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Military History Chronicle
United States
Приєднався 15 тра 2018
Mini-Wars 2021 - Dr. Robert Ballard
On October 9, 2021 Dr. Robert Ballard spoke virtually to a crowd on historians gathered at Cal Sate Fullerton to attend the annual Historical Miniatures Gaming Society - Pacific Southwest. The topic of his presentation was how his explorations have changed what we think we know about history. Tune to learn new insights about his exploration with the National Geographic Society and Ocean Exploration Trust on wrecks like the Bismarck, Lusitania, PT109, USS Thresher, USS Scorpion and more. Where is the E/V Nautilus now and where is it going? You'll have to watch to find out.
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Відео
No Fighting in the War Room - June 1944: The Death Knell of the Axis. Part One - Normandy
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Part One of our series on the events of June 1944. This was originally supposed to be one video, but thanks to the wide range of material, and Bucky's blathering, we turned it into a series. Hope you enjoy. Check out our blog: militaryhistorychronicle.com Visit us on Facebook: militaryhistorychronicle Have a look at our cool T-shirt designs: shop.spreadshirt.com/the-war-room
The Canadian Queen's Own Rifles at Normandy and Beyond
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MHC spent a few minutes with Mr. James Owens, a re-enactor with the Canadian Queen's Own Rifles, who landed on JUNO Beach on D-Day. Mr. Owens was kind enough to share some of his expertise with us. Facebook: Military-History-Chronicle-330458251113064 Blog: militaryhistorychronicle.com Merch: shop.spreadshirt.com/the-war-room
101st Airborne Glider Ops on D-Day
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MHC talks to re-enactor Kevin Frank at the National D-Day Memorial on the 75th Anniversary of the Normandy landings. Kevin plays Captain Thomas Wilder, commander of the 101st Reconnaissance Platoon and was kind enough to take a few minutes to speak with us. Facebook: Military-History-Chronicle-330458251113064 Blog: militaryhistorychronicle.com Merch: shop.spreadshirt.com/the-war-room
D-Day 75th Anniversary Missing Man Flyby
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The Missing Man Formation at the National D-Day Memorial in Bedford, Virginia, 6 June 2019 performed by a P-51 Mustang, F-16 Fighting Falcon, F-22 Raptor, and F-35 Lightning II. In honor of those who fell on the beaches and fields of Normandy 75 years ago today.
The Nisibis War: The Defense of the Roman East, AD 337-363 Part 4
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The conclusion of Major General John Harrel's 4-part lecture on Julian's Campaigns and the defense of the Roman east AD 337-363. Cal State Fullerton, 13 October 2018. Thanks to General Harrel for his kind permission to feature this program. General Harrel's book may be purchased here: amzn.to/2Rt1HZG Blog: militaryhistorychronicle.com MHC Merch: shop.spreadshirt.com/the-war-room/
The Nisbis War: The Defense of the Roman East, AD 337-363 Part 3
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Part three of Major General John Harrel's lecture on Julian's Campaigns in defense of the Roman east AD 337-363. Cal State Fullerton, 13 October 2018. Thanks to General Harrel for his kind permission to feature this program. Stay tuned for further installments on this topic. General Harrel's book may be purchased here: amzn.to/2Rt1HZG Blog: militaryhistorychronicle.com
The Nisibis War: The Defense of the Roman East, AD 337-363 - Part 2
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Part two of Major General John Harrel's lecture on Julian's Campaigns in defense of the Roman east AD 337-363. Cal State Fullerton, 13 October 2018. Thanks to General Harrel for his kind permission to feature this program. Stay tuned for further installments on this topic. General Harrel's book may be purchased here: amzn.to/2Rt1HZG Blog: militaryhistorychronicle.com
No Fighting in the War Room: Who Was The Best Fighting Admiral of World War II?
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No Fighting in the War Room returns with a debate on who was the best fighting admiral of World War II: William F. "Bull" Halsey or Raymond A. Spruance. Blog: militaryhistorychronicle.com MHC Merch: shop.spreadshirt.com/the-war-room Source Links "Bull Halsey" by E.B. Potter amzn.to/2C59vqB "Admiral 'Bull' Halsey: The Life and Wars of the Navy's Most Controversial Commander" by John Wukovits amz...
The Nisibis War: The Defense of the Roman East, AD 337-363 - Part 1
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Part one of Major General John Harrel's lecture on Julian's Campaigns and the defense of the Roman east AD 337-363. Cal State Fullerton, 13 October 2018. Thanks to General Harrel for his kind permission to feature this program. Stay tuned for further installments on this topic. General Harrel's book may be purchased here: amzn.to/2Rt1HZG Blog: militaryhistorychronicle.com MHC Merch: shop.spread...
Misunderstood Victory Lecture Part Three v2
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The conclusion of Jeff's lecture at the Cal State Fullerton Historical Lecture Series on 13 October 2018. Blog: militaryhistorychronicle.com MHC Merch: shop.spreadshirt.com/the-war-room
Part Two - The Battle of Cape Esperance 1942: The Misunderstood Victory of Admiral Norman Scott
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Part Two of Jeff's talk in the Cal State Fullerton Historical Lecture Series on 13 October at Mini-Wars 2018 Blog: militaryhistorychronicle.com MHC Merch: shop.spreadshirt.com/the-war-room
Fort Sumter: Tactical Victory for the Confederacy; Strategic Triumph for Lincoln
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Bucky discusses how the opening engagement of the American Civil War was an unquestioned tactical win for the South, but ultimately a strategic loss. Blog: www.militaryhistorychronicle.com MHC Merch: shop.spreadshirt.com/the-war-room/ Sources Steven E. Woodworth, "This Great Struggle: America's Civil War" amzn.to/2BfdBxr Allan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, "For the Common De...
Part One - The Battle of Cape Esperance 1942: The Misunderstood Victory of Admiral Norman Scott
Переглядів 11 тис.5 років тому
Part One of Jeff's talk in the Cal State Fullerton Historical Lecture Series on 13 October at Mini-Wars 2018 Blog: militaryhistorychronicle.com MHC Merch: shop.spreadshirt.com/the-war-room
Was the Battle of Tours REALLY Decisive?
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Bucky discusses whether Tours was really the turning point it has been made out to be and reveals it's real significance. Special guest appearance by Bucky's dog, so you really should watch. Blog: militaryhistorychronicle.com MHC Merch: shop.spreadshirt.com/the-war-room
What are the Most Prized Books in My Collection?
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What are the Most Prized Books in My Collection?
Alfred & Carl Answer the Mail Episode 2: The Warship That Got Too Big
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Alfred & Carl Answer the Mail Episode 2: The Warship That Got Too Big
Alfred & Carl Answer the Mail Episode 1: War is Hellebore
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Alfred & Carl Answer the Mail Episode 1: War is Hellebore
No Fighting in the War Room: Is Midway Overrated?
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No Fighting in the War Room: Is Midway Overrated?
What I'm Reading This Week: Tanks in Hell
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What I'm Reading This Week: Tanks in Hell
Mine is a tossup between Raymond Spruance and Chester Nimitz. Since the title prescribes “fighting,” I suppose I have to pick Spruance.
Halsey, the only US Admiral who was certain he could defeat any typhoon that came his way...
Raymond Spruance
very good analysis
The are even though Spruance never had to deal with Typhoons.
Raymond Spruance ……..by far …Why Halsey is even considered is beyond me
Spruance was a better commander
By the way, after the battle of Midway, there was an admiral who received an additional star at the insistence of Admiral Nimitz. Guess who it was? Here's a hint: it wasn't Spruance.
You should be discussing only 1944. The best tactical commanding admiral of 1942 was Frank Jack Fletcher. He, Fletcher, was in tactical command at three of the four great carrier on carrier battles in 1942. These were: Coral Sea, Midway (Fletcher did not turn over tactical command to Spruance until an hour after the last Japanese carrier was turned into a burning hulk) and Eastern Solomons. At these battles, under Fletchers command, six Japanese carriers were sunk and Kido Butai, the cream of Japanese naval aviation was crushed. 1944 was a different war. American naval power, both aviation and surface, were an order of magnitude better than Japans and Spruance and Halsey handled it differently.
Spruance.
Great review!
This series was absolutely incredible.
Excellent presentation. I just wish all the questions were kept for the end since I feel like people kept asking irrelevant questions which cut the flow of the topic multiple times.
I suggest you watch a speech delivered by Harold Stassen where he explains the process of the decision making for Leyte. Arm chair quarterbacks are a dime a dozen. Amazing how many people trash Halsey but glow about Spruance. Halsey, his staff, CINCPAC, King, and the joint chiefs made the decisions at Leyte. Kincaid was under MacArthurs command. Kincaid was like Spruance. Could make a decision. Too timid. But all of you continue to follow instead of lead.
As an under-recognized & under-represented Senior Allied Naval Commander in the Second World War, but then for outside of the the Pacific/Far Eastern Theatres of War Operations, serious consideration should henceforth also be given to the monumental efforts & immensely, successful record of Admiral Sir Max Horton, RN, whose ‘Joint-Western Approaches Command’ based in Liverpool, UK, had overall responsibility & control over the protection & planning for protecting the convoys destined for British ports mostly from North America in 1939-45 & for consequently defeating both the main ‘U-Boat’ menace & also to a lesser extent, the ‘Surface Raider’ threats, posed to both Atlantic convoys & by additional implication the Arctic & Mediterranean convoys’ protection forces too, as well! However, to underline the critical importance of Horton’s vital role (And those of his two immediate, predecessors, Admirals Martin Dunbar-Nasmith, RN & Percy Noble, RN too!), since his appointment in 1942 till 1945, throughout these years of the war they would be prove crucial to this part of the total Allied war effort, & should any adverse outcomes have then occurred or prevailed their dire consequences could then be appropriately described in the following terms, accordingly & without any exaggeration that if the major adversary, the German Kriegsmarine under either Admiral’s Erich Raeder or Karl Doenitz, especially the latter during WW2, had at anytime during the exactly six (6) years in total duration of the “Battle of the Atlantic-02/Sep/1939 till 02/Sep/1945,” won the submarine battle in the Atlantic for any prolonged & sustained length of time then Britain operationally, would have been afterwards forced to cease hostilities (Due to the impending or actual threat or impact of starvation of its populace, because of shortages of necessary food supplies, equipment & materials essential for continuing its own domestic industries’ war production, all caused by aggressive U-Boats actions, sinking any/all hapless Merchant Vessels & their cargoes then destined for UK ports, in the Atlantic beforehand!) against Nazi Germany & its Axis-partners, & as a consequence, then have been also effectively ‘knocked out’ of the Second World War, at least on a temporary basis, to which may have then also later proved to have been, an irrevocable & irredeemable, overall, strategic defeat for the Allies. Therefore, as a result of this situation from ever actually arising, particularly in 1942 or ‘43, it would also likely have led to Hitler being thus able to transfer very quickly, upto sixty (60) ‘freed-up’ divisions of fresh & fully-equipped & supplied Wehrmacht, Waffen SS & Luftwaffe units & troops from positions in Western Europe, directly to the Eastern Front which could thus have then easily induced & inflicted either a subsequent, direct, huge & catastrophic military defeat on the whole Red Army & Soviet Air Force, or else have then compelled the Soviet leadership into inevitably having to accept or sue for, a coerced & hostile peace imposed on them by Nazi Germany, & of whom would have surely thus then enacted & enforced very harsh, punitive & exacting terms upon the Soviet Union, as a total consequence, thereby!!
I'm not an anglophile but I think there is a fair case for Admiral Andrew Browne Cunningham to be considered for this title of "Best Fighting Admiral of World War II." I don't think it entered the discussion not because the learned gentlemen don't know who he is, I don't think he pales in comparison to Halsey or Spruance. I suspect it is because the Mediterranean is not quite the expanse the Pacific is, but I would suggest that not only was Cunningham a theater commander, so obviously had that responsibility but he also had tactical command over the British Mediterranean Fleet in the Battle off of Cape Matapan. He did not command the Task Force surrounding HMS ILLUSTRIOUS during the attack on the Regia Marina in Taranto, but he was generally aboard his Flagship, whether, HMS WARSPITE, or HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH throughout his command of the Mediterranean Fleet. The best comparison for his tactical command may not be Spruance or Halsey, but possibly Willis Lee or Daniel Callaghan. I think with the exception of the Battle of Midway, I think you're talking about a major Fleet or theater command. Whether its Halsey's command of the Guadalcanal Campaign or the latter Fleet commands of 3rd and 5th Fleet off of Philippines, Leyte Gulf, or Okinawa and Iwo Jima.
I have no arguments with the conclusion that each man was in the right place at the right time, however I'm confused regarding two things: 1) Did Admiral Halsey order the formation of TF 34 and if so, when? I ask because his flagship was USS New Jersey and obviously she would have been part of 34, yet she continued on with the rest of TF 38 in going after Ozawa off Cape Engano. 2)At the time of Leyte Gulf, Admiral Mitscher was still leading TF 38 with McCain under him in TG 38.1. McCain wouldn't gain command of 38 until AFTER Leyte when Mitscher was given some well deserved shore leave.
Sprudence > Ballsey
Neither could hold a candle to Fletcher.
Several comments have cited Halsey’s failure at Leyte Gulf but no one has mentioned his propensity for sailing his ships into the middle of typhoons.
I think both of the learned gentlemen mentioned the typhoons initially on the video around 24:30 in between a defense of Halsey's conduct at Leyte Gulf because of having a divided chain of command and specifically at 26:30. But in defense of Halsey, weather reporting especially in the context of no satellite imagery, had he had better weather reporting he probably would not a have demanded that the fleet stay in formation through the midst of the typhoon. A typhoon looks a lot different from the Admiral's bridge of the USS NEW JERSEY, then it does on deck of a FARRAGUT - class or FLETCHER- class destroyer that is light on fuel.
Halsey was too reckless when there was no need for it. Spruance was steady. Steady wins.
Halsey ought to give eternal thanks to TAFFY3 or his legacy would be much different.
Classic that the mustang was the one to take the climb. 👏👍
There were other admirals who enjoyed a fight. Wilhelm Marschall could've been dangerous if Kriegsmarine leaders were willing to use surface ships more
Andrew Cunningham...
I wouldn't blame Scott's tactics so much as our incompetent admirals who were absolute jackasses. Turner, Wright and Callaghan and the ship captains wern't much better
Until Ching Lee came in
I'm glad you included Wright (Tassafaronga) in the list of boobs.
Easy to say There are talkers and then there are doers.
Didn't have you there. To show how it should be done.
Massive overconfidence, based in racism, cost thousands of lives. It took most of the war to get over that.
"AH"!? No; AF. This is like a bad history book club.
You deserve more followers.
Is there a part 3?
In the battle of the Eastern Solomon’s I thought the Japanese damaged the carrier Enterprise as Yorktown was sunk at Midway
Correct. The Enterprise was a Yorktown class carrier though.
This is cool, I dont know much about Rome in the middle east after queen zenobia was defeated and before the fall of the west so this is an area I certainly can learn more about, I heard of julian the apostate but only about his paganism and ultimate demise fighting Persia around 363 so I'm ignorant of the details of the campaign as a whole
Imagine being on one of the us navy ships attacking and seeing "I am aoba!" flashing, what on earth, why's he telling us this when we're blasting him, oh he must think it's friendly fire lol a few more shells should convince him otherwise
I don't think this properly condemns Halsey for Leyte Gulf. The critics say that he took the bait. I think we should recognize that his run to the north was lousy even if those carriers had been fully armed with aircraft and pilots. In other words, even if they had not been bait, it was still a very poor choice to head north. Halsey was one of the critics of Spruance's actions in the Battle of the Philippines Sea. He failed to properly learn from it. In that earlier battle, the USN lost 23 aircraft and the fleet suffered just a single hit on a battleship while destroying the IJN air fighting capabilities. They then lost over 100 aircraft chasing after those impotent floating runways. I assume that one of the benefits of having Spruance and Halsey trade places every half year commanding the fleet was so that the one on the sideline could learn from the other and to reflect on the strategic situation. Halsey failed that test. Had Halsey properly recognized what happened at the turkey shoot, he would have recognized that the best tactic for dealing with an attack from IJN carrier forces was to defend the air attacks, and ignore the flat tops. He should also have recognized that the IJN has no need for flattops to defend against the invasion of the Philippines. They have plenty of runways on land and they are much cheaper to operate than an aircraft carrier. The carriers would be useful to defend Okinawa and Iwo Jima, but not the home islands. One could argue that Kincaid should have properly defended against the center force. Halsey says that he assumed Kincaid would do this. This is a lousy excuse. Halsey did not coordinate with Kincaid (as far as I know), when he attacked the IJN center force in the Sibuyan Sea. In other words, both assumed that this was the 3rd fleet's task. But when Halsey abandoned the San Bernardino Straight, he effectively gave the responsibility to Kincaid to defend against the center force. He made no attempt to tell Kincaid that the center force was now his problem. Notice the absurdity of this. Halsey's TG 38.3 was N of the straight, TG 38.4 was S of the straight, and TG 38.2 was right at the straight. It makes no sense that Kincaid would even think of sending ships or aircraft into that area to guard against the center force. That's a recipe for collisions. It was not his territory, much less any rational admiral's thinking that it was his responsibility. The failure to hand off the responsibility for defending against this major enemy force is ridiculous. The authors of this video attributed the failure to detach TF 34 to a communication's failure, but that is not correct. Halsey formed TF34 and chose to bring it N to attack the carriers. Lee asked Halsey if TF34 should be left to guard the straight and Halsey declined. Indeed, Halsey was on the NJ (BB62), which was in TF34. Note however, that it would have been a poor choice to leave TF34 to guard the straight. It makes no sense to put any USN warships within range of the IJN guns. Aircraft were far cheaper with both money and lives to defeat surface forces. The best course of action would have been to place TF34 at the exit of the straight to get in some night shooting while the IJN was single file. Then have them back off if any exited during daylight so that the TF38 aircraft could beat the crap out of them. There was no excuse to run the 3rd fleet North. That move did not benefit the USN regardless of whether the IJN carriers were potent or not. Finally, Halsey stewed in his cabin for like an hour deciding what to do when he learned the center force was pounding the Taffy's. He should have immediately detached TF34 and sent a TG with it to trap the IJN from exiting. Instead he wasted an hour and Kurita got away. Some argue that Halsey did not want to separate his forces when he was deciding to head N. OK, good point, except Halsey DID separate his forces when he turned TF34 around and sent a TG with it. Keep in mind that Nimitz's command was that destruction of the enemy's fleet was the highest priority if an opportunity presented itself. This goofy command (not properly quoted here) was used as an excuse for Halsey to go off chasing the aircraft carriers. But how about we get some perspective? What was the center force if not a significant enemy fleet? However, I am still a huge fan of Halsey.
He even took the ship guarding the channel entrance with him and that allowed the Japanese navy to slip in unobserved. Halsey was not qualified to command a roll boat. He was so stupid, that on two occasions he sailed into two typhoon's and murdered hundreds of sailors. He claimed to not know in what direction the typhoons were going, but back in Pearl, thousands of miles away, they knew and so did everyone else. A little man with a big mouth and nothing else.
Just a clusterfuck at first. Ha. I'm guessing some of these ships hadn't worked together before? The fog of war and uncertainty with the new tech (radar) I reckon? Partially?
Thank you for Canadian Corps in Normandy,on the Scheldt and in Germany, have read several books on the subject.
My Dad, George Yellak was on the USS Helena, Fire Control aft 6 inch guns , was on the ship from the day it was built to the day it was sunk in Kula Gulf.
My Dad, Robert Luck was in the 6 inch forward and he was on her from her refit after Pearl till she was sunk...
Fantastic discussion but its hard to seperate the two and there are merits both sides. Enjoyed that a lot. Question! Where can we order those mugs? That was class!
I think you hit the nail about midway. We civilians just need a bad guy and good guy with a short narrative hinging on one moment to make it memorable. Only question is "pilot fatigue" exists but how is it different that the German pilots who also could largely only get home in a box? We're the German pilots losing effectiveness? Maybe the fact that Germans got home for a week or two and weren't as isolated kept them going? I'm thinking they didn't lose that much effectiveness as pilots. I think there are a lot of cultural parallels between the militaries Germany and Japan in the 1940s. They both had an absolute need to win quick and maintain a culture of willpower and destiny vs reality in their troops. Both military cultures performed exceptionally in the beginning and both had to be utterly smashed displaying little or no willingness to negotiate.
the dialog is ok but , the screen cannot be seen clearly so, has much less effectiveness to the viewer. good subject wish it could have been shot better
The fact that Halsey never had any major disasters occur under his command can be entirely attributed to the audacious and heroic actions of the various Taffy 3 commanders during Samar. Anybody who hasn’t read about that action should familiarize themselves with what went on there. It’s something of a miracle. Halsey was aggressive and that’s a tough characteristic to overstate for a wartime leader. But remember that the Japanese were also major risk takers too during that war, and it culminated in the destruction of their fleet even when they still had numerical superiority (under Spruance, by the way!). So, I think it’s maybe a little easier to look up to Halsey, with his charisma and his big personality and his fighting spirit. And maybe a little bit harder to see the beauty and intricacy of Spruance’s command. Personally I’m more attracted to Spruance’s style. If he’d ever made the mistakes that the Japanese did, and that Halsey nearly did, it wouldn’t have been for the same reasons. He was judicious and pensive and highly intelligent. And let’s not forget, just Luke Halsey he was capable of deciding to pick up the anvil and smash away when he thought the time was right. Ultimately, I think we’re dealing in shades of grey here. Both guys were the right men for our country during that moment. They kind of reflected both sides of American spirit at the time. And both lead America to amazing victories. Are we allowed to admire them both!?
I submit that the losses suffered off Samar were a major disaster given that there was absolutely no point to taking the 3rd fleet N to attack empty or even full carriers.
Read the action reports. This was only adm Scott's victory in that he was the otc. The credit should go to Capt Gilbert Hoover in Helena.
I think it’s important to remember Crassus was being compared to some of the greatest generals who ever lived He wasn’t the general that Pompey and Caesar were and in Surena he was coming up against a seasoned and intelligent Parthian commander fielding a veteran professional force with an airtight plan for dealing with the cumbersome roman heavy infantry
So very interesting to watch. Thank you. And i thought that the militaires, and admirals at the time was 100% pro, and their fleets in a 100% control of the admiral, but then it turns out do be a major circus :)
I truly learned a lot from this, thanks gentlemen /greetings from Sweden
Thx for uploading, Ive been looking for info on this battle for YEARS. ✌🍀❤🇺🇸👍
Excellent debate and well spoken. Btw, Admiral Halsey wasn’t a huge fan of his Intelligence Officer. True to form, he was an introvert vice extrovert like Halsey and the rest of his staff.
If the landings at Leyte Gulf had not been so very successfully defended by Adm. Clifton Sprague and Adm. Thomas Sprague (no relation) Bull Halsey would have faced a court martial. (Or at least should have.)
Yeah, never could understand his apologists. No matter his achievements, Leyte Gulf could have been catastrophic. They trying to paint him as a Naval Patton now eclipsing Spruance as "too cautious".
Successfully defended, yes, but at a cost of over 800 American sailors in the Battle Off Samar.
Thanks for the presentation! Would love to listen to your take on the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal on 13 Nov and what went wrong. I read Captain Hara’s book Japanese Destroyer Captain. Was really chaotic!
Sez here he....ah...well....uhhhhh....he wasted....ah.....his money.......uhhh....when he went to...ahhhh....cal....uhhhhh.....state.....uhhhh fullerton.
The lecturer's back and forth body movements, constant use of "Uhhh", and his dry mouth, (he needed to drink water two times in just 16 minutes), indicates he was very nervous and not comfortable speaking to a live audience.
@@chuck33478 nor do you. I speak truth, why did you feel a need?
@oldgysgt , it takes practice, he will get there. His knowledge is more important than his delivery
I'll add two cents. Halsey was a fool. Spruance may well be the second best admiral of all time.
u are a penzi
@@ranyllee1180 No idea what you're on about. Either way, Halsey stupid. Spruance only outdone by Nelson.
I'd put John Paul Jones above Spruance or Halsey for American admirals. However Admiral Yi Sun-shin was the greatest admiral ever in recorded history. Nelson fought 13 battles, winning eight. Adm Yi had 23 battles against the Japanese invaders of Korea between 1592 and 1598, and won every one of them without losing a single ship. In 14 of these battles, moreover, not a single Japanese ship survived. He almost always fought while being outnumbered. He was a cavalry officer and had no formal naval training of any kind prior to taking over command of a fleet just prior to the conflict. Taught himself about ships, currents, helped modify or design what may be the first ironclad in history, etc. To learn of his whole story is one of the most amazing stories of honor, duty to country and perseverance and military genius in the history of human warfare.
Great series! Thank you for posting. My uncle Leo A Loumbas was one of the 107 lost aboard the Boise in the forward magazine room that night.
My uncle, Allen Crespo, was also killed in the forward magazine room of the Boise that night.
@@timherbert3955 Good to meet you virtually, Tim, and to make the Boise connection. At the time the Battle of Cape Esperance made big news, but it was soon understandably overshadowed by the other major and costly Pacific naval battles in the war.