An episode on the Law of Attraction and how it relates to other metaphysical philosophers would be really interesting. Curious to know if it would expose LOA believers or uplift them.
I'm a big fan of Epictetus in various not-typically-considered-to-be-stoic respects, but I find this particular aphorism and other typically-stoic passages dealing with ataraxia to be positivist and politically conservative.
I was also thinking that this aphorism seems very hands-off politically (I would consider this politically conservative): "the world is indifferent, you can't change it, you can only adapt yourself to the brutalities of the world," which seems to shun social progress. And, in the discussion of how desire leads to suffering, I think this aphorism suggests that social progress will come with suffering (because social progress desires something and has expectations). Is that sort of how you were thinking about it? I'd like to hear more about your interpretation
Yeah, I think that the proposition that non-expectation leads to peace invites a reversal according to _modus tollens_ , i.e., that non-peace entails expectation. Whether social progress requires expectation is questionable. It is always possible to combine action with _Gelassanheit_ , such that one determines to act and let the cards fall where they may, and this is typically Stoic action. What is questionable about Stoicism is whether one can really act well when one doesn't care about the outcome. One could well demand with Nietzsche that one be fully engaged with the world and willing to risk turmoil and defeat. This was the position of the Frankfurt School and Hegel. Is one getting the most out of life when one puts such a great premium on inner peace? What is so bad, exactly, about upset? (edited to change _modus ponens_ to _modus tollens_ )
I really love y'all's content and I'm so happy I found you. I've been diving into stoicism recently and the one thing I cannot figure out is how stoics respond to issues of Justice or rather lack thereof. We definitely get a sense that they hold integrity to a high degree, but do they see any kind of duties to bigger ethical issues?
@@leenadbouk1297 Hell yea! Epictetus at least was a careful reader of Plato's _Phaedo_ , I infer from indirect evidence. For him, then, it is better to die than to do a wrong thing, and this relates directly to social justice. If the ruler says "do this wrong thing or I will kill you," Epictetus counsels to say, "Kill me, then, for I will not do as you say.". This is the ultimate resistance against social power, and the ultimate basis for modern individualism. He says this at the beginning of the _Discourses_ , which I much prefer to the _Handbook_ . The significance of it was not lost on Montaigne. (edited to substitute "Kill me" for "Do it")
Martin Luther King's "Letter from a Birmingham Jail," a key document in civil disobedience literature, also has a clear antecedent in Epictetus' attitude. So does Foucault's theory of power, as described in Dreyfus & Rabinow's _Beyond Structualism and Hermeneutics_ . This has withstood the test of time.
I like the aphorism because it is making a distinction (from my perspective) between hope and expectations. In interpersonal relationships, it is fairly reasonable to believe that intentionally positive actions towards and for other people will result in positive reactions, but it is unreasonable to expect a positive reaction, because an expectation (at times) seems to assume a form of contract (however tacit) that does not exist. It is not unreasonable to hope for a positive reaction or feel hurt when one is not forthcoming, but that the action be reciprocated according to an agent's preconceived demands without a preestablished, formal contract... that isn't so reasonable and neither would an attempt to demand compensation. Acts towards and for others outside of contractual arrangements are those of hope and made in sacrifice (i.e. an act that does not have a formal basis of expectation for reciprocation, like within a contract)... I think this aphorism gets interesting when applied to people's concepts of the "American Dream," which for many seems to take on the aspect of a contract, but... it just isn't. It is a hope that can be achieved through the efforts of sacrifice, but it isn't guaranteed. To believe or assume so would be illusional.
It's ethically objectionable to treat others well solely in order to get something from them, even if it is only well treatment in return. ( _See_ , _e.g._ , Lawrence Kohlberg, _Philosophy of Moral Development_ ). Epictetus offers an escape from such instrumental reason in that he faintly suggests that actions might not just be taken without expectation of a result, but also not for the sake of any result. In ancient Greek, such actions were called _poiesis_ , as opposed to _techne_ or action taken to achieve some result. (edited to add "solely"). (edited again to substitute "action taken to achieve some result" for "instrumental reason") (edited yet again to add reference to Kohlberg)
Fair enough (and I do not believe we are disagreeing on the whole), but let's say I give you a present. I can do so with the hope or expectation that it will bring you pleasure/joy, and not with the explicit motive that an enjoyable present will somehow endear you to me. My issue isn't a sort of quid pro quo arrangement by which an agent means to benefit by the result or their action, but one by which they perceive the positive result they expect or hope for: I am hoping that you enjoy the gift. You may have the genuine reaction in finding the gift distasteful and discard it into the trash. My hope was your benefit, the result was the opposite: would I be in breach of ethics for being disappointed by your reaction? I would say no, unless I were to make you somehow incur my disappointment. If I were hoping for your benefit, then I would likely be less inclined to express my disappointment to you. If I were expecting your benefit, then I may be more inclined to express my disappointment. That is the distinction I hoped to make, and, granted, my continuation into contracts, sacrifice, efforts and dreams makes this earlier distinction less clear and does enter through continuation into transactionality. However, I am not clear on what you mean by an action made "not for the sake of any result." An act may be altruistic (perhaps), but the idea that an act outside of a reflex can be made without the intention (misguided or otherwise) of a result does not follow from my perspective. Maybe an action is just enjoyable to conduct (e.g. dancing in the dark) and this act may create something without intention (the joy of dancing, a new way for the dancer to understand motion, etc.), but even here the means (dancing) is the end (joy, understanding, etc.) result. I am not a direct or avid scholar of Greek philosoph-y/ers or the Christian philosophers who pick them up (though many of both have come up from time to time in my studies), but a non-reflexive act without an intrinsic, intuitive and/or unconscious purpose of effect (i.e. a result) on the world beyond the activity... that is beyond me, I'm afraid, perhaps to my ethical turpitude. Best of luck and skill to you
@@crowboggs Thank you for the explanation; your previous post is much clearer when I read it again. It reminds me of Kierkegaard's "knight of renunciation". _See_ his _Fear and Trembling_ . As for _poiesis_ , I will attempt a clarification. I think you are correct in your example that dancing in the dark still has dancing as a means to joy, etc., as an end. That the end is direct, immediate, and unintended does not change this. Unintended results are still results, and though they were not the purpose for which the act was performed, this does not make the act _poiesis_ because there might have been another purpose for the act in the mind of the doer, whether realized or not, making it _techne_ . What is done is still done because it is good, in the case of _poiesis_ (as with all action, I suppose), but in the case of immediate joy or understanding, even if these are intended, they are still something additional to the act itself, as you rightly point out. The difficulty comes, I think, in imagining dancing in the dark (or whatever) as _intrinsically_ or _inherently good_ , as good no matter what else comes of it (and here perhaps we might need a better example; none comes to mind, unfortunately), and done without intention of any result, only the intent to act because the action itself is thought to be good. In the case of _poiesis_ , the act and its end are one. Your difficulty might arise, following MacIntyre, in the problem of typically modern subjectivity. The subjectivity of specifically modern values (i.e., th ideas that values are relative, that everyone has their own tastes that are beyond criticism, there is no court of final appeal on them, etc.) divorces values from facts. See Hume's _Treatise_ , pt. III, for an early expression of this, called the "is/ought fallacy". For the ancients, again following MacIntyre and most natural law theorists (whom Hume was attacking in the 18th century), there was such a consensus around morals that what we call values were not regarded as subjective but objective. They were things upon which unquestioning, unanimous agreement could be had, just as we can still reasonably agree on facts through empiricism. From the idea that values were objective, it is a short step to the idea that some acts are intrinsically good, others intrinsically bad, and perhaps others neither one nor the other, but this requires some imagination for us moderns.
Is it a kind of weltschmerz, admission of one's lack of resources to meet the onslaughts, some bitter pill to swallow, grin -and -bear- it impasse, the mind assuming the Tarentinian boulder stand when you are buffeted all around, your mind quartered by waves of misfortune yet like the very same spent waves which die and rest calm ?
In psychological terms, what Prof. Anderson is doing in the latter half of the talk is ego-alienating her expectations, such that she does not see them as actions she chooses, but as forces that come upon her from beyond. This entails a shrinkage of the self, a pulling inward of the boundary between system and environment.
I think that @leenadbouk1297 has a point in that the discussion in the video implicitly centered around instrumental reasoning, i.e., that the aphorism provides a better _qua_ more effective way of skinning a cat. This view implicitly downplays social issues, which grouse at the instrumental aporoach. Habermas, for instance, sees this as endemic of Western thought, and advocates for a different form of thinking, one specifically adapted to social action. (edited for spelling). (edited again to change "gruff" to "grouse") (edited for spelling (again))
I don't enjoy this pop psych approach to 'expectations' and using it's accompanying language ie. 'frustration' to talk about most situations. It's used a lot in dating culture and in my opinion moving away from that vocabulary and even this acceptance framework offered by stoics makes conversations move in a more creative and self-conscious way rather than returning to tired tropes of what happens with the values we want to set down as boundaries, which are often labeled under the misnoper of 'expectations.'
Perhaps it's unfair, but I perceive it as a rather masculine life philosophy, appealing to a particularly armoured sensibility. I'm defining the masculine in a gendered, rather than a biological sense, though I also find a degree of overlap between the two. Just haven't noticed many women espousing modern-day Stoicism. The paradoxical danger is that of rationalist acceptance becoming a form of denial which cuts us off from valuable sources of information. It has something of "grim and bear it". Pun intended.
I've heard Stoicism described as a warrior ethic, and this seems right with the "even fear of death will not control me" aspect of it. Yes, emotions are downplayed in Stoicism, and this is a masculine trait. I imagine it to be due to the fact that war, being traditionally a man's business (though Plato argued for allowing women who wished it to fight in war), has also led to men being saddled with the task of trying to avoid war through routinization and invention of social customs. Max Weber points this out in _Economy and Society_ . Routinization is antithetical to charisma and emotionalism, and Stoicism seems to contribute to the "spirit of calculation" essential to rationalism and capitalism.
You’ve been spoiling us with content lately
great discussion as usual thanks I learned a lot about Epictetus today!!!
Thanks for this, great conversation! Accepting expectations, I needed to hear it :)
Love you Madame Professor ❤
An episode on the Law of Attraction and how it relates to other metaphysical philosophers would be really interesting. Curious to know if it would expose LOA believers or uplift them.
I'm a big fan of Epictetus in various not-typically-considered-to-be-stoic respects, but I find this particular aphorism and other typically-stoic passages dealing with ataraxia to be positivist and politically conservative.
I was also thinking that this aphorism seems very hands-off politically (I would consider this politically conservative): "the world is indifferent, you can't change it, you can only adapt yourself to the brutalities of the world," which seems to shun social progress. And, in the discussion of how desire leads to suffering, I think this aphorism suggests that social progress will come with suffering (because social progress desires something and has expectations). Is that sort of how you were thinking about it? I'd like to hear more about your interpretation
Yeah, I think that the proposition that non-expectation leads to peace invites a reversal according to _modus tollens_ , i.e., that non-peace entails expectation. Whether social progress requires expectation is questionable. It is always possible to combine action with _Gelassanheit_ , such that one determines to act and let the cards fall where they may, and this is typically Stoic action. What is questionable about Stoicism is whether one can really act well when one doesn't care about the outcome. One could well demand with Nietzsche that one be fully engaged with the world and willing to risk turmoil and defeat. This was the position of the Frankfurt School and Hegel. Is one getting the most out of life when one puts such a great premium on inner peace? What is so bad, exactly, about upset?
(edited to change _modus ponens_ to _modus tollens_ )
@@wynshiphillier313 Very good points, and your comment addressed my unorganized thoughts well. Thank you for your insight.
I really love y'all's content and I'm so happy I found you. I've been diving into stoicism recently and the one thing I cannot figure out is how stoics respond to issues of Justice or rather lack thereof. We definitely get a sense that they hold integrity to a high degree, but do they see any kind of duties to bigger ethical issues?
@@leenadbouk1297 Hell yea! Epictetus at least was a careful reader of Plato's _Phaedo_ , I infer from indirect evidence. For him, then, it is better to die than to do a wrong thing, and this relates directly to social justice. If the ruler says "do this wrong thing or I will kill you," Epictetus counsels to say, "Kill me, then, for I will not do as you say.". This is the ultimate resistance against social power, and the ultimate basis for modern individualism. He says this at the beginning of the _Discourses_ , which I much prefer to the _Handbook_ . The significance of it was not lost on Montaigne.
(edited to substitute "Kill me" for "Do it")
Martin Luther King's "Letter from a Birmingham Jail," a key document in civil disobedience literature, also has a clear antecedent in Epictetus' attitude. So does Foucault's theory of power, as described in Dreyfus & Rabinow's _Beyond Structualism and Hermeneutics_ . This has withstood the test of time.
Can we also get lev shestov's aphorism as well?
I like the aphorism because it is making a distinction (from my perspective) between hope and expectations. In interpersonal relationships, it is fairly reasonable to believe that intentionally positive actions towards and for other people will result in positive reactions, but it is unreasonable to expect a positive reaction, because an expectation (at times) seems to assume a form of contract (however tacit) that does not exist. It is not unreasonable to hope for a positive reaction or feel hurt when one is not forthcoming, but that the action be reciprocated according to an agent's preconceived demands without a preestablished, formal contract... that isn't so reasonable and neither would an attempt to demand compensation. Acts towards and for others outside of contractual arrangements are those of hope and made in sacrifice (i.e. an act that does not have a formal basis of expectation for reciprocation, like within a contract)... I think this aphorism gets interesting when applied to people's concepts of the "American Dream," which for many seems to take on the aspect of a contract, but... it just isn't. It is a hope that can be achieved through the efforts of sacrifice, but it isn't guaranteed. To believe or assume so would be illusional.
It's ethically objectionable to treat others well solely in order to get something from them, even if it is only well treatment in return. ( _See_ , _e.g._ , Lawrence Kohlberg, _Philosophy of Moral Development_ ). Epictetus offers an escape from such instrumental reason in that he faintly suggests that actions might not just be taken without expectation of a result, but also not for the sake of any result. In ancient Greek, such actions were called _poiesis_ , as opposed to _techne_ or action taken to achieve some result.
(edited to add "solely"). (edited again to substitute "action taken to achieve some result" for "instrumental reason") (edited yet again to add reference to Kohlberg)
Fair enough (and I do not believe we are disagreeing on the whole), but let's say I give you a present. I can do so with the hope or expectation that it will bring you pleasure/joy, and not with the explicit motive that an enjoyable present will somehow endear you to me. My issue isn't a sort of quid pro quo arrangement by which an agent means to benefit by the result or their action, but one by which they perceive the positive result they expect or hope for: I am hoping that you enjoy the gift. You may have the genuine reaction in finding the gift distasteful and discard it into the trash. My hope was your benefit, the result was the opposite: would I be in breach of ethics for being disappointed by your reaction? I would say no, unless I were to make you somehow incur my disappointment. If I were hoping for your benefit, then I would likely be less inclined to express my disappointment to you. If I were expecting your benefit, then I may be more inclined to express my disappointment. That is the distinction I hoped to make, and, granted, my continuation into contracts, sacrifice, efforts and dreams makes this earlier distinction less clear and does enter through continuation into transactionality. However, I am not clear on what you mean by an action made "not for the sake of any result." An act may be altruistic (perhaps), but the idea that an act outside of a reflex can be made without the intention (misguided or otherwise) of a result does not follow from my perspective. Maybe an action is just enjoyable to conduct (e.g. dancing in the dark) and this act may create something without intention (the joy of dancing, a new way for the dancer to understand motion, etc.), but even here the means (dancing) is the end (joy, understanding, etc.) result. I am not a direct or avid scholar of Greek philosoph-y/ers or the Christian philosophers who pick them up (though many of both have come up from time to time in my studies), but a non-reflexive act without an intrinsic, intuitive and/or unconscious purpose of effect (i.e. a result) on the world beyond the activity... that is beyond me, I'm afraid, perhaps to my ethical turpitude. Best of luck and skill to you
@@crowboggs Thank you for the explanation; your previous post is much clearer when I read it again. It reminds me of Kierkegaard's "knight of renunciation". _See_ his _Fear and Trembling_ .
As for _poiesis_ , I will attempt a clarification. I think you are correct in your example that dancing in the dark still has dancing as a means to joy, etc., as an end. That the end is direct, immediate, and unintended does not change this. Unintended results are still results, and though they were not the purpose for which the act was performed, this does not make the act _poiesis_ because there might have been another purpose for the act in the mind of the doer, whether realized or not, making it _techne_ . What is done is still done because it is good, in the case of _poiesis_ (as with all action, I suppose), but in the case of immediate joy or understanding, even if these are intended, they are still something additional to the act itself, as you rightly point out. The difficulty comes, I think, in imagining dancing in the dark (or whatever) as _intrinsically_ or _inherently good_ , as good no matter what else comes of it (and here perhaps we might need a better example; none comes to mind, unfortunately), and done without intention of any result, only the intent to act because the action itself is thought to be good. In the case of _poiesis_ , the act and its end are one.
Your difficulty might arise, following MacIntyre, in the problem of typically modern subjectivity. The subjectivity of specifically modern values (i.e., th ideas that values are relative, that everyone has their own tastes that are beyond criticism, there is no court of final appeal on them, etc.) divorces values from facts. See Hume's _Treatise_ , pt. III, for an early expression of this, called the "is/ought fallacy". For the ancients, again following MacIntyre and most natural law theorists (whom Hume was attacking in the 18th century), there was such a consensus around morals that what we call values were not regarded as subjective but objective. They were things upon which unquestioning, unanimous agreement could be had, just as we can still reasonably agree on facts through empiricism. From the idea that values were objective, it is a short step to the idea that some acts are intrinsically good, others intrinsically bad, and perhaps others neither one nor the other, but this requires some imagination for us moderns.
Is it a kind of weltschmerz, admission of one's lack of resources to meet the onslaughts, some bitter pill to swallow, grin -and -bear- it impasse, the mind assuming the Tarentinian boulder stand when you are buffeted all around, your mind quartered by waves of misfortune yet like the very same spent waves which die and rest calm ?
It's called "overthink" for a reason.
If you do not value thinking and questioning for their own sakes, you should steer clear of philosophical discussions.
expecting the overthrow of power and instead perceiving self sacrifice
also sounds a lot like the story of Onesimus
In psychological terms, what Prof. Anderson is doing in the latter half of the talk is ego-alienating her expectations, such that she does not see them as actions she chooses, but as forces that come upon her from beyond. This entails a shrinkage of the self, a pulling inward of the boundary between system and environment.
I think that @leenadbouk1297 has a point in that the discussion in the video implicitly centered around instrumental reasoning, i.e., that the aphorism provides a better _qua_ more effective way of skinning a cat. This view implicitly downplays social issues, which grouse at the instrumental aporoach. Habermas, for instance, sees this as endemic of Western thought, and advocates for a different form of thinking, one specifically adapted to social action.
(edited for spelling). (edited again to change "gruff" to "grouse") (edited for spelling (again))
Madam can we locate peace in our body just like our organs
🙏wu wei
Someone heard of the Dao? :)
stay tuned for an upcoming video in this aphorism series :)
As with most ancient Greek names, the accent apparently falls on the antipenult. So, it's eh-PIC-tee-tus.
I don't enjoy this pop psych approach to 'expectations' and using it's accompanying language ie. 'frustration' to talk about most situations. It's used a lot in dating culture and in my opinion moving away from that vocabulary and even this acceptance framework offered by stoics makes conversations move in a more creative and self-conscious way rather than returning to tired tropes of what happens with the values we want to set down as boundaries, which are often labeled under the misnoper of 'expectations.'
Di Indonesia sayang diperkenalkan stoic oleh om ua-cam.com/video/ylgO641ug4I/v-deo.htmlsi=7YBjFxvZYklGHmZZ
he accepted in some way the legitimacy of overseers?
Perhaps it's unfair, but I perceive it as a rather masculine life philosophy, appealing to a particularly armoured sensibility. I'm defining the masculine in a gendered, rather than a biological sense, though I also find a degree of overlap between the two. Just haven't noticed many women espousing modern-day Stoicism. The paradoxical danger is that of rationalist acceptance becoming a form of denial which cuts us off from valuable sources of information. It has something of "grim and bear it". Pun intended.
I've heard Stoicism described as a warrior ethic, and this seems right with the "even fear of death will not control me" aspect of it. Yes, emotions are downplayed in Stoicism, and this is a masculine trait. I imagine it to be due to the fact that war, being traditionally a man's business (though Plato argued for allowing women who wished it to fight in war), has also led to men being saddled with the task of trying to avoid war through routinization and invention of social customs. Max Weber points this out in _Economy and Society_ . Routinization is antithetical to charisma and emotionalism, and Stoicism seems to contribute to the "spirit of calculation" essential to rationalism and capitalism.
conspiracy theory without the "gods"
sounds like the beginnings of conspiracy theories