An important point about the changing nature of rifle fire: the three-part combination of smokeless powder, small-caliber rounds, and jacketed bullets created a much larger point blank range. In essence, point blank means the length between your bore and infinity where a man-sized target can be hit. This is why ladder and tangent sights became common on guns, you have to arc fire to predetermined ranges with old rifle tech. Previous generations of firearms used fat, relatively slow, cast lead bullets that had to be fired in an arc to hit anything farther away than about 200 yards due to drag and gravity causing dramatic bullet drop; there was a range between "whites of their eyes" and the end of a bullet arc where volley fire would simply sail over the heads of advancing soldiers. Accelerating the projectiles (with more potent propellant), making them more aerodynamic, meant that there wasn't really a "safe zone" between your lines and the enemy's anymore -- and it dramatically simplified marksmanship for the common soldier. Soft lead bullets mushroom and cause awful wounds (where jacketed bullets clip bone, they tend to simply shear it away), but jacketed rounds don't break up at high velocity. Metallic cartridge ammo made the volume of fire Dr. Murray cites possible. Package loading systems like en bloc and stripper clips sped up the rate of rifle fire. The screaming hot, flat trajectory of that fire made life above the trench line unsurvivable. Hence movement to fully below-the-ground shelter for soldiers. The generals were not stupid, but they were captives of their prior experience: experience of paper cartridges, range tables, an outdated manual of arms, solid-shot line-of-sight artillery, and the primacy of elán. Their soldiers were fighting on a totally different plane of reality by the time they realized their mistakes.
The majority of injuries came from air-burst artillery and shrapnel. That is why troops started wearing helmets. Bullets go straight through helmets so they are little protection against bullets. The smallest cross sectional area from above is given when a body is vertical. To achieve this a trench has to be deeper. It was the increase in artillery that influenced the change of shape of trenches.
Great lecture - thanks. Quibble - studies have shown that the true effective range for infantry combat is around 100 meters - thats how we wound up with the AKs and the M-16 and its derivatives. These are bush guns that can spray a lot of rounds effectively at 100 meters. Just because your weapon can reach out to 300 meters doesn't mean you're going to hit anything.
Depends a lot on how you define "effective". Are we talking how effective the troops are at using it? Or on the ballistics retaining a certain level of lethality? What role are we allowing for things like optics/iron sights, environmental factors, and so on? I'm not exactly disagreeing with you, but I feel (and I too nerd out on studies) it's really not something where you can say "this is THE effective range of infantry", and so I don't mind people coming up with slightly different numbers. Still, anything much over say... 150m or so seems pretty much a stretch when we're talking people with very low levels of training/practice, in crap conditions, under fire, etc, etc, unless we're talking merely "the weapon can kill at this distance" rather than "the soldier can reasonably expect to hit a target at this distance" or something like that.
Logistics are informed by tactics. You can't plan a war in 1914 in the same way as 1814. You need fuel for vehicles, more ammunition for soldiers, more spare parts for more complex weapons and the means to deliver all of these things in much larger quantities than previously.
The answere to the question about the Brusilow Offensive got me to cringe a bit: Yes especially the head of general staff was to some extend incompeted, but on the eastern front was no trench stalemate like on the western front, the Austrian army was underequipped, outnumbered, and undersupplied. No wonder that the russians steamrolled them to a certain extend. It's more of a miracle that they managed to somehow stay in the fight.
By the end of WWI, allied and Central Powers artillery barrages were short (a couple hours) instead of days long. A number of the advances in tactics CAME from the Eastern Front. Like, rolling barrages, getting the troops as close as possible before starting the attack, shock troop tactics, and so on.
War planners weren't _stupid_ per se; they were short-sighted. Murray is right about need driving innovation; it's why US industry in WW2 developed synthetic latex.
From about the 41:00 mark to 43:00 Murray argues that the level of firepower of an infantry squad hasn’t essentially changed, except that modern squads lack the range of WWI weapons. I have no idea how he reaches such a conclusion. There is no way that an infantry squad armed with bolt action rifles can sustain any where close to the same rate of fire as an infantry squad with semi automatic rifles. And, since modern rifles have 20-30 round box magazines vs 5 shot magazines of the typical WWI rifle, the amount of reload time has been reduced. It seems that the professor has been deluded into thinking that the best British “mad minute” times over 20 rounds per minute equate to the rate of fire of a squad with semi automatic rifles. That mad minute rate applies to the best trained soldiers for just one minute, not a sustained rate over the length of a day long engagement. As far as the ability for increased range of engagements , studies from the First World War through the Second World War and beyond have shown that engagements rarely begin beyond 400 yards. That had led armies to reduce the power of the rounds to facilitate the ability to control the accuracy of automatic fire. Despite this, his basic point that the 50 year period between the American Civil War and WWI was a tremendous period of technological change and firepower change for armies.
He said not much lower, not exactly the same, and he is right. The firepower of an infantry squad today compared to one in 1918 is not that much greater. While modern weapons are semi automatic and fully automatic most armies (including the US) are trained to use single shot as much as possible to conserve ammunition and accuracy. Burst fire is used occasionally, and full automatic almost never. There is not only the issue with ammunition consumption with sustained burst or automatic fire, but also with barrel overheating, and the personal weapons of the infantryman, unlike the squad support weapons, do NOT have the ability to rapidly change barrels. As a result burst and automatic fire are only used in extremis, or in specific conditions (such as breach). So when you look at it in the context of the tactical doctrine you can see the firepower is generally not that much higher today. You only need to look at the number of rounds each soldier carries then and now to see the implicit truth in that. 150 - 180 rounds per man basic combat load in 1918, compared to 210 - 250 (depending on army) for modern troops, as a basic combat load. While you are right about the ranges, you need to consider EFFECTIVE ranges, the effective range of a modern 5.56 is not much more than 600 yards, and generally less. Beyond that even skilled shooters are going to struggle to hit their targets. The effective range of WWI Battle Rifles IS well over a thousand yards, a good shot CAN hit out to that range. While most engagement ranges are 400 yards and below most does not mean ALL. In fact engagement range is an issue in both the US and British Armies at the moment, as the Taliban in Afghan were engaging beyond effective range of the 5.56 weapons systems requiring both armies to introduce 7.62 systems for the designated marksman role, specifically to meet that particular issue...
He's not wrong though, because looking at the squad level, rather than the individual rifleman, most of the fire output is coming from the LMGs. So assuming the LMG rof is about the same, the differences in rifle fire output are going to have a minimal impact at the tactical level.
The first world war was the first conflict where technology had evolved faster than human wisdom, and it only got worse since then: the US has 7000 nukes... a little difficult to explain.
I disagree with Dr. Murray on a number of points. He talked about how there were no flanks in 1914, making reference to a trench system that ran from Switzerland to the sea. When the war began, there was no trench system in place. The trench system mentioned didn't come into effect until after the Battle of the Marne. During the German sweep through Belgium, they continually turned the flank of the BEF. The Germans lost the Battle of the Marne because they left an exposed flank (actually a gap between two German corps). The question of whether they were stupid was more complicated. If you examine the behavior of the General Staffs of the Great Powers before and at the beginning of the war from their perspective, maybe not. But with some critical thinking of what was planned, yes they were. The French didn't believe in heavy artillery and believed that with the elan of their troops (clad in blue and red uniforms) that the offensive would be successful. The British and the Germans used khaki and field grey uniforms respectively. The Germans had a good offensive plan with the swing through Belgium and avoid the French border defenses. But what did they do, they kept transferring troops from the right wing to the center in Alsace Lorraine because the center was under the command of the Crown Prince. This denuded the right flank of sufficient troops to make the plan function as it should. After the French were bloodily repulsed from the German border defenses, the Germans hurled their troops against the French border defenses and suffered massive casualties (which the offensive through Belgium was designed to avoid). What's more, the German General Staff never consulted with the German Foreign Office about the consequences of the violation of Belgium neutrality (bringing Britain into the war). As for Dr. Murray's reference about the Germans having to go west at the start of the war because of their train time tables, the head of the German Army's Transportation Department was asked after the war about this. He was of the opinion that if requested, he and his staff could have revised the train schedules to send the bulk of the German Army to the east to fight the Russians. The problem was that everyone was rather close minded and never tried to "think outside the box." This seems to be the case where the military establishment fails to properly take into account the changes in technology. In that, Dr. Murray is correct that the technological changes from the American Civil War to World War One were tremendous, but unappreciated. Many of the British generals had been junior officers in the Boer War, but failed to draw the lessons of increased firepower from that conflict. Perhaps the system for creating generals in all of the European Armies was defective. Incidentally, no European Army at the beginning of the war believed that the war be a prolonged one. No previous war had lasted more than a season (with certain exceptions). Everyone believed that their army would be in the enemy capital before winter. Their collective miscalculation led to a long war which no one believed was possible.
I've noticed from these talks, that the presenter always gives a broad view of the subject and never delve into specifics and as a result, end up making general sweeping comments. I understand they're limited in time, but that's no excuse to go into specific circumstances from time to time and sacrifice the less important points.
Previous wars lasting a season? 30 years war, 100 years war, 7 years war, Napoleonic War, US Civil War, US War of Independance, the list goes on of wars prior to 1914 that did not in fact last a season.. It is true that the fighting in previous wars tended to be limited to seasons, before the Great War fighting rarely occured during the winter. However wars were often long drawn out affairs well before 1914. In fact, compared to many of the great conflicts beforehand the Great War was actually relatively SHORT. As for the lessons of increased firepower from the Boer war you miss one very important point. The Boers had no heavy artillery, in fact they had only limited (though modern) field artillery. The Boer War led to a huge change in how the British Army was trained and to huge changes in its equipment and doctrine. French observers in 1913 were very impressed by the British Armies method of deploying its infantry during the yearly maneuvers they witnessed, noting that the British infantry moved forward under suppressing fire, only ever fired from prone, and always fired from cover or concealment. As for your comment about shifting forces to the East, there is a quote, a famous one, by Falkenhayn during 1916, the quote is as follows: 'The East gives nothing back'. It is all too easy with hindsight to look back at events of a hundred years ago and state, categorically, that those living at that time should have learned this or that, when in fact lessons are not learned so easily, or so quickly. You only have to look at Climate Change in our own era to see how long it has taken people to realise the seriousness of the situation and STILL there are those who refuse to accept the evidence. In 100 years what will historians be saying of US I wonder? Will it be something along the lines of How could they have been so blind?
Wars may have lasted for longer in general terms but there was no continuous fighting from year to year like in the 20th century. The 100 Years War was decided by one sea battle and around five or six land engagements over the whole period. There was not 100 Years of continuous fighting, medieval economies could not sustain such an effort. The Napoleonic Wars had gaps of several years when 'nothing happened' - name a significant battle between 1800 and 1804 for example. Only when industrialisation made Total War possible do we have countries with the resources to maintain huge amounts of men in the field for years on end.
Listen to the presentation please, before making such stupid comments. At no stage does Dr Murray say there are no flanks in 1914. If as you say the BEF flanks were "continually" turned" how was it possible that you ended up with a front line running from the Alps to the North sea??
blitzkrieg is not a official doctrine operational art c🎉reated by soviets and adopted by usa however is a true doctrine. whit much more impressive results as shown in war in iraq
It was not invented by the Soviets per say, but rather formalized by them. Operative art has emerged as early as the first battle of the Marne in WW1 but was not recognized as such until later on.
Hello just watching now. here in New Zealand, we are constantly told that the Maori's invented trench warfare. Yet I knwo that there were many other examples.
Among the most thought providing lectures from a number of fascinating topics and knowledgeable presenters.
An important point about the changing nature of rifle fire: the three-part combination of smokeless powder, small-caliber rounds, and jacketed bullets created a much larger point blank range. In essence, point blank means the length between your bore and infinity where a man-sized target can be hit. This is why ladder and tangent sights became common on guns, you have to arc fire to predetermined ranges with old rifle tech. Previous generations of firearms used fat, relatively slow, cast lead bullets that had to be fired in an arc to hit anything farther away than about 200 yards due to drag and gravity causing dramatic bullet drop; there was a range between "whites of their eyes" and the end of a bullet arc where volley fire would simply sail over the heads of advancing soldiers. Accelerating the projectiles (with more potent propellant), making them more aerodynamic, meant that there wasn't really a "safe zone" between your lines and the enemy's anymore -- and it dramatically simplified marksmanship for the common soldier. Soft lead bullets mushroom and cause awful wounds (where jacketed bullets clip bone, they tend to simply shear it away), but jacketed rounds don't break up at high velocity. Metallic cartridge ammo made the volume of fire Dr. Murray cites possible. Package loading systems like en bloc and stripper clips sped up the rate of rifle fire. The screaming hot, flat trajectory of that fire made life above the trench line unsurvivable. Hence movement to fully below-the-ground shelter for soldiers. The generals were not stupid, but they were captives of their prior experience: experience of paper cartridges, range tables, an outdated manual of arms, solid-shot line-of-sight artillery, and the primacy of elán. Their soldiers were fighting on a totally different plane of reality by the time they realized their mistakes.
A modern rifle squad does, however, has very good communication and location equipment. The most decisive weapon I know of is tac coms, aka a radio.
Thank You for this!
22:33 great bit on the complexities of a modern military industrial complex
A riveting lecture. Thanks for posting it, NWW1MaM!
This was a very informative presentation.
The majority of injuries came from air-burst artillery and shrapnel. That is why troops started wearing helmets. Bullets go straight through helmets so they are little protection against bullets. The smallest cross sectional area from above is given when a body is vertical. To achieve this a trench has to be deeper. It was the increase in artillery that influenced the change of shape of trenches.
The later German helmets where sturdy enough to deflect a bullet too though wasn’t it?
Great lecture - thanks. Quibble - studies have shown that the true effective range for infantry combat is around 100 meters - thats how we wound up with the AKs and the M-16 and its derivatives. These are bush guns that can spray a lot of rounds effectively at 100 meters. Just because your weapon can reach out to 300 meters doesn't mean you're going to hit anything.
Depends a lot on how you define "effective".
Are we talking how effective the troops are at using it? Or on the ballistics retaining a certain level of lethality? What role are we allowing for things like optics/iron sights, environmental factors, and so on?
I'm not exactly disagreeing with you, but I feel (and I too nerd out on studies) it's really not something where you can say "this is THE effective range of infantry", and so I don't mind people coming up with slightly different numbers.
Still, anything much over say... 150m or so seems pretty much a stretch when we're talking people with very low levels of training/practice, in crap conditions, under fire, etc, etc, unless we're talking merely "the weapon can kill at this distance" rather than "the soldier can reasonably expect to hit a target at this distance" or something like that.
Great talk makes me want to read his book.
Beginners discuss tactics, experts talk logistics.
Logistics are informed by tactics. You can't plan a war in 1914 in the same way as 1814. You need fuel for vehicles, more ammunition for soldiers, more spare parts for more complex weapons and the means to deliver all of these things in much larger quantities than previously.
My calculator says the right wing of the Schlieffen Plan needed 81 million rounds. Go tell your officers.
The answere to the question about the Brusilow Offensive got me to cringe a bit: Yes especially the head of general staff was to some extend incompeted, but on the eastern front was no trench stalemate like on the western front, the Austrian army was underequipped, outnumbered, and undersupplied. No wonder that the russians steamrolled them to a certain extend. It's more of a miracle that they managed to somehow stay in the fight.
By the end of WWI, allied and Central Powers artillery barrages were short (a couple hours) instead of days long. A number of the advances in tactics CAME from the Eastern Front. Like, rolling barrages, getting the troops as close as possible before starting the attack, shock troop tactics, and so on.
Funny guy, good lecture.
Funny how? Like he's a clown?
@@Johnconno he's nervous
@@Johnconno It's the way he tells a story...
War planners weren't _stupid_ per se; they were short-sighted.
Murray is right about need driving innovation; it's why US industry in WW2 developed synthetic latex.
Who is this Ivan Block (Bloc? Bloque?...) character?
Google is giving me dead ends.
Ivan Bloch
de.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johann_von_Bloch
www.zeitschrift-osteuropa.de/site/assets/files/4012/oe081012.pdf
www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/Future-of-War.pdf
Wikipedia has Jan Gotlib Bloch, there's also Jean Bloch.
From about the 41:00 mark to 43:00 Murray argues that the level of firepower of an infantry squad hasn’t essentially changed, except that modern squads lack the range of WWI weapons. I have no idea how he reaches such a conclusion. There is no way that an infantry squad armed with bolt action rifles can sustain any where close to the same rate of fire as an infantry squad with semi automatic rifles. And, since modern rifles have 20-30 round box magazines vs 5 shot magazines of the typical WWI rifle, the amount of reload time has been reduced. It seems that the professor has been deluded into thinking that the best British “mad minute” times over 20 rounds per minute equate to the rate of fire of a squad with semi automatic rifles. That mad minute rate applies to the best trained soldiers for just one minute, not a sustained rate over the length of a day long engagement. As far as the ability for increased range of engagements , studies from the First World War through the Second World War and beyond have shown that engagements rarely begin beyond 400 yards. That had led armies to reduce the power of the rounds to facilitate the ability to control the accuracy of automatic fire.
Despite this, his basic point that the 50 year period between the American Civil War and WWI was a tremendous period of technological change and firepower change for armies.
He said not much lower, not exactly the same, and he is right. The firepower of an infantry squad today compared to one in 1918 is not that much greater. While modern weapons are semi automatic and fully automatic most armies (including the US) are trained to use single shot as much as possible to conserve ammunition and accuracy. Burst fire is used occasionally, and full automatic almost never. There is not only the issue with ammunition consumption with sustained burst or automatic fire, but also with barrel overheating, and the personal weapons of the infantryman, unlike the squad support weapons, do NOT have the ability to rapidly change barrels. As a result burst and automatic fire are only used in extremis, or in specific conditions (such as breach).
So when you look at it in the context of the tactical doctrine you can see the firepower is generally not that much higher today. You only need to look at the number of rounds each soldier carries then and now to see the implicit truth in that. 150 - 180 rounds per man basic combat load in 1918, compared to 210 - 250 (depending on army) for modern troops, as a basic combat load.
While you are right about the ranges, you need to consider EFFECTIVE ranges, the effective range of a modern 5.56 is not much more than 600 yards, and generally less. Beyond that even skilled shooters are going to struggle to hit their targets. The effective range of WWI Battle Rifles IS well over a thousand yards, a good shot CAN hit out to that range. While most engagement ranges are 400 yards and below most does not mean ALL. In fact engagement range is an issue in both the US and British Armies at the moment, as the Taliban in Afghan were engaging beyond effective range of the 5.56 weapons systems requiring both armies to introduce 7.62 systems for the designated marksman role, specifically to meet that particular issue...
He's not wrong though, because looking at the squad level, rather than the individual rifleman, most of the fire output is coming from the LMGs. So assuming the LMG rof is about the same, the differences in rifle fire output are going to have a minimal impact at the tactical level.
He's probably referencing well aimed shots at range, not mag dumping at something 20 yards away.
Interesting
The first world war was the first conflict where technology had evolved faster than human wisdom, and it only got worse since then: the US has 7000 nukes... a little difficult to explain.
"Human wisdom"?
Not sure i've ever seen evidence for this...
I disagree with Dr. Murray on a number of points. He talked about how there were no flanks in 1914, making reference to a trench system that ran from Switzerland to the sea. When the war began, there was no trench system in place. The trench system mentioned didn't come into effect until after the Battle of the Marne. During the German sweep through Belgium, they continually turned the flank of the BEF. The Germans lost the Battle of the Marne because they left an exposed flank (actually a gap between two German corps). The question of whether they were stupid was more complicated. If you examine the behavior of the General Staffs of the Great Powers before and at the beginning of the war from their perspective, maybe not. But with some critical thinking of what was planned, yes they were. The French didn't believe in heavy artillery and believed that with the elan of their troops (clad in blue and red uniforms) that the offensive would be successful. The British and the Germans used khaki and field grey uniforms respectively. The Germans had a good offensive plan with the swing through Belgium and avoid the French border defenses. But what did they do, they kept transferring troops from the right wing to the center in Alsace Lorraine because the center was under the command of the Crown Prince. This denuded the right flank of sufficient troops to make the plan function as it should. After the French were bloodily repulsed from the German border defenses, the Germans hurled their troops against the French border defenses and suffered massive casualties (which the offensive through Belgium was designed to avoid). What's more, the German General Staff never consulted with the German Foreign Office about the consequences of the violation of Belgium neutrality (bringing Britain into the war). As for Dr. Murray's reference about the Germans having to go west at the start of the war because of their train time tables, the head of the German Army's Transportation Department was asked after the war about this. He was of the opinion that if requested, he and his staff could have revised the train schedules to send the bulk of the German Army to the east to fight the Russians. The problem was that everyone was rather close minded and never tried to "think outside the box." This seems to be the case where the military establishment fails to properly take into account the changes in technology. In that, Dr. Murray is correct that the technological changes from the American Civil War to World War One were tremendous, but unappreciated. Many of the British generals had been junior officers in the Boer War, but failed to draw the lessons of increased firepower from that conflict. Perhaps the system for creating generals in all of the European Armies was defective. Incidentally, no European Army at the beginning of the war believed that the war be a prolonged one. No previous war had lasted more than a season (with certain exceptions). Everyone believed that their army would be in the enemy capital before winter. Their collective miscalculation led to a long war which no one believed was possible.
I've noticed from these talks, that the presenter always gives a broad view of the subject and never delve into specifics and as a result, end up making general sweeping comments. I understand they're limited in time, but that's no excuse to go into specific circumstances from time to time and sacrifice the less important points.
Previous wars lasting a season?
30 years war, 100 years war, 7 years war, Napoleonic War, US Civil War, US War of Independance, the list goes on of wars prior to 1914 that did not in fact last a season..
It is true that the fighting in previous wars tended to be limited to seasons, before the Great War fighting rarely occured during the winter. However wars were often long drawn out affairs well before 1914. In fact, compared to many of the great conflicts beforehand the Great War was actually relatively SHORT.
As for the lessons of increased firepower from the Boer war you miss one very important point. The Boers had no heavy artillery, in fact they had only limited (though modern) field artillery. The Boer War led to a huge change in how the British Army was trained and to huge changes in its equipment and doctrine. French observers in 1913 were very impressed by the British Armies method of deploying its infantry during the yearly maneuvers they witnessed, noting that the British infantry moved forward under suppressing fire, only ever fired from prone, and always fired from cover or concealment.
As for your comment about shifting forces to the East, there is a quote, a famous one, by Falkenhayn during 1916, the quote is as follows: 'The East gives nothing back'.
It is all too easy with hindsight to look back at events of a hundred years ago and state, categorically, that those living at that time should have learned this or that, when in fact lessons are not learned so easily, or so quickly. You only have to look at Climate Change in our own era to see how long it has taken people to realise the seriousness of the situation and STILL there are those who refuse to accept the evidence. In 100 years what will historians be saying of US I wonder?
Will it be something along the lines of How could they have been so blind?
Wars may have lasted for longer in general terms but there was no continuous fighting from year to year like in the 20th century. The 100 Years War was decided by one sea battle and around five or six land engagements over the whole period. There was not 100 Years of continuous fighting, medieval economies could not sustain such an effort. The Napoleonic Wars had gaps of several years when 'nothing happened' - name a significant battle between 1800 and 1804 for example. Only when industrialisation made Total War possible do we have countries with the resources to maintain huge amounts of men in the field for years on end.
Listen to the presentation please, before making such stupid comments. At no stage does Dr Murray say there are no flanks in 1914. If as you say the BEF flanks were "continually" turned" how was it possible that you ended up with a front line running from the Alps to the North sea??
@@alganhar1 what do you mean by "the east gives nothing back"?
People had no idea what to in WW 1
blitzkrieg is not a official doctrine
operational art c🎉reated by soviets and adopted by usa however is a true doctrine.
whit much more impressive results as shown in war in iraq
It was not invented by the Soviets per say, but rather formalized by them. Operative art has emerged as early as the first battle of the Marne in WW1 but was not recognized as such until later on.
Very interesting,pity the long winded warriors below are devoid of common sense and humour.
Hello just watching now. here in New Zealand, we are constantly told that the Maori's invented trench warfare. Yet I knwo that there were many other examples.
in serbia they told us we are rich and europe love us but i think it is not true. respect for New Zealand
Um i would rather play a drinking game with how many times this guy say UM
Why make such a useless comment?
I would rather play a drinking game than see you try and do a lecture in front of people like that.
For all the noobs here, this is the most basic stuff ever.
Says you.