Apples don't exist
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- Опубліковано 27 лип 2024
- Here I cover the explanatory exclusion argument for mereological nihilism, which the view that composite objects don't exist.
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OUTLINE
0:00 Mereological nihilism
4:16 Explanatory Exclusion Argument
9:40 Moorean objection
11:58 Other arguments and resources
LINKS
(1) My discussion with Dr. Olson: • Do Composite Objects E...
(2) My video on whether birds exist: • Birds don't exist, the...
(3) @KaneB's video on ordinary objects: • Metaphysics - Ordinary...
(4) Relevant SEP entries: (i) plato.stanford.edu/entries/or... (ii) plato.stanford.edu/entries/ma... (iii) plato.stanford.edu/entries/pr... (iv) plato.stanford.edu/entries/so...
(5) Dr. Crummett's popular case for mereological nihilism: capturingchristianity.com/two...
(6) Portions of this video are drawn from Schaffer's "From Nihilism to Monism", AJP (2007): www.jonathanschaffer.org/nihil...
(7) My Springer book: (a) www.amazon.com/Existential-In... (b) link.springer.com/book/10.100...
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Hmm if apples don’t exist we have more doctors
We're you not listening? Doctors don't exist either.
Hmm logic 101
It’s all a scam!!! 😏
You should do more short explanation videos like these
My first blush impression of mereological nihilism is that it seems to be a matter of semantics. "It's a collection of particles arranged chair-wise" to which I'd be tempted to reply, "OK, well, then that's my intensional definition of what chair is; in which case, it's still true that the chair exists."
Exactly. That's one of five such arguments I can think of. But who knows? It's easy to argue for the implications and easy to argue against them. It leaves us nowhere, except with time having been wasted.
I don’t think that’s how you understand chairs. For instance, when you sit on a chair, you ordinarily don’t think the chair ceased to exist and a new, similar chair came into existence. But every time you sit in a chair, the chair loses some particles, and hence every time you sit in a chair, there’s a distinct collection of particles arranged chair-wise.
@@MajestyofReasonI think some people can reasonably conceive of composite objects in this way. Borrowing the words of Eraclitus: No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it's not the same river and he's not the same man.
@@MajestyofReason
_I don’t think that’s how you understand chairs. For instance, when you sit on a chair, you ordinarily don’t think the chair ceased to exist and a new, similar chair came into existence. But every time you sit in a chair, the chair loses some particles, and hence every time you sit in a chair, there’s a distinct collection of particles arranged chair-wise._
Even supposing that's true, that doesn't technically contravene my response. Perhaps it'll help if I put my reasoning in a more semi-formal manner.
(1) If there is a collection of particles arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair.
(2) There is a collection of particles arranged chair-wise.
(3) Therefore, there is a chair.
Justification for (1): A chair is intensionally defined as a collection of particles arranged chair-wise.
Note that none of the premises nor the justification for (1) implies that identity of a chair changes when particles are moved or subtracted. There's a difference between a theory of identity and a theory of mereology (though there is admittedly some overlap). One could maintain the intensional definition I described while having a theory of identity that allows chair to be the "same" chair even when a few particles are removed. So collectively it could look something like this:
(4) Intensional definition of chair: a collection of particles arranged chair-wise.
(5) Intensional definition of "same" chair: C1 at t1 is the same chair as C2 at t2 iff (a) C1 and C2 are both chairs; and (b) C1 and C2 have a sufficiently high percentage of the same particles; and (c) the shape of C1 and C2 are sufficiently similar.
One might disagree with this analysis of what it is to be the "same" chair. My point is just that (4) is not logically inconsistent with (5).
@@MajestyofReason
My previous comment seems to have been deleted somehow, so I'll try again.
_I don’t think that’s how you understand chairs. For instance, when you sit on a chair, you ordinarily don’t think the chair ceased to exist and a new, similar chair came into existence. But every time you sit in a chair, the chair loses some particles, and hence every time you sit in a chair, there’s a distinct collection of particles arranged chair-wise._
That doesn't seem to contravene what I said. After all, theories of identity and theories of mereology are two different things (though there is some overlap). It seems to me that both propositions are logically consistent:
(1) Intensional definition: chairs are collections of particles arranged chair-wise.
(2) Analysis of "same chair": A chair C1 at time t1 is the same chair as chair C2 at time t2 if and only if: (a) C1 and C2 are both chairs (on the intensional definition of (1)); (b) C1 and C2 have a sufficiently high percentage of the same particles; and (c) C1 and C2 are sufficiently similar in shape.
My point isn't that (2) is the correct conception of "same chair" (at least, not necessarily correct in the sense of perfectly matching the colloquial sense of "same chair"); just that (1) and (2) are logically consistent. If both propositions are logically consistent, then my proffered definition of chair does not entail that there is a new chair every time you sit down and get back up, taking a few particles along with it (depending on what one means by "same chair").
I lean towards accepting mereological nihilism, but it has an interesting consequence. Because I am also pretty convinced that consciousness is neither explanatorily redundant nor epiphenomenal. Therefore consciousnesses would need to be mereological simples, which cashes out as an argument for substance dualism.
Or... Idealism, with mind being the fundamental substance, and external reality being the contents of the mind
@@doctorinternet8695 Maybe. But in that case the question arises why our minds build up reality out of invisible elementary particles that can only be discovered through extensive research.
we particles n shit bro fr 😂
looking at the title and thumbnail, I thought it was an early april fools video
Mereological nihilism seems to be supported as well by the arbitrariness of the definition of composite objects. This leads to the problem of the ship of theseus replacements as well as the question of how much material can I remove from an apple and have it still be an apple.
This is true, and I tend to be more sympathetic to mereological nihilism than to realism, but I think qualia (and consciousness in general) pose one of the bigger issues for the position. If qualia are instantiated in brains due to particular spatial connections of synapses and temporal patterns of neural activity, then how can such things be instantiated in brains that are very dissimilar (not just between two humans, but between different species) - or are we to accept that everything has a completely unique experience of the same qualia (i.e., my blue is not the same as your blue)? And can qualia of, say, redness be explained only in terms of fundamental particles (and if so, how?)?
I don't like that some nihilists tend to be atomists because it's not really clear that physics supports it
@@TheCynicalPhilosopher - I think that socially reinforced, convergent definitions allow us to treat concepts as identical irrespective of the differences in the electro-chemical representation of those concepts in our heads. My color blind friend can point to things that, he has been told, are "red" and, based on experience, point to things that are likely to be red but he himself has no conception of what red or redness is. He has to consult with me to choose furniture though so that the colors do not magically clash which he has learned the hard way.
@@dogsdomain8458 - I agree. Atoms are composite objects themselves. Adding or subtracting neutrons does not change the atom, merely its isotope. Also when you get down to the particles that are considered fundamental particles, the concept of existence starts to get a little fuzzy.
@@paulhammer2279 I agree that this is likely the case (convergent definitions), but it is still a radical position to take - many people would probably disagree. Especially since we would also likely need to accept semantic convergence: two people might have very different phenomenology when experiencing thoughts about the meaning of the word "tree" but our behavior surrounding the concept (and its extenstionality) has converged. But if this is true, then in a sense nobody would truly comprehend what another person means when they talk about something. It would make many of our rigid designators into mere conventions.
thanks for the argument-shaped video👍
One avenue I want to explore further is a sense in which I don't have to identify things like planets, trees, tables, etc, as composite objects. I haven't worked out the details yet, but this idea has been floating in the back of my mind for a few months now.
Thinking on the spot here - I think that "needed to explain" is introducing a lot of ambiguity in these premises. There's a sense in which I think a physicalist can accept that in principle fundamental particles are all that is "needed to explain" (ontological reduction), but because we exist at the macro-scale using languages we've created in diffierent discourses (physics, economics, psychology, literature) that are not intertheoretically reducible we shouldnt expect it to seem "normal" to us (hence pumping our intuitions about what is explanatorily sufficient) to talk about things in a theoretically reductive way. That is, I think you can accept a thesis about ontological reduction without supposing something like linguistic or semantic reduction to the terminology of physics. Tldr; something fishy in premise 2.
Excellent video.
I'd like to know if you have discussed Analytical Idealism and what's your take on it. I read Bernado Kastrup's work recently however I don't find it to be persuasive however I feel like I'm more in the camp of it's counter-intuitive as it's seems as though it's materialism+ an extra step.
Could you please discuss this in any of your future videos?
Nice one.... btw which epistemological theory you believe?
What do you think about transcendental argument, are you familiar with Jay Dyer?
If particles are truly concrete then would that imply that they have causal power without being caused? can we assume there is just an infinite causal chain of composition going further than just fundamental particles? You can argue strings theory but it's still uncertain and there might be something even beyond that as well
I agree with mereological nihilism as an interpretation. I'd be inclined to frame it as there being a different class of "object."
Tables are defined by their relationship to function, while Electrons are defined by their relationship to charge and other properties.
Thinking about natural phenomena works the same too. Trees are defined in a sense by their function. That is, matter which performs treeness.
However, I also think you could argue for breaking fundamental particles down to their properties. Eg mass, charge, spin functions performing electronness.
I think that is likely what leads to taking the universe as the only object. Why isolate the single region of those properties that are performingelectronness? Why not look at the whole universal wave function of charge and call that a single object?
With the way you speak of mereological nihilism, I think I might believe in that. You could think of how letters on a screen, or even an image, are made up of pixels. I don't think people would deny that.
On the explanatory exclusion argument, it would seem like Premise 1 should be explained from its own argument before being applied to this argument. I feel like i have no intuitive reason or evidential reason to assert that Premise 1 is correct.
By saying "there are particles arranged table-wise," then we are still talking about some concept, idea, or essence of "table"-ness. It seems like there is still some real composition of an idea, concept, or essence with the specific arrangement of particles.
Am i missing something here? I probably am, but it seems like adding "paraphrase" or "fiction" only seems to push the can down to road and still appear to use composite-like language.
I think computers provide a good analogy. In computer vision, the computer is fed image data through a camera. If you looked at the raw data it would make no sense. Nevertheless computers can take this data, look for patterns, and make classifications. Those classifications are based on distinct patterns found in the photo. So in a sense, computer vision is going “these pixels are arranged tablewise” and therefore the computer concludes there is a table. The “essence” of the idea is actually a collection of patterns the computer has classified as “tableness”.
It might be a petty reason, but I like that mereological nihilism would be something that philosophy adds to our knowledge of the world (in contrast to just slavishly codifying common sense).
what about ontological nihilism? it was recently defended by Westerhoff (2024).
I think mereological nihilism has useful application in the social sphere. Just as what we call objects can be argued to be arbitrary segmentations of experience (a car, for example, can't possibly fulfill its functions without air, fuel etc, but we don't normally view these as part of the car), so are social constructs actually arbiratry collages of experiences. Imagine a funeral, we have particular sets of expectations as to what compose a funeral, even tje very feeling of sadness is part of this abstract object. But nothing about a person dying informs us as to what would go with such event.
When you learn about quantum field theory, you stop believing that particulars are fundamental.
The reason why we think of QFTs in terms of particles is quite literally anthropic; they're the part of the theory we could solve analytically.
We think of the full non-linear theory in terms of interactions of the part we could solve.
It’s not a part of the argument, but what if someone denied that the world was composed of simple particles at all? Like if they said that space is a continuous quantity.
Space could be continuous even though the occupants of space are discrete and simple entities :)
@@MajestyofReason Ontic Structural Realism would be the antithesis of mereological nihilism, wouldn't it? The world as a network of relations, no simple particles at all.
@@zverhRelations between what exactly? How are we to think of some whole that consists of parts with different states such that the differentialy stateful areas can interact with one another without accepting that these areas, in order to maintain local state, actually must be parts? Honest question?
5 that you say this violates common sense because I find this extraordinarily intuitive.
I guess the challenge would be to explain emergent properties, to the point of making predictions
How would Explanatory Exclusion Argument react against the emergent properties? If an apple is a specific arrangement of a certain amount of particles and possesses an emergent property that takes a novel role in the causal powers of the object, something that cannot be reduced into the particles, then it is possible to argue that composite objects are required to explain the world.
Weak emergence isn't a problem for the view, and we don't seem to have any examples of strong emergence. If we find the latter, that certainly becomes a problem.
as I understand it (which could very well be misled), a property that emerges from a specific arrangement of particles is already explained through particles and their interactions (or arrangement), in a sort of direct way. That arrangement need not be seen as a composite that then has that emergent property, it can be seen as something that belongs to the interactions of the particles themselves - perhaps as potential // possibility within those particles that is actualized in the interaction.
Does the talk of emergent properties presuppose particulars or substances such as an apple, a tree, etc? When I say an apple is a specific arrangement A of a certain amount of particles XYZ, what I refer to as an apple might be a collection of all of the emergent properties that emerged from that interaction. Therefore, the word apple is just a placeholder for the emergent properties that emerged from that specific interaction of the said particles.
Let A be a strongly emergent property of an apple. Using Chalmer's definition, this means that truths concerning A cannot be deduced from truths concerning the low levels of the apple, that is, the particles of the said object.
But so what? Even if this is the case, does this mean that we are justified in considering an apple as a concrete particular, or a substance on its own?
The moment we need Catholic woo rhetoric to save mereological nihilism is when it's time to reconsider. There's no meaningful sense in which the most basic thing, quarks or whatever is settled on, really has the potential properties we'd have to shoehorn into them.
@@stephengalanis As a recovering Catholic, I approve this comment.
6:04 Why are some apples red, or yellow, or green? Sweet or tangy? Particles aren’t red or sweet, so that doesn’t fall under explanatory redundancy… and I wouldn’t know what “apple” refers to without thinking of some group of those properties, so they don’t seem to be epiphenomenal entities because they play some explanatory role in reference to apples. So premise one seems explanatorily bankrupt. We should Occam’s razor away propertyless particles.
I don't really understand the difference between the statements "an apple exists and is just a group or collection of atoms arranged apple-wise" vs "the apple doesn't exist and only atoms arranged apple-wise exist". The ontology is identical in both cases, it's just a dispute about semantics and concepts.
Importantly, though, the ontology isn't the same in both cases; the former commits to the existence of apples, whereas the latter does not. The former also faces an implausible consequence that the latter doesn't: it seems implausible to say that every time you pick up an apple, the apple ceases to exist and a new, similar apple comes into existence. But every time you pick up an apple, the apple loses some particles, and hence every time you pick up an apple, there’s a distinct collection of particles arranged apple-wise. If an apple were identical to a collection of atoms arranged apple-wise, then we'd have to admit that apples constantly cease to exist and new ones come into existence, which is contrary to how we ordinarily think of apples. We tend to think an apple persists throughout someone picking it up.
A simple a day keeps the doctor away
So the explanatory exclusion argument doesn't exist, and I'm not really thinking about it.
Maybe I didn't follow the explanation, but I would disagree with premise 2. Suppose a nililist assumes sodium and chlorine are 2 types of particles (along with other types of atoms). Both sodium and chlorine are dangerous. Yet the composition of both is not.
So I figure that the composition of particles is insufficient to explain how the world works.
I guess I don't understand the point of mereological nihilism? What does it get you?
It just seems to be an invitation to consider that apples are indeed composed of fundamental particles. Which is true, isn't it?
I guess practially it's a perspectival shift. For example, if we stop interpreting objects as these rigid discrete entities, we may build our worlds, technologies, phylosofies, relationships in a more flexible way. Maybe if I were to build a house I could stop and think, "well, there's no such thing as an ideal house, I can make however I wish" and then proceed to make a new structure that doens't fit commom definitions of house, that is able to fulfill new functions.
I think beginning to understand what is and isn't a concept and then trying our absolute best to find evidence for non-conceptual things is the beginning of the path to a conclusion like mereological nihilism. Its easy enough to understand why a thing like marriage is a concept for instance. Its a conceptual story shared by at least a few people and of course there is no physical "marriage matter" anywhere to be found. Then its just a matter of moving down the chain of what we consider more physical than conceptual. At least for me moving down that chain and taking a closer and closer look at it seems to keep leading me to believe consciousness is the irreducible thing that's fundamental to reality. All we have to do is separate out what we can say about an object that isn't reliant or though the perspective of consciousness. Pretty soon we are left with nothing. The way physicists have dealt with this problem is in part known as the observer problem. Long story short before we can do physics we need a frame of reference. So we need a thing, in fact anything, it can be a rock for all we care, that is at some known referential existence in relation to the thing being studied. They reassure us it obviously doesn't have to be a conscious "observer." I know I am enormously simplifying here but even when I look at it in much more complex detail I don't understand why they seemingly miss the fact that the referent itself doesn't have to be conscious but we conscious beings need the referent in the first place.
In a physical, material reality why would a rock need a frame of reference beyond its own material existence? Which to be fair is exactly what many have expected and is why the observer problem is considered "weird". Because what kinds of things can we say about the no frame of reference rock? What does it look like, well nothing of course. Visual appearance is after all a thing of consciousness. Physical objects don't have an inherent appearance, their appearance is created upon appearing as something to some conscious being. The same is true of all other appearances of consciousness like smell, touch, noise, thought, etc. Ok so whatever it is where's it going and how fast? Which is where we can swoop in with theories of relativity to answer that. Movement, speed, space, force is a relational thing we say. But again we have the same problem. It needs a relation for US to understand it, but what about those things in themselves? What about the rock itself? Where was it before it was in relation to anything else? What even is a "relation"? Isn't it just a useful concept we've come up with as conscious intelligence to understand reality? Without a conscious being restricted to a frame of reference thats apparently in relation to the speed of the molecules inside our heads creating appearances of things including time what does time even mean and how fast does stuff go to get from here to there outside of that context? We can say that the universal speed limit or the speed of causality is the speed of light. But again that's in relation to our conscious perception. How long for instance did we have to wait to be born? Without getting into the question of identity we can just say no time at all because it was upon being born that we began creating the only thing that we know time to be. Saying that people and things obviously existed before we were born is simply and utterly a conceptual story. Point to it then if its obviously the case. Where is any of that stuff besides in our own thoughts? Where is all that time that isn't the time that's right now, appearing to us as now?
These are just some examples of how even the things we consider as the most obviously physical things turn into concepts upon closer inspection. Or I should say its exactly when we hold them up to the very closest inspection we know how is when they take on a more and more conceptual nature. Ultimately passing it off to consciousness and saying that we can only know things as they appear to us naturally leads us to observing consciousness for the sake of observing it as the thing itself. But, even then, the closer we take a look the less we are left with. When we take the closest look possible, when the contents of our consciousness are as bare as they can be and all thought has disappeared what's left is exactly what's irreducible, which is awareness itself. Its exactly the thing that is prior to description. It doesn't have any inherent qualities, characteristics or attributes of its own. Its not a thing or substance or an entity and its entirely empty of any self, ego or form. But awareness isn't nothing either. Its not a void, its not the absence of consciousness but rather the very presence of consciousness. Its the light that illuminates contents of consciousness. Awareness is aware of itself and its own emptiness. Awareness is aware emptiness.
Anyways I'm rambling. Don't take mushrooms if you want any of this to make sense because it will make sense, lol.
Impressive, i share almost exactly your thoughts! Loved reading your text!
And you're right, mushrooms played a big part in me thinking this way haha
Have you ever searched about buddhism and meditation? It's a great way of expling deeply our experience such as you suggested.
This reminds me of those times when I wonder to myself: Where exactly am "I"? I can't point to "myself", I can point to my head, my skin, my eyes, my brain, specific neurons, whatever, but the actual center of awareness behind my experince is not located in space. Same with my thoughts and emotions. When we do physics we explain things in terms of fields, particles, forces, all happening in space and time. But the emotion of fear, for example, is a non spatial phenomenon, I can't point to it, nor can I escape it while it's here.
I hold to a kind of mereological Nihilism but not in a Netwonian system but in a Leibnizian-kind of system. The reasons being, among others, that I hold the substance of idea to be needed in order to compose physical simples into a consistent picture of the world, and an actual ontological order in the substance idea. So I don't think one can reasonable speak of particles existing in a tablewise way without connecting power or laws between them, at max that these powers or laws are not part of the material/physical world but part of the ideal world in interaction with it - and there I see monads to be the best model of explanation
Non-existence of apples is a core proposition?
The equivocation lies in the word "world"
The premises hold for the Physical World
The apple and the observer of the apple both exist also in the Social World.
i.e. A composite object (you) is observing another composite object (apple) from an holistic (rather than reductionist) perspective.
to me Mereological nihilism seems obviously true.
although i don't really like the 3rd primes one problem that i have with it is that it's not compatible with general relativity because that theory suggest that the explanation for an event is relative to the observer. which means existence would also plausibly be relative to the observer. and that seems ludicrous.
Mereological nihilism does not imply that apples do not exist. What this affirms is that the "apple" essence does not exist.
An apple is a certain order in certain elements of reality that constantly change in a largely unnoticed way.
In that continually changing order, one recognizes the "apple" in a range of those changes.
Apple is just a convenient conventional concept.
MN recognizes that nothing is immutable and that everything is constantly transformed and that although the conceptualization remains fixed (for practical purposes) the object itself inevitably changes.
I don’t see how a composite argument is redundant. Not only are the particles arranged applewise but the particles also act together in an applelike manner and will not suddenly dissociate and become arranged baseballwise and behave as a baseball. Plus Occam’s razor is a human concept just like an apple is a human concept so it’s unfair to use such a concept that is not particle based to support the particle only theory. The particles themselves should be enough to support the theory shouldn’t need to rely on a philosophical principle (occams razor) that is an explanatory redundancy created by particles arranged humanwise because it’s more than just looking at the particles themselves
Could you say consciousness begins to exist?
At least from our subjective perspective, I would say we can't say that consciousness begins to exist. For that to be true, we would need to be consciouss of a time when there was no consciousness, and consequently no time either.
Consciousness seems to just "be"... Even our earliest memories seem to just "exist".
(1) If i were already an anti-realist about particles, which is in fact the case, this particular argument has no dialectical power. (I am also skeptical of any entities postulated by science, so change particles for quantum fields is not an improvement).
(2) Even if there are particles, there also are moral facts, minds, demons or numbers, all of which have an effect in the world -are part of the causal history. So the first premise is false.
(3) I am just curious about which theory of mind accept the people who believe the third premise is true. Can you help me with that, Joe?
Nice video! Thanks!
Correction: numbers in my view dont have causal power (and yes, I think moral facts do have causal powers). But the point stands.
I don’t know I don’t find the conclusion all that staggering…
it just seems intuitive that a table is made of fundamental particles and the ‘table-ness’ of it isn’t going to play any causal role.
To a bird or alien they won’t recognize the table as a table, and it just doesn’t seem natural at all to posit some universal objective concept of “table”.
I guess I feel like seeing the table as a bunch of particle composed in a way we call “table-wise” as not really costing me anything philosophically
It seems like there is a kind of compatiblist-ish position where you say that yes apples do exist, but by apple I mean particles arranged applewise not that there is an objective concept of apple
Yeah, Vsauce blew my mind when he talked about this
I suppose I am a mereological nihilist in the Kantian/Schopenhauerian sense, where our mind creates our reality through space, time, causality and therefore we don’t know the **true** “things in themselves” (Kant). Furthermore, bc our mind individuates things Schop. argues that the thing in itself is “one”, and therefore our reality is just that “one” reflected to us through time, space, causality. Therefore, metaphysically, there are no composite objects as it is all “one”, but it appears to us that there are as our mind creates individuated objects. I suppose even 2 particles would be the same metaphysically, so it would go further than merological nihilism on a metaphysical level
The first premise seems a bit circular, since what "the world" is, is precisely the question at hand. If the world is just partciles, then it's trivially true, but if you think (as I do) that a full explanation of how the world works and evolves must include facts like "2024 is a presidential election year" then it doesn't seem to me like you could ever explain such things by only describing particles. Ideas like "election" and "calendar year" would be completely meaningless. This is not to deny that what happens is at the macro level is determined by micro-level stuff, but I deny that you can explain macro-level events without appealing to macro-level entities. I don't know, I hope that makes sense.
Even something as simple as "particles arranged table-wise" seems very suspect to me. What does table-wise mean? It's not like tables are identical at the atmoic level. Does it mean "appearing like a table"? But surely there's no such thing as appearance, since appearances aren't fundamental particles or whatever.
I think the problem of this view is the view of parsimony you have to take to reach its conclusion. Many people who aren't meriological nihilists might agree that composite objects are identical to the sum of their parts, and the properties of a composite object are reducible to the properties of its parts, but will not conclude from this that the composite objects don't exists because positing composite objects adds no theoretical complexity to their view. Maybe parsimony is not positing as few 'entities' as possible
Apples don't exist but they taste good
‘Here are some of the main problems with the video:
- The video confuses the difference between *nominal* and *real* definitions of words. A nominal definition is how we use a word in language, while a real definition is what the word refers to in reality. For example, the word "apple" has a nominal definition that describes its general features, such as being a fruit with a red or green skin and a sweet flesh. But the word "apple" also has a real definition that refers to the actual object that exists in the world, which may have more specific and complex properties than the nominal definition. The video wrongly assumes that the nominal definition of "apple" is the same as the real definition, and that any deviation from the nominal definition means that the object is not an apple. This is a fallacy of *equivocation* , where the same word is used with different meanings in the same argument.
- The video also commits the fallacy of *composition* , where it attributes the properties of the parts to the whole. The video argues that because an apple is made up of atoms, and atoms have no color, shape, taste, or smell, then an apple also has no color, shape, taste, or smell. This is a mistake, because the properties of the whole are not necessarily the same as the properties of the parts. For example, water is made up of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, but water has properties that hydrogen and oxygen do not have, such as being liquid, transparent, and wet. Similarly, an apple has properties that its atoms do not have, such as being solid, red or green, and sweet. The video ignores the fact that the properties of an object depend on the *arrangement* and *interaction* of its parts, not just on the parts themselves.
- The video also makes the error of *reification* , where it treats an abstract concept as if it were a concrete object. The video argues that because an apple is a concept, and concepts do not exist in reality, then an apple does not exist in reality. This is a misunderstanding, because an apple is not just a concept, but also a referent of the concept. A concept is a mental representation of an object, while a referent is the object that the concept represents. For example, the concept of "triangle" is a mental representation of a three-sided shape, while a referent of "triangle" is a physical object that has a three-sided shape. The video confuses the concept of "apple" with the referent of "apple", and denies the existence of the referent because of the nature of the concept. This is a fallacy of *hypostatization* , where an abstract entity is treated as a real entity.
In conclusion, the video is a poor attempt to undermine the reality of apples and other common objects. The video uses faulty logic and false assumptions to make its case, and fails to address the actual evidence and arguments that support the existence of apples. The video is not a serious philosophical challenge, but a sophistical exercise that can be easily debunked.’ 🍎
Thanks for the video. Here is my response to the Explanatory Exclusion Argument.
My objection: Depending on how you understand explanatory value, either P1 is false, or P2 is. Either way the argument is unsound. Composite wholes are not explanatorily redundant.
An object has practical explanatory value for someone if it is needed in order to make an explanation that is comprehensible to them. While it may be in principle possible to explain everything in terms of collections of primitive particles, in practice this is not possible. Humans have limited cognitive resources, and so we need to posit composite objects in order to give explanations that we can understand. If you don’t believe me, try giving an explanation of what an economy is in terms of fundamental particles. Any such account will be far less elegant, far more confusing, and far less useful than the definitions that you will find in economics textbooks, which will refer to such objects as people, preferences and goods. In this way, composite objects have enormous independent practical explanatory value for people (who tend to be the ones giving and receiving explanations!). So if we are talking about practical explanatory value, P1 is false. Fundamental particles simply cannot explain everything in the world, not for us mere humans anyway.
I imagine that the reply will be that the argument is not concerned with what explanations are practical, but with which are true in an absolute metaphysical sense. The idea here is that when we talk about explanation, we have in mind some kind of metaphysical notion of explanation, such as grounding. Even if humans cannot grasp how the explanation works, nonetheless the fundamental particles suffice to metaphysically explain everything. So composite objects still lack explanatory value.
My objection now switches to P2. It is plausible that composite objects lack independent explanatory value. That is, they lack any explanatory value independent from the explanatory value of their parts. But in order to establish P2 we have to make the further claim that just because composite objects lack independent explanatory value, they must be explanatorily redundant. And I don’t see why a believer in composite objects must accept this. The reason for this is that in order for fact A to render fact B explanatorily redundant, fact A and fact B must be offering competing explanations. They must be locked in a battle over the scarce ontological resource of explanatory power, such that if one has this power, the other loses it. And as I understand material composition, parts and wholes do not compete in this way.
For example, suppose my hand weighs 1kg, and I weigh 70kg. Does this mean that my hand and I together weigh 71kg? Obviously not! This is because I, as a composite object containing my hand, also include the mass of my hand. We are not competing over this 1kg of mass, we can both have it together. This example points us towards a general principle that any believer in composite objects should accept; that parts and wholes do not compete, and in particular do not compete in explanations.
This notion of competition may sound strange, but I think we need it to understand many debates in analytic philosophy. For instance, the difference between a physicalist and a dualist is that the physicalist (in my terminology) thinks that the mind and the physical matter that it is composed from do not provide competing explanations, while the dualist denies this. This is why the dualist faces the problem of causal overdetermination whereas the physicalist does not. The dualist thinks the mind has causal properties that are distinct from and in competition with the causal properties of the brain, and so the question arises about how these causal properties are not screened off by the physical brain. But, as the physicalist thinks that the mind and the physical brain do not provide competing explanations, so there is no danger of the mind’s properties being screened off. This whole debate would be incomprehensible if we did not have the idea of competing vs non-competing explanations, and if we did not think that only competing explanations raise a threat of explanatory redundancy.
If we accept that wholes and their parts provide non-competing explanations, then it is simply not true that composite objects are explanatorily redundant just because they lack independent explanatory value. For example, suppose my hand is missing a finger. In this case the fact that I am missing a finger does not have independent explanatory value. If you told me to hold up ten fingers and then asked me why I was only holding up nine, you could explain this fact simply by talking about my hands in isolation-my hands only have nine fingers. But this does not mean that the answer isn’t also that I (as a whole) only have nine fingers. Neither of these facts are explanatorily independent of the other, but they are both nonetheless explanatorily relevant, because the explanations they offer do not compete.
What all this means is that, if we find material composition at all credible (as I do), we will reject P2. Of course, my opponent might reject this claim that wholes and parts provide distinct but non-competing explanations (I think this is happening implicitly in the argument). But the way I see it, it is not on me to justify the claim that parts and wholes do not compete. I take this to be a common sense idea built into the very concept of material composition itself. It is on the person who denies material composition to explain why non-competing explanations are impossible. And until they do I do not find the argument from explanatory irrelevance plausible.
Again, thanks for the video-keep them coming!
More seriously, when it comes to definitions vs. the real world, our perspective should simply be one of criteria-satisfaction. Do the collection of particles satisfy the structural definition of X? If they do, then they are, as a whole, X.
How does quantum mechanism change this reasoning? There are no such things as particles, really. There are fields of influence that expand and interact non-locally. These fields encompass - quite literally - the entire universe, without division or separation. Nothing can be a "concrete object" entirely by itself.
an apple a day keeps the mereological nihilist away! 😋
I like the Moorean response 👀 (Which is not really an argument but an incredulous stare 😁)
Crummett admits mereological nihilism goes against common sense! I sure don't like going against common sense unless I really have to.
A quick argument against nihilism (no idea if this works): Are the simples of the apple red, leading to a red arrangement? So the arrangement inherits the redness? So the arrangement exists, as only existing things can have properties like redness. But it is this arrangement that all men call wholes 😁 (In other words, how can wholes not exist if they have properties?)
my only issue with this view (despite the fact that I pretty much accept it in an analytical sense) is that it brings almost no pragmatic value to the table, it'd be practically impossible to make sense of the world and to advance as a species if we tried to act as though these constructed categories aren't real in any way
I would disagree. A lot of progress can be made from overcoming categories, it's basically a shift in perspective towards completely flexible reasoning. For example, the smartphone is only possible due to the overcoming the category of what a phone should be. Lasers, after being invented, were said to be "solutions in need of a problem", because categories had to be created and expanded in order to find use for them, let's say, in a laser pointer, overcoming the category of things that can be used to point at stuff. The USA has an urbanistic problem because certain categories of how houses and public spaces should be are baked into law. Capitalism is a category that is often viewed as "the way things are" and its overcoming could benefit us greatly etc etc
I'm late to the party, but I definitely accept Mereological Nihilism. Macro-scale designations seem like artifice to me. It seems intuitive to me that fundamental particles are just going on their merry way, and we're observing the probabalistic consequences of the laws of physics simulated a trillion trillion times (or whatever number). I would hold that macro-scale designations are illusions apparent to us, including our own consciousness, but I haven't (yet) looked into the counter-arguments, so I may be missing something.
I mean, yeah, apples don't exist, it's the matter that is a part of the collection of what we call an apple that exists.
Premise 1: Apples don’t exist
Conclusion: Nothing keeps the doctors away
Doctors don't exist either, checkmate 😛
Imho the restrictivist (or universalist) should just reject that postulating apples or chairs violates Occam's Razor - that's because "composition as identity" seems true, i.e. the chair just is in some sense *identical to* the particles that make up that chair. Or in other words: the whole is nothing over and above its parts. So you are not postulating some further entity in addition to those particles - "chair" is just the name for the sum of the particles that compose that chair, taken together.
so I reject P2 of the argument - if the chair just IS the particles, then it's just wrong to say that the chair is explanatorily redundant or epiphenomenal because the particles DO have causal powers and DO offer an explanatory function
(of course CAI is controversial, but at least some weak version of it seems perfectly right to me)
This is a respectable view. I’ve always had two hang-ups with it, though, so hopefully you can help me!
My first hang-up is that something seems true of the chair that isn’t true of the particles composing it: namely, the chair is one, but the particles are many. If this is right, then the chair couldn’t be identical to the particles, as something is true of the chair that isn’t true of the particles.
My second hang-up is that it seems like the chair can exist without those exact particles composing it, and so the chair cannot be identical to those particles. Just imagine that God removes a single atom from the periphery of the chair and annihilates it. It seems like the chair exists before and after this change, but the particles composing the chair before the change certainly don’t exist after it. So the chair can’t be identical to the particles composing the chair. (In fact, this happens all the time - whenever someone sits on a chair, it loses a small number of particles. But at least ordinarily, we don’t tend to think this brings about the existence of a new, numerically distinct chair.)
What do you think?🙂
@@MajestyofReason So it seems like you have two objections - one from the Indiscernibility of Identicals and one from modality. Let me try to address them
-) Anticipating the challenge from the Indiscernbility of Identicals I clarified that I might only accept "some weak version" of CAI. Those weak versions say that CAI isn't strictly speaking about *numerical* identical, but that it's *close enough* to numerical identity that postulating things like chairs or tables is rather ontologically innocent. This move is pretty popular in the literature, but I have no firm view whether this ultimately makes sense or not.
Also, more importantly, I'm not sure whether it is genuinely true - if we are taking an objective stance - to say that the particles have some property that the chair doesn't have. You say "the chair is one, but the particles are many" but clearly what this means - if we resolve the ellipsis - is "The chair is one chair" and "The particles are many particles"... but if we are committed to CAI, then it just follows that the chair has the property of "being many particles" (because that's just what it MEANS to be a chair, as long as a certain arrangement obtains) and at the same time the particles have the property of "being one chair", given CAI. This might sound somewhat awkward in natural language, but I don't really see a definitive metaphysical problem here, but just a linguistic quirk based on ellipsis.
-) OK, so let's assume CAI: chair C is identical to the set of particles P. Then the fact that C could still exist even if we later have P-1 particles seems just analogous to some non-CAI case of persistence: Almost everyone accepts that objects can be such that they are at t *constituted* by a certain arrangement of particles, but could at t1 be such that they are now constiuted by a slightly different arrangement of particles. This change doesn't imply that the whole was never constituted by those particles in the first place! So the vast majority of philosophers already accept this for constitution, so why not accept it for identity?
Obviously it's incredibly difficult to figure out under which circumstances identity is preserved, but so what? Philosophy is difficult, after all
How did you comment 6 days ago when this was posted 30 minutes ago 😭
@@famiahamidtemporal nihilism
So what?
There are probably very few things that exist, scientists are looking for the things that exist, maybe particles, waves and energy exist, but most of everything known by people doesn't exist, it is rather a categorization made by our brains or spirit or whatever you think the self is composed of, for example:
"Parking lots" don't exist, this is simply what we call the place that is designated for our vehichles to rest.
"Cars" don't exist, this is simply how we categorize a conjunction of mechanical parts that work together to help with transportation.
"Together" doesn't exist, this is simply the way we describe it when 2 or more things have a small space between them.
"Between" doesn't exist, this is simply a characteristic we say things have based off their location or relation to other things.
"Location" doesn't exist, this is simply what we call a perceptive capability of our brain.
"Perception" doesn't exist, this is simply what we call our brain's translation of received information.
"Information" doesn't exist, .... and so on
So, pretty much nothing that most people "know" about exists.
Things are what they are, not what we name them, not how we categorize them.
My official ontology is mereologically nihilistic but my unofficial epistemology is mereologically realist.
There are no mereological simples. An entity that cannot be divided into distinct physical parts has neither dimensions nor spatial location, and it doesn't have shape, nor does it move.
I don’t see anything wrong with a point-sized physically simple entity; and besides, the mereological simples could just be extended simples - three-dimensional occupants of space which cannot be divided up into smaller occupants. It’s just a smooth, unbroken, indivisible, extended reality. I don’t see anything incoherent in that
@MajestyofReason even if I were to grant this latter point, it would nonetheless be a concencssion to composites, albeit indivisible composites, though nonetheless physical wholes with physical areas not identical to itself.
@@danzo1711 the proponent of this view doesn’t commit to the existence of ‘physical areas’ of the object; they would reject that there even are such things as physical areas. That would be to make the object composite; but it is not composite. It’s an extended simple. They will grant that the object is located here, and there, and there (etc.), but this doesn’t thereby commit them to the existence of things distinct from the object itself known as ‘physical areas’ of the object.
@@MajestyofReasonI must have misunderstood your prior post. How are these extended if they have no physical areas? How are they three dimensional, have sides, etc, without physical areas?
So not even atoms exist, since they are composed by subatomic particles
Mereological Nihilism seems pretty obvious to me.
And is in fact one of the useful things Philosophy actually helps us in.
Now going a bit wild,
What about temporal simplicity?
If there are no spatial things with parts, what if we take that to a temporal scale as well?
Or getting a bit more wild😅, what about we go with qualitative simplicity.
That would entail the rejection of substance-attribute dualism and maybe adopt some trope theory👀.
Go a step further and reduce the property tropes into relations viz.OSR, but then you come full circle and end up back at holism which would of course involve composite objects.
@@zverh One can also go anti-foundationalist if he wants from here.
I mean I know of certain trope theorists who also deny linking relations as well.
It would end up being some sort of representationalism/idealism.
Weird stuff.
Alright I am gonna leave my philosophy degree and do a real one.
The University of Minnesota put a lot of money into breeding Honeycrisps, so they'd better exist. :D
I hold a similar view that suggests the only things that exist properly are those fundamental to the world, but I take a much different approach. If I were to put it simply, I'd say I think the universe is little more than a formal structure, where the relationships that compose the structure are approximated by the laws of physics. In this sense, only those entities that are necessary for the structure exist properly, however, we conceive objects (like the apples, chairs, and trees) that are real patterns that can be derived from the structure.
I'm not sure where that puts me on mereological nihilism though. I almost reject premise 1, because I dont think that the fundamental objects are concrete, nor do I think, if they were concrete, that theyd be particles. However, now that I think about it, I think I disagree with premise 3, but Ill have to flesh that out in a later comment.
Ah! I think I've articulated my objection to your argument:
I see fault in premise 2 actually, my own beliefs regarding premise 1 aside. Specifically, I posit that composites would not be explanatorily redundant. This is because while simple particles may be able to explain the mechanics of things and how they occur (composition and cause/effect), they do not sufficiently explain the *function* of things we perceive in the world. For example, mereological nihilism may account for the mechanical goings-on of a game of chess, that is the board and pieces are composed of some substance, the neurological activity in our brains motivates our body to move the pieces along the board and such, which can all be explained with mechanistically by simples. However, the rules of the game we obey, whether or not a move is legal etc., is nowhere to be found in the particles, no? It is an abstraction we impose on the physical matter composed of simples. Perhaps you could still anchor the rules of the game in some kind of activity of simples in the neural composition in our brains, but I don't think there is any causal link between the laws of the universe and how we identify a game of chess.
Now, I'm still not completely sure what you mean by "particles . . . explain how the world works and evolves" or "the complete causal story of the world can be told in terms of . . . simple particles" or, lastly, "the project of explaining the world." On one hand, I take it you mean the actual, physical, causal happenings occurring, in contrast to patterns and abstractions we can identify among them, such as my chess example. But to me, this "causal story of the world" doesn't equate to "the project of explaining the world" or how it "works and evolves". Let's take your example of a stone breaking glass: The causal story of this situation is that a rock, which is a bunch of simples in a particular arrangement, contacts glass, which is more simples in a particular arrangement, and it shatters, which is etc. etc., and this is all governed by physical laws. Now, the physical laws *make* this happen, but I don't think the laws **tell us what will happen.** Yes, by observation and discovery, we can uncover physical laws and therefore make predictions, but by what means are we making those predictions? It is because we create abstractions, such as fragileness, hardness, force, and collision, which are properties of composite objects, which do not exist on the nihilist account, because all that exists physically are simples and *their* properties. In other words, explanation is a future-predicated endeavor, but the happenings of the simples only occur in the actual present.
I have one last rambling note to add (because I can't figure out how to join all my thoughts into one knot): Explaining how something happens on a micro- vs macro-scale is not a two-way street: we know that glass breaks when a rock hits it because of the arrangement and composition of its simples, however *the simples do not know that glass breaks when a rock hits it because* **there is no glass and there is no rock: there is only simples**.
Basically, there is more to the world than just what is. There is what does and what happens, and that can only be found in the composites we construct. I hope I made a little bit of sense. This has brought me down a fascinating train of thought nonetheless!
I think you are probably talking about Ontic Structural Realism (OSR)
@@zverh Pretty much, I hesitate to say if I'm all-in on it because I haven't researched it in a little bit, but when I did find out it was a thing I was all about it.
@@Gerard-997 Yes, me too. I first had this crossed my mind once, what if there is nothing else than mere relations, a relations only ontology? It is very fascinating but also very unintuitive, at least in the beginning. But then I found out that it is actually a view that is discussed in philosophy and goes by the name OSR.
Cuteness might be a quality of the whole (an epiphenomenal quality in terms of material composition) rather than of the parts. The bunny as a whole may be cute; but the individual quarks/subatomic particles might not be cute.
Egregious egregores ensnare each exhalation, eventuating eternernaly excessive estivation? Not cool.
Is philosophy a language scam?
The apple exists innthat i can attribute a name to some collectiin of parts. That identifier and what it identifies are both real. You can test this by askinf someone to pass you that apple. If thet do then they agree on the label. I'm 99% on board with this form of nihalism, but the last sentance in the proof, I think, is a word game and unfortunetly takes the premis too far - thus rendering it absurd for must people.
If particles are arranged "apple-wise," what are they arranged as? It would appear that the mereological nihilist answer would be "nothing," because otherwise the answer would have to be "an apple" (or some other term denoting that object) prompting the question "What then is an apple?" and that leads to circularity in the answer "Particles arranged apple-wise." Also, "particles arranged apple-wise" are a physical arrangement which obviously exists. Just point to one to prove it.
The problem is that MN discards _abstractions,_ which serve to make thought more efficient. Sure, at root, only "particles" exist (though, re physics, that's a lot more complex than this video considers), but if we could only discuss apples (and everything else) in terms of particles, that would all but prevent thought and communication. Therefore we abstract the "particle level" and denote the physical object with the conceptual term "apple."
To so otherwise is an absurd obstacle to thought and knowledge.
Mereological nihilism does seem to commit one to a sort of dualism, since if "apples" exist in the mind only, but physically speaking only fundamental particles exist, then the mind cannot be made of fundamental particles and is therefore not physical.
@@TheCynicalPhilosopher Not necessarily. Minds do not exist without brains, so a mind is physically instantiated. That we can't "see" a mind is like saying we can't see the inner workings of a CPU via the images on a screen. We can _understand_ a CPU and we can understand a mind. (The fact that we do not _yet_ understand the mind doesn't affect that it's possible.)
Personally, I currently think of mind as the brain "experiencing itself," though I'm no expert on brains & minds.
@@MichaelPiz I think this dispute, like many others in philosophy, is merely a verbal dispute. If it is arranged like an apple and performs the typical causal roles of an apple, then it is an apple. As the saying goes, if it looks like a duck and walks like a duck, it is a duck.
The problem is that arrangement makes a difference. The same fundamental particles may behave differently if arranged differently. This is where emergence comes in. Life and consciousness for example are emergent properties.
@@MichaelPiz We have not observed, or at the very least recognized, a mind existing without a brain. However, I tend to agree that minds supervene on the physical, yet things like the knowledge problem, or even Josh Rasmussen's counting problem, may pose an issue for such a position.
As far as "seeing" a mind, we do in a way: our own mind. While external phenemona impinging on my sense organs can certainly be explained through the physics of fundamental particles, my qualia of these (e.g., my experience of redness) cannot itself be reduced to fundamental particles - there is no "redon" particle to explain the subjective, first-person experience of redness.
@@zverh Agreed, though I might differ on deeper details. This might be nitpicking, but I'd use different phrasing than "if it is arranged like an apple and performance the typical causal roles of an apple, then it is an apple." That reads to me like Platonism, like there's an abstract "apple" that real-world apples conform to. I've always disagreed with Plato. (Frankly, I think he's a supernaturalist hack.) But, as I said, I might be picking nits with that.
As for the effect of arrangement, I agree with you. I still want to emphasize the importance of abstractions, though. Where MN falls down is in not recognizing that while we certainly can speak of apples in terms of the particles comprising them, the ability to study and discuss apples as apples or as fruits or as part of a tree or in other ways is far too important to throw away as MN does. What MN treats as fundamental is merely one of many "levels" that concretes can be treated on. For me, that's a fatal flaw.
Merelogical nihilism seems intuitively obvious to me but I'm open to being wrong.
Look into Ontic Structural Realism (OSR). It seems to be the antithesis of mereological nihilism. In the beginning it may sound very unintuitive, but with the passage of time and thinking about it, it starts making sense.
@@zverh Thanks, I'll look into it!
platonism's worst enemy
I dont get it but cool 👍🏼👍🏼👍🏼
As Stephen Hawking already said it: _"... philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge..."_
The question is not in these days and ages in the 21st century, whether or not "apples"/composite objects exist.
At least that is not really that good of a question to be considered that much.
This is the more interesting, relevant and significant question in the current days and ages of the 21st century:
*"What are more fundamental according to the standard model?*
*Particles or fields?"*
Gemini's response:
_"The question of whether particles or fields are more fundamental according to the Standard Model is a bit nuanced. Both concepts are intertwined and depend on how you interpret the model._
*_From a strictly mathematical perspective:_*
_- The Standard Model is described by _*_quantum field theory,_*_ where particles are excitations or localized quanta of underlying fields. In this sense, fields are more fundamental as they exist continuously through space and time, while particles are temporary disturbances within them._
*_From a physical perspective:_*
_- We often talk about and measure individual particles with specific properties like mass, spin, and charge. These observables align more directly with our intuitive understanding of "matter." Additionally, particle detectors directly observe individual particles, reinforcing this perspective._
*_Therefore, both interpretations hold merit:_*
*_- Fields are fundamental_*_ because they represent the underlying reality according to the mathematical formalism._
*_- Particles are fundamental_*_ because they correspond to measurable entities and our intuitive grasp of matter._
*_A crucial point to remember:_*
_- The distinction between particles and fields is not as clear-cut as in classical physics. Particles are not just tiny billiard balls; they are manifestations of the underlying field and exhibit wave-like behavior as well._
_Ultimately, both particles and fields are essential aspects of the Standard Model. Understanding their interplay and relationship is key to comprehending the fundamental structure of matter and the forces that govern it._
It always truly amazes me how much catching up philosophy yet has to do in order to be somewhat relevant and significant in these modern scientific ages.
With regards to demons causing climate change, it reminded me of Plantinga's hilarious attempt to extend his free will defense to natural evils by postulating that demons cause tornadoes and hurricanes. I suppose they could also be responsible for climate change. Buhahahaha
james ladyman et al. in 'every thing must go' pretty much debunked this kind of speculative metaphysics for anyone whose stances are empirically grounded, as there are no non-relational, self-subsistent 'simples' or 'individuals' in our best, provisionally 'fundamental' physical theories.
Yes, I also thought of OSR while watching this video.
@@zverh right, OSR is based as hell, i love me some OSR. actually one of the most eye-opening phil. of science texts i read so far. i am not quite sure how and why the obscurantist-magicalist 'analytic philosophers' survived so far, getting away with their BS shenanigans.. not cool, not cool.
"I "am an argument against this view 😁 though i am not a merological simple " I" am watching your excellent video... so premise 2 is false.
"no people exist to posit or to refute my genius idea"
Lol no
this (presocratic paradoxes of the many versus the one) has been resolved by Aristotle, the solution is called classical theism...
Ah yes, Aristotle, the famous classical theist.
Let's assume God exists, how does that help you deny the premises of the argument.
@@thedude882 yes, he's famous precisely for that...
@@thedude882 Aristotle adresses those problems of how there can be multiplicity and unity. The presocratic monists said all is one, and the other side (the precursors to nominalism, physicalism and atomism) said nothing is in unity and everything is infinitely divisible, that there are no absolute categories outside of human convention.
Aristotle solves this with two key concepts: the distinction between matter (hyle) and form (morphe) and the distinction between actuality (energeia) and potentiality (dynamis), concluding that the "unmoved mover", that necessarily ends the causal regress of per-se causes that can not be infinite, must be purely form and purely actuality, and purely intellect. That is what all people call God (he called it theos). Being purely form means it is not corruptible, nor material, being pure actuality means that it is the principle of all that is and can be, therefore omnipotent. There you have it: God. You can read the arguments on Schmid's favorite rival's material: Edward Feser. He's in my view the best English-speaking divulgator of Aristotelian philosophy.
@@NG-we8uu Aristotle's unmoved mover does not share the attributes of the God of clsssical theism. Aristotle is not a classical theist.
It betrays such a naive, useless understanding of physics and chemistry that I can't buy mereological nihilism without much revision.
Just insert the word entity for particle. Is there some deeper problem I'm missing?
I concede that the bold claim that "apples do not exist" was necessary to create a clickworthy video... (Obviously there are apples; and besides that there also exists the idea of an apple, and even the mere name "apple" exists- etc. which is proven by you reading this right now) But arguing that an apple, being a composite of particles( in my understanding the elementary indivisible, smallest pieces) and that thus the 'shorthand' is redundant for an understanding of anything makes sense to an extent. If we in fact could understand all the particles and all the laws that govern them, and we had all the time in the world - I think we could indeed have the perfect understanding and language of everything, without the need of ever using "variables" like "apple" and so on. And we are trying to understand particles. Scientists are trying to simulate chemical reactions on a molecular level- only problem just a handful of them require a computer the size of a building to simulate... And we can't name every single atom (or rather for each atom, also each nukleon or electron and for that each subparticle) to say this composition of particles (and mind you each apple is likely a unique arrangement of different amounts of particles) when we just want to talk about an apple. So the argument here is that given our human limitations, shorthands like "apple" will never be redundant as the perhaps more percise way to conceive and refer to things is out of reach for us mortals...
Personally I think we need at minimum 3 models. We've alienated man made calender time by trying to accommodate like 10 different states & old wold faiths to build a theory of everything in every discipline that's just a jail now that tuned Ed into recruiting rather than engaged learning to be active in it. .
The great debate when everyone thought they could deal with fundamental building blocks with a more deterministic statistical anylics was all on this side but since max plank they switched back.
Newtons fallen human dashboard hierarchy knowledge of Good and evil equations was very influential in America but its always been all about code , or measure of a reductionism phenotypical transfer of data. But in staying true with tripartite nature but only in Jesus salvational unification so the form and shape deterministic hamiltonian or evolution again is just inherently to much credibility for what fails on 3 degrees of linear motion. We run into trouble drawing lines through 3 vertical gradient natural systems at once so to speak.
All I hear is a bunch of meaningless words...
This isn’t anything revolutionary, just semantics games. Describing something the same way just using different terms to explain it the same way (I’ll agree that there is something that seems as an apple, but I won’t call it an apple but rather “an arrangement of X, Y, Z”, blah blah).
Great video tho (as always…)
Keep up the great work.
Bootstrap axioms in nihilism is the only "foundation", everything else is a band-aid on top. Thats why moral cognitivism/ realism, free will, meaning etc are incoherent and embarassing views.
The extremes of analytic philosophy… read the transcendental deduction of Kant or read the Science of Logic or something
Man talk slow
Studied/taught these things for 39 years before realizing how utterly useless the endeavor ultimately was. They are nice exercises for the brain that lead to nothing. Doing push ups instead is a better form of exercise, because it at least has practical, positive impacts on your life and those you care for.
If mereological nihilism is true, then there’s a good case to be made that we are souls. (I obviously exist; I’m clearly not a simple physical particle; so if all that exist are simple things, and the only physically simple things are particles, I must be a non-physical thinking thing, aka, a soul.) And this is pretty practically important - it affects how we understand ourselves and our place in nature, it’s clearly relevant to neuroscience, it influences whether we think life after death is possible (which is pretty practically significant), and it influences whether God’s existence is more or less likely (if souls exist, there must be laws connecting the states of souls to physical states of brains; but these would seem to be brute facts under atheism - which would be a new and significant theoretical cost of atheism - and they also have a very striking character that would be surprising under atheism). And whether God exists is very practically important, one reason being its bearing on religious belief.
@@MajestyofReason Of course, that is very obvious. It is actually my view. But it is impossible to know if it's true, or far more importantly, it is even impossible to know if it is most likely or more likely to be true. Then it's just another interesting though meaningless thought experiment.
You do a great job, though. Truly. In 20 years you will probably be a mystic of great value to the world.
fake philosophy
How so?
apples do exist.