Відео

How can "in" not be physical? If the ant were not in the room, the physical state of affairs would be different. How can you not see that?

Also it sounds weird to me to say being human is a condition for being a mammal. Or being green is a condition for being colored. Being unmarried and man are both necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being a bachelor. What do you think? Anyway love your videos!

I love your videos but oxygen is a condition in our world but it's not a necessary condition in the same sense of the math example you give. Same for being beheaded. It's not a sufficient condition. Just a very very likely causal relation. Very different relation from human bring sufficient for being mammal. Or am I missing anything? (Friendly remark)

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If you had the coordinates you could just say where the ant is. Exactly. Without needing to refer to the room Ant is at "coordinates" Since this sentence states where the ant is. Somewhere in spacetime. From that perspective is the 'in the room' state an unnecessary addition. There's no real need to make a relationship between the two particulars to describe where the ant is

dude, I just discovered your channel. I love it. Can you pull a Lazarus and resurrect your UA-cam channel from the dead. Please!!!

gracias

thanks for throwing light on this topic! i would like to add the pragmatist view here: even if objective moral values appear strange or weird, they help a great deal of people and societies all over the world! it is kinda like they run and manage the societies and create a uniformity.

Is it longer to be Empty extension when we transform the term currently living dodo bird to dodo bird.

nat atbot GPT-3 [:|]... 11:41 "thank you. " [BEEP]

Very helpful, thank u

Very clear and thorough explanation, thanks!

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I don't know why pple pass without subscribe

hi! im a student at another college and i just wanted to say thank you for your videos on ethics and philosophy. Ive been having a hard time understanding the topics and I have the mid term in a few days and this made me feel so much more comfortable for my exam. Thanks again!

Wow aha thanks ❤❤🎉🎉

Thank you so much Matt

thank you so much

this was rlly helpful thank you

Some cenatures are vindictive. Does this proposition has existenial import

Your explanation and diagram for O propositions was really good. I’ve been trying to understand that forever but now I finally get it thanks to you.

I want to perform a magic trick. For this trick, I am going to make J.L. Mackie's moral theory pass David Enoch's test of objectivity. First . . . nothing up my sleeve. Mackie argued that: (1) There is no such thing as objective, intrinsic prescriptivity. (2) Claims of intrinsic prescriptivity are built into the meanings of moral statements. (3) All moral statements are false. But . . . this is all Chapter 1. There are 9 more chapters to play with. First, Mackie does not deny the existence of objective value. He only denies the existence of objective, intrinsic prescriptivity. "We can then offer a general definition of ‘good’: such as to satisfy requirements (etc.) of the kind in question. Mackie, J.L.. Ethics (p. 57). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition. What are the requirements of the kind in question? There are objective, intrinsic requirements - but all claims that something is such as to satisfy these requrirements are false, since objective, intrinsic prescriptivity does not exist. And there is the matter of being such as to satisfy wants and desires. "Something may be called good simply in so far as it satisfies or is such as to satisfy a certain desire; but the objectivity of such relations of satisfaction does not constitute in our sense an objective value." Mackie, J.L.. Ethics (p. 25). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition. So, given that objective, intrinsic prescriptivity does not exist, a TRUE claim that something is good says that it is "such as to satisfy [the desires] in question" Let me illustrate. I have an aversion to pain. (You are going to have to take my word on that.) I can call something "bad" in virtue of its being such as to thwart my desire that I not be in pain. My aversion to pain is an objective (natural) fact. That something is such as to thwart my desire to not be in pain is an objective fact. However, the "desires in question" need not be my desires. Desires exist that are not mine, and I can determine if something is such as to satisfy those desires. So, for example, a good knife, according to Mackie, is a knife that has those qualities that serve the desires of those who use a knife of that type for its standard purpose. "What is common to all these cases is that in each there is, somewhere in the picture, some set of requirements or wants or interests, and the thing that is called good is being said to be such as to satisfy those requirements or wants or interests." Mackie, J.L.. Ethics (p. 57). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition. Remember, we have eliminated intrinsic prescriptivity, so at leaves "wants or interests" (desires) as the only thing that that a TRUE value claim can refer to. Mackie adds: "‘Requirements (etc.) of the kind in question’ is vague: deliberately so. This general definition covers different uses of the word ‘good’ . . . it leaves room for interests to be fed in in different ways in different sorts of case." Mackie, J.L.. Ethics (p. 58). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition. What about the moral case? Here, the moral case is all wants and interests (desires) regardless of whose they are. "In this third stage we are taking some account of all actual desires, tastes, preferences, ideals, and values, including ones which are radically different from and hostile to our own, and consequently taking some account of all the actual interests that anyone has, including those that arise from his having preferences and values that we do not share." Mackie, J.L.. Ethics (p. 100). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition. What are we evaluating? Well . . we are evaluating actions in virtue of the degree to which they conform to rules, the general adoption of which is such as to fulfill all actual desires (or, as many and as strong as possible). "No doubt my approach could be called, in a very broad sense, a rule utilitarian one . . . but it would be utilitarianism without its characteristic fictions." (Note, the characteristic fiction is objective, intrinsic prescriptivity. All value is of the form "is such as to satisfy the desires in question".) "and it would be not just a rule-utilitarianism but a rule-right-duty-disposition utilitarianism." Mackie, J.L.. Ethics (p. 218). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition. (An Aside: By eliminating the "characteristic fictions" of standard utilitarianism, Mackie's theory is not vulnerable to Derek Parfit's "Repugnant Conclusion" - but there is no room to discuss that here.) So, now, to apply David Enoch's three tests. The spinach test. "I am glad I do not like to molest children, because if I liked to molest children I would probably do it, and molesting children would violate a rule, the general adoption of which will tend to satisfy all desires regardless of whose they are." Not funny . . . the test is passed. The disagreement test. Two people meet. They debate whether capital punishment violates a rule, the general adoption of which will tend to satisfy all desires regardless of whose they are. There would be room for all sorts of debate about the effectiveness of deterrence, the value of closure for the victims, the possibility of rehabilitation, and the like. There might not be any room here for retributivist arguments, since retributivism seems to argue that punishing the guilty has a property of objective, intrinsic prescriptivity that does not exist. The test is passed. The counter-factual test. Would the extermination of the Jews be wrong if people came to value exterminating the Jews - if the extermination of the Jews was in fashion? Well, would exterminating the Jews violate a rule the general adoption of which would satisfy all desires regardless of whose they are. Well, since "all desires regardless of whose they are" includes the Jews . . . and since few people want to be a member of a group being exterminated . . . it would still be wrong. The test is passed. So, what do we do about this claim that all moral statements are false? Mackie has an answer for that. In the 1800s, all statements of the form, "Water is made up of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom" were false. This is because "atom" contained as a part of its meaning "having no parts". And statements of the form "Water is made up of two hydrogen things without parts and one oxygen thing without parts" were false. But, scientists just dropped "without parts" from the meaning of the term "atom" . . . and formerly false statements became true. "The fact that the word ‘atom’, as used in nineteenth-century physics, had as part of its meaning ‘indivisible particle of matter’ did not in itself, even in the nineteenth century, compel anyone to believe that there are indivisible material particles. One could either refrain from using the term ‘atom’ in affirmative statements or, as physicists have subsequently done, use the term with other parts of its meaning only, dropping the requirement of indivisibility. Mackie, J.L.. Ethics (p. 105). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition. So, we drop "intrinsic prescriptivity" from the meanings of moral terms. We stick with "is such as to conform to rules the general adoption of which will fulfill desires regardless of whose they are" we can have moral facts. Mackie is a moral anti-realist about in the same way that modern chemists are anti-realists about atoms. They are anti-realists under the old definition. But the new, reformed, definition serves the realist agenda just fine.

On the »no clear way to resolve disagreement » objection. Gensler’s response is weak. We can’t resolve whether it was raining here 10000 years ago does not prove that there is no right answer. But it does prove that we can’t base a action on which one is true. At best, it argues that moral facts are not relevant to choosing actions.

The establishment of agreement on general principles is not sufficient to defeat Mackie. One would have to show that the best explanation for the agreement is "objective, intrinsic prescriptivity". The example provided of "show people respect" would be question-begging. It is like the command to "do the right thing". That different cultures have a requirement to "do what morality requires" would not be the kind of agreement that would disprove Mackie's thesis. The very fact that different cultures have different ways of showing respect is proof enough that "showing respect" is not an objectively INTRINSIC property of any type of act. And Mackie is well aware of the fact that scientific disagreement does not disprove objectivism in science. But, in matters of science, there is massive agreement - and, more importantly, a type of agreement that can best be explained in terms of objective facts. Put a huge rock in the middle of a village in any culture at any time in history and, regardless of the cultural differences, people are going to ask who put the big rock in the middle of the village. All of the examples you mentioned are on complex theoretical matters. But there is a huge set of basic observations where people from different cultures at different times would all find agreement. Where do you find the basic observational agreement in morality? Also, while Mackie denies the existence of objective, intrinsic prescriptivity. Mackie also asserts that there is a second kind of objective value that is real. Mackie writes, "“Something may be called good simply in so far as it satisfies or is such as to satisfy a certain desire; but the objectivity of such relations of satisfaction does not constitute in our sense an objective value.” So, here is a kind of objective value that is real - it can be observed - it is a part of the fabric of the world. But it is not an INTRINSIC property, it is RELATIONAL - it relates the object of evaluation to one or more desires. You may be able to find agreement in terms of what relates objects of evaluation to one or more desires. Nearly every community requires obedience to rules, the breaking of which tends to thwart the desires of those in the community. This type of agreement does not require the existence of objective, intrinsic prescriptivity. It can be handled by appealing to the existence of goodness relating objects of evaluation to desires. On the argument from strangeness . . . note that none of your examples of strange properties are PRESCRIPTIVE. These are purely descriptive strangeness. Try to make sense of an intrinsic PRESCRIPTIVE property. There are good reasons to believe that no intrinsically prescriptive property exists - that motivation to act comes from desires, and desires alone.

The best

Can you make review on this based on relativa

THANKS KEEP IT UP

Great 😊

Thanks for this. Really helpful. ❤️

Thank you very much

I'm curious, can you tell me is this argument valid or invalid? No P are S, therefore, some S are P. Where the first Venn graph is shaded in the intersection, and the second Venn graph has an asterisk in the intersection. I think the answer is "valid" but I am not sure. Thank you.

Thank you so much professor for keeping it simple. Now I don't feel so stupid anymore. lol

I really appreciate these videos. You made is less intimidating! Clear to understand the material. Thank you so much for your contribution!

Thank you man, you made this simple and helped me learn.

So basically here’s the thing about Logic…when people apply Aristotelian Logical rules to Logic they do so consistently across the board. But when people “Claim to” apply Boolean Logical rules to Logic they inconsistently do so. Why does Boole tell us that universal and particular statements exclude each other, YET people who claim to apply Boolean Logic still follow the Aristotelian guidelines that subcontraries can not both be false?? Both CAN be false according to Boole’s distinction.

Have these people never heard of Occam's razor? Just because I can't prove that objective facts aren't determined by invisible pink unicorns doesn't mean that they are not but only an idiot would use that to support the existence of said unicorns. Occams razor suggests that we should not believe in objective moral facts if we have no known way of detecting them.

Wow this video is so helpful

You made a big simplification and clarification. Thank you so much!

Thank you very helpful

thanks matt, God bless

you explained it well! thank you sir

Thanks Sir! God bless youu

If an endangered specie gets extinct does it fall under the aristotelian category like the dragons?

Any statement that claims to be a fact must match up with physical reality.

I wonder if there’s an ontological reason for the difference you exposed or if it is completely arbitrary and we’re about ground heuristics of their respective logics here. I think you kinda discussed it with someone else in the comments. The point was that existential imports into universal propositions lead to absurd logics (like with the box). But I’m still feeling dizzy about it because I can find many cases where it doesn’t lead to absurdities and almost no case where it does. Maybe it doesn’t when we talk about simple reasonings, and it begins to create absurdities only when it becomes complex like with the box.

Thank you. I recently figured out I have never dung into logics before and have just taken them for granted without actually understanding. And now I have to say I’m already struggling. I don’t quite understand why A don’t imply existence when I and O do, outside of pure arbitrary consideration. Could you help me with this ? My reasoning atm is that « all A » implies that you infer A as existing, and so does « some A ». In each case you consider A, then what is the difference ? My first guess would be that « some » is something based of empiric evidence because you can point it out, whereas « all » is a platonician perspective of A. But actually if there’s no A before me, « some A » still is some form of platonician idea. Hope you still read comments sometimes. I require help good sir !

Very helpful, thankyou!