Sickles advance to the Peach Orchard was an unmilitary move as he needed every man on the line with no reserves, no supports, a big gap between the divisions, and both flanks in the air. As Meade, who was a real soldier, observed to Sickles, the Peach Orchard was neutral ground and neither side could hold it for the same reason. Lee's idea was that if Longstreet could secure the Peach Orchard it could be used as an artillery platform to get an oblique fire onto Cemetery Ridge and soften up the Union line in furtherance of the infantry echelon attack plan. At the end of the day, Longstreet was right to not want to go into battle with one boot off because what he needed after McLaws drove Humphreys out of the Peach Orchard and cleared out the Wheatfield was Pickett's Division to send through the breached Union line. Instead the echelon attack passed to Anderson's Division of Hills Corps and sputtered out because nobody would order Mahone to support Wright. Visiting Little Round Top and walking all around the hill, one is amazed that Sickles didn't think to emplace every rifled piece he had on that hill and turn it into the strong point on the field that commanded all of the ground in it's front, including the Peach Orchard.
Well said. The argument that Sickles' initial position was not defendable considering that is exactly where the Union defensive line was at the end of the day, is total nonsense and post hoc excuse-making.
Regarding Longstreets approach on July 2... I have read there was actually a "counter march", backtracking on the road on which they had already traveled....and that due to command considerations, the column did not "about face" march, but turned as a snake might turn so as to keep the same units at the head of the column. Agree? Regarding Johnston's recon.... I always thought it a bit remarkable he made it all the way to little round top. Geary's men had left apparently just before Johnston would have arrived to recon... a broken camp scene might have presented itself and been mentioned. It was not. I am guessing Johnston got to Big Round Top area, but no further. Nice job on the video!
Indeed, as part of the quibbling at the exposed position, McLaws was adamant that he continue to lead. Pfanz estimates the two divisions in column as about 1.5 miles long. Johnston's recon is worth an experiment of some sort.
According to Longstreet, McLaws was under orders from Lee to lead the attack up the Emmitsburg Road so he didn't believe he had the authority to change the order of the march, which would have placed Hood's Division in the lead. Upon finding out that Sickles had occupied the Peach Orchard, Longstreet did change the attack plan as Lee's plan was no longer practicable. The real question is why Longstreet countermarched and didn't just follow the route Alexander took to avoid being spotted.
@@jonathansloane702 Historians have really discounted Longstreet's recounting of anything. I'm not saying what you offer is inaccurate. Yes, I think Lee's plan was to roll up the Union line ..south to north up the Emmitsburg Road. The curiosity is the countermarch...and why it turned "as a snake" rather than just reverse order. That certainly suggests the order of attack was closely connected to the order of march.
Sickles should not have advanced to the Emmitsburg Road with a salient at the Peach Orchard extending to Devil's Den. That is well established and the consensus of historians. However, it is assumed that he should have extended his line along Cemetary Ridge, across the low ground and over the Wheatfield Road all the way to military crest of Little Round Top. But is that true? What would be the best line to take up? He had the authority to deploy his line in way he determined was appropriate to the situation and the terrain, within the limits set by Meade. I have never heard anyone make this suggestion, but suppose he deployed his Corps across the low ground along the stone wall at Eastern edge of the Wheatfield, and then up to and along the crest of Houk's ridge to Devil's Den. I think this would have been a much stronger line than the one he took up along the Emmitsburg Road, more easily defended, shorter in length (he didn't have enough men to defend the Peach Orchard line and need artillery to fill in the spaces), provided a good field of fire, stays connected to the Second Corps, and provides a fallback line of defense on Little Round Top. Plus, Little Round Top would have been an excellent place for his headquarters with an unimpeded view of his entire front. And best of all, he may not have lost his leg!!
if it had been planned that way with reinforcements already there, it would have been an excellent trap. if Meade would have sent Sykes to Little Round Top and Round Top from the beginning and used Sedgewick's Corp as the reserve, they could have destroyed Longstreet's Corps and the 3rd day probably doesn't happen.
I don't really understand your comment. Lee was defeated at Gettysburg, he was forced to withdraw at Antietam. You could say McClellan defeated him at Malvern Hill even though he withdrew the Army from the Penisula not long after. Grant didn't have an overwhelming victory in the campaign, but after the first 2 battles, he fought it as a war of attrition and just ground the AoNV into the dirt. Sherman did the same against the ever changing commands in Georgia and the Carolinas. Now if you are saying that AoP was too big and cumbersome to wield effectively, I would agree 100% there were too many generals with their own agendas and egos to properly execute orders, but then you could say about the AoP for most of its existence.
The story that Ewell erred at Gettysburg is nothing but postwar myth. When Lee suggested that Ewell take Cemetery Hill if practicable, he also cautioned him not to bring on a general engagement. One of Ewell's divisions had not yet arrived, he had received a report of Union forces on his flank, and he had no knowledge of the strength of Union forces on the hill. He sent out a reconnaissance detachment to obtain information of Union strength there. By the time that Ewell established that the report of Union forces on his flank was false, it was almost dark. The reconnaissance detachment returned at about this time and reported that Cemetery Hill was held by a "...superior force". None of Lee's subordinates failed him in this campaign. The major errors of the campaign were all made by Lee. The strategic objective of the campaign was to at least achieve enough of a success to force the Union to relieve Vicksburg, and Lee erred greatly in convincing the Confederate political leadership that he could accomplish this from over a thousand miles away. Moreover, Vicksburg was placed under siege before Lee's campaign even began- yet, Lee moved north with no great haste. Lastly, Lee's gravest error was that he violated the military axiom of "one force, one objective", and gave his cavalry commander two objectives for one (small) force. Since these two objectives coincided in time, Stuart could have never carried them both out successfully. He attempted to do so and predictably failed. Ironically, Lee's decision to carry out what became known as Pickett's charge was correct. The AoNV was foraging off of enemy territory and couldn't remain in any one area for more than 3-5 days, and it hadn't foraged since Lee's concentration order of 29 June. Furthermore, the clock was ticking at Vicksburg. Lee didn't have the time to attempt a maneuver around the AotP, and the minor Union victory of 1 July had all but ruined any possibility that the AotP would launch any offensive against the AoNV.
I think Lee was put in an impossible situation - he only had one option which was to eliminate the army of the Potomac as soon as physically possible. Virginia basically no longer had any food and his ability to resupply was becoming increasingly difficult for many reasons outside of his control. Napoleon often had his armies forage for food (as did Caesar) - mobility is fairly critical in Lee's aggressive campaign here. The biggest failure, in my opinion, was partially due to miscommunication and unclear orders (Lee's fault) AND the fractured chain of command. I don't think its fair to say that 'none of his subordinates failed him' , particularly Stuart who had ONE job and arguably the most critical job completely dropped the ball. It's easy to speculate about history but put yourself in Lee's shoes. I think his only mistake was leaving too many decisions up to his subordinates. Longstreet could have put far more effort into coordinating this attack properly but it's almost as if he didn't even care that much until the engagement already began. What would Jackson have done differently than Longstreet? Lee is clearly trying to think like Napoleon, I can't blame him - the (bizzare and poorly coordinated) 'grand battery' (attempt) on the 3rd day was not a bad idea based on the limited information Lee had. Lee's biggest mistake was probably due poor communication more than anything (George Meade did the complete opposite and it ultimately paid off).
Do I sense snark sir when speaking of one of the saviors of the republic, a one General Daniel Edgar Sickles?? If not for the general's wise maneuver Longstreet's men would of came right up to our flank in overwhelming numbers undiscovered and unmolested!
i appreciate the in depth details that lead to General Sickles moving his Third Corp out of position.
Excellent channel
Excellent maps and photos.
Sickles advance to the Peach Orchard was an unmilitary move as he needed every man on the line with no reserves, no supports, a big gap between the divisions, and both flanks in the air. As Meade, who was a real soldier, observed to Sickles, the Peach Orchard was neutral ground and neither side could hold it for the same reason. Lee's idea was that if Longstreet could secure the Peach Orchard it could be used as an artillery platform to get an oblique fire onto Cemetery Ridge and soften up the Union line in furtherance of the infantry echelon attack plan. At the end of the day, Longstreet was right to not want to go into battle with one boot off because what he needed after McLaws drove Humphreys out of the Peach Orchard and cleared out the Wheatfield was Pickett's Division to send through the breached Union line. Instead the echelon attack passed to Anderson's Division of Hills Corps and sputtered out because nobody would order Mahone to support Wright. Visiting Little Round Top and walking all around the hill, one is amazed that Sickles didn't think to emplace every rifled piece he had on that hill and turn it into the strong point on the field that commanded all of the ground in it's front, including the Peach Orchard.
Well said. The argument that Sickles' initial position was not defendable considering that is exactly where the Union defensive line was at the end of the day, is total nonsense and post hoc excuse-making.
Regarding Longstreets approach on July 2...
I have read there was actually a "counter march", backtracking on the road on which they had already traveled....and that due to command considerations, the column did not "about face" march, but turned as a snake might turn so as to keep the same units at the head of the column. Agree?
Regarding Johnston's recon....
I always thought it a bit remarkable he made it all the way to little round top.
Geary's men had left apparently just before Johnston would have arrived to recon...
a broken camp scene might have presented itself and been mentioned. It was not.
I am guessing Johnston got to Big Round Top area, but no further.
Nice job on the video!
Indeed, as part of the quibbling at the exposed position, McLaws was adamant that he continue to lead. Pfanz estimates the two divisions in column as about 1.5 miles long. Johnston's recon is worth an experiment of some sort.
According to Longstreet, McLaws was under orders from Lee to lead the attack up the Emmitsburg Road so he didn't believe he had the authority to change the order of the march, which would have placed Hood's Division in the lead. Upon finding out that Sickles had occupied the Peach Orchard, Longstreet did change the attack plan as Lee's plan was no longer practicable. The real question is why Longstreet countermarched and didn't just follow the route Alexander took to avoid being spotted.
@@jonathansloane702 Historians have really discounted Longstreet's recounting of anything. I'm not saying what you offer is inaccurate.
Yes, I think Lee's plan was to roll up the Union line ..south to north up the Emmitsburg Road.
The curiosity is the countermarch...and why it turned "as a snake" rather than just reverse order. That certainly suggests the order of attack was closely connected to the order of march.
Sickles should not have advanced to the Emmitsburg Road with a salient at the Peach Orchard extending to Devil's Den. That is well established and the consensus of historians. However, it is assumed that he should have extended his line along Cemetary Ridge, across the low ground and over the Wheatfield Road all the way to military crest of Little Round Top. But is that true? What would be the best line to take up? He had the authority to deploy his line in way he determined was appropriate to the situation and the terrain, within the limits set by Meade. I have never heard anyone make this suggestion, but suppose he deployed his Corps across the low ground along the stone wall at Eastern edge of the Wheatfield, and then up to and along the crest of Houk's ridge to Devil's Den. I think this would have been a much stronger line than the one he took up along the Emmitsburg Road, more easily defended, shorter in length (he didn't have enough men to defend the Peach Orchard line and need artillery to fill in the spaces), provided a good field of fire, stays connected to the Second Corps, and provides a fallback line of defense on Little Round Top. Plus, Little Round Top would have been an excellent place for his headquarters with an unimpeded view of his entire front. And best of all, he may not have lost his leg!!
if it had been planned that way with reinforcements already there, it would have been an excellent trap. if Meade would have sent Sykes to Little Round Top and Round Top from the beginning and used Sedgewick's Corp as the reserve, they could have destroyed Longstreet's Corps and the 3rd day probably doesn't happen.
Even Grant could not beat the CSA boys, only Lee's army having no food at Amelia Court House could.
I don't really understand your comment. Lee was defeated at Gettysburg, he was forced to withdraw at Antietam. You could say McClellan defeated him at Malvern Hill even though he withdrew the Army from the Penisula not long after. Grant didn't have an overwhelming victory in the campaign, but after the first 2 battles, he fought it as a war of attrition and just ground the AoNV into the dirt. Sherman did the same against the ever changing commands in Georgia and the Carolinas. Now if you are saying that AoP was too big and cumbersome to wield effectively, I would agree 100% there were too many generals with their own agendas and egos to properly execute orders, but then you could say about the AoP for most of its existence.
What do you use to edit your videos? It’s great stuff!
Thank You. I use Filmora from Wondershare. I have tried After Effects, but switched back.
The story that Ewell erred at Gettysburg is nothing but postwar myth. When Lee suggested that Ewell take Cemetery Hill if practicable, he also cautioned him not to bring on a general engagement. One of Ewell's divisions had not yet arrived, he had received a report of Union forces on his flank, and he had no knowledge of the strength of Union forces on the hill.
He sent out a reconnaissance detachment to obtain information of Union strength there. By the time that Ewell established that the report of Union forces on his flank was false, it was almost dark. The reconnaissance detachment returned at about this time and reported that Cemetery Hill was held by a "...superior force".
None of Lee's subordinates failed him in this campaign. The major errors of the campaign were all made by Lee. The strategic objective of the campaign was to at least achieve enough of a success to force the Union to relieve Vicksburg, and Lee erred greatly in convincing the Confederate political leadership that he could accomplish this from over a thousand miles away. Moreover, Vicksburg was placed under siege before Lee's campaign even began- yet, Lee moved north with no great haste. Lastly, Lee's gravest error was that he violated the military axiom of "one force, one objective", and gave his cavalry commander two objectives for one (small) force. Since these two objectives coincided in time, Stuart could have never carried them both out successfully. He attempted to do so and predictably failed.
Ironically, Lee's decision to carry out what became known as Pickett's charge was correct. The AoNV was foraging off of enemy territory and couldn't remain in any one area for more than 3-5 days, and it hadn't foraged since Lee's concentration order of 29 June. Furthermore, the clock was ticking at Vicksburg. Lee didn't have the time to attempt a maneuver around the AotP, and the minor Union victory of 1 July had all but ruined any possibility that the AotP would launch any offensive against the AoNV.
I think Lee was put in an impossible situation - he only had one option which was to eliminate the army of the Potomac as soon as physically possible. Virginia basically no longer had any food and his ability to resupply was becoming increasingly difficult for many reasons outside of his control. Napoleon often had his armies forage for food (as did Caesar) - mobility is fairly critical in Lee's aggressive campaign here. The biggest failure, in my opinion, was partially due to miscommunication and unclear orders (Lee's fault) AND the fractured chain of command. I don't think its fair to say that 'none of his subordinates failed him' , particularly Stuart who had ONE job and arguably the most critical job completely dropped the ball. It's easy to speculate about history but put yourself in Lee's shoes. I think his only mistake was leaving too many decisions up to his subordinates. Longstreet could have put far more effort into coordinating this attack properly but it's almost as if he didn't even care that much until the engagement already began. What would Jackson have done differently than Longstreet? Lee is clearly trying to think like Napoleon, I can't blame him - the (bizzare and poorly coordinated) 'grand battery' (attempt) on the 3rd day was not a bad idea based on the limited information Lee had. Lee's biggest mistake was probably due poor communication more than anything (George Meade did the complete opposite and it ultimately paid off).
Do I sense snark sir when speaking of one of the saviors of the republic, a one General Daniel Edgar Sickles?? If not for the general's wise maneuver Longstreet's men would of came right up to our flank in overwhelming numbers undiscovered and unmolested!
😂
what was the deal with taking a picture with hand i inside there shirt
Rout is not the way to pronounce route.
www.grammarphobia.com/blog/2011/08/route.html
The Southern accents are laughable & inaccurate.