Comments on around 41:00. (1) I think Nozick blocks the possibility of someone coming to own all the property, since that would run afoul of his Lockean Proviso. I cannot remember the details right now, but I believe his special version of the LP applies not only to acquisitions, but also transfers and other special cases (e.g., if a disaster strikes and every other resource of the same type as your P is destroyed, then your holding now violates the proviso, etc.). (2) Nozick has a footnote in ASU where he says that there may be times we can override moral side constraints in order to "avoid catastrophic moral horror." So, if there really is a distribution where someone is truly starving and dying, then perhaps this would fall under the "catastrophic moral horror" exception. (Of course, we shouldn't put too much weight on Nozick's "non-absolutism"; basically no one is an absolutist, for it just flies in the face of our intuitions too strongly. We can always seem to set the stakes high enough to force out utilitarian intuitions! Pro tanto rights and what not.) Also, there are some limitations on these kinds of justifications for violating what are normally people's rights. For instance, leftists might be tempted to use this catastrophic moral horror exception to justify redistributive taxation to the poor. But as Huemer points out, there seems to be a difference between one time horrors and constant, institutionalized redistribution. He explores this with the drowning child example, as I'm sure you're well familiar since you're his colleague.
Thanks for your comments, Veritas! My apologies for not seeing them until this moment. Re: 1: The Lockean Proviso only applies to initial acquisition of unowned property, so it would be possible for someone to come to own all of the property via free and uncoerced transactions (e.g., everyone else gives their property to that person) without a violation of the Lockean Proviso. It would also be possible for a person to initially acquire all of the property so long as no one else wanted any--the "enough and as good" condition only applies to those who want to own the sort of thing being acquired. Re: 2: Yes, you're absolutely right. I left that issue out here for two reasons. The first reason is that I didn't want to complicate the presentation of main issue, which was the particular historical theory of distributive justice presented by Nozick. The second reason is that it's not clear to me how Nozick can have two different normative theories interacting with one another in the way that he thinks is possible. If some second normative theory "kicks in" when the first normative theory (viz., the entitlement theory) produces catastrophic moral horror, then either we need to find a way to integrate the two theories into one coherent theory or Nozick was just not willing to accept the moral consequences of his theory. I agree with everything else you say, and really appreciate you bringing it up, as I'm sure it'll be very helpful for people looking to expand their knowledge of Nozick's ideas and related issues.
great to have all the chapters outlined!
Thank you for this great video.
II am very thankful for you to mention the problems with Nozicks Entitlement Theory.
Kind regards from Germany. :)
Where does it start from?
Comments on around 41:00. (1) I think Nozick blocks the possibility of someone coming to own all the property, since that would run afoul of his Lockean Proviso. I cannot remember the details right now, but I believe his special version of the LP applies not only to acquisitions, but also transfers and other special cases (e.g., if a disaster strikes and every other resource of the same type as your P is destroyed, then your holding now violates the proviso, etc.).
(2) Nozick has a footnote in ASU where he says that there may be times we can override moral side constraints in order to "avoid catastrophic moral horror." So, if there really is a distribution where someone is truly starving and dying, then perhaps this would fall under the "catastrophic moral horror" exception. (Of course, we shouldn't put too much weight on Nozick's "non-absolutism"; basically no one is an absolutist, for it just flies in the face of our intuitions too strongly. We can always seem to set the stakes high enough to force out utilitarian intuitions! Pro tanto rights and what not.)
Also, there are some limitations on these kinds of justifications for violating what are normally people's rights. For instance, leftists might be tempted to use this catastrophic moral horror exception to justify redistributive taxation to the poor. But as Huemer points out, there seems to be a difference between one time horrors and constant, institutionalized redistribution. He explores this with the drowning child example, as I'm sure you're well familiar since you're his colleague.
Thanks for your comments, Veritas! My apologies for not seeing them until this moment.
Re: 1: The Lockean Proviso only applies to initial acquisition of unowned property, so it would be possible for someone to come to own all of the property via free and uncoerced transactions (e.g., everyone else gives their property to that person) without a violation of the Lockean Proviso. It would also be possible for a person to initially acquire all of the property so long as no one else wanted any--the "enough and as good" condition only applies to those who want to own the sort of thing being acquired.
Re: 2: Yes, you're absolutely right. I left that issue out here for two reasons. The first reason is that I didn't want to complicate the presentation of main issue, which was the particular historical theory of distributive justice presented by Nozick. The second reason is that it's not clear to me how Nozick can have two different normative theories interacting with one another in the way that he thinks is possible. If some second normative theory "kicks in" when the first normative theory (viz., the entitlement theory) produces catastrophic moral horror, then either we need to find a way to integrate the two theories into one coherent theory or Nozick was just not willing to accept the moral consequences of his theory.
I agree with everything else you say, and really appreciate you bringing it up, as I'm sure it'll be very helpful for people looking to expand their knowledge of Nozick's ideas and related issues.