounded in this attack.A company of troops expended over 3000 rounds from rifles, bren guns and tommy guns into the Japanese from a distance as close as 10 yards. When the Aussies withdrew grenades were thrown and mortars were fired into the mass.
The point is these writters were not there and do not have a clue.
Hindsight is 20-20 (or maybe not so)
Paul your very early in the USA today.🙂
So am I reading this map correctly?, Seppos and limeys are now telling Strayans how to suck a Kokoda egg?.
What was wrong with the maps?
@@WW2TV They're topographical... 🙃
Yes, that's for people around the world less familiar. I have viewers all.over
You maybe correct with the maps but they do not show how bad the country was in relation to defense and may give the viewer a false impression on what the Australian forces had to contend with
We also showed photos of the area, and this is one of a whole series of shows we have done on Kokoda, Shaggy Ridge, Buna, Isurava etc. We have never played down the influence of the terrain
how about the quality of the troops ? our militia vs their 1st rank ? 2nd ? 3rd ?
how about the morale ? one side was having tremendous success, and the other not (a string of massive defeats) ...
True
Experience and the training, of the 2 armies' of both sides! In the first stages on was to me, the biggest factor! Australia had militias troops, with almost no training beyond the very basic, vs Crack Japanese units. Our professionals soldiers, were mostly in Africa. The same is true later, with American troops! in the beach campaign's on the north coast of the island!
My uncle was on the Kokoda, he told me they ambushed 2000 Japanese in a river bed from both sides, none survived. He said the river ran red. So there had to be more there than 2000. He had his 16th birthday there and was was there 4 years then went to Japan.
I heard it was 2 million.....
@@dulls8475 The stories grow. The 2/33rd claimed they killed 50 Japanese in an ambush, not 500, not 2000 but 50 and modern historians use Japanese diaries to disprove. They trust the writtings by an enemy at the time over a modest claim from troops who were there. Ah well, such is war.
There is always one in every family, in your case there is two, and your both of them.
@@dulls8475
How much of the story was the Australian Curtin government’s propaganda to justify withdrawing Australian forces from North Africa? Read Churchill on this point. Churchill said Australia was never at any real risk of invasion, and the 8th Army at sea to Egypt would have been diverted to Australia if Imperial Japan had attempted to invade Australia. So, there was a lot of Australian politics behind it. Some strategists argue that diverting such a huge force of battle-hardened Aussie troops to a little side-show such as New Guinea was a huge waste of valuable military resources. As Churchill put it, “Australian politicians were more interested in fighting each other than in fighting the enemy”.
Curtin needed no justification for withdrawing its experienced AIF divisions from the middle east to defend Australia.
It's 8th division of 15,000 men who had performed well in the Malaya campaign had been captured when Percival surrendered 130,000 British, Commonwealth and Empire troops to 30,000 Japanese troops in Malaya and Singapore which was supposed to be Britain's fortress defending Australia. Churchill was shocked.
Percival had assigned the Australians to the west of the island, the weakest part of the island defences and established a beachhead on 8 February. Percival had expected a crossing in the north and failed to reinforce the defenders in time.
In a report by British General Wavell to Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1942, Australian soldiers were singled out for criticism of their actions in the Fall of Singapore. A criticism that led London Newspapers to write “Australian cowardice led to the fall of Singapore”.
Churchill's strategic genius was responsible for the Gallipoli fiasco in WWI and his obsessions with attacking 'the soft underbelly of Europe' and other distractions drove his WWII generals and the Americans to despair.
Churchill considered Australia to be of less strategic importance than British territory in India, the Middle East and Britain itself. He effectively said so in a secret speech to the House of Commons on 23 April 1943 discussing the aftermath of the fall of Singapore. Churchill believed that it was likely that the Japanese would invade northern Australia .
Strangely, the Prime Minister of Australia did not share this relaxed attitude, but left the 9th Division in the Middle East tio play a vital part at El Alamein while recalling the 6th and 7th divisions home to defend their country.
Churchill wanted Australian soldiers in Burma. He diverted the Australian Convoy without informing PM Curtin.
A little side show. The Japanese would have taken Port Morseby.
@@righty.275 The defeat of the IJA was the paramount strategic objective, and it happened in Burma. We knew what were Japan’s strategic objectives because Bletchley Park had cracked all the Japanese codes. Burma was their prime objective, to cut the Burma Road supply route to get China out of the war, and to bring about insurrection in India. The scorched earth retreat through Burma, the devastation caused by Orde Wingate’s Chindit columns (mainly Gurkhas) cutting all the IJA’s supply lines, the truly heroic defences at Imphal and Kohima on the Indian border and Gen. Slim’s leadership of the 14th Army, the British- Indian Army, is what defeated the IJA on mainland Asia. Sorry to disappoint you, but Kokoda and PNG were indeed just a side show blown out of all proportion by Australian politicians. We knew Australia never was a Japanese strategic objective, but defeating China was their No.1 objective. That is why building the Siam-Burma railway was so important to Japan. Why tell Australian politicians what we knew, and how we knew, about Japan’s secrets?
@@pshehan1 I have seen reports that the Australian 8th Div was a very under strength division of only about 8,000. Whichever it was, the outcome was tragic. Weren’t most of the defending force Indian (including Sikh and Pashtun)? Indian POWs who did not agree to joining the Japanese against Britain were executed. This was a major warcrime.
@@stanyeaman4824 Almost 15,000 Australians became prisoners of war at Singapore. More than 1100 other Australians were either confirmed dead or listed as missing in action, and hundreds of others remained unaccounted for.
They were a minority of the 130,000 British, Commonwealth and Empire troops who fought in the Malaya and Singapore campaign unde General Percival.
This corrupted history of Kokoda has been debunked. It is based on selective history to support the author’s thesis. I suggest reading Ridiculous Claims By Peter Wilson, James Brown April 2. 2016.
Phil Bradley backs Peter Williams as a historian
Please provide a more detailed reference. - I can't find what you have cited. After a lot of reading over the years think, in terms of boots on the ground, Wilson's analysis rings true to me. However, I'm open to new information.
At the end of the day we defeated the Japanese., I think the first to.
Nationalist China had beaten them at Tierzhuang and Changsha. Australia was the first of the Western Allies to halt the IJA, though.
A sceptic might think that people write books in order to sell books and build reputations. No historian will gain much kudos by admitting that his predecessors got it mostly right.
So you are saying Peter Williams was wrong with his conclusions?
@@WW2TV I’m saying that he didn’t offer enough solid evidence to convince m e that his “conclusions” can be considered authoritative. I’m open to the argument that there will be a lot more information in his book, but I’ve read a number of accounts of that campaign - starting with the original - Retreat from Kokoda by Raymond Paul - which was wrotten when the eye-witnesses were still alive, and the quality varies from fairly good to pretty bloody awful.
Can you base an entire book on some raw numbers? I’m sceptical. but not completely dismissive.
Thanks, but in this show the idea wasn't to go into detail about supplies, and the performance of units, simply to state that the idea the Australians were massively outnumbered seems flawed
@@WW2TV Mate…
That’s fine, as far as it goes.
But it would gave taken two minutes and you wouldn’t have had material for the rest of the discussion. So no, it was *not* just about the numbers.
You asked him about the reasons for the discrepancy and his response is open to challenge.
Fair points@@peterwebb8732
this is my second today slow down please
and its only 10 am
The South Seas Detachment was division sized and commanded by a Major General, unlikely a rank for only 3 to 3000 personnel unit. It came direct from the victory in Malaya and was, thus, well versed in jungle warfare as regards tactics, logistics and acclimatisation. None of these attributes existed on the Australian side. Williams seems to think numbers are the only relevant factor, typical of hjstlrians wkthout milktary training. I cljld go on ablut hlw the Australians learnt jungle warfafe " on the job", turni g it back on the obliterating Batt,e of Gorari in Nkvember, north of Kokoda, bht that wluld dignify tbjs travesty of historical veracigy.
❤
Pre viewing comment:
At the very tip of the front line at the very start yes , but if we count everyone by the end of the campaign hell no , we had fresh units and even replacements
Thanks Matthew
There was no battle of Kokoda there was a kokoda action which was part of the broader battle of Isurava. Given most of the ww 2 veterans in Australia are mostly already dead this myth is perpetuated by boomers not even born when ww2 was raging.
The elevation of kokoda myth above other battles e.g. Tobruk, Crete, El alamein, even the battles of beachheads in png or other battles in png, this Kokoda hype is no more than a fabrication to keep anzac day relevant, and serves the militaries mythologies.
I am the son of 90 year btw who was alive in ww 2 served as a National Serviceman in Korea i also had a family member 53rd Militia in the Isurava battle, killed MIA, body was never recovered for respectable burial so i am buggered if going to care for the fabricated opinions of boomers trying to fabricate some mythos whom werent even born then.
Reminds me Hockey and Albo trying to sustain this myth they created all sons of post ww 2 immigrants to Australia, btw neither of british background.
We have talked widely about Isurava, Shaggy Ridge and Wau on WW2TV, along with RAAF, El Alamein and other campaigns
@@WW2TV Well aware.
So what points are you trying to make please? We are trying to bring both well and lesser well known history to people. Hence why I drew your attention to our shows on Isurava. But your idea that only people who lived through an event can talk about it is clearly nonsense. Today's generation of historians is doing incredible work re-evaluating the two world wars
Real account DAVID PARER AN AUSTRALIAN JOURNALIST WHO DIED IN BATTLE
WON A ACADEMY award call FRONTLINE A FILM ARCHIVE THAT HAS FILM AND PHOTO EVIDENCE