[Barbarossa] The Major Errors and Blunders - Or why Barbarossa Failed
Вставка
- Опубліковано 22 чер 2016
- Follow-up on my second video, well it took some time and you probably will realize why... This video will cover the major errors and blunders during the planning and execution of Operation Barbarossa. Ranging from Logistics, Diplomacy, Military Intelligence, down to even technical aspects.
»» GET OUR BOOK: Army Regulation Medium Panzer Company 1941 German/English - www.hdv470-7.com/
» HOW YOU CAN SUPPORT MILITARY HISTORY VISUALIZED «
(A) You can support my channel on Patreon: / mhv
(B) You can also buy "Spoils of War" (merchandise) in the online shop: www.redbubble.com/people/mhvi...
» SOCIAL MEDIA LINKS «
facebook: / milhistoryvisualized
twitter: / milhivisualized
tumblr: / militaryhistoryvisualized
Script & Further Information:
militaryhistoryvisualized.com/...
--Social Media--
facebook: / milhistoryvisualized
twitter: / milhivisualized
tumblr: / militaryhistoryvisualized
reddit: / militaryhistoryvis
SteamGroup: steamcommunity.com/groups/milh...
--Sources--
-Books & Articles-
Pahl, Magnus: Fremde Heere Ost
Förster, Jürgen: Der historische Ort des Unternehmens “Barbarossa”; in: Michalka, Wolfgang (Hrsg): Der Zweite Weltkrieg - Analyse, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz. S. 626-640
Wegner, Bernd: Hitlers zweiter Feldzug gegen die Sowjetunion. Strategische Grundlagen und historische Bedeutung”; in: Michalka, Wolfgang (Hrsg): Der Zweite Weltkrieg - Analyse, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz. S. 652-666
Martin, Bernd: Das deutsch-japanische Bündnis im Zweiten Weltkrieg; in: Michalka, Wolfgang (Hrsg): Der Zweite Weltkrieg - Analyse, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz. S. 120-137
Castano, Vincent: The Failure of Operation Barbarossa: Truth versus Fiction
Zaloga, Steven J. : KV-1 & 2 Heavy Tanks 1939-1945
David M. Glantz Jonathan M. House: When Titans Clashed - HOW THE RED ARMY STOPPED HITLER
Ueberschär, Gerd (Hrsg.): Hitlers Krieg im Osten
Müller-Hillebrand, Burkhart: Das Heer - Band 3 - 1941-1945
Kreidler, Eugen: Die Eisenbahnen im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Studien und Dokumente zur Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges
Glantz: The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay
-Websites & Links-
en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Franz_H...
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battles...
archive.org/stream/kriegstage...
--Credits & Special Thanks--
The Counter-Design is heavily inspired by Black ICE Mod for the game Hearts of Iron 3 by Paradox Interactive
forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/...
--Song---
Ethan Meixsell - Demilitarized Zone (the Irony :D)
UA-cam's ad policies are getting out of hand, thus sadly, I have to adapt my financial strategy if I want to continue this channel.
Please, support properly sourced Military History on Patreon! Every $ helps: patreon.com/mhv/
Military History Visualized have you done any videos on the Korean War, the one that followed ww2?
not yet, will definitely happen, but right now I probably will cover some other stuff, because my library is now quite extensive on various topics outside of the Korean war, but maybe I stumble across a great paper. My content process is actually extremely chaotic.
Military History Visualized would be perfect timing for it...considering current events. Understanding the Korean War, what led up to it, and how it's gone to present day. It's an incredibly important and forgotten war
UA-cam's ad policies are just the latest step in an Orwellian push by Google to further their own interests, and suppress those they consider dangerous or unsavory.
Thanks for all the videos man, I'm not too familiar with Patreon and I'm currently in college, but I'll look into what I would be able to donate :)
Explain what youtube is doing to impact your ad revenue?
I found an surprising fact buried in an appendix to a book on Barbarossa. It mentioned that the German Army in 1941 had about 1500 distinct types and models of transport trunks from 20 different countries. How in hell does any military maintain and repair that diversity of vehicles that are going to be in the field, breaking down continuously!? How can you train mechanics to work on so many different kinds of truck? How do you catalog and acquire all the needed replacement parts?
I spent the last year of my time in the US Army working in Class IX supply (repair and replacement parts supply) in an armored division and even with the blessedly limited number of vehicle types we had to support and the ridiculously large support units organic to the division, it was always a pain in the ass to keep our stuff rolling.
I imagine that a lot of the trucks the Wehrmacht started the operation with were driven into the ground and abandoned when the drivers and mechanics couldn't improvise ways to keep them working any more.
yeah, that is something covered in my recent video. Where I have numbers for one Panzer Division: ua-cam.com/video/K5Cgy6oiVY4/v-deo.html
Thanks for the link!
Yeah, I think a good military historian could write an interesting book solely about the logistics of Barbarossa. There HAD to have been some crazy, desperate improvisations and innovations to have kept it together as long as they did!
Agreed. I seem to recall reading that Paulus, a logistics specialist had suggested in writing that the army couldn't field enough troops to conquer the USSR, and couldn't properly supply an army the size they had 200km beyond the start-line rail-heads. Has anyone else read that? I can't remember where. I've read so much material over so many years, I cant always recall what author cited it.
THAT was a giant problem - thanks for pointing that out
The whole of Europe and even the USA worked on the Wehrmacht. I think there were no problems with spare parts. Moreover, the Germans are known for their practicality and scrupulous attitude.
funny, the length of the video is 19:44
best part it was unintentional
Illuminati Confirmed.
Kek wills it.
such a coincidence, that will create a butterfly effect... one coincidental length of a video will mean that a tsunami will happen in east asia in 2019.
Just one more second... Ah, a man can dream, a man can dream...
Having been a tank brigade logistics officer, I can tell you that I would have had a heart attack if I had been the German officer. At the planning stages of Barbarrosa. It was simply too big and too far to support 3 Army Groups in that weather and terrain of Russia.
Not to mention impossible communications
Jim Jones His generals were actually pretty dumb they never should have focused on Moscow. Also they could have NEVER made it to the Urals.
@@melvillesperryn9268 agreed.
@Jim Jones Germany's logistic insufficiency argues strongly for a strong, concentrated drive at Moscow, rather than an advance on a broad front. Taking Moscow would've split the rail network in half. They might have been able to seize the factories in Moscow before they could be moved to the Urals. Half of the Russian front would have had very limited access to Ural production. Also, this advance would be along the best transport routes into Russia, Germany would still have had to deal with the different gauges (perhaps they could have prepared suitable rolling stock?). The main problem was German arrogance and over-confidence: kick in the front door and Russia would collapse. The result is they never planned for their own known deficiencies. By the way, Hitler was more aware of the problems of raw material supply than his generals, who were all trained in a long tradition of fighting near their own borders so that logistics was less of a problem. Hence the plan to ship equipment back to Germany for repair, which presupposes excellent communications. The German generals never planned for a long war and their plans couldn't cope with one.
@@melvillesperryn9268 they needed the oil and food in the south. Just one army group south and the rest stays on the border
As I have often heard quoted, "an amateur studies tactics, an expert studies logistics."
and genius studies both?
seeing as he had a army bushwacking in his back yard for over ten years you'ed think he'd have burned the forests joisey, but hey he did win because Carthage had no idea how to run a war so...
well, the best plan is usless if your soldiers are hungry thusty and have no ammo + the plan is always the first how lies dead on the ground
an oversimplification, popular because it sounds clever. Only an idiot would think studying tactics is amateur, here's an idea, study both.
Bad tactics can lose battles, but bad logistics can lose wars.
I did my history thesis on the German invasion. The knowledge has really come a long way.
A lot of it comes back to arrogant German assumptions that the attack would be a walk over. You can't actually reach the Archangel - Volga - Astrakhan unless the invasion is largely unopposed beyond the frontier battles. Just get out your calipers and measure the average movement bounds of German units.
The baffling thing is the Germans actually knew a lot about basic conditions in the Soviet Union even if the detailed intelligence was poor. Your point about not interviewing officers who had worked with the Soviets in the Weimar period is telling. They probably thought they knew it all already.
They knew about the weather and they knew about the inadequate transport infrastructure.
They also knew about the unique rhythms of warfare in the East. Many senior officers had served on the Eastern front in WW1, which was a war of movement in harsh conditions.
They knew about Napoleon's campaign and its timeless lesson about the crucial importance of logistics and adapting to local conditions. Paulus, who was one of the planners, studied Napoleon's Moscow campaign as a hobby.
Yet they went ahead with few preparations to deal with these conditions and met essentially predictable disasters.
That’s what dopamine overload will do to you, especially if you’ve already had a few big victories before 1941.
*Arkhangelsk
The biggest disaster here is the millions of our people killed, even if many of them were soldiers, still it doesn't mean they all had a choice and a free will in the Soviet Union, they were young and many of them were not soldiers before the war.
@@KatyaLishch That hurts me the most. The Soviet commanders threw waves of young men to break the German defenses. The soviet commanders didnt seem to care about human life. In the end, the victory cost the soviets 27 million lives , 10.6 million were soldiers. The NKVD shot 300,000 soldiers who were trying to retreat. I hope the commanders who sent young men to their deaths are burning in hell.
@@KillerofWestoids Where did you get this 300,000 from? I thought it was mostly officers who actually disobeyed orders and around 13,000.
Refreshing to see videos that are fact based rather than emotional and ideological on WW2 topics.
Barberossa was fantasy.
We couldn't be conquered, we couldn't be defeated.
Except you were in the Firsy World War.
Not exactly, the Russians failed to invade Germany but Germany never attempted an invasion of Russia during WW1 and for good reason.... although Barbarosa was initially successful until Hitler derailed it with his ego and hatred of Stalin
Operation Barberossa was guaranteed to fail.
You can't blame Hitler.
SgtMoss
There was no need invade Russia because the Russian army was utterly shattered. It was combat ineffective by that point and the men needed to occupy it were better used in the west.
Yeah that final conclusion was spot on. Even to this day survivors of the operation Barbarossa still claim it was the winter that won the war and this isn't just the veterans who think this. While winter did play a significant part it just quickened the Germany's inevitable defeat. Besieged by multiple fronts they just didn't have the logistical capability, resources or the manpower to achieve victory at that point.
Hitting the supply lines has always been the easiest, and most effective, way to defeat an enemy force. They are never as strong as the front line, so as the enemy pushes in, you circle around and cut the supply lines. By the time the front line realizes what has happened, they are already fuc*ed.
The minute the US entered the war it was over for the axis.
correction-U.S. entered the war in Europe BECAUSE and WHEN it was over for the axis,in fear of Soviet Union beating them to the spoils.And even then their performance had left much to be desired.
mazanakaUA
No, the outcome of the war was not certain at all until we entered the war. Even then it wasn't until maybe 1942 that the germans were clearly on the offensive and didn't really have a chance at winning.
There was no substantial US military presence in Europe until 1944. Their substantial aid to USSR nothwistanding, the Nazis were losing badly way before USA really joined the European theatre.
It's refreshing to hear a serious analysis that rejects the idea that "Germany would've won if they'd taken Moscow in 1941." This view ignores the fact that reaching Moscow and taking Moscow were not the same thing (as Napoleon discovered), and that had the Germans tried, Stalingrad would've happened in Moscow, as it were.
People forget that USSR moved the capitol> Moscow wasn't the capitol during the first half of the war.
@@sillymesilly But Moscow was important in another way: many major roads and railroads all converged on Moscow. Look at any map of Russia during ww2 (even today), Moscow is at the very center of what looks like a giant spoked wheel. Given how so few usable roads there were, it's easy to understand why generals desired to take this hub.
Here is a map showing the Soviet railway system in 1941 users.tpg.com.au/adslbam9//Railways1941.png. As you can see, Moscow was indeed the major railway hub of the USSR, but there still stood a very dense network behind the capital. Take, for instance, the red-colored section of the Western Trans-Siberian which could effectively connect the Ural industrial area with the southern Soviet Fronts. Note the dense net of parallel tracks in the general area of Tambov and, in particular, directly to it's north.
Of significant interest is the generally poor rail support in the extended area where the battle of Stalingrad took place. This didn't prevent the Soviets from massing and supplying over 1.1 million men for the Uranus counter-offensive. The situation was even worse in the Caucasus, where the Soviets were down to 1 single-track railroad bordering the Caspian Sea plus the port of Baku to bring supplies to the 800,000 men of the Transcaucasus Front. Yet the Soviets succeeded in supplying them, albeit they were generally under-supplied compared to those of comparably large Fronts
Soviet centralized logistical system has reduced the effects of their bad infrastructure towards their logistics
Not exactly but it would have been a desaster for the Wehrmacht like Stalingrad.
funny that you say that, there is an Russian documentary about the war. they point out that the Germans waited with their attack on Moscow, that way the Russians rushed in the Siberian army of Zhukov, besides that. the Germans if they didn't siege Minsk and went straight for Moscow, they most likely would have overrun Russian defences. crippling their logistics, which overall would have made the siege on Leningrad even tougher.
I just finished reading Franz Halders biography and Guderians autobiography and after that I honestly wondered how Germany managed to come so far in the first place ...
could you elaborate a bit on that? (I only read Guderians but that was about 16+ years ago).
Halders Biography is written by his grand daughter. It is largely an attempt to wash Halders name clean and since he was a very facetted man and she is related to him I don't blame her.
It is worthwile in the sense that it goes to greath lenght to describe the culture of the high command of the Wehrmacht. It describes people like Beck, Brauchitsch and Halder as principled soldiers who think of themselves as tools for the political leadership. Since they were socialized in the Kaiserreich, they conceived the social order of the Reich as organically grown. To them the aristocracy was an outgrowth of the character of the German people, which legitimized them acting purely unpolitical.
The book let's Halder argue that since Nazi rule wasn't bound to tradition and acted completely irresponsible towards both Germans and Europeans those soldiers turned the acolytes of a death cult because they couldn't escape their social conditioning.
The author tries to describe Halder as a military visionary, close to the troops, responsible and ever critical of the Nazi regime. It has a short chapter on the "Komissarbefehl" and doesn't spend any time on the Einsatzgruppen. So it is heavily, and in my view irresponsibly biassed.
From halders letters to his wife and his diary the author quotes interesting things nontheless.
He quotes that Hitler strategically placed people like Keitel and Jodl in the OKW because he knew they basically adored him and would always support his plans. Hitler also continuosly undermined soldiers like Beck and Brauchitsch who he apparently brought close to nervous breakdown numerous times because he deemed them "too religious, politically unreliable". This atmosphere of distrust, according to Halder, was one of the reasons for a lacking unified strategy. He complains often about Hitler having no clue about grand theory but insisting that major resources be used to deal with what he thinks is important.
In this sense Halders biography tells a similar story as Guderians does. Hitler had no specific ideas but a specific ethos. He consistently eliminated or undermined people who didn't fit into those plans.
Guderian, who was fired by Hitler once as threatened his abdication another time, said that over time, Hitler made sure that everyone in the room was either 'hypnotized' by him or shut up. If he noticed somebody was strong willed or against him, he removed him from his post. Guderian also noticed that seasoned soldiers would criticize Hilter under 4 eyes but noone would do so in front of a group to not undermine his authority. So Hitler made sure that at least several people were in the room to prevent criticism from being uttered.
Guderians view on the war is mostly influenced by his relation to the Panzer troops. He clearly loves his men and his troops and he goes into great lenghts of Panzer production and theories of mobilized warfare.
He said that the strenght of the Russian tank forces was basically just guesswork. Guderian himself wrote a boot about the Russian tank armies and strategy and estimated the production of tanks Russia was able to achieve at 1300 per week in 1935 (I'm quoting from my memory, this might not be completely accurate.) He quotes Hitler is basically disregarding Guderians warnings, that the Russian were able to ouproduce the entire German tank industry in basically just one single factory, later admitting that it was a horrible mistake to him.
Guderian also mentions that Hitler strategially placed people to undermine the cohesion of the leadership of the Wehrmacht because he feared them as his only powerful political enemy. (Which, given the numerous attempts to stage a coup against him, was accurate.)
Something that must have hurt Guderian was Hitlers insistence to develop ever new and exotic tank models, weakening standardization of the production effort. He criticizes that Hitler basically changed his mind constantly about how tanks have to be prioritized. The experts favoured heavily armed and mobile tanks and Hitler agreed one day, just to change his mind the next day. This gave birth to the Tiger II and the Maus.
For some reason, I can't edit in paragraphs :(
thank you very much!
About Guderians prediction of Soviet tanks in his book, well that is funny, I read that he didn't even mention the Soviet Union... luckily, I got a copy of it: it is for motor vehicles and in percent: USA, England, France, Germany, Canada, Italy, "the rest" (übrige Länder)... so it seems Guderian was referring to book he didn't wrote ;) or maybe there were really two. My source: "Die Panzerwaffe - Ihre Entwicklung, Ihre Kampftaktik und ihre operativen Möglichkeiten bis zum Beginn des großdeutschen Freiheitskampfes" (which I think is the "war title" of "achtung Panzer" / the 2nd edition from 1943.)
In the part about Russia he assumes 10 000 tanks and 1200 armored cars.
Can you provide the names of the books. Currently trying to find good books to read on WW2. Specifically Soviet and German Generals.
Indeed! quite many still wrongly believe that, "...the mud and the winter stopped the Wermacht, not the Red Army!" ..another great video!
Your series is actually becoming quite an inspiration to me. I'm looking to go back to school to pursue degrees to teach History. Thank you. I ever get to the goal of classroom instruction, I will strongly consider your work as viable material, provided you permit it! :)
"Okay they took Moscow. Guess we tried, let's call it a day and surrender"
The Soviet high command according to Halder, probably
Jacopo Abbruscato . So you think that the entire Soviet Union and it’s government systems, it’s transportation systems and its civilian systems would remain calm and carry on despite the capital falling to defeat?
@@mattkierkegaard9403 Why would they surrender? They knew the Germans wanted to exterminate them.
@@mattkierkegaard9403 They would just make even more propoganda about needing to fight on. Grate power totalitarian states are uncapitulatable they will fight to the end.
@@ReachForTheSky Yes They new they would not fare well under German rule and the blood of their russian serfs is expendable.
@Soaring Hawk Dont get me wrong, I do not support the boļševiks or the other side of that coin, but Im being a realist, the USSR would not capitulate if Moskva fell they would fight on.
This is one of the most detailed and far reaching accounts on the causes of the failure of Operation Barbarossa I ever come across in any media. Congratulations for the insight !
thank you!
I AGREE.
Just want you to know your English is better than many native speakers. A pleasure to listen to. Well done!
I just stumbled across your videos... And I am loving them!! Good work, and thank you for the information
It's funny because I just watched the first video and discovered your channel and this comes out now
*Licks Kanade's Chest* (o_O
Same xD
Same here! What a find! :)
Me too
G'day mate, Greetings from Australia , just wanted to say i appreciate all your work! You bring an element of limited,if not no bias at all to these videos. Keep up the good work,Danke!
"the pen is mightier than the sword!"
I love your videos. While these are extremely complex and faceted subjects I greatly appreciate your condensation to the essentials. Beautifully done, keep it up!
"Mr Stalin I don''t suppose you would reconsider that little treaty we had a couple of months back" Germans really had no choice but to win, or go on into oblivion.
Thank you for your analysis of Operation Barbarossa. Great job!
I have been studying WWII for over 40 years and this is an absolutely fantastic strategic analysis, overall. In my two Russian/Soviet history courses, I came to understand that (the Grand Duchy of) Moscow had always been the beating heart and mind of the Russian/Soviet empires. When planning Barbarossa in light of the recent conquest of France and the Low Countries, the OKW should have considered the enormous scale. Driving from the Polish partition line to Moscow is more than double the distance of driving from Luxembourg to Dunkirk. The OKW and Hitler should then have opted for an "either-or" strategy: either take the flanks of St. Petersburg (Leningrad) and the Crimea OR drive to Moscow and defend the flanks. The AND strategy was absurd and ultimately doomed in a two-front war. Given Moscow's centrality to Russian strategic leadership, transportation (road, rail, and air) network, industrial production, communications, and culture, the generals were correct in targeting it for conquest in August/September. Hitler's political fears of another German economic collapse as in 1918 drove him to seek lebensraum, the Ukrainian wheat farms, and the Baku oil fields. Seizing St. Petersburg and the Crimea would also greatly isolate Russia's economy. But, the German generals were correct in targeting Moscow. If they had chosen the "Moscow first strategy", their flanks and supply lines would have been vulnerable to massed Soviet armies in 1941. Soviet generals were terrified of Stalin, so they mechanically implemented his directives of "attack always" as the Germans rolled east. The German Army's records indicate the Germans likely inflicted 20-to-1 casualties on these robotic, predictable Soviet attacks all through 1941. This meant securing the flanks should have been a feasible proposition, in line with pre-invasion assumptions about the great weaknesses of the Soviet Army.
I'm curious why the "rasputitsa - season of mud" seems a surprise to Germany in WWII after slogging through it SIX times during WWI. The "season of mud" shut down wheeled traffic each Spring thaw and Fall wet season in 1914 - 1917 also.
Don't rely too heavily on Glantz as he relies much too heavily on the extremely politicized records of the Soviet Army of the Great Patriotic War. Many of their strength and casualty numbers are clearly fantasies recorded to keep people from going in front of firing squads.
So glad I just discovered this channel! It is one of the best resources I have found on UA-cam.
"The German Army's records indicate the Germans likely inflicted 20-to-1 casualties on these robotic, predictable Soviet attacks all through 1941." TheWersum did not directly address this point by stating "Russians actually won the war." The central time period of my thesis above is 1941, not 1941 - 1945. I wholeheartedly believe that if Germany did not defeat the Soviet Union by end of 1941, or perhaps 1942, the weight of Soviet troops and industry, along with British, American, and other Allied contributions, made Germany's defeat inevitable.
The accounts of the fighting in 1941 that I have read repeat that: 1) Russian generals failed miserably against Finland in 1939 - 1940, so Stalin had many of them shot. 2) This followed the 1930's purge of the Soviet senior officers - making it clear that Stalin would have little fear of an attempted military coup d'etat 3) By June of 1941, any living Soviet general clearly understood that remaining alive meant doing what Stalin said - or else. In August 1941, Stalin issued Order Number 270 in desperation, making it a crime for Soviet officers to order a retreat anywhere under any circumstances. According to the many accounts I have read, if you combine the obedience of the Soviet generals, the elimination of the option to retreat, Soviet offensive doctrine as of 1941, and Germany's considerable advantages at the time (good radios, air superiority, active reconnaissance assets, recent battle experience from Poland, the Low Countries, France, and so on), then you get Soviet counterattacks that closely followed their script as spelled out in Soviet Army manuals for motorized warfare. When the Germans kept seeing the same sequence of operations over and over, they felt as if they were fighting against "robots". It also meant that they could optimize their responses, much like Wellington's sequence for countering the standard Napoleonic tactical sequences that Wellington developed in Spain from 1809 - 1814. It would be rather like playing against an AI opponent in a video game where the human player had learned the exact approach always taken by the AI opponent.
After the crisis point had passed with the German retreat from Moscow during the winter of 1941 - 1942, Stalin began to yield more and more control to generals like Zhukov, Rokossovsky, and Voroshilov as the war went on. These commanders eventually led the Red Army to the heart of Berlin using greatly improved tactics and weapons as compared to the desperate days of 1941. The Red Army of 1945 was far from "robotic" in its methods and means of waging front-level operations. Understand that the German soldiers always had immense respect for the hardy "Ivan" who was ready to die for the Motherland and glad to take some Fascists with him. It's just that "Ivan" was badly misused in 1941
Like Great Britain, the Soviet Empire is no more. For modern, patriotic Britons and Russians, the victory in WWII ("Great Patriotic War") is a touchpoint for when all was right with being at the head of the empire as it overcame Germany in a life-and-death struggle. Since then, the maladies of socialism and other sources of decline have made the present day version of each nation seem like shadows of their former selves. As a result, for modern, patriotic Britons and Russians, any criticism of how they waged that war is considered an attack on their sense of identity in the present.
There are similar dynamics in the USA as the nation has changed in so many ways since December 7, 1941.
As a Russian history and military history enthusiast and former practicing military intelligence officer, I don't feel like I have the luxury of defending military mistakes, no matter who has made or is making them. Tuning out change leads to a debacle like the Franco-British campaign against Germany in May - June 1940.
I agree with you that I have a pretty limited knowledge of the Eastern Front in WWII since: 1) virtually all of the participants did not speak or write in English 2) Operation Paperclip and the rapid embrace of West Germany allowed the losers to write most of the early histories while the other side's historians were quite constrained under Stalin. 3) Both the German and Soviet armies of WWII were waging war for dictators whose grip extended deep into propaganda and other forms of media.
However, let's look at population numbers. When Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, these were the populations (from Wikipedia) of the eventual combatants in the European Theater of Operations still fighting in 1944: Germany: 79 million Soviet Union: 169 million Great Britain: 50 million United States: 132 million This leaves out the many other nations that made contributions to both sides such as Hungary, Italy, and Romania on the Axis side and France, Poland, and the Baltic states on the Allied side. Total Germans in 1939: 79 million Total Allies (USSR, UK, and USA) in 1939: 351 million This means the Germans began WWII while outnumbered by the great powers at more than 4-to-1. Yet they came fairly close to victory over Great Britain and then the USSR, requiring nearly four years to defeat after rolling so deep into Russia that reconnaissance troops could see the spires of the Kremlin just four months after Operation Barbarossa began. Yes, Germany ultimately failed (thank you Jesus), but they provided material that serious military historians should examine for decades to come.
One more thing everyone should consider: military history is probably the least reliable history of all the areas of study. Most of it is written by "the winners," many of the eyewitnesses are dead and the survivors have all manner of emotional and other reasons for providing highly filtered versions of what happened. The Greeks essentially didn't try - dubbing the history of the Trojan War as a collection of legends and myths. We really shouldn't take "the facts" provided by military history all that seriously, but it is interwoven with national histories, national identities, and all manner of stories, books, movies, plays, and so on. Ultimately, it is a search for the meaning of a series of events that consumed millions of our fellow human beings. It is a constant reminder that all glory is fleeting and the grave awaits us all.
Like Great Britain, the Soviet Empire is no more. For modern, patriotic Britons and Russians, the victory in WWII ("Great Patriotic War") is a touchpoint for when all was right with being at the head of the empire as it overcame Germany in a life-and-death struggle. Since then, the maladies of socialism and other sources of decline have made the present day version of each nation seem like shadows of their former selves. As a result, for modern, patriotic Britons and Russians, any criticism of how they waged that war is considered an attack on their sense of identity in the present.
There are similar dynamics in the USA as the nation has changed in so many ways since December 7, 1941.
As a Russian history and military history enthusiast and former practicing military intelligence officer, I don't feel like I have the luxury of defending military mistakes, no matter who has made or is making them. Tuning out change leads to a debacle like the Franco-British campaign against Germany in May - June 1940.
I agree with you that I have a pretty limited knowledge of the Eastern Front in WWII since: 1) virtually all of the participants did not speak or write in English 2) Operation Paperclip and the rapid embrace of West Germany allowed the losers to write most of the early histories while the other side's historians were quite constrained under Stalin. 3) Both the German and Soviet armies of WWII were waging war for dictators whose grip extended deep into propaganda and other forms of media.
However, let's look at population numbers. When Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, these were the populations (from Wikipedia) of the eventual combatants in the European Theater of Operations still fighting in 1944: Germany: 79 million Soviet Union: 169 million Great Britain: 50 million United States: 132 million This leaves out the many other nations that made contributions to both sides such as Hungary, Italy, and Romania on the Axis side and France, Poland, and the Baltic states on the Allied side. Total Germans in 1939: 79 million Total Allies (USSR, UK, and USA) in 1939: 351 million This means the Germans began WWII while outnumbered by the great powers at more than 4-to-1. Yet they came fairly close to victory over Great Britain and then the USSR requiring nearly four years to defeat after rolling so deep into Russia that reconnaissance troops could see the spires of the Kremlin just four months after Operation Barbarossa began. Yes, Germany ultimately failed (thank you Jesus), but they provided material that serious military historians should examine for decades to come.
One more thing everyone should consider: military history is probably the least reliable history of all the areas of study. Most of it is written by "the winners," many of the eyewitnesses are dead and the survivors have all manner of emotional and other reasons for providing highly filtered versions of what happened. The Greeks essentially didn't try - dubbing the history of the Trojan War as a collection of legends and myths. We really shouldn't take "the facts" provided by military history all that seriously, but it is interwoven with national histories, national identities, and all manner of stories, books, movies, plays, and so on. Ultimately, it is a search for the meaning of a series of events that consumed millions of our fellow human beings. It is a constant reminder that all glory is fleeting and the grave awaits us all.
Another thing, that is important, in matter why Germany in 1941 was unstoppable and Russia was like Robots, and after 1943 was opposite, beside that Zukov, Rokossovsky and other brilliant generals start using German tactic and become unstoppable, was that Wehrmacht had several thousands of Panzers, but no fuel for them... While Russian Generals can do Blitzkrieg like Germans in his best days... Germany was in 1942 desperate for oil, and in war with two major economic powers with enormous industrial capabilities and with endless resources, and of course, with oil for their tanks...
I'm one of those who is skeptical of the idea that if the Germans who were teetering at the end of very long and very tenuous supply lines had somehow managed to seize and to hold Moscow in 1941 that alone guaranteed the defeat and the inevitable collapse of the Soviet system. It didn't work that way for Napoleon in 1812 because, just like the German forces in 1941, long before either the season of mud or the winter set in, the "mere" act of moving large forces for those great distances in inhospitable territory, and winning battles against a determined enemy was steadily depleting his army and limiting its striking power and its effectiveness.
I am a serious WWII historian. I have studied WWII for 32 years & I am very impressed with the person narrating these extraordinary videos. He not only discusses at length many aspects about WWII such as the supply & Logistics problems on the Eastern front, talking about the Russian railway structure & lack of German planning of rebuilding these railways therefore contributing to the cause of the German Army's death spiral, but he also discusses all of the major aspects of the war 100% accurately. For all you WWII buffs, have any of you seen the movie DOWNFALL??? The greatest & most accurate depiction of Hitler's last days in the bunker. The actor playing Hitler IS HITLER!!!! Fantastic movie & fantastic videos here :)
MHV, Thanks for the very well done and concise presentation on the inevitable failure of Barbarossa and the excellent visualizations used in the presentation!
thank you!
Just found this channel, I've binge watched ~2 hours of videos.
You produce great content, I very much enjoy how you can do deeper analysis of something without fully ignoring/disregarding more common/simplistic explanations.
+1 subscriber.
thank you! yeah, analysis is the fun part, the other fun part is to make it as accessible as possible. Welcome to the Channel!
I can't stop watching all your videos
Not sure how you crack out so many videos but keep up the great work. I appreciate your perspective especially as you have access and comprehension of sources I have never heard. You also have me hooked on Hearts of Iron.
These docs are all awesome, really informative and insightful, keep up the good work
Germany in late 1941 was like someone who had walked out of a bar with a friend, then suddenly turned on the friend and attacked the friend, achieving complete surprise! Then, WHAM! BAM! POW! WHAMBAMPOW! The German delivers six knockout punches in a row! Then the former friend says, "Huh?!!" And he is still standing.
And the German then realizes that he has made a fatal error.
Well the Germans and Russians both expected war with each other. It was just a question of who would double cross the other first.
Except Germany was fighting 2 other superpowers at the same time, constantly bombing german industries and cities. Nice try tho
Yeah, the Russians were like Rocky or Hulk Hogan. Taking an impossible beating early on, but then getting super motivated and even more impossibly shrugging it off and waging an unstoppable comeback.
@@IrishCarney No it wasn't like that at all. That is a Hollyweird fiction. In real life something went seriously wrong in Germany, and those SOBs started a war they couldn't possibly survive. From a now very distant perspective it looks insane, and may well have been. But some think things got out of control. The Germans had nothing. No strategic vision in their air force, no navy, no trucks, and no oil. Yet they used a horse army to started a war with half the globe. I'm not sure it went as planned for them. Or they were idiots one or the other.
@@duster0066 from trade with Soviet union Germany only had oil reserves up to late 41 so if they failed to knock the Soviet out of the war, the war is lost
These videos have superb graphic design that completely compliments the dialogue - the elements of periodic humor in graphics are also appealing - such as the sprung skull in the box as the graphic for the nasty surprise of Soviet KV heavy tanks.
as a longtime and faithful follower, i am time and again pleasantly surprised by the rewatch quality of these videos. excellent, incisive work as always.
your vids are way better than people who go on a rant about the what if or some silly idealogical crusade. Facts are great, and gives us the best picture.
I thought that was a particularly good and interesting presentation. Excellent stuff.
I am actually writing a term paper over this exact topic right now. I'm glad I found this video and was able to double check some of my research with what you presented, happy to say that our opinions matched up pretty well.
If if you think World War II historical facts involve opinions then good luck on your paper
Great video set... I completely relate with your practical and detailed review. I think most students in school would learn well from these videos. Interesting and to the point information.
Love the rationalism in your videos! Great job!
I'm not much of a military buff, but these videos are fascinating. And the narrator is funny and engaging. Good stuff
Don't forget that Germany brought 750,000 horses to carry supplies. Aside from the obvious better winter preparations, I wonder how Germany could've handled the monumental logistical demands better.
Great video! I'm starting to love this channel!
The Germans used large carts pulled by teams of horses. The large hard cart wheels and horses feet cut up the Russian roads. The Red army used horses and carts but the small peasants carts with one horse designed to weave between the trees in the forests on undamaged earth. The USA supplied the the USSR with 0.5 million tons of steel rails to rebuild the tracks together with 2k Russian gauge locomotives and tens of thousands of box cars and flat bed cars to replace the rail equipment destroyed by the Germans. The USA and Canada supplied the Red army with 600,000 trucks designed for the frozen north and deserts of North America. Germany did scour the occupied counties for every vehicle they could get but a small van designed for the well made roads of suburban France fell to bits carrying heavy munitions on the unmade roads of the eastern front
my grandmother in a small village in Bulgaria told stories about how friendly the German soldiers were to her, giving food and benches when they left.. And in contrast the communists who were raping and killing people, so her family had to hide in their house. And they also killed they mayor of the village and left his body in the town square as an example..
Germany should've won
Very honestly, this is the best short study on the failure of Barbarossa that I've ever seen or read. Thanks so much! It reminds me of Stephen Fritz's "Ostkrieg" and is equally powerful.
20k Subscribers then, 200k now, nearly a year later.
Thats what i call solid growth, a factor of 10.
Glückwunsch.
Thank you for the much valued information
a well-done presentation. there is so much myth about WWII. it is good to see some properly thought out ideas on the subject
I've just come across these videos, absolutely fascinating. Thank you
Love your channel! Keep these great educational videos coming.
I love these videos so much. And the best bit is how he always says furdermore all the time.
Its hard to interchange German/English nuance and inflection. I have a limited experience in this and can't imagine going any deeper.
You forgot to mention important part about Soviet divisions: they tended to be a lot smaller than German ones. Soviet corps was comparable to German division.
And since Soviets lacked radios, smaller divisions propably made sense since it is somewhat easier to command them. And red army did have enough officers, they only lacked senior officers who would be crucial for commanding divisions, corps, armies and army groups.
The detail you put into your vids is incredible. You actually lay out arguments based and buttressed w/facts!
thank you!
love your voice and history teaching. subbed :).
Germany first planned on attacking along the rail lines yet fail to plan on maintaining the trains and rails. While not a military logistics officer, I work with them frequently and this kind of thing they're always talking about. What are we going to use for the initial push? Where are our rail heads and are they compatible with our equipment? If we use local freight that's not compatible with ours, what's our solution for maintaining that. The soldier upfront has to be sustained during the long fight and not just the short thrust etc.
5:15 - I remember hearing that the Soviet trains used a different size for their tracks which slowed German logistics down quite a bit
Russian gauge (5ft) was there as a standard long before the Soviets come to a power. For an example, as a former part of the Empire Finland has the same gauge.
@@RustedCroaker because Finland used to be part of Russia. Europe minus Spain used the same Guage that USSR didn't use.
These video's are awesome keep up the great work I'm hooked!
thank you!
Wow. The levels of incompetent preparation and intelligence involved in Barbarossa were just horrible. Only just now getting into the meat of military history and still have a long way to go on learning the terminology and specifics, but I'm already loving the channel. You've earned yourself a subscriber, my friend. Keep up the great work.
Really good. I liked that you differentiated the Nazi ideological commitment to genocide as integral to their war effort rather than as a blunder. Although their commitment to genocide certainly degraded their war effort, the war wouldn't exist without their commitment to genocide, duh.
In other words, it was a feature, not a bug. Am I getting that right?
Germany, wasted and drunk af at 3pm : "Why dont we invade this country that literally spreads from the baltic to the pacific. Were back at christmas bois."
Fantastic presentation of facts. Thank you for creating this video!
Love this series, keep up the good work :)
I love this channel. Great work! I wrote an essay on this exact topic.
Back in the days I did International education in high school. We had to do final essay on topic of our choosing and I chose to write about the reasons of failure of German attack in 1941. My high school analysis was not as detailed and in depth as yours here. Most of my points were more or less similar to yours. I, however, argued that attack on Moscow instead of Kiev was at the very least a better option. After all it was the biggest city in Soviet Union with big manpower. Furthermore evacuation of Soviet industry took place mostly west of Moscow so it still held many factories and more importantly the biggest railway terminus in the whole country. I remember Soviet railway map and there was only one or two other railway lines that went to Leningrad other then that from Moscow.
But you made a valid point that Red Army exhausted itself in offensive around Smolensk. They would certainly be very hard to break on solid defence grounds around Moscow and would depleat German forces. I did not look this up when I wrote the essay but as I see it (and I am not military expert so this may be wrong) IV Panzer Army of HG 'Nord' was near Novgorod at that time. It would make perfect sense for them to attack Soviet flank near Moscow, but the terrain and infrastructure in this territory was very poor so it could just bog down...
yeah, the major railway lines could be an important factor, after all the Germans also didn't manage to cut off Leningrad completely. Would be interesting to have some expert in economics/logistics look at that matter.
By the way, I read somewhere that for the attack Germans gathered 500-600 thousand of cars and trucks not only German but also gathered from conquered nations. If this is true then it would also be a logistical nightmare in itself. How do you get spare parts for repair and tires to the front when you posses all this models from different countries (French, Czech, British)??
not sure about the number, but yeah, they took quite a lot and yeah, logistical nightmare.
The masses always try to make things simple. Your analysis, succeeds in not trying to make Barbarossa's failure simple. Barbarossa is far to complex.
A little tidbit of a war story. A Lodge Brother of mine was under Guderian's command during the invasion of France, but due to wounds and recuperation wound up in the Afrika Corps. He wound up happy to be captured by the British, instead of a Russian Front statistic.
I briefly misread "sadistic."
The reason media portrayes things like history but also science simple is, that the average idiot has no clie about the complexity and also no interest in knowing what's going on.
@@projectpitchfork860 thank you Captain Obvious. Spelling needs attention, too.
Thoughtful analysis as ever. Love the work mate
thank you!
Superb job on all of your videos. Thank you.
Hubris is what it boils down to.
An army which is only partially mechanised, in fact as little as 10 percent, simply cannot use campaigns in Western Europe as a paradigm for invading the USSR.
12:39 - The killing of civilians was - in the eyes of the Germans - a feature, not a bug.
just found your channel.Awesome work! Your videos are neutral, free of politics and you approach history with criticism. Very professional
Also, I subbed to your channel. I've watched like 10 - 15 of your videos so far and left many either serious comments or funny ones or funny comments to other people's comments. I know im about a year late to your channel, but I just never found these before.
Nice job! In my view, you hit the important points in flaws of Barbarossa. And what a price the Germans paid for them. Another great video, my friend.
thank you!
should it be funny that the video is 19:44 minutes long?
Why did I only find this channel now? This guy is great!
Thank you man...as usual very informative video
"dozen division" quote is used in HOI4 launch screen
The 3 major blunders of the German army in Russia during WWII according to me.
1. The constant shift of objectives during the entire war for instance the shifting of Panzer divisions during the opening face of Barbarossa although it lead to some stunning victories.
2. Personalizing the war. Stalingrad was not that important but Hitler could not just let it be so he committed the German army into an meat grinder that could have been avoided.
3. Hold your ground! Hitlers constant meddling and refusal to give his generals room to maneuver, the strength of the German army and it`s generals was it`s tactical and strategical superiority in mobile warfare and ability to regroup and counter attack at the best moment was denied them. Mansteins miracle is an example of what they could accomplish without Hitlers meddling.
Yes, German generals shown perfect tactical and strategical art at the begining of war. But the main problem was that Soviet generals learn German strategical art quickly. And Soviet General Stuff already demonstrated more advanced skills than German couterpart in 1943, 1944, 1045
+Дима Серов 1045 ;-)
I agree with all but point 2. Stalingrad was VERY important it was a city, that if conquered could have opened the transcaucases, an oil rich area, and southern russia, a enormous fertile piece of land
Jonath Martin Yes your point is true but what I meant by personalizing is Hitler did not care about strategy when it came to Stalingrad. German excellence was in open country not house to house fighting. He did not think resonable about the situation and wasted 300+ thousand well trained soldiers for nothing in an unwinnable situation. Even if only 2 out of 3 had been able to break out they could have made a decisive impact later. But we also have to give the Russians credit they used the situation to it`s full potential.
Renowned author Antony Beevor said Hitler's "Hold your ground" directive during the battle outside Moscow may actually have saved the German army's collapse, as it was close to exhaustion and dropped heavily in morale with winter, casualties and the sudden attack by fresh Siberian divisions.
Another great video! Well done!
Very cool channel. Nice to see well explained and accurate info.
Hitler chastised Guderian after reading his book "Achtung Panzer" where Guderian estimated the Russian tank strength to be on the order of 20,000 tanks.
what's the source on this? I forgot to take a look at the original, when I was at the library and got the reprint from the war. (And I move) Hence I can't check if the original had this number.
It has been a while,but I read it in Hiter Moves East by aurthor Paul Carrel I believe.A very good account of the war in Russia and case barbarrosa.Later in the war Hitler told Guderian "Had I known then that your numbers were right,I would have not started this war with Russia"
There is a short video clip on you-tube of a recorded conversation between Hitler and Field Marshal Mannerheim in the winter of 1942 where Hitler tells Mannerheim that up to that point the german army had already destroyed 35,000 soviet tanks thus far.
the problem is Paul Carell made up quite some stuff: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Carell
Yes,that could be true,though I have read from 3 different sources where Hitler told Guderian that he would have not started the war with russia had he known that Guderian's estimate of soviet tank numbers was correct.
I never thought German optimism would play a role.
It's oxymoronic, even-but I jest
For me the most interesting part of the war in Europe is Barbarossa. So much to learn and ponder.
Wonderful video.
this channel have really opened my eyes to how doomed the axis was from the start
Love your videos!
One question: If you were to add to the list of errors, would you include Hitler's frequent and drastic changes in strategy that necessitated numerous reorganizations of units and large formations moving hundreds of miles to enact those changes?
thx, yes. I think it is indirectly mentioned by changing the focus all the time. His "we gonna win" to "all doom and gloom" behavior had major impacts, see also the Dunkirk decision.
Can I suggest you, to look some documentaries about fuel crises in Germany before and during ww2? After you take the oil, as a primary resource and his desperate shortage in not just Wehrmacht, but Germany at whole, you will change the opinion of Hitler from Idiot, to military genius in second... All his orders will make perfect sense...
Lol, I love the metaphor you use to describe 💩itler and his Generals... lol, As a fellow Historian ( I’m not a Military Historian ) you’re Teaching technic is perfect for the person who simply just wants to learn the the basics & get to right too the point of Operation Barbarossa during WWII without getting into all the minutia... Great job, Keep up the good work!
Thank you so much, especially coming from yourself, you Rock Out! It REALLY means a lot to me, and I'm sure 100’s more! I really do appreciate it...🤘
Love your videos man, keep it up 🇩🇪👍🏽
I'm a military historian myself. Both of my Grandfathers fought for Canada. One was in the RCAF and hunted U-Boats from Gander covering the convoys out of Halifax heading into Arctic waters. He went onto DH-98's the greatest Allied aircraft of the war in Fighter Command to go to Japan.
My other Grandfather fought in Italy and the Battle of the Scheldt. He was decorated by the King.
My 1'st cousin's Grandfather was captured at Stalingrad and was marched to Siberia. He survived 13 years in the Gulag system and was released in 1955. He walked 3000 km to Turkey with no food or clean water. He trapped crows to survive.
There is much more to my cousins family story about the war but I will leave it there.
Thanks for your very good vids.
another good book on Russian T0&E is red army handbook 1939-1945, by Steven j. Zaloga and leland s. ness.
whats nice about it, its shows how tank/infantry and artillery division changed thought out the war. its very interesting to see how much they learned thought out the war and how they revamped there t0&e from 1941 to 1945 and how the changing situation influence the TO&E. anyway i think its something anybody should look at.
nice one, didn't know of that, but for TO&E of the Red Army, I actually have probably one of the best sources out there: Sharps 9 Volumes on the OOB. But I guess Zaloga offers a lot of other information that is just mentioned briefly by sharp.
During my time in the Navy it was drummed into my head Proper Prior Planning Prevents Piss Poor Performance! It's obvious Germany did not heed this advice.
that and arrogant leadership that forgot the first principle....
IF IT SEEMS TO GOOD TO BE TRUE -IT PROBABLY IS.
I love your clever icons. Thanks.
Great well researched videos m8
This video is basically, “Why Germany lost WWII”
Not his fault
the moment you do Germany versus Russia pretty much becomes that
it was the defining moment of ww2
Russian roads alone can defeat any army.
But Why the roads can't defeat Russian arny? :-) Or maybe "bad road myth" or "deadly frost myth" is just excuse of loosers?
That was a joke comrade. Besides my grandpa was in the Red Army during WWII. And the roads in Russia are indeed bad. Don't get so offended. :o)
The Russian strategy is to keep many of their facilities in a state that Western militaries would find totally unacceptable. The runways of Russian airbases, for example, are often overgrown with vegetation. This is because Russian military equipment can handle it, but Western-built equipment, with it's much tighter engineering standards, cannot. This means that a Western invasion force would not be able to immediately use captured airbases to extend their airpower, but would instead have to spend weeks defoliating those airbases, or building their own. Either one would result in a loss of momentum that could then be used by the Russians in an enveloping counterattack.
Dima, militarily speaking, this area denial strategy is a GOOD thing, and no more so than in a country the size of Russia.
lol I beg to disagree..italians used the same "tactic" about shitty infrastructure..it didnt work.
Russia today is not half as difficult a place to invade. For one thing Russians are no longer the tough patriotic men they were back then. Now they are spoiled and rich like the rest of the first world countries. Also technology has passed the point where cold weather can win you a war.
Excellent history lesson. Thank you!
We are Patreons. Keep up the great work.
Ahh the oversimplification of history is rampant these days. Thank you sir for making this video and trying to shed a more realistic light on the history of this time period. I cant tell you how infuriated I get when i speak with people at length on this topic and they merely default to the traditional belief of the German advance was halted by a soviet winter. End of discussion. Clearly, as with most things in history, multiple factors were in play. And the few you touched upon will hopefully set the record straight. Let us hope that as we near the centenary of this conflict we can still try to retain the most accurate of information.
All you need to say is ' Yelena Salient'. That should work..
Another great video! Thank you.
Comments:
1. "Germany First" was only possible after the decisive naval victory against the Japanese at Midway making Japanese advances near impossible. So it was as such the operational situation that made a grand Western strategy possible, and the ability to coordinate Grand Strategy between Germany and Japan was about as possible as coordination between the West and the USSR. And as the Japanese and Germany did not really have shared common goals, but similar national goals, then shared grand strategy does not really seem relevant. Italy and Germany were also direct competitors for power and influence in Europe, so it makes little sense for Italy to accept German lead in an alliance although that still was the de facto situation.
2. I think Hitler's point about looking back to Napoleon was relevant in designing the strategy. Moscow might have been the railway centre of Russia, but the Russians had no problem building new railways, and they moved their industry east. Just as in 1812 taking Moscow would just have been another random city, and the Russians would have fought on. Cities did not matter as land war in Russia was more like naval war. The territory was only a logistical problem, you needed to destroy the army in the field. This is why Kiev became a relevant early goal, as it was a focus point for the massive Ukrainian pocket to trap the Soviet Army and give the Germans a fighting chance in terms of numbers (that might not have been the intel they had, but that is how the reality was).
3. From my perspective Barbarossa was an unavoidable operation (Generalplan Ost), at the best time (Russian purge and T34s just starting to get to front line units - Germany would not have improved faster than the Russians), with the best strategy taking all factors into account. That the Polish resistance could destroy the German winter uniform storage was a major problem, but fighting a longer was not (as far as I know) completely off the table. The strategy of a short campaign was logical, as you could not plan for all the events to come. As an example Demyansk changed doctrine for both sides. Something that lead directly to the failure at Stalingrad.
4. The core failure might have been the obsession with territory (I know the resources were needed, but from a military perspective). The Germans would have benefited from being able to fall back in certain areas in order to bate the Russians into narrow advances, which for the Germans would make Hannibal-style encirclements possible (although this style of mind-game military thinking did not gain wide popularity in Western military circles until after the war). The fact that the Russian could decide when to defend and when to slowly push on broad fronts lead to a situation, where the Germans may have had the initiative, but the never truly controlled the conditions for battle. I know that nazi ideology would never accept strategical retreats, but in order to fight in Russia you need flexibility, and ideology did not give either side a fair chance to conduct optimal military operations. But then again war has always been the "continuation of policy with other means"...
Germany needed food, oil, steel and aluminium for a pro-longed war, and just sitting and doing nothing would give allies the upper hand as they outproduce Germany.
And falling back and making the front shorter would have saved up German troops for other uses, but on the other hand would the enemy be able to do the same, so no real advantages would have been gained by falling back.
During the first months alone of Operation Barbarossa did the German army crush over 150 Russian Divisions, and yet had intellligence observed that the Russians did possess atleast 150 more Divisions. So the decision to take Southern Russia instead of Moscow did make sense, since crushing the industrial war potential of an enemy could have brought the Russians to their knees just as in World War 1.
It would also provide Germany with raw materials, industrial capacity, food, territory to launch bombers on the Ural mountains, crushing the Black Sea Fleet and thereby securing the Black Sea chrome trade with Turkey... as well as bringing in Political Presitige and threatening the middle east with German troops, air attacks and support for rebel groups.
You are completely missing my point. I am talking about operational and tactical withdrawals to bring the Soviets out of defensive positions, and make it even harder for the Soviets to maintain order. With such deceptive operations, then it would be easier for the Germans to fake future advances and making it even harder for the Russians to trust their intel. about a coming decisive battle at Kursk. In the long run this played into Soviet hand, as German operations to a degree became predictable, and was why the Soviets could keep improving, while the Germans lost more and more initiative. The lack of flexibility hurt both the Soviets and the Germans, but the Soviets could take more losses, so in the long run it was pyrrhic victories for Germany.
It was a problem that territory and resources needed to be conquered, but it was also a problem that there was a lack of mind games from the German forces, when they still completely could control, when and how to fight.
Of course not only the practical reasoning, but also the post-WWI mindset, nazi ideology, earlier successes in the West, doctrine, schooling etc. made this logically impossible, but there was a reason for mentioning Hannibal in this. A lot of lessons could theoretically have been learned from him and his alpine elephants (both on what to do, and not to do) that would have given the Germans a lot more advantages at all levels.
There is no simple one solution, best solution, or final solution that could have solved everything, but it is often a problem with WWII history that people look for one. Germany needed to win in the East and that is really the only thing that mattered, as winning in the East would bring the most important resource for Germany to the Western Front in time for an allied invasion: loyal German manpower.
+nattygsbord
Bombing the Urals? Germany had no bombers capable of reaching the Urals and that's exactly why Stalin moved his industry out of harms way.
The book "Ostront" by Charles Winchester mentions German bombing raids on Russian industries in the Ural mountains right before the Stalingrad battle took place. When that battle begun, the airforce had to change their focus for ground support for the troops for obvious reasons.
The most interesting plan the Germans had for attacking Russian industry was attacking its power plants, Operation Eisenhammer, but it was never carried out.
Thank you, much appreciated.
Your Channel is a gold mine
Regarding your research showing the difficulties dealing with the French tanks and the surprise of the KV-1 and T-34, I recall reading that, prior to the war, Russians who had been invited to view some German wargames were shown the German top-of-the-line tanks. The Russians were very upset because they felt certain that the Germans were hiding their most advanced tanks. The Germans were perplexed by the Russian attitude for they'd shown them their best equipment.
+SuperShaihulud do you have a source for this? One of my professor told me something similar, so I assume it is true, but I never read it. Which means I won't use it in my videos.
I'm very sorry but it has probably been 30 or 40 years since I read that and a thousand books and articles past. It's just one of those little factoids that stuck in my memory.
As a native speaker I'd like to ask you how you interpret von Schlieffen's words on his deathbed. Was he saying ONLY make the right wing strong and disregard the left/center? Or just a simple admonition to remember to make the right strong? I've wondered if he had some premonition that his original plan would be watered down, as actually happened.
I know nearly to nothing of Schlieffen, hence my interpretation would be pretty worthless. Also "native" is quite relative more than a century.
Ok. But your research and videos are wonderful displays of your insights, just the same.
Regarding 'native speaker', I was asking if the language he used was open to interpretation, or misinterpretation. For example your opening sentence in the last post, "I know nearly to nothing" is understandable but a native English speaker would say 'I know NEXT to nothing'.. I know only what a English speaker has translated of von Schlieffen's words, reputedly "Only keep the right strong!'
I believe von Bock was right about an early push against Moscow. They started way to late and thus lost the initiative that their armored divisions gave them at that time. These were halted and used for the big encirclement operations. Huge mistake according to von Bock:
Hoth's army advanced so quickly that Bock immediately contacted Walter von Brauchitsch, requesting the bypassing of Minsk in favor of attacking toward Vitebsk so that a drive could be made for Moscow. Initially, the change in plan was accepted but it was soon overruled by Hitler, who favored the encirclement and destruction of the large Soviet armies near Minsk. Bock wrote in his diary:
"The envelopment of Minsk is not decisive. Besides, I am sure that the enemy expects us to attack Minsk, the next natural objective, and will concentrate defense forces there."
Differences between Bock's strategic intent and the intent of High Command repeatedly surfaced. Bock continued to favor a direct drive toward Moscow, bypassing Soviet armies and leaving them to be destroyed by infantry, which advanced on foot well behind tank columns. Bock argued that if encirclement were truly necessary then instead of diverting his tanks north and south to encircle and destroy smaller Soviet armies, a larger encirclement should be made eastward toward the Dvina-Dnieper River basins.
Hitler decided against this plan, and insisted that the pockets containing Soviet armies must be destroyed before advancing deeper into Russia. Bock, enraged by this decision, was quoted as saying: "We are permitting our greatest chance of success to escape us by this restriction placed on our armor!"
"All along, I demanded of Army High Command the authority to strike down the enemy when he was wobbling. We could have finished the enemy last summer. We could have destroyed him completely. Last August, the road to Moscow was open; we could have entered the Bolshevik capital in triumph and in summery weather. The high military leadership of the Fatherland made a terrible mistake when it forced my army group to adopt a position of defense last August. Now all of us are paying for that mistake"
Somarik Green . When Napoleon attacked Russia the Russian capital was Saint Petersburg, not Moscow. So your comparison is misplaced.
Great Video, keep the good work.
A very interesting video indeed. It has opened my eyes about this campaign, which along with most people, I thought was lost due to weather and logistics. Clearly there were other reasons too. Many thanks for this information. Vielen dank
thank you!
You should make a video about soviet blunders before and during Barbarossa. Stalin made sure for germans to have a good shot at winning. From command purges to Kiev encirclement.
saratov99 being Russian I heard so many times from the old people - the main Stalin mistake was not attacking German armies, when they concentrated at the soviet border in obvious preparation... Imaging on Jun 21 hundreds of Soviet bombers dropping bombs on railway stations full of German vehicles, ammunition, fuel, tanks, and on airfields with standing planes (reverse of what happened to soviet army on Jun 22). 😿 I would be happy to exchange blame of actually starting war for couple million of young soviet lads not being killed...
From the diary of Generaloberst
Franz Halder (the chief of staff of the Army High Command (OKH) in Nazi Germany from 1938 until September 1942):
*3 July 1941. 12th Day.*
...It is thus probably no overstatement to say that the Russian Campaign
has been won in the space of two weeks. Of course, this does not yet mean that it is closed. The sheer geographical vastness of the country and the stubbornness of the resistance, which is carried on with all means, will claim our efforts for many more weeks to some.
*11 August 1941. 51st Day.*
The whole situation makes it increasingly plain that we have underestimated the Russian Colossus, who consistently prepared for war with that utterly ruthless determination so characteristic of totalitarian States. This applies to organizational and economic resources, as well as the communications system and, most of all, to the strictly military potential. At the outset of the war we reckoned with about 200 enemy Divisions. Now we have already counted 360. Those Divisions indeed are not armed and equipped according to our standards, and their tactical leadership is often poor. But there they are, and if we smash a dozen of them, the Russians simply put up another dozen. The time factor favors them, as they are near their own resources, while we are moving farther and farther away from ours.
And so our troops, sprawled over an immense frontline, without any depth, are subjected to the incessant attacks of the enemy. Sometimes those are successful, because too many gaps must be left open in these enormous spaces.
Thank you, that was excellent!
really interesting
may I add that had Germany fully mobilised in dec 40, it might have had some logistical depth and larger reserves
thanks for your efforts