Including the guy @0:21 who is tapping on the mantlet to make it look like he's doing something? Most of them would soon be drafted into the army and replaced by slaves.
Thanks for sharing this footage - the StuG III Ausf.F with the L43 gun dates this footage nicely, also think I saw some StuG III C/D retrofitted with the L43 near the end.
They needed them to work as well as possible, given the shortages (fuel, materials, soldiers, etc.) they were dealing with. They knew they’d be outnumbered, often by a substantial number. They have to go for quality, as quantity isn’t happening. This seeming overdesign is playing to their strengths, not their (many) weaknesses.
@@dennisyoung4631 Building things good enough to last a decade of warfare should be good enough in most cases. A little rough finishing would also be OK. This would make it possible to cut down on costs and production time, ultimately increasing production. Imagine if you really need lots of cars, and you build all of them like a Rolls Royce... It makes no sense to make a few luxury tanks that could last 80 years in times of war when they'll be destroyed in a few years anyway. It also makes no sense in the same scenario to finish weapons like they are entering beauty contests. Even German last ditch weaponry made five minutes before the Soviets kicked in the door was usually much better finished than the average Soviet mass produced stuff. I understand that craftsmanship was an ideological issue and a source of pride for skilled German workers, but this was one of these times were output was more important.
@@hb9145 I think that @dennisyoung4631was making a valid point. The design & construction of German equipment was not just about German ideology, culture, or pride. it was a necessity, in part, because men & machine were less plentiful in Germany. I will also add that, in the German military, Panzer crewmen had the same lofty status as fighter pilots, so their equipment was expected to be of high standards, not only because of expectations on the battlefield, but also to retain confidence of the crews & for recruiting purposes. These realities also go a long way towards explaining why the Nazi leadership kept moving towards larger, better armed & more thickly armoured heavy tanks, assault guns & jagdpanzers (the 'Hetzer' being an exception)...even though these big beasts became increasingly expensive to build & operate, even more stressful on the engine & transmissions, and impossible to manufacture at the rate the Soviets & western allies were able to make their equipment.
@@derekbaker3279 The praise of high quality of German industrial labor was a central essence of NS ideology towards their own workers. As Marxist ideology deemed German workers as exploited, the NS government praised them for their exceptional quality and thereby increased their status. As Dr. G. pointed out in his diary, the workers just needed a pat on the back. I certainly understand the dilemma of lacking German industrial output compared to the allies, and building good equipment with a high degree of crew survivability makes sense. Let's make this clear: I am not arguing against thick armor. However, I am arguing against "wonder-weapons", over-engineering and against finishing everything like they were making luxury items. This dysfunctional chain of thought slowed down production and put a strain on resources. Standardization of parts came too late to make an impact - yes, they really made military hardware much like luxury cars when they couldn't afford to.
Panzer III chassis production and all of its derivatives were concentrated in this facility, additionally repairs of tanks damaged at the frontline were carried out here-an entirely peculiar move unique to Germany's needs during the war and highly wasteful of transport resources and time. Given the complexity of the Panzer III (the earliest designs suffered many serious setbacks with the suspension) there was probably no other way to handle this, but more than a few disasters can be traced to understrength Panzer Divisions lacking their tanks because of the non-existent frontline repair capabilities of Germany's Panzertruppen. This was simply not an issue with equivalent Allied tanks except for maybe British ones.
After the fall of France, subsequent designs of the Pz. Kpfw. III were quite reliable & not overly complex, and during Germany's conquest of its western neighbours, their system for basic maintenance & repairs in field workshops & major repairs back in Germany worked quite well. Even during Germany's first year or so in North Africa, the PzKpfw. III performed very well & the maintenance/repair system was more that adequate. This was basically true for nearly all other German equipment, tactics & strategy. However, during Barbarossa, Fall Blau & beyond, the tactics, strategy, logistics, and equipment that had proven so be so successful in western Europe....then adequate during the first year in North Africa...were all revealed to be inadequate or absolute failures on the Eastern Front. This was the case with the Luftwaffe as much as the Heer, which suggests that there was a huge underlying problem for the German war machine. The problem? Well, all of Germany's difficulties in their war against the Soviets were not as much the fault of inadequately applied German engineering, or even incompetence among industries & military minds. Instead, I would suggest that Germany's failures were largely a reflection of the fact that, during the interwar period, the entire German war machine had been rebuilt around the need to apply "Bewegungskrieg" to a war in Poland & conquest of western Europe, e.g. specific demands associated with the limitations of rail & road transportation in Poland & western Europe, the terrain & weather conditions in Poland & western Europe, and the typical distances involved those military campaigns. And the proof was in the pudding...the German war machine performed quite well within the context of the invasion, conquest & occupation of Poland & western Europe. However, when Hitler decided to look further west, with thoughts of subduing the British navy & air force, then invading Great Britain, the first inadequacies of a navy, air force & army built around one purpose (..defeat Poland, then western continental Europe..) began to be revealed. But, overall, no lessons were learned, or if they were, those lessons learned were not applied sufficiently prior to Hitler asking his generals to draw up plans for Barbarossa. Consequently, when Hitler turned his ambitions toward the east & Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Hitler was asking his military to wage war in an entirely different environment, with significantly different demands on supplies, logistics, equipment, tactics & strategy. Unlike the Soviets & western Allies, the abilities of German manufacturing & availability of raw materials did not enable the Germans to have the capability or capacity to adapt to an extreme diversity of needs that came with waging full-scale war across several continents. The consequence of this lack of adaptation - as well as Germany's profound lack of capacity to fuel its army & air force - made its crushing defeat at the hands of the Soviet Union & the western Allies inevitable.
В 1942г. - Alkeet выпустил: 215 Pzlll и 792 StuGlll - всего 1007 шт. Потом Alkett несколько раз бомбили союзники и в 1944г выпуск StuGlll составил 2552 штуки. Наверное английские и американские бомбардировщики сбрасывали на завод не бомбы, а станки и сырьё.
Wonderful footage- man, I can just imagine the incredible noise there, and nobody with hearing protection LOL And all the grinding with no eye protection just makes me cringe too. It's kind of interesting to see just how compact it all is- they're stacking hulls and, the chassis being worked on basically only have enough room for one guy to walk between them. Wild.
0:26 right side there's a worker using a file!! That strikes me as very strange on an assembly line..what level of tolerances were there on fabrication of parts?
![Sturmgeschütz Stug III in action in ww2 [Colorized & Enhanced]](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/bRaEwKLmyhg/mqdefault.jpg)
![Sturmgeschütz Stug III in action in ww2 [Colorized & Enhanced]](/img/tr.png)
The workers seem skilful and confident in what they do.
Including the guy @0:21 who is tapping on the mantlet to make it look like he's doing something?
Most of them would soon be drafted into the army and replaced by slaves.
A good number of them were Italians and Belgians in various states of "volunteered".
@obsidianjane4413 I saw that too, he is obviously testing the turret for resonance and most definitely not just looking busy for the cameras :D
That's Germans for ya
They are filming! Quick try to look busy.
Prceeds to gently hammer the gun mantlet 0:21
I didn't choose the Stug life, the Stug life chose me
Редко у меня появляется возможность смотреть кинохронику ВМВ без ненужных водяных знаков
Thanks for sharing this footage - the StuG III Ausf.F with the L43 gun dates this footage nicely, also think I saw some StuG III C/D retrofitted with the L43 near the end.
Beautiful
These things were built to last. In war, I don't think that's always necessary. ;)
They needed them to work as well as possible, given the shortages (fuel, materials, soldiers, etc.) they were dealing with. They knew they’d be outnumbered, often by a substantial number. They have to go for quality, as quantity isn’t happening.
This seeming overdesign is playing to their strengths, not their (many) weaknesses.
@@dennisyoung4631 Building things good enough to last a decade of warfare should be good enough in most cases. A little rough finishing would also be OK. This would make it possible to cut down on costs and production time, ultimately increasing production. Imagine if you really need lots of cars, and you build all of them like a Rolls Royce...
It makes no sense to make a few luxury tanks that could last 80 years in times of war when they'll be destroyed in a few years anyway. It also makes no sense in the same scenario to finish weapons like they are entering beauty contests.
Even German last ditch weaponry made five minutes before the Soviets kicked in the door was usually much better finished than the average Soviet mass produced stuff.
I understand that craftsmanship was an ideological issue and a source of pride for skilled German workers, but this was one of these times were output was more important.
@@hb9145 I think that @dennisyoung4631was making a valid point. The design & construction of German equipment was not just about German ideology, culture, or pride. it was a necessity, in part, because men & machine were less plentiful in Germany.
I will also add that, in the German military, Panzer crewmen had the same lofty status as fighter pilots, so their equipment was expected to be of high standards, not only because of expectations on the battlefield, but also to retain confidence of the crews & for recruiting purposes. These realities also go a long way towards explaining why the Nazi leadership kept moving towards larger, better armed & more thickly armoured heavy tanks, assault guns & jagdpanzers (the 'Hetzer' being an exception)...even though these big beasts became increasingly expensive to build & operate, even more stressful on the engine & transmissions, and impossible to manufacture at the rate the Soviets & western allies were able to make their equipment.
@@derekbaker3279 The praise of high quality of German industrial labor was a central essence of NS ideology towards their own workers. As Marxist ideology deemed German workers as exploited, the NS government praised them for their exceptional quality and thereby increased their status. As Dr. G. pointed out in his diary, the workers just needed a pat on the back.
I certainly understand the dilemma of lacking German industrial output compared to the allies, and building good equipment with a high degree of crew survivability makes sense. Let's make this clear: I am not arguing against thick armor.
However, I am arguing against "wonder-weapons", over-engineering and against finishing everything like they were making luxury items. This dysfunctional chain of thought slowed down production and put a strain on resources. Standardization of parts came too late to make an impact - yes, they really made military hardware much like luxury cars when they couldn't afford to.
They were built to protect the crew a much as possible.
Panzer III chassis production and all of its derivatives were concentrated in this facility, additionally repairs of tanks damaged at the frontline were carried out here-an entirely peculiar move unique to Germany's needs during the war and highly wasteful of transport resources and time. Given the complexity of the Panzer III (the earliest designs suffered many serious setbacks with the suspension) there was probably no other way to handle this, but more than a few disasters can be traced to understrength Panzer Divisions lacking their tanks because of the non-existent frontline repair capabilities of Germany's Panzertruppen. This was simply not an issue with equivalent Allied tanks except for maybe British ones.
After the fall of France, subsequent designs of the Pz. Kpfw. III were quite reliable & not overly complex, and during Germany's conquest of its western neighbours, their system for basic maintenance & repairs in field workshops & major repairs back in Germany worked quite well. Even during Germany's first year or so in North Africa, the PzKpfw. III performed very well & the maintenance/repair system was more that adequate. This was basically true for nearly all other German equipment, tactics & strategy.
However, during Barbarossa, Fall Blau & beyond, the tactics, strategy, logistics, and equipment that had proven so be so successful in western Europe....then adequate during the first year in North Africa...were all revealed to be inadequate or absolute failures on the Eastern Front. This was the case with the Luftwaffe as much as the Heer, which suggests that there was a huge underlying problem for the German war machine.
The problem? Well, all of Germany's difficulties in their war against the Soviets were not as much the fault of inadequately applied German engineering, or even incompetence among industries & military minds. Instead, I would suggest that Germany's failures were largely a reflection of the fact that, during the interwar period, the entire German war machine had been rebuilt around the need to apply "Bewegungskrieg" to a war in Poland & conquest of western Europe, e.g. specific demands associated with the limitations of rail & road transportation in Poland & western Europe, the terrain & weather conditions in Poland & western Europe, and the typical distances involved those military campaigns. And the proof was in the pudding...the German war machine performed quite well within the context of the invasion, conquest & occupation of Poland & western Europe.
However, when Hitler decided to look further west, with thoughts of subduing the British navy & air force, then invading Great Britain, the first inadequacies of a navy, air force & army built around one purpose (..defeat Poland, then western continental Europe..) began to be revealed. But, overall, no lessons were learned, or if they were, those lessons learned were not applied sufficiently prior to Hitler asking his generals to draw up plans for Barbarossa.
Consequently, when Hitler turned his ambitions toward the east & Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Hitler was asking his military to wage war in an entirely different environment, with significantly different demands on supplies, logistics, equipment, tactics & strategy. Unlike the Soviets & western Allies, the abilities of German manufacturing & availability of raw materials did not enable the Germans to have the capability or capacity to adapt to an extreme diversity of needs that came with waging full-scale war across several continents. The consequence of this lack of adaptation - as well as Germany's profound lack of capacity to fuel its army & air force - made its crushing defeat at the hands of the Soviet Union & the western Allies inevitable.
В 1942г. - Alkeet выпустил: 215 Pzlll и 792 StuGlll - всего 1007 шт. Потом Alkett несколько раз бомбили союзники и в 1944г выпуск StuGlll составил 2552 штуки.
Наверное английские и американские бомбардировщики сбрасывали на завод не бомбы, а станки и сырьё.
Why are able-bodied MEN working in the factories, and not on the front lines? All the Allied war materiel were assembled by women.
May be they never trust women
Total war policy didn't start until March 1943 after stalingrad. That is when men started to be drafted from factories and more women joined in
@@gweher43 It's before State of Total War declared by Goebbels indeed
"You make sparks, and you hit armor with a big hammer. Nobody look at the camera."
Deutsche Wert Arbeit. Können alle anderen sagen was sie wollen.
Over engineered . For war that’s not a good thing as it turned out . Quantity over production won .
Wonderful footage- man, I can just imagine the incredible noise there, and nobody with hearing protection LOL And all the grinding with no eye protection just makes me cringe too. It's kind of interesting to see just how compact it all is- they're stacking hulls and, the chassis being worked on basically only have enough room for one guy to walk between them. Wild.
needs some inspiring music...
Erica
@@flyingled3176or the "Panzerlied"
@@Ralphieboy I picked Erica because I didn't know the correct spelling of panzrlied 😂
@@flyingled3176 overrated
Henry Ford has entered the room….
0:26 right side there's a worker using a file!! That strikes me as very strange on an assembly line..what level of tolerances were there on fabrication of parts?
Орднунг