DAVID FOSTER WALLACE: Here is just one example of the total wrongness of something I tend to be automatically sure of: everything in my own immediate experience supports my deep belief that I am the absolute centre of the universe; the realest, most vivid and important person in existence. We rarely think about this sort of natural, basic self-centredness because it’s so socially repulsive. But it’s pretty much the same for all of us. It is our default setting, hard-wired into our boards at birth. Think about it: there is no experience you have had that you are not the absolute centre of. The world as you experience it is there in front of YOU or behind YOU, to the left or right of YOU, on YOUR TV or YOUR monitor. And so on. Other people’s thoughts and feelings have to be communicated to you somehow, but your own are so immediate, urgent, real.
Well, of course, you are the absolute center of your own world. What makes you think you are wrong ? Is it because you have other beliefs that say there is a world beyond your own, filled with other people and things ? Suppose this latter belief is correct, does that mean that you are not the absolute center of your own world ? I think I know what you mean. You mean that you can't be the absolute center of your own world if there is still a larger world beyond your own, and you only have real evidence of your own world and existence, and whatever 'evidence' you have of a larger world is really reducible to actual evidence of your own world and existence, and, therefore, this 'evidence' that appears to support your belief in the larger world does not in fact support it. Indeed, on this view, the only evidence that exists for you is evidence of your own existence, and, so, there is no real evidence for you that justifies your belief in a larger world -- yet, you feel so certain there is a larger world that exists that you are willing to declare all your evidence that supposedly supports your solipsism as false, misleading, wrong, etc. How strange ? I wonder just what you would consider to be actual evidence of a larger world ? Suppose you had direct access to other people's minds, and, so, you could know their thoughts and feelings directly, instead of having to rely on any forms of communication or inference. But you could in theory still doubt this 'evidence' because it would still have to be processed through your own mind, and, so, dependent on your own mind for it to exist as knowledge for you. In other words, you could just as easily claim that it was not actual evidence of the existence of other minds because this 'evidence' was really only a part of your own thinking. Indeed, what you seem to want is that there exist a kind of evidence that is not dependent upon your own thinking in any way, a kind of evidence that does not depend upon your mind's ability to process and comprehend it because once it becomes part of your mind -- data for it, so to speak -- you no longer trust it and consider it suspect. Oh, these philosophers with their insecurities; not only do they doubt everything else, they even doubt themselves and their cherished Reason.
But the two intuitions are only contradictory when not understood. The 'intuition' that you are directly aware of someone's anger by means of their body language, demeanor, expression, vocal tone, etc. is really just an inference which seems 'intuitive' only because it is so frequently affirmed by means of induction, and, so, based upon a multitude of our past experiences. Of course, we also have a much more common experience of not really knowing what other people are thinking or feeling. But the rational analysis is that this second intuition is not simply an inductive inference like the first, but is instead the only rational explanation of why other people seldom seem to be aware of our unexpressed thoughts and feelings, and why we are seldom aware of their unexpressed thoughts and feelings. We can make the first 'intuition' accord with the second by saying that body-language, words, tone, and so forth are just indications (or expressions) of what people actually think and feel, whereas what people actually think and feel is directly known only to themselves because only they have direct access to them. That is, we have to realize that the first 'intuition' is not in fact an intuition in reality, but only appears to be an intuition because of frequent experiences of past association, and, therefore, that it is instead simply an inference. Notice that the second intuition cannot be explained as merely an inference in terms of the first. If the reality were that we are all directly aware of each other thoughts and feelings through body-language, then it becomes inexplicable that you should so often fail to know what other people think and feel when they are in your presence, or that they should so often fail to read your own mind in return. In other words, it can't simply be an inference that you alone have direct access to your own thoughts and feelings because then we would not be able to satisfactorily reconcile the first 'intuition' to the second,
I think therefore I am. How do I know you think? I can measure signals in your brain but I cannot interact with your thoughts, I cannot experience them because they are metaphysical.
The last bit makes no sense. The initial person has to assume the sentients of "other" otherwise shame isn't felt. You can feel shame in a dream but once you realize its a dream and that everyone is just you there is no way to feel shame except via a lingering moral compass.
Whosoever needed proof of their own existence ? Certainly not Descartes. Read his 'Meditations' and he is there from the beginning. He writes like a man who does not actually doubt his existence, but, instead, affirms it at almost every turn. He tells about his youth, and his education, and his travels, and his desire to rebuild his knowledge from the ground-up, and his desire for certainty, and his intellectual project, and his reason for writing his 'Meditations', etc. Indeed, there is almost nothing the man writes that does not either directly or implicitly affirm his belief in his own existence. Even when he tells about his possible reasons for doubting other things, people, and even himself, he is still always there -- ever present as the one who is affirming, denying, imagining, hypothesizing, doubting, thinking... Sure, he reaches what he considers to be a 'proof' for his own existence -- namely, 'I think, therefore I exist'. But how did he know it was his own thinking ? Well, the imagined scenario that an evil demon was deluding him already presupposed his existence from the beginning. So, yes, if one of your premises is that you exist, then it is not contrary to the conclusion that you in fact exist. But of course the reasoning is simply fallacious : I exist, I am thinking, therefore, I exist. This is because the second premise is irrelevant to the conclusion, and already presupposes it, and because the conclusion itself is nothing more than a restatement of the first premise. Of course, on some level of his thinking, Descartes appears to realize this when he simply declares that he cannot doubt the statement of his own existence -- i.e. 'I am'. But why cannot this statement of one's own self-existence be doubted ? Well, some people have doubted it -- at least in theory. But what you find is that most of these people doubt almost everything -- they are determined skeptics who will never accept anything as real evidence whatsoever ! But do they doubt their own existence ? Not really, because like Descartes, they are always there as the ones doubting and denying, while all the time affirming their own existence in other ways that are much more convincing than are any of their denials. Of course, putting these pretending doubters to the side to hang-out with Thomas, the rest of us could say --- using our commonsense and basic reason -- that, if I say, 'I am', then go on to try to deny this, I am simply contradicting myself. So, I can't say it and then deny it without contradicting myself. This would appear to be the real reason why Descartes says he cannot doubt the statement 'I am'. But, of course, as the critics of the Ontological Argument have shown, you can't simply define -- nor can you simply assert -- a thing into existence ! So, what do you do ? Well, you either need evidence for the existence of the thing, or you simply have to know directly that it exists -- without any evidence. Without evidence ?! Well, let's suppose you are given some evidence to prove that something exists -- say, a black hole. How do you know this evidence itself exists -- and is not merely imaginary ? How do you know this is evidence for the existence for a black hole -- and not evidence for something else altogether different ? Yes, you have other knowledge and beliefs that will 'justify' your belief in this evidence, but if that other 'knowledge' and those other beliefs depend upon their own justification by still other evidence, then the problem just repeats itself. How do you even know there is such a thing as evidence ? What evidence do you have for the existence of any evidence whatsoever ? The absurdity of the question is intentional, for it shines a light on the absurdity of the ideal of an absolute skeptic The absolute skeptic is the bogeyman of epistemology. He does not exist in fact, yet he haunts the minds of almost every epistemologist with his dreaded doubts and incessant denials of the actual existence of knowledge. No, the absolute skeptic does not exist in reality, but the epistemologists do, and so do you ! Now, how do you know this ? Do you really need proof of your own existence ? Or, is it something you are intuitively aware of ? Yes, you can doubt it in your imagination, but you will still be there imagining your own non-existence, and pretending you don't really exist -- always present, even when only there in the background of your own focus and thinking -- just like Descartes was there all along, and never truly doubted his own existence, except in theory, and in his own insecure and speculative imagination.
DAVID FOSTER WALLACE:
Here is just one example of the total wrongness of something I tend to be automatically sure of: everything in my own immediate experience supports my deep belief that I am the absolute centre of the universe; the realest, most vivid and important person in existence. We rarely think about this sort of natural, basic self-centredness because it’s so socially repulsive. But it’s pretty much the same for all of us. It is our default setting, hard-wired into our boards at birth. Think about it: there is no experience you have had that you are not the absolute centre of. The world as you experience it is there in front of YOU or behind YOU, to the left or right of YOU, on YOUR TV or YOUR monitor. And so on. Other people’s thoughts and feelings have to be communicated to you somehow, but your own are so immediate, urgent, real.
Well, of course, you are the absolute center of your own world. What makes you think you are wrong ? Is it because you have other beliefs that say there is a world beyond your own, filled with other people and things ? Suppose this latter belief is correct, does that mean that you are not the absolute center of your own world ? I think I know what you mean. You mean that you can't be the absolute center of your own world if there is still a larger world beyond your own, and you only have real evidence of your own world and existence, and whatever 'evidence' you have of a larger world is really reducible to actual evidence of your own world and existence, and, therefore, this 'evidence' that appears to support your belief in the larger world does not in fact support it. Indeed, on this view, the only evidence that exists for you is evidence of your own existence, and, so, there is no real evidence for you that justifies your belief in a larger world -- yet, you feel so certain there is a larger world that exists that you are willing to declare all your evidence that supposedly supports your solipsism as false, misleading, wrong, etc. How strange ?
I wonder just what you would consider to be actual evidence of a larger world ? Suppose you had direct access to other people's minds, and, so, you could know their thoughts and feelings directly, instead of having to rely on any forms of communication or inference. But you could in theory still doubt this 'evidence' because it would still have to be processed through your own mind, and, so, dependent on your own mind for it to exist as knowledge for you. In other words, you could just as easily claim that it was not actual evidence of the existence of other minds because this 'evidence' was really only a part of your own thinking. Indeed, what you seem to want is that there exist a kind of evidence that is not dependent upon your own thinking in any way, a kind of evidence that does not depend upon your mind's ability to process and comprehend it because once it becomes part of your mind -- data for it, so to speak -- you no longer trust it and consider it suspect. Oh, these philosophers with their insecurities; not only do they doubt everything else, they even doubt themselves and their cherished Reason.
I don't always know how I get to a solution, but I often do, and I've concluded that somehow perception is the answer to "the riddle".
But the two intuitions are only contradictory when not understood. The 'intuition' that you are directly aware of someone's anger by means of their body language, demeanor, expression, vocal tone, etc. is really just an inference which seems 'intuitive' only because it is so frequently affirmed by means of induction, and, so, based upon a multitude of our past experiences. Of course, we also have a much more common experience of not really knowing what other people are thinking or feeling. But the rational analysis is that this second intuition is not simply an inductive inference like the first, but is instead the only rational explanation of why other people seldom seem to be aware of our unexpressed thoughts and feelings, and why we are seldom aware of their unexpressed thoughts and feelings. We can make the first 'intuition' accord with the second by saying that body-language, words, tone, and so forth are just indications (or expressions) of what people actually think and feel, whereas what people actually think and feel is directly known only to themselves because only they have direct access to them. That is, we have to realize that the first 'intuition' is not in fact an intuition in reality, but only appears to be an intuition because of frequent experiences of past association, and, therefore, that it is instead simply an inference. Notice that the second intuition cannot be explained as merely an inference in terms of the first. If the reality were that we are all directly aware of each other thoughts and feelings through body-language, then it becomes inexplicable that you should so often fail to know what other people think and feel when they are in your presence, or that they should so often fail to read your own mind in return. In other words, it can't simply be an inference that you alone have direct access to your own thoughts and feelings because then we would not be able to satisfactorily reconcile the first 'intuition' to the second,
Reading all your comments is amusing....especially since none of you are real...
Lol the sudden cut off at the end, did I really listen to it or was it just a hallucination feeling :D
where can I get the full lecture?
I think therefore I am. How do I know you think? I can measure signals in your brain but I cannot interact with your thoughts, I cannot experience them because they are metaphysical.
The last bit makes no sense. The initial person has to assume the sentients of "other" otherwise shame isn't felt. You can feel shame in a dream but once you realize its a dream and that everyone is just you there is no way to feel shame except via a lingering moral compass.
Whosoever needed proof of their own existence ? Certainly not Descartes. Read his 'Meditations' and he is there from the beginning. He writes like a man who does not actually doubt his existence, but, instead, affirms it at almost every turn. He tells about his youth, and his education, and his travels, and his desire to rebuild his knowledge from the ground-up, and his desire for certainty, and his intellectual project, and his reason for writing his 'Meditations', etc. Indeed, there is almost nothing the man writes that does not either directly or implicitly affirm his belief in his own existence. Even when he tells about his possible reasons for doubting other things, people, and even himself, he is still always there -- ever present as the one who is affirming, denying, imagining, hypothesizing, doubting, thinking... Sure, he reaches what he considers to be a 'proof' for his own existence -- namely, 'I think, therefore I exist'. But how did he know it was his own thinking ? Well, the imagined scenario that an evil demon was deluding him already presupposed his existence from the beginning. So, yes, if one of your premises is that you exist, then it is not contrary to the conclusion that you in fact exist. But of course the reasoning is simply fallacious : I exist, I am thinking, therefore, I exist. This is because the second premise is irrelevant to the conclusion, and already presupposes it, and because the conclusion itself is nothing more than a restatement of the first premise. Of course, on some level of his thinking, Descartes appears to realize this when he simply declares that he cannot doubt the statement of his own existence -- i.e. 'I am'. But why cannot this statement of one's own self-existence be doubted ? Well, some people have doubted it -- at least in theory. But what you find is that most of these people doubt almost everything -- they are determined skeptics who will never accept anything as real evidence whatsoever ! But do they doubt their own existence ? Not really, because like Descartes, they are always there as the ones doubting and denying, while all the time affirming their own existence in other ways that are much more convincing than are any of their denials. Of course, putting these pretending doubters to the side to hang-out with Thomas, the rest of us could say --- using our commonsense and basic reason -- that, if I say, 'I am', then go on to try to deny this, I am simply contradicting myself. So, I can't say it and then deny it without contradicting myself. This would appear to be the real reason why Descartes says he cannot doubt the statement 'I am'. But, of course, as the critics of the Ontological Argument have shown, you can't simply define -- nor can you simply assert -- a thing into existence !
So, what do you do ? Well, you either need evidence for the existence of the thing, or you simply have to know directly that it exists -- without any evidence. Without evidence ?! Well, let's suppose you are given some evidence to prove that something exists -- say, a black hole. How do you know this evidence itself exists -- and is not merely imaginary ? How do you know this is evidence for the existence for a black hole -- and not evidence for something else altogether different ? Yes, you have other knowledge and beliefs that will 'justify' your belief in this evidence, but if that other 'knowledge' and those other beliefs depend upon their own justification by still other evidence, then the problem just repeats itself. How do you even know there is such a thing as evidence ? What evidence do you have for the existence of any evidence whatsoever ? The absurdity of the question is intentional, for it shines a light on the absurdity of the ideal of an absolute skeptic
The absolute skeptic is the bogeyman of epistemology. He does not exist in fact, yet he haunts the minds of almost every epistemologist with his dreaded doubts and incessant denials of the actual existence of knowledge. No, the absolute skeptic does not exist in reality, but the epistemologists do, and so do you ! Now, how do you know this ? Do you really need proof of your own existence ? Or, is it something you are intuitively aware of ? Yes, you can doubt it in your imagination, but you will still be there imagining your own non-existence, and pretending you don't really exist -- always present, even when only there in the background of your own focus and thinking -- just like Descartes was there all along, and never truly doubted his own existence, except in theory, and in his own insecure and speculative imagination.
I know nothing.
This is a dangerous philosophy to some. Should not be spread.