Відео

Mine is a tossup between Raymond Spruance and Chester Nimitz. Since the title prescribes “fighting,” I suppose I have to pick Spruance.

Halsey, the only US Admiral who was certain he could defeat any typhoon that came his way...

Raymond Spruance

very good analysis

The are even though Spruance never had to deal with Typhoons.

Raymond Spruance ……..by far …Why Halsey is even considered is beyond me

Spruance was a better commander

By the way, after the battle of Midway, there was an admiral who received an additional star at the insistence of Admiral Nimitz. Guess who it was? Here's a hint: it wasn't Spruance.

You should be discussing only 1944. The best tactical commanding admiral of 1942 was Frank Jack Fletcher. He, Fletcher, was in tactical command at three of the four great carrier on carrier battles in 1942. These were: Coral Sea, Midway (Fletcher did not turn over tactical command to Spruance until an hour after the last Japanese carrier was turned into a burning hulk) and Eastern Solomons. At these battles, under Fletchers command, six Japanese carriers were sunk and Kido Butai, the cream of Japanese naval aviation was crushed. 1944 was a different war. American naval power, both aviation and surface, were an order of magnitude better than Japans and Spruance and Halsey handled it differently.

Spruance.

Great review!

This series was absolutely incredible.

Excellent presentation. I just wish all the questions were kept for the end since I feel like people kept asking irrelevant questions which cut the flow of the topic multiple times.

I suggest you watch a speech delivered by Harold Stassen where he explains the process of the decision making for Leyte. Arm chair quarterbacks are a dime a dozen. Amazing how many people trash Halsey but glow about Spruance. Halsey, his staff, CINCPAC, King, and the joint chiefs made the decisions at Leyte. Kincaid was under MacArthurs command. Kincaid was like Spruance. Could make a decision. Too timid. But all of you continue to follow instead of lead.

As an under-recognized & under-represented Senior Allied Naval Commander in the Second World War, but then for outside of the the Pacific/Far Eastern Theatres of War Operations, serious consideration should henceforth also be given to the monumental efforts & immensely, successful record of Admiral Sir Max Horton, RN, whose ‘Joint-Western Approaches Command’ based in Liverpool, UK, had overall responsibility & control over the protection & planning for protecting the convoys destined for British ports mostly from North America in 1939-45 & for consequently defeating both the main ‘U-Boat’ menace & also to a lesser extent, the ‘Surface Raider’ threats, posed to both Atlantic convoys & by additional implication the Arctic & Mediterranean convoys’ protection forces too, as well! However, to underline the critical importance of Horton’s vital role (And those of his two immediate, predecessors, Admirals Martin Dunbar-Nasmith, RN & Percy Noble, RN too!), since his appointment in 1942 till 1945, throughout these years of the war they would be prove crucial to this part of the total Allied war effort, & should any adverse outcomes have then occurred or prevailed their dire consequences could then be appropriately described in the following terms, accordingly & without any exaggeration that if the major adversary, the German Kriegsmarine under either Admiral’s Erich Raeder or Karl Doenitz, especially the latter during WW2, had at anytime during the exactly six (6) years in total duration of the “Battle of the Atlantic-02/Sep/1939 till 02/Sep/1945,” won the submarine battle in the Atlantic for any prolonged & sustained length of time then Britain operationally, would have been afterwards forced to cease hostilities (Due to the impending or actual threat or impact of starvation of its populace, because of shortages of necessary food supplies, equipment & materials essential for continuing its own domestic industries’ war production, all caused by aggressive U-Boats actions, sinking any/all hapless Merchant Vessels & their cargoes then destined for UK ports, in the Atlantic beforehand!) against Nazi Germany & its Axis-partners, & as a consequence, then have been also effectively ‘knocked out’ of the Second World War, at least on a temporary basis, to which may have then also later proved to have been, an irrevocable & irredeemable, overall, strategic defeat for the Allies. Therefore, as a result of this situation from ever actually arising, particularly in 1942 or ‘43, it would also likely have led to Hitler being thus able to transfer very quickly, upto sixty (60) ‘freed-up’ divisions of fresh & fully-equipped & supplied Wehrmacht, Waffen SS & Luftwaffe units & troops from positions in Western Europe, directly to the Eastern Front which could thus have then easily induced & inflicted either a subsequent, direct, huge & catastrophic military defeat on the whole Red Army & Soviet Air Force, or else have then compelled the Soviet leadership into inevitably having to accept or sue for, a coerced & hostile peace imposed on them by Nazi Germany, & of whom would have surely thus then enacted & enforced very harsh, punitive & exacting terms upon the Soviet Union, as a total consequence, thereby!!

I'm not an anglophile but I think there is a fair case for Admiral Andrew Browne Cunningham to be considered for this title of "Best Fighting Admiral of World War II." I don't think it entered the discussion not because the learned gentlemen don't know who he is, I don't think he pales in comparison to Halsey or Spruance. I suspect it is because the Mediterranean is not quite the expanse the Pacific is, but I would suggest that not only was Cunningham a theater commander, so obviously had that responsibility but he also had tactical command over the British Mediterranean Fleet in the Battle off of Cape Matapan. He did not command the Task Force surrounding HMS ILLUSTRIOUS during the attack on the Regia Marina in Taranto, but he was generally aboard his Flagship, whether, HMS WARSPITE, or HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH throughout his command of the Mediterranean Fleet. The best comparison for his tactical command may not be Spruance or Halsey, but possibly Willis Lee or Daniel Callaghan. I think with the exception of the Battle of Midway, I think you're talking about a major Fleet or theater command. Whether its Halsey's command of the Guadalcanal Campaign or the latter Fleet commands of 3rd and 5th Fleet off of Philippines, Leyte Gulf, or Okinawa and Iwo Jima.

I have no arguments with the conclusion that each man was in the right place at the right time, however I'm confused regarding two things: 1) Did Admiral Halsey order the formation of TF 34 and if so, when? I ask because his flagship was USS New Jersey and obviously she would have been part of 34, yet she continued on with the rest of TF 38 in going after Ozawa off Cape Engano. 2)At the time of Leyte Gulf, Admiral Mitscher was still leading TF 38 with McCain under him in TG 38.1. McCain wouldn't gain command of 38 until AFTER Leyte when Mitscher was given some well deserved shore leave.

Sprudence > Ballsey

Neither could hold a candle to Fletcher.

Several comments have cited Halsey’s failure at Leyte Gulf but no one has mentioned his propensity for sailing his ships into the middle of typhoons.

Halsey was too reckless when there was no need for it. Spruance was steady. Steady wins.

Halsey ought to give eternal thanks to TAFFY3 or his legacy would be much different.

Classic that the mustang was the one to take the climb. 👏👍

There were other admirals who enjoyed a fight. Wilhelm Marschall could've been dangerous if Kriegsmarine leaders were willing to use surface ships more

I wouldn't blame Scott's tactics so much as our incompetent admirals who were absolute jackasses. Turner, Wright and Callaghan and the ship captains wern't much better

"AH"!? No; AF. This is like a bad history book club.

You deserve more followers.

Is there a part 3?

In the battle of the Eastern Solomon’s I thought the Japanese damaged the carrier Enterprise as Yorktown was sunk at Midway

This is cool, I dont know much about Rome in the middle east after queen zenobia was defeated and before the fall of the west so this is an area I certainly can learn more about, I heard of julian the apostate but only about his paganism and ultimate demise fighting Persia around 363 so I'm ignorant of the details of the campaign as a whole

Imagine being on one of the us navy ships attacking and seeing "I am aoba!" flashing, what on earth, why's he telling us this when we're blasting him, oh he must think it's friendly fire lol a few more shells should convince him otherwise

I don't think this properly condemns Halsey for Leyte Gulf. The critics say that he took the bait. I think we should recognize that his run to the north was lousy even if those carriers had been fully armed with aircraft and pilots. In other words, even if they had not been bait, it was still a very poor choice to head north. Halsey was one of the critics of Spruance's actions in the Battle of the Philippines Sea. He failed to properly learn from it. In that earlier battle, the USN lost 23 aircraft and the fleet suffered just a single hit on a battleship while destroying the IJN air fighting capabilities. They then lost over 100 aircraft chasing after those impotent floating runways. I assume that one of the benefits of having Spruance and Halsey trade places every half year commanding the fleet was so that the one on the sideline could learn from the other and to reflect on the strategic situation. Halsey failed that test. Had Halsey properly recognized what happened at the turkey shoot, he would have recognized that the best tactic for dealing with an attack from IJN carrier forces was to defend the air attacks, and ignore the flat tops. He should also have recognized that the IJN has no need for flattops to defend against the invasion of the Philippines. They have plenty of runways on land and they are much cheaper to operate than an aircraft carrier. The carriers would be useful to defend Okinawa and Iwo Jima, but not the home islands. One could argue that Kincaid should have properly defended against the center force. Halsey says that he assumed Kincaid would do this. This is a lousy excuse. Halsey did not coordinate with Kincaid (as far as I know), when he attacked the IJN center force in the Sibuyan Sea. In other words, both assumed that this was the 3rd fleet's task. But when Halsey abandoned the San Bernardino Straight, he effectively gave the responsibility to Kincaid to defend against the center force. He made no attempt to tell Kincaid that the center force was now his problem. Notice the absurdity of this. Halsey's TG 38.3 was N of the straight, TG 38.4 was S of the straight, and TG 38.2 was right at the straight. It makes no sense that Kincaid would even think of sending ships or aircraft into that area to guard against the center force. That's a recipe for collisions. It was not his territory, much less any rational admiral's thinking that it was his responsibility. The failure to hand off the responsibility for defending against this major enemy force is ridiculous. The authors of this video attributed the failure to detach TF 34 to a communication's failure, but that is not correct. Halsey formed TF34 and chose to bring it N to attack the carriers. Lee asked Halsey if TF34 should be left to guard the straight and Halsey declined. Indeed, Halsey was on the NJ (BB62), which was in TF34. Note however, that it would have been a poor choice to leave TF34 to guard the straight. It makes no sense to put any USN warships within range of the IJN guns. Aircraft were far cheaper with both money and lives to defeat surface forces. The best course of action would have been to place TF34 at the exit of the straight to get in some night shooting while the IJN was single file. Then have them back off if any exited during daylight so that the TF38 aircraft could beat the crap out of them. There was no excuse to run the 3rd fleet North. That move did not benefit the USN regardless of whether the IJN carriers were potent or not. Finally, Halsey stewed in his cabin for like an hour deciding what to do when he learned the center force was pounding the Taffy's. He should have immediately detached TF34 and sent a TG with it to trap the IJN from exiting. Instead he wasted an hour and Kurita got away. Some argue that Halsey did not want to separate his forces when he was deciding to head N. OK, good point, except Halsey DID separate his forces when he turned TF34 around and sent a TG with it. Keep in mind that Nimitz's command was that destruction of the enemy's fleet was the highest priority if an opportunity presented itself. This goofy command (not properly quoted here) was used as an excuse for Halsey to go off chasing the aircraft carriers. But how about we get some perspective? What was the center force if not a significant enemy fleet? However, I am still a huge fan of Halsey.

Just a clusterfuck at first. Ha. I'm guessing some of these ships hadn't worked together before? The fog of war and uncertainty with the new tech (radar) I reckon? Partially?

Thank you for Canadian Corps in Normandy,on the Scheldt and in Germany, have read several books on the subject.

My Dad, George Yellak was on the USS Helena, Fire Control aft 6 inch guns , was on the ship from the day it was built to the day it was sunk in Kula Gulf.

Fantastic discussion but its hard to seperate the two and there are merits both sides. Enjoyed that a lot. Question! Where can we order those mugs? That was class!

I think you hit the nail about midway. We civilians just need a bad guy and good guy with a short narrative hinging on one moment to make it memorable. Only question is "pilot fatigue" exists but how is it different that the German pilots who also could largely only get home in a box? We're the German pilots losing effectiveness? Maybe the fact that Germans got home for a week or two and weren't as isolated kept them going? I'm thinking they didn't lose that much effectiveness as pilots. I think there are a lot of cultural parallels between the militaries Germany and Japan in the 1940s. They both had an absolute need to win quick and maintain a culture of willpower and destiny vs reality in their troops. Both military cultures performed exceptionally in the beginning and both had to be utterly smashed displaying little or no willingness to negotiate.

the dialog is ok but , the screen cannot be seen clearly so, has much less effectiveness to the viewer. good subject wish it could have been shot better

The fact that Halsey never had any major disasters occur under his command can be entirely attributed to the audacious and heroic actions of the various Taffy 3 commanders during Samar. Anybody who hasn’t read about that action should familiarize themselves with what went on there. It’s something of a miracle. Halsey was aggressive and that’s a tough characteristic to overstate for a wartime leader. But remember that the Japanese were also major risk takers too during that war, and it culminated in the destruction of their fleet even when they still had numerical superiority (under Spruance, by the way!). So, I think it’s maybe a little easier to look up to Halsey, with his charisma and his big personality and his fighting spirit. And maybe a little bit harder to see the beauty and intricacy of Spruance’s command. Personally I’m more attracted to Spruance’s style. If he’d ever made the mistakes that the Japanese did, and that Halsey nearly did, it wouldn’t have been for the same reasons. He was judicious and pensive and highly intelligent. And let’s not forget, just Luke Halsey he was capable of deciding to pick up the anvil and smash away when he thought the time was right. Ultimately, I think we’re dealing in shades of grey here. Both guys were the right men for our country during that moment. They kind of reflected both sides of American spirit at the time. And both lead America to amazing victories. Are we allowed to admire them both!?

Read the action reports. This was only adm Scott's victory in that he was the otc. The credit should go to Capt Gilbert Hoover in Helena.

I think it’s important to remember Crassus was being compared to some of the greatest generals who ever lived He wasn’t the general that Pompey and Caesar were and in Surena he was coming up against a seasoned and intelligent Parthian commander fielding a veteran professional force with an airtight plan for dealing with the cumbersome roman heavy infantry

So very interesting to watch. Thank you. And i thought that the militaires, and admirals at the time was 100% pro, and their fleets in a 100% control of the admiral, but then it turns out do be a major circus :)

I truly learned a lot from this, thanks gentlemen /greetings from Sweden

Thx for uploading, Ive been looking for info on this battle for YEARS. ✌🍀❤🇺🇸👍

Excellent debate and well spoken. Btw, Admiral Halsey wasn’t a huge fan of his Intelligence Officer. True to form, he was an introvert vice extrovert like Halsey and the rest of his staff.

If the landings at Leyte Gulf had not been so very successfully defended by Adm. Clifton Sprague and Adm. Thomas Sprague (no relation) Bull Halsey would have faced a court martial. (Or at least should have.)

Thanks for the presentation! Would love to listen to your take on the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal on 13 Nov and what went wrong. I read Captain Hara’s book Japanese Destroyer Captain. Was really chaotic!

Sez here he....ah...well....uhhhhh....he wasted....ah.....his money.......uhhh....when he went to...ahhhh....cal....uhhhhh.....state.....uhhhh fullerton.

I'll add two cents. Halsey was a fool. Spruance may well be the second best admiral of all time.

Great series! Thank you for posting. My uncle Leo A Loumbas was one of the 107 lost aboard the Boise in the forward magazine room that night.