I heard a story that Montgomery had a meeting with Churchill and the King. After Montgomery had left, Churchill remarked ‘I think he’s after my job’. ‘Thank God’, replied the King, ‘I thought he was after mine!’
I heard that after 28th May1940 when Belgium surrendered, Montgomery realised and there was now a 20 mile gap in the allied lines. Under Gort's direction he ordered the 3rd Division to march 20 miles overnight and form up as part of the defensive line in the eastern sector of the rapidly forming Dunkirk pocket. This action made a significant contribution to the defences at Dunkirk.
@@lyndoncmp5751 From memory, I think Alanbrooke noted that probably, of the BEF, only Montgomery could have achieved the night march feat. Also, that Alanbrooke saw with his own eyes, in France in 1940, that Montgomery (and Alexander), could be trusted in extremely trying circumstances. If any American half head comes on here trying to dispute this, I will trawl through both volumes of Alanbrooke's diaries and find the relevant bits.
From memory 🤣,ya you were posting since 2010 - at least - your words.Of course Google says 2013 - but what do they know? Alan Brooke is still drying channel water out of his eyes so he couldn't help monty with that German jackboot in his backside
I think Monty wasn't brilliant but at the same time he was someone that got the job done despite his ego. He was someone Britain needed most at the time. That's how I see him.
He got the job done because he had far more resources than his opponents. Give him and Rommel equal fighting forces and supplies, and he would've been absolutely crushed.
@@GeraltofRivia22 I have two things to say on that. First, the hole point of his built up was to have more fighting forces than Rommel. Second, even if he had the entire army/air force of the British empire behind him it would be useless if he couldn't use them effectively, as the battle of Singapore showed, better a lion leading an army of sheeps than a sheep leading an army of lions
@@NP3GA I agree, he's not a terrible commander, just mediocre and used outdated tactics that only worked because of the troop and supply disparity. The saddest part is he was the best the Brits had to offer.
@@GeraltofRivia22 "Give him and Rommel equal fighting forces and supplies, and he would've been absolutely crushed." The British had learned from their previous commanders' mistakes and were not going to fall for Rommels tactics....
@@NP3GA Would like to point out that while the British had superiority in the number of soldiers at Singapore, they were completely outnumbered in aircraft and had no tanks and virtually no anti-tank weaponry.
The Australian 9th division loved Montgomery because he was so much better than his predecessors. The Australian relationship with Auchinleck was particularly toxic. The 9th division suffered 20% of the casualties at el Alamein despite numbering 10% of the men there but still retained faith in Montgomery's plan. They never doubted that they would in the end win the battle.
@@jacqueslheureux9161 ah but do you know how he used his knowledge? In the first world war 72k UK soldiers in hospital for trench foot, 450k for VD. In preparation 1939 to 1940 he sent out a letter with dry wit to tell officers to find authorised brothels in France that were medically checked to reduce troop losses 😁. He acted like he loved his men but they were a resource not to be wasted. Patton was just a Russian, his troops lives meant nothing only his chase for glory, he would have walked his troops over mines to bring a victory a day nearer, very much Russian doctrine.
@@michaelbarmby9105 Patton took over in Tunisia from an appaling US general. And did advance. As a general it is difficult not to kill soldiers. Soldiers are walking dead per definition in wartime. Patton had a very succes rate and against the germans, that was no mean feet in 42-44.
"Was he as good or as bad as history books claim?" As with most any person in his position, the answer is yes. All generals are a complex and complicated mix of confidence, daring, caution, doubt and just about every other attribute you can think of. Successful generals are revered, unsuccessful ones are disparaged but very often their success or failure is down to luck or factors beyond their control. As they say, history is written by the victors and so is tarnished by an admiration for one's own side but the truth is often muddier than that. No one is ever as good nor as bad as they're made up to be. If you stepped forward and did the best you could with what you had and in the circumstances in which you found yourself, that's enough.
GOODWOOD did not get Montgomery fired as Ground Forces Commander. The plan had always been for Eisenhower to take that role himself after OVERLORD's conclusion because the preponderance of American troops deployed in comparison to the British/Commonwealth meant, politically, that it would be unacceptable for a British Officer to remain in that post. Saying that Monty was "fired" from this role implies that it was as a direct consequence of his actions while in command when in reality it was a decision made before the operation had even begun.
And when Eisenhower took over, the allied advance stalled and got next to nowhere for the next seven months, with even a retreat thrown in for good measure.
It's especially galling given that a quick look at the Overlord briefing, or even the bloody Wikipedia reference shows that the goal of all the operations around Caen WAS NOT to necessarily TAKE Caen, but to suck in the German armour and destroy them. The breakout was always going to be through St Lo: Operation Cobra. Why doesn't Monty get credit for Cobra?
It’s naive to believe that Bernard Montgomery positioned the British/Canadian troops solely to bring most of the German armour upon them leaving the Americans free to break through the German defences. Certainly he knew that the more open country would attract more armour as the terrain was more conducive to maneuver but it was also the more direct route out of Normandy and toward Paris. Montgomery envisioned the British taking Caen, utilizing their own armour, artillery and tactical air support to break through German lines while the Americans were diverted to the Cotentin Peninsula and the capture of the Port of Cherbourg. Unfortunately for Montgomery the German defences were too concentrated and he did not achieve his breakout, however, his efforts did allow the Americans to achieve their objectives on the Cotentin and subsequently break through the thinned out German lines opposing them. So yes Montgomery did contribute to the eventual breakout by engaging the majority of the German armour but that is not how he hoped or envisioned the Battle of Normandy would unfold.
@@Chiller11 It's not naive you only have to see the number of Divisions pulled into that area. Also this supports the argument as well ua-cam.com/video/t-0AxubQEWM/v-deo.html
I always thought Bill Slim was Britain's best general in World War II. And I never regarded Montgomery so much as a butcher, as overcautious because he was under political pressure not to lose too many troops - Britain was simply running out of manpower.
Montgomery was Britain's best general, and he proved it again and again in THE most important theatre the western allies fought. With all due respect to Slim, he didn't.
@@lyndoncmp5751 To be fair Bill Slim is a candidate for being the best, his campaign was fought and won in extremely rugged terrain, under supplied and outnumbered against a battle hardened enemy that was used to fighting in the Jungle. The circumstances of Slim were very demanding. Montgomery had a large army that was well equipped ( of course to his credit) and more resources.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Yeah that's the problem. Slim has always been underestimated because he fought in a forgotten - and in fact irrelevant - part of the war. But he managed to take a demoralised army, turn it round to defeat the Japanese. He had far more imagination than Montgomery IMO.
Bob Just because you are successful in a completely different theatre against a completely different enemy doesn't translate that you will be successful wherever you are. You can't be considered the best if you don't defeat the best. Again, with respect Slim didn't defeat the best. The Japanese in Burma certainly weren't. Overlord was imaginative, Market Garden was imaginative (and probably would have suceeded with different air decisions). I'll say again, Montgomery was the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. He proved it. 👍
@@lyndoncmp5751 Out of Army Group Centre, Army Group South, Army Group North, Army Group Africa, Army Group B, which would you class as the best German forces for performance during the war?
My great grandfather was part of the 8th in North Africa & helped plan the invasion of Sicily as one of 2 second in commands to field marshal Montgomery and was sent back to the uk as a colonel ( I’m assuming with Montgomery) to organise D day and the crossing of the Rhine and later got a OBE . I’ve got a few photos of him and Montgomery in the family album and from what my grandad says his dad had nothing but respect for Montgomery and says he was a military genius. Amazing video really helps me learn more about what my great grandad was apart of
My Grandad was a sapper in Monty's 8th Army. He held the highest respect for Monty as did all his peers. He told me so many stories that I have passed on to my daughter. And I have a picture of Monty next to my Grandad's framed in uniform photo.
A complicated man, was prone to charging lines affixed bayonets, but would be hesitant to spend the lives of his troops, and never finding a balance in between.
Absolutely false - Monty used up ALL of his men, especially his Indian troops like cannon fodder. Unlike Patton, he NEVER figured out how to do combined arms offensives and rarely made good use of tactical air power, primarily because he was such a martinette that he got into a personal feud with Air Marshal Coningham, the guy in charge of RAF tactical forces, and this feud was SO BAD that in his planning for Market Garden, Monty deliberately did not notify the various air groups of his plans until the day of the operation. As a result, Market Garden would be the ONLY Allied operation in Western Europe that would go WITHOUT air superiority or any tactical air support. Germany was able to carry out several bombing raids during Market Garden as a result. Had the advanced Allied forces had radio contact with tactical air groups and been able to call in air strikes in real time, as many of the US Army groups were already doing in France, Market Garden might have actually succeeded, despite all of its other flaws. That Monty was considered a success by the British is entirely because of just how piss poor the performance was of the entire establishment of British Generals prior to his selection. He was the fourth or fifth British general to be put in charge. The most promising British General that might have been far superior to Monty, General Gott, was assassinated by the Germans in a targeted air attack on his transport plane in Africa, right before he was supposed to take command (an American military attache with the British in Egypt was inadverdently leaking British plans to the Germans through his reports back to Washington, which the Germans intercepted). Monty's success can be attributed to one thing and one thing only - massive American military aid and support was arriving coincident with his appointment, which was enough by itself to overwhelm the German forces. You would have to be utterly incompetent to screw that advantage up, but Monty did his best to do just that with multiple poorly conceived offensive operations Coningham was a major pioneer in the development of tactical air support. After the war, he was asked by the Air Ministry to write his account of the war, and his account was apparently so harshly critical of Monty that his entire account was quietly buried and never saw the light of day. He died not long after in a transport airplane crash, and so hardly anybody knows who he is anymore.
Gandolph Greyhame Patton's Lorraine debacle was the worse allied failure of autumn 1944, after the Ardennes. He spent 4 months, nearly 55,000 casualties and still failed to achieve his goal of getting through the Siegfried Line. His handling of Metz was appalling. And all again a third rate German rabble of an army, and that's according to its own commander Balck.
Larry Blais, Drop in the bucket compared to the American lives Patton squandered in the Lorraine Hodges squandered in the Hurtgen Forest. And for what?
Monty's men loved him because he was much more frugal with their lives. In 1971 I met a meek and fragile looking man who was in Patton's army. He said to me "Patton was called old blood and guts and it was our blood and guts"
Monty was a stickler for physical fitness and training; not so much for uniforms---see his memo following the soldier, naked except for top hat, who was driving a truck and passed Monty, tipping his hat. ("Top hats will not be worn in the 8th Army...") He cared greatly for his men.
Montgomery had a lower casualty ratio while facing Germanys best. Patton had a high casualty ratio while facing Germanys worst. Even the German commander in the Lorraine, Hermann Balck said it was the worst army he ever took charge of. It still stopped Patton in the Lorraine inflicting 55,000 casualties on him, which was DOUBLE that of Montgomerys 21st Army Group casualties in autumn 1944 in the Netherlands and the Scheldt campaigns combined.
I've never really known what to make of Montgomery. He always struck me as the British equivalent of MacArthur. A bold, egotistical, personality who, while not incompetent, created the illusion of military brilliance with good PR and lot's of embellishment.
And masses of success. Montgomery was by some way the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander. Nobody did more to help win the ground war in the west than Bernard Montgomery.
Putting Macarthur anywhere near Monty's level would be generous at best. At least the latter could back up his gigantic ego and never screwed up as badly as Mr 'I shall return' over here.
@@901Sherman better than Monty who sent us to do the dangerous work while they get the glory🤣 at least MacArthur had sympathy but Monty is just another soulless Brit who is rotting 6ft with his Queen in hell
Bullcrap,Britain had much better officers - Monty was ass,he had 6 months to plan his Normandy Operations and ran it into the sand immediately.Getting stuck and not off the beach to the surrounding staging areas in quick fashion caused a logjam.When the berk finally did get men/materiel up and out then he got stuck at Caen for 43 days.Monty and MacArthur were one in the same - lying,lagging,braggarts who were shameless self promoters. Neither was essential or important to the Allied War effort,quite the opposite really
I lost all respect for him cause he did a tv interview where when someone asked about losing battles he just laughed and said he can't remember a time he ever lost. I found that beyond egotistical and disrespectful to the troops he screwed over during his garden operation
Montgomery's 21st Army Group supplied the Market Garden concept. ...... Eisenhower took time convincing. ...... All planning - and execution - of the airborne landings, was NOT in Montgomery's hands. ...... American pilots of transport aircraft were unable to fly 2 sorties in one day, so it was not possible to land at Arnhem in one day, greatly weakening the 6th Airborne plan for Arnhem. ...... Gavin and Browning at Nimegen went off into the flank, worrying about a nonexistent German 'threat', instead of securing the town and the bridge. ...... After a heroic river crossing by Gavin's paratroopers, the bridge was captured, and a small number of tanks were pushed across. ...... However, Nimegen was still not secure, and the supply route was at risk, so further advance had to wait. Had Monty been the land commander, able to put the operation into action sooner, before German lines stiffened, I think it had a very good chance of succeeding. ...... As it was, it came close.
I know you are sincere with your comment, but the myth that Market Garden and its failure was due to Monty needs to end. Yes, Monty was responsible for the idea, but as has been mentioned in the previous comment, planning and execution was not under his control. The American commanders Lietenant General Brereton (who scrapped British landing plans near the bridges and reduced flights to one a day, which delayed reinforcements) and Brigadier General Gavin (who did not capture Nijmegen Bridge on the first day, thus delaying XXX Corps by 36 hours) are more of the reason why it failed.
@@Historylover-ho6lg But his involvement in Market Garden was minimal. The reason why everybody thinks it failed because of him is because of post-war American propaganda intended to cover up American failures (like Col. Bonner Fellers etc.)
Anytime you hear something about Grant from long ago, there is a monster factor to keep in mind. Most military historians in the US back then came from the South. To put it simply, they were butthurt, and they propped up Lee's reputation while doing everything they could to trash Grant. If you look at more contemporary, neutral POV's, you can get a more realistic outlook. Just for the record, Grant openly wept about the casualty figures during the Virginia campaign in 1864-65, while he utterly hated the sight of blood because of his youth working at a butcher shop. The fact is, that campaign devolved into a WW1 style trench war that maybe only Napoleon himself could have figured out a far less bloody strategic victory, which by the way the Europeans should have seen that era coming from the Civil War.
The armies on Offense tend to sustain higher casualties then those on Defense, and while the Confederate army lacked the manpower to replace those killed or wounded, the Union had no such problems. So, in a sense, Grant could afford to look like a butcher as his strategy was to hold on with a bulldog's grip and never give Lee the chance for respite, to keep hitting him again and again. However, when you look at the numbers of men lost as opposed to those killed, Grant's ratio of Union losses to Confederates killed is light, or to be expected (around 18% killed, wounded, or missing), whilst his opponent Lee, whose numbers of Confederate losses, to Union soldiers killed is higher (somewhere between 22% and 25% killed at last tally, wounded, or missing) though those numbers may or may not have changed in today's count. If any one is to be called a "butcher" then it most assuredly is Robert E. Lee.
Most people forget that Montgomery was the most experienced of the Allied generals and played the key role in Normandy, which was needed to kick start the reconquest of France. He was cautious at times, he saw the slaughter of WW1 and didn't wish to see a repeat. He did get the job done, however. Unfortunately his personality traits often overshadowed his abilities as a commander.
An Aunt of mine used to drive U.K. generals to their many meetings around London during the War (WW2). She told me that she liked general Alexander "The best" and that "Monty" was O.K. but a "Little bit arrogant". She had to know London's streets as well as a cab driver but, in addition, during the Blitz, each morning, know where the bombed out streets were! "Time was of the essence on every journey apparently"! One of my family's heroes - she did her bit!
It's difficult to compare the skill of generals of different armies. Would he have won at El Alamein with an army equal to the Afrika korps, with its very same resources (just no more oil) and with a minority of German soldiers supported by Italians who, why not to say it, mostly were not willing to be there or even to fight? Would he have reached Belgium and the Netherlands with the same air support that the German army? It's very easy to overcome obstacles when you drive a steamroller.
So spot on. Monty was to me the right man at the right time in Africa. He was defiantly not a butcher and took very good care of his troops. Later in the war he seem to never adapt to a war that was evolving very quickly. He was also a jerk and wore on people.
Not a chance. The man was still using WW1 tactics and only achieved victories because of the overwhelming disparity in troops and supplies. Its rather sad that he was the best commander the Brits had during the war.
One thing that has to be taken into account: US Col. Bonner Fellers was handing over British intel to the Germans and Italians right through 1942. He was sending reports about the British back to America and including details on British positions, supplies, contingency plans, moral etc. Fellers was using a code which was known to be compromised and was unknowingly giving Rommel the best intel imagineable. He used these regular reports when planning his attacks. The information was so valuable that the Germans nicknamed Fellers "The Good Source". British operations were being undermined constantly and after losing several ships in Operation Harpoon, the British team at Ultra ascertained that Fellers was the leak. They got the US to remove him in July 1942. Up to that point, the British were fighting with both hands tied behind their back. Monty wasn't sure how much Rommel knew about British plans for El Alamein, which one reason why he showed extra caution.
@@GeraltofRivia22 ??? Look in an American that thinks highly of British forces but not so much there leadership but I will defend monty on this one. This is a first. The British, who often try to fight the war they are in like the last war they were in, were doing that in North africa again. The campaign vs the Italians was epic and very well done vs a poorly equipped and lead army. The Inter war years are a mess with new tech changing warfare at a very quick pace and some good doctrines and some poor one. America got the heavy 4 engine bomber right with the b-17 development in 1934. Brits in like 37. Germans cancelled there 4 engine bomber programs then got caught behind later. Look at submarines. Americans, British and Japanese sub doctrine was as fleet scouts and to attack war ships pre war. Meanwhile the germans said we think they work best as commerce raiders. It didnt take long before the Americans to adjust after seeing the Germans were right. The British figured it out late and the Japanese never really did. The Germans got massing tanks to create a breakthrough early in the war right. The British thought of fast tanks as more napoleonic Calvary used to chase fleeing enemies, screen movements, flak enemies. They were also still using ww1 defensive tactics. When the "desert fox", a man that never should have been able to do what he did if the British didn't keep making the same 2 mistakes time and time again. Rommel was hyped big time post war to make up for British poor leadership and the ability to change. First rimmed would send tanks on a fake attack then retreated.when the British tanks charged after the fleeing Germans, they were lead into anti tank traps. The other was ww1 defensive line structure that the Germans could mass a majority of there forces and firepower on 1 point of the British lines creating a breakthrough that then forced a British retreat before they got encircled. When monty got to north africa, he stopped the British from doing those things. Rommel also knew the British goings on through the German code breaking, lost that ability around this time.. Look both armies had gone back and forth across the desert. On the attack your lines of supply got very long and very demanding.on the retreat they got shorter and so eventually stopping attacks becomes easier. Monty wanted to make sure when he went forward that it was a one way trip and no chance rommel could counter attack by waiting til he had a huge stockpile of equipment, men and supplies..
As far as Caen goes, whether it was planned or not, the operation worked. German armour was tied down and sucked in, the Americans were able to fan out across North West France I believe?
Posted this in another thread, but it is relevant: The myth that Market Garden and its failure was due to Monty needs to end. Yes, Monty was responsible for the idea, but as has been mentioned in the previous comment, planning and execution was not under his control. The American commanders Lietenant General Brereton (who scrapped British landing plans near the bridges and reduced flights to one a day, which delayed reinforcements) and Brigadier General Gavin (who did not capture Nijmegen Bridge on the first day, thus delaying XXX Corps by 36 hours) are more of the reason why it failed.
Blaming the Canadians speaks volumes honestly, and personally he wasn’t the first choice for command in N Africa but he got the job done. Fabian strategy usually works if you can maintain its principles.
My father served with him and he said could be difficult , however he held him in the very highest regard. My farther was an officer the Ulster Rifles in Normandy and at Arnhem.
4:37: This friendly fire incident could make a nice video topic. 8:43: Makes you wonder how the Canadian, French, former Soviet states, Italian, Irish, Dutch, Belgian, and German historians think about all this.
Montgomery never threw away lives, he always tried to prevent casualties because he had fought in WWI and was almost killed; he was always conscious of casualties, which his why he is sometimes criticised for being cautious.
Check out his record in Ireland, he was a snotty little martinet who had his position because of his family and because of a class system . He succeeded in Africa because of the work of his predecessors and almost every other campaign was rescued by the Americans and Canadians.The only thing "Monty" was successful at was self promotion.
That’s a joke? You obviously have forgotten about the needless destruction of Caen and the slaughter of its remaining civilians at Montgomery’s hand. This bombing campaign provided the German troops with the perfect battlefield amongst the ruins where their uniforms melted into the colours of the rubble.
@@jfurl5900 'He succeeded in Africa because of the work of his predecessors and almost every other campaign was rescued by the Americans and Canadians.' When did hat happen?
My grandfather fought under Montgomery. He was in a number of major battles and was adamant that Montgomery save the lives of many soldiers. He stated that if Monty had decided to attack Hell, his soldiers would have grabbed buckets of water and follow him!
He did. He even saved the US 7th Armored Division st St Vith in the Bulge by ordering them to withdraw westwards instead of staying there to get surrounded. The commander of 7th Armored was most grateful for that.
from the horses ass you mean Lyndon changed her name she previously got so battered about.Monty apologized for suggesting he did anything but hold on to 3 bridges and a shoulder look it up.he in fact wanted to retreat. Lyndon's real name is Lucien Trueb - read *The Full Monty*
@@bigwoody4704 Go away Woody you are not wanted here You are too Anglophobic to be un- biased I am almost as bad as you but have still praised your lot when they merited it.
Monty was a Horse's ass. So was Patton. I do take note of Montgomery's resentment of Americans involvement in a European War. Winston would have not felt the same.
Montgomery resented a desk man with zero combat service (Eisenhower) taking over ground strategy just to appease the American public. I agree wit him. Sadly, the war dragged on for longer and with hundreds of thousands more casualties because of that decision.
This is the first I've heard of him described as a butcher- I thought his critics mostly thought of him as over-cautious and unwilling to commit troops in unplanned actions, due to Britain's comparatively small forces by 1944. I've also heard *from American sources like Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett no less* that his command of U.S. troops in the Bulge was actually quite tactful. Finally, the animosity between him and Patton was (so I hear) massively exaggerated just like everything else in the movie Patton. It seems to some sources they had differences, but were still quite chummy and could see each other as a cut above the average commander.
Montgomery refused to allow US 7th Armored Division to be cut off and surrounded at St Vith in the Bulge, for which its commander General Hasbrouck was very grateful.
Monty was knowingly wrong in many occasions, with D day he refused to push and let the yanks do the hard work, Market Garden he fucked up by not listening and cancel the operation. He was only accepted by Roosenveldt of political reasons and against the will of Eisenhower. North Africa all was already done, and was only a succes because of failing German logistics. He was a star in taking the honor from others.
BBC "The Second Battle of El Alamein was a turning point in the North African campaign. It ended the long fight for the Western Desert, and was the only great land battle won by the British and Commonwealth forces without direct American participation."
@@GeraltofRivia22 Patton reveled in the name his troops gave him.."Old Blood and Guts". The joke was on him, because they would mutter afterwards, his guts, our blood.....
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- every commander has mistakes and blunders. It's just that Montgomery really had nothing impressive to balance it out, unlike Patton.
One thing that this video skipped over were a couple of Montgomery's best moments: his command of 3rd Division during the retreat to Dunkirk and his suckering of Rommel into a bad defensive position at Homs. In the former, Montgomery did one better than Patton - he took his division out of line, marched 30 miles overland at night with no units covering his flank to take up blocking positions to replace the surrendering Belgium army. At Homs, he deliberately stopped well short of the port of Tripoli so that Rommel would build a defensive line in the open desert rather than in the hills near Tripoli. This enabled him to attack Rommel, rout him out of position and pursue him westwards past the port, capturing Tripoli intact. Also, the statement by Montgomery about American troops was actually a creation of the Germans, which they managed to get inserted into Allied news reporting. This falsification was later picked up by a number of people who despised Montgomery to use it against him. History shows Montgomery never said this, and in fact praised American troops for their fighting prowess during the Battle of the Bulge. He also wouldn't have given the US forces the role of breaking out of the Normandy bridgehead if he, as Land Forces Commander, didn't think the Americans could do it. That said, Montgomery's inner demons led him to take credit for things that he didn't do, to inflate his own victories, mistreat friends and colleagues after the war, and rewrite history in his memoirs to try and paint himself in a better light. Although this was a failing he shared with many German generals, because people could check the facts against Montgomery's writings, he made himself extremely unpopular with even his former friends. Overall, I would say that Montgomery was a good general, because unlike most of his contemporaries, he made the German forces dance to his tune most of the time. This is the mark of a good general. He saw how the British Army could defeat the Germans, and made it into a fighting force that could do just that. It may not have been the flashy, dashing advances that the Germans made, but it was extremely effective. And, like the advance of the British Army after El Alamein or after the breakout from Normandy (250 miles in 7 days), they could cover a lot of ground in a very short period of time given the right circumstances.
Montgomery even wrote this in his own diary, right after conferring with Patton in Sicily on July 28th 1943: "We had a great reception. The Americans are very easy to work with. I discussed plans for future operations with General Patton. Their troops are quite first class and I have a very great admiration for the way they fight". Montgomery never said or wrote a bad word about American troops.
Great Generals are made when the odds are stacked against them?? Monty always had superior forces and numbers on his side. Rommel still managed to hold back Monty's huguly superior forces at El Alamein, and allowed some of Rommel's forces to retreat all the way back to Tunisia. The war in North Africa would have dragged on for at least another few months, had the Americans not helped Monty flush out the last German resistance in Tunisia. Then the Battle of Normandy? The British D Day beach landings went according to plan. But the Battle of Normandy went on far longer than planned. Monty was looking like a pretty average Field Marshal. So he tried to save face by creating Operation Market Garden. What a disaster!!! The recon information there cost the lives of many British, American and Polish parabats. As well as POWs and wounded. After that? Besides the Battle of the Bulge, the Allied Generals chased back a weak and defeated German Army.
@@charlesknowles6301 That is wrong. In Belgium, Montgomery was outnumbered by the Germans during the retreat to Dunkirk, and yet pulled off a spectacular night move of 30 miles with an open flank to put his division into a blocking position next morning. He was also commander of the British forces at Dunkirk when Alan Brooke was recalled to England. So Montgomery oversaw some of the final days of the evacuation from Dunkirk. At Alam Halfa Montgomery was outnumbered by Rommel 5 divisions to 7. At Medinine Montgomery was outnumbered 3 divisions to the German's 5. He won both battles. And the Americans didn't bail out Montgomery in North Africa. In fact it was nearly the other way around. Also, you seem to overlook that in Normandy Montgomery was the Allied Land Forces Commander from June 6 until September 1, after the breakout. British forces under his command drove 300 miles in about a week from the River Seine to Antwerp. Hardly a plodding general. So I will have to disagree completely.
Nick Danger Cherbourg and Le Havre were cleared and were able to well supply the US armies for all their autumn 1944 failures such as the Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, Operation Queen, Alsace and Vosges.
@@bigwoody4704 on a tactical level Caan was supposed to be taken in three days, I talking about a strategic level, Paris ninety days, it took eighty nine, but also bear in mind, Iwo Jima was originally a three day operation, things don't go to plan sometimes because of an important element, the enemy, thank you for your comment 👍
I quite enjoyed watching this video. I think you people could turn this into a video series where each episode is themed around a particular military commander (E.G. Erwin Rommel, Douglas MacArthur, ect) and discussing the pros and cons of each of them. Good job!
Although i don't know if this is really Montgomery's statement but he really was a fan of Bajirao 1's light cavalry tactics especially his decisive victory in the Battle of Palkhed against the more numerous and cumbersome Army of the Nizam and how it inspired his North African campaign against Rommel.
Aimed at winning the campaign. He was methodical in his battles. He kept his army in balance while making the enemy unbalanced (battle of El Alamein and the Normandy campaign).
Found this. Montgomerys own personal written words in his diary. Right after conferring with Patton in Sicily on July 28th 1943: "We had a great reception. The Americans are very easy to work with. I discussed plans for future operations with General Patton. Their troops are quite first class and I have a very great admiration for the way they fight". From Monty and Patton Two Paths to Victory by Michael Reynolds, page 142. Contrary to the myth, Montgomery NEVER went around disparaging the American soldiers. Quite the opposite in fact. 👍
Absolutely. His famed press conference after the Bulge - read it a couple times, can't find a condemnation of Eisenhower or US troops or even an attempt to hog the credit. Too many people read too few accounts and perspectives - have you noticed how the anti-monty camp and the overuse of the word overrated came about the same time? Right after Tom Hanks and Ted Danson dismissed Montgomery in Saving Private Ryan, laying the blame for US forces not capturing their D+1 objectives at the gates of Caen with "That guy is overrated!" That film spawned a million duplicates in publishing, budget documentary, gaming and meme - and now everything is valued on the overrated scale. Monty blamed, quite hysterically, for all the failures of WW2. Gotta have a target if you just wanna throw rocks.
Oh dear. Saving Private Ryan has a lot to answer for. In it they Blame Montgomery not taking Caen as the reason St Lo wasn't taken. The two towns were different objectives for two different armies. US 1st Army abandoned advancing on St Lo in June because of the Bocage. Yes, Montgomery's Bulge conference was full of praise for the American soldiers and for Eisenhower. That's why Montgomery held it. To defend Eisenhower from the British press. I found another excerpt from Montgomery, regarding the American defeat at Kasserine. While British commander Alexander stuck the boot in and criticised the American soldiers, Montgomery actual somewhat defended them: "They were going through their early days, just as we had had to go through ours. We had been at war a long time and our mistakes lay mostly behind us."
I think reviewing all the various factors, and the fact that in war, it can get pretty "foggy", I think your video is a good summation of the various attributes that made him a complex character, with all the noted flaws he, and so many other generals, had at the time. He was human, with an ego, which was fed by his various successes and potentially tempered by his failures. We were lucky to have him. And to have Patton too.
Was he perfect? No. Did he make mistakes - yes. Did he deliver the first major land victory against the Germans after 3 years of complete German dominance across Europe and africa - absolutely! The effect of that win on the morale of the population when GB had been under seige since 39 is incalculable. I bet there were plenty of people who wanted to give up or make some non aggression pact with Germany up to that point, especially as the atlantic war was starving gb towards submission combined with the simultanious blitz, the siege of Malta, the Channel Islands and the Mediterranean and african campaigns. Dont forget we were also fighting and losing to the japanese in burma and singapore as well! The win gave Churchill what he needed to keep gb opposition politicians quietened down. As to caen, that leans towards him tying down / being tied down with the German armour which gave the us time to sort themselves out after the disasterous omaha landing. I am not saying he planned that, but the German armour was being held back in that area by hitler for the expected attack on calais. Re. Market Garden, the drops were dispersed too greatly, the intelligence wasn't updated to reflect latest German movements and the us land forces didn't make sufficient progress. It was a high risk operation but if it had succeeded, it would have meant the western allies with a rhine crossing could have got to Berlin well before the Russians and maybe saved the following 45 years of Germany being divided up, etc. The cold war might have been very different. That operation doesn't resonate with the accusations of him being overly cautious. Patton had his own wins and losses, but the us population or its industrial base was never in peril in anything like the way that gb or the soviet union was. Every country needed to create its heroes for its people to look up to and follow. We shouldn't put any of them on a pedestal as being saints, but they were there when we needed them and as a result of their actions and the bravery of those who served under then, here we stand.
There's one thing.you should understand about him: He was the consummate professional soldier. He had fought everyone and anyone in the name of his King Emperor. He held himself to the absolute highest possible standard, and expected the same from everyone else. He didn't get on with many of the American's, because he considered them, with exceptions, rank amateur's. Which by his standards they were. He was a master of logistics, and he understood very well that the only way to ensure victory was through overwhelming force. That saves lives on his side. Yes, he considered his men expendable, he had to but he also wasn't someone who would expend expend.them lightly. He looked after his men. He was well.know for making sure that they had decent food, access to hot showers, clean uniforms etc. Not out of the goodness of his heart, but because a clean, well fed, rested soldier is a happy, and more importantly, aggressive soldier. He was well known for firing any Officer or NCO irrespective of rank, who didn't do their uttermost in that regard. One good little trick of his was to walk into a canteen, or field kitchen, unannounced and require to be immediately served what was being served. God help all concerned if he didn't consider it up to snuff.
I wasn't aware anyone has ever accused Monty of being wasteful with the lives of his troops, British generals including Monty have always been criticised for the opposite compared to the US with their comparatively unlimited manpower reserves and 'gung'ho' generalship. I think its ironic how Monty is consistently held up as self aggrandizing and arrogant by the US historians, you have to think about the environment he was operating in and his peers, Patton, Bradley, Clark, MacArthur etc. Patton and Clark literally disobeyed direct orders purely for self interested reasons, and British involvement in entire battles (like the Bulge) was completely written out of the news to protect the egos of US commanders. Its not me defending Monty as i'm sure he was unpleasant and annoying, but i'd wager all of them were. Its probably a character trait you need to be a top general.
This video leaves out Montgomerys difference with the Eisenhower on how best to proceed after the Germans were defeated at Normandy. It jumps straight from Normandy to Operation Market Garden. After Normandy was secured, Montgomeryv along with American General Bradley proposed a narrow assault that would have taken advantage of the German collapse and not allowed them, to regroup. The Allies could have reached the Rhine very quickly as German resistance was in disarray,. Eisenhower favoured a broad frontal attack. This was the plan adopted and while a lot of territory in France was recaptured, importantly it allowed the Germans to regroup and withdraw to the Rhine. This prolonged the war. Montgomery's strategy was the correct one. How this major chapter in Montgomery;'s career and how it could have shortened the war in the west, was not mentioned, makes this a very substandard account of Montgomery's career. Disappointing that so many would watch this and judge his career despite this major omission in the analysis. Overall despite a small amount of grudging praise, it is slanted against Montgomery and I wouldnt believe it if I were you.
@@nickymatthews3491 Market Garden didn't slow down Patton, even if it hadn't taken place he still would have ran out of fuel. To be fair to Montgomery his plan was to take large bits of Holland including access to the channel ports for supplies as much as it was for the quick strike into Germany, it was a qualified success. He had months to plan for Overlord, Market Garden was planned in a week on the back of a napkin with major parts of his forces and fuel being siphoned off for other commanders and fronts ( Patton and Bradley in the Metz and Hurtgen)
@@nickymatthews3491 Caen was held by 80% of the German armour, and the plan was to tie them up there ( or nearby) to allow Bradley to breakout through St Lo. Which happened. Mind you, St Lo was only defended by 2 infantry divisions, and it didn't fall quickly, either...
A man leads his men into battle without adequate supplies, proper planning and wins a lightning fight and he's a genius. If he fails he's a wasteful butcher. If a man is methodical, builds up his supplies and reserves, is cautious with the lives of his men and still gets the job done he is seen as cautious and allowing his enemy time to build up. If he fails, he's a butcher and a waster of lives. You can never win being a general, one way or another you will have victories and defeats but it will always be seen as down to the commander of the army without thinking about higher interference, such as the government or politicians, for example. I believe like all generals Monty was inspirational, clever and he wanted to do the job he had been tasked with. Any general who had fought in the first world war would want to prioritise their men's lives as key, especially as Britain did not have a huge population that could be drawn from as a lot of countries did. Finally, show me a general from that time who wasn't an egomaniac (of from any period in history for that matter.)
@@DidMyGrandfatherMakeThis His abiility to juggle all the egos underneath his command, like Patton, and Bradley. He was acceptable to the Brits and got along with Monty. Right man for the job.
Ego and confidence are partners, very often great commanders are viewed with great suspicion by those who seek to harness their charisma and skill. I've no doubt that he was all of these things, most importantly a great commander cannot break under pressure, all are butchers of men but miraculously some are good for morale.
Very relatable in Soviet. The 3 Marshals that is executed, the military genius of Soviet Union was suspected, being charged of conspiracy of collaborating with Nazi Germany to overthrow Stalin.
Ah the Lyndon Library braying nonsense again.Auchinlech had already won in the desert and With the weight of allied supplies that Monty had nothing to do with procuring. As daft as you are even you could have won there.He hid behind Dorman-Smith's mine field using The Auk's battle plans
There is a comment comparing Montgomery with Rommel in North Africa. Rommel was said to be always at the point of greatest emergency. Montgomery, in contrast, did not have emergencies. Some of his critics are guilty of romanticising manoeuvre warfare (AKA Blitzkrieg). MW can be highly effective at forcing an enemy out of position and into retreat, but that can leave your enemy with his forces intact and ready to fight again. At Alamein, Montgomery wanted to fix the Axis forces in place and destroy them so effectively that they would not be able to fight again for a significant period. Op Goodwood was also a classical strategy - to engage the enemy so heavily in one part of the theatre, that the enemy commander is forced to thin his lines elsewhere and deploy his reserves to reinforce the attacked point, leaving those lines vulnerable and without a reserve to counterattack. In other words, Monty created the conditions in which Patton was able to look good. For all the talk about his ego, it should be remembered that Montgomery gave that opportunity to Patton.
Absolutely. Patton's Third Army didn't even join the Normandy fighting until August, nearly two months after it had been raging and after the Germans had been bled white. Patton literally had next to no enemy to engage when he arrived. Montgomery had already whittled them away and Patton only faced a German army already in retreat.
"wanted to fix the Axis forces in place and destroy them so effectively that they would not be able to fight again for a significant period" Afrika Korps was mauled, but it was not destroyed at El Alamein. So insted of doing manoeuvre warfare and encircle the Afrika Korps, ther its was "perfect" terrain for manouver warfare, agenst a enemy that is inferior in number, is critical low on supply, and in a unorganized state. Montgomery did think it was better to allow the mauled Afrika Korp to reatreat to Tunisa, there the Africa Korps did get re-suplied, renforced, reoginised, and entrench themself in the ex french fortifications. Do that sound like a good thinking?
@@kirgan1000 Firstly, the Axis forces *were* forced to retreat all the way to Tunisia before they could mount any significant opposition. You appear to think that insignificant. Secondly, why would you try to play Rommel at his own game, instead of awning and operating according to your own strengths.
@@peterwebb8732 Where is the best place to destroy the remains of the Afrika Korps? Then they are retreating west in open terain, and are critical low on suplie and unorganized? Like in the desert of Egypt/Libya? Then the Eighth Army is close to there suplie point. Then they are fortified in (ex) french fortifications, close to there own suplie point, and is given time to organzie there troops, and gain replacement troops/material? Like in east Tunisia? There the Eighth Army is far away from there suplie piont.
JR Montgomerys 8th Army still did a record 1,300km in just 20 days from El Alamein to El Agheila November 4th to 23rd 1942. Rommel's force was smaller lighter, less encumbered, had a heady start and didn't have to get past half a million mines. Montgomery had to stop at Benghazi and wait for the port to be repaired otherwise he'd have had a near 2,000km supply line. He was not stupid.
"The National Army Museum conducted a poll in 2011 to determine Britain’s greatest general. Montgomery’s name was not among the finalists." Bernard Law Montgomery - Military History - Oxford page
The finalists were The Duke of Wellington, the Duke of Marlborough, Oliver Comwell, William Slim and Douglas Haig. Some might argue that the presence of Haig amongst the top five makes it a somewhat questionable list.
Training soldiers hard in the BEF while waiting to fight is the only thing a commander should do, can't fault that. The 8th Army loved him. I remember my Grandfather talking about meeting him when he visited troops in the field and later when he met him face to face very personally and; he liked and respected the man. Montgomery was cautious in the desert to reduce potential casualties. He certainly was the man the world and Britain needed at that time.
Indeed, I have little to add from history, but know that my Grandfather said that he and the troops loved him. I can't ask about it, my Grandfather died in 1976, but thats about the only thing he ever said about the war.
He certianly knew the value of psycholoy and knew how important it was to be a figure head that people could follow. Hennce the wearing of the tankers beret for one thing, and the Aussie slouch hat.
Awful lot of Brits out there with a touchy nerve about such things. Me, say whatever you want about MacArthur or others, it's no skin off my nose. But I do appreciate British humor. Like David Nivens response as a British officer to an irate Itslian officer in a ww2 comedy I saw once. The Italian says the English have no imagination and are the most obstinate people on Earth. That for example Dunkirk was a terrible defeat. Yet the English call it a victory. He says to Niven "Was Dunkitk not a terrible defeat?" And Niven answers, "Of course it was. And the fact we English regard it as a victory only goes to show how much imagination we actually have."
Throughout history men have been reviled / loved. Another example (besides Monty) was Douglas Bader. Some officers loved him, but the same stubbornness and perseverance that saw him back in the RAF in a cockpit after losing his legs also made him difficult for some to get on with. Similarly Guy Gibson treated the men under him - allegedly - less well than other officers. Sir Arthur T 'Bomber' Harris was another who some loved and some disliked. One can only speak as one finds.. ergo some liked Monty and others didn't.
I just watched a movie on Bader with Kenneth More. He's in the hospital after losing his legs, annoys his nurse. She says to him "I wouldn't come to you if you were the last man on Earth." He replies, "Of course not, you'd be killed in the rush."
@@donberry7657 the biopic Reach For The Sky? That exchange may be fictional for the movie, but it illustrates what I meant, his self belief (arrogance depending on context) versus reaction to his personality.
Well the pre-war Brit and French garrisons in North Africa had out-dated weapons as they only had to deal with local tribesmen... Rommel had very good equipment and troops... Actually Monty was driven around in a captured Austrian Steyr staff car which he really liked !
Very good indeed! Certainly at self-promoting PR….not unlike so many of his contemporaries. The names Patton, Rommel, Mountbatten and MacArthur all spring to mind in no particular order, for some reason….🤔
I'd guess that he was what he wanted to be. A symbol to the British army and citizens that they could look up to and gladly follow. To my fellow Americans. He had a massive ego and didn't care much for us. Makes you wonder what would have happened if Monty ever crossed paths with or spoke with Admiral King?
Is that the Admiral King that let his Pacific Fleet be wiped on the floor? ...... And was so behind in modern warfare, ships were sunk by the dozen off the US coast because even the most basic anti-submarine measures were not in place? ...... Even the lights on shore were still on!
One of the big reasons for Monty's negative view towards the Americans was because of the damage US Col. Bonner Fellers did in North Africa from 1941-1942. Many British soldiers and ships were needlessly lost because of Fellers using a code which was known to be compromised when sending intel about the British back the US.
@@strongbrew9116 The Americans also thought the British decadent, and that thery were going to show Britain how wars were won. The US learnt nothing from 1939 until 7 DEC 1941. ...... Look at how they were caught with their pants down at Pearl Harbour. ...... Look at the huge losses in US shipping off the east coast of the US, because the lights were still on onshore, and there were no effective anti-submarine measures. The same attitude was in the US Army in North Africa. ...... Until Kasserine Pass. ...... Then they began to realise that war has a steep learning curve, all paid in blood.
King thought the Pacific theater should come first hated the English in bullheaded way. King would not adapt convoys to protect crgo ships rather have them go it almost alone and cost many lives. Kings stubborn attitude irked many and even IKE said he could have cost the war in Europe to be lost until he finally changed or was forced to change tactics.
Hmm should do a feature on Mark Clarkes bonehead run for Rome letting thousands of German troops to form another line instead of supporting the Canadian and British armies to cut them off and prevent another yr of slogging it out in Italy.
@@mathewm7136 "Five crucial days passed before Montgomery allowed the Americans to cross the boundary. By then it was too late to close the gap. The Falaise Pocket would be sealed between Trun and Chambois, but only after large numbers of German troops had escaped." Canada Legion on line magazine The Havoc Continues: Closing In On Falaise
@@nickdanger3802 Oddly, there seems to be this idea that Rommel's army got away after El Alamein. It didn't. Monty may have been one of the best Allied commanders in battle, but he wasn't a master of the weather. An untimely heavy rain hampered the immediate pursuit from El Alamein, but the fact remains that facing an enemy commander (Rommel) widely regarded as a tactical genius, who conducted a masterful rearguard retreat, he nonetheless succeeded in destroying virtually the entire Africa Korps. Just to review: 2nd El Alamein began 23rd October 1942, the 8th Army finally punched through Rommel's army on November 5th, at which point Rommel retreated with whatever German mechanized forces he could, and abandoning the non-motorized Italians to their fate. (They gallantly defended Rommel's retreat) Three months after El Alamein, by 13th February, and following several rearguard battles, the last Axis soldiers retreated out of Libya. The 8th Army had pursued them 1,400 miles, without any railway to move material, and with every supply port en route wrecked and unusable. How many of Rommel's vaunted Afrika Korps are left? According to Historian Matthew Cooper, just *5,000* made it out of Libya. Quote *"When the Panzerarmee arrived, the Afrika Korps had only 5,000 men, 35 tanks, 16 armoured cars, 12 anti-tank guns, 12 field howitzers"* That's 111,000 out of 116,000 men of the Africa Korps (& Italian allies) either killed, captured or evacuated as wounded from Libya. An entire fresh Axis army of some 350 - 400,000 reinforcements was then diverted from Europe (or Russia) and sent to Tunisia
Bullet-Tooth-Tony, Excellent post. This nonsense that Montgomery let Rommel get away after El Alamein is ridiculous. Its much easier to stay in front of a chasing army when you are a smaller, lighter and less encumbered force, have a major head start and don't have to get across half a million mines. Even so, as we know, Montgomerys 8th Army did 1,300km in 20 days chasing after Rommel. 👍
Love how you just jump straight from Alamein to Sicily, ignoring the fact that Monty drove Rommel from Alamein all the to the Mareth line in Tunisia, the equivalent distance from Moscow to Paris, with enormously stretched supply lines, not using more than three divisions the whole time whereas Rommel had six divisions. In North Africa Monty's 8th Army advanced from El Alamein to El Agheila from the 4th to 23rd November 1942, 1,300 km in just 19 days. *The fastest advance for such such a distance in WW2.* And that was after fighting a major exhausting battle at El Alemein through half a million mines. No such quantity of mines was laid anywhere else in the Second World War. _”Even Rommel’s escape on this day was brought about only by a headlong retreat which Eighth Army forced him to execute prematurely and which therefore completed their triumph of the day before. In Rommel’s own words, he had hoped to hold Fuka ‘long enough for the Italian and German infantry to catch up’. When Eighth Army’s pressure “forced him out of Fuka late on 5 November, his unmotorized units had no chance of doing anything other than surrender to XIII Corps. It is almost amusing to read the British accounts of Eighth Army’s slowness and caution, and then to find Paul Carell for instance, lamenting that:_ *_’Montgomery was pressing on with unusual speed, chasing Rommel’s troops towards Fuka. His men were marching on a parallel course to the Germans, giving them no time to reorganize or dig in for a defence-not even in Fuka._*_ The British High Command seemed to be fully aware of the disastrous position in which Rommel found himself… In any case _*_the boldness of the British pursuit was conspicuous.‘“_* - Eighth Army's Greatest Victories: Alam Halfa to Tunis 1942-1943 by Adrian Turner From Nigel Hamilton’s 3 volume biography of Monty: _…and though later historians might mock it for its ‘onerous’ progress, all contemporary evidence shows that _*_Eisenhower’s headquarters were amazed at the rapidity with which Eighth Army overcame its supply problems and the vast distances of its lines of communication. Not only did Eighth Army assume First Army’s responsibility - as dictated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive of 14 August 1942, and still envisaged in late December 1942 - for the capture of Tripoli, but it even removed the need for Eisenhower’s planned assault on Rommel’s supply line at Sfax - as Butcher noted on 18 January 1943:_* _’The essence of our meeting was that the plan to cut Rommel’s supply line, which had been ‘laid on’ for the II Corps under Major-General Fredendall, was called off because General Alexander’s _*_Eighth Army had made such rapid progress.’_* _On 20 January Butcher recorded: ‘Rommel was _*_being driven our way much faster than even the Combined Chiefs had expected.’”_* -Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. Nigel Hamilton. Monty beat Rommel 5 times in N.Africa and then beat Rommel’s armies a further 2 times after Rommel left: ♦ Battle of Alam Halfa; ♦ Second Battle of El Alamein; ♦ Battle of El Agheila; ♦ Battle of Tripoli; ♦ Battle of Medenine; ♦ Battle of the Mareth Line; ♦ Battle of Wadi Akarit.
John Burns quit printing bullshit here is the time at when you need to start learning - ENJOY *ua-cam.com/video/duOYnIGivys/v-deo.html* Claude Auchinleck (who BTW was a hell of a general) and Dorman Smith had just won the 1st battle of El Alamein concluded on July 30th.Auchilech was relieved for no reason except Churchill's impatienceand General Gott was installed but unfortunately his plane got shot down killing him. Everything and I mean everything was already in place to win. ♦ Churchill wrongly removed General Auchinleck who argued that his men had not regrouped and needed reinforcing. Several military analysts accused Churchill of misunderstanding desert warfare tactics, saying he placed too much emphasis on territorial occupation. *They needed 6 weeks to refit and resupply. So what does Monty do - took 10 weeks(Aug-13-Oct 23) to advance - much more time than Auchileck and Dorman Smith insisted on and got fired for in the 1st place* Almost any Commander was walking into assured victory.The British finally got their victory over a German Army and Monty was made a Hero when in truth it was a British /Allied victory. Montgomery had 1500 miles and every concievable advantage - BIG ADVANTAGES in men/materiel/air cover/intelligence/tanks/artillery. ♦Rommel had to move at dark to keep his columns from being strafed and obliterated. In the Mediteranean & the desert *Air Marshall Conningham and Adml Cunningham strangled the German supply lines while keeping the Allies supplied was paramount. Yet Montgomery didn't grab airfields or open any ports - this continued into Italy- Normandy* Montgomery really should have never gotten that gig - he really could not lose after Auchilech and Dorman-Smith lined the massive mine fields on the Ridge of Alam Halfa( that Bernard later attempted to take credit for)also shored up defense line by the Qattara Depression to the south which was impassable to mechanized armor at El Alamein creating a choke point. And it was Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith that had 2 fresh divisions moved over from the Nile Delta. Monty couldn't lose in the desert where an embarrassment of riches covered his obvious lack of leadership abilities.Monty never pinned down Rommel he simply pursued ♦Then The Torch Landings forces included 60,000 troops in Morocco, 15,000 in Tunisia, and 50,000 in Algeria, Forced Rommel's hand as now there would be more enemy troops to deal with.And of course ULTRA was now fully operation and provided updates. ♦By August '42 USA had sent the 300 Shemans and over 100 self propelled 105 mm Howitzers sent by Order of FDR.The 8th Army had an 5:1advantage of tanks over the AK.And with the landings 3:1 in manpower. The Afrika Korp was short on everything and their armor and vehicles had been in the desert for over 2 yrs. ♦The allied supply port of Alexandria was 100 miles away,The Axis supply port was 1,000 miles away in Tripoli.Also factor in complete Air Superiority - Rommel had to move at dark to keep his columns from being strafed and obliterated. So even you can clearly see reality exists All these things came together at the same time and Monty couldn't help himself - taking credit that wasn't his and deflecting blame that was - all thru the war. In 1500 miles with overwhelming advantages Monty never captured Rommel ♦Monty left a vastly numerical inferior forces in front of him get away None of those benefits were enjoyed by Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith. Save the Air Superiority. All of it in place and none of it Bernard's doing long before he sashayed into this mirage
Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013 Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013 John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013 John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013 John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013 TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013
@@bigwoody4704 Except what most people don’t mention, or are unaware of, was that Auchinleck launched five poorly planned, piecemeal, uncoordinated attacks against Rommel in July that achieved very little but large casualties and morale in Eighth Army hit rock bottom. Monty never had the advantages that Auchinleck had at First El Alamein, which was a halfhearted try-on due to Rommel’ forces being exhausted and overstretched. _During that time also, the soldiers of Eighth Army had won seven battles, two on the defensive, four on the offensive, and the most famous on what can only be called the defensive offensive since they had gained their victory not by their own attacks but by their successful repulse of enemy counter-attacks. It seems sad therefore that all except Alamein have tended to be forgotten and all, even Alamein, have tended to be belittled. The fashionable attitude appears to be that it was easy for Eighth Army to achieve its conquests because it now had the superior numbers and the superior equipment that its predecessors had lacked._ _Such suggestions are grossly unjust. In sheer numbers of men Eighth Army did have the advantage throughout the period of its conquests but so it had done throughout the period of its ordeals. Indeed at Alam Halfa, that victory on which all else depended, _*_’the strength of the two sides was nearer to an even balance than it was either before or later’. It was Rommel who had increased the number of his German divisions from three to four, plus his independent parachute brigade; who had been joined by the finest of his Italian divisions, the Folgore; who had doubled the number of his flak regiments with their 88mms; who had at last received the ‘murderous Mark IV Specials’; whose Mark III Specials had more than doubled in number from those available in June, more than quadrupled in number from those available in July. No wonder he was confident that Alam Halfa would be his ‘decisive battle’. And even in later encounters, Eighth Army would never have the overwhelming weight of numbers in its favour that it had done under Auchinleck in July._* _Nor did Eighth Army enjoy a qualitative superiority of weapons during the period of its conquests. On the contrary, while the Allies had had the better tanks throughout the whole of Auchinleck’s rule as C-in-C, Middle East, in August 1942, the arrival on the battlefield of the Mark IV Specials gave the Germans a tank which was superior to all on the Allied side and would remain so despite the later advent of the best of the Allied tanks, the Shermans. Eighth Army’s disadvantage was again of course at its greatest at Alam Halfa when the Shermans had not yet reached the front line._ _The German 88mm anti-tank guns had been superior to any that the British could find throughout the days of Eighth Army’s ordeals-and they remained superior until the first few ‘Pheasants’ arrived at the time of Medenine. _*_The only difference was that at Alam Halfa, Alamein and the Mareth Line, the Axis commanders had more than, and at Wadi Akarit almost, twice the number of 88mms that had been present during CRUSADER, three times the number that had been present at ‘First Alamein’._* _It should also be emphasized _*_that throughout its conquest of North Africa, Eighth Army had had to overcome problems not experienced by its predecessors. Its supply-line had to stretch further than ever before at the time of its victory at El Agheila, and even further still at the time of its final thrust to Tripoli._*_ At Medenine also, Eighth Army’s supply-line was far from adequate, a fact which makes the admirable defensive preparations it carried out in an astonishingly short space of time all the more remarkable._ _In addition, _*_when Auchinleck had launched his attacks in July 1942, the enemy had had no opportunity to prepare adequate defences, while during CRUSADER he could outflank the defences altogether through the open desert. For that matter Rommel had enjoyed the same advantage during his counter-offensive after CRUSADER and at Gazala._* _By contrast when Eighth Army took the offensive at Alamein in October 1942, _*_the Axis position could not be by-passed and was protected by half-a-million mines and all the hideous devices of the ‘Devil’s Gardens’. At El Agheila it was possible to avoid the defences but only by crossing terrain worse than any that either Eighth Army or Panzerarmee Afrika had yet encountered. At Buerat the front line could be outflanked without too much difficulty, but the going encountered later left even the tough, experienced New Zealanders ‘speechless’; while the Homs-Tarhuna escarpment was only mastered because Eighth Army moved too quickly for Rommel to offer adequate resistance there. At Mareth, Eighth Army was opposed by long-prepared fixed defences, the only way round which led to a ‘bottleneck’ so dangerous that it was feared an attack through it would be ‘a second Balaclava’. And finally in the Gabes Gap Eighth Army faced a formidable natural barrier which it had to assault head-on. Only superb troops could have surmounted such a series of difficulties._* _But then the men of Eighth Army had always been superb troops. All they had lacked had been ‘a clearly defined purpose and a leader’. _*_They ‘got both in Montgomery’._*_ His critics have referred to him slightingly as ‘a superlative actor’ or ‘a great showman’, and certainly some aspects of his attempts to restore morale when he arrived in the Desert are open to such complaints. These were, however, unimportant, in fact largely irrelevant, _*_compared with the actions which really did restore morale: first, his cancellation of all previous plans for withdrawals to reserve positions, whether within the Alamein defences or outside the combat-zone altogether; next, his victory at Alam Halfa, won in just the way he had foretold and as a result of precisely those alterations which he had made to the previous plans._* _Moreover _*_Montgomery made other contributions to success at least as significant as his restoration of morale, vital though that was. He welded the different branches of Eighth Army into one integrated whole, and added to it the close co-operation of ‘his’ Air Force. He displayed great strategical insight as demonstrated by his ability to think ‘one battle ahead’. Most of all perhaps, in his seven victories he justified the opinion of Brooke that he was ‘without question the best tactical commander in the [British] Army’._* _It might indeed be queried _*_whether any mere actor or showman would have proved capable in just over a fortnight of transforming a plan which ‘might almost have been written for Rommel’s express benefit’ into one which provided the basis for the victory of Alam Halfa. Or of devising those ‘crumbling’ operations against the enemy infantry at Alamein which compelled the enemy armour to risk crippling losses in counter-attacks and at the same time made the enemy anti-tank guns less effective. Or of showing that combination of ruthless resolution and flexibility of mind which then saw Alamein through to its successful conclusion. Or of making the imaginative move of ‘grounding’ one corps and using it to provide supplies to the front for the advance on Tripoli. Or of thrusting past the Homs-Tarhuna defences before these could be organized properly. Or of winning the flawless defensive battle of Medenine. Or of executing the ‘Left Hook’ which so brilliantly redeemed the initial failure at Mareth. Or of overcoming the positions in the Gabes Gap-according to Rommel the most formidable natural obstacle in North Africa-in less than twenty-four hours._* _Brigadier Sir Edgar Williams certainly thinks otherwise. Williams is frequently reported as hating the Army and although this was not the case he had no intention of making it his career and he was very far from being respectful of its senior officers. He was also well aware of the advantages and deficiencies of ‘Ultra’. _*_His judgement: ‘Montgomery was the best British field-commander since Wellington.’_* - Eighth Army's Greatest Victories: Alam Halfa to Tunis 1942-1943 by Adrian Turner
@@bigwoody4704 Except what most people don’t mention, or are unaware of, was that Auchinleck launched five poorly planned, piecemeal, uncoordinated attacks against Rommel in July that achieved very little but large casualties and morale in Eighth Army hit rock bottom. Monty never had the advantages that Auchinleck had at First El Alamein, which was a halfhearted try-on due to Rommel’ forces being exhausted and overstretched. _During that time also, the soldiers of Eighth Army had won seven battles, two on the defensive, four on the offensive, and the most famous on what can only be called the defensive offensive since they had gained their victory not by their own attacks but by their successful repulse of enemy counter-attacks. It seems sad therefore that all except Alamein have tended to be forgotten and all, even Alamein, have tended to be belittled. The fashionable attitude appears to be that it was easy for Eighth Army to achieve its conquests because it now had the superior numbers and the superior equipment that its predecessors had lacked._ _Such suggestions are grossly unjust. In sheer numbers of men Eighth Army did have the advantage throughout the period of its conquests but so it had done throughout the period of its ordeals. Indeed at Alam Halfa, that victory on which all else depended, _*_’the strength of the two sides was nearer to an even balance than it was either before or later’. It was Rommel who had increased the number of his German divisions from three to four, plus his independent parachute brigade; who had been joined by the finest of his Italian divisions, the Folgore; who had doubled the number of his flak regiments with their 88mms; who had at last received the ‘murderous Mark IV Specials’; whose Mark III Specials had more than doubled in number from those available in June, more than quadrupled in number from those available in July. No wonder he was confident that Alam Halfa would be his ‘decisive battle’. And even in later encounters, Eighth Army would never have the overwhelming weight of numbers in its favour that it had done under Auchinleck in July._* _Nor did Eighth Army enjoy a qualitative superiority of weapons during the period of its conquests. On the contrary, while the Allies had had the better tanks throughout the whole of Auchinleck’s rule as C-in-C, Middle East, in August 1942, the arrival on the battlefield of the Mark IV Specials gave the Germans a tank which was superior to all on the Allied side and would remain so despite the later advent of the best of the Allied tanks, the Shermans. Eighth Army’s disadvantage was again of course at its greatest at Alam Halfa when the Shermans had not yet reached the front line._ _The German 88mm anti-tank guns had been superior to any that the British could find throughout the days of Eighth Army’s ordeals-and they remained superior until the first few ‘Pheasants’ arrived at the time of Medenine. _*_The only difference was that at Alam Halfa, Alamein and the Mareth Line, the Axis commanders had more than, and at Wadi Akarit almost, twice the number of 88mms that had been present during CRUSADER, three times the number that had been present at ‘First Alamein’._* _It should also be emphasized _*_that throughout its conquest of North Africa, Eighth Army had had to overcome problems not experienced by its predecessors. Its supply-line had to stretch further than ever before at the time of its victory at El Agheila, and even further still at the time of its final thrust to Tripoli._*_ At Medenine also, Eighth Army’s supply-line was far from adequate, a fact which makes the admirable defensive preparations it carried out in an astonishingly short space of time all the more remarkable._ _In addition, _*_when Auchinleck had launched his attacks in July 1942, the enemy had had no opportunity to prepare adequate defences, while during CRUSADER he could outflank the defences altogether through the open desert. For that matter Rommel had enjoyed the same advantage during his counter-offensive after CRUSADER and at Gazala._* _By contrast when Eighth Army took the offensive at Alamein in October 1942, _*_the Axis position could not be by-passed and was protected by half-a-million mines and all the hideous devices of the ‘Devil’s Gardens’. At El Agheila it was possible to avoid the defences but only by crossing terrain worse than any that either Eighth Army or Panzerarmee Afrika had yet encountered. At Buerat the front line could be outflanked without too much difficulty, but the going encountered later left even the tough, experienced New Zealanders ‘speechless’; while the Homs-Tarhuna escarpment was only mastered because Eighth Army moved too quickly for Rommel to offer adequate resistance there. At Mareth, Eighth Army was opposed by long-prepared fixed defences, the only way round which led to a ‘bottleneck’ so dangerous that it was feared an attack through it would be ‘a second Balaclava’. And finally in the Gabes Gap Eighth Army faced a formidable natural barrier which it had to assault head-on. Only superb troops could have surmounted such a series of difficulties._* _But then the men of Eighth Army had always been superb troops. All they had lacked had been ‘a clearly defined purpose and a leader’. _*_They ‘got both in Montgomery’._*_ His critics have referred to him slightingly as ‘a superlative actor’ or ‘a great showman’, and certainly some aspects of his attempts to restore morale when he arrived in the Desert are open to such complaints. These were, however, unimportant, in fact largely irrelevant, _*_compared with the actions which really did restore morale: first, his cancellation of all previous plans for withdrawals to reserve positions, whether within the Alamein defences or outside the combat-zone altogether; next, his victory at Alam Halfa, won in just the way he had foretold and as a result of precisely those alterations which he had made to the previous plans._* _Moreover _*_Montgomery made other contributions to success at least as significant as his restoration of morale, vital though that was. He welded the different branches of Eighth Army into one integrated whole, and added to it the close co-operation of ‘his’ Air Force. He displayed great strategical insight as demonstrated by his ability to think ‘one battle ahead’. Most of all perhaps, in his seven victories he justified the opinion of Brooke that he was ‘without question the best tactical commander in the [British] Army’._* _It might indeed be queried _*_whether any mere actor or showman would have proved capable in just over a fortnight of transforming a plan which ‘might almost have been written for Rommel’s express benefit’ into one which provided the basis for the victory of Alam Halfa. Or of devising those ‘crumbling’ operations against the enemy infantry at Alamein which compelled the enemy armour to risk crippling losses in counter-attacks and at the same time made the enemy anti-tank guns less effective. Or of showing that combination of ruthless resolution and flexibility of mind which then saw Alamein through to its successful conclusion. Or of making the imaginative move of ‘grounding’ one corps and using it to provide supplies to the front for the advance on Tripoli. Or of thrusting past the Homs-Tarhuna defences before these could be organized properly. Or of winning the flawless defensive battle of Medenine. Or of executing the ‘Left Hook’ which so brilliantly redeemed the initial failure at Mareth. Or of overcoming the positions in the Gabes Gap-according to Rommel the most formidable natural obstacle in North Africa-in less than twenty-four hours._* _Brigadier Sir Edgar Williams certainly thinks otherwise. Williams is frequently reported as hating the Army and although this was not the case he had no intention of making it his career and he was very far from being respectful of its senior officers. He was also well aware of the advantages and deficiencies of ‘Ultra’. _*_His judgement: ‘Montgomery was the best British field-commander since Wellington.’_*
Montgomery was a Pom; conceited, know-all with scant regard for the truth. However, in spite of all of his faults, errors and inability to engage sensibly in an allied expeditionary campaign, he did a workman-like job. The major problem was the UK press, booming him up to the point that rendered him impervious to dismissal or even serious reprimand. In this regard he was the Brit version of Macarthur - but with vastly more runs on the board.
If Monty had been named supreme allied commander, there would be no D day. The A-bomb would have dropped on Berlin, and Monty would have taken credit for the win.
Something Montgomery should absolutely get credit for is being the first British General in North Africa who would not allow himself to be brow-beaten into a premature offensive by winston Churchill's needs fo a morale boosting victory.... he went when he was ready.
He sent a telegram about the forthcoming battle of Alamein to Churchill: - 1. If we attack in September the attack will fail 2. If we attack in October I guarantee complete success 3. Do I attack in September
The debate will always go on forever the simple question is who else could have done his job. Every previous commander was unable to control Churchill Montgomery did and won at the decisive moment that's what counts
Yes Who else would have the tenacity to literally camp until you have enaugh numbers to steamroll your oponent, while taking no risk or advantage from situation.
@@GeraltofRivia22 You know, the more you post "Monty was mediocre", the more it seems like your opinion. He had lower casuality rates than many of his contempories, served all the way through the war from 1939-1945 with many success, was loved by the men who served under him and accepted the surrender of Germany (in a solemn ceremony with no showboating).
It is arguable that in North Africa and Normandy, Montgomery's leadership and strategy set up the Axis forces for catastrophic attritional defeat. Such that he was a general seeking decisive battle and destruction of enemy forces. It is again arguable that without this component, Patton's risk taking would have seen him open to defeat by German forces who would not have been pinned in attritional combat with Montgomery's forces. Market Garden on the other hand would seem to have been inadvisable and a gross failure; Montgomery there drawing the allies into great cost and arguable prolonging of the war (and that costly in itself). For Brits he's simply the last Empire general; El Alamein the last military hurrah of Empire.
Market Garden never prolonged the war. Eisenhowers broad front strategy did, with all that messing around in the Lorraine, Alsace and Hurtgen Forest. A strong northern thrust would have been the way to go in September/October 1944.
Nick Danger Under Montgomery, the western allies moved 500km in just 3 months, June to September 1944. Under Eisenhower the allies barely moved 100km in 6 months September 1944 to February 1945...... with even a retreat thrown in for good measure.
"While during the planning there had been lofty talk, from Montgomery especially, of driving beyond Caen on D-Day, deep concern had also been expressed that the entire enterprise might fail. On D plus 1, the mood in the Allied camp was this: huge relief that the invasion had so far gone considerably better than many had dared hope but not quite as well as the best-case scenario." forces net days after d day what happened next page
@nickdanger3802 I'm sorry, but Caen gets wayyy too much focus when we analyse Operation Overlord. I understand it's importance, roads, infrastructure etc but it seems to dominate debates, perhaps far too much. If I was to criticise Eisenhower throughout this campaign perhaps his refusal or inaction to make the channel ports a priority. Especially considering this was how the United States portion of the forces were going to be supplied in the planning stages of this campaign.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Caen in allied hands, Caen in German hands, nothing changed. The Germans still concentrated the vast bulk of their armour in front of British Second Army. Caen in allied hands added almost nothing to the allied build up.
um no you twisted twirp little villa they were there for the road network only way in/out of Pas deCalais at that time to Paris.Monty and the British were Dunkirked before when the odds were even and only the heaviest bombing of the Normandy Campaign and the naval shelling from right off shore and The GIs landing with them kept it from happening again
After Alamein Monty pushed Rommel all the way to the Mareth line in Tunisia, the equivalent distance from Moscow to Paris, with enormously stretched supply lines, barely using more than three divisions the whole time whereas Rommel had six.
John Burns - Monty lost a lot. What he won he won with overwhelming superiority in men, materials,air support and ULTRA. And then barely.. and poorly.Alam Halfa, which was fought with Dorman-Smith's battle plan but did not end the North African campaign because Monty montied. EVERYTHING was already in place to win in the desert. Churchill wrongly removed General Auchinleck who argued that his men had not regrouped and needed reinforcing. Several military analysts accused Churchill of misunderstanding desert warfare tactics, saying he placed too much emphasis on territorial occupation. They needed 6 weeks to refit and resupply. *So what does Monty do - took 10 weeks(Aug-13-Oct 23) to advance - much more time than Auchileck and Dorman Smith insisted on and got fired for in the 1st place.* ♦Montgomery had 1500 miles and every concievable advantage - BIG ADVANTAGES in men/materiel/air cover/intelligence/tanks/artillery and still Montgomery never captured Rommel
♦Monty didn't build up the arms/men/tanks/materiel - the allies did -Dorman-Smith had engineers and infantry plant the massive mine field on the Alam Halfa ridge , that Bernard attempted to take credit for. ♦ULTRA became fully operational in August 1942 after the Germans had changed some wheels/gears on Enigma ♦The Torch Landings - forces included 60,000 troops in Morocco, 15,000 in Tunisia, and 50,000 in Algeria. ♦Claude Auchinleck called over two fresh divisions from the Nile Delta after winning 1st Alamain. ♦Both of those troop deployments forced Rommel's hand as now there would be more enemy troops to deal with. ♦The Air and Naval Corp completely strangled the Afrika Korps supply lines. Sweeping the skies and seas in/over the Mediterranean ♦Montgomery never opened ports or grabbed Air Strips for them in return ♦his would continue into Sicily and Normandy where Monty's deficiencies would be exposed -Rommel in his memoirs credited complete Air superiority by Conningham's RAF that they could hardly sleep in the heat and battle of the day and could only move at nite ♦*Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts p.282-83* On 12 September 1942 Churchill had cause to thank Roosevelt telling him the 317 Sherman tanks and 94 self propelled 105 mm guns "which you kindly gave me on that dark Tobruk day in Washington" and arrived safetly in Egypt and been received with the greatest enthusiasm.....as these tanks were taken from the hands of the American Army ♦Montgomery had ABSOLUTELY NOTHING to do with any of the above actions. The British Press needed a Hero and Monty reveled in the roll, Denigrating others who had done so much for the War effort. He loved grabbing the Glory at least twice later he almost got sacked.And if it wasn't for the sorry fact that General Gott's plane crashed and British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have.
@@bigwoody4704 Monty never lost a battle. The best General of WW2. A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2: ♦ Battle of Alam Halfa; ♦ Second Battle of El Alamein; ♦ Battle of El Agheila; ♦ Battle of Tripoli; ♦ Battle of Medenine; ♦ Battle of the Mareth Line; ♦ Battle of Wadi Akarit; ♦ Allied invasion of Sicily- the largest seaborne invasion in history before Normandy; ♦ Battle of the Sangro River; ♦ Operation Overlord - the largest seaborne invasion in history; ♦ Operation Market Garden ♦Battle of Overloon ♦Operation Pheasant- took 60 miles of German held territory, liberated Eindhoven and Nijmegen, along with many towns and protected Antwerp. This created a narrow salient that ran from the north of Belgium across the south-east of the Netherlands. The Allies then cleared the German forces from the region between Antwerp and the Maas securing allied supply lines. In addition the offensive completely cut off the Germans who were left holding their positions at the mouth of the Scheldt River, which the Aliies then cleared, opening it up for shipping. Over 40,000 German troops capitulated. ♦ Battle of the Bulge; ♦ Operation Veritable; ♦ Operation Plunder - the greatest river assault crossing of all time. Not only did Monty replan and serve as Allied Ground Forces Commander for Overlord, the largest seaborne born invasion in history, he also replanned the Alllied invasion of Sicily, the largest seaborne invasion in history before that. _”Had the Sicily landings proved - as Salerno and Anzio would prove - near-disasters, then history might well have cast Eisenhower and Alexander in the same noble but failed mound as their predecessors in the Middle East, Auchinleck and Wavell. It is for this reason surely that General Dempsey, on his deathbed, referred to Sicily as Monty’s ‘finest hour’ - for Monty alone among the senior Allied military commanders had the courage to refuse to carry out an ill-conceived plan, and to insist that, if tackled, the invasion be mounted properly. Though he would be pilloried by the ignorant or envious, and his motives made out to be megalomaniacal rather than military, the accusations tell us more about his accusers than about Monty. As one British colonel - not friendly towards Monty - would later remark: I find those who criticise Monty loudest are so uniformly second-rate that I prefer not to make my own views known!….”_ -Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944 In Normandy Monty was in command of all ground forces and was the architect of the 5 beach invasion plan and the overall strategy of the campaign. The plan Overlord by Frederick Morgan was revised by Montgomery, like the original plan for the invasion of Sicily. Both would have led to complete disaster before Monty’s revision. This is something a lot of people don’t seem to be aware of. Monty was the one that made the Overlord plan what it was. The plan was originally just 3 divisions and army Corp landing on some beaches together. He changed the plan from 3 to 5 beaches and from 3 divisions to 8 correctly arguing that 3 beachheads would’ve been too narrow a front and such an attack could be easily rolled up on both flanks. And instead of some airborne brigades, it should be 3 airborne divisions to assist while each army Corp of the British and Americans should have their own beaches to ease organization. And he emphasized Cherbourg as the key. The Allies prevailed in Normandy using Monty’s invasion plan and his ground strategy. On Normandy: _”That the COSSAC plan for a 3-divisional assault in ‘Overlord’ was a recipe for disaster now seems undeniable. Had Alexander been appointed to command the land forces in the invasion, would Morgan’s COSSAC plan have been enacted? Monty was not alone in recognizing its flaws, as will be seen, but he was alone in having the courage and conviction to see that it was thrown out and a better plan adopted. He had done so at Alam Halfa, he had done so gain over ‘Husky’ and whatever mud was slung at him, he was determined that he would do so over ‘Overlord’. For Morgan’s ‘Overlord’ plan, the result of one and a half years of research and discussions, had no prospect of succeeding, as Morgan’s planners themselves confessed…_ _….and by presenting such a clearly defined strategic plan for the battle thereplan can be no doubt that Monty brought to his Allied land, sea and air forces a unity of purpose and conception that was remarkable - and often confused later with Eisenhower’s role as Supreme Commander.”_ -Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944
@@johnpeate4544 Those books don't say that I've left the facts. Post the page numbers - you deliberately leave them out John Burns so no one can point out your forgeries. With out the GIs Monty ended up in the Channel after they arrived he never got Dunkirked again - imagine that. The British had good commanders Bernard wasn't one of them. Close examination reveals time after time very stunted results.He was promoted above his abilities and accomplishments. Churchill removed the wrong guy and stuck with a mistake rather than dare admit he made one. *Ike & Monty ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb,page 409 There were many reasons why Montgomery was being effectively downgraded once more.Eisenhower had no doubt any longer that his reputation as a battle-winning commander was greatly inflated* The experience at Caen,Antwerp,Arnhem and delays in following up the Ardennes assault and the excessively thorough build up for the Rhine crossing provided sufficient evidence for that. *General Whitely IKE's British Deputy Chief of Operations,said the feeling at Allied HQs "was that if anything was to be done quickly,don't give it to Monty. Monty was the last person that would be chosen to drive on Berlin - he would have needed 6 months to prepare".* More Monty victims Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013 Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013 John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013 John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013 John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013 TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013
@@bigwoody4704 The books *all* say that. Real books by real historians not pop tabloid history and comic book fantasies. _Montgomery’s military philosophy is quite clear. He believed in commanding a _*_balanced army-one in which the fighting arm was fully backed up by the logistical component. Unless those two elements were balanced, the army would eventually grind to a halt, short of the wherewithal to carry on fighting._*_ Before this happened, Montgomery would pause to bring the logistical support forward-a process he called ‘bringing up the logistical tail’ and so fighting a ‘tidy battle’. There was nothing wrong with this philosophy. Montgomery did not believe in ad-hoc, make-it-up-as-you-go-along strategies, but dealing with the logistical problem did entail periodic pauses. These gave the Americans an excuse for that endless bitching and whining about Montgomery’s ‘caution’ and ‘slowness’ which has haunted his reputation ever since. _*_The record shows that the US armies also paused; the difference is that Montgomery slowed before he outran his supplies, while Patton and his ilk stopped because they had outrun their supplies.”_* - The Battle for the Rhine 1944: Arnhem and the Ardennes, the Campaign in Europe by Robin Neillands
Try one of your other fraud accounts you phony. Again you left out the page many have busted your pathetic editing of the facts. WHAT PAGE NUMBER? if that's not asking too much.Geronimo compared your writings in grammerly and they came out eerily the same you wag. Read The Full Monty i think you are mentioned in it
Market-Garden failed because the 82nd ABN failed to take their only objective - Nijmegen railway bridge - on the first day. This was due to BG Gavin's decision, once on the ground, to temporarily disregard his mission objective in order to defend against an imaginary threat from the east. What should have been taken on the 17th didn't happen until the 20th sealing the fate of the Brit 1st ABN. While there are additional reasons, this fact was the single most deciding factor in whether M-G would succeed or fail.
"Browning and Brigadier-General Gavin, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, were in agreement that the priorities around Nijmegen were first the vast area of high ground known as the Groesbeek Heights, followed by the bridge at Grave, the three smaller bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal, and finally the very large bridge at Nijmegen. Browning also told Gavin that he was not to make any attempt to move towards Nijmegen until the Heights had been secured; Gavin agreed though he later felt confident enough in his plan to allow one battalion to head for the bridge immediately after landing. The Groesbeek Heights were certainly important as they served as the Division's main drop zone and dominated the entire area, and so there is no question that the position of the 82nd Airborne Division, not to mention the right flank of the 2nd British Army when they arrived, would have been placed under considerable pressure if the area were to remain in enemy hands." Pegasus Archive Marlet Garden LG Browning
@@nickdanger3802 Gavin's orders were to take the bridges "with thunderclap surprise". Browning approved his plan to secure the heights, but didn't think it would take Gavin hours to get around to taking his PRIMARY OBJECTIVE. The "heights" didn't dominate anything. They're a small rise, and certainly the position didn't prevent the Germans reinforcing the bridge and surrounds. I don't understand why a screening force wasn't put in place up there, and the main effort to the bridge. Gavin screwed the whole Op.
1st Parachute Brigade (BG Lathbury, 2,212 men) and 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron (181 men with "special jeeps") were tasked with taking and holding the three bridges on day one. Rail bridge was blown six hours after landing. Arriving in jeeps nine hours after landing 740 men (one third of 1st PB) captured one lightly defended end of the last intact bridge after 9th SS Panzer Recon Batt used it to advance to Nijmegen. Pegasus Archive Market Garden Order of Battle on line
Montgomery was doing the best job he could with the resources at hand. And he was obviously aware of the manpower limits the British were dealing with as the war in Europe ground into 1945. Instead of berating him -- and other British and American and Canadian generals, let's look at the successes they had in working (and yes, arguing) strategy and operations out. Compare this to the Germans and Italians and the Japanese: How well did they coordinate their strategy and operations? I'm glad everything was "joint" with the Brits, Canadians and Americans. The team that won in western Europe. I salute Montgomery and other commanding generals (e.g., Horrocks, Alexander come to mind, as well as Crerar from Canada and Freyberg from New Zealand) in the British army. Did they do everything correctly? No... they were human. Did they have egos? Yes... but that seems to go hand-in-hand with success on the battlefield. Some behaved poorly... that's human, too. But show me a better team... I don't think there was one. They solved problems together. As a retired American serviceman (U.S. Navy chief petty officer), I raise my hat to Montgomery.
Monty was able to win victories (mainly due to the quality of his British soldiers, air superiority and unbroken supply lines) but he always seemed to let the Germans escape: post-El Alamein, Sicily, Normandy, von Zangen's 15th Army. In addition, I always thought it was somewhat ironic that the one time he launched a truly audacious operation it was a disaster. He would have been an outstanding general in the First World War
It is hard to catch a man who is running for his life. Rommel only escaped by abandoning Libya and bolting into Tunisia. The original TORCH plan was for Tunisia to be occupied and then those troops advance into Libya and attack Rommel from the rear. However it ended up that Montgomery had to come to the rescue of the TORCH armies and advance into Tunisia to help them win.
Are you aware that his 8th Army's 1,300 km advance in just 20 days from El Alamein to El Agheila November 4th to 23rd 1942 was the fasted long advance by any army in WW2, and it came immediately after fighting a gruelling near two week battle and getting through half a million mines. Nobody did more to help win the ground war in the west than Bernard Montgomery. Nobody. Have some respect for the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2.
@@lyndoncmp5751 I have tremendous admiration for Monty, as I said above he would have made an outstanding general in the first war. If Monty had been forced to conduct a campaign or battle under the conditions his opponents were facing his name would rank along those of Cunningham, Ritchie, Wavell and Auchinleck, defeated and removed from command
@@lyndoncmp5751 and I might also add that a 1300 mile advance in 20 days is meaningless when the guy being pursued does it in 19 days. In a war of movement, Monty was always "a day late and a dollar short"
Yes, that was always going to happen with more American armies arriving. The ironic thing is, when Eisenhower took over as ground commander thats when the allied advance stopped and went next to nowhere for the following six months..... with even a retreat thrown in.
A nice way to treat allies, calling them cowardly. Had the American cities been under Luftwaffe attack for almost three years, and with the V1 soon to be V2 still landing on the SE of England. The term cowardly is nasty term. The British and her commonwealth had lost nearly half a million men, the US with a population more than four times that of the UK lost in the entire war a similar number. Annoying that the US calls this a European War as if the British were just as culpable as the Germans, and of course their help to the UK to fight fascism, had a price tag attached that we did not fully pay back until December 2006.
I'd call the Generals in WW1 Butchers, maybe some of the early Soviet commanders. I don't even like Monty, i.blame him 75% for Operation Market Garden failure. But I wouldn't call him a butcher, if anything, thst Roman General who waited and waited while Hannibal rampages through Italy till he had overwhelming forces.
Montgomery was 100% responsible for the failure of Market Garden. It was doomed to failure before it was ever launched and Ike, Smith and Patton knew it was going to be a failure. However Churchill insisted on it.
@@billsanders5067 Scouting and reconnaissance is a joint Anglo-American responsibility neither side spotted the 2 panzer divisions that no one expected to be there
No better or worse than most. Made his reputation in the desert. As is so often the case he was in the right place at the right time. His greatest achievement was ignoring Churchill knowing that every day he waited his army became stronger relative to Rommel's
as I understand it Monty came up with the idea for operation Market Garden but he had nothing else to do with organising and planning it , Eisenhower turned all detailed planning over to US General Lewis Brereton's 1st Allied Airborne Army staff , Brereton had no airborne assault experiance. and after the Battle of the Bulge Monty praised the US Gi's and Eisenhower but didn't mention any us Generals , and considering the likes of US Major General Cota gave orders to hold against overwhelming odds & then went to dinner and couldn't be reached , can you blame him
Damn, I think I just spent the last HOUR reading the 'comments' and 'replies' to this video. I've NEVER spent that much time doing that on ANY video I've watched before. It was all so interesting and informative I couldn't stop reading. I had my own opinions about some of the discussions, but decided it was best to just read and keep my mouth shut! Anyway, just wanted to thank everyone for their 'comments' and 'replies', because I really appreciated the h*ll out of all of them!
You've jumped a big part of Monty's WW2 service by going straight from Dunkirk to Egypt. Montgomery's "next big posting" after the retreat from France was as V Corps commander with responsibility for the defense of Hampshire and Dorset, then as XII Corps Commander in charge of the defense of Kent, and in both commands he played a leading role in training up the British Army - a largely volunteer force - to face the years of war. He would also demand the utmost fitness and competence from his officer subordinates and was ruthless in removing those he found wanting. After this he was placed in command of South-Eastern Command, which he renamed South-Eastern Army, and implemented his training ideas on larger scale, which culminated in the Exercise TIGER, at the time the largest military exercise ever conducted on the UK. In his capacity as Commander of South-Eastern Army he was responsible for planning part of the Dieppe Raid but considered it cancelled when it's window of opportunity had passed - it would be resurrected by Louis Mountbatten after Montgomery had been reassigned to command the 8th Army in Egypt.
Brings to mind McClellan, no claim as parallel. McClellan trained a superb army , but appeared constitutionally unwilling to commit them. Montgomery was able to commit to battle, but my, untrained non-professional opinion is that there have been better stratigists. His not realilizing the the road infrastrucure was extremely iffy to expedite the relief forces in Market Garden is one of his true failures.
Yeah, he won so many battles in the South-Eastern Army and saying he had anything to do with planning Dieppe is like kissing a pig! For Monty it would have to be a male pig!
@@mgt2010fla I was filling a big gap in Montgomery's career that the video left out by jumping straight from Dunkirk to Egypt. I was not attempting to do anything other than that. It would be completely wrong to ignore the more controversial aspects of Montgomery's life and career and to pretend he never did anything wrong or deny he had any part in any failed operations. As such I though it was important to recognize that he had a part in planning the Dieppe Raid. I'm am no so insecure in my thoughts and beliefs that I am unable to recognize the faults in the careers generals I think highly of.
"... ruthless in removing those ... wanting." A lesson that Grant found difficult, but learned. Critical skill for those in positions where thousands of lives are at stake.
@@inyobill The failure of MARKET GARDEN can be attributed to many "trained professional" including IKE who was adamant about advancing toward Berlin in a "Broad Front". What changed Ike's mind?
Monty was perfectly happy to fight to the "last Canadian". Yeah, that is probably from "up high" (b/c the Brits were running short on men...after many years at war!) However, b/c of Ultra, he was "reading the mail" of the enemy....so his "big win" had some help. In Sicily, he couldn't deal with the fact that "his" area wasn't making progress (b/c of extensive Axis resistance!). so he commandeered the east/west highway that had been delegated toUS Army units...which, eventually led to the successful evacuation of MANY of the Axis units (e.g. Hermann Goering Division, etc.) that the Allies would have to fight later in Italy. The fact that he says that Operation Market Garden (which would have been BRILLIANT if it had worked!!!) was the fault of the Canadians (and Military Intelligence and I presume, code breakers) is embarrassing. After all, he claimed it was "90% successful"...in a field where things are binary: win or lose...no points for "style"...should be a disqualification of him from ANY "Best General" list.
Not many people realise even in WW2 British military casualities were 1.6 times higher than any of the other Commonwealth nations (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India). No way intended to minimise the sacrifice of any of the Commonwealth forces, but just pointing out that the British usually had the highest casuality rates.
@@shanemcdowall Around 6 amoured divisions and 12 infantry. You then have the Desert Air Force and Royal Navy units in the Med. Another point to consider is that many commonwealth divisions also contained many British brigades (e.g. 4th Indian Infantry Division contained 4th British Armoured Brigade in 1941). And then on a brigade level, many of the battalions were British (e.g. 5th Indian Infantry Brigade contained 1st Battalion Royal Fusiliers, Welsh Regiment, Essex Regiment at various stages throughout 1941).
@@thebrigadier1496 12 British Infantry divisions. Can you name them? There is the 70th and later the 51st Highland. A few other brigades. Perhaps I have missed these other ten British infantry divisions. About 11,000 New Zealanders fought in the RAF, many in the Desert Air Force. The truth is that I am right. Most British infantry divisions spent June 1940 to June 1944 swanning around the British Isles.
@@shanemcdowall Get over the fact that you are called out on your nonsense by facts. It is clear your opinion is coloured by his appalling acts in Ireland, at least admit it as such.
The fog of war is the common saying, the ordinary soldier and the officers who lead them are the real heroes. No amount of strategy or tactics can predict any ultimate result in any battle.
Having read his biography, Montgomery had all the necessary traits and motivations in common with other excellent generals through out history. He was a student of history, especially military history; he was determined to learn in both theory and practice. He was an astute organisaer and logistician; and a meticulous planner. From his deployment with the BEF in France in 1940, through all his major campaigns to the end of the war, Monty thoroughly prepared and resisted political pressure to act before he was ready. These are all traits that historically correlate with good generalship. But where people are often unfair to Montgomery is that he was fighting and at times, succeeding, in defeating the Germans at a time when other nation states were collapsing in front of the German Army. The French had a massive army, that the Germans were able to quickly defeat, it took the Russians 6 months, a thousand kilometres of retreat and 5 million casualties to even blunt the Wermacht. The United States had a massive economic/industrial advantagte, and virtually unlimited manpower reserves - and by the time they were directly engaged with the Germans they were already in decline. Not so for Montgomery, he had none of these luxuries. He had inferior weaponry, limited reserves of manpower, no real strategic depth to work with (in France and North Africa); and on top of that, he fought the war from beginning to end; as a divisional commander to an army group commander. The German generals are given extreme amounts of credit despite losing. Patton is credited with being an excellent manuever commander, despite having virtually limitless reserves of men and materiel; Zhukov didn't manage a successful counteroffensive until 1943 - and at a horrific cost in lives. Even Rommel didn't really come close. The things that made Montgomery unpopular were ancillary political issues for which he shouldn't be responsible. For example, there was considerable outrage back in England when Monty suggested, in response to high rates of STIs his soldiers were getting from French prostitutes, that they use condoms. This caused considerable outrage back in England at the time - but both our present day standards and objective medical reality - this is the appropriate decision, and really is a bit of a no-brainer. Another issue that was raised was that in 1944 during a press interview, American commanders and observers, felt that "Monty was taking all the credit". Was this fair? Personally, I think not. The American generals were glory-hounds and were unduly sensitive to others getting attention over them. The behaviour of American senior commanders, such as Marshall, King and Eisenhower reek of Dunning-Kruger Sydnrome - they were unreasonably suspicious of British motives; when the reality was, most British commanders simply understood the war and Europe better than the Americans. This thesis is largely supported by the fact that American generals continued to behave in this way after the war, including in Korea. Even today, Americans have a rather inflated opinion of their martial prowess, despite all the factual information to the contrary. To conclude, Montogomery was probably better than the history books give him credit for. Most of his detractors disliked him for political, rather than performance reasons, and any smears on his conduct of the war were derived from those political motives. He was one of the only field commanders to fight through the entire war with any degree of success; he successfully resisted pressure form Churchill to carry out his campaigns as was required. His political/media naivety probably relfected on him slightly higher as a general, because he simply told people the facts of the situation. It is considered by some that Monty might have what we call today "Aspbergers" which is why some reported that he could be difficult socially to deal with; although this could be just as much a result of the culture clash between the two allies. I'd rate him as easily the best commander of the entire war.
Great post. I fully agree. With regards to Montgomery taking credit, this was the press conference during the Battle of the Bulge, and his comments were cherry picked and edited later. He actually praised the American soldiers and Eisenhower in that conference, but that was later conveniently ignored. The thing is, Montgomery only held that conference to support Eisenhower, who was getting criticised in the British press, so Montgomery gave him some support, calling Eisenhower the "team captain". Additionally, in all previous conferences, neither Bradley or Patton made any mention of Montgomerys role in the Bulge. They both gave the impression that Bradley was in overall command of all armies. They did not acknowledge Montgomery. This reached a zenith on January 5th 1945 when Beddell Smith had to issue a SHAEF press release stating that Montgomery was in command of US 1st and 9th Armies and had been since December 20th. So when Montgomery only talked about himself, Eisenhower and the American and British soldiers and did not mention Bradley (and Patton), well he was only doing the same thing that Bradley and Patton had been doing for weeks. None of that is remembered now, only that Montgomery credited himself.
Do you have a Monty shrine in your bedroom? Yamashita, Zhukov, Nimitz, and Kuribayashi all were better leaders in WWII! Von Rundstedt, Kovev, and Rommel, and von Manstein were also better because each had dealt with winning and losing during the war yet held their troops together! Monty never had to deal with that kind of defeat, because he never faced that kind of opposition, except at Caen, where the Americans saved his ass! The Americans joined the war in Europe "when the Germans were already in decline". What are you smoking, share! If it wasn't for the American's the British would be speaking German! Not sure there would be any change of the quality of the menu! The US not only made the weapons of war needed by Britian, but kept their economy afloat with importing raw materials so their factories could run, brought in foodstuffs to keep the British from starving. Supplied shipping, invasion craft, repaired British ships in US ports, supplied almost ALL the naval aircraft for British aircraft carriers! I could do this all day! Monty claimed every victory that was won as his doing, and every lose he had he blamed someone else! Caen? Monty! Falaise? Monty! Failure to open Antwerp to the sea? Monty! Monty CLAIMED that the "groups of British armies" turned the tide on the northern part of the Bulge! ONE BRITISH DIVISION helped with the Battle of the Bulge! Monty fought to the last man of the 1st US Army during the Bulge, and when he claimed at a press conference it was Monty! Churchill had to correct the record, on the floor of the House of Commons, that the Bulge was the greatest American battle of Western Europe! British historians Beevor and Hastings say the same thing, as does Ryan and Ambrose. (I can supply the books, pages, and quotes to back my comments up. There are right behind me on the bookshelf! I noticed you don't back up any of your comments with any sources! Usual for Monty fans!) Eisenhower, Bradley, Hodges and Gerow were not "glory hounds" and even Patton wasn't as bad as Monty! The British author Hasting in "Armageddon" the British could have learned how to fight a war from the Americans if they weren't so sure their way was the best! Or the only way! It wasn't! Monty thought THE ONLY WAY TO WIN was by HIM leading the way, with a couple of US Armies to lead the way and with maximum US logistical support at the expense of all other units! Monty wanted to sit nearly ONE MILLIION US TROOPS ON THEIR ASS so he could win, or lengthen, the war in the West! It wouldn't have worked because as Hastings points out in the same book, there was no way to supply anything close to that many troops on such a narrow road system. He was correct! Look forward to your reply, with sources, or at authors and book titles. No biographies, they are not good source material, tend to be a bit bias!
Montgomery's largest victory was El Alamein and he used the guy in charge before him plan. Caen was his day one goal but it took him 2 months to take the city. Market Garden counted on using a single narrow road which could never work. After the was a hotel in London served a Montgomery martini which was 16 parts gin to 1 part vermouth. When asked why, they said those are the numbers advantage he needed to attack.
Monty fought Alamein when he was ready. ...... My late father was an officer on HM Submarine Torbay sinking Rommel's supply ships. ...... Monty was, it is true, slow on the follow up, but he won at Wadi Akrit, too, and turned the old line of Italian fortifications. ...... The terrain was very difficult indeed. Normandy. ...... Caen ITSELF had no value to the Allies, except as a road junction and railhead they might deny the Germans. ...... The value of successfully taking Caen lay in being BEYOND Caen, and able to dominate the terrain there, and force the Germans to attack. ...... Without Caen taken, the plan was still the same - force the Germans into a war of attrition they could never win. Monty always intended that British and Canadian forces would hold the vast majority of German armour, leaving the Americans an easier task, as they faced far less armour. ...... Bearing in mind that much of the British and Canadian force had never seen action, and were facing Germans who had seen 5 years of war, it is hardly surprising that learning how to fight in a modern war would take time. ...... The Americans were left free to break out, and although not fully closed, the Falaise pocket was a charnel house of dead Germans and horses, and a scrapyard of destroyed or abandoned equipment. Once Eisenhower took over as Land Commander, there was a lack of grip and understanding on what was required. ...... Logistics almost fell apart as the armies moved east. ...... Monty saw the Holland / Arnhem route to Germany as the route closest to sources of supply. ...... He could have taken Antwerp first, allowing the Germans time to recover on the approaches to the Rhine. ...... Instead, he proposed a bold strike through Arnhem. Had the Americans been able to see the advantages of having a bridgehead across the Rhine before Christmas 1944, and fully supported it in every way possible, it is possible that the war could have ended in 1944, and that Russian control over eastern Europe may have been less than it eventually was. Part of the American dislike of Monty stems from their abysmal trouncing by the German's in the Ardennes. ...... The Ardennes are a defender's paradise, yet the Germans cut through the Americans like a knife through butter. ...... While Supreme Headquaters was in a flap, Monty cooly realised that a regrouping of forces was needed, including American forces under his command, to protect routes leading towards Antwerp, and prevent German access to huge supply dumps near the Meuse. I believe that Monty was genuine in saying that his rapid reaction to the German threat was an 'interesting challenge' ( or some similar words ), and that Americans were unduly sensitive over his comments at a press conference. ...... The truth is that Monty's dispositions were exactly right to meet the threat. ...... Impressive speed of action by Patton, plus the courage of the US paras, plugged the gap long enough for the German offensive to begin running out of fuel, and thus to lose momentum.
It has been pointed out in the comment above, but Caen was always intended to be where the British and Canadians would hold up German forces (90% of all German armour in that region of France) while the Americans could break out of Normandy and push the Allied front down to the south and then east. It was highly successful.
@@strongbrew9116 British forces had been training since 1939, and there were plenty of veterans, whereas the US Army in Normandy was mostly seeing battle for the fist time. ...... So it made sense to have the British and Canadians attract the majority of Germany's effort, while the Americans found their feet.
@@Inucroft I agree, Germas - in terms of actual combat experience - but the difference between them and the US forces was that they had been training longer, plus there were plenty of veterans, which speeds up the learning curve. ...... Not always - 7th Armoured found it hard to adapt to Normandy after the desert, for example.
I think Monty was a classic British general, expert at methodical, slow and steady, in the same vein as Wellington. He got the job done but given the superiority in numbers of men, equipment and particularly air power at his disposal, I think almost any of the Allied generals would have been successful. I certainly wouldn’t have fancied his chances if he had parity with the Germans.. he would have been found out as a plodder, and in the desert particularly would have lost his army.
not as accurate as your new guinea episodes. It was 21st Army group consisting of the 1st canadian army and 2nd british army in normandy which had a peak strength of 18 empire divisions (plus some polish ones), goodwood involved 5 british divisions. The plan posted before DDay included a breakout by the americans whilst fixing the armour before Caen (as that is teh direction it was going to come from. Montys problem was talking up what monty was doing particularly things like takeing Caen on day 1
The part about the battle of the bulge is straight up false. Montgomery came in as he was the highest ranking officer in the local area and his objective was to keep the American line whole while he bought up the British reserves to form a second defensive line so the Germans couldn’t break through and encircle like they had in the first battle of France. It was a German general who said Montgomerys contribution was that he turned the us front from a series of isolated holding actions into a unified front fighting to a singular battle plan. And the purpose of operation goodwood and the Normandy breakout is not in debate by historians. Pretty much every allied war diary says the plan was always that the British divisions would pin German forces in place at Caen so the US forces could break out without getting bogged down by german reserves.
A lot in this video is false. Montgomery wasn't fired from ground control. Eisenhower just decided he wanted to control everything. Nor did he blame the Canadians for Market Garden. In the Bulge, Montgomery never took credit for it all either. He actually highly praised the American soldiers and cited Eisenhower as the battle winning captain of the team. The press conference was only held by Montgomery in the first place to help Eisenhower, who was getting criticised in the British press for the American retreat there due to the failed broad front strategy.
I think that above all if it's true that he was the type of leader who led from the front, truly had a genuine love and respect for his men and they're lives and that the men under his leadership would truly follow him anywhere (which in my opinion is insanely underrated among qualifies of revered military leaders) kind of answers the question of whether he was truly a good leader or if he was hyped up due to the situation he was thrown into fighting in two world wars...the fact that a video is being made about him, one of many may I add, just managed to concrete his legend even more
Except its not true. This channel is honestly pretty bad. Its all surface level normie stuff. Did you know that their original channel is about Star Wars?
@@GeraltofRivia22 it's free content . We should be a bit more appreciative of hard working of others. We can say we disagree respectfully but no need to denigrate them.
Typical Montgomery, making a big show of dispelling defeatism when taking over the Eighth Army, when in reality Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith had already stopped Rommel, were handling Rommel's attacks and re-structuring the army into something more effective while re-supplying. People forget that the defeats had come when Auchinleck was theatre commander, not in the field. When he took over direct command of the army Rommel saw the difference. Dorman-Smith had predicted what would be Rommel's big attack and laid plans, which Monty used without acknowledgement. Auchinleck's major failing was the trust he placed in his subordinate generals, but when he stepped in to bail them out he proved himself. His other failing was perhaps his relations with the Australians, who rebelled against him and cost him the opportunity to destroy Rommel's stranded armour at El Alamein. Montgomery was a great self-publicist, not unheard of for a general, but doing it by trash-talking his predecessor leaves a bad taste in the mouth. Both Churchill and Montgomery were a little dishonest in their memoirs, something which particularly enraged Dorman-Smith who took legal action. Dorman-Smith was sidelined after Alamein but performed brilliantly in Italy, something which really irked many of his plodding contemporaries. Monty had his strengths, but if you were looking for the best British General of the war I'd suggest Bill Slim. Slim wasn't handed an army in the ascendancy, which Monty was contrary to his self-serving rhetoric, he took an army on the retreat, managed their retreat ,moulded them into a force which stopped the enemy and then launched a successful offensive. He did this in a theatre which was very much second choice when it came to handing out materiel.
The 8th Army was in a pretty bad state before Montgomery took over. Montgomery turned it around overnight, due to instilling greater moral and more vigorous training. Montgomery also got rid of mindless cavalry like tank charges and instead placed far greater emphasis on artillery and closer ground to air co-ordination. You'll note that Alam el Halfa was the first time the British did not suffer disproportionate tank losses against Rommel. Rommel's second in command, von Mellenthin, agreed the 8th Army needed a change and that Auchinleck was right to be replaced. He said Auchinleck constantly failed to make his subordinates do as he wanted them to do and that Montgomery instilled a far greater will on those under his command in a manner that Auchinleck was lacking. Von Mellenthin called Montgomery the best tactician if not strategist of the war. Montgomery was by some way the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander. You cannot compare him with Slim. Apples and oranges. Two completely different theatres and two completely different opposition. Its mere opinion that Slim was the best British commander. Its established fact that Montgomery was the most successful. Nobody, absolutely nobody, did more to help win the ground war in the west than Bernard Montgomery.
From Von Mellenthin: Panzer Battles, Chapter IX Farewell To Africa, pages 137/138. "During August we heard of important changes of command on the British side. General Alexander had replaced Auchinleck and General Montgomery had taken over command of Eighth Army. There can be no question that the fighting efficiency of the British improved vastly under the new leadership, and for the first time Eighth Army had a commander who really, made his will felt throughout the whole force. Montgomery is undoubtedly a great tactician, circumspect and thorough in making his plans, utterly ruthless in carrying them out. He brought a new spirit to Eighth Army, and illustrated once again the vital importance of personal leadership in war" Von Mellenthin also writes about Auchinleck on the same pages "Auchinlech was an excellent strategist with many of the qualities of a great commander but he seems to have failed in tactical detail, or perhaps in ability to make his subordinates do what he wanted. His offensives were costly, unsuccessful and from a tactical point of view extremely muddled. In the light of the July battles I think Churchill acted wisely in making a change"
Eric Dorman-Smith may indeed have been a brilliant military theorist but he was regarded as a sinister influence by most of the professional British/Commonwealth officers because he was attempting to introduce into their armies ideas which their forces had neither the training, equipment nor doctrine to successfully execute. Alan Brooke wrote of Dorman-Smith that he "had a most fertile brain, continually producing new ideas, some of which (not many) were good and the rest useless." which reflected the general attitude towards him from his peers. It was Dorman-Smith's influence over Auchinleck that Brooke attributed to the 8th's poor tactical performance. To make matters worse, Dorman-Smith was not only the kind of arsehole who believed he was the only person with the right ideas and that everyone else was a blithering idiot, but also the kind of arsehole who made up petty and insulting nicknames about people he didn't like and refered to them by those nicknames publically and to their face, which made him no friends or allies within the military and certainly contributed to his somewhat lack-luster career despite his recognized intellect.
Let's remember, Ike and the Senior British Officers wanted him relieved in Normandy. Churchill said no, but only because the British press had built him up to be this great General. Yes he did a good job as a Division Commander in France in 1940, but I think that he actually peaked at that position. He got lucky in North Africa. He got there when the British Army finally was up to strength and had a huge amount of new equipment and supplies that they had not had before. They also had, had time to do some training up with their new equipment. He made out his battle plan and then Ultra delivered him the German's complete battle plan. Also, Rommel had previously had access to all British plans, disposition of forces and supply situation...that had ended by then. He actually wanted to use his original battle plan until his senior subordinates convinced him to change it to counter the intercepted German plan. He had his plusses and minuses, but he definitely got promoted above his skill level. Look at Good Wood and Market Garden and the casualties there. Also remember, Rommel was not nearly as wonderfully smart as he is give credit for...he did not or could not think strategically, only tactically.
@@Curmudgeon2 ‘Let's remember, Ike and the Senior British Officers wanted him relieved in Normandy. Churchill said no, but only because the British press had built him up to be this great General.’ Your words. As far as I can see, Montgomery kept his job in Normandy because he was easily the most competent senior allied commander there. Eisenhower had made mess of planning the Italian campaign, Bradley, and Devers had not planned any sort of campaign. None of those three even had any personal combat experience to bring to the problem. This from the supposed ring-leader of any attempt to get Montgomery removed from the command of allied land forces: WITH PREJUDICE The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder G.C.B. CASSELL & COMPANY 1966 P 563 According to the diary of Eisenhower’s aide, Captain Butcher, I told the Supreme Commander on the evening of 19 July that Montgomery had in effect, stopped his armour from going farther. Later, I am reported as saying that he British Chiefs of Staff would ‘support any recommendation that Ike might care to make with respect to Monty for not succeeding in going places with his big three-armoured division push I am sure that this record is misleading for although I strongly disapproved of Montgomery’s action, it was quite beyond my powers to speak in the name of the British Chief’s of Staff.’ ARTHUR BRYANT TRIUMPH IN THE WEST 1943-46 COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959 P243 July 27th. “There is no doubt that Ike is all out to do all he can to maintain the best relations between British and Americans. But it is equally clear that Ike knows nothing about strategy. Bedell Smith, on the other hand, has brains but no military education in its true sense. He is certainly one of the best American officers but still falls far short when it comes to strategic outlook. With that Supreme Command set-up it is no wonder that Monty’s real high ability is not always realised. Especially so when ‘national’ spectacles pervert the perspective of the strategic landscape.” ’ P244 ‘ “It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war! I drew his attention to what your basic strategy has been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw Germans on to the flank whilst you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the armour had continuously been kept against the British. He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch a major offensive on each front simultaneously. I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy was 2½ times that on the Russian front whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% Russian superiority on eastern front. Such a procedure would definitely not fit in with our strategy of mopping up Brest by swinging forward western flank.” ’ SIR BRIAN HORROCKS CORPS COMMANDER Sidgwick & Jackson LONDON 1977 Page 53 ‘Sir Brian Horrocks Comments: Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’ CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948 P282 ‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’ More to follow...
Andrew Adams ‘Yes he did a good job as a Division Commander in France in 1940, but I think that he actually peaked at that position.’ Your words. ARTHUR BRYANT THE TURN OF THE TIDE 1939-43 COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1957 P 107-08 ' In taking over the 1st Division I was for the first time having the experience of having Alexander working under me. It was a great opportunity . . . to see what he was made of, and what an admirable commander he was when in a tight place. It was intensely interesting watching him and Monty during those trying days, both of them completely imperturbable and efficiency itself, and yet two totally different characters. Monty with his quick brain for appreciating military situations was well aware of the very critical situation that he was in, and the very dangers and difficulties that faced us acted as a stimulus on him; they thrilled him and put the sharpest of edges on his military ability. Alex, on the other hand, gave me the impression of never fully realising all the very unpleasant potentialities of our predicament. He remained entirely unaffected by it, completely composed and appeared never to have the slightest doubt that all would come right in the end. It was in those critical days that the appreciation I made of those two commanders remained rooted in my mind and resulted in the future selection of these two men to work together in the triumphal advance from Alamein to Tunis.' So there you have it. Alanbrooke saw Montgmomery (and Alexander), in the eye of the storm in 1940 , and knew that they were men would perform when the chips were down. More to follow...
Andrew Adams ‘He got lucky in North Africa. He got there when the British Army finally was up to strength and had a huge amount of new equipment and supplies that they had not had before. They also had, had time to do some training up with their new equipment. He made out his battle plan and then Ultra delivered him the German's complete battle plan. Also, Rommel had previously had access to all British plans, disposition of forces and supply situation...that had ended by then.’ Your words. ‘He actually wanted to use his original battle plan until his senior subordinates convinced him to change it to counter the intercepted German plan.’ Your words. Montgomery’s predecessor as Eighth Army commander had enjoyed a marked advantage over the Axis in men and equipment numbers, and had been receiving ULTRA information, but the troops under his command had been broken up into too many smaller units, and there was a major morale problem: ARTHUR BRYANT THE TURN OF THE TIDE 1939-43 COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1957 PART TWO THE WINNING OF THE INITIATIVE CHAPTER NINE. A MOMENTOUS JOURNEY P 475 ‘without consulting Cairo, he issued immediate orders that, if Rommel attacked, all units should fight on the ground where they and that there should be no withdrawal or surrender. The effect on the Army was electric.’ P 478 ‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence-a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’ WINSTON S CHURCHILL. THE SECOND WORLD WAR. CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950. VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE BOOK II Africa Redeemed Chapter XXIX: Return to Cairo P464 ‘Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’ GENERALS AT WAR MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DE GUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. HODDER AND STOUGHTON 1964 P 188 ‘I have always considered that Montgomery’s first two or three days with his Army was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life, and the way in which he put over his personality, right through the Army, was really remarkable. Besides talking to the staff and laying down what he called his ‘military philosophy’, he met all Commanders and their troops and, of course, examined in great detail the ground now held and that over which we would have to fight. I accompanied him during the reconnaissances which resulted in decisions as to the way he proposed to dispose his forces for the defensive battles which we all expected. It would be Rommel’s last desperate to reach the Delta, and failure would remove once and for all the threat to our Middle East Base.’ Here is German Generalmajor FW von Mellenthin on Montgomery: "Montgomery when he arrived in Africa changed the way the 8th army fought, he was a very good army trainer and was ruthless in his desire to win, he changed the battle into an infantry battle supported by artillery. The only disagreement between Montgomery and his subordinate commanders, took place during the battle, and was about where the point of attack should be in order to create the breakthrough for the armoured reserve. ‘He had his plusses and minuses, but he definitely got promoted above his skill level.’ Your words. If that is so, god help the allies if Bradley, Devers and Eisenhower had been left to get on with things. ‘Look at Good Wood and Market Garden and the casualties there.’ Your words. GOODWOOD (Good Wood) casualties were little different in scale to other allied operations in Normandy: Saint-Lô, BLUECOATS, and so on. MARKET GARDEN’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
‘Also remember, Rommel was not nearly as wonderfully smart as he is give credit for...he did not or could not think strategically, only tactically.’ Your words. Perhaps you are right? Who can say? Not me. I never met him, nor have I taken part in a war.
Montgomery was not a gambling man and he made sure his men were meticulously trained and that he had enough material and manpower for any given task. It is little wonder why Eisenhower gave him the planning of D-day.
Me a Canadian mmm, squint eyes (Dieepe raid, Rome, Little Stalingrad, Major Leo, battle of the Scheldt, multi stage Amphibious assaults'. not learning from D-day, were airborne troops are better if sped out in a wide arrays. Canadians forced to retreat, to cover the British during D-day, we were all pretty much drunk at that point.
@@thebrigadier1496 "The Royal Air Force, however, refused to land any troops so close to Arnhem, and so Lathbury sought an alternative. His solution was to take Major Gough's 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron under his command and charge them with undertaking a coup de main. This unit, consisting of one hundred and eighty men, were all mounted on Jeeps which were vulnerable to enemy fire but armoured with powerful twin-Vickers "K" Machine Guns. Although completely unsuited to the purpose, the Squadron was expected to face only minimal opposition and so should have little difficulty in racing to the Bridge, as soon as their vehicles had been unloaded from their gliders, and holding it until the leading elements of the 1st Parachute Brigade arrived several hours later." Pegasus Archive Market Garden The Plan page
I have since my Teenage days virtually Worshiped Field Marshal Montgomery as A Great Leader of Men and A Mighty General for whom Nothing WAS Impossible! Retired Ambassador HVSManral.
Patton was not an expert on mobile warfare at that time. Before the invasion of Sicily he had only been in 2 battles against axis forces in North Africa . He lost one and won one. But not on his own, there were also British, NZ, Indian and South African forces involved too, and they were much more experienced an Patton and his men. Monty cared about the health and wellbeing of his men and Patton only cared about the result, not cost.
No the battle of El Guettar Patton commanded. kasserine pass was commanded by Loyd Fredendall. Since you don't read History Patton's forces took both Palermo and Messina while monty montied
@@bigwoody4704 Sorry, since you don’t read English - I wasn’t talking about who was in command of the overall operations, and I clearly said “before the invasion of Sicily”- I was explaining his lack of real experience at the time. He had espoused a lot of theory, and written a book on it, but hadn’t put any of it into practice yet.. Until you have put that theory into action and proven it correct, you are no expert. Expert he wasn’t, yet, but after time spent on the Italian campaign, he certainly gained a lot of experience. Also Patton may have taken Palermo and Messina - but he did it by ignoring his superiors and doing his own thing. He was lucky no-one else was relying on him to follow instructions, otherwise he could have been responsible of the deaths of 1000s - then how would history look upon him. He came very close to being sent back to America in disgrace. “Monty Montied” - you mean he cared about his men and didn’t want to waste lives unnecessarily. A lesson learnt with Britain having been at war for about 3.5 years in North Africa before the Americans got involved, and had been successful in beating Rommel back to the east toward the American forces.
@@bruceironside1105 Monty got 1100 paras and airman killed in ONE DAY crossing the Rhine,look that up my royal revisionist friend. That ass cared for a headline Caen and Market Garden also he was given all the supplies and preference IKE could possibly give mediocre at best Britain had much better commanders. Patton was tank commander at the end of WW1,he studied the emerging concept between wars.America had been fighting in the Pacific also. Try looking up Britains bullshit - in Sicily Alexander gave the inside paved road 124 to Montgomery that was in the American operating sector that was ignoring allied protocol. And Patton twice flanked Kesselrings forces along the northshore with Gen. Lucian Truscott 3rd Division & Lt. Col. Lyle Bernard led the 2d Battalion using amphibious landings around the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division. And you try reading An Army at Dawn,Desert Generals or watch the video on YT - it's in English . And Monty reaped the benefits of those who came before him in the desert O'Connor and Auchinleck were good commanders and winston had no business sticking his nose into their command which unfortunately led to the position falling to monty which never should have happened. By the time Bernard showed up allied advantages were such that even he couldn't faff it up. British Imperial holdings in the middle east was of no concern of the American people or it's army . Actually neither was the war in Europe - it is the reasons millions left for these shores - paying the butchers bill in feudal systems for princes and lords and the rest of the caslte's inhabitants three and half years? British forces being "evacuated" from: Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940 Greece, Crete,Hong Kong and Libya in 1941 Tobruk and Dieppe,Singapore in 1942 OKAY
I love the part in the movie Patton where the germans get the news, "Patton has taken Palermo" and the reaction is "Damn!" Then Monty gets the news of Patton taking Palermo and his reaction is, "DAMN!" I don't know if it was true but it sure was funny.
Pithy wanker Patton took Palermo and Messina while monty montied. Try using the address bar at the top of the page to relieve other of furthering you education
Patton's race to Palermo was a good photo op, but it allowed 100,000 enemy troops to escape to the mainland with their heavy equipment. Why do you think Patton was sidelined after Sicily? For bad media optics?
The best General of the war. A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2: ♦ Battle of Alam Halfa; ♦ Second Battle of El Alamein; ♦ Battle of El Agheila; ♦ Battle of Tripoli; ♦ Battle of Medenine; ♦ Battle of the Mareth Line; ♦ Battle of Wadi Akarit; ♦ Allied invasion of Sicily- the largest seaborne invasion in history before Normandy; ♦ Battle of the Sangro River; ♦ Operation Overlord - the largest seaborne invasion in history; ♦ Operation Market Garden ♦Battle of Overloon ♦Operation Pheasant- took 60 miles of German held territory, liberated Eindhoven and Nijmegen, along with many towns and protected Antwerp. This created a narrow salient that ran from the north of Belgium across the south-east of the Netherlands. The Allies then cleared the German forces from the region between Antwerp and the Maas securing allied supply lines. In addition the offensive completely cut off the Germans who were left holding their positions at the mouth of the Scheldt River, which the Aliies then cleared, opening it up for shipping. Over 40,000 German troops capitulated. ♦ Battle of the Bulge; ♦ Operation Veritable; ♦ Operation Plunder - the greatest river assault crossing of all time. Not only did Monty replan and serve as Allied Ground Forces Commander for Overlord, the largest seaborne born invasion in history, he also replanned the Alllied invasion of Sicily, the largest seaborne invasion in history before that. _”Had the Sicily landings proved - as Salerno and Anzio would prove - near-disasters, then history might well have cast Eisenhower and Alexander in the same noble but failed mound as their predecessors in the Middle East, Auchinleck and Wavell. It is for this reason surely that General Dempsey, on his deathbed, referred to Sicily as Monty’s ‘finest hour’ - for Monty alone among the senior Allied military commanders had the courage to refuse to carry out an ill-conceived plan, and to insist that, if tackled, the invasion be mounted properly. Though he would be pilloried by the ignorant or envious, and his motives made out to be megalomaniacal rather than military, the accusations tell us more about his accusers than about Monty. As one British colonel - not friendly towards Monty - would later remark: I find those who criticise Monty loudest are so uniformly second-rate that I prefer not to make my own views known!….”_ -Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944 In Normandy Monty was in command of all ground forces and was the architect of the 5 beach invasion plan and the overall strategy of the campaign. The plan Overlord by Frederick Morgan was revised by Montgomery, like the original plan for the invasion of Sicily. Both would have led to complete disaster before Monty’s revision. This is something a lot of people don’t seem to be aware of. Monty was the one that made the Overlord plan what it was. The plan was originally just 3 divisions and army Corp landing on some beaches together. He changed the plan from 3 to 5 beaches and from 3 divisions to 8 correctly arguing that 3 beachheads would’ve been too narrow a front and such an attack could be easily rolled up on both flanks. And instead of some airborne brigades, it should be 3 airborne divisions to assist while each army Corp of the British and Americans should have their own beaches to ease organization. And he emphasized Cherbourg as the key. The Allies prevailed in Normandy using Monty’s invasion plan and his ground strategy. On Normandy: _”That the COSSAC plan for a 3-divisional assault in ‘Overlord’ was a recipe for disaster now seems undeniable. Had Alexander been appointed to command the land forces in the invasion, would Morgan’s COSSAC plan have been enacted? Monty was not alone in recognizing its flaws, as will be seen, but he was alone in having the courage and conviction to see that it was thrown out and a better plan adopted. He had done so at Alam Halfa, he had done so gain over ‘Husky’ and whatever mud was slung at him, he was determined that he would do so over ‘Overlord’. For Morgan’s ‘Overlord’ plan, the result of one and a half years of research and discussions, had no prospect of succeeding, as Morgan’s planners themselves confessed…_ _….and by presenting such a clearly defined strategic plan for the battle thereplan can be no doubt that Monty brought to his Allied land, sea and air forces a unity of purpose and conception that was remarkable - and often confused later with Eisenhower’s role as Supreme Commander.”_ -Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944
John Burns You bent freak those were allied victories where the little tosser happened to be mentioned in.The Allies provided such massive advantages that even the tart bernard couldn't faff it up.The imbalance was so one sided that even a losided loon like you would have succeded ♦Claude Auchinleck had won just one month earlier against the same army and he had none of the massive advantages the allies built up by the middle of august ♦Monty didn't bring over the fresh divisions from the Nile Delta Claude Auchinleck did ♦Montgomery really should have been appointed.General Gott's plane was shot down and Auchilech and Dorman-Smith lined the massive mine fields on the Ridge of Alam Halfa( that Bernard later attempted to take credit for) and also shored up defense line by the Qattara Depression to the south which was impassable to mechanized armor at El Alamein creating a choke point. ♦Monty didn't bring The Torch Landings forces that included 60,000 troops in Morocco, 15,000 in Tunisia, and 50,000 in Algeria - IKE did that. which Forced Rommel's hand as now there would be more enemy troops to deal with. ♦The BEF had 1,100 tanks and 225,000 men and FDR agreed to send Churchill after Trobruk - the 300 tanks and 100 - 105 mm Howitzers,not Monty ♦The allied supply port of Alexandria was 100 miles away,The Axis supply port was 1,000 miles away in Tripoli.Also factor in complete Air Superiority provided by Air marshall Conningham - Rommel had to move at dark to keep his columns from being strafed and obliterated.Monty didn't arrange that either ♦The RN & RAF in the Mediterranean strangle all the supplies sent ♦ULTRA was fully operational in August 1942 Blechley made that possible not Monty ♦Rommel had 200 tanks,90,000 men ,low on fuel,food, water Here you go john Burns they will lead you out of your land of make believe *ua-cam.com/video/duOYnIGivys/v-deo.html* ua-cam.com/users/sgaming/emoji/7ff574f2/emoji_u2666.png *Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188* Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front! *The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61"Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself.* Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed" *The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 521 Montgomery was in a position to profit by the bitter experience of his predecessors .While supplies on our side had been cut to a trickle ,American and British ships were bringing vast quantities on materials to North Africa .Many times greater than either his predecessors had ever had.* His principle was to fight no battle unless he knew for certain that he would win it .Of course that is a method which will only work given material superiority - but that he had. He was undoubtedly more of a strategist than a tactician. Command of a mobile battle force was not his strong point British officers made the error off planning operations according to what was strategically desirable ,rather than what was tactically attainable.
Definitely the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander.
Here you two cyber psychos on the same account More Monty victims Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013 Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013 John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013 John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013 John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013 TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013 Isn't that right Cornell,err,I mean Lyndon
He hated working with the Americans yet a naval invasion of continental Europe even Sicily was not possible without them, the UK never had a chance in land battles against any of the great powers in Europe by itself.
What nonsense. Every comment he made about American troops was positive. He got along well with Patton, Hasbrouk & Gavin both spoke highly of him (and he of them). Where do people get these silly ideas?
The amusement continues, you chode - it was Churchill's idea.The "soft underbelly" more like the soft spot on your head where your were dropped What other rare gems have you mined for us today,you poltroon?
In Italy Montgomery was always slow. In north Africa, after 2nd Alamein, he let a beaten, poorly supplied, enemy get away virtually unmolested. Major failings. I've heard a story, can't remember where, that Montgomery wanted command in Europe and opposed almost everything that he didn't propose. Eventually someone, again, can't remember who, told him that if they replaced Eisenhower it would be with Viscount Slim, not him. He got the point immediately. Slim may be the most unknown excellent Allied general of the war.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- It wasn't virtually destroyed. They fought well when given the time to get supplies. Besides, 'virtually destroyed' isn't good enough.
@@stephennewton2223 According to Historian Matthew Cooper only 5,000 troops of the 116,000 Africa Corps survived the battles against the Eighth army. Quote *"When the Panzerarmee arrived, the Afrika Korps had only 5,000 men, 35 tanks, 16 armoured cars, 12 anti-tank guns, 12 field howitzers"* That's 111,000 Axis troops, killed, wounded, and evacuated from Libya. So no, they did get destroyed. In contrast Montgomerys army only suffered a mere 13,000 casualties.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- My reading is that is not what was left after the battle. That is the number who reached Tunisia....I think that is where they ended up. They lost thousands because of their poor supply state. The British pursuit seems to have been very poorly handled. Poor air/ground cooperation and poorly handled logistics.
@@stephennewton2223 You must be from an alternate reality because the history in ours in pretty much the complete opposite of what you just posted. Monty's pursuit of Rommel over North Africa was done in record time without ever strectching the supply train beyond its limit.
One thing you kinda glossed over with Normandy stuff is that before D-Day there was correspondence between him Ike and Churchill that make it seem like at least the latter two were under the impression that Caen was supposed to fall in a couple days. It was only after the fact that Monty was like “yep two month battle of attrition that was the plan all along” and a lot of historians look at that and are like “yep mr ‘master plan’ over there is full of it”. It was basically the same bs he tried to pull with Market Garden but he doesn’t get nearly as much heat about Caen.
One of the most frequent criticisms made of Montgomery was him being "slow" around Caen and failing to take it on time. He is also frequently criticised for telling Eisenhower and the Allied High Command one thing about his plans and intention while either having something completely different in mind in practice or else saying something different about it after the fact. I might argue that Cean is, in fact, a stronger example of Monty drawing criticism for his...questionable relationship with the truth than MARKET GARDEN because he was ultimately successful in Normandy despite the tactical set-backs while his attempt to take Arnhem resulted in a defeat, therefore the "Bridge Too Far" is a self-evidence example of a failure in his generalship while the actions around Caen are overshadowed by the victory of OVERLORD that was achieved ahead of schedule.
@Joseph-lj4sp I think you'll find that the Normandy portion of the Official History of the Canadian Army, by Colonel Charles Perry Stacey (the author) provides ample evidence demonstrating a holding action in the Caen sector was always part of Montgomery's plan. Taken from *"Appreciation on Possible Development of Operations to Secure a Lodgement Area" produced by 21st Army Group Planning, May 7th, 1944 (one month before D-Day).* This was forwarded to the First US Army Group, among others, on the 18th May under a covering letter which reads in part, *"With regard to the outline of action at Part IV, this represents the Commander In Chief' (Montgomery's) intentions as far as they can be formulated at this stage."* *Page 83 of the Official History of the Canadian army - The Victory Campaign by Colonel Charles Perry Stacey, Department of National defence* *IV. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS* Quote "The type of country immediately South of the initial bridgehead does not favour a rapid advance. The Allied build-up relative to the estimated German build-up indicates that a period may supervene round about D+14, when there will be a grave risk of operations stabilising on a line which gives the Germans advantages in defence. The greatest energy and initiative will be required at this period to ensure the enemy is not allowed to stabilise his defence." "Once through the difficult bocage country, greater possibilities for manoeuvre and for the use of armour begin to appear. *Our aim during this period should be to contain the maximum enemy forces facing the Eastern flank of the bridgehead, and to thrust rapidly toward Rennes.* "On reaching Rennes our main thrust should be towards Vannes; but diversionary thrusts with the maximum use of deception should be employed to persuade the enemy that our object is Nantes." *If, at this time, the enemy weakens his Eastern force to oppose us North of Redon, a strong attack should be launched toward the Seine.* " Part IV continues, advocating alternating attacks on the Eastern and Western flanks of the bridgehead in reaction to German reinforcement moves, in order to bring German reinforcements sent to the American front back to the British front. Thus it is fairly clear that Montgomery intended before ever landing to hold in the East and strike in the West.
@Joseph-lj4sp 'One thing you kinda glossed over with Normandy stuff is that before D-Day there was correspondence between him Ike and Churchill that make it seem like at least the latter two were under the impression that Caen was supposed to fall in a couple days.' What correspondence? I have never seen it. The undertaking that Montgomery gave for Normandy was for the allies to be at the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78. As regards Caen. This, from an eye witness to Montgomery's briefing to allied leaders on the 15th May, 1944, at St Paul's school, West London: OPERATION VICTORY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O. HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947 P 393 ‘I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen .' On Montgomery's strategy for Normandy: ‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’ From US General Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story. ‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’ ‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled. From US General Dwight D Eisenhower's Crusade in Europe. And Alanbrooke to Montgomery, 28/07/23: ‘ “It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war! I drew his attention to what your basic strategy has been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw Germans on to the flank whilst you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the armour had continuously been kept against the British. He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch a major offensive on each front simultaneously. I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy was 2½ times that on the Russian front whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% Russian superiority on eastern front. Such a procedure would definitely not fit in with our strategy of mopping up Brest by swinging forward western flank.” ’
@@thevillaaston7811 it’s pretty funny to me how you started that reply off like “those supposed allegations about Caen don’t exist” then proceeded to write an entire essay of random people trying to refute said allegations lol. Kinda contradicting yourself there my guy. If no one has ever claimed Monty wanted to take Caen in two days, why exactly do you think anyone felt the need to defend the fact he did it in two months instead?
@@andywilson2406 Monty never. Sasoboski was removed from his job as he refused to take his men in. He did eventually. But his refusal got him the sack by Brereton, an American, the commander of the army he was in, the First Allied Airborne Army.
Irving Burns you distorted wort, bernard getting stuck and sitting on his can at Caen for 43 days with the heaviest bombing of the Normandy Campaign is called cowering not commanding. They call that a Field Marshall in your land of make believe. But hey at least he finally crawled out of the channel - but then ran 3,000 miles away with the Germans right there. Ask the Czechs you threw under the bus at the Munich agreement in 1938.Were there any Czech representatives present during that particular cowardly British act? While the Royals cavorted on their estates playing polo,cricket,fox hunting whilst the yeomanry were forced mining precious metals/stones, and any other resources of value they could purloin from subjugated countries.
I heard a story that Montgomery had a meeting with Churchill and the King. After Montgomery had left, Churchill remarked ‘I think he’s after my job’. ‘Thank God’, replied the King, ‘I thought he was after mine!’
I thought that was Eisenhower instead of Churchill
@@AndrewMRoots No, I’m pretty sure it was Churchill.
Yep. And he would have done it better, although being better than Churchill would have been quite a job.
U
He was a bad general
I heard that after 28th May1940 when Belgium surrendered, Montgomery realised and there was now a 20 mile gap in the allied lines. Under Gort's direction he ordered the 3rd Division to march 20 miles overnight and form up as part of the defensive line in the eastern sector of the rapidly forming Dunkirk pocket. This action made a significant contribution to the defences at Dunkirk.
You are correct. This action is well known.
Von Mellenthin :
"Montgomery, who we first encountered in France in 1940 impressed us with his ability to fight by day and march by night".
@@lyndoncmp5751
From memory, I think Alanbrooke noted that probably, of the BEF, only Montgomery could have achieved the night march feat. Also, that Alanbrooke saw with his own eyes, in France in 1940, that Montgomery (and Alexander), could be trusted in extremely trying circumstances.
If any American half head comes on here trying to dispute this, I will trawl through both volumes of Alanbrooke's diaries and find the relevant bits.
From memory 🤣,ya you were posting since 2010 - at least - your words.Of course Google says 2013 - but what do they know? Alan Brooke is still drying channel water out of his eyes so he couldn't help monty with that German jackboot in his backside
@@bigwoody4704 What Brooke was doing at this time is very interesting and not so well known.
I think what Churchill actually said about Montgomery was: "magnanimous in defeat, insufferable in victory".
memonk11
'I think what Churchill actually said about Montgomery was: "magnanimous in defeat, insufferable in victory".'
Where is this on record ?
😄
@@thevillaaston7811: who cares… it sounds great. 🤣🤣🤣🤣
I think Monty wasn't brilliant but at the same time he was someone that got the job done despite his ego. He was someone Britain needed most at the time. That's how I see him.
He got the job done because he had far more resources than his opponents. Give him and Rommel equal fighting forces and supplies, and he would've been absolutely crushed.
@@GeraltofRivia22 I have two things to say on that. First, the hole point of his built up was to have more fighting forces than Rommel. Second, even if he had the entire army/air force of the British empire behind him it would be useless if he couldn't use them effectively, as the battle of Singapore showed, better a lion leading an army of sheeps than a sheep leading an army of lions
@@NP3GA I agree, he's not a terrible commander, just mediocre and used outdated tactics that only worked because of the troop and supply disparity. The saddest part is he was the best the Brits had to offer.
@@GeraltofRivia22 "Give him and Rommel equal fighting forces and supplies, and he would've been absolutely crushed."
The British had learned from their previous commanders' mistakes and were not going to fall for Rommels tactics....
@@NP3GA Would like to point out that while the British had superiority in the number of soldiers at Singapore, they were completely outnumbered in aircraft and had no tanks and virtually no anti-tank weaponry.
The Australian 9th division loved Montgomery because he was so much better than his predecessors. The Australian relationship with Auchinleck was particularly toxic.
The 9th division suffered 20% of the casualties at el Alamein despite numbering 10% of the men there but still retained faith in Montgomery's plan. They never doubted that they would in the end win the battle.
A good post.
@@thevillaaston7811 He was good at propaganda.
Just like the USA whats his name, with the pipe, no not popeye
probably Mcarthur
@@jacqueslheureux9161 ah but do you know how he used his knowledge? In the first world war 72k UK soldiers in hospital for trench foot, 450k for VD. In preparation 1939 to 1940 he sent out a letter with dry wit to tell officers to find authorised brothels in France that were medically checked to reduce troop losses 😁. He acted like he loved his men but they were a resource not to be wasted. Patton was just a Russian, his troops lives meant nothing only his chase for glory, he would have walked his troops over mines to bring a victory a day nearer, very much Russian doctrine.
@@michaelbarmby9105 Patton took over in Tunisia from an appaling US general. And did advance.
As a general it is difficult not to kill soldiers. Soldiers are walking dead per definition in wartime.
Patton had a very succes rate and against the germans, that was no mean feet in 42-44.
@@jacqueslheureux9161 really want you and the likes of Patton in charge. You made my point.
"Was he as good or as bad as history books claim?"
As with most any person in his position, the answer is yes. All generals are a complex and complicated mix of confidence, daring, caution, doubt and just about every other attribute you can think of.
Successful generals are revered, unsuccessful ones are disparaged but very often their success or failure is down to luck or factors beyond their control. As they say, history is written by the victors and so is tarnished by an admiration for one's own side but the truth is often muddier than that.
No one is ever as good nor as bad as they're made up to be. If you stepped forward and did the best you could with what you had and in the circumstances in which you found yourself, that's enough.
He was a publicity hound and you forget Enigma".
Sometimes your plan sucks or don't know when to stop throwing away lives. Or to cautious to end the battle causing more lives lost. A butcher.
Too be fair every now an again you get Generals like Cadorna or Hötzendorf who absolutely deserve the negative press they get
Viking FIST,
Patton and Hodges caused far more casualties when their sucky plans in the Lorraine and Hurtgen Forest kept on and on failing for months.
Well said, just human beings.
GOODWOOD did not get Montgomery fired as Ground Forces Commander.
The plan had always been for Eisenhower to take that role himself after OVERLORD's conclusion because the preponderance of American troops deployed in comparison to the British/Commonwealth meant, politically, that it would be unacceptable for a British Officer to remain in that post.
Saying that Monty was "fired" from this role implies that it was as a direct consequence of his actions while in command when in reality it was a decision made before the operation had even begun.
And when Eisenhower took over, the allied advance stalled and got next to nowhere for the next seven months, with even a retreat thrown in for good measure.
It's especially galling given that a quick look at the Overlord briefing, or even the bloody Wikipedia reference shows that the goal of all the operations around Caen WAS NOT to necessarily TAKE Caen, but to suck in the German armour and destroy them. The breakout was always going to be through St Lo: Operation Cobra. Why doesn't Monty get credit for Cobra?
because Montgomery plans were such complete failures they have to rebuild and regroup.@@lyndoncmp5751
It’s naive to believe that Bernard Montgomery positioned the British/Canadian troops solely to bring most of the German armour upon them leaving the Americans free to break through the German defences. Certainly he knew that the more open country would attract more armour as the terrain was more conducive to maneuver but it was also the more direct route out of Normandy and toward Paris. Montgomery envisioned the British taking Caen, utilizing their own armour, artillery and tactical air support to break through German lines while the Americans were diverted to the Cotentin Peninsula and the capture of the Port of Cherbourg. Unfortunately for Montgomery the German defences were too concentrated and he did not achieve his breakout, however, his efforts did allow the Americans to achieve their objectives on the Cotentin and subsequently break through the thinned out German lines opposing them. So yes Montgomery did contribute to the eventual breakout by engaging the majority of the German armour but that is not how he hoped or envisioned the Battle of Normandy would unfold.
@@Chiller11 It's not naive you only have to see the number of Divisions pulled into that area. Also this supports the argument as well ua-cam.com/video/t-0AxubQEWM/v-deo.html
I always thought Bill Slim was Britain's best general in World War II. And I never regarded Montgomery so much as a butcher, as overcautious because he was under political pressure not to lose too many troops - Britain was simply running out of manpower.
Montgomery was Britain's best general, and he proved it again and again in THE most important theatre the western allies fought. With all due respect to Slim, he didn't.
@@lyndoncmp5751 To be fair Bill Slim is a candidate for being the best, his campaign was fought and won in extremely rugged terrain, under supplied and outnumbered against a battle hardened enemy that was used to fighting in the Jungle. The circumstances of Slim were very demanding. Montgomery had a large army that was well equipped ( of course to his credit) and more resources.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Yeah that's the problem. Slim has always been underestimated because he fought in a forgotten - and in fact irrelevant - part of the war. But he managed to take a demoralised army, turn it round to defeat the Japanese. He had far more imagination than Montgomery IMO.
Bob
Just because you are successful in a completely different theatre against a completely different enemy doesn't translate that you will be successful wherever you are. You can't be considered the best if you don't defeat the best. Again, with respect Slim didn't defeat the best. The Japanese in Burma certainly weren't.
Overlord was imaginative, Market Garden was imaginative (and probably would have suceeded with different air decisions).
I'll say again, Montgomery was the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. He proved it. 👍
@@lyndoncmp5751 Out of Army Group Centre, Army Group South, Army Group North, Army Group Africa, Army Group B, which would you class as the best German forces for performance during the war?
My great grandfather was part of the 8th in North Africa & helped plan the invasion of Sicily as one of 2 second in commands to field marshal Montgomery and was sent back to the uk as a colonel ( I’m assuming with Montgomery) to organise D day and the crossing of the Rhine and later got a OBE . I’ve got a few photos of him and Montgomery in the family album and from what my grandad says his dad had nothing but respect for Montgomery and says he was a military genius. Amazing video really helps me learn more about what my great grandad was apart of
My Grandad was a sapper in Monty's 8th Army. He held the highest respect for Monty as did all his peers. He told me so many stories that I have passed on to my daughter. And I have a picture of Monty next to my Grandad's framed in uniform photo.
Monty was short sighted and a moron who was only in his position due to title.
If Monty was such a genius why was “Market Garden” such a cluster fuk?
A complicated man, was prone to charging lines affixed bayonets, but would be hesitant to spend the lives of his troops, and never finding a balance in between.
Funny, he spent American lives like one's in a strip club at Market Garden
Absolutely false - Monty used up ALL of his men, especially his Indian troops like cannon fodder. Unlike Patton, he NEVER figured out how to do combined arms offensives and rarely made good use of tactical air power, primarily because he was such a martinette that he got into a personal feud with Air Marshal Coningham, the guy in charge of RAF tactical forces, and this feud was SO BAD that in his planning for Market Garden, Monty deliberately did not notify the various air groups of his plans until the day of the operation. As a result, Market Garden would be the ONLY Allied operation in Western Europe that would go WITHOUT air superiority or any tactical air support. Germany was able to carry out several bombing raids during Market Garden as a result. Had the advanced Allied forces had radio contact with tactical air groups and been able to call in air strikes in real time, as many of the US Army groups were already doing in France, Market Garden might have actually succeeded, despite all of its other flaws.
That Monty was considered a success by the British is entirely because of just how piss poor the performance was of the entire establishment of British Generals prior to his selection. He was the fourth or fifth British general to be put in charge. The most promising British General that might have been far superior to Monty, General Gott, was assassinated by the Germans in a targeted air attack on his transport plane in Africa, right before he was supposed to take command (an American military attache with the British in Egypt was inadverdently leaking British plans to the Germans through his reports back to Washington, which the Germans intercepted).
Monty's success can be attributed to one thing and one thing only - massive American military aid and support was arriving coincident with his appointment, which was enough by itself to overwhelm the German forces. You would have to be utterly incompetent to screw that advantage up, but Monty did his best to do just that with multiple poorly conceived offensive operations
Coningham was a major pioneer in the development of tactical air support. After the war, he was asked by the Air Ministry to write his account of the war, and his account was apparently so harshly critical of Monty that his entire account was quietly buried and never saw the light of day. He died not long after in a transport airplane crash, and so hardly anybody knows who he is anymore.
@@gandalfgreyhame3425 bruh go write a book
Gandolph Greyhame
Patton's Lorraine debacle was the worse allied failure of autumn 1944, after the Ardennes. He spent 4 months, nearly 55,000 casualties and still failed to achieve his goal of getting through the Siegfried Line.
His handling of Metz was appalling. And all again a third rate German rabble of an army, and that's according to its own commander Balck.
Larry Blais,
Drop in the bucket compared to the American lives Patton squandered in the Lorraine Hodges squandered in the Hurtgen Forest. And for what?
Monty's men loved him because he was much more frugal with their lives. In 1971 I met a meek and fragile looking man who was in Patton's army. He said to me "Patton was called old blood and guts and it was our blood and guts"
Monty was a stickler for physical fitness and training; not so much for uniforms---see his memo following the soldier, naked except for top hat, who was driving a truck and passed Monty, tipping his hat. ("Top hats will not be worn in the 8th Army...")
He cared greatly for his men.
@@scottjoseph9578 and his men knew that
Monty got the colonists and allies killed, he was captain of the swim team however
Montgomery had a lower casualty ratio while facing Germanys best.
Patton had a high casualty ratio while facing Germanys worst. Even the German commander in the Lorraine, Hermann Balck said it was the worst army he ever took charge of. It still stopped Patton in the Lorraine inflicting 55,000 casualties on him, which was DOUBLE that of Montgomerys 21st Army Group casualties in autumn 1944 in the Netherlands and the Scheldt campaigns combined.
@@lyndoncmp5751 I believe the Third Army suffered 139,000 casualties, mostly due to the aggressive nature of Patton's bullrush approach.
I've never really known what to make of Montgomery. He always struck me as the British equivalent of MacArthur. A bold, egotistical, personality who, while not incompetent, created the illusion of military brilliance with good PR and lot's of embellishment.
And masses of success. Montgomery was by some way the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander. Nobody did more to help win the ground war in the west than Bernard Montgomery.
You are wrong. Monty was brilliant!
Putting Macarthur anywhere near Monty's level would be generous at best. At least the latter could back up his gigantic ego and never screwed up as badly as Mr 'I shall return' over here.
@@901Sherman better than Monty who sent us to do the dangerous work while they get the glory🤣 at least MacArthur had sympathy but Monty is just another soulless Brit who is rotting 6ft with his Queen in hell
Bullcrap,Britain had much better officers - Monty was ass,he had 6 months to plan his Normandy Operations and ran it into the sand immediately.Getting stuck and not off the beach to the surrounding staging areas in quick fashion caused a logjam.When the berk finally did get men/materiel up and out then he got stuck at Caen for 43 days.Monty and MacArthur were one in the same - lying,lagging,braggarts who were shameless self promoters. Neither was essential or important to the Allied War effort,quite the opposite really
I lost all respect for him cause he did a tv interview where when someone asked about losing battles he just laughed and said he can't remember a time he ever lost. I found that beyond egotistical and disrespectful to the troops he screwed over during his garden operation
Montgomery's 21st Army Group supplied the Market Garden concept. ...... Eisenhower took time convincing. ...... All planning - and execution - of the airborne landings, was NOT in Montgomery's hands. ...... American pilots of transport aircraft were unable to fly 2 sorties in one day, so it was not possible to land at Arnhem in one day, greatly weakening the 6th Airborne plan for Arnhem. ...... Gavin and Browning at Nimegen went off into the flank, worrying about a nonexistent German 'threat', instead of securing the town and the bridge. ...... After a heroic river crossing by Gavin's paratroopers, the bridge was captured, and a small number of tanks were pushed across. ...... However, Nimegen was still not secure, and the supply route was at risk, so further advance had to wait.
Had Monty been the land commander, able to put the operation into action sooner, before German lines stiffened, I think it had a very good chance of succeeding. ...... As it was, it came close.
I know you are sincere with your comment, but the myth that Market Garden and its failure was due to Monty needs to end. Yes, Monty was responsible for the idea, but as has been mentioned in the previous comment, planning and execution was not under his control. The American commanders Lietenant General Brereton (who scrapped British landing plans near the bridges and reduced flights to one a day, which delayed reinforcements) and Brigadier General Gavin (who did not capture Nijmegen Bridge on the first day, thus delaying XXX Corps by 36 hours) are more of the reason why it failed.
@@Historylover-ho6lg So by that logic, Operation Overlord was a success because of Monty being Chief in Command of all Ground Forces?
@@Historylover-ho6lg But his involvement in Market Garden was minimal. The reason why everybody thinks it failed because of him is because of post-war American propaganda intended to cover up American failures (like Col. Bonner Fellers etc.)
@@Historylover-ho6lg So unjust credit also means unjust blame?
Grant was also called a butcher, but sometimes your strategic victory is a war of attrition, especially when faced with a skillful opponent.
Don't mention Grant and Monty together. Maybe Grant and Patton, but Monty was suck shit crap load of a general.
Anytime you hear something about Grant from long ago, there is a monster factor to keep in mind. Most military historians in the US back then came from the South. To put it simply, they were butthurt, and they propped up Lee's reputation while doing everything they could to trash Grant. If you look at more contemporary, neutral POV's, you can get a more realistic outlook. Just for the record, Grant openly wept about the casualty figures during the Virginia campaign in 1864-65, while he utterly hated the sight of blood because of his youth working at a butcher shop. The fact is, that campaign devolved into a WW1 style trench war that maybe only Napoleon himself could have figured out a far less bloody strategic victory, which by the way the Europeans should have seen that era coming from the Civil War.
The armies on Offense tend to sustain higher casualties then those on Defense, and while the Confederate army lacked the manpower to replace those killed or wounded, the Union had no such problems. So, in a sense, Grant could afford to look like a butcher as his strategy was to hold on with a bulldog's grip and never give Lee the chance for respite, to keep hitting him again and again. However, when you look at the numbers of men lost as opposed to those killed, Grant's ratio of Union losses to Confederates killed is light, or to be expected (around 18% killed, wounded, or missing), whilst his opponent Lee, whose numbers of Confederate losses, to Union soldiers killed is higher (somewhere between 22% and 25% killed at last tally, wounded, or missing) though those numbers may or may not have changed in today's count. If any one is to be called a "butcher" then it most assuredly is Robert E. Lee.
@@donorbanemonty was pretty great. Definitly better than patton
Most people forget that Montgomery was the most experienced of the Allied generals and played the key role in Normandy, which was needed to kick start the reconquest of France. He was cautious at times, he saw the slaughter of WW1 and didn't wish to see a repeat. He did get the job done, however. Unfortunately his personality traits often overshadowed his abilities as a commander.
Patton and Montgomery both had big egos whom often clashed with each other. Eisenhower outrank both of them.
@@BHuang92 Yes but Eisenhower also knew how to use them and what they were capable of.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- which makes Eisenhower a good general
@Alfred the Great MacArthur has taught him well, albeit not in a good and traditional way
Are we forgetting all the general who came out of WW I ?
An Aunt of mine used to drive U.K. generals to their many meetings around London during the War (WW2). She told me that she liked general Alexander "The best" and that "Monty" was O.K. but a "Little bit arrogant". She had to know London's streets as well as a cab driver but, in addition, during the Blitz, each morning, know where the bombed out streets were! "Time was of the essence on every journey apparently"! One of my family's heroes - she did her bit!
It's difficult to compare the skill of generals of different armies.
Would he have won at El Alamein with an army equal to the Afrika korps, with its very same resources (just no more oil) and with a minority of German soldiers supported by Italians who, why not to say it, mostly were not willing to be there or even to fight?
Would he have reached Belgium and the Netherlands with the same air support that the German army?
It's very easy to overcome obstacles when you drive a steamroller.
So spot on. Monty was to me the right man at the right time in Africa. He was defiantly not a butcher and took very good care of his troops. Later in the war he seem to never adapt to a war that was evolving very quickly. He was also a jerk and wore on people.
Not a chance. The man was still using WW1 tactics and only achieved victories because of the overwhelming disparity in troops and supplies. Its rather sad that he was the best commander the Brits had during the war.
@@GeraltofRivia22 " Its rather sad that he was the best commander the Brits had during the war."
Bill Slim was the best commander.
One thing that has to be taken into account: US Col. Bonner Fellers was handing over British intel to the Germans and Italians right through 1942. He was sending reports about the British back to America and including details on British positions, supplies, contingency plans, moral etc. Fellers was using a code which was known to be compromised and was unknowingly giving Rommel the best intel imagineable. He used these regular reports when planning his attacks. The information was so valuable that the Germans nicknamed Fellers "The Good Source".
British operations were being undermined constantly and after losing several ships in Operation Harpoon, the British team at Ultra ascertained that Fellers was the leak. They got the US to remove him in July 1942. Up to that point, the British were fighting with both hands tied behind their back. Monty wasn't sure how much Rommel knew about British plans for El Alamein, which one reason why he showed extra caution.
@@GeraltofRivia22 ??? Look in an American that thinks highly of British forces but not so much there leadership but I will defend monty on this one.
This is a first.
The British, who often try to fight the war they are in like the last war they were in, were doing that in North africa again. The campaign vs the Italians was epic and very well done vs a poorly equipped and lead army.
The Inter war years are a mess with new tech changing warfare at a very quick pace and some good doctrines and some poor one. America got the heavy 4 engine bomber right with the b-17 development in 1934. Brits in like 37. Germans cancelled there 4 engine bomber programs then got caught behind later.
Look at submarines. Americans, British and Japanese sub doctrine was as fleet scouts and to attack war ships pre war. Meanwhile the germans said we think they work best as commerce raiders. It didnt take long before the Americans to adjust after seeing the Germans were right. The British figured it out late and the Japanese never really did.
The Germans got massing tanks to create a breakthrough early in the war right. The British thought of fast tanks as more napoleonic Calvary used to chase fleeing enemies, screen movements, flak enemies. They were also still using ww1 defensive tactics. When the "desert fox", a man that never should have been able to do what he did if the British didn't keep making the same 2 mistakes time and time again. Rommel was hyped big time post war to make up for British poor leadership and the ability to change. First rimmed would send tanks on a fake attack then retreated.when the British tanks charged after the fleeing Germans, they were lead into anti tank traps. The other was ww1 defensive line structure that the Germans could mass a majority of there forces and firepower on 1 point of the British lines creating a breakthrough that then forced a British retreat before they got encircled.
When monty got to north africa, he stopped the British from doing those things. Rommel also knew the British goings on through the German code breaking, lost that ability around this time..
Look both armies had gone back and forth across the desert. On the attack your lines of supply got very long and very demanding.on the retreat they got shorter and so eventually stopping attacks becomes easier.
Monty wanted to make sure when he went forward that it was a one way trip and no chance rommel could counter attack by waiting til he had a huge stockpile of equipment, men and supplies..
As far as Caen goes, whether it was planned or not, the operation worked. German armour was tied down and sucked in, the Americans were able to fan out across North West France I believe?
It did work, yes. The battles around Caen bled white almost the entire German armour forces in the whole of France.
@@lyndoncmp5751 people would do well to bear that in mind before criticising the delays while troops faced weapons such as the fearsome 88!
Market Garden was primarily Monty's failure. He accepted absolutely _no_ responsibility for the failure and blamed everything on others.
Posted this in another thread, but it is relevant: The myth that Market Garden and its failure was due to Monty needs to end. Yes, Monty was responsible for the idea, but as has been mentioned in the previous comment, planning and execution was not under his control. The American commanders Lietenant General Brereton (who scrapped British landing plans near the bridges and reduced flights to one a day, which delayed reinforcements) and Brigadier General Gavin (who did not capture Nijmegen Bridge on the first day, thus delaying XXX Corps by 36 hours) are more of the reason why it failed.
@@strongbrew9116 yep anyone who knows anything about mg would blame either brereton, browning or gavin
But but but... Cornelius Ryan write a book that became a movie! Are you saying Hollywood is wrong?!!!
@@bushyfromoz8834 noo?!?!?!?1!?!?!?
Blaming the Canadians speaks volumes honestly, and personally he wasn’t the first choice for command in N Africa but he got the job done. Fabian strategy usually works if you can maintain its principles.
My father served with him and he said could be difficult , however he held him in the very highest regard. My farther was an officer the Ulster Rifles in Normandy and at Arnhem.
Up the Irish Rangers !!!
4:37: This friendly fire incident could make a nice video topic.
8:43: Makes you wonder how the Canadian, French, former Soviet states, Italian, Irish, Dutch, Belgian, and German historians think about all this.
Yeah, The Front often doesn't do a great job at explaining history - too many details overlooked.
Montgomery never threw away lives, he always tried to prevent casualties because he had fought in WWI and was almost killed; he was always conscious of casualties, which his why he is sometimes criticised for being cautious.
His attrition style tactics waisted more lives then was necessary. He led his troops like a bookkeeper.
Check out his record in Ireland, he was a snotty little martinet who had his position because of his family and because of a class system . He succeeded in Africa because of the work of his predecessors and almost every other campaign was rescued by the Americans and Canadians.The only thing "Monty" was successful at was self promotion.
That’s a joke? You obviously have forgotten about the needless destruction of Caen and the slaughter of its remaining civilians at Montgomery’s hand. This bombing campaign provided the German troops with the perfect battlefield amongst the ruins where their uniforms melted into the colours of the rubble.
@@jfurl5900
'He succeeded in Africa because of the work of his predecessors and almost every other campaign was rescued by the Americans and Canadians.'
When did hat happen?
Except if you were an Irish civilian apparently !
My grandfather fought under Montgomery. He was in a number of major battles and was adamant that Montgomery save the lives of many soldiers. He stated that if Monty had decided to attack Hell, his soldiers would have grabbed buckets of water and follow him!
He did. He even saved the US 7th Armored Division st St Vith in the Bulge by ordering them to withdraw westwards instead of staying there to get surrounded. The commander of 7th Armored was most grateful for that.
from the horses mouth, you cant beat that. thx for sharing :)
from the horses ass you mean Lyndon changed her name she previously got so battered about.Monty apologized for suggesting he did anything but hold on to 3 bridges and a shoulder look it up.he in fact wanted to retreat. Lyndon's real name is Lucien Trueb - read *The Full Monty*
@@bigwoody4704 Go away Woody you are not wanted here You are too Anglophobic to be un- biased I am almost as bad as you but have still praised your lot when they merited it.
Your pronunciation of Caen is a breath of fresh air, particularly on this platform.
Monty was a Horse's ass. So was Patton. I do take note of Montgomery's resentment of Americans involvement in a European War. Winston would have not felt the same.
Montgomery resented a desk man with zero combat service (Eisenhower) taking over ground strategy just to appease the American public. I agree wit him. Sadly, the war dragged on for longer and with hundreds of thousands more casualties because of that decision.
This is the first I've heard of him described as a butcher- I thought his critics mostly thought of him as over-cautious and unwilling to commit troops in unplanned actions, due to Britain's comparatively small forces by 1944. I've also heard *from American sources like Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett no less* that his command of U.S. troops in the Bulge was actually quite tactful. Finally, the animosity between him and Patton was (so I hear) massively exaggerated just like everything else in the movie Patton. It seems to some sources they had differences, but were still quite chummy and could see each other as a cut above the average commander.
Seems like a lot of the animosity towards him comes from post war propaganda
Montgomery refused to allow US 7th Armored Division to be cut off and surrounded at St Vith in the Bulge, for which its commander General Hasbrouck was very grateful.
you said what I was going to say.
@@crumpetcommandos779 As opposed to wartime propaganda ? He didnt care for the lives of his men,,,,, He said he did .!!!!! that was the propaganda.
Monty was knowingly wrong in many occasions, with D day he refused to push and let the yanks do the hard work, Market Garden he fucked up by not listening and cancel the operation.
He was only accepted by Roosenveldt of political reasons and against the will of Eisenhower. North Africa all was already done, and was only a succes because of failing German logistics. He was a star in taking the honor from others.
BBC "The Second Battle of El Alamein was a turning point in the North African campaign. It ended the long fight for the Western Desert, and was the only great land battle won by the British and Commonwealth forces without direct American participation."
Two words...Operation Compass
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Take it up with the BBC
@@nickdanger3802 Oh yes the British Bullshit Corporation 😂😂
What great land battle did the Americans win against the Germans without direct British Commonwealth involvement?
@@lyndoncmp5751 Operation Dragoon
Patton and Montgomery were birds of a feather, egomaniacs. Brilliant subordinates and superiors made them successful.
Agreed fully
Except Patton was also a skilled commander, Montgomery was not.
@@GeraltofRivia22 And where exactly did he display skill in his debacle in the Lorraine Campaign then?
@@GeraltofRivia22 Patton reveled in the name his troops gave him.."Old Blood and Guts". The joke was on him, because they would mutter afterwards, his guts, our blood.....
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- every commander has mistakes and blunders. It's just that Montgomery really had nothing impressive to balance it out, unlike Patton.
One thing that this video skipped over were a couple of Montgomery's best moments: his command of 3rd Division during the retreat to Dunkirk and his suckering of Rommel into a bad defensive position at Homs. In the former, Montgomery did one better than Patton - he took his division out of line, marched 30 miles overland at night with no units covering his flank to take up blocking positions to replace the surrendering Belgium army. At Homs, he deliberately stopped well short of the port of Tripoli so that Rommel would build a defensive line in the open desert rather than in the hills near Tripoli. This enabled him to attack Rommel, rout him out of position and pursue him westwards past the port, capturing Tripoli intact.
Also, the statement by Montgomery about American troops was actually a creation of the Germans, which they managed to get inserted into Allied news reporting. This falsification was later picked up by a number of people who despised Montgomery to use it against him. History shows Montgomery never said this, and in fact praised American troops for their fighting prowess during the Battle of the Bulge. He also wouldn't have given the US forces the role of breaking out of the Normandy bridgehead if he, as Land Forces Commander, didn't think the Americans could do it.
That said, Montgomery's inner demons led him to take credit for things that he didn't do, to inflate his own victories, mistreat friends and colleagues after the war, and rewrite history in his memoirs to try and paint himself in a better light. Although this was a failing he shared with many German generals, because people could check the facts against Montgomery's writings, he made himself extremely unpopular with even his former friends.
Overall, I would say that Montgomery was a good general, because unlike most of his contemporaries, he made the German forces dance to his tune most of the time. This is the mark of a good general. He saw how the British Army could defeat the Germans, and made it into a fighting force that could do just that. It may not have been the flashy, dashing advances that the Germans made, but it was extremely effective. And, like the advance of the British Army after El Alamein or after the breakout from Normandy (250 miles in 7 days), they could cover a lot of ground in a very short period of time given the right circumstances.
Montgomery even wrote this in his own diary, right after conferring with Patton in Sicily on July 28th 1943:
"We had a great reception. The Americans are very easy to work with. I discussed plans for future operations with General Patton. Their troops are quite first class and I have a very great admiration for the way they fight".
Montgomery never said or wrote a bad word about American troops.
he retreated.. nuff sedd
Great Generals are made when the odds are stacked against them?? Monty always had superior forces and numbers on his side. Rommel still managed to hold back Monty's huguly superior forces at El Alamein, and allowed some of Rommel's forces to retreat all the way back to Tunisia. The war in North Africa would have dragged on for at least another few months, had the Americans not helped Monty flush out the last German resistance in Tunisia. Then the Battle of Normandy? The British D Day beach landings went according to plan. But the Battle of Normandy went on far longer than planned. Monty was looking like a pretty average Field Marshal. So he tried to save face by creating Operation Market Garden. What a disaster!!! The recon information there cost the lives of many British, American and Polish parabats. As well as POWs and wounded. After that? Besides the Battle of the Bulge, the Allied Generals chased back a weak and defeated German Army.
@@charlesknowles6301 That is wrong. In Belgium, Montgomery was outnumbered by the Germans during the retreat to Dunkirk, and yet pulled off a spectacular night move of 30 miles with an open flank to put his division into a blocking position next morning. He was also commander of the British forces at Dunkirk when Alan Brooke was recalled to England. So Montgomery oversaw some of the final days of the evacuation from Dunkirk. At Alam Halfa Montgomery was outnumbered by Rommel 5 divisions to 7. At Medinine Montgomery was outnumbered 3 divisions to the German's 5. He won both battles. And the Americans didn't bail out Montgomery in North Africa. In fact it was nearly the other way around. Also, you seem to overlook that in Normandy Montgomery was the Allied Land Forces Commander from June 6 until September 1, after the breakout. British forces under his command drove 300 miles in about a week from the River Seine to Antwerp. Hardly a plodding general. So I will have to disagree completely.
Charles Knowles
Inform yourself. Your post is nonsense.
This is quite interesting because Montgomery's plan was for 90 days, it actually took 2 months, 3 weeks and 3 days
And he went better and was in Brussels Belgium in that time line.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Without clearing a single port.
Nick Danger
Cherbourg and Le Havre were cleared and were able to well supply the US armies for all their autumn 1944 failures such as the Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, Operation Queen, Alsace and Vosges.
@@bigwoody4704 on a tactical level Caan was supposed to be taken in three days, I talking about a strategic level, Paris ninety days, it took eighty nine, but also bear in mind, Iwo Jima was originally a three day operation, things don't go to plan sometimes because of an important element, the enemy, thank you for your comment 👍
@@fastyaveitTrue but the GIs didn't suggest their set backs were because they were helping Monty - that is disingenuous. I like the board
I quite enjoyed watching this video. I think you people could turn this into a video series where each episode is themed around a particular military commander (E.G. Erwin Rommel, Douglas MacArthur, ect) and discussing the pros and cons of each of them. Good job!
Excellent idea 😊👍👍👍
@@Kruppt808 I second that! 👍
Yes. All generals on all sides in that war
Yeah I think this channel is a series😅
Although i don't know if this is really Montgomery's statement but he really was a fan of Bajirao 1's light cavalry tactics especially his decisive victory in the Battle of Palkhed against the more numerous and cumbersome Army of the Nizam and how it inspired his North African campaign against Rommel.
Aimed at winning the campaign. He was methodical in his battles. He kept his army in balance while making the enemy unbalanced (battle of El Alamein and the Normandy campaign).
Found this. Montgomerys own personal written words in his diary. Right after conferring with Patton in Sicily on July 28th 1943:
"We had a great reception. The Americans are very easy to work with. I discussed plans for future operations with General Patton. Their troops are quite first class and I have a very great admiration for the way they fight".
From Monty and Patton Two Paths to Victory by Michael Reynolds, page 142.
Contrary to the myth, Montgomery NEVER went around disparaging the American soldiers. Quite the opposite in fact. 👍
Absolutely. His famed press conference after the Bulge - read it a couple times, can't find a condemnation of Eisenhower or US troops or even an attempt to hog the credit.
Too many people read too few accounts and perspectives - have you noticed how the anti-monty camp and the overuse of the word overrated came about the same time?
Right after Tom Hanks and Ted Danson dismissed Montgomery in Saving Private Ryan, laying the blame for US forces not capturing their D+1 objectives at the gates of Caen with "That guy is overrated!"
That film spawned a million duplicates in publishing, budget documentary, gaming and meme - and now everything is valued on the overrated scale. Monty blamed, quite hysterically, for all the failures of WW2.
Gotta have a target if you just wanna throw rocks.
Oh dear. Saving Private Ryan has a lot to answer for. In it they Blame Montgomery not taking Caen as the reason St Lo wasn't taken. The two towns were different objectives for two different armies. US 1st Army abandoned advancing on St Lo in June because of the Bocage.
Yes, Montgomery's Bulge conference was full of praise for the American soldiers and for Eisenhower. That's why Montgomery held it. To defend Eisenhower from the British press.
I found another excerpt from Montgomery, regarding the American defeat at Kasserine. While British commander Alexander stuck the boot in and criticised the American soldiers, Montgomery actual somewhat defended them:
"They were going through their early days, just as we had had to go through ours. We had been at war a long time and our mistakes lay mostly behind us."
A bit of trivia - My Aunties husband was on his staff throughout the war and when it finished he wrote a letter thanking him for his service.
welditmick
Great. Thanks for sharing that 👍.
Yea, He didn't disparage American Soldiers, just helped them DIE!
Thank god we’re finally talking about this, but I was wondering the same question without trying to lean too far to either side.
I think reviewing all the various factors, and the fact that in war, it can get pretty "foggy", I think your video is a good summation of the various attributes that made him a complex character, with all the noted flaws he, and so many other generals, had at the time.
He was human, with an ego, which was fed by his various successes and potentially tempered by his failures.
We were lucky to have him. And to have Patton too.
Was he perfect? No. Did he make mistakes - yes. Did he deliver the first major land victory against the Germans after 3 years of complete German dominance across Europe and africa - absolutely!
The effect of that win on the morale of the population when GB had been under seige since 39 is incalculable.
I bet there were plenty of people who wanted to give up or make some non aggression pact with Germany up to that point, especially as the atlantic war was starving gb towards submission combined with the simultanious blitz, the siege of Malta, the Channel Islands and the Mediterranean and african campaigns. Dont forget we were also fighting and losing to the japanese in burma and singapore as well!
The win gave Churchill what he needed to keep gb opposition politicians quietened down.
As to caen, that leans towards him tying down / being tied down with the German armour which gave the us time to sort themselves out after the disasterous omaha landing. I am not saying he planned that, but the German armour was being held back in that area by hitler for the expected attack on calais.
Re. Market Garden, the drops were dispersed too greatly, the intelligence wasn't updated to reflect latest German movements and the us land forces didn't make sufficient progress. It was a high risk operation but if it had succeeded, it would have meant the western allies with a rhine crossing could have got to Berlin well before the Russians and maybe saved the following 45 years of Germany being divided up, etc. The cold war might have been very different. That operation doesn't resonate with the accusations of him being overly cautious.
Patton had his own wins and losses, but the us population or its industrial base was never in peril in anything like the way that gb or the soviet union was.
Every country needed to create its heroes for its people to look up to and follow. We shouldn't put any of them on a pedestal as being saints, but they were there when we needed them and as a result of their actions and the bravery of those who served under then, here we stand.
Malta was never taken.
@@accomuk thanks. You are right, it was a siege for 2 years and 5 months
There's one thing.you should understand about him:
He was the consummate professional soldier. He had fought everyone and anyone in the name of his King Emperor. He held himself to the absolute highest possible standard, and expected the same from everyone else.
He didn't get on with many of the American's, because he considered them, with exceptions, rank amateur's. Which by his standards they were.
He was a master of logistics, and he understood very well that the only way to ensure victory was through overwhelming force. That saves lives on his side.
Yes, he considered his men expendable, he had to but he also wasn't someone who would expend expend.them lightly.
He looked after his men. He was well.know for making sure that they had decent food, access to hot showers, clean uniforms etc. Not out of the goodness of his heart, but because a clean, well fed, rested soldier is a happy, and more importantly, aggressive soldier. He was well known for firing any Officer or NCO irrespective of rank, who didn't do their uttermost in that regard. One good little trick of his was to walk into a canteen, or field kitchen, unannounced and require to be immediately served what was being served. God help all concerned if he didn't consider it up to snuff.
Well what half way decent general do all those things? So he doesn't get any extra points for having those traits.
You said it yourself ...a good little trick .......thats all he was .
I wasn't aware anyone has ever accused Monty of being wasteful with the lives of his troops, British generals including Monty have always been criticised for the opposite compared to the US with their comparatively unlimited manpower reserves and 'gung'ho' generalship.
I think its ironic how Monty is consistently held up as self aggrandizing and arrogant by the US historians, you have to think about the environment he was operating in and his peers, Patton, Bradley, Clark, MacArthur etc. Patton and Clark literally disobeyed direct orders purely for self interested reasons, and British involvement in entire battles (like the Bulge) was completely written out of the news to protect the egos of US commanders.
Its not me defending Monty as i'm sure he was unpleasant and annoying, but i'd wager all of them were. Its probably a character trait you need to be a top general.
This video leaves out Montgomerys difference with the Eisenhower on how best to proceed after the Germans were defeated at Normandy. It jumps straight from Normandy to Operation Market Garden. After Normandy was secured, Montgomeryv along with American General Bradley proposed a narrow assault that would have taken advantage of the German collapse and not allowed them, to regroup. The Allies could have reached the Rhine very quickly as German resistance was in disarray,.
Eisenhower favoured a broad frontal attack. This was the plan adopted and while a lot of territory in France was recaptured, importantly it allowed the Germans to regroup and withdraw to the Rhine. This prolonged the war.
Montgomery's strategy was the correct one. How this major chapter in Montgomery;'s career and how it could have shortened the war in the west, was not mentioned, makes this a very substandard account of Montgomery's career. Disappointing that so many would watch this and judge his career despite this major omission in the analysis. Overall despite a small amount of grudging praise, it is slanted against Montgomery and I wouldnt believe it if I were you.
He couldn't even take Caen, let alone make it to the Rhine.
@@nickymatthews3491 He did take Caen, it took 6 weeks how long did it take Patton to get inside Metz? 3 months.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Because his supplies were reduced in favor of Market Garden, a Monty-led debacle.
@@nickymatthews3491 Market Garden didn't slow down Patton, even if it hadn't taken place he still would have ran out of fuel. To be fair to Montgomery his plan was to take large bits of Holland including access to the channel ports for supplies as much as it was for the quick strike into Germany, it was a qualified success.
He had months to plan for Overlord, Market Garden was planned in a week on the back of a napkin with major parts of his forces and fuel being siphoned off for other commanders and fronts ( Patton and Bradley in the Metz and Hurtgen)
@@nickymatthews3491 Caen was held by 80% of the German armour, and the plan was to tie them up there ( or nearby) to allow Bradley to breakout through St Lo. Which happened. Mind you, St Lo was only defended by 2 infantry divisions, and it didn't fall quickly, either...
A man leads his men into battle without adequate supplies, proper planning and wins a lightning fight and he's a genius. If he fails he's a wasteful butcher.
If a man is methodical, builds up his supplies and reserves, is cautious with the lives of his men and still gets the job done he is seen as cautious and allowing his enemy time to build up. If he fails, he's a butcher and a waster of lives.
You can never win being a general, one way or another you will have victories and defeats but it will always be seen as down to the commander of the army without thinking about higher interference, such as the government or politicians, for example.
I believe like all generals Monty was inspirational, clever and he wanted to do the job he had been tasked with. Any general who had fought in the first world war would want to prioritise their men's lives as key, especially as Britain did not have a huge population that could be drawn from as a lot of countries did.
Finally, show me a general from that time who wasn't an egomaniac (of from any period in history for that matter.)
Gen Slim
Eisenhower wasn't an ego maniac.
@@stitchjones7134 and you are basing this on?
@@DidMyGrandfatherMakeThis His abiility to juggle all the egos underneath his command, like Patton, and Bradley. He was acceptable to the Brits and got along with Monty. Right man for the job.
too bad his 8 days of market garden killed 13k allied troops. He was overrated.....but not as overrated as MCarthur.
Ego and confidence are partners, very often great commanders are viewed with great suspicion by those who seek to harness their charisma and skill. I've no doubt that he was all of these things, most importantly a great commander cannot break under pressure, all are butchers of men but miraculously some are good for morale.
He just had more tanks. No skill there.
Very relatable in Soviet. The 3 Marshals that is executed, the military genius of Soviet Union was suspected, being charged of conspiracy of collaborating with Nazi Germany to overthrow Stalin.
Viking FIST
Montgomery didn't have more of anything at Alam el Halfa. He still beat Rommel there.
@@Armored_Fist by that logic, no Allied General showed any skill in France.
Ah the Lyndon Library braying nonsense again.Auchinlech had already won in the desert and With the weight of allied supplies that Monty had nothing to do with procuring. As daft as you are even you could have won there.He hid behind Dorman-Smith's mine field using The Auk's battle plans
There is a comment comparing Montgomery with Rommel in North Africa. Rommel was said to be always at the point of greatest emergency. Montgomery, in contrast, did not have emergencies.
Some of his critics are guilty of romanticising manoeuvre warfare (AKA Blitzkrieg). MW can be highly effective at forcing an enemy out of position and into retreat, but that can leave your enemy with his forces intact and ready to fight again. At Alamein, Montgomery wanted to fix the Axis forces in place and destroy them so effectively that they would not be able to fight again for a significant period.
Op Goodwood was also a classical strategy - to engage the enemy so heavily in one part of the theatre, that the enemy commander is forced to thin his lines elsewhere and deploy his reserves to reinforce the attacked point, leaving those lines vulnerable and without a reserve to counterattack. In other words, Monty created the conditions in which Patton was able to look good. For all the talk about his ego, it should be remembered that Montgomery gave that opportunity to Patton.
Absolutely. Patton's Third Army didn't even join the Normandy fighting until August, nearly two months after it had been raging and after the Germans had been bled white. Patton literally had next to no enemy to engage when he arrived. Montgomery had already whittled them away and Patton only faced a German army already in retreat.
"wanted to fix the Axis forces in place and destroy them so effectively that they would not be able to fight again for a significant period"
Afrika Korps was mauled, but it was not destroyed at El Alamein. So insted of doing manoeuvre warfare and encircle the Afrika Korps, ther its was "perfect" terrain for manouver warfare, agenst a enemy that is inferior in number, is critical low on supply, and in a unorganized state. Montgomery did think it was better to allow the mauled Afrika Korp to reatreat to Tunisa, there the Africa Korps did get re-suplied, renforced, reoginised, and entrench themself in the ex french fortifications.
Do that sound like a good thinking?
@@kirgan1000
Firstly, the Axis forces *were* forced to retreat all the way to Tunisia before they could mount any significant opposition. You appear to think that insignificant.
Secondly, why would you try to play Rommel at his own game, instead of awning and operating according to your own strengths.
@@peterwebb8732 Where is the best place to destroy the remains of the Afrika Korps?
Then they are retreating west in open terain, and are critical low on suplie and unorganized? Like in the desert of Egypt/Libya? Then the Eighth Army is close to there suplie point.
Then they are fortified in (ex) french fortifications, close to there own suplie point, and is given time to organzie there troops, and gain replacement troops/material? Like in east Tunisia? There the Eighth Army is far away from there suplie piont.
JR
Montgomerys 8th Army still did a record 1,300km in just 20 days from El Alamein to El Agheila November 4th to 23rd 1942.
Rommel's force was smaller lighter, less encumbered, had a heady start and didn't have to get past half a million mines.
Montgomery had to stop at Benghazi and wait for the port to be repaired otherwise he'd have had a near 2,000km supply line. He was not stupid.
"The National Army Museum conducted a poll in 2011 to determine Britain’s greatest general. Montgomery’s name was not among the finalists."
Bernard Law Montgomery - Military History - Oxford page
So what?
The finalists were The Duke of Wellington, the Duke of Marlborough, Oliver Comwell, William Slim and Douglas Haig. Some might argue that the presence of Haig amongst the top five makes it a somewhat questionable list.
Training soldiers hard in the BEF while waiting to fight is the only thing a commander should do, can't fault that. The 8th Army loved him. I remember my Grandfather talking about meeting him when he visited troops in the field and later when he met him face to face very personally and; he liked and respected the man. Montgomery was cautious in the desert to reduce potential casualties. He certainly was the man the world and Britain needed at that time.
Absolutely.
Indeed, I have little to add from history, but know that my Grandfather said that he and the troops loved him. I can't ask about it, my Grandfather died in 1976, but thats about the only thing he ever said about the war.
possibly the greatest thing he did was make the 8th army think that they could beat Rommel and that was hugely important at the time.
He certianly knew the value of psycholoy and knew how important it was to be a figure head that people could follow. Hennce the wearing of the tankers beret for one thing, and the Aussie slouch hat.
My grandad was in the 8 th army he was in Sherman's they liked Monty he cared for his men
@@chrisoffer3074 Anyone in Sherman's facing 88's and Tigers deserves all the respect we can give them.
Awful lot of Brits out there with a touchy nerve about such things. Me, say whatever you want about MacArthur or others, it's no skin off my nose. But I do appreciate British humor. Like David Nivens response as a British officer to an irate Itslian officer in a ww2 comedy I saw once. The Italian says the English have no imagination and are the most obstinate people on Earth. That for example Dunkirk was a terrible defeat. Yet the English call it a victory. He says to Niven "Was Dunkitk not a terrible defeat?"
And Niven answers, "Of course it was. And the fact we English regard it as a victory only goes to show how much imagination we actually have."
Throughout history men have been reviled / loved. Another example (besides Monty) was Douglas Bader. Some officers loved him, but the same stubbornness and perseverance that saw him back in the RAF in a cockpit after losing his legs also made him difficult for some to get on with. Similarly Guy Gibson treated the men under him - allegedly - less well than other officers. Sir Arthur T 'Bomber' Harris was another who some loved and some disliked. One can only speak as one finds.. ergo some liked Monty and others didn't.
I just watched a movie on Bader with Kenneth More. He's in the hospital after losing his legs, annoys his nurse. She says to him "I wouldn't come to you if you were the last man on Earth."
He replies, "Of course not, you'd be killed in the rush."
@@donberry7657 the biopic Reach For The Sky? That exchange may be fictional for the movie, but it illustrates what I meant, his self belief (arrogance depending on context) versus reaction to his personality.
@Julian Hall True Dat. Good flick though and there's no question his drive to walk and excel were admirable.
I do believe that one of the German officers in North Africa said something upon these lines:
"After Montgomery arrived, war ceased to be a game".
Well the pre-war Brit and French garrisons in North Africa had out-dated weapons as they only had to deal with local tribesmen... Rommel had very good equipment and troops... Actually Monty was driven around in a captured Austrian Steyr staff car which he really liked !
Very good indeed! Certainly at self-promoting PR….not unlike so many of his contemporaries. The names Patton, Rommel, Mountbatten and MacArthur all spring to mind in no particular order, for some reason….🤔
Winning battles was his PR. And he won more battles than any other Western Allied ground commander in WW2.
@@lyndoncmp5751 HAHAHAHAHA pure cerebral diarrhea !!
"In the dark, in the rain, going uphill."
-The British Infantryman's Way
I'd guess that he was what he wanted to be. A symbol to the British army and citizens that they could look up to and gladly follow.
To my fellow Americans. He had a massive ego and didn't care much for us. Makes you wonder what would have happened if Monty ever crossed paths with or spoke with Admiral King?
Or Douglas McArthur
Is that the Admiral King that let his Pacific Fleet be wiped on the floor? ...... And was so behind in modern warfare, ships were sunk by the dozen off the US coast because even the most basic anti-submarine measures were not in place? ...... Even the lights on shore were still on!
One of the big reasons for Monty's negative view towards the Americans was because of the damage US Col. Bonner Fellers did in North Africa from 1941-1942. Many British soldiers and ships were needlessly lost because of Fellers using a code which was known to be compromised when sending intel about the British back the US.
@@strongbrew9116 The Americans also thought the British decadent, and that thery were going to show Britain how wars were won.
The US learnt nothing from 1939 until 7 DEC 1941. ...... Look at how they were caught with their pants down at Pearl Harbour. ...... Look at the huge losses in US shipping off the east coast of the US, because the lights were still on onshore, and there were no effective anti-submarine measures.
The same attitude was in the US Army in North Africa. ...... Until Kasserine Pass. ...... Then they began to realise that war has a steep learning curve, all paid in blood.
King thought the Pacific theater should come first hated the English in bullheaded way. King would not adapt convoys to protect crgo ships rather have them go it almost alone and cost many lives. Kings stubborn attitude irked many and even IKE said he could have cost the war in Europe to be lost until he finally changed or was forced to change tactics.
Hmm should do a feature on Mark Clarkes bonehead run for Rome letting thousands of German troops to form another line instead of supporting the Canadian and British armies to cut them off and prevent another yr of slogging it out in Italy.
The same thing happened at Anzio and the Falaise Pocket. Nothing new there.
Unlike Montgomery who let Rommel get away twice.
@@mathewm7136 "Five crucial days passed before Montgomery allowed the Americans to cross the boundary. By then it was too late to close the gap. The Falaise Pocket would be sealed between Trun and Chambois, but only after large numbers of German troops had escaped."
Canada Legion on line magazine The Havoc Continues: Closing In On Falaise
@@nickdanger3802 Oddly, there seems to be this idea that Rommel's army got away after El Alamein.
It didn't.
Monty may have been one of the best Allied commanders in battle, but he wasn't a master of the weather.
An untimely heavy rain hampered the immediate pursuit from El Alamein, but the fact remains that facing an enemy commander (Rommel) widely regarded as a tactical genius, who conducted a masterful rearguard retreat, he nonetheless succeeded in destroying virtually the entire Africa Korps.
Just to review:
2nd El Alamein began 23rd October 1942, the 8th Army finally punched through Rommel's army on November 5th, at which point Rommel retreated with whatever German mechanized forces he could, and abandoning the non-motorized Italians to their fate. (They gallantly defended Rommel's retreat)
Three months after El Alamein, by 13th February, and following several rearguard battles, the last Axis soldiers retreated out of Libya. The 8th Army had pursued them 1,400 miles, without any railway to move material, and with every supply port en route wrecked and unusable.
How many of Rommel's vaunted Afrika Korps are left?
According to Historian Matthew Cooper, just *5,000* made it out of Libya.
Quote *"When the Panzerarmee arrived, the Afrika Korps had only 5,000 men, 35 tanks, 16 armoured cars, 12 anti-tank guns, 12 field howitzers"*
That's 111,000 out of 116,000 men of the Africa Korps (& Italian allies) either killed, captured or evacuated as wounded from Libya. An entire fresh Axis army of some 350 - 400,000 reinforcements was then diverted from Europe (or Russia) and sent to Tunisia
Bullet-Tooth-Tony,
Excellent post. This nonsense that Montgomery let Rommel get away after El Alamein is ridiculous. Its much easier to stay in front of a chasing army when you are a smaller, lighter and less encumbered force, have a major head start and don't have to get across half a million mines. Even so, as we know, Montgomerys 8th Army did 1,300km in 20 days chasing after Rommel. 👍
Love how you just jump straight from Alamein to Sicily, ignoring the fact that Monty drove Rommel from Alamein all the to the Mareth line in Tunisia, the equivalent distance from Moscow to Paris, with enormously stretched supply lines, not using more than three divisions the whole time whereas Rommel had six divisions.
In North Africa Monty's 8th Army advanced from El Alamein to El Agheila from the 4th to 23rd November 1942, 1,300 km in just 19 days. *The fastest advance for such such a distance in WW2.* And that was after fighting a major exhausting battle at El Alemein through half a million mines. No such quantity of mines was laid anywhere else in the Second World War.
_”Even Rommel’s escape on this day was brought about only by a headlong retreat which Eighth Army forced him to execute prematurely and which therefore completed their triumph of the day before. In Rommel’s own words, he had hoped to hold Fuka ‘long enough for the Italian and German infantry to catch up’. When Eighth Army’s pressure “forced him out of Fuka late on 5 November, his unmotorized units had no chance of doing anything other than surrender to XIII Corps. It is almost amusing to read the British accounts of Eighth Army’s slowness and caution, and then to find Paul Carell for instance, lamenting that:_
*_’Montgomery was pressing on with unusual speed, chasing Rommel’s troops towards Fuka. His men were marching on a parallel course to the Germans, giving them no time to reorganize or dig in for a defence-not even in Fuka._*_ The British High Command seemed to be fully aware of the disastrous position in which Rommel found himself… In any case _*_the boldness of the British pursuit was conspicuous.‘“_*
- Eighth Army's Greatest Victories: Alam Halfa to Tunis 1942-1943 by Adrian Turner
From Nigel Hamilton’s 3 volume biography of Monty:
_…and though later historians might mock it for its ‘onerous’ progress, all contemporary evidence shows that _*_Eisenhower’s headquarters were amazed at the rapidity with which Eighth Army overcame its supply problems and the vast distances of its lines of communication. Not only did Eighth Army assume First Army’s responsibility - as dictated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive of 14 August 1942, and still envisaged in late December 1942 - for the capture of Tripoli, but it even removed the need for Eisenhower’s planned assault on Rommel’s supply line at Sfax - as Butcher noted on 18 January 1943:_*
_’The essence of our meeting was that the plan to cut Rommel’s supply line, which had been ‘laid on’ for the II Corps under Major-General Fredendall, was called off because General Alexander’s _*_Eighth Army had made such rapid progress.’_*
_On 20 January Butcher recorded: ‘Rommel was _*_being driven our way much faster than even the Combined Chiefs had expected.’”_*
-Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944. Nigel Hamilton.
Monty beat Rommel 5 times in N.Africa and then beat Rommel’s armies a further 2 times after Rommel left:
♦ Battle of Alam Halfa;
♦ Second Battle of El Alamein;
♦ Battle of El Agheila;
♦ Battle of Tripoli;
♦ Battle of Medenine;
♦ Battle of the Mareth Line;
♦ Battle of Wadi Akarit.
John Burns quit printing bullshit here is the time at when you need to start learning - ENJOY
*ua-cam.com/video/duOYnIGivys/v-deo.html*
Claude Auchinleck (who BTW was a hell of a general) and Dorman Smith had just won the 1st battle of El Alamein concluded on July 30th.Auchilech was relieved for no reason except Churchill's impatienceand General Gott was installed but unfortunately his plane got shot down killing him. Everything and I mean everything was already in place to win.
♦ Churchill wrongly removed General Auchinleck who argued that his men had not regrouped and needed reinforcing. Several military analysts accused Churchill of misunderstanding desert warfare tactics, saying he placed too much emphasis on territorial occupation. *They needed 6 weeks to refit and resupply. So what does Monty do - took 10 weeks(Aug-13-Oct 23) to advance - much more time than Auchileck and Dorman Smith insisted on and got fired for in the 1st place* Almost any Commander was walking into assured victory.The British finally got their victory over a German Army and Monty was made a Hero when in truth it was a British /Allied victory. Montgomery had 1500 miles and every concievable advantage - BIG ADVANTAGES in men/materiel/air cover/intelligence/tanks/artillery.
♦Rommel had to move at dark to keep his columns from being strafed and obliterated. In the Mediteranean & the desert *Air Marshall Conningham and Adml Cunningham strangled the German supply lines while keeping the Allies supplied was paramount. Yet Montgomery didn't grab airfields or open any ports - this continued into Italy- Normandy* Montgomery really should have never gotten that gig - he really could not lose after Auchilech and Dorman-Smith lined the massive mine fields on the Ridge of Alam Halfa( that Bernard later attempted to take credit for)also shored up defense line by the Qattara Depression to the south which was impassable to mechanized armor at El Alamein creating a choke point. And it was Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith that had 2 fresh divisions moved over from the Nile Delta. Monty couldn't lose in the desert where an embarrassment of riches covered his obvious lack of leadership abilities.Monty never pinned down Rommel he simply pursued
♦Then The Torch Landings forces included 60,000 troops in Morocco, 15,000 in Tunisia, and 50,000 in Algeria, Forced Rommel's hand as now there would be more enemy troops to deal with.And of course ULTRA was now fully operation and provided updates.
♦By August '42 USA had sent the 300 Shemans and over 100 self propelled 105 mm Howitzers sent by Order of FDR.The 8th Army had an 5:1advantage of tanks over the AK.And with the landings 3:1 in manpower. The Afrika Korp was short on everything and their armor and vehicles had been in the desert for over 2 yrs.
♦The allied supply port of Alexandria was 100 miles away,The Axis supply port was 1,000 miles away in Tripoli.Also factor in complete Air Superiority - Rommel had to move at dark to keep his columns from being strafed and obliterated. So even you can clearly see reality exists All these things came together at the same time and Monty couldn't help himself - taking credit that wasn't his and deflecting blame that was - all thru the war. In 1500 miles with overwhelming advantages Monty never captured Rommel
♦Monty left a vastly numerical inferior forces in front of him get away None of those benefits were enjoyed by Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith. Save the Air Superiority. All of it in place and none of it Bernard's doing long before he sashayed into this mirage
Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013
Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013
John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013
John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013
John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013
TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013
@@bigwoody4704
Except what most people don’t mention, or are unaware of, was that Auchinleck launched five poorly planned, piecemeal, uncoordinated attacks against Rommel in July that achieved very little but large casualties and morale in Eighth Army hit rock bottom.
Monty never had the advantages that Auchinleck had at First El Alamein, which was a halfhearted try-on due to Rommel’ forces being exhausted and overstretched.
_During that time also, the soldiers of Eighth Army had won seven battles, two on the defensive, four on the offensive, and the most famous on what can only be called the defensive offensive since they had gained their victory not by their own attacks but by their successful repulse of enemy counter-attacks. It seems sad therefore that all except Alamein have tended to be forgotten and all, even Alamein, have tended to be belittled. The fashionable attitude appears to be that it was easy for Eighth Army to achieve its conquests because it now had the superior numbers and the superior equipment that its predecessors had lacked._
_Such suggestions are grossly unjust. In sheer numbers of men Eighth Army did have the advantage throughout the period of its conquests but so it had done throughout the period of its ordeals. Indeed at Alam Halfa, that victory on which all else depended, _*_’the strength of the two sides was nearer to an even balance than it was either before or later’. It was Rommel who had increased the number of his German divisions from three to four, plus his independent parachute brigade; who had been joined by the finest of his Italian divisions, the Folgore; who had doubled the number of his flak regiments with their 88mms; who had at last received the ‘murderous Mark IV Specials’; whose Mark III Specials had more than doubled in number from those available in June, more than quadrupled in number from those available in July. No wonder he was confident that Alam Halfa would be his ‘decisive battle’. And even in later encounters, Eighth Army would never have the overwhelming weight of numbers in its favour that it had done under Auchinleck in July._*
_Nor did Eighth Army enjoy a qualitative superiority of weapons during the period of its conquests. On the contrary, while the Allies had had the better tanks throughout the whole of Auchinleck’s rule as C-in-C, Middle East, in August 1942, the arrival on the battlefield of the Mark IV Specials gave the Germans a tank which was superior to all on the Allied side and would remain so despite the later advent of the best of the Allied tanks, the Shermans. Eighth Army’s disadvantage was again of course at its greatest at Alam Halfa when the Shermans had not yet reached the front line._
_The German 88mm anti-tank guns had been superior to any that the British could find throughout the days of Eighth Army’s ordeals-and they remained superior until the first few ‘Pheasants’ arrived at the time of Medenine. _*_The only difference was that at Alam Halfa, Alamein and the Mareth Line, the Axis commanders had more than, and at Wadi Akarit almost, twice the number of 88mms that had been present during CRUSADER, three times the number that had been present at ‘First Alamein’._*
_It should also be emphasized _*_that throughout its conquest of North Africa, Eighth Army had had to overcome problems not experienced by its predecessors. Its supply-line had to stretch further than ever before at the time of its victory at El Agheila, and even further still at the time of its final thrust to Tripoli._*_ At Medenine also, Eighth Army’s supply-line was far from adequate, a fact which makes the admirable defensive preparations it carried out in an astonishingly short space of time all the more remarkable._
_In addition, _*_when Auchinleck had launched his attacks in July 1942, the enemy had had no opportunity to prepare adequate defences, while during CRUSADER he could outflank the defences altogether through the open desert. For that matter Rommel had enjoyed the same advantage during his counter-offensive after CRUSADER and at Gazala._*
_By contrast when Eighth Army took the offensive at Alamein in October 1942, _*_the Axis position could not be by-passed and was protected by half-a-million mines and all the hideous devices of the ‘Devil’s Gardens’. At El Agheila it was possible to avoid the defences but only by crossing terrain worse than any that either Eighth Army or Panzerarmee Afrika had yet encountered. At Buerat the front line could be outflanked without too much difficulty, but the going encountered later left even the tough, experienced New Zealanders ‘speechless’; while the Homs-Tarhuna escarpment was only mastered because Eighth Army moved too quickly for Rommel to offer adequate resistance there. At Mareth, Eighth Army was opposed by long-prepared fixed defences, the only way round which led to a ‘bottleneck’ so dangerous that it was feared an attack through it would be ‘a second Balaclava’. And finally in the Gabes Gap Eighth Army faced a formidable natural barrier which it had to assault head-on. Only superb troops could have surmounted such a series of difficulties._*
_But then the men of Eighth Army had always been superb troops. All they had lacked had been ‘a clearly defined purpose and a leader’. _*_They ‘got both in Montgomery’._*_ His critics have referred to him slightingly as ‘a superlative actor’ or ‘a great showman’, and certainly some aspects of his attempts to restore morale when he arrived in the Desert are open to such complaints. These were, however, unimportant, in fact largely irrelevant, _*_compared with the actions which really did restore morale: first, his cancellation of all previous plans for withdrawals to reserve positions, whether within the Alamein defences or outside the combat-zone altogether; next, his victory at Alam Halfa, won in just the way he had foretold and as a result of precisely those alterations which he had made to the previous plans._*
_Moreover _*_Montgomery made other contributions to success at least as significant as his restoration of morale, vital though that was. He welded the different branches of Eighth Army into one integrated whole, and added to it the close co-operation of ‘his’ Air Force. He displayed great strategical insight as demonstrated by his ability to think ‘one battle ahead’. Most of all perhaps, in his seven victories he justified the opinion of Brooke that he was ‘without question the best tactical commander in the [British] Army’._*
_It might indeed be queried _*_whether any mere actor or showman would have proved capable in just over a fortnight of transforming a plan which ‘might almost have been written for Rommel’s express benefit’ into one which provided the basis for the victory of Alam Halfa. Or of devising those ‘crumbling’ operations against the enemy infantry at Alamein which compelled the enemy armour to risk crippling losses in counter-attacks and at the same time made the enemy anti-tank guns less effective. Or of showing that combination of ruthless resolution and flexibility of mind which then saw Alamein through to its successful conclusion. Or of making the imaginative move of ‘grounding’ one corps and using it to provide supplies to the front for the advance on Tripoli. Or of thrusting past the Homs-Tarhuna defences before these could be organized properly. Or of winning the flawless defensive battle of Medenine. Or of executing the ‘Left Hook’ which so brilliantly redeemed the initial failure at Mareth. Or of overcoming the positions in the Gabes Gap-according to Rommel the most formidable natural obstacle in North Africa-in less than twenty-four hours._*
_Brigadier Sir Edgar Williams certainly thinks otherwise. Williams is frequently reported as hating the Army and although this was not the case he had no intention of making it his career and he was very far from being respectful of its senior officers. He was also well aware of the advantages and deficiencies of ‘Ultra’. _*_His judgement: ‘Montgomery was the best British field-commander since Wellington.’_*
- Eighth Army's Greatest Victories: Alam Halfa to Tunis 1942-1943 by Adrian Turner
@@bigwoody4704
Still peddling your nonsense I see. Now you know Rambo. Now you know.
@@bigwoody4704
Except what most people don’t mention, or are unaware of, was that Auchinleck launched five poorly planned, piecemeal, uncoordinated attacks against Rommel in July that achieved very little but large casualties and morale in Eighth Army hit rock bottom.
Monty never had the advantages that Auchinleck had at First El Alamein, which was a halfhearted try-on due to Rommel’ forces being exhausted and overstretched.
_During that time also, the soldiers of Eighth Army had won seven battles, two on the defensive, four on the offensive, and the most famous on what can only be called the defensive offensive since they had gained their victory not by their own attacks but by their successful repulse of enemy counter-attacks. It seems sad therefore that all except Alamein have tended to be forgotten and all, even Alamein, have tended to be belittled. The fashionable attitude appears to be that it was easy for Eighth Army to achieve its conquests because it now had the superior numbers and the superior equipment that its predecessors had lacked._
_Such suggestions are grossly unjust. In sheer numbers of men Eighth Army did have the advantage throughout the period of its conquests but so it had done throughout the period of its ordeals. Indeed at Alam Halfa, that victory on which all else depended, _*_’the strength of the two sides was nearer to an even balance than it was either before or later’. It was Rommel who had increased the number of his German divisions from three to four, plus his independent parachute brigade; who had been joined by the finest of his Italian divisions, the Folgore; who had doubled the number of his flak regiments with their 88mms; who had at last received the ‘murderous Mark IV Specials’; whose Mark III Specials had more than doubled in number from those available in June, more than quadrupled in number from those available in July. No wonder he was confident that Alam Halfa would be his ‘decisive battle’. And even in later encounters, Eighth Army would never have the overwhelming weight of numbers in its favour that it had done under Auchinleck in July._*
_Nor did Eighth Army enjoy a qualitative superiority of weapons during the period of its conquests. On the contrary, while the Allies had had the better tanks throughout the whole of Auchinleck’s rule as C-in-C, Middle East, in August 1942, the arrival on the battlefield of the Mark IV Specials gave the Germans a tank which was superior to all on the Allied side and would remain so despite the later advent of the best of the Allied tanks, the Shermans. Eighth Army’s disadvantage was again of course at its greatest at Alam Halfa when the Shermans had not yet reached the front line._
_The German 88mm anti-tank guns had been superior to any that the British could find throughout the days of Eighth Army’s ordeals-and they remained superior until the first few ‘Pheasants’ arrived at the time of Medenine. _*_The only difference was that at Alam Halfa, Alamein and the Mareth Line, the Axis commanders had more than, and at Wadi Akarit almost, twice the number of 88mms that had been present during CRUSADER, three times the number that had been present at ‘First Alamein’._*
_It should also be emphasized _*_that throughout its conquest of North Africa, Eighth Army had had to overcome problems not experienced by its predecessors. Its supply-line had to stretch further than ever before at the time of its victory at El Agheila, and even further still at the time of its final thrust to Tripoli._*_ At Medenine also, Eighth Army’s supply-line was far from adequate, a fact which makes the admirable defensive preparations it carried out in an astonishingly short space of time all the more remarkable._
_In addition, _*_when Auchinleck had launched his attacks in July 1942, the enemy had had no opportunity to prepare adequate defences, while during CRUSADER he could outflank the defences altogether through the open desert. For that matter Rommel had enjoyed the same advantage during his counter-offensive after CRUSADER and at Gazala._*
_By contrast when Eighth Army took the offensive at Alamein in October 1942, _*_the Axis position could not be by-passed and was protected by half-a-million mines and all the hideous devices of the ‘Devil’s Gardens’. At El Agheila it was possible to avoid the defences but only by crossing terrain worse than any that either Eighth Army or Panzerarmee Afrika had yet encountered. At Buerat the front line could be outflanked without too much difficulty, but the going encountered later left even the tough, experienced New Zealanders ‘speechless’; while the Homs-Tarhuna escarpment was only mastered because Eighth Army moved too quickly for Rommel to offer adequate resistance there. At Mareth, Eighth Army was opposed by long-prepared fixed defences, the only way round which led to a ‘bottleneck’ so dangerous that it was feared an attack through it would be ‘a second Balaclava’. And finally in the Gabes Gap Eighth Army faced a formidable natural barrier which it had to assault head-on. Only superb troops could have surmounted such a series of difficulties._*
_But then the men of Eighth Army had always been superb troops. All they had lacked had been ‘a clearly defined purpose and a leader’. _*_They ‘got both in Montgomery’._*_ His critics have referred to him slightingly as ‘a superlative actor’ or ‘a great showman’, and certainly some aspects of his attempts to restore morale when he arrived in the Desert are open to such complaints. These were, however, unimportant, in fact largely irrelevant, _*_compared with the actions which really did restore morale: first, his cancellation of all previous plans for withdrawals to reserve positions, whether within the Alamein defences or outside the combat-zone altogether; next, his victory at Alam Halfa, won in just the way he had foretold and as a result of precisely those alterations which he had made to the previous plans._*
_Moreover _*_Montgomery made other contributions to success at least as significant as his restoration of morale, vital though that was. He welded the different branches of Eighth Army into one integrated whole, and added to it the close co-operation of ‘his’ Air Force. He displayed great strategical insight as demonstrated by his ability to think ‘one battle ahead’. Most of all perhaps, in his seven victories he justified the opinion of Brooke that he was ‘without question the best tactical commander in the [British] Army’._*
_It might indeed be queried _*_whether any mere actor or showman would have proved capable in just over a fortnight of transforming a plan which ‘might almost have been written for Rommel’s express benefit’ into one which provided the basis for the victory of Alam Halfa. Or of devising those ‘crumbling’ operations against the enemy infantry at Alamein which compelled the enemy armour to risk crippling losses in counter-attacks and at the same time made the enemy anti-tank guns less effective. Or of showing that combination of ruthless resolution and flexibility of mind which then saw Alamein through to its successful conclusion. Or of making the imaginative move of ‘grounding’ one corps and using it to provide supplies to the front for the advance on Tripoli. Or of thrusting past the Homs-Tarhuna defences before these could be organized properly. Or of winning the flawless defensive battle of Medenine. Or of executing the ‘Left Hook’ which so brilliantly redeemed the initial failure at Mareth. Or of overcoming the positions in the Gabes Gap-according to Rommel the most formidable natural obstacle in North Africa-in less than twenty-four hours._*
_Brigadier Sir Edgar Williams certainly thinks otherwise. Williams is frequently reported as hating the Army and although this was not the case he had no intention of making it his career and he was very far from being respectful of its senior officers. He was also well aware of the advantages and deficiencies of ‘Ultra’. _*_His judgement: ‘Montgomery was the best British field-commander since Wellington.’_*
Montgomery was a Pom; conceited, know-all with scant regard for the truth. However, in spite of all of his faults, errors and inability to engage sensibly in an allied expeditionary campaign, he did a workman-like job. The major problem was the UK press, booming him up to the point that rendered him impervious to dismissal or even serious reprimand. In this regard he was the Brit version of Macarthur - but with vastly more runs on the board.
Very well stated perhaps the best explanation I've read on YT 👍Monty was on the winning side.Britain had much better Commanders
If Monty had been named supreme allied commander, there would be no D day. The A-bomb would have dropped on Berlin, and Monty would have taken credit for the win.
Its a definite no.
It was impossible to use atomic weapons in Europe.
Something Montgomery should absolutely get credit for is being the first British General in North Africa who would not allow himself to be brow-beaten into a premature offensive by winston Churchill's needs fo a morale boosting victory.... he went when he was ready.
"The swine isn't attacking" said Rommel to von Mellenthin in frustration during Alam el Halfa.
Montgomery was too smart to fall into Rommel's trap.
He sent a telegram about the forthcoming battle of Alamein to Churchill: -
1. If we attack in September the attack will fail
2. If we attack in October I guarantee complete success
3. Do I attack in September
@@lyndoncmp5751 Reminds me of " This Wellington fights in a new way, he fights sitting on his ass"
The debate will always go on forever the simple question is who else could have done his job. Every previous commander was unable to control Churchill Montgomery did and won at the decisive moment that's what counts
Yes Who else would have the tenacity to literally camp until you have enaugh numbers to steamroll your oponent, while taking no risk or advantage from situation.
This is true. But it's honestly sad that someone as mediocre as Montgomery was the best the Brits had to offer during WW2.
@@GeraltofRivia22 It wasn't the best, there was also Bill Slim, Richard O Connor, Auchinleck, Miles Dempsey, Pip Roberts.
@@GeraltofRivia22 You know, the more you post "Monty was mediocre", the more it seems like your opinion. He had lower casuality rates than many of his contempories, served all the way through the war from 1939-1945 with many success, was loved by the men who served under him and accepted the surrender of Germany (in a solemn ceremony with no showboating).
It is arguable that in North Africa and Normandy, Montgomery's leadership and strategy set up the Axis forces for catastrophic attritional defeat. Such that he was a general seeking decisive battle and destruction of enemy forces. It is again arguable that without this component, Patton's risk taking would have seen him open to defeat by German forces who would not have been pinned in attritional combat with Montgomery's forces. Market Garden on the other hand would seem to have been inadvisable and a gross failure; Montgomery there drawing the allies into great cost and arguable prolonging of the war (and that costly in itself). For Brits he's simply the last Empire general; El Alamein the last military hurrah of Empire.
Market Garden never prolonged the war. Eisenhowers broad front strategy did, with all that messing around in the Lorraine, Alsace and Hurtgen Forest.
A strong northern thrust would have been the way to go in September/October 1944.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Eindhoven, Netherlands→Berlin, Germany 399 miles.
Nick Danger
Under Montgomery, the western allies moved 500km in just 3 months, June to September 1944.
Under Eisenhower the allies barely moved 100km in 6 months September 1944 to February 1945...... with even a retreat thrown in for good measure.
"While during the planning there had been lofty talk, from Montgomery especially, of driving beyond Caen on D-Day, deep concern had also been expressed that the entire enterprise might fail. On D plus 1, the mood in the Allied camp was this: huge relief that the invasion had so far gone considerably better than many had dared hope but not quite as well as the best-case scenario."
forces net days after d day what happened next page
@nickdanger3802
I'm sorry, but Caen gets wayyy too much focus when we analyse Operation Overlord. I understand it's importance, roads, infrastructure etc but it seems to dominate debates, perhaps far too much.
If I was to criticise Eisenhower throughout this campaign perhaps his refusal or inaction to make the channel ports a priority. Especially considering this was how the United States portion of the forces were going to be supplied in the planning stages of this campaign.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
Caen in allied hands, Caen in German hands, nothing changed. The Germans still concentrated the vast bulk of their armour in front of British Second Army.
Caen in allied hands added almost nothing to the allied build up.
um no you twisted twirp little villa they were there for the road network only way in/out of Pas deCalais at that time to Paris.Monty and the British were Dunkirked before when the odds were even and only the heaviest bombing of the Normandy Campaign and the naval shelling from right off shore and The GIs landing with them kept it from happening again
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Channel ports were in Montys AO.
@@thevillaaston7811 Take it up with Forces Net fuk wit.
After Alamein Monty pushed Rommel all the way to the Mareth line in Tunisia, the equivalent distance from Moscow to Paris, with enormously stretched supply lines, barely using more than three divisions the whole time whereas Rommel had six.
John Burns - Monty lost a lot. What he won he won with overwhelming superiority in men, materials,air support and ULTRA. And then barely.. and poorly.Alam Halfa, which was fought with Dorman-Smith's battle plan but did not end the North African campaign because Monty montied.
EVERYTHING was already in place to win in the desert. Churchill wrongly removed General Auchinleck who argued that his men had not regrouped and needed reinforcing. Several military analysts accused Churchill of misunderstanding desert warfare tactics, saying he placed too much emphasis on territorial occupation. They needed 6 weeks to refit and resupply. *So what does Monty do - took 10 weeks(Aug-13-Oct 23) to advance - much more time than Auchileck and Dorman Smith insisted on and got fired for in the 1st place.*
♦Montgomery had 1500 miles and every concievable advantage - BIG ADVANTAGES in men/materiel/air cover/intelligence/tanks/artillery and still Montgomery never captured Rommel
♦Monty didn't build up the arms/men/tanks/materiel - the allies did -Dorman-Smith had engineers and infantry plant the massive mine field on the Alam Halfa ridge , that Bernard attempted to take credit for.
♦ULTRA became fully operational in August 1942 after the Germans had changed some wheels/gears on Enigma
♦The Torch Landings - forces included 60,000 troops in Morocco, 15,000 in Tunisia, and 50,000 in Algeria.
♦Claude Auchinleck called over two fresh divisions from the Nile Delta after winning 1st Alamain.
♦Both of those troop deployments forced Rommel's hand as now there would be more enemy troops to deal with.
♦The Air and Naval Corp completely strangled the Afrika Korps supply lines. Sweeping the skies and seas in/over the Mediterranean
♦Montgomery never opened ports or grabbed Air Strips for them in return
♦his would continue into Sicily and Normandy where Monty's deficiencies would be exposed -Rommel in his memoirs credited complete Air superiority by Conningham's RAF that they could hardly sleep in the heat and battle of the day and could only move at nite
♦*Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts p.282-83* On 12 September 1942 Churchill had cause to thank Roosevelt telling him the 317 Sherman tanks and 94 self propelled 105 mm guns "which you kindly gave me on that dark Tobruk day in Washington" and arrived safetly in Egypt and been received with the greatest enthusiasm.....as these tanks were taken from the hands of the American Army
♦Montgomery had ABSOLUTELY NOTHING to do with any of the above actions. The British Press needed a Hero and Monty reveled in the roll, Denigrating others who had done so much for the War effort. He loved grabbing the Glory at least twice later he almost got sacked.And if it wasn't for the sorry fact that General Gott's plane crashed and British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have.
@@bigwoody4704
Monty never lost a battle.
The best General of WW2.
A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2:
♦ Battle of Alam Halfa;
♦ Second Battle of El Alamein;
♦ Battle of El Agheila;
♦ Battle of Tripoli;
♦ Battle of Medenine;
♦ Battle of the Mareth Line;
♦ Battle of Wadi Akarit;
♦ Allied invasion of Sicily- the largest seaborne invasion in history before Normandy;
♦ Battle of the Sangro River;
♦ Operation Overlord - the largest seaborne invasion in history;
♦ Operation Market Garden ♦Battle of Overloon ♦Operation Pheasant- took 60 miles of German held territory, liberated Eindhoven and Nijmegen, along with many towns and protected Antwerp. This created a narrow salient that ran from the north of Belgium across the south-east of the Netherlands. The Allies then cleared the German forces from the region between Antwerp and the Maas securing allied supply lines. In addition the offensive completely cut off the Germans who were left holding their positions at the mouth of the Scheldt River, which the Aliies then cleared, opening it up for shipping. Over 40,000 German troops capitulated.
♦ Battle of the Bulge;
♦ Operation Veritable;
♦ Operation Plunder - the greatest river assault crossing of all time.
Not only did Monty replan and serve as Allied Ground Forces Commander for Overlord, the largest seaborne born invasion in history, he also replanned the Alllied invasion of Sicily, the largest seaborne invasion in history before that.
_”Had the Sicily landings proved - as Salerno and Anzio would prove - near-disasters, then history might well have cast Eisenhower and Alexander in the same noble but failed mound as their predecessors in the Middle East, Auchinleck and Wavell. It is for this reason surely that General Dempsey, on his deathbed, referred to Sicily as Monty’s ‘finest hour’ - for Monty alone among the senior Allied military commanders had the courage to refuse to carry out an ill-conceived plan, and to insist that, if tackled, the invasion be mounted properly. Though he would be pilloried by the ignorant or envious, and his motives made out to be megalomaniacal rather than military, the accusations tell us more about his accusers than about Monty. As one British colonel - not friendly towards Monty - would later remark: I find those who criticise Monty loudest are so uniformly second-rate that I prefer not to make my own views known!….”_
-Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944
In Normandy Monty was in command of all ground forces and was the architect of the 5 beach invasion plan and the overall strategy of the campaign.
The plan Overlord by Frederick Morgan was revised by Montgomery, like the original plan for the invasion of Sicily. Both would have led to complete disaster before Monty’s revision. This is something a lot of people don’t seem to be aware of.
Monty was the one that made the Overlord plan what it was. The plan was originally just 3 divisions and army Corp landing on some beaches together. He changed the plan from 3 to 5 beaches and from 3 divisions to 8 correctly arguing that 3 beachheads would’ve been too narrow a front and such an attack could be easily rolled up on both flanks. And instead of some airborne brigades, it should be 3 airborne divisions to assist while each army Corp of the British and Americans should have their own beaches to ease organization. And he emphasized Cherbourg as the key.
The Allies prevailed in Normandy using Monty’s invasion plan and his ground strategy.
On Normandy:
_”That the COSSAC plan for a 3-divisional assault in ‘Overlord’ was a recipe for disaster now seems undeniable. Had Alexander been appointed to command the land forces in the invasion, would Morgan’s COSSAC plan have been enacted? Monty was not alone in recognizing its flaws, as will be seen, but he was alone in having the courage and conviction to see that it was thrown out and a better plan adopted. He had done so at Alam Halfa, he had done so gain over ‘Husky’ and whatever mud was slung at him, he was determined that he would do so over ‘Overlord’. For Morgan’s ‘Overlord’ plan, the result of one and a half years of research and discussions, had no prospect of succeeding, as Morgan’s planners themselves confessed…_
_….and by presenting such a clearly defined strategic plan for the battle thereplan can be no doubt that Monty brought to his Allied land, sea and air forces a unity of purpose and conception that was remarkable - and often confused later with Eisenhower’s role as Supreme Commander.”_
-Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944
@@johnpeate4544 Those books don't say that I've left the facts. Post the page numbers - you deliberately leave them out John Burns so no one can point out your forgeries. With out the GIs Monty ended up in the Channel after they arrived he never got Dunkirked again - imagine that.
The British had good commanders Bernard wasn't one of them. Close examination reveals time after time very stunted results.He was promoted above his abilities and accomplishments. Churchill removed the wrong guy and stuck with a mistake rather than dare admit he made one.
*Ike & Monty ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb,page 409 There were many reasons why Montgomery was being effectively downgraded once more.Eisenhower had no doubt any longer that his reputation as a battle-winning commander was greatly inflated* The experience at Caen,Antwerp,Arnhem and delays in following up the Ardennes assault and the excessively thorough build up for the Rhine crossing provided sufficient evidence for that.
*General Whitely IKE's British Deputy Chief of Operations,said the feeling at Allied HQs "was that if anything was to be done quickly,don't give it to Monty. Monty was the last person that would be chosen to drive on Berlin - he would have needed 6 months to prepare".*
More Monty victims
Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013
Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013
John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013
John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013
John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013
TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013
@@bigwoody4704
The books *all* say that. Real books by real historians not pop tabloid history and comic book fantasies.
_Montgomery’s military philosophy is quite clear. He believed in commanding a _*_balanced army-one in which the fighting arm was fully backed up by the logistical component. Unless those two elements were balanced, the army would eventually grind to a halt, short of the wherewithal to carry on fighting._*_ Before this happened, Montgomery would pause to bring the logistical support forward-a process he called ‘bringing up the logistical tail’ and so fighting a ‘tidy battle’. There was nothing wrong with this philosophy. Montgomery did not believe in ad-hoc, make-it-up-as-you-go-along strategies, but dealing with the logistical problem did entail periodic pauses. These gave the Americans an excuse for that endless bitching and whining about Montgomery’s ‘caution’ and ‘slowness’ which has haunted his reputation ever since. _*_The record shows that the US armies also paused; the difference is that Montgomery slowed before he outran his supplies, while Patton and his ilk stopped because they had outrun their supplies.”_*
- The Battle for the Rhine 1944: Arnhem and the Ardennes, the Campaign in Europe by Robin Neillands
Try one of your other fraud accounts you phony. Again you left out the page many have busted your pathetic editing of the facts. WHAT PAGE NUMBER? if that's not asking too much.Geronimo compared your writings in grammerly and they came out eerily the same you wag. Read The Full Monty i think you are mentioned in it
Market-Garden failed because the 82nd ABN failed to take their only objective - Nijmegen railway bridge - on the first day. This was due to BG Gavin's decision, once on the ground, to temporarily disregard his mission objective in order to defend against an imaginary threat from the east. What should have been taken on the 17th didn't happen until the 20th sealing the fate of the Brit 1st ABN.
While there are additional reasons, this fact was the single most deciding factor in whether M-G would succeed or fail.
The Son Bridge was blown 1st day no blame to 101st. Nijmegen could not have been crossed Until day 3 no matter what.
"Browning and Brigadier-General Gavin, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, were in agreement that the priorities around Nijmegen were first the vast area of high ground known as the Groesbeek Heights, followed by the bridge at Grave, the three smaller bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal, and finally the very large bridge at Nijmegen. Browning also told Gavin that he was not to make any attempt to move towards Nijmegen until the Heights had been secured; Gavin agreed though he later felt confident enough in his plan to allow one battalion to head for the bridge immediately after landing. The Groesbeek Heights were certainly important as they served as the Division's main drop zone and dominated the entire area, and so there is no question that the position of the 82nd Airborne Division, not to mention the right flank of the 2nd British Army when they arrived, would have been placed under considerable pressure if the area were to remain in enemy hands."
Pegasus Archive Marlet Garden LG Browning
@@nickdanger3802 Gavin's orders were to take the bridges "with thunderclap surprise". Browning approved his plan to secure the heights, but didn't think it would take Gavin hours to get around to taking his PRIMARY OBJECTIVE. The "heights" didn't dominate anything. They're a small rise, and certainly the position didn't prevent the Germans reinforcing the bridge and surrounds. I don't understand why a screening force wasn't put in place up there, and the main effort to the bridge. Gavin screwed the whole Op.
@@stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85
Frost: "my task was to take the three bridges ... on that first afternoon"
ua-cam.com/video/mdvpA94XSv0/v-deo.html
1st Parachute Brigade (BG Lathbury, 2,212 men) and 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron (181 men with "special jeeps") were tasked with taking and holding the three bridges on day one. Rail bridge was blown six hours after landing. Arriving in jeeps nine hours after landing 740 men (one third of 1st PB) captured one lightly defended end of the last intact bridge after 9th SS Panzer Recon Batt used it to advance to Nijmegen.
Pegasus Archive Market Garden Order of Battle on line
Monty was *not* fired as land forces commander. Eisenhower taking over was predetermined.
monty was given the title to auuaged his poor feelings,probably from missing his swiss boy hey but in Whitehall that makes you a Failed Marshall
Montgomery was doing the best job he could with the resources at hand. And he was obviously aware of the manpower limits the British were dealing with as the war in Europe ground into 1945. Instead of berating him -- and other British and American and Canadian generals, let's look at the successes they had in working (and yes, arguing) strategy and operations out. Compare this to the Germans and Italians and the Japanese: How well did they coordinate their strategy and operations? I'm glad everything was "joint" with the Brits, Canadians and Americans. The team that won in western Europe. I salute Montgomery and other commanding generals (e.g., Horrocks, Alexander come to mind, as well as Crerar from Canada and Freyberg from New Zealand) in the British army. Did they do everything correctly? No... they were human. Did they have egos? Yes... but that seems to go hand-in-hand with success on the battlefield. Some behaved poorly... that's human, too. But show me a better team... I don't think there was one. They solved problems together. As a retired American serviceman (U.S. Navy chief petty officer), I raise my hat to Montgomery.
Excellent post. Well put. 👍
Monty was able to win victories (mainly due to the quality of his British soldiers, air superiority and unbroken supply lines) but he always seemed to let the Germans escape: post-El Alamein, Sicily, Normandy, von Zangen's 15th Army. In addition, I always thought it was somewhat ironic that the one time he launched a truly audacious operation it was a disaster. He would have been an outstanding general in the First World War
It is hard to catch a man who is running for his life. Rommel only escaped by abandoning Libya and bolting into Tunisia. The original TORCH plan was for Tunisia to be occupied and then those troops advance into Libya and attack Rommel from the rear. However it ended up that Montgomery had to come to the rescue of the TORCH armies and advance into Tunisia to help them win.
Are you aware that his 8th Army's 1,300 km advance in just 20 days from El Alamein to El Agheila November 4th to 23rd 1942 was the fasted long advance by any army in WW2, and it came immediately after fighting a gruelling near two week battle and getting through half a million mines.
Nobody did more to help win the ground war in the west than Bernard Montgomery. Nobody.
Have some respect for the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2.
@@lyndoncmp5751 I have tremendous admiration for Monty, as I said above he would have made an outstanding general in the first war. If Monty had been forced to conduct a campaign or battle under the conditions his opponents were facing his name would rank along those of Cunningham, Ritchie, Wavell and Auchinleck, defeated and removed from command
@@lyndoncmp5751 and I might also add that a 1300 mile advance in 20 days is meaningless when the guy being pursued does it in 19 days. In a war of movement, Monty was always "a day late and a dollar short"
@@michaelkenny8540 Monty rescued no one, he was stopped at the Mareth Line for 3 months
Fired? Or was the position of Ground Forces Commander eliminated when Ike moved to the Continent and took command of all the Allied forces?
Yes, that was always going to happen with more American armies arriving.
The ironic thing is, when Eisenhower took over as ground commander thats when the allied advance stopped and went next to nowhere for the following six months..... with even a retreat thrown in.
Monty was the UK version of Americas General Custer. Both men ran on bluster with no real ability for command, tactics or leadership.
A nice way to treat allies, calling them cowardly. Had the American cities been under Luftwaffe attack for almost three years, and with the V1 soon to be V2 still landing on the SE of England. The term cowardly is nasty term. The British and her commonwealth had lost nearly half a million men, the US with a population more than four times that of the UK lost in the entire war a similar number. Annoying that the US calls this a European War as if the British were just as culpable as the Germans, and of course their help to the UK to fight fascism, had a price tag attached that we did not fully pay back until December 2006.
No Division suffered 75% casualties in Normandy. (8:50) That is complete and utter rubbish.
Like a lot of other stuff the narrator said. 👍
I'd call the Generals in WW1 Butchers, maybe some of the early Soviet commanders.
I don't even like Monty, i.blame him 75% for Operation Market Garden failure. But I wouldn't call him a butcher, if anything, thst Roman General who waited and waited while Hannibal rampages through Italy till he had overwhelming forces.
Montgomery was 100% responsible for the failure of Market Garden. It was doomed to failure before it was ever launched and Ike, Smith and Patton knew it was going to be a failure. However Churchill insisted on it.
@@billsanders5067 I'd say the blame rests with both Browning and Brereton.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- gavin maybe also
@@billsanders5067 Scouting and reconnaissance is a joint Anglo-American responsibility neither side spotted the 2 panzer divisions that no one expected to be there
@@samsativa245 and the Dutch resistance was so compromised by German intelligence at that stage that it was not even remotely reliable
No better or worse than most. Made his reputation in the desert. As is so often the case he was in the right place at the right time. His greatest achievement was ignoring Churchill knowing that every day he waited his army became stronger relative to Rommel's
as I understand it Monty came up with the idea for operation Market Garden but he had nothing else to do with organising and planning it , Eisenhower turned all detailed planning over to US General Lewis Brereton's 1st Allied Airborne Army staff , Brereton had no airborne assault experiance. and after the Battle of the Bulge Monty praised the US Gi's and Eisenhower but didn't mention any us Generals , and considering the likes of US Major General Cota gave orders to hold against overwhelming odds & then went to dinner and couldn't be reached , can you blame him
Damn, I think I just spent the last HOUR reading the 'comments' and 'replies' to this video. I've NEVER spent that much time doing that on ANY video I've watched before. It was all so interesting and informative I couldn't stop reading. I had my own opinions about some of the discussions, but decided it was best to just read and keep my mouth shut! Anyway, just wanted to thank everyone for their 'comments' and 'replies', because I really appreciated the h*ll out of all of them!
You deserve a thumbs up for that.
You've jumped a big part of Monty's WW2 service by going straight from Dunkirk to Egypt.
Montgomery's "next big posting" after the retreat from France was as V Corps commander with responsibility for the defense of Hampshire and Dorset, then as XII Corps Commander in charge of the defense of Kent, and in both commands he played a leading role in training up the British Army - a largely volunteer force - to face the years of war.
He would also demand the utmost fitness and competence from his officer subordinates and was ruthless in removing those he found wanting.
After this he was placed in command of South-Eastern Command, which he renamed South-Eastern Army, and implemented his training ideas on larger scale, which culminated in the Exercise TIGER, at the time the largest military exercise ever conducted on the UK.
In his capacity as Commander of South-Eastern Army he was responsible for planning part of the Dieppe Raid but considered it cancelled when it's window of opportunity had passed - it would be resurrected by Louis Mountbatten after Montgomery had been reassigned to command the 8th Army in Egypt.
Brings to mind McClellan, no claim as parallel. McClellan trained a superb army , but appeared constitutionally unwilling to commit them. Montgomery was able to commit to battle, but my, untrained non-professional opinion is that there have been better stratigists. His not realilizing the the road infrastrucure was extremely iffy to expedite the relief forces in Market Garden is one of his true failures.
Yeah, he won so many battles in the South-Eastern Army and saying he had anything to do with planning Dieppe is like kissing a pig! For Monty it would have to be a male pig!
@@mgt2010fla I was filling a big gap in Montgomery's career that the video left out by jumping straight from Dunkirk to Egypt. I was not attempting to do anything other than that.
It would be completely wrong to ignore the more controversial aspects of Montgomery's life and career and to pretend he never did anything wrong or deny he had any part in any failed operations. As such I though it was important to recognize that he had a part in planning the Dieppe Raid.
I'm am no so insecure in my thoughts and beliefs that I am unable to recognize the faults in the careers generals I think highly of.
"... ruthless in removing those ... wanting." A lesson that Grant found difficult, but learned. Critical skill for those in positions where thousands of lives are at stake.
@@inyobill The failure of MARKET GARDEN can be attributed to many "trained professional" including IKE who was adamant about advancing toward Berlin in a "Broad Front". What changed Ike's mind?
thank you , good video.
Just as I finished watching A Bridge Too Far.
Which is filled with errors...
Um no it was so accurate that the fraud monty was in it - just like the actual operation
Monty was perfectly happy to fight to the "last Canadian". Yeah, that is probably from "up high" (b/c the Brits were running short on men...after many years at war!)
However, b/c of Ultra, he was "reading the mail" of the enemy....so his "big win" had some help.
In Sicily, he couldn't deal with the fact that "his" area wasn't making progress (b/c of extensive Axis resistance!). so he commandeered the east/west highway that had been delegated toUS Army units...which, eventually led to the successful evacuation of MANY of the Axis units (e.g. Hermann Goering Division, etc.) that the Allies would have to fight later in Italy.
The fact that he says that Operation Market Garden (which would have been BRILLIANT if it had worked!!!) was the fault of the Canadians (and Military Intelligence and I presume, code breakers) is embarrassing. After all, he claimed it was "90% successful"...in a field where things are binary: win or lose...no points for "style"...should be a disqualification of him from ANY "Best General" list.
Not many people realise even in WW2 British military casualities were 1.6 times higher than any of the other Commonwealth nations (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India). No way intended to minimise the sacrifice of any of the Commonwealth forces, but just pointing out that the British usually had the highest casuality rates.
Between Dunkirk and D-Day, most British infantry divisions were based in Britain. Tell me, how many British infantry divisions served in North Africa?
@@shanemcdowall Around 6 amoured divisions and 12 infantry. You then have the Desert Air Force and Royal Navy units in the Med. Another point to consider is that many commonwealth divisions also contained many British brigades (e.g. 4th Indian Infantry Division contained 4th British Armoured Brigade in 1941). And then on a brigade level, many of the battalions were British (e.g. 5th Indian Infantry Brigade contained 1st Battalion Royal Fusiliers, Welsh Regiment, Essex Regiment at various stages throughout 1941).
@@thebrigadier1496 12 British Infantry divisions. Can you name them? There is the 70th and later the 51st Highland. A few other brigades. Perhaps I have missed these other ten British infantry divisions. About 11,000 New Zealanders fought in the RAF, many in the Desert Air Force. The truth is that I am right. Most British infantry divisions spent June 1940 to June 1944 swanning around the British Isles.
@@shanemcdowall Get over the fact that you are called out on your nonsense by facts.
It is clear your opinion is coloured by his appalling acts in Ireland, at least admit it as such.
Both Monty and Patton had some level of narcissism and Monty seemed to be a sociopath.
The fog of war is the common saying, the ordinary soldier and the officers who lead them are the real heroes. No amount of strategy or tactics can predict any ultimate result in any battle.
Having read his biography, Montgomery had all the necessary traits and motivations in common with other excellent generals through out history. He was a student of history, especially military history; he was determined to learn in both theory and practice.
He was an astute organisaer and logistician; and a meticulous planner. From his deployment with the BEF in France in 1940, through all his major campaigns to the end of the war, Monty thoroughly prepared and resisted political pressure to act before he was ready. These are all traits that historically correlate with good generalship.
But where people are often unfair to Montgomery is that he was fighting and at times, succeeding, in defeating the Germans at a time when other nation states were collapsing in front of the German Army. The French had a massive army, that the Germans were able to quickly defeat, it took the Russians 6 months, a thousand kilometres of retreat and 5 million casualties to even blunt the Wermacht. The United States had a massive economic/industrial advantagte, and virtually unlimited manpower reserves - and by the time they were directly engaged with the Germans they were already in decline.
Not so for Montgomery, he had none of these luxuries. He had inferior weaponry, limited reserves of manpower, no real strategic depth to work with (in France and North Africa); and on top of that, he fought the war from beginning to end; as a divisional commander to an army group commander. The German generals are given extreme amounts of credit despite losing. Patton is credited with being an excellent manuever commander, despite having virtually limitless reserves of men and materiel; Zhukov didn't manage a successful counteroffensive until 1943 - and at a horrific cost in lives. Even Rommel didn't really come close.
The things that made Montgomery unpopular were ancillary political issues for which he shouldn't be responsible. For example, there was considerable outrage back in England when Monty suggested, in response to high rates of STIs his soldiers were getting from French prostitutes, that they use condoms. This caused considerable outrage back in England at the time - but both our present day standards and objective medical reality - this is the appropriate decision, and really is a bit of a no-brainer.
Another issue that was raised was that in 1944 during a press interview, American commanders and observers, felt that "Monty was taking all the credit". Was this fair? Personally, I think not. The American generals were glory-hounds and were unduly sensitive to others getting attention over them. The behaviour of American senior commanders, such as Marshall, King and Eisenhower reek of Dunning-Kruger Sydnrome - they were unreasonably suspicious of British motives; when the reality was, most British commanders simply understood the war and Europe better than the Americans.
This thesis is largely supported by the fact that American generals continued to behave in this way after the war, including in Korea. Even today, Americans have a rather inflated opinion of their martial prowess, despite all the factual information to the contrary.
To conclude, Montogomery was probably better than the history books give him credit for. Most of his detractors disliked him for political, rather than performance reasons, and any smears on his conduct of the war were derived from those political motives. He was one of the only field commanders to fight through the entire war with any degree of success; he successfully resisted pressure form Churchill to carry out his campaigns as was required. His political/media naivety probably relfected on him slightly higher as a general, because he simply told people the facts of the situation. It is considered by some that Monty might have what we call today "Aspbergers" which is why some reported that he could be difficult socially to deal with; although this could be just as much a result of the culture clash between the two allies.
I'd rate him as easily the best commander of the entire war.
Great post. I fully agree.
With regards to Montgomery taking credit, this was the press conference during the Battle of the Bulge, and his comments were cherry picked and edited later. He actually praised the American soldiers and Eisenhower in that conference, but that was later conveniently ignored.
The thing is, Montgomery only held that conference to support Eisenhower, who was getting criticised in the British press, so Montgomery gave him some support, calling Eisenhower the "team captain". Additionally, in all previous conferences, neither Bradley or Patton made any mention of Montgomerys role in the Bulge. They both gave the impression that Bradley was in overall command of all armies. They did not acknowledge Montgomery. This reached a zenith on January 5th 1945 when Beddell Smith had to issue a SHAEF press release stating that Montgomery was in command of US 1st and 9th Armies and had been since December 20th.
So when Montgomery only talked about himself, Eisenhower and the American and British soldiers and did not mention Bradley (and Patton), well he was only doing the same thing that Bradley and Patton had been doing for weeks. None of that is remembered now, only that Montgomery credited himself.
Do you have a Monty shrine in your bedroom? Yamashita, Zhukov, Nimitz, and Kuribayashi all were better leaders in WWII! Von Rundstedt, Kovev, and Rommel, and von Manstein were also better because each had dealt with winning and losing during the war yet held their troops together! Monty never had to deal with that kind of defeat, because he never faced that kind of opposition, except at Caen, where the Americans saved his ass!
The Americans joined the war in Europe "when the Germans were already in decline". What are you smoking, share! If it wasn't for the American's the British would be speaking German! Not sure there would be any change of the quality of the menu! The US not only made the weapons of war needed by Britian, but kept their economy afloat with importing raw materials so their factories could run, brought in foodstuffs to keep the British from starving. Supplied shipping, invasion craft, repaired British ships in US ports, supplied almost ALL the naval aircraft for British aircraft carriers! I could do this all day!
Monty claimed every victory that was won as his doing, and every lose he had he blamed someone else! Caen? Monty! Falaise? Monty! Failure to open Antwerp to the sea? Monty! Monty CLAIMED that the "groups of British armies" turned the tide on the northern part of the Bulge! ONE BRITISH DIVISION helped with the Battle of the Bulge! Monty fought to the last man of the 1st US Army during the Bulge, and when he claimed at a press conference it was Monty! Churchill had to correct the record, on the floor of the House of Commons, that the Bulge was the greatest American battle of Western Europe! British historians Beevor and Hastings say the same thing, as does Ryan and Ambrose. (I can supply the books, pages, and quotes to back my comments up. There are right behind me on the bookshelf! I noticed you don't back up any of your comments with any sources! Usual for Monty fans!)
Eisenhower, Bradley, Hodges and Gerow were not "glory hounds" and even Patton wasn't as bad as Monty! The British author Hasting in "Armageddon" the British could have learned how to fight a war from the Americans if they weren't so sure their way was the best! Or
the only way! It wasn't! Monty thought THE ONLY WAY TO WIN was by HIM leading the way, with a couple of US Armies to lead the way and with maximum US logistical support at the expense of all other units! Monty wanted to sit nearly ONE MILLIION US TROOPS ON THEIR ASS so he could win, or lengthen, the war in the West! It wouldn't have worked because as Hastings points out in the same book, there was no way to supply anything close to that many troops on such a narrow road system. He was correct!
Look forward to your reply, with sources, or at authors and book titles. No biographies, they are not good source material, tend to be a bit bias!
Montgomery's largest victory was El Alamein and he used the guy in charge before him plan. Caen was his day one goal but it took him 2 months to take the city. Market Garden counted on using a single narrow road which could never work. After the was a hotel in London served a Montgomery martini which was 16 parts gin to 1 part vermouth. When asked why, they said those are the numbers advantage
he needed to attack.
Monty fought Alamein when he was ready. ...... My late father was an officer on HM Submarine Torbay sinking Rommel's supply ships. ...... Monty was, it is true, slow on the follow up, but he won at Wadi Akrit, too, and turned the old line of Italian fortifications. ...... The terrain was very difficult indeed.
Normandy. ...... Caen ITSELF had no value to the Allies, except as a road junction and railhead they might deny the Germans. ...... The value of successfully taking Caen lay in being BEYOND Caen, and able to dominate the terrain there, and force the Germans to attack. ...... Without Caen taken, the plan was still the same - force the Germans into a war of attrition they could never win.
Monty always intended that British and Canadian forces would hold the vast majority of German armour, leaving the Americans an easier task, as they faced far less armour. ...... Bearing in mind that much of the British and Canadian force had never seen action, and were facing Germans who had seen 5 years of war, it is hardly surprising that learning how to fight in a modern war would take time. ...... The Americans were left free to break out, and although not fully closed, the Falaise pocket was a charnel house of dead Germans and horses, and a scrapyard of destroyed or abandoned equipment.
Once Eisenhower took over as Land Commander, there was a lack of grip and understanding on what was required. ...... Logistics almost fell apart as the armies moved east. ...... Monty saw the Holland / Arnhem route to Germany as the route closest to sources of supply. ...... He could have taken Antwerp first, allowing the Germans time to recover on the approaches to the Rhine. ...... Instead, he proposed a bold strike through Arnhem.
Had the Americans been able to see the advantages of having a bridgehead across the Rhine before Christmas 1944, and fully supported it in every way possible, it is possible that the war could have ended in 1944, and that Russian control over eastern Europe may have been less than it eventually was.
Part of the American dislike of Monty stems from their abysmal trouncing by the German's in the Ardennes. ...... The Ardennes are a defender's paradise, yet the Germans cut through the Americans like a knife through butter. ...... While Supreme Headquaters was in a flap, Monty cooly realised that a regrouping of forces was needed, including American forces under his command, to protect routes leading towards Antwerp, and prevent German access to huge supply dumps near the Meuse.
I believe that Monty was genuine in saying that his rapid reaction to the German threat was an 'interesting challenge' ( or some similar words ), and that Americans were unduly sensitive over his comments at a press conference. ...... The truth is that Monty's dispositions were exactly right to meet the threat. ...... Impressive speed of action by Patton, plus the courage of the US paras, plugged the gap long enough for the German offensive to begin running out of fuel, and thus to lose momentum.
It has been pointed out in the comment above, but Caen was always intended to be where the British and Canadians would hold up German forces (90% of all German armour in that region of France) while the Americans could break out of Normandy and push the Allied front down to the south and then east. It was highly successful.
@@strongbrew9116 British forces had been training since 1939, and there were plenty of veterans, whereas the US Army in Normandy was mostly seeing battle for the fist time. ...... So it made sense to have the British and Canadians attract the majority of Germany's effort, while the Americans found their feet.
@@zen4men Majority of British forces for France were Green
@@Inucroft I agree, Germas - in terms of actual combat experience - but the difference between them and the US forces was that they had been training longer, plus there were plenty of veterans, which speeds up the learning curve. ...... Not always - 7th Armoured found it hard to adapt to Normandy after the desert, for example.
SECOND best British General - Uncle Bill Slim was the best
I think Monty was a classic British general, expert at methodical, slow and steady, in the same vein as Wellington. He got the job done but given the superiority in numbers of men, equipment and particularly air power at his disposal, I think almost any of the Allied generals would have been successful. I certainly wouldn’t have fancied his chances if he had parity with the Germans.. he would have been found out as a plodder, and in the desert particularly would have lost his army.
In the desert, Montgomery's four divisions defeated Rommel's six divisions at Alam el Halfa.
not as accurate as your new guinea episodes. It was 21st Army group consisting of the 1st canadian army and 2nd british army in normandy which had a peak strength of 18 empire divisions (plus some polish ones), goodwood involved 5 british divisions. The plan posted before DDay included a breakout by the americans whilst fixing the armour before Caen (as that is teh direction it was going to come from. Montys problem was talking up what monty was doing particularly things like takeing Caen on day 1
I had two great uncles who fought under his leadership. They had the greatest respect for him.
The part about the battle of the bulge is straight up false. Montgomery came in as he was the highest ranking officer in the local area and his objective was to keep the American line whole while he bought up the British reserves to form a second defensive line so the Germans couldn’t break through and encircle like they had in the first battle of France. It was a German general who said Montgomerys contribution was that he turned the us front from a series of isolated holding actions into a unified front fighting to a singular battle plan.
And the purpose of operation goodwood and the Normandy breakout is not in debate by historians. Pretty much every allied war diary says the plan was always that the British divisions would pin German forces in place at Caen so the US forces could break out without getting bogged down by german reserves.
A lot in this video is false. Montgomery wasn't fired from ground control. Eisenhower just decided he wanted to control everything. Nor did he blame the Canadians for Market Garden.
In the Bulge, Montgomery never took credit for it all either. He actually highly praised the American soldiers and cited Eisenhower as the battle winning captain of the team. The press conference was only held by Montgomery in the first place to help Eisenhower, who was getting criticised in the British press for the American retreat there due to the failed broad front strategy.
Are you Lucian,monty like you was a fine example of a bad example
Favored direct confrontation to German style lighting strikes, and certainly worked for him
I think that above all if it's true that he was the type of leader who led from the front, truly had a genuine love and respect for his men and they're lives and that the men under his leadership would truly follow him anywhere (which in my opinion is insanely underrated among qualifies of revered military leaders) kind of answers the question of whether he was truly a good leader or if he was hyped up due to the situation he was thrown into fighting in two world wars...the fact that a video is being made about him, one of many may I add, just managed to concrete his legend even more
Except its not true. This channel is honestly pretty bad. Its all surface level normie stuff. Did you know that their original channel is about Star Wars?
@@GeraltofRivia22 it's free content . We should be a bit more appreciative of hard working of others. We can say we disagree respectfully but no need to denigrate them.
@@Kruppt808 I will denigrate it for spreading historical inaccuracies.
@@GeraltofRivia22 Please explain how it's not true that his men didn't respect him, then? Don't see how you claim it isn't true.
Monty was never in the front line..................
Typical Montgomery, making a big show of dispelling defeatism when taking over the Eighth Army, when in reality Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith had already stopped Rommel, were handling Rommel's attacks and re-structuring the army into something more effective while re-supplying. People forget that the defeats had come when Auchinleck was theatre commander, not in the field. When he took over direct command of the army Rommel saw the difference. Dorman-Smith had predicted what would be Rommel's big attack and laid plans, which Monty used without acknowledgement. Auchinleck's major failing was the trust he placed in his subordinate generals, but when he stepped in to bail them out he proved himself. His other failing was perhaps his relations with the Australians, who rebelled against him and cost him the opportunity to destroy Rommel's stranded armour at El Alamein. Montgomery was a great self-publicist, not unheard of for a general, but doing it by trash-talking his predecessor leaves a bad taste in the mouth. Both Churchill and Montgomery were a little dishonest in their memoirs, something which particularly enraged Dorman-Smith who took legal action. Dorman-Smith was sidelined after Alamein but performed brilliantly in Italy, something which really irked many of his plodding contemporaries. Monty had his strengths, but if you were looking for the best British General of the war I'd suggest Bill Slim. Slim wasn't handed an army in the ascendancy, which Monty was contrary to his self-serving rhetoric, he took an army on the retreat, managed their retreat ,moulded them into a force which stopped the enemy and then launched a successful offensive. He did this in a theatre which was very much second choice when it came to handing out materiel.
The 8th Army was in a pretty bad state before Montgomery took over. Montgomery turned it around overnight, due to instilling greater moral and more vigorous training. Montgomery also got rid of mindless cavalry like tank charges and instead placed far greater emphasis on artillery and closer ground to air co-ordination.
You'll note that Alam el Halfa was the first time the British did not suffer disproportionate tank losses against Rommel.
Rommel's second in command, von Mellenthin, agreed the 8th Army needed a change and that Auchinleck was right to be replaced. He said Auchinleck constantly failed to make his subordinates do as he wanted them to do and that Montgomery instilled a far greater will on those under his command in a manner that Auchinleck was lacking.
Von Mellenthin called Montgomery the best tactician if not strategist of the war.
Montgomery was by some way the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander. You cannot compare him with Slim. Apples and oranges. Two completely different theatres and two completely different opposition. Its mere opinion that Slim was the best British commander. Its established fact that Montgomery was the most successful. Nobody, absolutely nobody, did more to help win the ground war in the west than Bernard Montgomery.
From Von Mellenthin: Panzer Battles, Chapter IX Farewell To Africa, pages 137/138.
"During August we heard of important changes of command on the British side. General Alexander had replaced Auchinleck and General Montgomery had taken over command of Eighth Army. There can be no question that the fighting efficiency of the British improved vastly under the new leadership, and for the first time Eighth Army had a commander who really, made his will felt throughout the whole force. Montgomery is undoubtedly a great tactician, circumspect
and thorough in making his plans, utterly ruthless in carrying them out. He brought a new spirit to Eighth Army, and
illustrated once again the vital importance of personal leadership in war"
Von Mellenthin also writes about Auchinleck on the same pages
"Auchinlech was an excellent strategist with many of the qualities of a great commander but he seems to have failed in tactical detail, or perhaps in ability to make his subordinates do what he wanted. His offensives were costly, unsuccessful and from a tactical point of view extremely muddled. In the light of the July battles I think Churchill acted wisely in making a change"
Eric Dorman-Smith may indeed have been a brilliant military theorist but he was regarded as a sinister influence by most of the professional British/Commonwealth officers because he was attempting to introduce into their armies ideas which their forces had neither the training, equipment nor doctrine to successfully execute.
Alan Brooke wrote of Dorman-Smith that he "had a most fertile brain, continually producing new ideas, some of which (not many) were good and the rest useless." which reflected the general attitude towards him from his peers.
It was Dorman-Smith's influence over Auchinleck that Brooke attributed to the 8th's poor tactical performance.
To make matters worse, Dorman-Smith was not only the kind of arsehole who believed he was the only person with the right ideas and that everyone else was a blithering idiot, but also the kind of arsehole who made up petty and insulting nicknames about people he didn't like and refered to them by those nicknames publically and to their face, which made him no friends or allies within the military and certainly contributed to his somewhat lack-luster career despite his recognized intellect.
Let's remember, Ike and the Senior British Officers wanted him relieved in Normandy. Churchill said no, but only because the British press had built him up to be this great General. Yes he did a good job as a Division Commander in France in 1940, but I think that he actually peaked at that position. He got lucky in North Africa. He got there when the British Army finally was up to strength and had a huge amount of new equipment and supplies that they had not had before. They also had, had time to do some training up with their new equipment. He made out his battle plan and then Ultra delivered him the German's complete battle plan. Also, Rommel had previously had access to all British plans, disposition of forces and supply situation...that had ended by then. He actually wanted to use his original battle plan until his senior subordinates convinced him to change it to counter the intercepted German plan. He had his plusses and minuses, but he definitely got promoted above his skill level. Look at Good Wood and Market Garden and the casualties there. Also remember, Rommel was not nearly as wonderfully smart as he is give credit for...he did not or could not think strategically, only tactically.
Not really...
@@thevillaaston7811 yep, really.
@@Curmudgeon2
‘Let's remember, Ike and the Senior British Officers wanted him relieved in Normandy. Churchill said no, but only because the British press had built him up to be this great General.’
Your words.
As far as I can see, Montgomery kept his job in Normandy because he was easily the most competent senior allied commander there. Eisenhower had made mess of planning the Italian campaign, Bradley, and Devers had not planned any sort of campaign. None of those three even had any personal combat experience to bring to the problem.
This from the supposed ring-leader of any attempt to get Montgomery removed from the command of allied land forces:
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
P 563
According to the diary of Eisenhower’s aide, Captain Butcher, I told the Supreme Commander on the evening of 19 July that Montgomery had in effect, stopped his armour from going farther. Later, I am reported as saying that he British Chiefs of Staff would ‘support any recommendation that Ike might care to make with respect to Monty for not succeeding in going places with his big three-armoured division push I am sure that this record is misleading for although I strongly disapproved of Montgomery’s action, it was quite beyond my powers to speak in the name of the British Chief’s of Staff.’
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P243
July 27th.
“There is no doubt that Ike is all out to do all he can to maintain the best relations between British and Americans. But it is equally clear that Ike knows nothing about strategy. Bedell Smith, on the other hand, has brains but no military education in its true sense. He is certainly one of the best American officers but still falls far short when it comes to strategic outlook. With that Supreme Command set-up it is no wonder that Monty’s real high ability is not always realised. Especially so when ‘national’ spectacles pervert the perspective of the strategic landscape.” ’
P244
‘ “It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war! I drew his attention to what your basic strategy has been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw Germans on to the flank whilst you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the armour had continuously been kept against the British. He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch a major offensive on each front simultaneously. I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy was 2½ times that on the Russian front whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% Russian superiority on eastern front. Such a procedure would definitely not fit in with our strategy of mopping up Brest by swinging forward western flank.” ’
SIR BRIAN HORROCKS
CORPS COMMANDER
Sidgwick & Jackson
LONDON 1977
Page 53
‘Sir Brian Horrocks Comments: Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P282
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
More to follow...
Andrew Adams
‘Yes he did a good job as a Division Commander in France in 1940, but I think that he actually peaked at that position.’
Your words.
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON
1957
P 107-08
' In taking over the 1st Division I was for the first time having the experience of having Alexander working under me. It was a great opportunity . . . to see what he was made of, and what an admirable commander he was when in a tight place. It was intensely interesting watching him and Monty during those trying days, both of them completely imperturbable and efficiency itself, and yet two totally different characters. Monty with his quick brain for appreciating military situations was well aware of the very critical situation that he was in, and the very dangers and difficulties that faced us acted as a stimulus on him; they thrilled him and put the sharpest of edges on his military ability. Alex, on the other hand, gave me the impression of never fully realising all the very unpleasant potentialities of our predicament. He remained entirely unaffected by it, completely composed and appeared never to have the slightest doubt that all would come right in the end. It was in those critical days that the appreciation I made of those two commanders remained rooted in my mind and resulted in the future selection of these two men to work together in the triumphal advance from Alamein to Tunis.'
So there you have it. Alanbrooke saw Montgmomery (and Alexander), in the eye of the storm in 1940 , and knew that they were men would perform when the chips were down.
More to follow...
Andrew Adams
‘He got lucky in North Africa. He got there when the British Army finally was up to strength and had a huge amount of new equipment and supplies that they had not had before. They also had, had time to do some training up with their new equipment. He made out his battle plan and then Ultra delivered him the German's complete battle plan. Also, Rommel had previously had access to all British plans, disposition of forces and supply situation...that had ended by then.’
Your words.
‘He actually wanted to use his original battle plan until his senior subordinates convinced him to change it to counter the intercepted German plan.’
Your words.
Montgomery’s predecessor as Eighth Army commander had enjoyed a marked advantage over the Axis in men and equipment numbers, and had been receiving ULTRA information, but the troops under his command had been broken up into too many smaller units, and there was a major morale problem:
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON
1957
PART TWO
THE WINNING OF THE INITIATIVE
CHAPTER NINE. A MOMENTOUS JOURNEY
P 475
‘without consulting Cairo, he issued immediate orders that, if Rommel attacked, all units should fight on the ground where they and that there should be no withdrawal or surrender. The effect on the Army was electric.’
P 478
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence-a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE
BOOK II Africa Redeemed
Chapter XXIX: Return to Cairo
P464
‘Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
GENERALS AT WAR
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DE GUINGAND
K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODDER AND STOUGHTON 1964
P 188
‘I have always considered that Montgomery’s first two or three days with his Army was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life, and the way in which he put over his personality, right through the Army, was really remarkable. Besides talking to the staff and laying down what he called his ‘military philosophy’, he met all Commanders and their troops and, of course, examined in great detail the ground now held and that over which we would have to fight. I accompanied him during the reconnaissances which resulted in decisions as to the way he proposed to dispose his forces for the defensive battles which we all expected. It would be Rommel’s last desperate to reach the Delta, and failure would remove once and for all the threat to our Middle East Base.’
Here is German Generalmajor FW von Mellenthin on Montgomery:
"Montgomery when he arrived in Africa changed the way the 8th army fought, he was a very good army trainer and was ruthless in his desire to win, he changed the battle into an infantry battle supported by artillery.
The only disagreement between Montgomery and his subordinate commanders, took place during the battle, and was about where the point of attack should be in order to create the breakthrough for the armoured reserve.
‘He had his plusses and minuses, but he definitely got promoted above his skill level.’
Your words.
If that is so, god help the allies if Bradley, Devers and Eisenhower had been left to get on with things.
‘Look at Good Wood and Market Garden and the casualties there.’
Your words.
GOODWOOD (Good Wood) casualties were little different in scale to other allied operations in Normandy: Saint-Lô, BLUECOATS, and so on. MARKET GARDEN’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
‘Also remember, Rommel was not nearly as wonderfully smart as he is give credit for...he did not or could not think strategically, only tactically.’
Your words.
Perhaps you are right? Who can say? Not me. I never met him, nor have I taken part in a war.
Montgomery was not a gambling man and he made sure his men were meticulously trained and that he had enough material and manpower for any given task. It is little wonder why Eisenhower gave him the planning of D-day.
Me a Canadian mmm, squint eyes (Dieepe raid, Rome, Little Stalingrad, Major Leo, battle of the Scheldt, multi stage Amphibious
assaults'. not learning from D-day, were airborne troops are better if sped out in a wide arrays. Canadians forced to retreat, to cover the British during D-day, we were all pretty much drunk at that point.
I am note sure if you are blaming Monty or not, but Dieppe was Mountbatten and the Market Garden airdrops were planned by American General Brereton.
@@thebrigadier1496 "The Royal Air Force, however, refused to land any troops so close to Arnhem, and so Lathbury sought an alternative. His solution was to take Major Gough's 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron under his command and charge them with undertaking a coup de main. This unit, consisting of one hundred and eighty men, were all mounted on Jeeps which were vulnerable to enemy fire but armoured with powerful twin-Vickers "K" Machine Guns. Although completely unsuited to the purpose, the Squadron was expected to face only minimal opposition and so should have little difficulty in racing to the Bridge, as soon as their vehicles had been unloaded from their gliders, and holding it until the leading elements of the 1st Parachute Brigade arrived several hours later."
Pegasus Archive Market Garden The Plan page
I have since my Teenage days virtually Worshiped Field Marshal Montgomery as A Great Leader of Men and A Mighty General for whom Nothing WAS Impossible! Retired Ambassador HVSManral.
Patton was not an expert on mobile warfare at that time. Before the invasion of Sicily he had only been in 2 battles against axis forces in North Africa . He lost one and won one. But not on his own, there were also British, NZ, Indian and South African forces involved too, and they were much more experienced an Patton and his men. Monty cared about the health and wellbeing of his men and Patton only cared about the result, not cost.
No the battle of El Guettar Patton commanded. kasserine pass was commanded by Loyd Fredendall. Since you don't read History Patton's forces took both Palermo and Messina while monty montied
@@bigwoody4704 Sorry, since you don’t read English - I wasn’t talking about who was in command of the overall operations, and I clearly said “before the invasion of Sicily”- I was explaining his lack of real experience at the time. He had espoused a lot of theory, and written a book on it, but hadn’t put any of it into practice yet.. Until you have put that theory into action and proven it correct, you are no expert.
Expert he wasn’t, yet, but after time spent on the Italian campaign, he certainly gained a lot of experience.
Also Patton may have taken Palermo and Messina - but he did it by ignoring his superiors and doing his own thing. He was lucky no-one else was relying on him to follow instructions, otherwise he could have been responsible of the deaths of 1000s - then how would history look upon him. He came very close to being sent back to America in disgrace.
“Monty Montied” - you mean he cared about his men and didn’t want to waste lives unnecessarily. A lesson learnt with Britain having been at war for about 3.5 years in North Africa before the Americans got involved, and had been successful in beating Rommel back to the east toward the American forces.
@@bruceironside1105 Monty got 1100 paras and airman killed in ONE DAY crossing the Rhine,look that up my royal revisionist friend. That ass cared for a headline Caen and Market Garden also he was given all the supplies and preference IKE could possibly give mediocre at best Britain had much better commanders. Patton was tank commander at the end of WW1,he studied the emerging concept between wars.America had been fighting in the Pacific also. Try looking up Britains bullshit - in Sicily Alexander gave the inside paved road 124 to Montgomery that was in the American operating sector that was ignoring allied protocol. And Patton twice flanked Kesselrings forces along the northshore with Gen. Lucian Truscott 3rd Division & Lt. Col. Lyle Bernard led the 2d Battalion using amphibious landings around the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division. And you try reading An Army at Dawn,Desert Generals or watch the video on YT - it's in English . And Monty reaped the benefits of those who came before him in the desert
O'Connor and Auchinleck were good commanders and winston had no business sticking his nose into their command which unfortunately led to the position falling to monty which never should have happened. By the time Bernard showed up allied advantages were such that even he couldn't faff it up. British Imperial holdings in the middle east was of no concern of the American people or it's army . Actually neither was the war in Europe - it is the reasons millions left for these shores - paying the butchers bill in feudal systems for princes and lords and the rest of the caslte's inhabitants
three and half years? British forces being "evacuated" from:
Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940
Greece, Crete,Hong Kong and Libya in 1941
Tobruk and Dieppe,Singapore in 1942
OKAY
I love the part in the movie Patton where the germans get the news, "Patton has taken Palermo" and the reaction is "Damn!" Then Monty gets the news of Patton taking Palermo and his reaction is, "DAMN!" I don't know if it was true but it sure was funny.
There is no evidence of this.
Pithy wanker Patton took Palermo and Messina while monty montied. Try using the address bar at the top of the page to relieve other of furthering you education
@DesertRats332
Again, there is no evidence of this.
Patton's race to Palermo was a good photo op, but it allowed 100,000 enemy troops to escape to the mainland with their heavy equipment. Why do you think Patton was sidelined after Sicily? For bad media optics?
The best General of the war.
A list of Montgomery’s victories in WW2:
♦ Battle of Alam Halfa;
♦ Second Battle of El Alamein;
♦ Battle of El Agheila;
♦ Battle of Tripoli;
♦ Battle of Medenine;
♦ Battle of the Mareth Line;
♦ Battle of Wadi Akarit;
♦ Allied invasion of Sicily- the largest seaborne invasion in history before Normandy;
♦ Battle of the Sangro River;
♦ Operation Overlord - the largest seaborne invasion in history;
♦ Operation Market Garden ♦Battle of Overloon ♦Operation Pheasant- took 60 miles of German held territory, liberated Eindhoven and Nijmegen, along with many towns and protected Antwerp. This created a narrow salient that ran from the north of Belgium across the south-east of the Netherlands. The Allies then cleared the German forces from the region between Antwerp and the Maas securing allied supply lines. In addition the offensive completely cut off the Germans who were left holding their positions at the mouth of the Scheldt River, which the Aliies then cleared, opening it up for shipping. Over 40,000 German troops capitulated.
♦ Battle of the Bulge;
♦ Operation Veritable;
♦ Operation Plunder - the greatest river assault crossing of all time.
Not only did Monty replan and serve as Allied Ground Forces Commander for Overlord, the largest seaborne born invasion in history, he also replanned the Alllied invasion of Sicily, the largest seaborne invasion in history before that.
_”Had the Sicily landings proved - as Salerno and Anzio would prove - near-disasters, then history might well have cast Eisenhower and Alexander in the same noble but failed mound as their predecessors in the Middle East, Auchinleck and Wavell. It is for this reason surely that General Dempsey, on his deathbed, referred to Sicily as Monty’s ‘finest hour’ - for Monty alone among the senior Allied military commanders had the courage to refuse to carry out an ill-conceived plan, and to insist that, if tackled, the invasion be mounted properly. Though he would be pilloried by the ignorant or envious, and his motives made out to be megalomaniacal rather than military, the accusations tell us more about his accusers than about Monty. As one British colonel - not friendly towards Monty - would later remark: I find those who criticise Monty loudest are so uniformly second-rate that I prefer not to make my own views known!….”_
-Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944
In Normandy Monty was in command of all ground forces and was the architect of the 5 beach invasion plan and the overall strategy of the campaign.
The plan Overlord by Frederick Morgan was revised by Montgomery, like the original plan for the invasion of Sicily. Both would have led to complete disaster before Monty’s revision. This is something a lot of people don’t seem to be aware of.
Monty was the one that made the Overlord plan what it was. The plan was originally just 3 divisions and army Corp landing on some beaches together. He changed the plan from 3 to 5 beaches and from 3 divisions to 8 correctly arguing that 3 beachheads would’ve been too narrow a front and such an attack could be easily rolled up on both flanks. And instead of some airborne brigades, it should be 3 airborne divisions to assist while each army Corp of the British and Americans should have their own beaches to ease organization. And he emphasized Cherbourg as the key.
The Allies prevailed in Normandy using Monty’s invasion plan and his ground strategy.
On Normandy:
_”That the COSSAC plan for a 3-divisional assault in ‘Overlord’ was a recipe for disaster now seems undeniable. Had Alexander been appointed to command the land forces in the invasion, would Morgan’s COSSAC plan have been enacted? Monty was not alone in recognizing its flaws, as will be seen, but he was alone in having the courage and conviction to see that it was thrown out and a better plan adopted. He had done so at Alam Halfa, he had done so gain over ‘Husky’ and whatever mud was slung at him, he was determined that he would do so over ‘Overlord’. For Morgan’s ‘Overlord’ plan, the result of one and a half years of research and discussions, had no prospect of succeeding, as Morgan’s planners themselves confessed…_
_….and by presenting such a clearly defined strategic plan for the battle thereplan can be no doubt that Monty brought to his Allied land, sea and air forces a unity of purpose and conception that was remarkable - and often confused later with Eisenhower’s role as Supreme Commander.”_
-Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944
John Burns You bent freak those were allied victories where the little tosser happened to be mentioned in.The Allies provided such massive advantages that even the tart bernard couldn't faff it up.The imbalance was so one sided that even a losided loon like you would have succeded
♦Claude Auchinleck had won just one month earlier against the same army and he had none of the massive advantages the allies built up by the middle of august
♦Monty didn't bring over the fresh divisions from the Nile Delta Claude Auchinleck did
♦Montgomery really should have been appointed.General Gott's plane was shot down and Auchilech and Dorman-Smith lined the massive mine fields on the Ridge of Alam Halfa( that Bernard later attempted to take credit for) and also shored up defense line by the Qattara Depression to the south which was impassable to mechanized armor at El Alamein creating a choke point.
♦Monty didn't bring The Torch Landings forces that included 60,000 troops in Morocco, 15,000 in Tunisia, and 50,000 in Algeria - IKE did that. which Forced Rommel's hand as now there would be more enemy troops to deal with.
♦The BEF had 1,100 tanks and 225,000 men and FDR agreed to send Churchill after Trobruk - the 300 tanks and 100 - 105 mm Howitzers,not Monty
♦The allied supply port of Alexandria was 100 miles away,The Axis supply port was 1,000 miles away in Tripoli.Also factor in complete Air Superiority provided by Air marshall Conningham - Rommel had to move at dark to keep his columns from being strafed and obliterated.Monty didn't arrange that either
♦The RN & RAF in the Mediterranean strangle all the supplies sent
♦ULTRA was fully operational in August 1942 Blechley made that possible not Monty
♦Rommel had 200 tanks,90,000 men ,low on fuel,food, water
Here you go john Burns they will lead you out of your land of make believe
*ua-cam.com/video/duOYnIGivys/v-deo.html*
ua-cam.com/users/sgaming/emoji/7ff574f2/emoji_u2666.png
*Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188* Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
*The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61"Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself.* Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed"
*The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 521 Montgomery was in a position to profit by the bitter experience of his predecessors .While supplies on our side had been cut to a trickle ,American and British ships were bringing vast quantities on materials to North Africa .Many times greater than either his predecessors had ever had.* His principle was to fight no battle unless he knew for certain that he would win it .Of course that is a method which will only work given material superiority - but that he had. He was undoubtedly more of a strategist than a tactician. Command of a mobile battle force was not his strong point British officers made the error off planning operations according to what was strategically desirable ,rather than what was tactically attainable.
Definitely the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander.
@@lyndoncmp5751
There’s no other WW2 general, western or eastern, Allied or Axis, with either his ability or accomplishments.
Here you two cyber psychos on the same account
More Monty victims
Barrie Rodliffe joined 26 Sept 2013
Giovanni Pierre joined 28 Sept 2013
John Peate joined 28 Sept 2013
John Burns joined 07 Nov 2013
John Cornell joined 13 Nov 2013
TheVilla Aston joined 20 Nov 2013
Isn't that right Cornell,err,I mean Lyndon
He hated working with the Americans yet a naval invasion of continental Europe even Sicily was not possible without them, the UK never had a chance in land battles against any of the great powers in Europe by itself.
What nonsense. Every comment he made about American troops was positive. He got along well with Patton, Hasbrouk & Gavin both spoke highly of him (and he of them). Where do people get these silly ideas?
@@stephenmccartneyst3ph3nm85
They get the silly ideas from Hollywood.
And how was a campaign in Sicily going to work without the British?
The amusement continues, you chode - it was Churchill's idea.The "soft underbelly" more like the soft spot on your head where your were dropped
What other rare gems have you mined for us today,you poltroon?
In Italy Montgomery was always slow. In north Africa, after 2nd Alamein, he let a beaten, poorly supplied, enemy get away virtually unmolested. Major failings. I've heard a story, can't remember where, that Montgomery wanted command in Europe and opposed almost everything that he didn't propose. Eventually someone, again, can't remember who, told him that if they replaced Eisenhower it would be with Viscount Slim, not him. He got the point immediately. Slim may be the most unknown excellent Allied general of the war.
The Africa Corps was virtually destroyed, Monty hunted Rommel down and drove him out of North Africa.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- It wasn't virtually destroyed. They fought well when given the time to get supplies. Besides, 'virtually destroyed' isn't good enough.
@@stephennewton2223 According to Historian Matthew Cooper only 5,000 troops of the 116,000 Africa Corps survived the battles against the Eighth army.
Quote *"When the Panzerarmee arrived, the Afrika Korps had only 5,000 men, 35 tanks, 16 armoured cars, 12 anti-tank guns, 12 field howitzers"*
That's 111,000 Axis troops, killed, wounded, and evacuated from Libya.
So no, they did get destroyed.
In contrast Montgomerys army only suffered a mere 13,000 casualties.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- My reading is that is not what was left after the battle. That is the number who reached Tunisia....I think that is where they ended up. They lost thousands because of their poor supply state. The British pursuit seems to have been very poorly handled. Poor air/ground cooperation and poorly handled logistics.
@@stephennewton2223 You must be from an alternate reality because the history in ours in pretty much the complete opposite of what you just posted. Monty's pursuit of Rommel over North Africa was done in record time without ever strectching the supply train beyond its limit.
One thing you kinda glossed over with Normandy stuff is that before D-Day there was correspondence between him Ike and Churchill that make it seem like at least the latter two were under the impression that Caen was supposed to fall in a couple days.
It was only after the fact that Monty was like “yep two month battle of attrition that was the plan all along” and a lot of historians look at that and are like “yep mr ‘master plan’ over there is full of it”. It was basically the same bs he tried to pull with Market Garden but he doesn’t get nearly as much heat about Caen.
One of the most frequent criticisms made of Montgomery was him being "slow" around Caen and failing to take it on time. He is also frequently criticised for telling Eisenhower and the Allied High Command one thing about his plans and intention while either having something completely different in mind in practice or else saying something different about it after the fact.
I might argue that Cean is, in fact, a stronger example of Monty drawing criticism for his...questionable relationship with the truth than MARKET GARDEN because he was ultimately successful in Normandy despite the tactical set-backs while his attempt to take Arnhem resulted in a defeat, therefore the "Bridge Too Far" is a self-evidence example of a failure in his generalship while the actions around Caen are overshadowed by the victory of OVERLORD that was achieved ahead of schedule.
@Joseph-lj4sp I think you'll find that the Normandy portion of the Official History of the Canadian Army, by Colonel Charles Perry Stacey (the author) provides ample evidence demonstrating a holding action in the Caen sector was always part of Montgomery's plan.
Taken from *"Appreciation on Possible Development of Operations to Secure a Lodgement Area" produced by 21st Army Group Planning, May 7th, 1944 (one month before D-Day).*
This was forwarded to the First US Army Group, among others, on the 18th May under a covering letter which reads in part, *"With regard to the outline of action at Part IV, this represents the Commander In Chief' (Montgomery's) intentions as far as they can be formulated at this stage."*
*Page 83 of the Official History of the Canadian army - The Victory Campaign by Colonel Charles Perry Stacey, Department of National defence*
*IV. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS*
Quote "The type of country immediately South of the initial bridgehead does not favour a rapid advance. The Allied build-up relative to the estimated German build-up indicates that a period may supervene round about D+14, when there will be a grave risk of operations stabilising on a line which gives the Germans advantages in defence. The greatest energy and initiative will be required at this period to ensure the enemy is not allowed to stabilise his defence."
"Once through the difficult bocage country, greater possibilities for manoeuvre and for the use of armour begin to appear. *Our aim during this period should be to contain the maximum enemy forces facing the Eastern flank of the bridgehead, and to thrust rapidly toward Rennes.*
"On reaching Rennes our main thrust should be towards Vannes; but diversionary thrusts with the maximum use of deception should be employed to persuade the enemy that our object is Nantes." *If, at this time, the enemy weakens his Eastern force to oppose us North of Redon, a strong attack should be launched toward the Seine.* "
Part IV continues, advocating alternating attacks on the Eastern and Western flanks of the bridgehead in reaction to German reinforcement moves, in order to bring German reinforcements sent to the American front back to the British front.
Thus it is fairly clear that Montgomery intended before ever landing to hold in the East and strike in the West.
@Joseph-lj4sp
'One thing you kinda glossed over with Normandy stuff is that before D-Day there was correspondence between him Ike and Churchill that make it seem like at least the latter two were under the impression that Caen was supposed to fall in a couple days.'
What correspondence? I have never seen it.
The undertaking that Montgomery gave for Normandy was for the allies to be at the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78.
As regards Caen. This, from an eye witness to Montgomery's briefing to allied leaders on the 15th May, 1944, at St Paul's school, West London:
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P 393
‘I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen .'
On Montgomery's strategy for Normandy:
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From US General Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story.
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.
From US General Dwight D Eisenhower's Crusade in Europe.
And Alanbrooke to Montgomery, 28/07/23:
‘ “It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war! I drew his attention to what your basic strategy has been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw Germans on to the flank whilst you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the armour had continuously been kept against the British. He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch a major offensive on each front simultaneously. I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy was 2½ times that on the Russian front whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% Russian superiority on eastern front. Such a procedure would definitely not fit in with our strategy of mopping up Brest by swinging forward western flank.” ’
@@thevillaaston7811 it’s pretty funny to me how you started that reply off like “those supposed allegations about Caen don’t exist” then proceeded to write an entire essay of random people trying to refute said allegations lol. Kinda contradicting yourself there my guy.
If no one has ever claimed Monty wanted to take Caen in two days, why exactly do you think anyone felt the need to defend the fact he did it in two months instead?
@@Joseph-lj4sp
I don't know what you find funny. You have been taken apart.
Read again, and learn.
Monty never blamed Canadian troops at Market Garden as none were there.
No, he blamed the Poles - in an appalling, disgraceful manner.
@@andywilson2406
Monty never. Sasoboski was removed from his job as he refused to take his men in. He did eventually. But his refusal got him the sack by Brereton, an American, the commander of the army he was in, the First Allied Airborne Army.
Irving Burns you distorted wort, bernard getting stuck and sitting on his can at Caen for 43 days with the heaviest bombing of the Normandy Campaign is called cowering not commanding. They call that a Field Marshall in your land of make believe. But hey at least he finally crawled out of the channel - but then ran 3,000 miles away with the Germans right there. Ask the Czechs you threw under the bus at the Munich agreement in 1938.Were there any Czech representatives present during that particular cowardly British act?
While the Royals cavorted on their estates playing polo,cricket,fox hunting whilst the yeomanry were forced mining precious metals/stones, and any other resources of value they could purloin from subjugated countries.