This is false as Malpass states it here. He is making a fundamental philosophical error in his "argument" by equivocating with the term "Necessary." There is no logical connection when one applies the term "Necessary" as a descriptive of a conscious Agent who has the capacity to freely choose. He equivocates the application of the term Necessary between Necessary Truths, and a Necessary Being. If a Necessary Being exists, then it is perfectly, logically acceptable that if He chooses to create a contingent effect, a universe for instance, then there is no entailment of His intrinsic Necessity upon the contingent effect at all. Malpass merely asserts there is an entailment making the effect Necessary, but supplies no reason for the assertion. The assertion is not only not substantiated, but it is false relative to a conscious, free, Necessary Being.
I think this misses the point. He seems to be worried about the explanatory power of adding a necessary being to the contingent causal chain. If a necessary being with complete free will chooses to make a world, let’s say, because it would end up with the maximum number of people who freely believe in him, well that would seem to provide a bit more of an explanation as to why the universe is this way. However, the reason behind that choice is still either necessary by his nature, in which case everything would seem to be necessary, and could be argued to have ultimately no explanation, or contingent upon his free will and could have been otherwise. But if it is contingent, then either he has a more fundamental reason to making that decision which could be necessary (see above) or also contingent which would continue the regress as contingent things require explanation, which is the motivation of the argument in the first place, or no reason at all but just a whim, which provides no explanation.
This is false as Malpass states it here. He is making a fundamental philosophical error in his "argument" by equivocating with the term "Necessary." There is no logical connection when one applies the term "Necessary" as a descriptive of a conscious Agent who has the capacity to freely choose. He equivocates the application of the term Necessary between Necessary Truths, and a Necessary Being. If a Necessary Being exists, then it is perfectly, logically acceptable that if He chooses to create a contingent effect, a universe for instance, then there is no entailment of His intrinsic Necessity upon the contingent effect at all. Malpass merely asserts there is an entailment making the effect Necessary, but supplies no reason for the assertion. The assertion is not only not substantiated, but it is false relative to a conscious, free, Necessary Being.
In that case, you're not really applying a normal version of strong PSR.
To insert free will to avoid the modal collapse is a tricky action.
I think this misses the point. He seems to be worried about the explanatory power of adding a necessary being to the contingent causal chain. If a necessary being with complete free will chooses to make a world, let’s say, because it would end up with the maximum number of people who freely believe in him, well that would seem to provide a bit more of an explanation as to why the universe is this way.
However, the reason behind that choice is still either necessary by his nature, in which case everything would seem to be necessary, and could be argued to have ultimately no explanation, or contingent upon his free will and could have been otherwise. But if it is contingent, then either he has a more fundamental reason to making that decision which could be necessary (see above) or also contingent which would continue the regress as contingent things require explanation, which is the motivation of the argument in the first place, or no reason at all but just a whim, which provides no explanation.