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Absolute Philosophy
United Kingdom
Приєднався 16 тра 2021
I am a graduate of Cambridge University with a PhD in Philosophy. My thesis was on the nature of truth (soon to be a book with an academic publisher), and I specialise in metaphysics, logic, and the history of analytic philosophy. I believe philosophy should be made accessible to the curious and philosophers have a duty to reenter the public debate on the questions of importance to our age. This channel is my attempt to do that!
To take the ideas I explore on this channel to the next level with in-depth videos and more academic content, please become a member. Most of the videos I produce are exclusive to members. There are also options here to get in touch with me and do philosophy together. Also, with your support I will be able to spend more time reading, thinking, writing, and shooting video content for all you good people! But I need to keep my family fed too, so your membership is GREATLY appreciated.
It's a simple equation: more members = more videos. Thanks!
To take the ideas I explore on this channel to the next level with in-depth videos and more academic content, please become a member. Most of the videos I produce are exclusive to members. There are also options here to get in touch with me and do philosophy together. Also, with your support I will be able to spend more time reading, thinking, writing, and shooting video content for all you good people! But I need to keep my family fed too, so your membership is GREATLY appreciated.
It's a simple equation: more members = more videos. Thanks!
Kastrup responds to my criticisms of Analytic Idealism (part 1)
Bernardo Kastrup and I discuss concerns I have with aspects of his metaphysics of Analytic Idealism. (For a link to a video I did on the main problems I see here: ua-cam.com/video/zdZWQe46f1U/v-deo.html) Kastrup provides important clarifications and further detail. In this part we focus discussion on the interaction of scientific evidence with philosophical views, and how modelling can provide insights into the nature of reality.
Part 2 will focus on the nature of mind at large (is it meta-conscious?) and some differences between my idealism and Kastrup's. It will also include questions the UA-cam community want me to ask him. (Look out for that!).
#bernardokastrup #idealism #metaphysics
Join this channel to get access to exclusive videos:
ua-cam.com/channels/6X4SWZQBcQf1Mi-a4t0Ddg.htmljoin
If you want, you can book philosophy sessions with me (limited spaces) via email: drnathanhawkins _AT_ gmail _dot_ com.
---------- Video Contents ----------
0:00:00 - Introduction
0:00:46 - Nutshell compared to Baloney
0:04:49 - Does Nutshell reveal your frustration?
0:09:25 - The role of empirical evidence in metaphysics
0:26:03 - How 'real' are physical theories in analytic idealism?
0:31:10 - How does entropy disprove naive realism?
0:39:13 - What does entropy tell us about mind at large?
0:51:45 - How can we make sense of mind at large?
1:06:02 - Does mathematics relate to reality?
1:23:14 - How can we talk or think about reality beyond the dashboard?
1:32:50 - Analytic idealism outlined
1:36:03 - Analytic idealism and behaviourism
1:47:13 - Bodies and corpses
1:56:14 - How does meta-consciousness arise from phenomenal consciousness?
2:06:01 - Does mind at large perceive?
2:12:46 - Mental excitations and appearances
2:30:24 - Things to come in part 2
_____Channel description_____
I am a graduate of Cambridge University with a PhD in Philosophy, and I am also an affiliated researcher there alongside doing some lecturing and tuition. My thesis was on the nature of truth, and I specialise in metaphysics, logic, and the history of analytic philosophy. I believe philosophy should be made accessible to the curious and philosophers have a duty to reenter the public debate on the questions of importance to our age. This channel is my attempt to do that!
On a personal level, I am a lucky husband, and proud father of two young boys that keep me very much grounded!
Part 2 will focus on the nature of mind at large (is it meta-conscious?) and some differences between my idealism and Kastrup's. It will also include questions the UA-cam community want me to ask him. (Look out for that!).
#bernardokastrup #idealism #metaphysics
Join this channel to get access to exclusive videos:
ua-cam.com/channels/6X4SWZQBcQf1Mi-a4t0Ddg.htmljoin
If you want, you can book philosophy sessions with me (limited spaces) via email: drnathanhawkins _AT_ gmail _dot_ com.
---------- Video Contents ----------
0:00:00 - Introduction
0:00:46 - Nutshell compared to Baloney
0:04:49 - Does Nutshell reveal your frustration?
0:09:25 - The role of empirical evidence in metaphysics
0:26:03 - How 'real' are physical theories in analytic idealism?
0:31:10 - How does entropy disprove naive realism?
0:39:13 - What does entropy tell us about mind at large?
0:51:45 - How can we make sense of mind at large?
1:06:02 - Does mathematics relate to reality?
1:23:14 - How can we talk or think about reality beyond the dashboard?
1:32:50 - Analytic idealism outlined
1:36:03 - Analytic idealism and behaviourism
1:47:13 - Bodies and corpses
1:56:14 - How does meta-consciousness arise from phenomenal consciousness?
2:06:01 - Does mind at large perceive?
2:12:46 - Mental excitations and appearances
2:30:24 - Things to come in part 2
_____Channel description_____
I am a graduate of Cambridge University with a PhD in Philosophy, and I am also an affiliated researcher there alongside doing some lecturing and tuition. My thesis was on the nature of truth, and I specialise in metaphysics, logic, and the history of analytic philosophy. I believe philosophy should be made accessible to the curious and philosophers have a duty to reenter the public debate on the questions of importance to our age. This channel is my attempt to do that!
On a personal level, I am a lucky husband, and proud father of two young boys that keep me very much grounded!
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Відео
Do Near Death Experiences evidence the Afterlife? - Dr Max Baker-Hytch
Переглядів 5 тис.Місяць тому
In this episode I speak to Dr Max Baker-Hytch, who is a tuition fellow in philosophy at Oxford University. Our discussion centres around his recent paper on the evidence near death experiences (aka NDEs) provide for an afterlife available here: www.academia.edu/123701615/Glimpses_into_the_Great_Beyond_On_the_Evidential_Value_of_Near_Death_Experiences In this episode we discuss near death experi...
Perception leads to Idealism - Prof Howard Robinson
Переглядів 4,2 тис.2 місяці тому
In this episode I speak to Professor Howard Robinson, who is a research fellow in philosophy at Oxford University. Our discussion centres around his recent book 'Perception and Idealism' which can be found here: global.oup.com/academic/product/perception-and-idealism-9780192845566 In this episode we discuss theories of perception, why matter should be rejected in favour of idealism, and why thi...
Why philosophy is our future - Prof James Tartaglia
Переглядів 1,8 тис.4 місяці тому
In this episode I speak to James Tartaglia, who is professor of metaphysical philosophy at Keele University, and the author of several books aimed at general audiences. His books include Philosophy in a Meaningless Life, Gods and Titans, and his most recent book, which is what we will centre our discussion around called Inner Space Philosophy. These are all available on Amazon here: www.amazon....
The Logical Argument for Fate
Переглядів 2,9 тис.4 місяці тому
Do the laws of classical logic lead to fate and the rejection of free will? This is the question I explore in this video, by presenting an ancient argument for fate by Aristotle that has puzzled philosophers ever since. I then explain my own reply to the argument. #fate #freewill #logic Video Contents 0:00 - Philosophical fatalism 0:34 - The argument for fate 1:23 - A correspondence notion of t...
You HAVE Free Will (Alex O'Connor Critiqued)
Переглядів 55 тис.5 місяців тому
Here I argue we have free will by presenting my own, event-causal libertarian theory of free will, and by critiquing the argument used by Alex O'Connor and others to say we don't have it. To make my case I must discuss related topics like causation, natural laws, determinism and how to analyse 'could have done otherwise' claims. #freewill #alexoconnor #cosmicskeptic For more ways to connect wit...
20 BRUTAL INSULTS by philosophers
Переглядів 3 тис.6 місяців тому
Philosophers are known to dish out cutting insults to each other. Here is a collection of twenty of the most brutal, along with some inteeresting background to them. For booking philosophy sessions with me please email: drnathanhawkins _AT_ gmail _dot_ com (calendar system coming). To become a member please hit 'join' (much appreciated). #philosophy #insult Video Contents 00:00 - Introduction 0...
The Case for Idealism: Truth, Facts, and Existence
Переглядів 10 тис.8 місяців тому
By considering the nature of truth, I argue for idealism via the claim that facts are in the mind, and that all that exists, exists in thought. For booking philosophy sessions with me please email: drnathanhawkins _AT_ gmail _dot_ com (calendar system coming). To become a member please hit 'join' (much appreciated). Video on Frege's sense and reference distinction: ua-cam.com/video/Moo18_vbYIA/...
Bernardo Kastrup's Analytic Idealism CRITIQUED
Переглядів 28 тис.10 місяців тому
This video explains the two mistakes I believe Bernado Kastrup makes when defending his version of idealism: Analytic Idealism. Link to video about indirect realism: ua-cam.com/video/ZF1sBHxa2Qc/v-deo.htmlsi=US2k9mNblOl_LFs7 #Kastrup #idealism #critique Video Contents 00:00 - Introduction 00:38 - Disclaimer 01:08 - Issue 1: Kastrup's method of argument 01:49 - The entropy argument 10:06 - The e...
FREGE: Interview with Prof. Michael Potter (2/3)
Переглядів 3,1 тис.Рік тому
Over three sessions I interview Michael Potter, Cambridge Professor and Frege expert, all about Frege. In this second session we cover his second book "Foundations of Arithmetic" [German: _die grundlagen der arithmetik_ ]. This book discusses logic and arithmetic in a philosophical rather than technical way. it is one of the most accessible and influential works on the philosophy of mathematics...
FREGE: Interview with Prof. Michael Potter (1/3)
Переглядів 4,7 тис.Рік тому
Over three sessions I interview Michael Potter, Cambridge Professor and Frege expert, all about Frege. In this first session we cover a brief biography, some background on Frege's overall project, such as his anti-psychologism, and then go in-depth on his first published book, _Begriffsschrift_ (or Conceptual Notation), and some of the key ideas in that work, such as scope and quantification an...
F.H. BRADLEY: Interview with Prof. Jean-Paul Rosaye
Переглядів 2,2 тис.Рік тому
I interview Jean-Paul Rosaye, professor of of British studies and the history of ideas at Universite d’Artois. Rosaye is an expert on British Idealism and has translated Bradley's Appearance and Reality into French (link to his translation below). NOTE: This is an edited version of our discussion. A full version (over 2 hours long) is available to members. In our discussion, Rosaye focuses on t...
FRANK RAMSEY: Interview with Prof. Michael Potter
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I interview Michael Potter, Cambridge Professor and early analytic philosophy expert, about Frank Ramsey's famous paper: Universals. In this paper Ramsey argues there is no logical distinction between objects and universals (or properties), and that this means there is no metaphysical distinction between them either. We discuss the paper's background: logical atomism, Wittgenstein's Tractarian ...
The world isn't real because of this...
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Since the ancient Greeks began considering illusions there has been a desire to establish what reality is like and how we can know. These days it is implicitly assumed physics provides us with clear and direct knowledge about the nature of reality. Philosophically, this idea often relies on the concept called the primary/secondary quality distinction put forward by the philosopher John Locke in...
Russell's Ramified Theory of Types | Frank Ramsey lecture 1 of 4
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Russell's paradox shook the logicist project to its core. But Russell attempts to solve it, and all paradoxes, by isolating what united these paradoxes and formulating a theory that will make them meaningless. This theory is his ramified theory of types, and it was in response to this attempted solution that Frank Ramsey wrote one of his most significant papers. This is the first part of a four...
R.G. COLLINGWOOD: Interview with Dr. Maarten Steenhagen
Переглядів 3,1 тис.2 роки тому
R.G. COLLINGWOOD: Interview with Dr. Maarten Steenhagen
David Hume: On Miracles (Explained and Critiqued)
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David Hume: On Miracles (Explained and Critiqued)
WITTGENSTEIN on LANGUAGE GAMES (interview clip)
Переглядів 4,9 тис.2 роки тому
WITTGENSTEIN on LANGUAGE GAMES (interview clip)
WITTGENSTEIN on RELIGION (interview clip)
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WITTGENSTEIN on RELIGION (interview clip)
WITTGENSTEIN: Interview with Prof. Michael Potter
Переглядів 28 тис.2 роки тому
WITTGENSTEIN: Interview with Prof. Michael Potter
Is Metaphysics Pointless? Discussion | F.H. Bradley's "Appearance and Reality" Introduction
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Is Metaphysics Pointless? Discussion | F.H. Bradley's "Appearance and Reality" Introduction
Introduction. Appearance and Reality by F.H. Bradley (READ)
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Introduction. Appearance and Reality by F.H. Bradley (READ)
Bertrand Russell: On Denoting Explained
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Bertrand Russell: On Denoting Explained
Gottlob Frege: Sense and Reference Explained
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Gottlob Frege: Sense and Reference Explained
Idealism vs Materialism vs Dualism (and others)
Переглядів 21 тис.2 роки тому
Idealism vs Materialism vs Dualism (and others)
The chess example is not really a good one. You see, choosing a figure to move is, by definition, not free will at all. First, you have a set of chess rules and patterns you follow. Second, you have the whole set of your body conditions, which will make you act more or less risky. Third, you have an opponent who might be able to trick you into making certain moves. There is not much freedom left here, and even if you sit completely isolated, your brain will validate your move by modeling the opponent's future steps. Again, this is based on patterns you know and your concentration level, which will vary depending on factors like when and how you last ate. A much harder argument is art. Painting or playing music, for instance, requires your consciousness to act in the moment, expressing your feelings or will. This argument would be far more difficult to disassemble, as, even though art might have boundaries like technique or style-these are just forms. The content within the form, in fact, might align with both definitions of free will.
17 seconds in and you're already misleading your audience with the survey that shows 11 percent of philosophers don't believe in free will. The same survey shows 59 % claiming compatibilism, which is a redefinition of free will that doesn't deny hard determinism or free will impossibilism. The 18% percent that hold libertarianism to be true are almost all Christian philosophers of religion.
Almost but not molecules, the things our senses cannot perceive as our eyes do not perceive most of light (not perfect example but hopefully understood) we re present a map for our brains not the territory
Loved this ❤. The illustration of game play is insightful. If the desire is to win and only one solution is known then there will be no free will involved. But if a solution is not known there will be plenty of free will choices being made!!!
Making predictions is something every sentinel creature does every waking moment but it has nothing to do with truth claims. There might be just one future but that does not mean it’s predetermined in a fatalistic way, but of course everything is determined by something! The inability to predict the future accurately is what enable free will to exist. If a being was to know the future it would have no free will.
Excellent discussion Thanks❤ It seems the human dashboard is effectively a VR in which all our human qualia must exist. Do other species have different dashboards?
Excellent. Thank you.
There is no causation. Just never ending thermodynamic entropy which marches on absolutely with time.lol
So physicists use non casual determinism? The falling egg will break. When the egg breaks it does not effect the egg in the past but it does indicate that the egg probably fell. This does not alter the state of the egg in the past as the past is imutable as far as we can tell. But we can collect evidence that would lead to a hypothesis that the egg must have fallen. This is a knowledge update, not a past-state altering event.
Physicist here. No one has abandoned causality. Determinism is still extremely fundamental and the basis of everything we do. When we do a calculation we usually timestep it, so there is a clear cause and effect. When people are talking about "gravitational astronomy" *cosmology, the whole model it built on cause and effect relationships, such as the CMB causation, or evolutionary models of the universe including dark matter... This guy is chatting absolute breeze :')
Loved Kastrup's comments around the discussion about behaviorism and then bodies and corpses around 1:30:00-1:50:50. i felt that was the turning point for me when his explanations overcame most of my reasoned doubts. What a cool moment in philosophy this is.
Crossing my fingers that Part 2 drops tomorrow
Very few public intellectuals are balanced enough to integrate negative feedback. Props to both of you
@0:33 I mean... I will probably listen, since i like your vids. But dude. Just be straight up front for a change? No logical deduction can prove anything "real". I thought philosophers knew this. You can only show your axioms (if consistent) lead to theorems. No theorem ever is about the real world. Some (perhaps infinitely many in some branches of physics, say) *_might_* be true when mapped to some real world relations (and I think so, otherwise I'd give up physics), maybe for your ideas too if the real world conforms to your axioms. Other youtube logic bros though... my God, why do people pay them any credence?
What about dr. Sam Parnia? (including his AWARE-II study and the latest book) Edit: 24:50 it's mentioned a little 49:00-53:00 on the relation of math (Probability Theory, Bayes Theorem) with philosophy and religion.
Wow, BK has really chilled out haha. I understand him usually being on the defense because his serious scholarship is often approached in bad faith like it is a new age religion. It is important to be able to actually name the issues and address them head on. This is a fantastic discussion! Really good questions and answers. Can't wait for part 2!
B Ketchup is one of the most arrogant dudes ever. Dude just talks with undying conviction so people believe him.
Absolute Philosophy, kudos for the effort, but let’s break this down because your case for free will is holding about as much water as a colander. 1. The Chess and Wants Example: You claim deliberation during chess proves freedom of action because the player considers moves based on reasoning. But here’s the twist: that reasoning stems from desires (to win) and beliefs (which move is better)-neither of which you freely chose or create. Those inputs come from prior conditioning, experiences, and innate tendencies. Your 'freedom' is really just the predictable unfolding of these factors. You don't even create the smalles urge that arises. 2. Deliberation Proves Free Will: You emphasize deliberation as proof of choice, but deliberation is just a process of weighing inputs-inputs you didn’t author. You’re not choosing your reasons; you’re reacting to them. Deliberation isn’t freedom; it’s just a more complex form of causation playing out. 3. Uncaused Decisions as Free Will: Saying decisions are 'uncaused causes' doesn’t solve the problem-it’s metaphysical hand-waving. If a decision is uncaused, it’s random and not under control. If it’s caused, it’s determined by prior events. Either way, free will is nowhere to be found. Calling decisions 'uncaused causes' is like calling a rabbit out of a hat an explanation-it’s not. 4. Physics Doesn’t Help Your Case: Your reliance on Russell’s critique of causation misses the mark. Determinism doesn’t have to be classical billiard-ball causality. The determinism relevant here is simply that all actions arise from prior conditions. Quantum randomness doesn’t help you-it replaces determined outcomes with probabilistic ones, and randomness isn’t freedom. 5. 'You Could Have Done Otherwise': The claim that you can act on different reasons doesn’t hold water. The reasons you choose are dictated by your desires, beliefs, urges and past experiences-none of which you control or create. Sure, you *feel* like you could have done otherwise, but that’s just the illusion of choice created by how the brain processes decision-making. 6. The Final Blow: There Is No 'You': Here’s the kicker: not only is free will an illusion, but so is the 'self' that claims to have it. The 'I' that you believe is deliberating, choosing, and acting is just a thought-a fleeting, constructed sense of identity arising in consciousness. Desires, thoughts, and actions happen, but there’s no independent entity orchestrating them. Free will requires an 'I' to own and direct the will, but no such 'I' exists. So, while your philosophical gymnastics are entertaining, your arguments don’t stick the landing. The truth is simpler and more liberating: there’s no self to imprison, no free will to defend, and no need to grasp at illusions. Life unfolds-spontaneous, causeless, free in its own way. Maybe give that a think. 😉
Thanks for the lengthy comment. Against my better judgement, and ignoring your condescending tone, here is how I would respond to your points: 1. No proof is being offered in my example here. Only a straightforward undermining of the supposed proof of us not having free will from a psychological perspective since it is not only 'wants' that feature. The second half of your point is bald assertion, and one which I stress cannot and does not provide a 'contrastive explanation' of what is done (see video). 2. I'm not sure if you understood the theory I explained but, of course, willing is weighing reasons (if you like), or choosing reasons. You don't author the reasons, but you weigh/choose them, which is not determined by those reasons. 3. Saying a decision is an uncaused cause is exactly what has been stipulated to be required for free will to be possible, it is no 'trick' or hand waving, it is the nature of what is experienced in deliberation. The caused/random dichotomy is unanswerably false when applied broadly to all facts. Is the fact that 2+2=4 caused or random? Is the fact that objects obey laws caused or random (think about it, it can't be either, as philosophers like Pelczar have pointed out)? Is the fact that nothing is both round and square caused or random? Basically, the dichotomy doesn't hold within the rational sphere, only (possibly) within the empirical. And decisions occur within the rational sphere. 4. You misunderstand me (and Russell). The issue does not concern any particular kind of causation, but only the idea that causation indicates a temporal priority of cause over effect. Physics is mathematical, where there is no _causal_ determinism, just _mathematical_ determinism. So it is not required by physics that effects 'arise from' prior causes, only that they are mathematically related to them, and this does not undermine choice. 5. What you write is pure assertion. And, by the way, without the legitimacy of the claim that things 'could have been otherwise' the distinction between events that are 'caused' and events that are 'random' disappears. To be a random event it must be the case that things 'could have been otherwise'. And, as I tirelessly explain in the video, you need 'could have done otherwise' to have _determining_ laws in the first place (as opposed to mere descriptive ones). 6. Again, your claim is pure assertion. And I purposely avoided appealing to an 'I' in any case. That's why I distanced my view from Shapiro's.
@@AbsolutePhilosophy Absolute Philosophy, thanks for engaging with my points. Before diving into the specifics of your arguments, let me acknowledge something upfront: There are individuals like Tony Parsons, Karl Renz, Richard Sylvester, Jim Newman, Kenneth Madden and other speakers in the nonduality space who describe a radical shift-the falling away of the "I" structure. From their perspective, free will is seen as an illusion because the "I" itself is revealed to be an illusion. However, I understand that this might feel like an abstract, irrelevant claim to you. Without direct connection to or resonance with this experience, it’s natural to hold tightly to the framework of the "I" and, consequently, to the notion of free will. For now, I’ll set aside that perspective and engage with your arguments from a purely logical and philosophical standpoint, working strictly within the framework you’ve presented. Let’s take a closer look at your points: 1. 'Not Just Wants': You argue that I misunderstood your point about reasons being distinct from wants. But let’s examine this carefully: A reason like "I should move the knight" doesn’t exist in isolation-it arises from the desire to win, the belief in strategic thinking, and a host of other mental constructs. These constructs, in turn, are shaped by factors like experience, conditioning, and even innate tendencies. If a reason is simply a refined, abstracted form of a want (and it is), then your distinction collapses. The reasons you "weigh" are inseparable from the wants driving them, and none of these are authored by you. Your attempt to distinguish reasons from wants doesn’t save free will-it just rephrases the problem. 2. 'Weighing Reasons': You assert that we don’t author reasons, but we weigh or choose them, and that this weighing isn’t determined by the reasons themselves. Here’s where this falls apart: What does the weighing? If the "chooser" isn’t an authored entity, then weighing is just another automatic process arising from prior conditions. Reasons are "weighed" according to their salience, desirability, or relevance-factors that are entirely outside your control. For instance, the reason "going to the gym is good for my health" outweighs "staying on the couch" because of prior conditioning, not because of an independent weighing process. If the process of weighing reasons isn’t truly independent, your notion of "choosing reasons" is just window dressing for causally determined outcomes. 3. 'Uncaused Cause': You defend the idea of uncaused causes as a requirement for free will, pointing to philosophical examples like 2+2=4 or the laws of physics. But this comparison is fundamentally flawed: Mathematical and logical truths aren’t analogous to decisions. They’re tautological-they exist as definitional truths, not as events occurring in the world. A decision, by contrast, is an event. Events must be either caused (arising from prior conditions) or uncaused (random). There’s no logical escape from this dichotomy. If a decision is an uncaused cause, then it’s random by definition-meaning it’s not under your control. If it’s caused, it’s determined. Neither scenario supports free will. Invoking the rational sphere doesn’t solve this-it’s just a rebranding of randomness. 4. 'Physics and Causation': You suggest that causation in physics isn’t about temporal priority, but mathematical determinism. Fine, let’s grant that for a moment: Mathematical determinism doesn’t grant agency-it simply replaces cause-and-effect with a relational framework. Whether an event is temporally or mathematically determined, the outcome is still dictated by the system’s parameters. Choice, in this framework, is just another output of the system-not an independent action. Reframing causation in mathematical terms doesn’t sidestep the problem; it just gives determinism a new wardrobe. 5. 'Could Have Done Otherwise': You claim that without the notion of "could have done otherwise," the distinction between causation and randomness collapses. But this misses the point entirely: Randomness doesn’t require alternative possibilities-it only requires a lack of identifiable causation. Your argument assumes that causation and randomness depend on "could have done otherwise," but they don’t. The idea of alternative possibilities is an illusion created by the brain’s sense of agency. In reality, there’s only one outcome-determined or random-and the feeling of "I could have done otherwise" is just a post hoc rationalization. The concept of "could have done otherwise" adds nothing to your defense of free will. 6. 'No 'I,' No Problem': You claim to avoid the "I" entirely, but your arguments rest on an implicit agent capable of weighing reasons and making uncaused decisions. Without a chooser, your entire framework collapses: Decisions arise spontaneously, shaped by prior conditions and the moment’s context. There’s no entity behind the scenes orchestrating this process. Even if you reject the "I," your arguments sneak it back in under the guise of a decision-maker. But without a self to anchor free will, the entire concept dissolves. Final Thoughts: Your defense of free will hinges on redefining concepts to avoid their natural implications-reason becomes separate from wants, uncaused causes escape randomness, and mathematical determinism somehow grants agency. None of these moves hold up under scrutiny. Ultimately, free will is an illusion created by the mind’s identification with the "I." While I recognize that this perspective may not resonate with you, I hope this response highlights the logical weaknesses in your argument. Life unfolds as it does, not because of free will, but because that’s its nature-spontaneous, seamless, and causeless. Mic dropped. 😉
This was great. At first I was annoyed because the host said he had at least read Nutshell but then talked as if Bernardo claimed emprical research was enough. But, as the conversation rolled on, it became a delight to hear Bernardo asked specific questions and ready to elaborate from multiple points of view. I really hope that their next conversation does start as Bernardo requested, with the host making his argument for God would be meta-conscious. Bernardo is very fun to watch when he goes into question mode. Hopefully, they've recorded it and it's dropping tomorrow :)
Event causal decisions? How is that also not an uncaused cause? That would mean worms, bacteria and robots have free will.
If you look back in your own history you never "did otherwise" and therefore never could have "done otherwise". It is fully possible to imagine what "doing otherwise" would have been like. It is a part of the human minds capacity. The reason you in fact did not "do otherwise" is because of the initial state of the universe at that time made you do what you actually did instead. The human brain is part of cause and effect aka casual determinism. When you take the decision to chose x or y you feel like the choice is free but once you decide it is because of the current state of the universe in that moment.
It's weird. First he denies causation then affirms it. He also didn't support being able to do otherwise sufficiently. Suppose the universe were to be rewound to a minute ago a billion times, I'd write the same comment every time. If I did actually write something else, it would just be random. If atoms control our brains (as it seems), no free will.
I truly hope that most viewers share my impression that this stance and its discussion is outright bullshit in a philosophical sense (H. G. Frankfurt). Bad metaphysics. Bad epistemology. Bad definition of consciousness. - How could I ever loose my consciousness, which I do e.g. during narcosis or epileptic seizures, if it were independent from my brain? You assume that substantial consciousness might be temporarily unconscious which for me is an evident contradictio in se adiecto. Like it or not, daily clinical experience strongly supports physicalism. - Any relevant (clinically, ethically, etc.) state of consciousness is someone's experience - "there is something it is like to x" is an incomplete definition of consciousness; actually "it is somehow for someone to x" is the complete definition. Don't get confused by pseudoscientific ego-less buddhistic lay monks who got lost in speculation.
What is Kastrup point? He believes the 2nd Law and the concept of entropy, but denies that we can ingest low entropy, exemplified by the apple, which ultimately comes from the sun.
Great interview, really insightful questions
Thank for debunking Kastrups nonsense- can you do the same for idealism please ?
This is great. Polite, well articulated and respectful points, despite some disagreement. This is how it should be done, rather than silly mediated debates that achieve nothing.
It seemed an embarrassed bluff to defend his sci-fi speculation. I like the dashboard idea to describe the incredible extent to which our brain transduces/interprets/creates a "reality" out of the quantum soup, but I think he's making a cult out of it. Interesting that last question, hashed out and hashed out then seemingly resolved as definitional to his model, whether correct or not. It was great the way Kastrup approached that. Hmmm.
Kastrup's recent interview on [his] Daemonic possession OMG ua-cam.com/video/DsP0C6tdQIA/v-deo.html 😱
After watching the whole interview, I gather that Bernardo is REALLY enthusiastic about identifying as a monkey. For some reason, he finds it appropriate to push his simian identity onto the rest of us, who are humans. The faux outrage over sexism because a man referred to a third person example as a male, really is just so tiresome.
I agree the monkey theme is in tension with being (at the same time) a dissociated alter of mind at large (which is apparently less evolved than us). Seems we are the pinnacle of mind in the universe so not 'just a bipedal ape' at all. I have this on my list of concerns for our next chat.
We are apes. This is a well establish fact in biology. Also, the so-called "outrage" about sexism is quite hyperbolic. Affirming that it could have been stated better doesn't make one "outraged".
@@AbsolutePhilosophy Right. Aside from the internal inconsistency, it strikes me as an attempt to undermine our sense that we are spiritual beings. Even if that isn't the intention, that is the effect of repeating that point in particular, and the most important part of being a public speaker is to be sensitive to the effect ones words have on the audience. It reminded me of a discussion between Keith Ward and Daniel Dennett. Keith said something about his soul, Daniel interrupted and said something to the effect of: "What are you talking about? What is this soul of yours?" And Keith responded (paraphrasing): "You're just a brain Daniel, but I have a soul."
@@donaldanderson6578 I don't believe in evolution. "Faux outrage" is a linguistic unit that's used for the whole spectrum of phony protest. What else could be said, faux botheredness? Doesn't exactly roll off the tongue
"Consciousness is the canvas on which the material universe is painted" Schrodinger.
You are wrong, bernardo kastrup idealism holds up 100%
I wish more people online would confirm whether or not their view on idealism is of the epistemological nature or the ontological nature that would make things so clear: thanks for doing this in your video. I personally am an ontological materialist out of intuition, but an epistemological idealist out of skepticism and arguably logic: interesting how that works isn't it 🤣
I wouldn't say that according to Wittgenstein all there is are facts. Facts are all that we can describe using meaningful language, things we can philosophise about. See the theses 6.4 and onwards, especially 6.522. The things you talk about post 49:30, our duties for example, are what's mystical according to Tractatus. They cannot be put to words, nevertheless they can be shown. There is a great work of a Polish philosopher named Bogusław Wolniewicz that explores Wittgenstein's Tractatus in much depth, but well... it's mainly in Polish so I guess you are going to miss out on it.
I don't disagree. The show-tell distinction is in play for sure. He also describes the self as the limit of the world. So the self is not in the world either. But my video asks whether the world is in the mind, and Wittgenstein says the world is the totality of facts. Like him, I think there is more than this. There is more than facts.
1:16:00 again on mathematics
If physical reality and our minds are aspects of a 'mind at large' - then the insights of 'mind' about physical reality are the insights of 'mind-at-large'. Therefore, things like mathematics, patterns, and geometry are in fact true representations (albeit 'isomorphic') of mind-at-large
The fact that only 20% report NDE does not mean that the rest do not have. How many of us remember our dreams?
Great interview! I was hoping you'd press Kastrup a little more on the "How does meta-consciousness arise from phenomenal consciousness?" question, but hopefully you will do that next time. In particular, I think there are other hard problems of consciousness--the problems of intentionality and reason, at the very least, and maybe more--which, if these features of mind are also irreducible, force us by the same logic to accept these features of mind as being fundamental to reality alongside phenomenal consciousness. To appeal to "re-representation" you'd first need representation, which requires intentionality or "aboutness". And just like how I think it's impossible to get phenomenal consciousness from non-phenomenality, I think it's impossible to get intentionality from non-intentional building blocks, or rationality from non-rational building blocks. Insofar as pure phenomenality is non-intentional and non-rational, we don't get intentionality and reason for free by appealing to evolution, any more than physicalists can appeal to evolution to explain phenomenal consciousness. In other words, there's a constitutive problem, not just a "historical" one. If the underlying thing being appealed--matter, in the case of physicalism--cannot, even in principle, give rise to what we are trying to explain--phenomenal consciousness--evolution won't help us. But likewise, if pure phenomenality cannot in principle give rise to *real* intentionality or rationality, I don't think we can just say "evolution" and solve the problem. He'd first have show how phenomenality can constitute or ground intentionality/reason in the here and now, before being able to appeal to evolutionary processes. And I don't think that's possible. He could reject intentionality as an illusion and say that there's nothing more to intentional states than their phenomenality, but that brings with it a whole new set of problems (not least of all, that there is no genuine re-representation happening in meta-consciousness).
Agreed. Will press this next time.
There is no unique Markov blanket - Friston is just bullshitting and obfuscating. His mathematical drivel is not even well-defined or self-consistent. Paper after pathetic paper. [1] Citations: [1] The Emperor's New Clothes
Another masterclass from bernardo 💯👌
Thank you for asking questions to Bernado which I've not seen him answer before! I love that you put in so much effort into learning his ideas, and I love how Bernado seemingly loves being asked questions that he hasn't encountered before. Great interview, can't wait for the next.
Thanks!
Wonderful and interesting conversation. I so much look forward to next part and would love to hear you challenge Bernardo on his view of Mind at Large in relation to his discussions with his friend Rupert Spira who insists that Consciousness is meta conscious and is in essense unconditional love. Bernardo agreed with Rupert in one of their last conversations on YT but it really still doesn’t sound like what Bernardo is telling us here. Thank you for making and sharing this 🙏
That's the plan! I think this, along with what I take to be a pure leap of epistemic faith beyond the dashboard, are the weakest points, philosophically, of his view. I pressed the first in this part, the next part will press the quality of consciousness present in mind at large. I think this part laid some good groundwork to really push it home and Kastrup has said I can begin the next part by presenting my arguments... so I'm working on formulating them.
@@AbsolutePhilosophy Thank you for your reply. I don't have an academic back ground and English is not my native language, so sometimes it was a bit difficult to follow your discussion, but I've also struggled somewhat regarding his dashboard metaphor. It's hard for me to put my finger on it but there is something unintuitive about it with the mix of a physical setting (airplane with no windows) to explain all being mental. On a side note I've often longed for Bernardo to offer alternative metaphors for this very theme. For a man that says "in other words" a lot it's a little "amusing" that he does this in that context :-) But I get that it's probably not that easy to come up with another well thought through metaphor for the same thing. It just puzzels me that no other interviewers have pressed him on this issue. Either way I think Bernardo has the most plausible TOE as it stands today. There is just something extremely appealing in it's elegant an non-convoluted parsimoni. I am really looking forward to your next conversation. If I had a chance to sit down and discuss the matter of Consciousness and science, I would certainly suggest that him and all his peers sat down in a filmed "world forum"/symposium over several days and hashed it out so to speak also with curious sceptics from the realm of materialists - all for the acceleration and benefit for mankind. You know as addition to the many discussions in "silos" like on yours and many other channel but in a larger forum of present and most relevant thinkers of our time. If I were a rich person I would set that up and invite a lot of interesting and relevant people :-)
@@skemsen an alternative metaphor to the dashboard is for example the desktop, graphical userinterface of windows, which displays maps or files/documents as icons on your screen, which is convenient for our understanding. but the reality behind it is, that there are no maps and no documents represented there, just 1s and 0s in the memory of your computer...
Actually, what Bernardo and Rupert discovered in that conversation is that they were using the term "meta" and "self-conscious" differently and that Rupert does not believe that fundamental reality is meta-conscious. When he says that it is self-conscious he means that it is, of course, the consciousens of The Self. So they ended up realizing that they both agree that fundamental reality is not meta-conscious. It was fascinating to listen to them get to that moment.
@@AbsolutePhilosophy Actually, what Bernardo and Rupert discovered in that conversation is that they were using the term "meta" and "self-conscious" differently and that Rupert does not believe that fundamental reality is meta-conscious. When he says that it is self-conscious he means that it is, of course, the consciousens of The Self. So they ended up realizing that they both agree that fundamental reality is not meta-conscious. It was fascinating to listen to them get to that moment.
@50: BK is hanging way too much there on "quantum fields". Does he even realize they are fictional accounting tools? (He should, since he denies scientific concepts reality before, no?) QFT is a lovely theory, but it is not fundamental. Hilbert space is also a fiction, another "accounting tool" (Has massive irremovable gauge redundancy, so cannot be physical). The spinor fields are mathematical objects, not physical objects, we use them in QM and QFT to transform (rotate, boost and dilate mostly) the frame defining the observables to the co-moving frame of an elementary particle. The elementary particles are what are real, and they're not fields. We describe them using fields. The only real field needed in physics (to date) is 4D spacetime. If you want, also fibre bundles attached, but we don't even need fibre bundles, since 4D nontrivial topology is sufficient to account for the fibers in at least the Standard Model, and account for non-local effects as needed in entangled systems. If there really is supersymmetry, or strings, than yeah, we'd need more than 4D Riemannian spacetime.
It is ironic that Kastrup identifies theoretical entities as convenient fictions when his “mind at large” concept, too, is a theoretical entity, cannot be given in a possible experience, and eo ipso is a convenient fiction. Kastrup’s position is more than naive, it is inconsistent.
Yes, he realizes they are temporary fictions, but useful ones for now, good analogies.
@@rooruffneck As I wrote in my critique of analytic idealism: “Nor can Kastrup insist on the mere regulative validity of the mind at large-a regulative principle is in no position to dissociate into alters-such that Kastrupian analytic idealism is dogmatic or nothing at all”.
@34:00 our _physical body_ has an upper bound on information processing capacity. Not our soul, at least not if you understand the human soul is non-physical. The _physical expression_ of the soul's Mind is what is limited, not necessarily the Mind itself. There is no theory of the limits of the mind (imagination, insight, creativity) that anyone knows of, since there is no information theoretic theory of subjective mind. Friston's is not a theory of mind, his is a theory of brain, or brain+, which is only the _physical_ expressive power of the mind. The brain has already extraordinary capacity to express our Mind's thoughts, our souls are not spiritually aware enough yet to really saturate our brain capacity, plus we have hard drives these days. Pretty useful when the brain gets too hot.
I agree that "wants" is too simple of a term, because we don't identify with our wants. But really our values, ambitions, personality, etc are just different types of these "wants" that Alex speaks of. But we identify with those things, it seems that we are made of our values, ambitions and personality. So even if these things determine our decisions, that is still us making the decision. Even if I live in a deterministic universe where I could not have done otherwise, I still think that I have free will because I (my wants, or in other words my values, personality and ambitions) am doing the determining.
The Idealist difficulty: how does mind/experience/consciousness (maybe something like the dreamer and dreamworlds) produce the hard stuff of reality? The Physicalist: how does stuff produce mind/experience/consciousness (here they posit emergence or epiphenomenon)? Whatever the universe is, it is first a first-person experience: and that experience is what constitites reality...we only find later fields, particles, electrochemical neural firings, etc. So obviously physicalism pervades our everyday life but if we meditate or take certain drugs (i.e. Huxley's account in "The Portals of Perception"), we become idealists as we experience reality as just fluctuations of our own perspective. Hence, it seems that experientalism (the variety and range of our experiences) or perspectivism (reality is always 1st-person...always from the point if view of w. what's it like to be something...and we are looking at reality from the human, which is sensorily and cognitively limited and no guarantee reality IS or ISN'T just matter or just mind. There is a relationship between mind and matter which neither of these philisophies is able to imagine, let alone express without gaps. Great discussion and Q&A!
When I dream, I often experience the 'hard stuff of reality'. The other night, I was thrown into a brick wall and it felt like my back broke. The mind has no problem with generating intensities.
We created the airplane which does not have consciousness, so we gave it a dashboard form of sensors. In effect, a second hand artificial type of consciousness.
as a believer in free will and self-causing causes, i expect you'll believe me when i say this post caused itself.
a little unfriendly title on the yt thumnail.
He has some fascinating stuff, of course, but I get the impression he both argues deceptively when his model is potentially undercut ... and he is in his own bubble so much (where he acts as authority) that he isn't used to being challenged and gets away with bluffing complete confidence in his ideas that isn't really supported. It can't hold up to the deep dive the host is taking here.