This post contains my first ever attempt a philosophy paper, I have no formal training out side of these videos, if you can stomach the read please leave feed back, and i really do mean anyone: Labels, lairs, and subversives. Often, I find myself considering the notion that redefinition of words is a tactic of subversion or defense individuals use to remove themselves from a label like, “liar” and its connotations. Sadly, this current generation is enamored with subversion and social justice, labels can never be applicable to them. In fact, attempting to label any consistent repeatable pattern of behavior is often taken as personal attacks. Either its a reduction of the individual, or a self-projection by the observer. Consequently, labels have had their meaning subverted when applied to individuals, taking on a whole new connotation as a result. How does an individual identify their own personality traits and labels? On many occasions it seems my self-evaluation is based in projections of self onto another. But these projections are not merely an externalization of my inner narrative, they are observations based in personal experience, defined by labels with immutable definitions. A sum of my relative experience projected on another. What steps does an individual take to attempt this type of subjective comparison? Its egotistical by nature but also emphatic, an attempt to cultivate some type of understanding or recognition, followed by an attempt to rationalize the situation based on the variation between me and my comparator. Labeling life experience as advice often derives from self-appointed labels to identify the value of an experience, to the self and others allowing it to gain relativity outside its preconditions of subjectivity, in a sense also serving as self-validation of experiences. Peer-to-peer catharsis is essential to experience based validation for both parties. The listener gains valuable time to consider themselves, the situation at hand, and the experience being shared with them; and make their own comparison, then give validity to the present information pertaining to them. These identifications of self are also projections of the listener onto another’s situation, objectively a selfish mechanism or a shared experience of self-indulgence. Both parties practice self-reflection in experiences removed from their adjective selves for validation. Group catharsis allows validation of self simultaneously with validation or recognition from everyone involved. A paradox of selfless selfishness for all who take part, allowing for vulnerability whilst seeking validation. It is my belief this type of group catharsis attempts to convey something by which its nature is subjective. We use labels to identify this subjectivity and gain an objective understanding. Through these labels we are attempting to convey something personal, but undeniably universal about our experiences. However, we require some common terms with to communicate them by, and as proposed above labels are quite frequently a reasonable and broadly universal form of association by which we gain common ground to express experiences. Consider yourself in this situation; in conversation with a close friend you reveal a personal taboo, something in a morally gray area, what could possibly motivate you to reveal such information? The normal gage for most people is how much they trust someone or a “level of trust” they have with groups. What is this trust based off though? A multitude of different labels, “consistency”, “integrity”, “confidentiality”; a sum of labeled information to help you gage reaction and judgment on information revealed. Hence forth to trust someone or deem them trustworthy, you have Labeled them. For example, trust as labeled above, the “consistent integrity of your confidentiality”, which matches the dictionary definition: “firm belief in the reliability, truth, ability, or strength of someone or something.”. Quite often the sum off all known labels defines a meta-label literally if not exactly and this hirer archery is reflected top to bottom of labeling. All labels are capable of being meta-labels, except for words whose definitions are immutable such as True False, cardinal-left, cardinal-right, ordinal numbers, cardinal numbers, process, fact, fiction, yes, no, rational, irrational and so on, known as base labels. Meta-labels can contain all known labels below them and vice versa in a form of global inheritance. What makes base labels definitions immutable? Take rational for example, it refers to a base label of logic or reason which describe the base-label result. So, in practice rational and irrational can only be a base label, who’s state of rationality Is described by base labels true or false. In theory if you manipulate a base labels definition your concept of the world suddenly stops matching reality. If you decided that rational and irrational now descried heat and lack of heat, do “rational/irrational heat” describe anything? You would never find out because heat does not describe a result, it describes a state of energy and its activity level which is likely to result in a threshold value and a base-label of True/False that describes the state. Then what is the issue with labeling? Everyone wants to be trustworthy; it has a positive connotation associated with it. However, if you take an example where someone is objectively a liar it is a negative connotation. Obviously, no one wants to be called a liar and a reasonable course of action is to reject the allegation and present proof on the contrary. Unfortunately, in recent times new tactics of discreditation have emerged, in the subversion of meaning. A common tactic is to subvert the meaning of a label in the meta-label such as consistency, claiming variation of some degree is required to qualify them of negatively connotated behavior. A far more a sinister approach is implying that by observing their behavior and defining it, you have projected personal meta-labels onto them. This approach attempts to discredit the defined meta-label as subjective by gaslighting the observers labels as part of a personal narrative or projecting, which is an “inherently true statement”, unfortunately. However, when one considers the actual mechanism by which personal narrative, self-evaluation, and meta-labeling occur, the gaslight goes out. Claiming “that observation is a self-projection”, and “your definition of given label is subjective” only goes to further prove the objective nature of a given observation in practice. Foremost, we all read the same dictionary, and learned the same definitions of, behavior, process, cause, effect, all these labels with immutable definitions, taught to a national standard. So, to claim different definitions of the label “true” based on subjectivity means you experience the definition of true differently than everyone else. That is an easy claim to test, ask them to complete the sentence “true or false equals what?”. If they answer anything besides “true” it is subverting the meaning of true because “true or false” is always true. Let us expand further, say you observe someone to be religious and give them the labels “spiritual” and “acknowledgment”. Religious is “relating to or believing in a religion” or in this case the “acknowledgment of spirituality” these subjective labels resulted in an objectively correct description of what it is to be religious without implication of faith or denomination. While that could be available information, its unnecessary when the known labels crate an accurate description of the meta-label.
If there are underlying imperatives to the universe... a bent towards order, for instance... the functions that contribute to that imperative would be considered 'virtuous' or 'good', wouldn't they? And so these mind-independent morals wouldn't have to be metaphysical entity-like things, but the description of a type of process (organizing, from my earlier example). To go against these inherit underlying universal imperatives would be considered then 'vices' or 'sins'. This of course assumes there is some underlying universal imperative, but I think that's somewhat obvious after listening to your lecture on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason -- we may not know what exist in the noumenon, but given that there is that sense of consistency in our individual and collective experiences, there at least must be something beyond pure random or void (which would both be lacking imperatives, or else morality in those universes might be bent towards chaos and non-existence!)
How do you see this from Heidergerrs Dasein point of view? As in modes of being, that are just normal reaction of a being. Not only that but if we take in account that all being inherently tries to be the best it can be. Anything against that process of being is immoral.
Somewhat annoyingly, some philosophers use "moral realism" in such a way that it includes relativist and subjectivism views. In short, for these philosophers, moral realism is the thesis that (1) cognitivism is true, and (2) there are some moral truths. This is obviously a terminological dispute, but I agree that your way of carving the terrain is better.
I think this view that moral properties are human-mind-independent is absurd. It is similar to Platonism which says numbers and ideas literally float around and we perceive such abstract entities with our mystical Third Eye or Sixth Sense. No, people should really ask themselves: "Am I really perceiving these spooky objects? Is it really self-evident to me that I'm directly aware of these Platonic objects?" I think most people would deny that's the case if they really thought about the implications of this absurd view.
The reason abstract objects are real is because you can disect the word real into different layers. If something is real... You have to say "how" is it real? The different kinds of real-ness are: 1) all possible things (abstract concepts and physical objects) 2) mathematical truth vs mathematical falsehood (false ideas like flat earth theory fall into the category: mathematical falsehood) 3) all possible laws of physics 4) all possible timelines in this particular universe 5) an object existing in this timeline in this universe (like the planet Jupiter) 6) mental existence... I can imagine things. 6) the bottom layer... Which is the choice of whether or not something Is real and updating your mental model of reality. If you choose to believe something, you are assuming: 1) existence exists 2) mathematical truth exists 3) possible universes exist 4) possible timelines exist 5) physical objects exist 6) ideas exist 7) you are choosing to believe something So, the platonic realm isn't that spooky. It's just saying that our physical existence needs to assume other levels of existence in order to make sense in context. As far as moral truths go... They are not descriptions of the world, but prescriptions. Therefore, they belong in the layer of reality: "ideas in the brain". They are not real in the sense that they are mathematically true... And the laws of physics do not depend on laws of morality. That being said.. insofaras ppl can agree to which boundaries they should have, morality can be seen to be objective. But, if ppl have different desires about the future, morality in that sense is subjective.
When you say 'mind independent' do you mean not dualist? Religious moral realism obviously makes dualistic space for moral realism. There is also a materialist moral realism which is necessarily brain dependent, though not mind dependent in a dualistic sense.
At 9:07 you indicate that you think most people are intuitive moral realists. Why do you think this is true? I take this to be an empirical claim, and I don't think existing empirical data provides much in the way of compelling evidence that most people are intuitive moral realists.
According to a recent survey, 62% of contemporary philosophers are moral realists. I'm not sure how one could survey the general public on this kind of question-and maybe you're right that anti-realism, nihilism, etc., are now more prevalent than they used to be-but I think most people would agree. See journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/article/id/2109/
@@PhiloofAlexandria Thanks for the response. I'm familiar with the 2020 PhilPapers survey results and I'm aware most respondents endorsed moral realism. However, those results are exclusively of philosophers (and mostly analytic philosophers, in particular), not people in general. Apologies if I was not clear with my initial question: my question is about ordinary people without philosophical training. Your remark seemed to indicate that you believe most people in general are moral realists. If so, I'm curious why you think that would be.
thanks for the video, its very intellectually enlightening. But I think that moral realists are confused about the fundamental structure truth claims. But I don't know much about the arguments, so i'd certainly like to know more about the metaethical reasonings for moral realism. its just that i'm fairly confident, after the logical debuttals I've heard so far, that there can never be truth to normative claims because morality is of a different enterprise than epistemology you can break the laws of ethics, you cant break the laws of physics. the greatest german philosopher of all time, friedrich nietzsche, completely demolishes the supposed sound justifications for one set of morality against another. its a very deep truth, which I however would not like to talk about or mention. because having made this insight might lead people to be less motivated to do ethical activism. some realist philosophers I debated, who study philosophy, were a bit annoyed and disrespectful but I understand why they reacted that way. in their mind I seemed arrogant and disrespectful, because they study philosophy, that I essentially seemed to invalidate their life passion and work. they also claimed most philosophers are moral realists, which I'm still a bit skeptical about. they need to provide evidence for that claim as well. but hypothetically saying it was true, then that arguments would face 2 points of criticisms from me: 1. its understandable that most philosophers would believe morality to be objective since it's their life work and passion, and they would not like to believe that it isnt objective. most theologians believe god exists, (for obvious reasons) but thats still not a good reason to why god exists. imo you're just replacing god with moral realism. 2. the deepest insight in the moral philosophical inquiry is nietzsches beyond good and evil, which utterly demolishes moral realism. I think those moral philosophers who are realists are in their profession not intellectually progressed enough to really understand beyond good and evil, because afterall you can have a masters degree in philosophy and be one of the thoustands of philosophy teachers, while not being educated on the deepest fronts of your field. I actually wanted to study philosophy originally, but choose not to because science is more solid knowledge wise than philosophy. its like this: as a scientists its relatively easier to read into philosophical literature in your sparetime constrasted to as a philosopher reading scientific textbooks. So in the end, as a vegan humanist, I really wish that moral realism was true, but unfortunately imperatives "truths" are not the same as descriptive truths. I think this analogy with the scientific method is a fundamental fallacy. the burden of proof is on the realist
You could believe there are moral truths but they are not mind independent. This is subjectivism in the video. I'm not sure where Nietzsche would stand on this. The way I think of it is that you have a community of practice around moral virtues such as justice, courage, temperance, and practical reason. A person is not compelled to be part of this community since it requires a choice that these are the moral virtues we want to cultivate because of the goods the community receives from these virtues and the personal satisfaction individuals receive from enacting the virtues. But the virtues are not mind independent. In contrast, a person could be a hedonist devoted to pleasure in the tradition of Epicuros because pursuing refined pleasures results in tranquility for the individual. 2 points -- 1. I've outlined Stoic and Epicurean views of morality. Both believed in mind independent moral truth. For Epicuros all animals by nature pursue pleasure and pleasure is THE goal of human activity too. So the question was, what pleasures are best by nature for humans and what virtues do we need to cultivate to experience these pleasures? The Stoics believed the virtues result from reasoning about the TRUE nature of human beings. 2. Many people don't believe that the natural end of human life must be pleasure or that Stoic virtues can be defended based on the universal nature of human beings centered on our unique ability to reason. But you can still choose to pursue solely pleasure (presumably refined) in your life or cultivate Stoic virtues because of the goods they provide the individual and the community. I see this as subjectivism. There could be other moralities of course but they reflect history, psychology, choices about what a particular moral community perceives as goods within that community. But one could not be compelled to join a particular moral community because that morality reflects mind independent moral truths since those do not exist. I don't know whether I'm on track but this is how I see the difference between mind dependent and independent moral truth.
Rather than comparing ethics with physics, try comparing it with logic. People regularly ignore the rules of logic, but those of us who try to follow them think they are objectively true. Are we mistaken?
Morality is entirely subjectivistic. History alone, in regards to specific instantiations of moral 'truths' shows this to be the case. Unlike the physical universe, there are no known human mind external and independent systems or methods for encoding or carrying (entirely human abstractions) of morality.
No that arguments fails. History like sociology and anthropology are descriptive subjects. Morality is a prescriptive subject. Morality is about how an agent ought to or ought not behave. History describes what happened and makes no comment on whether the people described in the historical event ought to or ought not to have acted that way. It is one thing to describe something, it is another thing entirely to say if it was supposed to be that way. To make this easy to explain if I ask you to advise me what I ought to wear for my date when looking in my wardrobe if you take a descriptive approach you will say 'your shirt is black' 'your jeans are blue' etc. These descriptive statements cannot help me determine what i ought to do. It lacks prescriptions, it doesnt tell me what i ought to do. History doesnt prove morality to be subjectivistic as it could be that those societies ought not to have acted the way they did and that their beliefs were wrong. You don't know if thats the case as you assume morality (prescriptivity) is subjective based on descriptions which do not relate to the subject. A last example. Women were burned at the stake in the middle ages when their community members believed they used magic / witchcraft to kill members of the community, cause bad weather, cause crop failure, cause disease etc. This is a descriptive fact of what the people believed and what they did to women. However, the beliefs these people held were falsified when humanity discovered geographical facts on weather, biological facts about bacteria and viruses and the biological reasons for crop failure be it from pests to other causes. The people who burned women who truly believed they could use magic and were the cause of their issues, these peoples beliefs were wrong. If their beliefs were wrong then their actions too can be called wrong. This can be said about both moral and non-moral values. Describing other peoples behaviour does not automatically validate it. It's a bad argument and it undermines history as an academic discipline as it describes the past in a neutral manner not commenting or judging what it describes. That includes saying all peoples values are equal and that morals are subjective. It has nothing to say on morality, history can only describe the past.
These concepts are an example of why philosophy is antiquated and nobody takes it seriously outside of those unfortunate enough to have invested in a philosophy degree. Only a small minority have bothered looking into cog-sci and what it has provided which basically renders the vast majority of established categories in ethics and meta-ethics, useless. Do yourselves a favour and tour Rebecca Saxe and George Lakoff's work on morality then work your way towards neurolinguistics only to realize Wittgenstein was right and contextualism is the only thing that's really left standing as a result.
Not if you consider philosophical discourse as an end in itself, i.e. the meta science of questioning without respect for the utility of any answers that it can provide
@@renenegron4689 What I expect is that an academic field keep up with answers that have been provided by science and use such knowledge as hinge propositions for the next inference. Currently, ethics and meta-ethics are in dire need of truncation and revision.
I have some interest in cognitive science and neuroscience. What has been established within those disciplines that renders meta-ethical and ethical categories useless? I would say that much of the work in those fields employs philosophical concepts such as those in meta-ethics and ethics. Just to give one or 2 examples, Jesse Prinz and Jonathan Haidt among others. In the cases of Prinz and Haidt we find non-cognitivism and emotivism or sentamentalism being defended. Both defend something close to Humean emotivist theory. In the case of Lakoff, all sorts of claims are made about morality and politics, and yet other cognitive scientists completely disagree with him (e.g. Steven Pinker). With all these divergent theories about morality within the ambit of cog sci and neuroscience, how can one hope to show that any one such theory is true? There's no "scientific consensus" on the matter, if indeed such a consensus would be meaningful (i.e. it's not clear that ethical and meta-ethical positions can be ajudicated by science, as there may or may not be objective truths about morality). These are thus open questions. Cognitive linguistics, psychology and neuroscience have not changed that.
@@silverskid You ever hear the phrase 'that's not right, that's not even wrong'? That's ethics and meta-ethics in a nutshell. The way humans make moral evaluations requires context in order to have meaning. Language operates with the exact same restrictions and constraints, which is why Wittgenstein unsurprisingly found fault in language itself when it comes to unscientific claims. A philosopher still treats morality as a form of argument trying to use logic to erect systems that, in the end all fall apart under scrutiny. Any evaluation, as a result is an exercise in decontextualization because you're now examining a chunk outside of its context rendering it completely meaningless. Great example of the necessity of context resides in the work Rebecca Saxe has been doing when it comes to false beliefs. Say you have a group that's visiting a chemical plant for instance and, they all stop for a coffee break. Samantha stops to get coffee for herself and a colleague. There's a jar with packets labeled sugar but, unbeknownst to her, they've been laced with a deadly chemical that ends up killing her coworker. Same example only now she's completely aware of the fact that there's poison. Anyone beyond the age of 5 I believe is able to tell the difference and effectively tell the difference between the two. Children however, who are younger, are unable to discern false beliefs. Examine these components on their own however, without context and you're engaging in a fool's errand. At this point we shouldn't even be entertaining the notion of objective morality because it's entirely dependent on the agent, their ability, their experiences, etc., making the entire dichotomy of realism vs anti-realism obtuse.
@@pascalbro7524 This is still one among many possible positions (contextualism). Your version interestingly presupposes that "scientific claims" are different in kind without explicating a boundary condition between science and non-science (something verificationists and falsificationists like Popper spent entire careers trying to establish with very limited success). At any rate, to say that non-scientific statements are necessarily context-dependent is to claim they are not truth-apt, and so we have a form of non-cognitivism against which moral realists in cognitive science (e.g. Steven Pinker) would argue. So your position is just that, a position and not a definitive and final refutation of all other positions in this area. This comes down to epistemic humility. You could be wrong.
These little lectures are great.
This post contains my first ever attempt a philosophy paper, I have no formal training out side of these videos,
if you can stomach the read please leave feed back, and i really do mean anyone:
Labels, lairs, and subversives.
Often, I find myself considering the notion that redefinition of words is a tactic of subversion or defense individuals use to remove themselves from a label like, “liar” and its connotations. Sadly, this current generation is enamored with subversion and social justice, labels can never be applicable to them. In fact, attempting to label any consistent repeatable pattern of behavior is often taken as personal attacks. Either its a reduction of the individual, or a self-projection by the observer. Consequently, labels have had their meaning subverted when applied to individuals, taking on a whole new connotation as a result.
How does an individual identify their own personality traits and labels? On many occasions it seems my self-evaluation is based in projections of self onto another. But these projections are not merely an externalization of my inner narrative, they are observations based in personal experience, defined by labels with immutable definitions. A sum of my relative experience projected on another. What steps does an individual take to attempt this type of subjective comparison? Its egotistical by nature but also emphatic, an attempt to cultivate some type of understanding or recognition, followed by an attempt to rationalize the situation based on the variation between me and my comparator. Labeling life experience as advice often derives from self-appointed labels to identify the value of an experience, to the self and others allowing it to gain relativity outside its preconditions of subjectivity, in a sense also serving as self-validation of experiences.
Peer-to-peer catharsis is essential to experience based validation for both parties. The listener gains valuable time to consider themselves, the situation at hand, and the experience being shared with them; and make their own comparison, then give validity to the present information pertaining to them. These identifications of self are also projections of the listener onto another’s situation, objectively a selfish mechanism or a shared experience of self-indulgence. Both parties practice self-reflection in experiences removed from their adjective selves for validation. Group catharsis allows validation of self simultaneously with validation or recognition from everyone involved. A paradox of selfless selfishness for all who take part, allowing for vulnerability whilst seeking validation.
It is my belief this type of group catharsis attempts to convey something by which its nature is subjective. We use labels to identify this subjectivity and gain an objective understanding. Through these labels we are attempting to convey something personal, but undeniably universal about our experiences. However, we require some common terms with to communicate them by, and as proposed above labels are quite frequently a reasonable and broadly universal form of association by which we gain common ground to express experiences.
Consider yourself in this situation; in conversation with a close friend you reveal a personal taboo, something in a morally gray area, what could possibly motivate you to reveal such information? The normal gage for most people is how much they trust someone or a “level of trust” they have with groups. What is this trust based off though? A multitude of different labels, “consistency”, “integrity”, “confidentiality”; a sum of labeled information to help you gage reaction and judgment on information revealed. Hence forth to trust someone or deem them trustworthy, you have Labeled them. For example, trust as labeled above, the “consistent integrity of your confidentiality”, which matches the dictionary definition: “firm belief in the reliability, truth, ability, or strength of someone or something.”. Quite often the sum off all known labels defines a meta-label literally if not exactly and this hirer archery is reflected top to bottom of labeling.
All labels are capable of being meta-labels, except for words whose definitions are immutable such as True False, cardinal-left, cardinal-right, ordinal numbers, cardinal numbers, process, fact, fiction, yes, no, rational, irrational and so on, known as base labels. Meta-labels can contain all known labels below them and vice versa in a form of global inheritance. What makes base labels definitions immutable? Take rational for example, it refers to a base label of logic or reason which describe the base-label result. So, in practice rational and irrational can only be a base label, who’s state of rationality Is described by base labels true or false. In theory if you manipulate a base labels definition your concept of the world suddenly stops matching reality. If you decided that rational and irrational now descried heat and lack of heat, do “rational/irrational heat” describe anything? You would never find out because heat does not describe a result, it describes a state of energy and its activity level which is likely to result in a threshold value and a base-label of True/False that describes the state.
Then what is the issue with labeling? Everyone wants to be trustworthy; it has a positive connotation associated with it. However, if you take an example where someone is objectively a liar it is a negative connotation. Obviously, no one wants to be called a liar and a reasonable course of action is to reject the allegation and present proof on the contrary. Unfortunately, in recent times new tactics of discreditation have emerged, in the subversion of meaning. A common tactic is to subvert the meaning of a label in the meta-label such as consistency, claiming variation of some degree is required to qualify them of negatively connotated behavior. A far more a sinister approach is implying that by observing their behavior and defining it, you have projected personal meta-labels onto them. This approach attempts to discredit the defined meta-label as subjective by gaslighting the observers labels as part of a personal narrative or projecting, which is an “inherently true statement”, unfortunately. However, when one considers the actual mechanism by which personal narrative, self-evaluation, and meta-labeling occur, the gaslight goes out.
Claiming “that observation is a self-projection”, and “your definition of given label is subjective” only goes to further prove the objective nature of a given observation in practice. Foremost, we all read the same dictionary, and learned the same definitions of, behavior, process, cause, effect, all these labels with immutable definitions, taught to a national standard. So, to claim different definitions of the label “true” based on subjectivity means you experience the definition of true differently than everyone else. That is an easy claim to test, ask them to complete the sentence “true or false equals what?”. If they answer anything besides “true” it is subverting the meaning of true because “true or false” is always true. Let us expand further, say you observe someone to be religious and give them the labels “spiritual” and “acknowledgment”. Religious is “relating to or believing in a religion” or in this case the “acknowledgment of spirituality” these subjective labels resulted in an objectively correct description of what it is to be religious without implication of faith or denomination. While that could be available information, its unnecessary when the known labels crate an accurate description of the meta-label.
Can't thank enough for your classes , sir
If there are underlying imperatives to the universe... a bent towards order, for instance... the functions that contribute to that imperative would be considered 'virtuous' or 'good', wouldn't they? And so these mind-independent morals wouldn't have to be metaphysical entity-like things, but the description of a type of process (organizing, from my earlier example). To go against these inherit underlying universal imperatives would be considered then 'vices' or 'sins'. This of course assumes there is some underlying universal imperative, but I think that's somewhat obvious after listening to your lecture on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason -- we may not know what exist in the noumenon, but given that there is that sense of consistency in our individual and collective experiences, there at least must be something beyond pure random or void (which would both be lacking imperatives, or else morality in those universes might be bent towards chaos and non-existence!)
How do you see this from Heidergerrs Dasein point of view? As in modes of being, that are just normal reaction of a being. Not only that but if we take in account that all being inherently tries to be the best it can be. Anything against that process of being is immoral.
Somewhat annoyingly, some philosophers use "moral realism" in such a way that it includes relativist and subjectivism views. In short, for these philosophers, moral realism is the thesis that (1) cognitivism is true, and (2) there are some moral truths.
This is obviously a terminological dispute, but I agree that your way of carving the terrain is better.
Who would we identify as moral realists whereas morality is independent of the mind. I'd think Kant, Aquinas. I think also the Stoics.
Woke up to this!
Watched it twice, lol.
First just listening and second time looking and listening.
Good times!
Thank you
Glad you enjoyed it!
I think this view that moral properties are human-mind-independent is absurd. It is similar to Platonism which says numbers and ideas literally float around and we perceive such abstract entities with our mystical Third Eye or Sixth Sense. No, people should really ask themselves: "Am I really perceiving these spooky objects? Is it really self-evident to me that I'm directly aware of these Platonic objects?" I think most people would deny that's the case if they really thought about the implications of this absurd view.
The reason abstract objects are real is because you can disect the word real into different layers. If something is real... You have to say "how" is it real? The different kinds of real-ness are: 1) all possible things (abstract concepts and physical objects) 2) mathematical truth vs mathematical falsehood (false ideas like flat earth theory fall into the category: mathematical falsehood) 3) all possible laws of physics 4) all possible timelines in this particular universe 5) an object existing in this timeline in this universe (like the planet Jupiter) 6) mental existence... I can imagine things. 6) the bottom layer... Which is the choice of whether or not something Is real and updating your mental model of reality.
If you choose to believe something, you are assuming:
1) existence exists
2) mathematical truth exists
3) possible universes exist
4) possible timelines exist
5) physical objects exist
6) ideas exist
7) you are choosing to believe something
So, the platonic realm isn't that spooky. It's just saying that our physical existence needs to assume other levels of existence in order to make sense in context.
As far as moral truths go... They are not descriptions of the world, but prescriptions. Therefore, they belong in the layer of reality: "ideas in the brain". They are not real in the sense that they are mathematically true... And the laws of physics do not depend on laws of morality.
That being said.. insofaras ppl can agree to which boundaries they should have, morality can be seen to be objective. But, if ppl have different desires about the future, morality in that sense is subjective.
When you say 'mind independent' do you mean not dualist? Religious moral realism obviously makes dualistic space for moral realism. There is also a materialist moral realism which is necessarily brain dependent, though not mind dependent in a dualistic sense.
At 9:07 you indicate that you think most people are intuitive moral realists. Why do you think this is true?
I take this to be an empirical claim, and I don't think existing empirical data provides much in the way of compelling evidence that most people are intuitive moral realists.
According to a recent survey, 62% of contemporary philosophers are moral realists. I'm not sure how one could survey the general public on this kind of question-and maybe you're right that anti-realism, nihilism, etc., are now more prevalent than they used to be-but I think most people would agree. See journals.publishing.umich.edu/phimp/article/id/2109/
@@PhiloofAlexandria Thanks for the response. I'm familiar with the 2020 PhilPapers survey results and I'm aware most respondents endorsed moral realism. However, those results are exclusively of philosophers (and mostly analytic philosophers, in particular), not people in general.
Apologies if I was not clear with my initial question: my question is about ordinary people without philosophical training. Your remark seemed to indicate that you believe most people in general are moral realists. If so, I'm curious why you think that would be.
Liked for laterings
Do you consider "Secular ethics" a mind independent truth?
@-GinPi Gamma
Yes i agree, i read about it in a book for yuval harari (21 lesson for 21st century), he mentioned the ethical codes of secularism.....
but these ethics not exclusively ,also share it with religions...
Secular ethics are just heresy...
Please I need gmail this professor
@-GinPi Gamma
Do you mean that secularism is a successive interpretation of the interaction of religion with reality and society?
thanks for the video, its very intellectually enlightening. But I think that moral realists are confused about the fundamental structure truth claims. But I don't know much about the arguments, so i'd certainly like to know more about the metaethical reasonings for moral realism. its just that i'm fairly confident, after the logical debuttals I've heard so far, that there can never be truth to normative claims because morality is of a different enterprise than epistemology you can break the laws of ethics, you cant break the laws of physics. the greatest german philosopher of all time, friedrich nietzsche, completely demolishes the supposed sound justifications for one set of morality against another. its a very deep truth, which I however would not like to talk about or mention. because having made this insight might lead people to be less motivated to do ethical activism. some realist philosophers I debated, who study philosophy, were a bit annoyed and disrespectful but I understand why they reacted that way. in their mind I seemed arrogant and disrespectful, because they study philosophy, that I essentially seemed to invalidate their life passion and work. they also claimed most philosophers are moral realists, which I'm still a bit skeptical about. they need to provide evidence for that claim as well. but hypothetically saying it was true, then that arguments would face 2 points of criticisms from me:
1. its understandable that most philosophers would believe morality to be objective since it's their life work and passion, and they would not like to believe that it isnt objective. most theologians believe god exists, (for obvious reasons) but thats still not a good reason to why god exists. imo you're just replacing god with moral realism.
2. the deepest insight in the moral philosophical inquiry is nietzsches beyond good and evil, which utterly demolishes moral realism. I think those moral philosophers who are realists are in their profession not intellectually progressed enough to really understand beyond good and evil, because afterall you can have a masters degree in philosophy and be one of the thoustands of philosophy teachers, while not being educated on the deepest fronts of your field. I actually wanted to study philosophy originally, but choose not to because science is more solid knowledge wise than philosophy. its like this: as a scientists its relatively easier to read into philosophical literature in your sparetime constrasted to as a philosopher reading scientific textbooks. So in the end, as a vegan humanist, I really wish that moral realism was true, but unfortunately imperatives "truths" are not the same as descriptive truths. I think this analogy with the scientific method is a fundamental fallacy. the burden of proof is on the realist
You could believe there are moral truths but they are not mind independent. This is subjectivism in the video. I'm not sure where Nietzsche would stand on this.
The way I think of it is that you have a community of practice around moral virtues such as justice, courage, temperance, and practical reason. A person is not compelled to be part of this community since it requires a choice that these are the moral virtues we want to cultivate because of the goods the community receives from these virtues and the personal satisfaction individuals receive from enacting the virtues. But the virtues are not mind independent.
In contrast, a person could be a hedonist devoted to pleasure in the tradition of Epicuros because pursuing refined pleasures results in tranquility for the individual.
2 points --
1. I've outlined Stoic and Epicurean views of morality. Both believed in mind independent moral truth. For Epicuros all animals by nature pursue pleasure and pleasure is THE goal of human activity too. So the question was, what pleasures are best by nature for humans and what virtues do we need to cultivate to experience these pleasures? The Stoics believed the virtues result from reasoning about the TRUE nature of human beings.
2. Many people don't believe that the natural end of human life must be pleasure or that Stoic virtues can be defended based on the universal nature of human beings centered on our unique ability to reason. But you can still choose to pursue solely pleasure (presumably refined) in your life or cultivate Stoic virtues because of the goods they provide the individual and the community. I see this as subjectivism.
There could be other moralities of course but they reflect history, psychology, choices about what a particular moral community perceives as goods within that community. But one could not be compelled to join a particular moral community because that morality reflects mind independent moral truths since those do not exist.
I don't know whether I'm on track but this is how I see the difference between mind dependent and independent moral truth.
Rather than comparing ethics with physics, try comparing it with logic. People regularly ignore the rules of logic, but those of us who try to follow them think they are objectively true. Are we mistaken?
Morality is entirely subjectivistic. History alone, in regards to specific instantiations of moral 'truths' shows this to be the case. Unlike the physical universe, there are no known human mind external and independent systems or methods for encoding or carrying (entirely human abstractions) of morality.
I agree with you. Kant's categorical imperative and all this entails would be a challenge to our point of view.
No that arguments fails. History like sociology and anthropology are descriptive subjects. Morality is a prescriptive subject. Morality is about how an agent ought to or ought not behave. History describes what happened and makes no comment on whether the people described in the historical event ought to or ought not to have acted that way. It is one thing to describe something, it is another thing entirely to say if it was supposed to be that way. To make this easy to explain if I ask you to advise me what I ought to wear for my date when looking in my wardrobe if you take a descriptive approach you will say 'your shirt is black' 'your jeans are blue' etc. These descriptive statements cannot help me determine what i ought to do. It lacks prescriptions, it doesnt tell me what i ought to do. History doesnt prove morality to be subjectivistic as it could be that those societies ought not to have acted the way they did and that their beliefs were wrong. You don't know if thats the case as you assume morality (prescriptivity) is subjective based on descriptions which do not relate to the subject.
A last example. Women were burned at the stake in the middle ages when their community members believed they used magic / witchcraft to kill members of the community, cause bad weather, cause crop failure, cause disease etc. This is a descriptive fact of what the people believed and what they did to women. However, the beliefs these people held were falsified when humanity discovered geographical facts on weather, biological facts about bacteria and viruses and the biological reasons for crop failure be it from pests to other causes. The people who burned women who truly believed they could use magic and were the cause of their issues, these peoples beliefs were wrong. If their beliefs were wrong then their actions too can be called wrong. This can be said about both moral and non-moral values. Describing other peoples behaviour does not automatically validate it. It's a bad argument and it undermines history as an academic discipline as it describes the past in a neutral manner not commenting or judging what it describes. That includes saying all peoples values are equal and that morals are subjective. It has nothing to say on morality, history can only describe the past.
These concepts are an example of why philosophy is antiquated and nobody takes it seriously outside of those unfortunate enough to have invested in a philosophy degree. Only a small minority have bothered looking into cog-sci and what it has provided which basically renders the vast majority of established categories in ethics and meta-ethics, useless. Do yourselves a favour and tour Rebecca Saxe and George Lakoff's work on morality then work your way towards neurolinguistics only to realize Wittgenstein was right and contextualism is the only thing that's really left standing as a result.
Not if you consider philosophical discourse as an end in itself, i.e. the meta science of questioning without respect for the utility of any answers that it can provide
@@renenegron4689 What I expect is that an academic field keep up with answers that have been provided by science and use such knowledge as hinge propositions for the next inference. Currently, ethics and meta-ethics are in dire need of truncation and revision.
I have some interest in cognitive science and neuroscience. What has been established within those disciplines that renders meta-ethical and ethical categories useless? I would say that much of the work in those fields employs philosophical concepts such as those in meta-ethics and ethics. Just to give one or 2 examples, Jesse Prinz and Jonathan Haidt among others. In the cases of Prinz and Haidt we find non-cognitivism and emotivism or sentamentalism being defended. Both defend something close to Humean emotivist theory. In the case of Lakoff, all sorts of claims are made about morality and politics, and yet other cognitive scientists completely disagree with him (e.g. Steven Pinker). With all these divergent theories about morality within the ambit of cog sci and neuroscience, how can one hope to show that any one such theory is true? There's no "scientific consensus" on the matter, if indeed such a consensus would be meaningful (i.e. it's not clear that ethical and meta-ethical positions can be ajudicated by science, as there may or may not be objective truths about morality). These are thus open questions. Cognitive linguistics, psychology and neuroscience have not changed that.
@@silverskid You ever hear the phrase 'that's not right, that's not even wrong'? That's ethics and meta-ethics in a nutshell. The way humans make moral evaluations requires context in order to have meaning. Language operates with the exact same restrictions and constraints, which is why Wittgenstein unsurprisingly found fault in language itself when it comes to unscientific claims. A philosopher still treats morality as a form of argument trying to use logic to erect systems that, in the end all fall apart under scrutiny. Any evaluation, as a result is an exercise in decontextualization because you're now examining a chunk outside of its context rendering it completely meaningless. Great example of the necessity of context resides in the work Rebecca Saxe has been doing when it comes to false beliefs. Say you have a group that's visiting a chemical plant for instance and, they all stop for a coffee break. Samantha stops to get coffee for herself and a colleague. There's a jar with packets labeled sugar but, unbeknownst to her, they've been laced with a deadly chemical that ends up killing her coworker. Same example only now she's completely aware of the fact that there's poison. Anyone beyond the age of 5 I believe is able to tell the difference and effectively tell the difference between the two. Children however, who are younger, are unable to discern false beliefs. Examine these components on their own however, without context and you're engaging in a fool's errand. At this point we shouldn't even be entertaining the notion of objective morality because it's entirely dependent on the agent, their ability, their experiences, etc., making the entire dichotomy of realism vs anti-realism obtuse.
@@pascalbro7524 This is still one among many possible positions (contextualism). Your version interestingly presupposes that "scientific claims" are different in kind without explicating a boundary condition between science and non-science (something verificationists and falsificationists like Popper spent entire careers trying to establish with very limited success). At any rate, to say that non-scientific statements are necessarily context-dependent is to claim they are not truth-apt, and so we have a form of non-cognitivism against which moral realists in cognitive science (e.g. Steven Pinker) would argue. So your position is just that, a position and not a definitive and final refutation of all other positions in this area. This comes down to epistemic humility. You could be wrong.